Aion 13

Aion 13
Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

CHRIST, A SYMBOL OF THE SELF
耶稣基督，自性的象征

73 The God-image in man that was damaged by the first sin
can be ”reformed” 20 with the help of God, in accordance with
Romans 12:2: “And be not conformed to this world, but be
transformed by the renewal of your mind, that you may prove
what is . . . the will of God” (RSV).

在人身上的上帝的意象受到首次原罪的损害，凭借上帝的帮助，能够被「修复」，以符合「罗马书12：2」:「人身上的上帝的意象无法符合这个世界，但是能够凭借你的心灵的更新来转化。这样，你可以证明什么是上帝的意志」。（RSV）

The totality images which
the unconscious produces in the course of an individuation
process are similar “reformations” of an a priori archetype (the
mandala). 21 As I have already emphasized, the spontaneous symbols
of the self, or of wholeness, cannot in practice be distinguished
from a God-image.

在个体化的过程，无意识产生的完整性意象，是先验的原型（曼荼罗）的类似「修复」。如同我已经强调的，自性或完整性的自动自发的象征，实际上，无法跟上帝的意象区别。

Despite the word ^era^op^ovaBe (‘be
transformed’) in the Greek text of the above quotation, the
“renewal” (dyaKaiVwo-is, reformatio) of the mind is not meant as
an actual alteration of consciousness, but rather as the restoration
of an original condition, an apocatastasis.

尽管「被修复」这个字词，在以上引述的希腊文本，心灵的更新并不是用来作为意识的实际轮换，而是作为原初的情况的恢复，复原。

This is in exact
agreement with the empirical findings of psychology, that there
is an ever-present archetype of wholeness 22 which may easily
disappear from the purview of consciousness or may never be
perceived at all until a consciousness illuminated by conversion
recognizes it in the figure of Christ.

这是确实符合心理学的经验的发现。有一个完整性的永久存在的原型，很容易就从意识的关注里消失，或直至受到转化启明的意识，从耶稣基督的人物体认出它，它才可能被感知。

As a result of this “anamnesis”
the original state of oneness with the God-image is restored.
It brings about an integration, a bridging of the split in
the personality caused by the instincts striving apart in different
and mutually contradictory directions.

由于这个「病历」，原初跟上帝的意象合一的状态被恢复，它导致一种融合，人格的分裂的弥合，因为本能导致的分裂，朝不同而且互相矛盾的方向裂开的本能。

The only time the split
does not occur is when a person is still as legitimately unconscious
of his instinctual life as an animal. But it proves harmful
and impossible to endure when an artificial unconsciousness—
a repression—no longer reflects the life of the instincts.

唯有一次分裂没有发生，当一个人跟动物一样，同属他的本能的生命的合理的无意识。但是那证明是有害，而且不可能持久，当人为的无意识—一种压抑—不再反映本能的生命。

74 There can be no doubt that the original Christian conception
of the imago Dei embodied in Christ meant an allembracing
totality that even includes the animal side of man.

无可置疑，原初的基督教具有神性意象的观念，具体表现在耶稣基督身上，用意是要拥抱一切的完整性，甚至包括人的动物的一面。

Nevertheless the Christ-symbol lacks wholeness in the modern
psychological sense, since it does not include the dark side of
things but specifically excludes it in the form of a Luciferian
opponent.

可是，基督的象征在现代的心理学意义，欠缺完整性。因为它并没有包括事情的黑暗面，而是明确地排除它，以魔鬼的对手的形态。

Although the exclusion of the power of evil was
something the Christian consciousness was well aware of, all it
lost in effect was an insubstantial shadow, for, through the doctrine
of the privatio boni first propounded by Origen, evil was
characterized as a mere diminution of good and thus deprived
of substance.

虽然邪恶的力量的被排除，是基督教徒的意识清楚知道的事情，它实际上所丧失的东西，是一个非实质的阴影。通过起源论提倡的原罪的教条，作为仅是善的缩影，因此被剥夺掉物质。

According to the teachings of the Church, evil is
simply “the accidental lack of perfection.” This assumption
resulted in the proposition “omne bonum a Deo, omne malum
ab homine.” Another logical consequence was the subsequent
elimination of the devil in certain Protestant sects.

依照教会的教导，邪恶仅是「偶然地欠缺完美」。这个假设造成这个命题：「所有的善来自上帝，所有的恶归诸人类。」另外一个逻辑的结果是，在某些的基督教派里，魔鬼随后被减除。

75 Thanks to the doctrine of the privatio boni, wholeness
seemed guaranteed in the figure of Christ. One must, however,
take evil rather more substantially when one meets it on the
plane of empirical psychology.

由于原罪的教条，完整性似乎被保证，以耶稣基督的形态。可是，我们必须以更加实质的方式看待邪恶，当我们在经验心理学的层面遇到它。

There it is simply the opposite
of good. In the ancient world the Gnostics, whose arguments
were very much influenced by psychic experience, tackled the
problem of evil on a broader basis than the Church Fathers. For
instance, one of the things they taught was that Christ “cast off
his shadow from himself.” 23

恶仅是善的对立面。在古代的世界，诺斯教派的论点相当受到心灵经验的影响，他们处理恶的难题，比教会的祖先更加广泛的基础。譬如，他们教导的一件事是，耶稣基督将阴影从他自己身上祛除。

If we give this view the weight it
deserves, we can easily recognize the cut-off counterpart in the
figure of Antichrist. The Antichrist develops in legend as a perverse
imitator of Christ’s life. He is a true avn/u/xov wvevfia, an
imitating spirit of evil who follows in Christ’s footsteps like a
shadow following the body.

假如我们给予这个观念它应有的重视，我们能够容易地体认出这个被切割的类同之物，以反-基督的人物。反-基督在传说里发展，作为一位变态的模仿耶稣基督的一生。他是一位真实的邪恶的模仿精灵，他遵循耶稣基督的榜样，就像阴影遵循身体。

This complementing of the bright
but one-sided figure of the Redeemer—we even find traces of it
in the New Testament—must be of especial significance. And
indeed, considerable attention was paid to it quite early.

救赎者作为光辉但是单面的人物的互补，意义特别重要—我们甚至在新约都找得到它的痕迹。的确，很早前，就有人给予它相当的关注。

76 If we see the traditional figure of Christ as a parallel to the
psychic manifestation of the self, then the Antichrist would correspond
to the shadow of the self, namely the dark half of the
human totality, which ought not to be judged too optimistically.

假如我们看待耶稣基督的传统的人物，作为是跟自性的心灵的展示相提并论。那么，反-基督将就是对应于自性的阴影。换句话说，人的完整性的黑暗面，它不应该过于乐观地判断。

So far as we can judge from experience, light and shadow are so
evenly distributed in man’s nature that his psychic totality
appears, to say the least of it, in a somewhat murky light. The
psychological concept of the self, in part derived from our
knowledge of the whole man, but for the rest depicting itself
spontaneously in the products of the unconscious as an archetypal
quaternity bound together by inner antinomies, cannot
omit the shadow that belongs to the light figure, for without it
this figure lacks body and humanity.

只要我们能够根据经验判断，光与阴影在人的天性里如此平均地分配，以致人的心灵的完整性出现在相当朦胧的光里，这尚是委婉的说法。自性的心理的观念，部分从我们对完整的人的知识获得。但是对于其余的自动自发地描述它自己，以无意识的产物，作为被内部的对立物质联接一块的原型四位一体，无法省略属于光的人物的阴影。因为假如没有这个阴影，这个人物欠缺身体与人性。

In the empirical self, light
and shadow form a paradoxical unity. In the Christian concept,
on the other hand, the archetype is hopelessly split into two
irreconcilable halves, leading ultimately to a metaphysical dualism—
the final separation of the kingdom of heaven from the
fiery world of the damned.

在这个经验的自性，光与阴影形成一个悖论的一致性。另一方面，在基督教的观念，原型没有希望地被分裂成为两个无法和解的对半。最后导致一个形上学的双重性—天上的王国跟天谴的烈火世界分开。

77 For anyone who has a positive attitude towards Christianity
the problem of the Antichrist is a hard nut to crack. It is nothing
less than the counterstroke of the devil, provoked by God’s
Incarnation; for the devil attains his true stature as the adversary
of Christ, and hence of God, only after the rise of Christianity,
while as late as the Book of Job he was still one of God’s
sons and on familiar terms with Yahweh.24

对于任何对基督教持积极态度的人，反-基督的难题是很难破解的难题。它实实在在就是魔法的反击，受到上帝的具体化身所激发。因为魔法获得他真实的地位，作为是耶稣基督的敌人，因此就是上帝的敌人。就在基督教興起之后，晚至约伯记的时代，魔鬼依旧是上帝的儿子中的一位。他跟耶和华相处甚为熟稔。

Psychologically the
case is clear, since the dogmatic figure of Christ is so sublime
and spotless that everything else turns dark beside it. It is, in
fact, so one-sidedly perfect that it demands a psychic complement
to restore the balance.

