Archive for May, 2010

雄伯遊記990531

May 31, 2010

雄伯遊記990531

真難想像早上七點多還在大陸福州吃早餐,晚上六點多,我已經回到台灣東部的花蓮。有賴新式動車組的快捷,從福州到廈門只花了兩個小時,然後搭乘渡輪到金門,再轉搭乘飛機到松山機場,也不是怎麼困難的事。難得的是,一到松山火車站,我還能立刻買到北迴鐵路下一班回花蓮的自強號列車車票。

「這次的自助旅遊,什麼是你最大的收獲?」假如有人這樣問。

我的回答是:「我學會如何觀察事情運作的背後真相,隨而產生警覺的意識。」

我這次出發,原先並沒有做任何規劃,只是夜間觀看下載的「雪域天路」的連續影片,描述青康藏公路及鐵路初期的創建,心頭被青海那一片蒼茫的高原撩撥得蠢蠢欲動。隔幾天早上醒來,就拎起簡單的背包,塞上幾件換洗衣褲,就走路到火車站,臨時買火車半票,到松山機場後補等待,買到金門的敬老機票。

在廈門東渡碼頭,填一張表格,貼一張照片,台胞證的三個月加簽,也輕易地完成。出關後,走路到外圍大馬路,攔一部計程車到松柏汽車站。就這樣,我睡在上下三排的臥舖大巴士裡,搖搖晃晃,昏昏沉沉中,就見到杭州的曙光。

杭州不愧是文明的古都,公車站的盥洗室保持得清潔清爽,連上大號的馬桶都是坐姿。人的基本生理既然得到照顧,心理也跟著愉快起來。於是花了175元買了一張車費及景點門票通包的西湖一日遊。

廂型車的司機兼導遊,帶我們搭乘遊船逛一個湖中小島後,就將我們轉讓給遊覽車的導遊。這位口才犀利的女導遊,侃侃而談人生大道理,從應該及時行樂,到佛教的慈悲施捨都套上:「出來旅遊就是要享受,自己賺的錢自己捨不得花,將來頂多是遺產!所以信佛要虔誠,金紙錢燒得越多,越能表示你們對於佛的信仰是真心誠意,千萬不要謗佛,以免有人一語成懺!」

問題是,她口中的鼎鼎大名的龍井茶園景觀,乾隆皇帝讚賞有加,欽為貢品的龍井茶,其實就是規模較大的茶園販賣場。比較具有歷史文物價值的「宋城」,被她輕描淡寫地說:「沒有興趣的人可以不去」。她希望我們大部份的時間都逗留在前面的蠶絲文物博物館,其實是蠶絲被以及各項昂貴絲綢衣物及餐飲的大賣場。更咄咄逼人的是,她口中莊嚴慈悲的佛,竟是靈隱寺排樓前的商家內的一尊開口笑的彌勒佛像,背後就是販賣金紙香火的櫃檯。買完後要進入靈隱寺,竟然還統一再收30元門票錢。

來自秦皇島的兩位年輕人,跟我搭乘同一班臥車大巴士從廈門來杭州。有一位還自稱喜歡柏拉圖哲學,跟我交談得還頗為茅塞頓開。他們遊完西湖後,還規劃要搭車去蘇州觀賞湖邊夜景,享受那裡頗具盛名的風月生活,邀我一同前往。我雖然有點心動,但是猶豫中警覺到,在言談中我台胞的身份已經透漏,萬一被他們帶到陰暗的地方,很容易陷入險境,終於還是理智地回說:「我還是到市中心好!」

第二天早上,我在火車站花820元買到一張從杭州直達北京的軟臥下舖的夜間八點多車票。這表示我有充裕的時間在杭州多逗留一天。我決定自己搭乘公車重回西湖再仔細看個究竟。

在公車裡,我聽到後面一位中年婦人向車掌小姐問「雷峰塔」及「虎跑泉」的搭車方向,一時怦然心動,回頭跟她說:「等一下,我跟你走,我也要去那裡。」

沒有想到,她一口回絕:「你別跟我!我跑得快!」

果然,我才一下公車,四顧張望,卻已經不見她的人影。不過,在重建的現代化的七層的雷峰塔裡,我繞來繞去,總是會遇到她。似乎彼此每招呼一次,彼此的感情就親近了一步似的。

