Archive for June, 2011

可能不是類似 217h

June 30, 2011

可能不是類似 217h

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

Look at page 22. It is very instructive and I could translate it in more ways than one, including making use of my earlier being and having. But I will tackle things more simply in order to recall to you something that I already emphasised, namely,
that none of the so-called paradoxes that classical logic dwells on, specifically the one of I am lying, hold up except from the moment they are written. It is quite clear that to say I am lying is something that creates no obstacle, because we do nothing but that, so then why would it not be said? What can that mean?


That it is only when it is written that here there is a paradox, because people say: “Well here, either you are lying or you are telling the truth?” It is exactly the same thing that I pointed out to you at one time, as to write: “The smallest number that can be written in more than 15 words”. You see no obstacle to it when you say it. If it is written, you count them, you see that there are only 13 of them, in what I have just said.


But that is only counted when it is written. Because if it is written in Japanese, I
would defy you to count them. Because here you ask yourself the question all the same, there are little bits of wailing like that, little o‟s and little oua‟s, about which you ask whether they must be stuck to the word, or whether they must be detached and counted as a word, it is not even a word, it is eh, it is like that. Only when it is written, it is countable.


So then the truth, you will notice that exactly as in the metamathematics of Lorenzen, if you posit that one cannot at the same time say yes and no on the same point, there you win. You will see later what you win. But if you bet that it is either yes or no, there you lose. Consult Lorenzen, but I am going to illustrate it immediately. I posit: it is not true, I say to the truth, that you are telling the truth and that you are lying at the same time.


The truth can answer many things. Because it is you who make it answer, it costs
you nothing. In any case, this is going to culminate at the same result, but I will detail it for you to remain close to Lorenzen. She says: “I am telling the truth!”; you answer her: “I am not making you tell it!”. So then to piss you off, she says to you: “I am lying.”


To which you reply: “Now I have won, I know that you are contradicting yourself!” It is exactly what you discover with the unconscious, it is no more important. That the unconscious always tells the truth and that it lies, is, from its point of view, perfectly
(72) sustainable. It is simply up to you to know it. What does that teach you? That you do not know something about the truth until it is unleashed; because it is unleashed, it has broken your leash, it has told you the two things, moreover, when you said that the conjunction was not sustainable.


But suppose on the contrary, that you had said to her: “Either you are telling the truth, or you are lying”. Well in this case you have had all your trouble for nothing. Because what is she going to answer you:


“I grant it to you, I put myself in chains; you tell me: either you are telling the truth or you are lying and in effect that is quite true.” Only in that case then, you for your part know nothing. You know nothing about what she has told you, since either she tells the truth or she lies, so that you lose out. I do not know whether you see the relevance of this, but it means something that we have constant experience of, which is that if the truth refuses itself, in that case it is of some use to me.


This is what we have to deal with all the time in analysis and that, that she gives up, that she accepts the chain, whatever it may be, well then, it‟s all Greek to me. In other words that…that leaves me desiring.


That leaves me desiring and that leaves me my position of demanding, since I am wrong to think that I can only deal with the truth that I can only recognise when it is unchained, showing you in what un-chaining you are participating.


There is something that deserves to be highlighted in this relationship, it is the function of this something that for a long time I have been putting like that on the mat, and which is called freedom.


It happens that through the phantasy, there are people who lucubrate about certain ways in which if not the truth itself, at least the phallus could be tamed. I am not going to tell you about all the variety of details in which these lucubrations can be laid out. But there is one striking thing.


It is that, apart from a certain kind of lack of seriousness which is perhaps the most solid way to define perversion, well then these elegant solutions, it is clear that the people for whom that … it is serious, this whole little affair, because good God, language counts for them and so does writing, if only because it allows for a logical questioning, because when all is said and done, what is logic if not this absolutely fabulous paradox that only allows writing to take the truth as a referent?


It is obviously through this that one communes, when one begins by giving the first, the very first formulae of propositional logic, one takes as a reference that there are
propositions that can be marked as True and others that can be marked as False. It is with this that there begins the reference to (73) truth.


To refer oneself to the truth, is to posit an absolute false, namely, a false to which one could refer oneself as such.


Serious people, I take up again what I am in the process of saying, to whom there are proposed these elegant solutions which might bring about the taming of the phallus, you know it is very curious, it is they who reject them. And why, if not to preserve what they call liberty, in so far as it is precisely identical to this non-existence of the sexual relationship.


Because after all, do we need to point out that this relationship of man and woman, in so far as it is radically falsified by the law, the law described as sexual, is all the same something that leaves it to be desired that each man has his woman (qu‟á chacun il y ait sa chacune) to respond to it. If this happens what can we say?


Certainly not that this is something natural, because in this respect there is no nature, since The woman does not exist – that she exists is the dream of a woman, and it is the dream from which Don Juan emerged, if there were A man for whom The woman existed, it would be marvellous, one would be sure of one‟s desire. It is a feminine
lucubration. For a man to find his woman, what else if not the romantic formula: it was destined, it was written.


Once again, we have come to this crossroads at which I told you I would tip over what is involved in the true lord, this chap who is translated, very badly, faith, by man, like that a little bit above the common, it is this see-saw, between the hsing, this nature as it is inscribed by the effect of language, inscribed in this disjunction between a man and a woman. And on the other hand this: “it is written”, this ming, this other character, whose shape I already once showed you here, which is the one before which freedom retreats.