从心理学而言，这个情况甚为清楚。因为耶稣基督的教条人物是如此崇高，没有瑕疵，以致在它旁边，每样其他东西都变成黑暗。事实上，基督在单方面是如此完美，以致它要求心灵的互补，才能恢复平衡。

This inevitable opposition led very
early to the doctrine of the two sons of God, of whom the elder
was called Satanael.25 The coming of the Antichrist is not just a
prophetic prediction—it is an inexorable psychological law
whose existence, though unknown to the author of the Johannine
Epistles, brought him a sure knowledge of the impending
enantiodromia.

这个无可避免的对立很早就导致上帝的两个儿子的教条。年长的那位儿子被称为撒旦尔。反-基督的来临并不仅是预言的预测—它是一个无情的心理的法则。这个法则的存在，让他确实地知道，「善复为妖」的来临。虽然传道书的作者自己并不知道。

Consequently he wrote as if he were conscious
of the inner necessity for this transformation, though we may be
sure that the idea seemed to him like a divine revelation. In
reality every intensified differentiation of the Christ-image
brings about a corresponding accentuation of its unconscious
complement, thereby increasing the tension between above and
below.

结果，他书写，好像他知道内部需要有这种转化。虽然我们可以确定，他觉得这个观念似乎是神性的启示。实际上，基督的意象的每次强化的差异，都导致对应地强调它的无意识的互补。因此增加上界与下界的紧张对立。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Lacan: The Absolute Master 11

Lacan: The Absolute Master
拉康：绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

Human Desire is thus the Desire that desires itself as unsatisfied desire: pure “negativity,” we would say in Hegelian terms, pure “transcendence” in Heideggerian terms. It remains to be understood in what sense Desire desires “itself”: as “itself” or as “other”? That, obviously, is the whole problem of this Hegelian-Heideggerian amalgam. For Hegel, it is clear that desire desires itself through the other that it denies, which is precisely why Hegel, in this connection, spoke of the “doubling” of self-consciousness: self-consciousness desires itself in another that it itself is, having first to alienate itself in another desire before being able to reappropriate it for itself as its
very own (and, thus, to arrive at the famous “satisfaction”).

人的欲望因此就算欲望它自己的欲望，作为没有被满足的欲望：我们用黑格尔的术语说，就是纯粹的「否定性」。用海德格的术语说，就是纯粹的「超验」。有待理解的是，在怎样的意义，欲望欲望「它自己」：作为「它自己」，或是作为「它者」？显而易见，那是黑格尔与海德格混合的整个难题。对于黑格尔，显而易见，欲望欲望它自己，通过它否定的它者。这确实是为什么黑格尔关于这一点，会谈论到自我-意识的「双重性」：自我-意识欲望它自己，用另外一个自我-意识。它自己就是那个另外一个自我-意识，但是首先它必须异化它自己，在另外一个欲望，这样它才能重新佔有它，为了它自己，作为属于它（因此，才能获得这个著名的「满足」）。

By contrast, if desire is defined, in para-Heideggerian terms, as transcendence toward nothing, it is none the less clear that it will desire “itself” only as nothingness—in other words, as pure negativity and absolute alterity: that Desire (capital D) will desire “itself” as Other (capital O), beyond itself and every “ego.” Therefore, in formulas ambiguous enough to admit of all readings, we shall say that Desire is “Desire of Desire,” or “Desire of the Desire of the other.”53 Human Desire, according to Kojeve, is what is brought to bear on another human Desire: it desires to be desired—that is, “recognized”—as pure desire of nothing. The only strictly human Desire is “Desire of recognition,” and the only “human reality” is “recognized reality” or “social reality”: “If . . . human reality is a social reality, society is human only as a set of Desires mutually desiring one another as Desires.”54

比较起来，假如欲望被定义，用类似-海德格的术语，作为朝向空无的超验。仍然显而易见的是，它将会欲望「它自己」，仅是作为空无。换句话说，作为纯粹的否定性与绝对的它者：欲望（大写字母D），将会欲望「它自己」，作为「大它者」（大写字母O），超越它自己与每个「自我」。因此，在足够模棱两可的公式，容下各种解读，我们将会说，欲望就是「欲望的欲望」，或是「他者的欲望的欲望」。依照科耶夫，人的欲望就是跟另外一个人的欲望产生关系的欲望：它欲望被他者欲望—换句话说，它欲望被他者承认—作为空无的纯粹欲望。这个仅有的严峻的欲望，就是「被承认的欲望」，这个唯一的「人的现实」，就是「被承认的现实」，或是「社会的现实」：「假如人的现实是社会的现实，社会仅有作为彼此互相欲望作为欲望的一组欲望时，它才是人的社会。」

The problem, however, only becomes more acute. Aside from the difficulty of seeing where this Desire for recognition comes from (in keeping with “dualistic ontology,” social-human reality arises ex abrupto from natural reality, with absolutely no transition and no mediation), there is also the difficulty of understanding how it could ever be “satisfied,” if, as Kojeve asserts, it is pure desire of nothing. For “human reality,” the only way to become recognized and desired as pure Desire would be in fact to die, to radically negate itself as animal life and “given reality”—and so to go completely unrecognized.

可是，这个难题仅是变得更加敏锐。除了有困难看出想要获得承认的欲望来自何处（为了符合「双重本体论」，社会的人的现实，起源于自然的现实，绝对没有中转与中介）。另外也有困难，要理解欲望如何能够被「满足」，如同科耶夫主张的，假如欲望就是空无的纯粹欲望。对于「人的社会」，唯一的方法，要获得承认，并且被欲望，作为纯粹欲望，事实上，那将是寻求死亡，强烈地否定它自己，作为动物的生命，与「特定的现实」–然后完全地没有被承认。

This brings us right back to the “absolute Master, death.” Kojeve, to resolve the difficulty, calls on the strictly Hegelian solution of the problem—namely, the struggle for recognition (for “pure prestige” says Kojeve, since the consciousnesses are fighting each other for nothing) and the subsequent dialectic of master and slave. According to this theory, one of the two battling consciousnesses would become frightened of death (that is, of its “own” Desire) and would prefer unilateral recognition of the other as its master, thus setting off the long process of Labor and History as the Struggle for a truly final and definitive recognition. And so not until the end of history would Man satisfy his truly human Desire—at exactly that moment when he is no longer a Man, but a Wise Man. Let us reread Kojeve’s idyllic summary: “If Desire must end in satisfaction … the interaction of Master and Slave must finally end in the ‘dialectical overcoming’ of both of them. … It is only by being ‘recognized’ by another, by many others, or—in the extreme—by all others, that a human being is really human.”55

这让我们直接回的科耶夫的「绝对的主人，死亡」，为了解决这个困难，召唤严谨的黑格尔对难题的解决—也就是要求承认的奋斗（科耶夫说是「为了纯粹的尊严」，因为意识就互相为了空无而战斗），就是随后的主人与奴隶的辩证法。依照这个理论，两个战斗中的意识的其中一个，会变得害怕死亡（也就是，害怕它自己的欲望），然后宁可要他者的单边的承认，作为它的主人，因此触发劳工与历史的漫长过程，作为获得最后与明确的承认的奋斗。就是在他不再为一个人的时刻，而是作为一位智慧的人。让我们重新阅的科耶夫的诗歌般的总结：「假如欲望必须以满足作物结束、、、主人与奴隶的互动最后必须以辩证法地克服它们两者，作为结束、、、仅有凭借被另外一个人，被许多的他者承认，推倒极点，就是要被所有的他者承认，这时，人才确实是人。」

Here, peals of laughter from Alexandre, Jacques, and Georges— for how would Desire be satisfied in the end, if it had not been satisfied at the beginning? The slave, as Bataille and Lacan have both noted, is still alive, having recoiled before the “absolute Master,” and thus the desire that, in the end, he “satisfies” is in no way the one in question at the beginning, the pure Desire of death. In reality, this Desire of death cannot possibly be satisfied, if, as Kojeve insists, it is a human desire: How could a man ever experience the pure negativity that he “himself” “is,” if not by perpetually deferring it—by perpetually desiring it?

在此，从科耶夫，拉康与巴塔耶那里响起笑声—因为欲望如何会被满足，假如它从一开头就没有被满足？如同巴塔耶与拉康两人注意到的，奴隶依旧存活，在「绝对的主人」面前退缩。因此，最后他所满足的欲望，根本就不是从一开头就受到质疑的这个欲望，死亡的这个欲望。事实上，死亡的这个欲望不可能被满足，如同科耶夫坚持的，假如死亡是人的欲望。一个人如何凭借欲望这个纯粹的否定性，而不是永久地拖延它地经验它？而他自己就是那个纯粹的否定性？

If strictly human Desire is the desire that desires itself as desire of nothing, then man can never take his proper place except as desire of himself, as impossible desire of himself. “Man” was the name of the impossible. Man is not in man, he is always beyond himself. And “the desire of man,” Lacan would conclude, following the thread of desire straight down from Kojeve, “is the desire of the Other.”