傳說中的雷峰塔早就已經坍塌,遺址只剩一堆磚頭泥塊,被保留在現代化鋼架建築的底下兩層,用厚玻璃圍著,供人流連觀賞。上面的五層建築得美輪美奐,其中一層,雕塑著白素真從天庭起凡心,橋頭借傘,天庭盜藥草、水淹金山、到兒子登科,全家團圓的璧畫,雕塑得逼真細膩。還有一層是十一尊菩薩尊者的畫相、偈詩、禪語及傳略,將國畫的象徵筆法表現得玲瓏剔透。另有一層是歷代文人雅士對雷峰塔的題詩。我覺得美中不足的是,雷峰塔最早是宋朝末代吳越王錢俶為紀念皇妃所建,原先塔璧鐫刻有八十華嚴的經文。如今現代化重建,皇妃的事跡容或隱諱,但是華嚴的原始精神應該予以彰顯。

從雷峰塔出來後,我先到對面小吃店用完午餐,在霏霏細雨中,撐一把十元買到的小雨傘,到蘇堤及白堤附近的花園幽徑健行了幾個小時。出來後,我搭乘往虎跑方向的公車。

當我撐著小雨傘走進虎跑公園的林蔭小路,迎面而來的就是那位在雷峰塔邂逅五六次的中年婦人。她一見到我,興高采烈地說:「我一下雷峰塔就到處找你,逢人就問,卻被人譏笑,他又不是你的朋友,你為什麼要找他?」

我心中不無感動地回應,但是彼此畢竟就是初次相識的陌生人,一時話題只能繞著虎跑的李叔同及李濟公的紀念館交談。何況,她已經買好晚間回上海的車票,我也已經買好前往北京的夜車車票。這短暫的心靈交會,哪堪經得起理智跟現實的風吹雨打?

我們彼此揮手告別,內心的惆悵各自掩埋在各自的潛意識層!

Knowledge and truth

May 9, 2010

Knowledge and Truth 3
知識與真理
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡

What is knowledge? It is strange that, prior to Descartes, the question of knowledge had never been raised. Analysis had to come onto the scene before this question was raised afresh.

知識是什麼?耐人尋味的,笛卡爾以前,知識的問題從未被提出過。精神分析學必需先進入這個場域,才能重新提出這個問題。

Analysis came to announce to us that there is knowledge that is not known, knowledge that is based on the signifier as such. A dream does not introduce us into any kind of unfathomable experience or mystery—it is read in what is said about it, and one can go further by taking up the equivocations therein in the most anagrammatic sense of the word ( “ equivocations”). It is regarding that aspect of language that Saussure raised the question whether the strange punctuation marks he found in the saturnine verses were intentional or not. That is where Saussure was awaiting Freud. And it is where the question of knowledge is raised afresh.

精神分析學對我們宣稱,有些知識是不可思議,即使是以意符作為基礎的知識。我們作夢所感受的知識,並非什麼深不可測的經驗或神秘。我們閱讀夢境的所見所聞,然後像解答字謎一般地在字裡行間拆解分析,繼續探究下去。關於語言的這一方面,語言學家索緒爾提出這個問題:憂鬱症患者所寫的詩句,標點符號怪異,那是自然流露?還是刻意這樣?那就是索緒爾有待佛洛伊德來回答的地方。那是知識的問題要被重新提出的地方。

If you will excuse me for borrowing from an entirely different register, that of the virtues inaugurated by the Christian religion, there is here a sort of belated effect, an offshoot of charity. Wasn’t it charitable of Freud to have allowed the misery of speaking beings to say to itself that there is—since there is the unconscious –something transcendent, truly transcendent, which is but what the species inhabits, namely, language? Wasn’t there, yes, charity in the fact of announcing the news that his everyday life has, in language, a more reasonable basis than it seemed before, and that there is already some wisdom—unattainable object of a vain pursuit—there?

容我借用另一種完全不同的表達方式來解釋,那就是基督教所創導的善行,從事慈善行為的流派後來所產生的影響。佛洛伊德的行為難道不也是一種慈善行為嗎?假如他能讓說話的主體理解,從無意識界來觀照,自己的悲慘境遇,是對自己透露,有某種超越,真正超越的主體居住在自己身上,換句話說,是何許人也居住於自己的語言場域裡。是的,當佛洛伊德宣佈這個訊息:我們的日常生活表面看起來瑣碎無聊,但是經過語言的詮釋,變成深有意義,這難道不就是一種慈善行為?我們表面上看起來徒勞無功地追尋人生難於實現的目標,這個行為的本身難道不就是一種智慧的表現?