拉康繞了老半天,終於回到孟子的「性」與「命」,還跟「沒有性關係There is no sexual relationship 」「女人不存在the woman doesn’t exist 」扯在一起!我翻都翻糊塗了,不知道有沒有人願意幫我解惑?


June 30, 2011


拉康論通過制度 La passe
Lacan invented the pass to clarify and formalize the transition between analysand and analyst: “This dark cloud that covers this juncture I am concerned with here, the one at which the psychoanalysand passes to becoming a psychoanalyst—that is what our School can work at dissipating” (Lacan, 1995).
Lacan’s foundation of theÉcole freudienne de Paris (Freudian School of Paris) on June 21, 1964, was marked by the originality of its membership categories. No longer were there permanent members or didacticians, since an analysis could be recognized as didactic only after the fact by the analysand in question becoming an analyst.

There were three categories of membership: analyst of the school (a title initially given to all the former permanent members of the Société psychanalytique de Paris [Paris Psychoanalytic Society] and the Société française de psychanalyse [French Society of Psychoanalysis]), member analysts of the school (who were nominated by a reception committee that guaranteed the “competence” and “regularity” of the candidate’s analytic practice), and practicing analysts (who declared their own practice to be analytic, although it was not guaranteed by the school).

Internal conflicts soon developed within the school over training and clinical ability. In an attempt to overcome this crisis, François Perrier proposed, on March 31, 1967, in an address to the analysts of the school, the formation of a college of analysts of the school, which would be devoted to “the clinic as a career and a vocation” (1994). This initiative did not receive any support from Lacan, who wrote up an alternative plan under the title “Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the psychoanalyst of the school” (1995). The procedure that Lacan proposed involved having a candidate give an account of an analysis in which the candidate was the analysand before three “passers,” who had been nominated by their own analysts. The passers would then report about their sense of the analysis to an acceptance committee, which could then allow the candidate to pass from analysand to analyst.

This initiative gave rise to a lively debate within the school. As early as 1968, Piera Aulagnier, Maud Mannoni, François Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega made their objections known (later published in Analytica, 7 [1978]). And when Lacan put the proposal to a vote for inclusion in the school’s statutes during the Lutetia (Paris) session, Piera Aulagnier, François Perrier, and Jean-Paul Valabrega resigned from the school.


Nevertheless, the pass was put into practice. It seemed that Lacan expected the pass to be not an “experiment in unconscious knowledge,” but a “revelation.” Thus the pass had nothing to do with analysis. In 1974, in a letter to three of his Italian adherents (Giacomo Contri, Muriel Drazien, and Armando Verdiglione), Lacan recommended that they create an Italian group, “including the principle of the pass for those who apply for it” (1982). In Italy the pass was thus proposed at the outset before the school was functioning.

On January 7 to 8, 1978, during the Deauville session on the pass experiment, Lacan heard much discussion on the value of the pass. He mostly heard objections to the procedure, notably from Ginette Raimbault and Serge Leclaire. So he closed the session with these words: “I had wanted to hear testimonials about how it’s working. And obviously I didn’t hear any. The pass really is a complete failure” (Lettres de l’école, April 1978).

Lacan’s declaration that the pass was a failure seemed to indicate that it is impossible to pinpoint within the analytic situation the passage from analysand to analyst. Thus analysts must resort to the other way of recognizing a psychoanalyst, namely an ability to maintain the analytic position as verified by a supervised analysis. This leads to the hypothesis that one is an analyst only in the analytic situation.

See also: École de la Cause freudienne; École freudienne de Paris; France; Quatrième Groupe (O.P.L.F.), Fourth group; Training analysis; “Unconscious, The.”

可能不是類似 217g

June 30, 2011

可能不是類似 217g

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

The person who reminded me about the thing in connection with the flute, also pointed out to me that for singing, where in appearance there is no instrument, this is why singing is particularly interesting, it is because here too you have to divide your body, that you divide two things which are quite distinct, in order to be able to sing, but which usually are absolutely synergetic, namely, the placing of the voice and breathing.


Good! These primary truths which I did not need to be reminded of, because moreover I told you that I had my last experience of it with a golf club, this is what leaves open, as a question, whether there is still somewhere a knowledge of the
instrument phallus.


Only the phallus instrument is not an instrument like the others, it is like singing, the phallus instrument, I already told you that it is not at all to be confused with the penis.


The penis, for its part, is regulated by law, namely, by desire, namely, by surplus enjoying, namely, by the cause of desire, namely, by phantasy. And this, the supposed
knowledge of the woman who is supposed to know encounters a problem (un os) precisely the one that the organ is lacking, if you will allow me to continue in the same vein.


Because in certain animals there is one of bone. Yes! Here there is a lack, it is a missing bone, it is not the phallus, it is desire or its functioning. The result is that a
woman has the testimony of her insertion into the law, of what supplies for the relationship, only through the desire of the man.


Here it is enough to have a tiny little bit of analytic experience to be certain of it, the desire of the man, as I have just said, is linked to its cause, which is surplus enjoying, or again as I put it on several occasions, if it has its source in the field of…from which everything starts, the effect of language, in the desire then of the Other, and the woman, on this occasion, one sees that it is she who is the Other.