假如严谨的人都欲望，就是欲望它自己作为空无的欲望的欲望，那么人永远没有办法取代他的合宜的位置，除了就是欲望他自己，作为他自己的不可能的欲望。「人」就是不可能的这个名字。人并不是人，人总是在超越他自己。拉康的结论是：「人的欲望遵循欲望的脉络，从科耶夫一直延续到大他者的欲望。」

“What do you desire to know?” asked Valentin, shouting.
Indeed, what could she desire to know, the poor wreck? If she wanted to hear about her past, Valentin possessed all the desired documentation.
“If you are a clairvoyant,” said Miss Pantruche, leaning toward him to try to glimpse his face through the veil, “if you are a clairvoyant, you should know what I desire to know.”
And to think that this derelict dares to be skeptical, sighed Valentin, I’ll have to one-up her.
“You desire to know the future,” he vocalized.
“That’s it!” Miss Pantruche announced triumphantly.56

「你欲望知道什么？」范伦丁问，大叫地。
的确，她能够欲望知道什么，这位可怜的人？假如她想要知道她的过去，范伦丁拥有一切被欲望的文件。
「假如你是一位通灵者，」潘鲁奇小姐说，倾身向他，为了瞥见他的脸孔，通过面纱，「假如你是一位通灵者，你应该知道我欲为知道什么？」
「想想看，这位可怜的人竟然大胆地怀疑!」范论丁叹口气，「我非赢过她不可!」
「你欲为知道未来，」他发出声音。
「一针见血！」潘鲁奇小姐得意洋洋的宣佈。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

梦心理面面观 8

梦心理面面观 8
General Aspects of Dream Psychology

Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

我因此获得这个结论：弗洛依德认为梦基本上具有满足愿望与维持睡眠的功能，是太过狭隘的观点。虽然生物具有补偿的功能的这个基本思想，确实是正确的。这个补偿的功能在某个程度上仅是关注睡眠的状态。而它的主要的意义则是跟意识的生活相关。我主张，梦对于当下的意识的状况具有补偿功能。它们尽可能维持睡眠。换句话说，它们在睡眠状态的影响下，必然而且自动地发挥功能。但是当它们的功能要求睡眠状态时，梦却失败。也就是，当补偿的内容是如此强烈时，它们无法对对抗睡眠。补偿的内容特别强烈，当它对意识的取向具有重大的意义时。

远在1907年，我就指出这个补偿的关系，在意识与分裂的情结之间的补偿的关系。我也强调它们具有目的的特性。弗罗诺跟我分开独立做相同的事情。从这些观察，目的的无意识冲动的可能性变得很明显。可是，我应该强调的是，无意识的最后取向并没有跟我们的意识的意图同时并行。通常，无意识的内容显明地对照于意识的材料，特别是当意识的态度太过于专注地倾向于这个方向，会威胁个人的生命的需求的方向。他的意识的态度越是单边，它就越是偏离有利的状态，越是有可能然生动的梦具有强烈对照与目的的内容，就会出现，作为心灵的自我规范的表达。正如身体会有目的地反应伤害，感染或任何异常的情况，心灵的功能也很反应，对于不自然或危险的扰乱，用有目的的防卫机制。在这些目的的反应当中，我们必须包括梦。因为梦供应在特定的意识的情况里集结的无意识材料，并且以象征的形式，供应它给意识。在这个情况里，所有那些始终是无意识的联想能够被找到。因为这些联想到力量微弱，但是仍然拥有充分的精力来让它们自己被感受到，在睡眠的状态。当然，梦的内容具有目的的特性，并没有立即从外面被觉察出来，假如没有更进一步探索的话。先要有显梦内容的分析，我们才能够理解这些确实具有补偿的因素，在潜梦的内容里。大部分的生理的防卫机制，都属于这些非明显，也就是间接的特性的梦。仅有经过仔细探索之后，它们的目的才会被体认出来。我仅是要提醒你们，在受到感染的伤口，发高烧或发炎的意义。

心理的补偿的过程几乎总是属于个人的特性。这让证明它们具有补偿的特性的工作，变得相当困难。因为它们的特殊性，对于初学者，会相当困难地看出，梦的内容如何具有补偿的意义。以补偿理论作为基础，我们将会倾向于假设，譬如，对于生活的态度太过于悲观的人，他会有非常愉快而乐观的梦。仅有在某个人的天性让他能够以这种方式被刺激，被鼓励的情况，这种预期才是真实的。但是，假如他具有相当不同的天性，他的梦将有目的地形成一个更加黑暗的特性，比起他的意识的态度。他的梦因此会遵循顺势疗法的原则。

因此，要替梦的这种补偿奠定特别的规则，并不容易。它的特性总是跟个人的整体的人格息息相关。补偿的可能性是无限而且无法穷尽，虽然随着经验的增加，某些的基本的特征会慢慢地具体显现。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Aion 13

Aion 13
Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

CHRIST, A SYMBOL OF THE SELF
耶稣基督，自性的象征

68 The dechristianization of our world, the Luciferian development
of science and technology, and the frightful material and
moral destruction left behind by the second World War have
been compared more than once with the eschatological events
foretold in the New Testament.

我们的世界被除去耶稣基督，科学与科技的魔鬼般地发展，以及第二次世界大战遗留的可怕的物质与道德的毁灭，不仅一次，可跟新约圣经预言的末日启示录的事件相与伦比。

These, as we know, are concerned
with the coming of the Antichrist: “This is Antichrist,
who denieth the Father and the Son.” x “Every spirit that dissolved!
Jesus … is Antichrist … of whom you have heard
that he cometh.” 2 The Apocalypse is full of expectations of terrible
things that will take place at the end of time, before the
marriage of the Lamb. This shows plainly that the anima Christiana
has a sure knowledge not only of the existence of an
adversary but also of his future usurpation of power.

我们知道，这些事件关注的是反-基督的来临：「这是反-基督，他否认是天父与圣子。」「每个瓦解的圣灵！耶稣就是反-基督，你们曾经听说过他的来临。」末日启示录充满了对于可怕事物的预期，它们将会发生在世界的末日，在绵羊的结婚之前。这明白显示，阿尼玛的基督徒确实知道敌人的存在，也知道他未来会篡夺权力。

69 Why—my reader will ask—do I discourse here upon Christ
and his adversary, the Antichrist? Our discourse necessarily
brings us to Christ, because he is the still living myth of our
culture.

我的读者会问，为什么我在这里要论述耶稣基督与其敌人，反-基督？我们的辞说必然会带领我们来到耶稣基督，因为他依旧是我们文化的活生生的神话。
He is our culture hero, who, regardless of his historical
existence, embodies the myth of the divine Primordial Man, the
mystic Adam. It is he who occupies the centre of the Christian
mandala, who is the Lord of the Tetramorph, i.e., the four symbols
of the evangelists, which are like the four columns of his
throne. He is in us and we in him. His kingdom is the pearl of
great price, the treasure buried in the field, the grain of mustard
seed which will become a great tree, and the heavenly
city. 8 As Christ is in us, so also is his heavenly kingdom.4

他是我们的文化英雄。无论他存在于历史与否，他具体表现具有神性的原初的人，神秘的亚当的神话。就是他，佔据基督曼荼罗的中心。他说四分图的上帝。传道书的四个象征，它们就像是他的王座的四根柱子。他在我们身上，我们在他身上。他的王国是无价之宝的珍珠，被埋藏在田野里的财宝，将成为伟大的树与天上城邦的芥末的种子。因为耶稣基督在我们身上，他的天上的王国也在我们身上。

7° These few, familiar references should be sufficient to make
the psychological position of the Christ symbol quite clear.
Christ exemplifies the archetype of the self.

这些少数，熟稔的指称，应该足够让耶稣基督的象征的心理学的立场非常清楚。耶稣基督作为自性的原型的典范。

5 He represents a
totality of a divine or heavenly kind, a glorified man, a son of
God sine macula peccati, unspotted by sin. As Adam secundus
he corresponds to the first Adam before the Fall, when the latter
was still a pure image of God, of which Tertullian (d. 222) says:

他代表神性或天国的整体性，一位被推崇的人，上帝的儿子，没有受到原罪的污染。作为亚当的后代，他对应于最初的亚当，在伊甸园的堕落之前。当亚当依旧是上帝的纯洁形象，特土良教派说：

“And this therefore is to be considered as the image of God in
man, that the human spirit has the same motions and senses as
God has, though not in the same way as God has them.” 6 Origen
(185-254) is very much more explicit:

「因此，这应该被认为是上帝在人身上的形象，人的精神具有相同的动机与感觉，如同上帝，虽然跟上帝拥有它们的方式并不相同。俄利根教派（185-254）说得很明确：

The imago Dei imprinted
on the soul, not on the body,7 is an image of an image, “for my
soul is not directly the image of God, but is made after the likeness
of the former image.” 8

神性的意象被铭记在灵魂里，而不是在身体里，是意象的意象，因为我的灵魂并不直接是上帝的意象，而是模拟前者的意象的类似而塑造。

Christ, on the other hand, is the
true image of God,9 after whose likeness our inner man is made,
invisible, incorporeal, incorrupt, and immortal. 10 The God image
in us reveals itself through “prudentia, iustitia, moderatio,
virtus, sapientia et disciplina.”