Do we need this whole detour to raise the question of knowledge in the form,” What is it that knows?” do we realize that it is the Other? –such as I posited it at the outset, as a locus in which the signifier is posited, and without which nothing indicates to us that there is a dimension of truth anywhere, a dit-mension, the residence of what is said, of this said ( dit) whose knowledge posits the other as locus. The status of knowledge implies as such that there already is knowledge, that it is in the other, and that it is to be acquired ( a prendre). That is why it is related to learning ( fait d’apprendre).

我們有需要迂迴一大圈,才能提出這個知識論的問題:「什麼是知識的主體?」難道我們還沒有體會到,那不就是大它者?如同我一開始就提出的,大它者是意符運作的軌跡。假如沒有大它者,就沒有任何人可以指示,有真理的向度存在。我們的一言一行的跡象,處處都顯示,大它者是我們意符運作的軌跡。人作為知識的主體的地位暗示著,人有認識自己的能力,那就是從大它者那裡,人可以獲得對於自己的知識。那就是為什麼,大它者跟學習有關。

The subject results from the fact that this knowledge must be learned, and even have a price put on it—in other words, it is its cost that values it, not as exchange but as use. Knowledge is worth just as much as it costs ( coute), a pretty penny ( beau-cout), in that it takes elbow grease and that it’s difficult. Difficult to what? Less to acquire it than to enjoy it ( d’en jouir).

主體的形成是由於這個事實:對於自我的知識必須經由學習而獲得,並且願意付出代價去獲得。換句話說,就是你付出的代價,使這個自我的知識具有價值,不是作為交換的價值,而是作為使用的價值。對於自我的知識的價值,跟它所付出的代價,及它所耗費的心力成正比,因為它非經頭破血流無法獲得,它是如此的艱難。艱難什麼?不是艱難於如何獲得,而是艱難於如何享有。

In the enjoying, the conquest of this knowledge is renewed every time it is exercised, the power it yields always being directed toward its jouissance.

當我們享有自我的知識時,每一次我們要運用它,我們就必須重新再克服它一次,它所產生的力量總是朝向它的歡爽。

It is strange that it has never been brought out clearly that the meaning of knowledge resides altogether in the fact that the difficulty of its exercise is the very thing that increases the difficulty of its acquisition. That is because, with every exercise of this acquisition, we find anew that there’s no point asking which of these repetitions was the first to have been learned .

耐人尋味的,有一個隱隱約約跡象顯示,對於自我的知識之所以那麼意義重大,完全就在於,對於自我的知識的運用越是困難,它所獲得的過程越是困難。那是因為,隨著這個獲得以後的每一次的運用,我們會重新發現到,重點不是在於詢問,這些重複的運用,有幾樣是原先所學習獲得的。

Of course there are things that run and that certainly seem to work like little machines—they are called computers . I am willing to accept the notion that a computer thinks. But that it knows, who would say such a thing? For the foundation of knowledge is that the jouissance of its exercise is the same as that of its acquisition.

當然,自我的知識會有一些運作,似乎可以像一些小機器般準確無誤。這些機器被稱之為電腦。我願意接受電腦會思維這樣的觀念。但是我無法接受電腦能夠認識自我的觀念。有誰願意說,電腦對自己的一生有所認識?因為認識的基礎是,它獲得的過程時的歡爽越是艱難,它運用時的歡爽就越強烈。

Here we encounter in a sure manner, surer than in Marx’s own work, the true nature of use value, since in Marx’s work use value serves only as an ideal point in relation to exchange value, to which everything is reduced.

在此,我們遭遇到使用價值的真正本質,以一種確定的方式,比馬克思自己的作品還要確定,因為馬克思的工作的使用價值,只是充當一個跟交換價值的理想點,當每一樣東西都貶低成為交換價值的時候。

Let us talk about this learned (appris) that is not based on exchange. With Marx’s knowledge of politics—which is not nothing—one cannot do “ commarxe,” if you will allow me. No more than one can, with Freud’s knowledge, defraud.