Only she is the Other from a completely different source, from a completely different register than her knowledge, whatever it may be. (70) Here then the phallic instrument is posited, with inverted commas, as “cause” of language, I did not say the origin.


And here, despite the late hour, good God, I will go quickly, I will point out the
trace that one can have of it, namely, the maintaining, whatever you may wish, of a prohibition on obscene words.


And because I know that there are people who are waiting for this something that I
promised them, to make an allusion to Eden, Eden, Eden, ah! And to say why I do not sign, what are they called, these things, these petitions, in this connection, the fact is, it is certainly not because my esteem for this attempt is lukewarm. In its way, it is comparable to my Ecrits. Except that it is much more despairing; it is completely
hopeless to language the phallic instrument. And it is because I consider it as being hopeless at this point that I also think that nothing but misunderstandings can develop around such an attempt. You see that my rejection is placed at a highly theoretical point on this occasion.


What I want to get to is this: from where does one question the truth?


Because the truth can say whatever it wants. It is the oracle. That has always existed, and after that, we can only do the best we can.


Only there is a new fact, huh? The first new fact ever since the oracle has been functioning, namely, from all time. The new event is one of my writings called The Freudian thing where I indicated something that no one had ever said, huh? Only since it is written, naturally you have not heard it. I said that “the truth speaks I, la vérité parle Je.”


If you had given its weight to this kind of polemical luxuriance that I carried out to present the truth as that, I no longer even know what I wrote, like coming into a room to the sound of a shattering mirror, that would perhaps have opened your ears. This sound of breaking mirrors does not strike you in something written. It is nevertheless
rather well written, this is what is called an effect of style.


This would certainly have helped you to understand what is meant by “the truth speaks I”.


That means that you can say thou to it and I am going to explain what use that is to you. You are going to think of course that I am going to tell you that it can be used for a dialogue. It is a long time now since I said that there was no dialogue. And with the truth, naturally, still less.


Nevertheless, if you read something La Métamathématique by Lorenzen, I brought it along, it is published by Gauthier-Villars et Mouton. Good! And then I am even going to indicate the page where you will see some very clever things.


They are dialogues, they (71) are written dialogues, namely, that it is the same person who writes the two rejoinders. It is a quite particular dialogue, only it is very instructive.



可能不是類似 217f

June 29, 2011

可能不是類似 217f

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

This is where and in what there resides the incompatibility of being and having. In this text, this is repeated with a certain insistence, and putting into it certain emphases of style, which I repeat are just as important to make one‟s way as the graphs at which they culminate.


And behold, I had in front of me, like that, at the famous Congrès de Royaumont,
some people who laughed derisively, if everything is there, if it is a matter of being and having, that did not seem to them to have any great importance, being and having. One makes one‟s choice, huh!


(67) This is nevertheless what is called castration. What I am proposing is the following, it is to posit that we will put language here (1), in its reserved field in this gap of the sexual relationship, as the phallus leaves it open, by positing that what it introduces here, is not, not two terms that are defined as male and female, but this choice between these terms of a quite different nature and function that are called being and having. What proves, what supports, what renders this distance absolutely obvious, definitive, is the following, something whose difference it does not seem people have noticed, is the substitution for the sexual relationship of what is
called sexual law.


It is here that there is this distance in which it is inscribed that there is nothing in common between what can be stated as a relationship which lays down the law in so far as it derives, in some form or other, from the application that a mathematical function circumscribes most closely, and a law that is coherent to the whole
register of what is called desire, of what is called prohibition, of what underlines that it is from the very gap of the inscribed prohibition that there derives the conjunction, indeed the identity, as I dared state, of this desire and of this law, and what is posited correlatively for everything that derives from the effect of language, from everything
that establishes the demansion of the truth from a structure of fiction.


13.1.71 I 85
The correlation that has always been made between ritual and myth, whose ridiculous weakness is to say that myth is supposed to be simply a commentary on the ritual, what is done to sustain it, to explain it, while it is, in accordance with a topology that I have already for long enough given a destiny not to have to recall it, ritual and myth are like the front and the back (l‟endroit et l‟envers), on condition that this front and this back are in continuity.


The maintaining, the maintaining in analytic discourse of this residual myth that is called the Oedipus complex, God knows why, which is in fact that of Totem and taboo, in which there is inscribed this myth that is entirely invented by Freud, of the primordial father in so far as he enjoys all the women, it is all the same here that we ought to question a little further from the point of view of logic and of writing, what it means.


It is a long time since I introduced here the schema of Peirce about propositions in so far as they are divided into four, universal, particular, affirmative and negative, the two terms, the two couples of terms interchanging. Everyone knows that to say that: every x is y, if the schema of Peirce, Charles Sanders, has an interest, it is to show, it
is to define as necessary that every something is provided with such an attribute, is a perfectly acceptable universal position without there being for all that any x. In Peirce‟s little formula, little schema, I remind you, here we have a certain number of vertical strokes, here we have none, here we have a little mixture of the two, and that it is from the overlapping of two of these boxes that there results the specificity of one or other of these propositions.


And that it is by bringing together these two quadrants that one can say: every stroke
is vertical. There is no stroke if it is not vertical. To give the negative, it is these two that must be brought together. Either there is no stroke, or there are none that are vertical.


What the myth of the enjoyment of all the women designates, is that there are not all the women. There is no universal of the woman. Here is what is posed by a questioning of the phallus, and not of sexual relationship, as regards what is involved in the enjoyment it constitutes, because I said that it was feminine enjoyment.