另一方面，耶稣基督是上帝的真实的意象。我们内在的人就是模拟他的类似而被塑造：看不见，没有肉身，不会腐败，永生生命。我们身上的上帝的意象显示它自己，通过「自我控制，节制，调和性情，品德，纪律」 。

7 1 St. Augustine (354-430) distinguishes between the God image
which is Christ and the image which is implanted in
man as a means or possibility of becoming like God.12 The Godimage
is not in the corporeal man, but in the anima rationalis,
the possession of which distinguishes man from animals. “The
God-image is within, not in the body. . . . Where the understanding
is, where the mind is, where the power of investigating
truth is, there God has his image.” 13

圣、奥古斯丁(354-430)区别作为耶稣基督的上帝的意象，跟铭记在人身上的意象，作为成为像上帝一般的工具与可能性。上帝的意象并不是在肉身的人的身上，而是在阿尼玛的理性灵魂。拥有这个理性的灵魂，就是人跟动物不同的地方。「上帝的意象是在内部，而不是在身体里。理解所在，心灵所在，探寻真理的力量所在，上帝就拥有他的意象。」

Therefore we should remind
ourselves, says Augustine, that we are fashioned after the
image of God nowhere save in the understanding: “. . . but
where man knows himself to be made after the image of God,
there he knows there is something more in him than is given to
the beasts.” 14

因此，我们应该提醒我们自己，圣、奥古斯丁说，我们被塑造，模拟上帝的意象，就仅是在理解里：仅是在人知道他自己是模拟上帝的意象被塑造。仅是在人知道，他身上有某件东西，超过被给予野兽的东西。

From this it is clear that the God-image is, so to
speak, identical with the anima rationalis. The latter is the
higher spiritual man, the homo coelestis of St Paul. 15
从这里，显而易见，上帝的意象可以说是跟阿尼玛的理性的灵魂一致。后者就是更高的精神的人，圣、保罗的「天上的人」。

Like Adam before the Fall, Christ is an embodiment of the Godimage,
16 whose totality is specially emphasized by St. Augustine.
“The Word,” he says, “took on complete manhood, as it were in
its fulness: the soul and body of a man. And if you would have
me put it more exactly—since even a beast of the field has a ‘soul’
and a body—when I say a human soul and human flesh, I mean
he took upon him a complete human soul.” 17

就像在伊甸园堕落之前的亚当，耶稣基督是上帝的意象的具体代表。它的完整性特别受到圣、奥古斯丁的强调。他说：「道形成完整的人性，充实存在作为人的灵魂与身体。假如你们想要我表达得更加明确—因为即使田野的野兽也会有灵魂与身体—当我说人的灵魂与人的肉身时，我指的是他具有一个完整的灵魂在他身上。」

72 The God-image in man was not destroyed by the Fall but
was only damaged and corrupted (“deformed”), and can be
restored through God’s grace. The scope of the integration is
suggested by the descensus ad inferos, the descent of Christ’s
soul to hell, its work of redemption embracing even the dead.

在人身上的上帝的意象并没有因为伊甸园的堕落而毁灭，而仅是被损坏与腐败（扭曲变形），通过上帝的恩典，则可以被恢复。融合的范围被暗示出来，那就是耶稣基督的灵魂降落到地狱，从事即使死者，他都要拥抱救赎的工作。

The psychological equivalent of this is the integration of the
collective unconscious which forms an essential part of the individuation
process. St. Augustine says: “Therefore our end must
be our perfection, but our perfection is Christ,” 18 since he is the
perfect God-image.

这个工作的心理学的相等语，就是集体无意识的融合。集体无意识形成个体化的过程的部。圣、奥古斯丁说：「因此，我们的目标必需是我们的完美，但是我们的完美是耶稣基督」，因为他是完美的上帝的意象。

For this reason he is also called “King.” His
bride (sponsa) is the human soul, which “in an inwardly hidden
spiritual mystery is joined to the Word, that two may be in one
flesh,” to correspond with the mystic marriage of Christ and the
Church.19

因为这个理由，他也被称为是「国王」。他的新娘就是人类的灵魂。在内部隐藏的精神的神秘里，人类的灵魂跟真理之道联接一块。两者联接在一个肉身里，为了要符合耶稣基督与教会的神秘的结合。

Concurrently with the continuance of this hieros
gamos in the dogma and rites of the Church, the symbolism
developed in the course of the Middle Ages into the alchemical
conjunction of opposites, or “chymical wedding,” thus giving
rise on the one hand to the concept of the lapis philosophorum,
signifying totality, and on the other hand to the concept of
chemical combination.

跟教条与教堂的各种仪式的神圣结婚的延续的同时，这个象征主义，在中世纪的过程，被发展成为对立象征的炼金术的结合，或「化学的婚礼」，因此一方面产生「哲学家的石头」的观念，象征着完整性。在另一方面，则是产生化学的结合点观念。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Lacan: The Absolute Master 9

Lacan: The Absolute Master 9
拉康：绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

This is the moment described in Section A of Chapter 4, and thus we understand why Kojeve found it so interesting: this moment is that of “man,” of the “human I” in its opposition to natural life. For Hegel, however, this opposition was an autoopposition of Life becoming conscious of itself through the experience of death, whereas Kojeve for his part conceived of it as a radical opposition of man to the same “natural” and “immediate” life that man negates and, therefore, is not. Man, Kojeve never tires of explaining, “is essentially different from animals”44 in that he confronts death and so “goes beyond the given reality,”45 “transcending the given that is given to [him] and that [he him]self is”46 as a natural being. Strictly “human reality” is the reality that differs from itself, that perpetually negates itself as reality.

这就是在第四章的A部分被描述的时刻。因此，我们理解为什么科耶夫发现它如此有趣：这个时刻是「人」的时刻，这个「人性的我」的时刻，它跟自然的生命对立。可是，对于黑格尔，这个对立是生命通过死亡的经验，意识到它自己的自动对立。而科耶夫就他自己而言，构想它，作为人与相同的「自然」与「当下」的生命的强烈的对立。因为人否定，并且并不是这个相同的「自然的」与「当下的「生命。科耶夫不厌其烦地解释，人基本上是不同于动物。因为人面对死亡，并且因此「超越特定的现实」。超与给予人的这个特定物，人的自性是一个自然的生命。严格「人的现实」就是不同于它自己的现实，永久地否定它自己作为现实的现实。

At the same time, this no longer has anything to do with dialectic (at least in the Hegelian sense), since here we stumble rudely upon an irreducible duality, which Kojeve obligingly describes as “dualistic ontology.”47 Indeed, on one side we would have the natural, substantial, “thingish” being, always identical to itself—whether it were what Kojeve called “Being pure and simple” or, to use a term that Lacan would later take up, the “Real.” On the other side we would have the non-natural being that “nihilates in Being”48 by negating, surpassing, transcending everything Real—whether it were what Kojeve indiscriminately called “Man,” “Subject,” “Desire,” or “Discourse” (for example, “Spirit is the Real revealed by Discourse.

同时，这个现实更辩证法不再有任何关系（至少从黑格尔的意义来说），因为在此我们粗略地碰触到无法还原的双重性。科耶夫生动地描绘这种双重性为「双重的本体论」。的确，一方面，我们将拥有这个自然，实质，「物化」的生命，总是跟它自己一致—无论是科耶夫所谓的「纯粹而单纯的生命」，或是，用拉康后来从事的术语，所谓的「实在界」。在另一方面，我们将拥有这个非-自然的生命，在「生命实存里消灭」，凭借否定，跨越，超越每样实在界的东西。无论它是科耶夫没有区别地称为「人」，「主体」，「欲望」，或是「辞说」（譬如，精神就是辞说显示的实在界）。

Discourse is born in Man who opposes himself to Nature.. .. From this ‘rending’ [dechirement] of the Real into Man and Nature are born Understanding and its Discourse, which reveal the Real and thus transform it into Spirit”).49 We can certainly recognize this “rending” duality (the duality of the “symbolic” and the “real,” as Lacan will say later)—it is simply that of Heidegger’s Dasein and Vorhandensein, here rebaptized for the occasion as “human reality” and “given reality”—just as in Kojeve’s “dualistic ontology” we recognize Heidegger’s famous “difference” between Being and being, simply (and roughly) reinterpreted in terms of the difference between two regions of being.50

辞说诞生于人将他自己跟自然对立的人身上。从实在界被撕裂成为人与自然，理解与理解的辞说被诞生。它们显示实在界，因此将实在界转变成为精神）。我们确实体认这个「撕裂」的双重性（如同拉康后来所说的，「象征界」与「实在界」的双重性）。那仅是海德格的「存有」与「存在」的双重性，在此重新命名，作为「人类现实」与「特定现实」的场合。正如科耶夫的「双重本体论」，我们体认出海德格的著名的「差异」在「存有」与「存在」之间，粗略地被重新解释为生命存在的两个地区。

That this amalgam of Hegel and Heidegger is philosophically untenable is quite obvious. Indeed, it is hard to see how Hegel could tolerate an Absolute split in two—that is, a dialectic frozen indefinitely at the moment of finite “reflection.” As for Heidegger, we know that he explicitly refuses to turn Being into a power of nihilation that human being could purely and simply appropriate (this will be the substance of his “Letter on Humanism,” fundamentally as much a response to Kojeve as to his philosophical heir, Jean-Paul Sartre). And yet it is just this philosophical incongruity that Kojeve brought to life with all the authority of his word, under the magical names of “negativity,” “historicity,” “dialectic,” and, to come straight to the point, “Desire.”