讓我談論一下,有關並不建立在交換價值之上的由學習獲的知識。用馬克思膾炙人口的知識的辯證法來說,我們無法拿「馬克思交易」,因為他是非賣品,容我這樣說。同樣的,佛洛伊德的自我的知識也無法拿來交易。

One has but to look to see that, wherever one does not come by such knowledge ( ces saviors) by pounding it into one’s head by tough experience, it falls flat. It can neither be imported nor exported. There is no information that stands up unless it is shaped for use ( forme a l’usage).

我們只要張望一下,就會看得出來。對於自我的認識,若是沒有歷經艱困就獲得,那種認識其實也沒有什麼可稱道。它既無法內化為自信,也無法博得別人的讚賞。除非它能在運用時,表現風範,這種認識只是虛張聲勢。

Thus is deduced the fact that knowledge is in the Other and owes nothing to being except that the latter has borne the letter thereof. From whence it results that being can kill where the letter reproduces, but never reproduces the same, never the same being of knowledge.

因此,我們可以推論,這種虛張聲勢的自我的認識受制於大它者,不是來自主體的實存,除非實存已經能夠建立自己的字母意符。主體的實存能夠從建立的意符那裡操縱,字母意符在哪裡再現它,但字母意符永遠無法再現相同的實存,永遠無法再現相同的知識主體的實存

I think you must have an inkling now of the function I grant the letter in relation to knowledge. I beg you not too quickly associate this function with so-called messages, for it makes the letter analogous to a germ cell , which, in the realm of molecular physiology, must be strictly separated from the bodies with respect to which it transmits life and dead together.

我想你們一定略微知道,我賦予跟自我知識相關的字母意符怎樣的功用。我請求你們不要太過於匆促就將這個功用,跟所謂的訊息傳遞混為一談,因為這樣會使字母意符類同於生殖細胞的功用。在分子生理學的領域,生殖細胞跟身體嚴格區分,因為身體的生存跟死亡都是經根據大它者的基礎,由它們來傳遞。

Marx and Lenin, Freud and Lacan are not coupled in being. It is via the letter they found in the other that, as beings of knowledge, they proceed two by two, in a supposed Other. What is new about their knowledge is that it doesn’t presume the Other knows anything about it—certainly not the being who constituted the letter there—for it is clearly on the basis of the other that he constituted the letter at his own expense, at the price of his being, which, by God, is not nothing at all for each of us, but not a whole lot either, to tell the truth.

馬克思與列寧,佛洛伊德與拉岡,就主體的實存而言,並非是雙雙對對。但是經由他們在大它者那裡所發現的字母意符,作為知識的主體而言,他們是並肩前進,成為被人認同的大它者。他們的自我認知新穎的地方在於,他們並不假定大它者什麼都知道,就字母意符所組成的主體的實存而言,他們確實無法什麼都知道。顯而易見的,他們犧牲自己作為代價,他們以自己主體的實存作為代價,組成自己的字母意符,作為大它者的基礎。就大它者是上帝的標準而言,這樣的犧牲對於我們個別來說,並非毫無意義,但是說實在話,也不是對於全體人類都有意義。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com

Knowledge and truth 2

May 7, 2010

Knowledge and truth 2
知識與真理
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡:再來

Analysis presumes that desire is inscribed on the basis of a corporal contingency.

精神分析學假設,欲望的鐫刻以肉體的一時的激情為基礎。

Let me remind you what I based this term “ contingency” on. The phallus—as analysis takes it up as the pivotal or extreme point of what is enunciated as the cause of desire—analytic experience stops not writing it. It is in this “ stops not being written” that resides the apex of what I have called contingency.

讓我提醒你們,「激情」這個術語的基礎是什麼。那就是陽具。因為精神分析學接納陽具作為被表達為欲望的原因的關鍵點,精神分析的經驗會永不停止地書寫它。我所謂的一時的激情的最高潮,就在於這個「永不停止地被書寫」。

Analytic experience encounters its terminus ( terme) here, for the only thing it can produce, according to my writing, is S1. I think you still remember the clamor I managed to stir up last time by designating this signifier, S1, as the signifier of even the most idiotic jouissance—in the two senses of the term, the idiot’s jouissance, which certainly functions as a reference here, and also the oddest jouissance.