It is starting from these statements that a certain number of questions can be radically displaced. After all, but it is possible that there is a knowledge of the enjoyment that is called sexual which is attributable to this particular woman. This is not unthinkable, there are like that, mythical traces of it in certain corners. The things called Tantra, it is said that this is practised. It is all the same clear that for a good while, if you will allow me to express my thinking in this way, the skill of female flute players is much more open to view. It is not to… play with obscenity that I am putting forward that at this point.


The fact is, there is here, and I suppose there is at least one person who knows what it is to play the flute, it is the person who recently, pointed out to me in connection with this flute playing, but one can (69) say it also with respect to any use of an instrument, what division from the body the use of an instrument, whatever it may be, makes necessary.


I mean a breakdown of synergy. It is enough to play any instrument whatsoever. Get onto a pair of skis, and you will see immediately that your synergies have to be broken. Take up a golf club, I do this from time to time, I started again, it‟s the same
thing, huh? There are two types of movement that you have to make at the same time, at the beginning you will absolutely not succeed in doing it, because synergetically, it is not arranged like that.



可能不是類似 217e

June 29, 2011

可能不是類似 217e

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

There was a first condition which could have immediately allowed us to see it, which is that the sexual relationship, like every other relationship when all is said and done,
only subsists from the written. What is essential in the relationship, is an application, a applied onto b (a b), and if you do not write this a and b, you do not sustain the relationship as such.


This does not mean that things are not happening in the real. But by what right
would you call it a relationship? Something as crude as that would be already enough, let us say, to make it conceivable, that there is no sexual relationship, but it would in no way settle the fact that one cannot manage to write it. I would even say more, there is something that has been done for some time, which is to write it like this: ♂ ♀,
(65) using little planetary signs, namely, the relationship of what is male to what is female.

這並不意味著,事情沒有發生在真實界。但是憑藉怎樣的權利,你稱它是一種關係?某件如此簡陋的事情已經足夠讓它被想像為:沒有性關係,我們不妨說。但是這樣想像絲毫沒有解決這個事情:我們無法成功地書寫這個關係。我甚至說得更過分:有段時間,某件事情被做,可以使用小小的平面符號,書寫成像這樣的公式:♂ ♀。換句話說,男性的東西跟女性的東西的關係。

I would even say that for some time, thanks to the progress that the use of the microscope allows, because let us not forget that before Swammerdam, one could have no kind of idea of it, this…may seem to articulate the fact that the relationship,
however complex it may be, however meiotic the process may be by which cells described as gonadic give a model of fecundation from which proceeds reproduction, well then, it seems that in effect something is founded, established there, that allows there to be situated at a certain level described as biological what is involved in
the sexual relationship.


The strange thing assuredly – and after all, good God, not all that much so, but I would like to evoke for you the dimension of strangeness of the thing – is that the duality and the sufficiency of this relationship have from all time had their model, I
evoked it for you the last time in connection with little Chinese signs, they are those whose signs, all of a sudden I became impatient to show you, this seemed to be done simply to startle you, well then, the yin that I did not make for you the last time here it is – and the yang, here it is. I am repeating myself am I not, right!


Another little feature here. The yin and the yang, the male and female principles, are things which after all are not special to the Chinese tradition.


This is something that you will find in every kind of cogitation about the relationships of action and passion, about the formal and the substantial, about Purusha, the spirit, and Prakriti some feminised matter or other. The general model of this relationship of the male to the female is indeed what has always haunted for all time the mapping out, the mapping out of the speaking being as regards the forces of the world, those which are t‟ien hsia, under the heavens.


It would be well to mark something completely new, what I called the effect of surprise, to understand what has emerged, whatever it may be worth, from analytic discourse.


It is that it is untenable to (66) remain in any way with this duality as sufficient, the fact is that the function described as the phallus, which is to tell the truth very
awkwardly handled, but which is there, which functions in what is involved, not simply in an experience, linked to something or other that would be considered as deviant, as pathological, but which is essential as such for the establishment of analytic discourse.


This function of the phallus renders henceforth untenable this sexual bipolarity, and untenable in a way that literally makes vanish into thin air anything involved about what can be written about this relationship.


It is necessary to distinguish what is involved in this intrusion of the phallus, from what some people thought they could express by the term of “lack of signifier”. It is not the lack of signifier that is at stake, but the obstacle raised to a relationship.


The phallus, by emphasising an organ, does not designate, does not in any way
designate the organ described as the penis with its physiology, nor even the function that one may, faith, attribute to it with some verisimilitude, as being that of copulation.

陽具,作為一個器官的強調,並沒有指明,並沒有以任何方式指明這個被描述為陰莖的器官,帶著它的生理特徵,甚至也沒有指明是我們歸屬於它的功用,相信是帶有某種真理信心,作為男女交媾的真理信心 。

It aims in the least ambiguous way, if one refers to analytic texts, at its relationship to
enjoyment. And this is how they distinguish it from the physiological function.


There is, this is what is posited as constituting the function of the phallus, there is an enjoyment which constitutes in this relationship, different from the sexual relationship, what, what we will call its condition of truth.