黑格尔与海德格的混合在哲学上难以自圆其说，是相当明显的。的确，我们很难看出，黑格尔如何能够忍受两者里面的绝对的分裂—换句话说，辩证法的不明确的冰冻，在最后的「悟道」的时刻。至于海德格，我们知道，他明确地拒绝将「存有」转变成为空无的力量，那是人类纯粹能够据有点（这将是他的「论人文主义的信函」的物质，基本上作为对科耶夫的回应，关于他的哲学的继承人，保罗、萨特）。可是，科耶夫用他的文字的权威恢复生命力量的，不仅是这个哲学的不协调，在这些具有魔力的名称：「否定性」，「历史性」，「辩证法」，然后直达要点，「欲望」。

In fact, let us return to the Phenomenology of Spirit, grasped through Kojeve’s interpretation. Hegelian desire, we have seen, desires itself in its object (it determines itself by negating the object, and so on). When does this desire become properly “human,” “non-natural,” “non-animal”? Kojeve’s response: when it addresses itself to a non-natural object, since desire itself then becomes the object abolished through its own appropriation of itself. But where are we to find such an “object,” if not precisely in desire? “The only thing that goes beyond the given reality is Desire itself.”51 Note the capital letter: here there is no question of desire for this or that (which could be only an empirical need, as Lacan will say more than once), but rather of Desire in its essence of Desire. And what is Desire as Desire? It is an empty desire: “Desire taken as Desire— i.e., before its satisfaction—is but a revealed nothingness, an unreal emptiness. Desire, being the revelation of an emptiness, the presence of the absence of a reality, is something essentially different from the desired thing, something other than a thing, than a static and given real being that stays eternally identical to itself.”52 Will Lacan ever say anything different?

事实上，让我们回到「精神现象学」，通过科耶夫的解释来理解。我们已经看出，黑格尔的欲望，在它的客体里欲望它自己（它决定它自己，凭借否定客体，等等）。这个欲望何时成为合宜的「人文」，「非自然」，「非动物」？科耶夫的回达是：当它针对一个非-自然的客体，言说它自己时，因为欲望的自身因此成为客体，通过它自己据有它自己而被废除的客体。但是，我们应该到哪里找的这样的一个「客体」，难道不确实就在欲望里？「唯一超越特定现实的东西，就是欲望自身」。请注意「欲望」这个字的大写字母：在此，这并不是欲望这个或是那个的问题（如同拉康不仅一次强调，那仅是一种经验的需要）。相反地，是欲望处于「欲望」的本质的问题。什么是欲望作为「欲望」？那就是空无的欲望：「被视为「欲望」的欲望，等等，在它的满足之前，仅是一个被启示的空无，一个非实在的空无。欲望，作为空无的启示，是现实的缺席的出席，是某件基本上不同于被欲望的东西，某件非物象的东西，除了就是静止及特定的真实存在，它永久保持跟它自己一致。」拉康将会说出任何不同的东西吗？

雄伯译
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黑暗太阳 6

黑暗太阳 6
The Black Sun

史坦顿、马伦
Stanton Marlan

chapter 1
第一章
The Dark Side of Light
光的黑暗面

Moore and Gillette have observed that, when the King sits on his
throne and is the center of the world, “world” becomes defined as that
part of reality that is organized and ordered by the King.” What is outside
the boundaries of his influence is noncreation, chaos, the demonic
and non-world.15

摩尔与基列特观察到，当太阳端坐在他的王座，并且是世界的中心，「世界」就变成被定义，作为现实的那个部分，被国王组织与命令的现实的部分。在他的影响的边界外边的东西，都是非创造物，混乱，恶魔与非世界。

This situation sets the stage for a massive
repression and devaluation of the “dark side” of psychic life. It creates
a totality that rejects interruption and refuses the other from within its
narcissistic enclosure.

这个情境竖立巨大压抑与贬抑心灵生活的「黑暗面」的舞台。它创造一个完整性，排斥中断与拒绝它的自恋的封闭的内部的它者。

For a number of philosophers—Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, and
others—there is a dangerous tendency in modernity toward closure
and tautological reductionism: “totalization, normalization and domination.”
16 Levin has noted that behind our Western visionary tradition
lies the shadow of phallocentrism, logocentrism, and a “heliopolitics”
driven by the violence of Light.

对于许多的哲学家—海德格，傅科，德希达，与其他人—在现代化有一个朝向封闭与同义反复的还原的危险的倾向：「完整性，正常化与统辖」。列铭曾经注意到，在我们西方的幻景的传统的背后，有着阳具中心，逻辑中心与太阳政治的影影，受到光的暴力的驱使。

To put it more simply, the
concern about modernity is that it is governed by male desire and
power and by an egocentric rationality that serves political agendas
that conceal intrinsic violence. In his work Writing and Difference,
Derrida speaks of the violence of Light and the imperialism of theory
associated with it.

更加简单地说，现代化的关注是，它受到男性欲望与权力的统辖，受到自我中心的理想的统辖，它被用来服役政治的行事暦，隐藏本质的暴力。在他的著作「书写与差异」，德希达谈论光的暴力与跟它息息相关的理论的帝国主义。

He notes that this kind of violence also troubled the
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, whose work was aimed at developing
an ethical theory freed as much as possible from the violence implicit
in Western metaphysical thinking.17 If one agrees with the philosophers
and critics of our tradition, one might imagine our time as one
locked into the tyrannical shadow of a Sun King who bears within
himself the seeds of his own destruction.

他注意到，这种的暴力也困扰到哲学系列维纳斯。他的研究目标朝着发展伦理学的理论，尽可能从西方形上学的思维潜藏的暴力解放出来。假如我们同样我们传统的那些哲学家与批评家，我们可能想像我们的时代，作为被太阳-国王关进暴虐的阴影里。他在他自己内部播下他自己毁灭的种种。

Is it possible to imagine this situation as rooted in an unconscious
identification with the King and the Light? If so, such unconscious
identification colors the psyche and has important personal and cultural
consequences.

我们可能想像这个情境，作为根源于无意识的认同太阳与光吗？假如是这样，这种的无意识的认同扭曲了心灵，并且拥有心灵与重要的个人与文化的各种结果。

On the most personal level, analysts have approached such concerns
not so much philosophically but as they manifest themselves in
clinical situations. In The Anatomy of the Psyche, Jungian analyst Edward
Edinger, for instance, cites the expressions of unconscious kingly
inflations in “outbursts of affect, resentment, pleasure or power demands.”

在最个人的层次，精神分析家曾经靠近这些都关注，不是从哲学的观点，而是当它们展示自己在临床的情境里。譬如，在「心灵的解剖」一书，荣格学派的精神分析家艾德华、阿丁基引述这些表达：无意识像国王般地自我膨胀，「情感，怨恨，快乐或权力的要求发作出来」。

18 The refinement of these affects is difficult. As an inner figure,
the primitive King/ego must undergo a transformation not only in
our culture but also in the lives of people.

这些情感的精炼是困难的。作为内部的人物，原初的国王/自我必须经历转化，不但在我们的文化，而且在人们的生活里。

Alchemy recognizes this
fact when it sees that the King is at the beginning—the raw matter of
the philosopher’s stone—and that he must be purified and refined by
undergoing a series of alchemical processes, eventually dying and being
reborn.

炼金术体认出这个事实，当它看出，国王处于开始的地方—哲学家的石头的原料—他必须经历一连串的炼金术的过程的纯净转化与精炼，最后死亡与重生。

In alchemy, the process of dying, killing, and blackening is part of the
operation of mortificatio. This operation is a necessary component of
the transformative process of the King and other images of the prima
materia such as the Sun, the Dragon, the Toad, and the condition of innocence.