精神分析經驗遭遇到它的終極限制,因為依照我的書寫,它唯一能夠產生的是第一主體。我想你們還依舊記得,我上一次引起的譁然,當我指明這個第一主體的意符,作為白痴般歡爽的意符。歡爽這個術語有兩層意義:其一是白痴般的歡爽,在此確實可以充當符號之用;另外一種是古怪的歡爽。

The necessary is introduced to us by the “ doesn’t stop”( ne cesse pas) The “ doesn’t stop” of the necessary is the “ doesn’t stop being written”( ne cesse pas de s’ ecrire).Analysis of the reference to the phallus apparently leads us to this necessity.

「永不停止」給我們介紹的觀念是必需的場域。必需的場域的「永不停止」意思就是「永不停止被書寫」。精神分析學提到陽具,顯而易見,會引導我們到達這個必需的場域。

The “ doesn’t stop not being written,” on the contrary, is the impossible and it is with this that I characterize the sexual relationship—the sexual relationship doesn’t stop not being written.

在另一方面,「永不停止不被書寫」目標是不可能的場域。我給它下這樣的定義,根據的事實是:不可能的場域無論如何無法被書寫。我用這個事實來表現性關係的特徵:性關係永不停止不被書寫。

Because of this, the apparent necessity of the phallic function turns out to be mere contingency. It is as a mode of the contingent that the phallic function stops not being written. What submits the sexual relationship to being, for speaking beings, but the regime of the counter is tantamount to contingency. It is only a contingency that, thanks to psychoanalysis , the phallus, reserved in antient times to the Mysteries, has stopped not being written. Nothing more. It has not entered into the “ doesn’t stop,” that is, into the field on which depend necessity, on the one hand, and impossibility.

因為這樣,陽具功能顯而易見的必需,結果就成為只是一時的激情。只有充當一時的激情模式,陽具才停止不被書寫。對於說話的主體而言,這是性關係所能提供的生命的存在感覺,但是這種邂逅的模式,不也是相當於一時的激情?在古代,保留在神秘主義秘而不宣,現在的精神分析學則揭櫫出來:只有充當一時的激情,陽具才已經停止不被書寫。僅此而已。陽具並沒有進入到「永不停止」的階段,換句話說,進入到一方面是必需的領域,另一方面是不可能的領域。

The true thus attests here that by making us beware the imaginary, as it does, it has a lot to do with “ a-anatomy.”

這個真相證實,陽具讓我們注意到想像界的存在,它跟「超生理解剖學」有密切關係。

It is, in the final analysis, from a depreciatory perspective that I contribute the three terms I write as a , S(A), and Φ. They are written on the triangle constituted by the imaginary; the Symbolic, and the Real.

追根究底,我就是從這個貶抑陽具功能的觀點,來提出我書寫的術語,如小客體、被大它者禁制的主體,及被閹割的陽具。它們被書寫成由想像界、意符界、真實界所組成的三個角落。

To the right is the scant reality ( peu-de-reahte) on which the pleasure principle is based, which is such that everything we allowed to approach by way of reality remains rooted in fantasy.

右邊的斜線是快樂原則作為基礎的貧瘠的現實世界。這個現實世界是如此的貧瘠,以致於透過它所能接近的一切,都是根源於幻見。

On the other side, what is S (A) but the impossibility of telling the whole truth ( tout le vrai), about which I spoke earlier?

在另一方面,這個被大它者禁制的主體,難道不是我先前所說過,不可能說出整個真相的主體?

Lastly, the symbolic, directing itself toward the real, shows us the true nature of object a. If I qualified it earlier as a semblance of being, it is because it seems to give us the basis of being. In everything elaborated on being and even on essence, in Aristotle’s work for example, we can see, if we read it on the basis of analytic experience, that object a is what is at stake. Contemplation, for example, Aristotelian contemplation, is based on the gaze, a I defined it in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, as one of the four media that constitute the cause of desire.