The angle from which the organ is taken which, with respect to what is involved for the totality of living beings, is in no way linked to this particular form; if you knew the variety of organs of copulation that exist in insects, you could, which is after all the source of what is still wearing well, namely, astonishment, to question the real, you could certainly, in effect, be astonished that it is like that in particular that it functions in vertebrates.


What is at stake here is the organ in so far – I have to go quickly here, because I am not after all going to go on forever and take up everything again, people can consult the text that I spoke about earlier, The direction of the treatment and the principles of its power – the phallus is the organ in so far as it is, it is being that is at stake, in so far as it is …feminine enjoyment.



可能不是類似 217d

June 29, 2011

可能不是類似 217d

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

There is no more free association than one could say that a variable linked to a mathematical function is free, and the function defined by analytic discourse is obviously not free, it is bound, it is bound by conditions that I will rapidly designate as those of the analytic consulting room. At what distance is my analytic discourse as it is here defined by this written arrangement, at what distance is it from the analytic consulting room, this is precisely what constitutes what we will call my disagreement with a certain number of analytic consulting rooms.


So then this definition of analytic discourse, to highlight where I am, does not appear to them to be adapted to the conditions of the psychoanalytic consulting room. Now, what my discourse outlines, or at least delivers, is one part of the conditions that constitute the analytic consulting room. Just measure what one does when one goes into analysis, it is something that indeed has its importance, but in any case as far as I am concerned, is indicated by the fact that I always undertake numerous of preliminary conversations.


A pious person that I will not designate otherwise found, it appears, according to the latest news, anyway news three months old, at least it was an unsustainable wager for her to ground transference on the subject supposed to know, because moreover the method implies that it is sustained by a total absence of prejudice as regards a case. The subject supposed to know what, then? I would allow myself to ask this person, if the psychoanalyst should be supposed to know what he is doing, and if he effectively does it?


Starting from there, starting from there one will understand that I pose my questions on transference in a certain way, in The direction of the treatment for example, which is a text to which I see with pleasure in my school (63) something new is happening. The fact is that in my school people are starting to work as a school, this is all the same a step that is new enough to be noted. I was able to note not without pleasure
that people had seen that in this text, I do not in any way settle what is involved in transference. It is very precisely by saying the subject supposed to know, as I define it, that the question is…remains untouched as to whether the analyst can be supposed to know what he is doing.


13.1.71 I 80
To take it up in a way at the start, the start of what today is going to be stated, and for which this little Chinese character because this is one, it is one of them, I greatly regret that the chalk did not allow me to put in the accents that the brush would allow, it is one of them which has a meaning, to satisfy the requirement of the logical
positivists, a meaning which you are going to see is completely ambiguous because it means at the same time twisted (retors) that it also means personal in the sense of private.


And then there are still other ones. But what appears remarkable to me, is its written form, and its written form is going to allow me to tell you immediately where there are placed the terms around which my discourse today is going to turn.


If we place here somewhere (1) what I am calling in the broadest sense – you are going to see that it is broad…I should say that I have no need, it seems to me, to underline it – the effects of language, it is here (2) that we will have to put what is involved, where they find their source. Where they find their source, is in the fact that analytic discourse reveals something which, which is a step, I tried to recall it,
even though what is at stake for analysis is primary truth. It is with this that I am going to begin right away. We would have here then (3) the fact of writing.

(64) It is very important at our epoch, and starting from certain statements that have been made and that tend to establish very regrettable confusions, to recall that all the same writing is not the first step but the second with respect to a whole function of language, and that nevertheless without writing, it is in no way possible to come
back and question what results in the first place from the effect of language as such, in other words the symbolic order, namely the dimension, to please you, but you know that I introduced the term of demansion the demansion, the residence, the locus of the Other of truth. I know that this demansion raised a question for some people, echoes have come back to me, well then, if demansion is in effect a term, a new term that I fabricated and if it still has no meaning, well then, that means that it is up to you to give it one.

To question the demansion of the truth, of the truth in its dwelling place, is something, here is the term, the novelty of what I am introducing today, which can only be done by writing, and by writing in so far as it is only from writing that logic is established.


This is what I am introducing at this point of my discourse this year. There is no
logical question unless it starts from writing, in so far as writing is precisely not language. And this is why I stated that there is no metalanguage, that writing itself in so far as it is distinguished from language is there to show us that, if it is from writing that language is questioned, it is precisely in so far as writing is not it, but that it only
constructs itself, only fabricates itself from its reference to language.


After having posited this which has the advantage of opening up to you my perspective, my project, I start again from something which concerns this point, this point which is of the order of this surprise to which there is signalled the effect of retrogression by which I have tried to define the junction between truth and knowledge, and that I stated in these terms that there is no sexual relationship in the
speaking being.



可能不是類似 217c

June 29, 2011

可能不是類似 217c

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

You will see, if you refer to the text of Meng-Tzu, you have two ways of doing it, you can find it on the one hand in an edition that in short is very good which was produced by a Jesuit at the end of the 19th Century, someone called Wieger, in an edition of the Four fundamental books of Confucianism.


You have another way, which is to get hold of this Mencius on the mind, which was published by Kegan Paul in London. I do not know if nowadays there are a lot of copies still available, as they say, but after all it is worth the trouble, why not, to try to get it for those who might be curious to consult something that is so fundamental, for a certain illumination of a reflection on language which is the work of a neo-positivist and which is certainly not negligible. Mencius on the mind, therefore, by Richards, can be found in London at Kegan Paul.