在炼金术，垂死，杀死，与暗淡的过程，神精神转化的运作的部分。这个运作是国王与其他意象的转化的过程的必要的成分。那些意象包括原初的材料，诸如，太阳，龙，蛤蟆与纯真的情况。

Edinger devotes a chapter of The Anatomy of the Psyche to this
process. The mortificatio process was often thought of as tortuous and
as the “most negative operation in alchemy.”19 “It has to do with darkness,
defeat, torture, mutilation, death and rotting. The process of rotting
is called putrefactio, the decomposition that breaks down organic
bodies.”20

阿丁基将「心灵的解剖」的一个章节，专注探讨这个过程。精神转化的过程往往被认为是迂回，并且是「炼金术中最负面的运作」。它跟黑暗，挫败，折磨，切除，死亡与腐败息息相关。腐败的过程被称为是「将有机体瓦解」。

Edinger has schematized and charted this operation reproduced in
figure 1.3, an example of what he calls “cluster thinking”—thinking
that is concerned with elaborating a network of expanded meanings
derived from a central image. The process “goes back and forth, returning
to the central image again and again, building up a rich associative
cluster of interconnected images, something like a spider web.

在图形1.3，阿丁基将这个运作系统化并且形成图表，作为他所谓的「思想集结」的例子—这个思想关注于建构从中心意象获得的扩张的意义的网络。这过程「反复来回，一再地回到中心的意象，累积丰富的联想的互为关联的意象的集结，有点像是蜘蛛网络。

The result of such thinking is a rich tapestry of elaboration around a
central image.”21 Figure 1.3 shows the structural placement of related
images (e.g., the slaying of the King, the Dragon, the Toad, poison,
defeat, humiliation, torture, mutilation, the slaying of the innocent,
corpses, and rotting, as well as the placement of this operation in relation
to other alchemical processes).

如此思想的结果丰富地环绕一个中心的意象，建构织锦。图形1.3显示相关的各种意象的结构的位置（譬如，国王的杀戮，龙，蛤蟆，毒药，挫败，羞辱，折磨，切成，无辜者的屠杀，尸体，腐败，以及这个运作的位置，跟其他炼金术的过程相关）。

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32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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梦心理面面观 7

梦心理面面观 7
General Aspects of Dream Psychology

Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

从这里，我们能够看见，病人如何让情景变得虚假。梦以哲学家与心理学家的伪装，来到我这里，以满足他的幻想，并且让神经症的这个事实隐退到背景。但是梦以令人不愉快的方式提醒他这件事，并且强迫他说实话。他必须吞下这个苦涩的饮料。他回想到算命师清楚地跟我们显示，他曾经如何想像我们的活动。如同梦告诉他，他必须首先同意治疗，他才能到达我这里。

梦矫正这个情景。梦贡献所欠缺的材料，然后改正病人的态度。那就是为什么在治疗里我们需要梦的解析。

我并不希望让人有这个印象：所有的梦都像这个梦那么简单，或是梦都是这种类型。我相信，所有的梦确实补偿意识的内容。但是这个补偿的功能确实并不是像这个例子里，那样清楚地出现。虽然梦凭借自动地展现出被压抑，被忽略，或未知的东西，促成心灵的自我调节。梦的补偿的意义往往并不是当下就很明显。因为我们依旧仅有一些不完整的知识，对于人类心灵的特性与需要。总是有些心理的补偿，距离手边的难题，似乎非常遥远。在这些情况，我们必须总是记住，每个人在某个意义上都代表整个人类与它的历史。在一般的人类的历史里可能的事情，在每个个人身上，小规模是可能的。人类所需要的东西，个人最后也可能有这个需求。因此，这并不足为奇，宗教在梦里扮演重要的角色。在我们的时代，这越来越是如此，这是我们外观的胜行的物质主义的自然的结果。

唯恐有人认为，当代的梦的意义是新的发现，或仅是被「发明」，为了满足解析的方便。我将引用一段非常古老而著名的例子。在「丹尼尔的书」第四章，我们能够找到。当内布查内扎在权力的巅峰，他作了以下的梦：

、、、我看见，并且注意到一棵树在大地的中央。这棵树非常高大。
这棵树成长，而且强壮。它的高度到达天上。它的景象到达大地的末端。
它的树叶非常美丽，水果非常多，可供大家食用：田野的野兽在树下遮阴。天上的鸟驻居在它的树枝里。所有人食用它的水果。
在我的睡床上，我在我的头的景象里看见，并且注意到，一位观看者，一位神圣者从上天降临下来。
他大声喊叫，这样说著，砍掉这棵树，砍掉他的树枝，摇落他的树叶，散开他的水果。让野兽离开它，鸟飞离他的树枝。
可是，让他的根的树干留在大地里，即使在田野的鲜嫩草地，有一排铁与铜。让树淋湿著天上的露水，让他的部分身体跟野兽一起在大地的草上。
让他的心被改变，从人的心，让野兽的心被给予他；让七种时间从他上方通过。

在梦的第二部分，这棵树变成人形化。所以很容易看出，这棵树就是作梦的国王他自己。丹尼尔用这个意义诠释这个梦。它的意义显而易见是企图补偿国王的自大狂。依照这个故事，这个自大狂发展成为真实的精神病。依照我的观点，将梦的过程解释为补偿，跟一般的生物的过程的特性是完全一致。弗洛依德的观点倾向于相同方向。因为他也将补偿的角色归属于梦，只要它们保持睡眠。如同弗洛依德曾经证明，有些梦显示某些外在的刺激会让作梦者无法睡眠。这些外在刺激如此受到扭曲，以致它们刺激想要睡眠的愿望，或是不想要被扰乱的愿望。同样地，如同弗洛依德能够显示，有无数的梦，心灵内部的刺激，诸如很可能会释放强烈情感反应的个人的观念，会被扭曲，为了符合伪装令人痛苦的观念的梦的内容，并且让强烈的情感的反应成为不可能。

面对这些，我们不应该忽略这个事实：最扰乱睡眠的梦—这些是非比寻常的梦—它们拥有戏剧化的结构，目标朝着逻辑地创造强烈情感的情景，并且有效地增强它，让情感无可置疑地唤醒作梦者。弗洛依德解释这些梦，凭借说，检查者不再能够压制令人痛苦的情感。我觉得，这种解释并没有充分解释这些事实。以令人不愉快的方式关注自己的梦，会有白日生活令人痛苦的经验与活动，那是众所周知的。以我之见，在此谈论梦可以维持睡眠，伪装情感的功能，是难以自圆其说。我们必须跟现实相反，才能在这些梦里看出弗洛依德的肯定。就那些情况而言，也是相同的道理，被压抑的性的幻想没有伪装地出现在显梦的内容里。

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梦心理面面观 6

梦心理面面观 6
General Aspects of Dream Psychology

Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

因果律的观点显而易见更加同情我们时代的科学的精神，因为它具有严格因果律的推理。弗洛依德的观点，有很多可称赞的地方，作为梦的心理学的科学的解释。但是我对它的完整性略有微词，因为心灵无法被构想，仅是凭借因果的术语，而是也要求一个最后的观点。只有观点的组合，它尚未以科学令人满意度方式被完成，由于巨大的困难，实际与理论依旧有待克服。可是，它给予我们一个更加完整的观念，对于梦的特性。

我现在想要简短地处理梦的心理学的某个更加深入的问题。这些问题对于梦的一般讨论是迫切的。首先，关于梦的分类，我不想要过分强调这个问题的实际或理论的重要性。我每年研究大约1500到2000个梦。根据这个经验的基础，我能够主张，典型的梦确实存在。但是，它们并不是很经常。从梦的最终性的观点，它们丧失因果观点给予它们的重要性，因为象征的最后的意义。我觉得，在梦中的典型的母题，更加重要。因为它们容许跟神话的母题比较。很多的这些神话的母题—特别是弗罗宾尼斯给予这个收集具有讯息的服务—它们也在梦里被发现，经常具有相同的意义。虽然我在此无法更加详细地探讨这个问题。我想要强调，典型的梦的母题的比较，跟神话的那些母题的比较，暗示这个观念，尼采已经提出的这个观念—梦的思想应该被认为是比思想的有机体更加古老的模式。

非但没有加倍例子，我仅是提到我们的样本的梦，就最能显示我的意思。我们将要记住，这个梦介绍苹果的场景，作为代表性爱的负罪感的典型的方式。从它那里抽取出来的思想，可以总结为：像那样的行为，我正在做错事。」具有特色的说，梦从来没有表达它们自己，以这种逻辑，抽象的方式，而总是用寓言或明喻的语言。这也是原始语言的特色，它们的辞藻华丽，引人注意。假如我们记住古代文学的纪念碑，我们发现，今天凭借抽象表达的东西，当时大部分都用明喻表达。即使像柏拉图这样的哲学家，他并没有藐视用这样的方式来表达基本的观念。