最後,意符界引導自身朝向真實界的時候,會顯現小客體的真實特性。早先我將它的特質定位為存在的冒充偽裝,那是因為它似乎給我們作為生命存在的基礎。以亞里斯多德的作品為例,對於生命存在及生命本質的各種論述,我們能夠看出,假如我根據精神分析經驗來閱讀,那個小客體的地位岌岌可危。沉思,例如亞里斯多德的沉思,是建立在眼光的凝視,如同我在「精神分析學的四個基本觀念」所定義的,作為組成欲望的原因的四個媒介之一。

With such a ‘ graphicization”—not to say “ graph,” because that term has a precise meaning in the mathematical logic—we are the correspondences that make the real an open (set) between semblance, a result of the symbolic, and reality as it is based on the concreteness of human life: on what leads men, on what makes them always run headlong down the same pathways, and on what is such that the yet-to-be-born ( encore-a-naitre) will never yield anything but l’encorne.

用這樣的「圖形化」(我姑且不用「圖形」這個術語,因為那個術語的準確意義,是用在數理邏輯方面),我們精神分析學是中間的聯繫,使真實界成為一個開放的集合場域,處於意符界產生的小客體的冒充偽裝,及人類的生活具體表現的現實世界之間。在現實世界的人類,總是身不由己地被迫朝著跟前人相同的途徑盲人前進,內心的渴望所能產生的滿足就是「再來一次」。

On the other side we have a. Being on the right path, overall, it would have us take it for being , in the name of the following—that it is apparently something. But it only dissolves , in the final analysis, owing to its failure, unable, as it is, to sustain itself in approaching the real.

在另一方面,我們擁有小客體。大體上,小客體的途徑是正確的,有時它還讓我們誤以為它就是生命的存在,因為它顯而易見是擁有很具體的東西。但是追根究底,它會煙消雲散,因為事實上它在靠近真實界時,它就無法支撐自己。

The true, then, of course, is that. Except that it is never reached except by twisted pathways. To appeal to the true, as we are often led to do, is simply to recall that one must not make the mistake of believing that we are already at the level of semblance. Before the semblance, on which, in effect, everything is based and springs back in fantasy, a strict distinction must be made between the imaginary and the real. It must not be thought that we ourselves in any way serve as a basis for the semblance. We are not even semblance. We are, on occasion, that which can occupy that place, and allow what to reign there ? Object a.

當然,真相因此就是這樣。除了不斷地迂迴曲折,它永遠無法抵達。如我們時常所被引導,讓真相大白的方法就是回想起,我們一定不要犯下這個錯誤,以為冒充偽裝的小客體就是真實界。在這個冒充偽裝之前,每一樣我們所賴以建立的,以及起源於幻想的東西,我們都必須嚴格區分是屬於想像界,還是真實界。我們千萬不要以為,我們自己就可以充當冒充偽裝的基礎。我們甚至還夠不上冒充偽裝。有時候,我們只是且權佔有那個位置,然後讓什麼東西在那裡號發司令?那就是小客體。

Indeed, the analyst, of all ( those whose) orders of discourse are sustained currently ( actuellement)—and that word is not nothing, provided we give “ action’ its full Aristotelian meaning—is the one who, by putting object a in the place of semblance, is in the best position to do what should rightfully ( juste) be done, namely, to investigate the status of truth as knowledge.

的確,在目前可以自成一家之言的四個真理論述當中,精神分析師的真理論述主張,只要我們將亞里斯多德的「行動」的觀念貫徹始終,文字語言能否表達無關緊要。我們用小客體來代替那個冒充偽裝,是最有立場可以來做理應當做的事情,換句話說,最有立場來調查真理作為知識的地位。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
Springherohsiung@gmail.com

Knowledge and truth

May 6, 2010

Knowledge and Truth
知識與真理
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡

I would really like it if, from time to time, I had a response, even a protest.

有時,我真希望有人對我回應,即使是抗議都好。

I left rather worried the last time, to say the least. It seemed altogether bearable to me, nevertheless, when I reread what I had said—that’s my way of saying that it was very good. But I wouldn’t be displeased if someone could attest to having understood something. It would be enough for a hand to go up for me to give that hand the floor, so to speak.

上一次我離開時,心理忐忑不安,容我含蓄地說。我覺得我講得太過火爆,可是當我重新閱讀我講的內容,我又覺得句句出之肺腑,沒有什麼不好。即使有人認為我是胡說八道,我也不會有什麼不高興。換句話說,假如有人舉手發言,要求我立即中止胡說。

I see that no one is putting a hand up, and thus I must go on.