And those who find it worthwhile to take the trouble of getting a copy, if they cannot
get the book, could get perhaps a photocopy, and they will understand all the better a certain number of references that I will make to it this year because I will come back to it.


It is one thing then to speak about the origin of language, and another thing of its link to what I am teaching, to what I am teaching in conformity with what I articulate, what last year I articulated, as the discourse of the analyst.


Because you are well aware, linguistics began with Humboldt with this sort of prohibition, not to ask oneself the question of the origin of language, otherwise one would certainly go astray. It is no small thing that someone should have noticed at
the height of the period of developmental mythmaking, this was the style at the beginning of the 19th Century, should have posited that nothing would ever be situated, established, articulated, about language, if one did not start first of all by forbidding the questions of (61) origin.


It is an example which might well have been followed elsewhere, this would have avoided us a lot of lucubrations of the type called primitivist. There is nothing like a reference to the primitive to…make thinking more primitive. It is what regularly
regresses to the very measure of what it claims to discover as primitive.


The discourse of the Analyst, I have to tell you, because in short you have not heard it, the discourse of the Analyst is nothing other than the logic of action. Why have you not heard it? Because in what I articulated last year with these little letters on the
board, in this form, the small o over the S2 and of what happens at the level of the
analysand, namely, the function of the subject in so far as he is barred and in so far as what he produces as signifiers, and not just any ones, master signifiers.


It is because it was written like that, because I wrote it down on many occasions, it is for that very reason that you did not hear it. It is in this way that writing is differentiated from speaking, and it is necessary to put the word back into it and to butter it up seriously, but naturally not without fundamental drawbacks for it to be heard. One can write then a whole pile of things without them reaching any ear. It is nevertheless written.


That is even the reason that I called my Ecrits as I did. That scandalised, like that,
sensitive people and not just anyone. It is very curious that the person that this literally threw into convulsions was a Japanese woman. I will deal with that later.
Naturally here, it did not give anyone convulsions, the Japanese woman that I spoke about is not here.


And anybody at all, who comes from that tradition, will be able I think on this occasion to understand why this kind of effect of insurrection was produced. It is through the word of course that the path towards writing is opened up.


If I entitled my Ecrits that, it is because they represented an attempt, an attempt at writing, which is very sufficiently marked by the fact that it culminated in graphs. The
trouble, is that, is that people who claim to give a commentary on me start immediately from the graphs. They are wrong, the graphs are only understandable in function, I would say, of the slightest effect of style of the aforesaid Ecrits, which are in a way the steps to reach it.


As a result of this the written, the written taken up all by itself, whether it is a matter of one or other schema, the one that is called L or any other one whatsoever, or the big graph itself, presents an opportunity for all sorts of misunderstandings. What is at stake is a (62) word, in so far as, of course, and why, it tends to clear the way to
these graphs that is at stake. But it would be well not to forget this word, for the reason that it is the very one that is reflected by the analytic rule which is as you know, speak, speak, speak. It is enough for you to speak, here is the box from which there come all the gifts of language, it is a Pandora‟s box.


What is the relationship then with these graphs? These graphs of course, no one has yet dared to go that far, these graphs in no way show you anything whatsoever that allow you to return to the origin of language. If there is something that appears there immediately, it is that not alone do they not give it, but they do not promise it either.


What is going to be at stake today is the situation with respect to the truth that results from what is called free association, in other words a free use of the word. I have never spoken about it except with irony.



可能不是類似 217b

June 29, 2011

可能不是類似 217b

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

And yeh is something that concludes a sentence without saying, properly speaking, that what is at stake is something of the order that what we are stating here is, being, it is a conclusion.


It is a conclusion or let us say a punctuation, because the sentence continues here since things are written from right to left, the sentence continues here with a certain tse which means consequently, or which in any case indicates the consequence. So then let us see what is at stake.


Yen means nothing other than language, but like all the terms stated in the Chinese tongue, it is liable also to be used in the sense of a verb. So then that can mean both the word and the one who speaks, and who speaks what? In this case that would be what follows, namely hsing, nature, what speaks about nature under the heavens, and yeh would be a punctuation.


Nevertheless, and this is why it is interesting to take an interest in a sentence of the written tongue, you see that you can cut things up differently and say: the word, indeed the language, because if it was a matter of specifying the word, we would have another character that is slightly different. At this level, as it is written here, this character can just as well mean word as language. These sorts of ambiguities
are altogether fundamental in the use of what is written, very (58) precisely, and this is the importance of what I am writing.


As I pointed out to you, as I pointed out to you at the start of my discourse this year, and especially the last time, it is very precisely in so far as the reference as regards everything involved in language is always indirect that language takes on its import.


We could then also say: language, in so far as it is in the world, as it is under the heavens, language, is what makes hsing, nature, because this nature is not, at least in Meng-Tzu, just any nature, what is at stake is precisely the nature of the speaking being, which, in another passage, he is careful to specify is the difference between this nature and the nature of the animal, a difference, he adds, he highlights in two terms which mean what they mean, “an infinite difference.” And which perhaps is the one that is defined there.