正如身体载负著它的进化发展的痕迹，人类的心灵也是一样。因此，梦的比喻的语言是思想的过时模式的残留物的可能，就无足为奇了。

同时，苹果的偷窃是典型的梦的母题，发生在无数的梦的许多的变化里。这也是一个著名的神话的母题。它的基础不但是伊甸园的故事，而且是自古以来，世界各地的无数的神话与幻想。其中一个普世的人类的象征，潜意识地重新出现在任何人，任何时代。因此，梦的心理学展开这个途径，进入一般比较心理学。从那里，我们希望获得相同的理解，对于人类心灵的发展与结构，如同比较解剖曾经给予我们的理解，关于人类的身体。

梦，因此，用比喻的语言传递给我们。换句话说，用感觉鲜明，具体的意象—思想，判断，观点，指令，倾向。它们都是无意识，要就是因为压抑，要不就是由于欠缺实现。确实是因为它们是无意识的内容，梦是无意识过程的衍生物。它包含无意识内容的反映。它并不是一般的无意识内容的反映，而仅是某些内容的反映。它们联想地联结一块，并且受到当下的意识的情景所选择。我认为这个观察在实践时很重要的观察。假如我们想要正确地解释一个梦，我们需要一个彻底的知识，对于那个时刻的意识的情景。因为梦包括它的无意识的补充。换句话说，意识情景在无意识里集结的材料。假如没有这个知识，我们不可能正确地解释一个梦，除了凭借幸运的巧合。我想要以一个例子说明这点。

一个人前来跟我寻求首次谘商。他告诉我，他从事各种的学问的追寻，也对精神分析感到興趣，从文学的观点。他身体的状况非常好，他说，他不想要被认为是某种的病人。他仅是在追寻精神分析的興趣。他非常健康，并且有许多时间专注于这个追寻。他想要认识我，为了让我引导他进入精神分析理论的秘密。他承认，我必须处理一位正常的人，一定会非常无聊。因为我一定发现「疯狂」的人们，还比较有趣。几天前，他曾经写信给我，询问是否我能够会见他。在谈话的过程，我们不久谈到梦的这个问题。我因此询问他，他是否前个晚上作个这个梦。他肯定这个，然后告诉我以下的梦：「我处于空荡荡的房间。有位护士接待我。她要我坐在桌边。一瓶泡好的牛奶放在桌上，我应该喝下。我想要去找荣格医生，但是护士告诉我，我在医院里，荣格医生没有时间接待我。」

显而易见，从梦的显著内容，拜访我的这个预期以某种方式集结他的无意识。他给出以下的联想：空荡荡的房间：「某个冷冰冰的接待室，如同办公室大楼，或是医院的候诊室。我从来没有在医院里当病人。」护士：「她看起来令人厌恶，她斜眼看人。那让我想起一位算命师与手相师，我有次拜访他算命。有一次。我生病，有位女执事当我的护士。泡好的牛奶瓶：「泡好的牛奶瓶令人呕吐。我无法喝它。我的太太总是喝它。我因为这样取笑她，因为她著迷于这个观念: 我们必须要为健康做某件事情。我记得我有一次在疗养院—我的神经不太健康—在那里，我必须喝泡好的牛奶。」

在这个时刻，我谨慎地中断他：从此以后，他的神经症完全消失了吗？他尝试避开这个问题，但是他最后必须承认，他依旧有这个神经症。实际上，他的妻子长久以来就催促他找我谘商。但是，他确实没有感觉如此神经，以致他必须因为那个原因找我谘商。他毕竟没有发疯，而我仅是治疗疯子。他仅是感到興趣，学习有关我的心理的理论，等等。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Lacan: The Absolute Master 10

Lacan: The Absolute Master 10
拉康：绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

What this celebrated thesis means is precisely that man never rejoins or appropriates his Being. Ek-sistentialism is not a “humanism”: the moment when human Dasein finally realizes its ultimate possibility is the moment of its death—that is, the impossible moment when it no longer ek-sists, or when it simply is no longer there (Nicht-mehr-Dasein). Dasein’s freedom, which makes it transcend all being, is a “freedom-toward-death” (Freiheit zum Tode) and, as such, cannot be appropriated. Thus, Being-there, as long as it ek-sists, is nothing but a perpetual “Being-toward-death” (Sein-zum~ Tode).

这个著名命题的意涵，确实是，人从没有没有重新加入，或佔有他的生命实存：「当人的生命实存最后体现它的最终的可能的时刻，就是它死亡的时刻—换句话说，当它不再存在的不可能的时刻，或是当它就是不再那里的时刻。生命实存的自由，让它超验所以的存在，这是一种「朝向死亡的自由」。作为这样一种自由，它无法被佔用。因此，在那里的生命实存，只要它是外部存在，它仅是永远的「朝向死亡的生命实存」。

Kojeve reformulated this thesis—translating and commenting on Hegel’s passage about the Spirit that “endures [death] and maintains itself in it”—by saying that “human Being … is the death which lives a human life,”39 to which Lacan in turn, quoting Oedipus at ColonuSy replied that such a life is properly inhuman. Yes, Oedipus “lives a life that is dead,” but is the sense of this life “as human as all that?”: “Am I a man,” exclaims Oedipus (1988b, 232/271, 229/268), “in the hour that I cease to be?”

科耶夫阐述这个主题—翻译并且评论黑格尔关于精神的段落，「精神承载死亡，在死亡里维持它自己」–凭借说「人类是过著人的生命的死亡」。拉康则是引述「在科伦拿斯的伊狄浦斯」。他回答说，这样的生命合宜地说，是非人类的。没错，伊狄浦斯「过着死去的生命」，但是这个生命的意义是「实实在在的人类吗？」伊狄浦斯惊叫着：「当我不再拥有生命实存的那个时刻，我是人吗？」(1988b, 232/271, 229/268),

All of this, very briefly summarized, will have to suffice in explaining the extent to which Heidegger’s Dasein differs not only from Hegel’s Spirit but also from the Man-God of “atheistic humanism.” Nevertheless, it was to precisely such an amalgam, under the name of “human reality,” that Kojeve invited his fascinated listeners. “Human reality” was the term proposed by Henry Corbin to translate Heidegger’s Dasein into French. Was Kojeve influenced by that translation, which in so many ways is “monstrous,” to recall Derrida’s term?40 Or should we believe instead that the translation was itself an effect of Kojeve’s teaching, since he began using the term in 1933?

所有这一切，简单总结起来，将必须足够用来解释，海德格的「生命实存」不但不同于黑格尔的精神，而且不同于「无神论的人本主义」人即上帝。可是，以「人类的现实」的名义，科耶夫邀请他的著迷的听众，确实就是这样的合金。「人类现实」是亨利、寇宾建议的术语，将海德格的「生命实存」翻译成为法文。科耶夫受到这样的影响吗？在很多方面，这个翻译是古怪的，让人想起德希达的术语？」或者，我们应该相信，这个翻译的本身是科耶夫的教学的结果？因为他在1933年开始使用这个术语。

(As Denis Hollier notes in his collection from the College de sociologie,41 Corbin originally translated Dasein as “existence,” and it was not until 1938 that he opted for “human reality,” carrying Sartre along with him.) That matters very little here; what really matters is that, right from the second paragraph of the text which opens the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, we find this philosophical monster—and in the company of that other monster, itself destined for a glorious future under Lacan’s pen: “Desire.”

（丹尼斯、赫勒在他的「大学社会学文选」里注意到，寇宾起初翻译Dasein为「存在」。直到1938年，他才选择「人类的现实」，拉着萨特跟他一块用）。在此，这并无关紧要。在此，确实重要的是，从「阅读黑格尔导言」开始的文本的第二段，我们发现这个哲学的怪物—伴随着那另外一个怪物，它的本身注定会获得光辉灿烂的未来，在拉康的笔下：「欲望」。

Here is what Kojeve wrote: “The analysis of ‘thought,’ ‘reason,’ ‘understanding,’ and so on,. . . never reveals the why or the how of the birth of the word ‘I,’ and consequently of self-consciousness— that is, of human reality. . . . The man who is ‘absorbed’ by the object that he is contemplating can be ‘brought back to himself only by a Desire. .. . The (human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire.”42 What is going on here? This opening text, entitled “In Place of an Introduction,” is really an annotated translation of Section A of the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, devoted to the (from then on) famous “dialectic of master and slave.” Why, then, did Kojeve choose to “introduce the reading of Hegel” by that particular section?

在此在科耶夫写的内容：「思想，理想，理解，等等，从来没有显示「我」这个字的诞生的为什么与如何。结果，对于自我-意识，换句话说，人类现实的诞生。人被他正在沉思的客体所吸收，仅有靠着欲望才能够回到它只见、、、人的这个「我」，就是欲望或是属于欲望的我」。这确实是「精神现象学」的第四章的第一部分的注释。它专注于（从那时开始）著名的主人与奴隶的辩证法。因此，为什么科耶夫选择「黑格尔阅的的导引」，以那个特殊的部分？

Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of Spirit discusses “self-consciousness”—that is, consciousness whose object is not the object “in-itself” of theoretical consciousness (described in the first three chapters, which deal with “sense-certainty,” “perception,” and “understanding”), but rather the object “for-itself” of an active freedom. Self-consciousness does not contemplate the object (outside itself), it desires it (for itself).

「精神现象学」第四章探讨「自我-意识」。也就是，意识的客体并非是理论意识的客体「自身内部」（在前三章被描述，它处理「意义-确定性」，「知觉」，「理解」。而是积极自由的「为了它自身」。自我-意识并没有沉思外在于它自己的客体，它欲望它（为了它自己）。

Thus, “self-consciousness,” Hegel writes, “is desire (Begierde) in general,”43 in the very precise sense of knowing no alterity that it does not immediately carry back to itself. Desiring itself through the other, it negates the other (by eating it, Kojeve would clarify, always careful to dot his i‘s). This first phase of self-consciousness is thus that of “Life”—a life that develops of itself, from itself, and so is perfectly free, “independent” of any Other.

因此，黑格尔写的，自我-意识是一般的欲望。确实的意义上，它知道的他者，当下都会回到它自身。通过他者欲望它自己，它否定他者（凭借吃食它，科耶夫澄清，总是小心翼翼地）自我意识到第一时期因此就算「生命」的时期—这种生命自身会发展。因此完全脱离于，独立于任何的大他者。

But this natural life also remains profoundly un-conscious of itself: it does not know itself to be free, does not know itself to be alive. Immediately negating everything that is not itself, at bottom it has no mirror to see itself, and that is why, according to the Hegelian system, it must mediate itself—that is, it must oppose itself to itself and reflect itself in order to know itself. In short, it must confront death, deny itself as natural life to become conscious of itself as freedom.

但是这种自然的生命也始终是它自己的深深的无意识：它并不知道它自己是自由的，并不知道它自己是活动。它当下否定并不是它自己的一切东西，追根究底，它没有镜子来看就它自己。那就是为什么，依照黑格尔的系统，它必须中介它自己。换句话说，它必须将它自己跟它自己对立，并且反映它自己，为了知道它自己。总之，它必须面临死亡，否认它自己，作为自然的生命，为了意识它自己，作为自由。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Aion 12

Aion 12
永恒纪元
By Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

Chapter 4
第四章

The Self
自性

65 I regard these parallels as important because it is possible,
through them, to relate so-called metaphysical concepts, which
have lost their root connection with natural experience, to living,
universal psychic processes, so that they can recover their
true and original meaning.

我认为这些对比是重要的，因为通过它们，才有可能将所谓的形上学的观念，跟活生生的普世的心灵的过程联结一块。因为形上学的观念已经丧失跟自然的经验的根源连系。这样它们才能够恢复它们的真实与原初的意义。

In this way the connection is reestablished
between the ego and projected contents now formulated
as “metaphysical” ideas. Unfortunately, as already said,
the fact that metaphysical ideas exist and are believed in does
nothing to prove the actual existence of their content or of the
object they refer to, although the coincidence of idea and reality
in the form of a special psychic state, a state of grace, should not
be deemed impossible, even if the subject cannot bring it about
by an act of will.

以这种方式，自我与投射的内容之间的联接重新被建立。它们现在被阐述为形上学的观念。不幸地，如同已经说过，形上学存在，并且被相信的这个事实，并无助于证明它们内容的实际存在，或它们提到的客体的实际存在。虽然观念与现实的巧合，以特殊心灵状态，恩典状态的形式。它们不应该被认为是不可能，即使主体无法凭借意志的行动导致它。

Once metaphysical ideas have lost their capacity
to recall and evoke the original experience they have not
only become useless but prove to be actual impediments on the
road to wider development. One clings to possessions that have
once meant wealth; and the more ineffective, incomprehensible,
and lifeless they become the more obstinately people cling to
them. (Naturally it is only sterile ideas that they cling to; living
ideas have content and riches enough, so there is no need to
cling to them.) Thus in the course of time the meaningful turns
into the meaningless. This is unfortunately the fate of metaphysical
ideas.

一旦形上学的观念丧失它们回忆与召唤原初经验的能力，它们不但成为没有用途，而且对于通往更加宽广的发展，证明是实际的阻碍。我们坚持曾经一度意味着财富的财产。随着人们更加顽强地坚持它们，它们变得更加无效，更加无法理解，更加没有生命。（当然，他们坚持的仅是贫瘠的观念，活生生的观念自有足够的内容与财富。所以并没有需要坚持它们。）因此，随着时间过去，有意义的东西变成无意义。不幸地，这是形上学观念的命运。

66 Today it is a real problem what on earth such ideas can
mean. The world—so far as it has not completely turned its back
on tradition—has long ago stopped wanting to hear a “message”;
it would rather be told what the message means. The words that
resound from the pulpit are incomprehensible and cry for an
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explanation.

今天 这是一个确实的难题，这些观念究竟能够意味着什么。只要这个世界还没有完全背离传统，长久以来，这个世界就停止想要听到〔讯息〕。相反地，这个世界被告诉这个讯息是什么意思。从讲堂迴响的那些话语，无法被理解，而且要求解释。

How has the death of Christ brought us redemption
when no one feels redeemed? In what way is Jesus a Godman
and what is such a being? What is the Trinity about, and
the parthenogenesis, the eating of the body and the drinking of
the blood, and all the rest of it? What connection can there be
between the world of such concepts and the everyday world,
whose material reality is the concern of natural science on the
widest possible scale?

耶稣基督的死亡带给我们怎样的救赎，假如并没有人感到被救赎？以怎样的方式，耶稣是上帝的化身，这样的神-人是怎样的情况？三位一体是什么意思？圣灵生子，身体的吞噬与血液的饮食，以及其余是怎样一回事？在这些观念的世界与日常的世界之间，有怎样的关联？日常世界的物质的现实，是自然科学的关注，从广义的规模来说。

At least sixteen hours out of twenty-four
we live exclusively in this everyday world, and the remaining
eight we spend preferably in an unconscious condition. Where
and when does anything take place to remind us even remotely
of phenomena like angels, miraculous feedings, beatitudes,
the resurrection of the dead, etc.? It was therefore something of
a discovery to find that during the unconscious state of sleep
intervals occur, called “dreams,” which occasionally contain
scenes having a not inconsiderable resemblance to the motifs of
mythology. For myths are miracle tales and treat of all those
things which, very often, are also objects of belief.

至少从24小时的16小时，我们专注地生活于这个日常生活里。剩余的8小时，我们宁可在无意识的情况里度过。何地，何时发生的事情，让我们想起那些遥远的现象，诸如天使，奇迹的天粮，崇高的欢喜，死者的复活，等等？因此，这是某件发现的事情，当我们发现，在睡眠的无意识的状态，梦境会发生在中间。这些梦有时包括的场景，跟神话的主题相当酷似。因为神话是奇迹的故事，神话处理所有那些经常是信仰的对象的事情。

67 In the everyday world of consciousness such things hardly
exist; that is to say, until 1933 only lunatics would have been
found in possession of living fragments of mythology. After this
date the world of heroes and monsters spread like a devastating
fire over whole nations, proving that the strange world of myth
had suffered no loss of vitality during the centuries of reason
and enlightenment.

在意识的日常的世界，这些事情几乎不存在。换句话说，直到1933年，仅有疯子才会被认为拥有神话的活生生的片断。在这个日期之后，英雄与怪物的世界就像吞噬的火一样，传遍全世界。证明经过几世纪的理性与启蒙，神话的奇异世界依旧蓬勃发展。

If metaphysical ideas no longer have such a
fascinating effect as before, this is certainly not due to any lack
of primitivity in the European psyche, but simply and solely to
the fact that the erstwhile symbols no longer express what is
now welling up from the unconscious as the end-result of the
development of Christian consciousness through the centuries.

假如形上学的观念不再拥有如此令人著迷的影响，那确实不是因为欧洲的心灵欠缺原始感觉，而仅仅是因为这个事实：先前的象征不再表达现在从无意识膨胀出来的东西，作为几世纪来基督教的意识的发展的结果产物。

This end-result is a true antimimon pneuma, a false spirit of
arrogance, hysteria, woolly-mindedness, criminal amorality, and
doctrinaire fanaticism, a purveyor of shoddy spiritual goods,
spurious art, philosophical stutterings, and Utopian humbug,
fit only to be fed wholesale to the mass man of today. That is
what the post-Christian spirit looks like.

这个结果产物是虚假精神，傲慢，歇斯底里，头脑不清楚，罪犯的欠缺道德，与教条的狂热份子，廉价的庸俗精神货品，欺瞒的艺术，哲学的陈腔滥调，乌托邦的冒牌货。它们仅是适合于批发给今天的集体的人们。那就是后-基督教精神的面貌。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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