You will see, moreover, whether we take one or other of these interpretations, the
axis of what is going to be said as a consequence will not be changed. Tse therefore, is the consequence. In consequence, ku, is here ku, in consequence, relates to the cause – because cause means nothing else, whatever may be the ambiguity that in a certain book, a certain book called Mencius on the mind, namely, a book produced by someone called Richards, who was certainly not a newcomer – Richards and
Ogden are two leaders of a position originating in England and altogether in agreement with the best tradition of English philosophy, who established at the beginning of this century the doctrine described as logical positivism, whose major work is entitled The meaning of meaning.


It is a book to which you will already find an allusion in my Ecrits where I take up a certain disparaging position with regard to it. The meaning of meaning means le sens du sens. Logical-positivism proceeds from this requirement that a text should
have a graspable meaning, which leads it to a position which is the following: a certain number of philosophical statements find themselves in a way devalorised in principle by the fact that they are not…that they give no graspable result as regards a search for meaning. In other words, if a philosophical text is caught red handed
in non-sense, it is ruled out for that very reason.

在我的精神分析論文集,你們將會發現我提到這本書。在書裏,我採取某種貶低它的立場。「意義的意義」意思是「le sens du sens.」。邏輯實證論繼續從這個要求出發,一個文本應該有一個可理解的意義,這個意義引導它到一個如下的立場:某些的哲學陳述發現它們自己,原則上被它們並不存在這個事實,貶低價值、、、他們沒有給予可理解的結果,關於對於意義的追尋。換句話說,假如一個哲學的文本在無意義的場所被人贓俱獲,它會因為那個理由而被排除。

It is only too clear (59) that this is a way of pruning away the things that scarcely allows us to find our way, because if we start from the principle that something that has no meaning cannot be essential in the development of a discourse, we quite simply lose our bearings.


I am not saying of course, that such a requirement is not a procedure, but that this procedure forbids us in a way any articulation whose meaning is not graspable, this is something which, for example, may culminate in the fact, for example, that we can no longer make use of mathematical discourse, which, on the admission of the most qualified logicians, is characterised by the fact that it may be that at one or other of its points, we can no longer give it any meaning – which does not prevent it from being precisely, among all the discourses, the one that is developed with most rigor.


We find ourselves moreover, because of this fact, at a point that is quite essential to highlight concerning the function of writing.


So then, it is ku that is at stake, it is ku that is at stake and as i wei, because I already told you that this wei that can in certain senses mean to act indeed something that is of the order of to do even though it is not just anything whatsoever, i here has the sense of something like with, it is with that we are going to proceed like, like what? Like li, this is the word about which I point out to you, I am highlighting for you the fact that li, I repeat, that this li which means reward, interest, profit, and the thing is all the more remarkable in that precisely Mencius, Mencius in his first chapter, in presenting
himself to a certain prince, it does not matter who, of what made up the kingdoms described, described afterwards, as the warring kingdoms, finds himself with this prince who demands his advice, with this prince, pointing out that, he is not there to teach him what constitutes our law which is present to everyone, namely, what is
appropriate for the increase of the wealth of the kingdom, and specifically what we would call surplus value. If there is a meaning that one can give retroactively to li, this indeed is what is at stake.


(60) Now, it is indeed here that it is remarkable to see that what Mencius points out on this occasion, is that starting then from this word which is nature, or if you wish from the word that concerns nature, what is going to be at stake, is to arrive at the cause, in so far as the aforesaid cause, is li, erh, i i, which means the li, erh is something that means at the same time like and, and like but, erh i, is simply that, and so that there can be no doubt about it, the i that ends, which is a conclusive i, this i has the same accent as simply. It is li, and that is enough. Here I am allowing myself in short to recognize that, as regards the effects of discourse, as regards what is under the
heavens, what emerges from it is nothing other than the function of the cause, in so far as it is surplus enjoying.











可能不是类似 217

June 28, 2011

可能不是類似 217

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 4: Wednesday 17 February 1971

[Before the seminar Lacan writes on the board a quotation from Meng-Tzu: probably the following.]


“Everywhere under the heavens, when one speaks about nature, what is meant are natural effects”



– This is the name of the author of this little formula…

– Louder!

– This is the name of the author of this little formula!

– Thank you.

– this little formula to which, despite the fact that it was written around 250BC, in China as you see, in chapter 2 of Book IV, the second part, sometimes it is classified in a different way, so that in that case it would be part VIII, of Book IV, the second part of paragraph 26 of Meng-Tzu, whom the Jesuits called Mencius, because they are the ones who took a step forward, well before the epoch when there were sinologists, namely, at the beginning of the 19th Century.


I had the pleasure of acquiring the first book on which there are found conjointly a plaque of Chinese printing, it is not quite the same thing as the first book in which there were at the same time Chinese characters and European characters, it is the first book in which there was a Chinese printing plate with things written, with
things printed, from our part of the world. It is a translation of Aesop‟s fables.


This appeared in 1840, and it prides itself, quite rightly in being the first book in which this conjunction was realised. (56) 1840, you can say that it is more or less, precisely, the notice of the moment when sinologists came on the scene. The Jesuits were in China for a very long time, as perhaps some of you may remember.


They almost made the connection between China and what they represented as missionaries. Only they allowed themselves to be a little, a little bit impressed by the Chinese rites, and as you know perhaps, in the middle of the 18th Century, that created some difficulties for them with Rome, which did not show on this occasion particular political acuity. That happens sometimes in Rome.


Anyway in Voltaire, if you read Voltaire, but of course no one reads Voltaire anymore, you are making a great mistake, it is full of all kinds of things. In Voltaire, there is, very exactly in Le Siècle de Louis XIV, an appendix, I think that it forms a particular lampoon, a long elaboration about this Quarrel of the Rites, of which many things in history now find themselves in a position of filiation.


In any case then, we are talking about Mencius, and Mencius wrote this – because I wrote it on the board….to begin with that does not form properly speaking a part of my discourse today, that is why I finished it before the exact hour of 12.30 – I will tell you, or I am going to try to make you sense what it means, and then this will get us into the swing of what, properly speaking, is the object of what I want to state today, it is namely that….in what preoccupies us, what is the function of writing (l‟écriture).


Since writing, exists in China since…time immemorial, I mean that well before we have to properly speak of works, writing already existed for an extremely long time, and one cannot evaluate how long it did exist.


This writing has, in China, an altogether pivotal role, in a certain number of things that happened, and it is rather…it is quite illuminating as regards what we may think about the function of writing.


It is certain that writing has played a quite decisive role in supporting something, something to which we have… this particular access and no other, namely, a type of social structure that was sustained for a very long time and from which, until a recent epoch, one could conclude that there was a completely different filiation as regards what was supported in China, than what was engendered among us, and specifically by one of these phyla that interest us particularly, namely, the philosophical phylum in so far as, I highlighted it last year, it is nodal to understand what is at stake as
regards the discourse of the Master.


(57) So then this is how this exergue is stated. As I showed you on the board the last time this designates the heavens, it is called tien. T‟ien hsia, is under the heavens, everything that is under the heavens.


Here there is a determinative tchih, what is at stake is something that is beneath the heavens; what is beneath the heavens, is what comes afterwards. What you see there is nothing other than the designation of the word that on this occasion we will state as yen. Yen hsing, I already put it on the board the last time, in signalling to you that this
hsing, was precisely one of the elements that will preoccupy us this year, in so far as the term that gets closest to it is nature.



可能不是類似 15

June 28, 2011

可能不是類似 15

雅克 拉康研討班


On a discourse that might not be a semblance

And what is introduced, what is introduced anew by what I will call the Freudian hypothesis? It is, in an extraordinarily prudent, but all the same a syllogistic form, the following: if we call pleasure principle the fact that always, by the behaviour of the living being, he comes back to a level which is that of minimal excitation, and that
this rules his economy; if it proves to be the case that repetition is exercised in such a way that a dangerous enjoyment, an enjoyment that goes beyond this minimal excitation, is brought back – is it possible, it is in this way that Freud states the question – that it could be imagined that life, caught up itself in its cycle – it is a novelty with (20) respect to this world which does not universally comprise it –
that life includes this possibility of repetition which would be the return to this world in so far as it is a semblance?


雄伯:這有點類似哲學家尼采所焦慮的「永恆的輪迴」eternal recurrence。這是每個人必須面對的生命意義的問題:重複意味著厭倦與無聊嗎?

high point 顛峰

I can point out to you by a drawing on the board that this involves, instead of the series of ascending and descending curves of excitation, all close to a limit, which is an upper limit, the possibility of an intensity of excitation that can moreover go to infinity, what is conceived as enjoyment not involving in itself, in principle, any other
limit than this lower tangential point, this point that we will call high (supreme), in giving its proper sense to this word which means the lowest point of a higher limit, in the same way as the lowest (infime) is the highest point of a lower limit.


The coherence given of the mortal point, then conceived without Freud underlining it, as a characteristic of life but in truth, what people do not think of is, in effect, the fact that we confuse what is non-life, and which is far, my word, from not stirring up the eternal silence of the infinite spaces that dazed Decartes.


They talk, they sing, they move about in every (21) way, now when we look at them. What is called the inanimate world is not dead. Death is a point, is designated as a terminal point, a point at the term of what? Of the enjoyment of life.


This is precisely what is introduced by the Freudian statement, one that we could qualify as hyper-hedonism, if I can express myself in this way. Who can fail to see that the economy, even that of nature, is always a fact of discourse. It cannot grasp that this indicates that nothing else could be at stake here but enjoyment in so far as it is itself not only a fact, but an effect of discourse.


If something that is called the unconscious can be half-said as a language structure, it is so that finally there can appear to us the relief of this effect of discourse that up to then appeared to us as impossible, namely, surplus enjoying.


Does that mean, to follow one of my formulae, that in so far as it was impossible, it functioned as real? I am opening up the question, because in truth, nothing implies that the irruption of the discourse of the unconscious, however stammering it remains, implies anything whatsoever, in what preceded it, that was subjected to its structure. The discourse of the unconscious is an emerging, it is the emerging of a certain function of the signifier. That it existed up to then as a token, is indeed the reason why I put it at the source of the semblance.


13.1.71 I 36
But the consequences of its emerging, is what ought to be introduced so that something may change, which cannot change, because it is not possible. It is on the contrary because a discourse is centred from its effect as impossible that it will have some chance of being a discourse that might not be a semblance.



拉康希望無意識的真理論述,成為可能不是類似物的一種真理。是他一廂情願的信仰,還是真有可能在你的生命歷程被驗證?就看信不信由你。你信仰,你實行,因此產生的影響就是你獲得的東西。至於客觀現實是否證實或認同?你若是真的超越到那個顛峰high point,你那裏還會在乎?