我看到,現在並沒有人舉手,那我就繼續講下去。
1
What I will willingly write for you today as “ hainamoration” is the depth ( relief) psychoanalysis was able to situate the zone of its experience. It was evidence of good will on its part. If only it had been able to call it by some other name than the bastardized one of “ ambivalence,” perhaps it would have succeeded better in shaking up the historical setting in which it inserted itself. But perhaps that was modesty on its part.

.今天,我很樂意為你演講的內容是「愛恨情結」,這是精神分析學在經驗的領域所能夠探勘到的縱深位置。這是它的善意。即使它想不出其它更好的名稱,而套用一般的陳腔濫調為「愛恨交加」,它仍然成功地動搖到,精神分析學能夠成為一門科學的真理的歷史背景。但是,將它定位為一門學科,可能是小覷了它的功能。

I mentioned last time that it’s no accident Freud arms himself with Empedocles’ statement that God must be the most ignorant of all beings, since he does not know hatred. The question of love is thus linked to that of knowledge. I added that Christians transformed God’s non-hatred into a mark of love. It is here that analysis reminds us that one knows nothing of love without hate. Well, if the knowledge ( connaissance)that has been fomented over the course of the centuries disappoints us, and if today we must overhaul the function of knowledge, it is perhaps because hatred has never been put in its proper place.

我上一次提到,佛洛伊德不是無緣無故,才引述恩比特克拉斯的陳述:宇宙萬物,上帝最為純樸無知,因為他不懂得什麼叫恨。愛的問題因此跟認知的問題息息相關。我補充說,基督徒將上帝的無所怨恨,轉變成為博愛眾生。但是,過去幾個世紀來,這個認知的宣導變成只是陳腔濫調,真是令人大失所望。今天,假如我們必須對這個認知的功能大加整修,那可能是因為恨的位置沒有被適當地擺好。

True, that doesn’t seem to be the most desirable thing to mention. That’s why I ended last time with the sentence, “ One could say that the more a man believes a woman confuse him with God, in other words, what she enjoys,” recalls the schema I presented last time, “ the less he hates,” and simultaneously, “ the less he loves.” I wasn’t too happy about having ended on that note, which is nevertheless a truth. That is why today I will examine once more in what respect the true and the real apparently get confused.

的確,我們似乎很不願意提起這樣的事情。那就是為什麼上一次結束時,我會說出這樣的句子:「我們能夠說,男人越是相信女人將他跟上帝混淆,換句話說,跟她心目中的仰慕混淆,」請回想一下我上一次提出論述,「他就恨得越少,」同時,「他也愛得越少。」以那樣悲觀的語調作為終結,我自己並不太樂意,可是那是一句真實的論述。那就是為什麼我今天要再一次審察一下,我將真理的論述跟真實界在哪些方面混為一談。

“ The true aims at the real”—that statement is the fruit of a long reduction of pretensions to truth. Wherever truth presents itself, assers itself as if it were an ideal that could be based on speech, it is not so easily attained. If analysis rests on a presumption, it is that knowledge about truth can be constituted on the basis of its experience.

「真理的論述的目標是真實界。」那句陳述是真理長期被冒充偽裝的結果。無論真理在哪裡展現自己,宣稱自己宛如是一個能夠以言語為基礎的理想,實際上,真理並沒有那麼容易獲得。假如精神分析學要以真理作為前提,那是它對於真理的認知,是以它實際的經驗所構成。

In the little writing ( gramme) I gave you of analytic discourse, a is written in the upper left-hand corner, and is supported by S2, in other words, by knowledge insofar as it is in the place of truth. It is from that point that it interrogates $, which must lead to the production of S1, that is, of the signifier by which can be resolved what ? It s relation to truth

我用底下的小公式,來為你們說明精神分析學的論述。小客體a被放置左上方,底下支撐它的是第二主體S2,換句話說,在真實界認知的主體。這個主體從那個位置質疑右上方被禁制的主體 $。這個被禁制的主體會導致右下方的第一主體S1的產生,換句話說,藉由意符而產生什麼,產生它跟真理的關係。

Truth, let us say, to go right to the quick, is originally δληθεια, a term about which Heidegger speculated extensively. Emet, the Hebrew term, is, like every term for truth, of juridical origin. Even in our times, a witness is asked to tell the truth, nothing but the truth, and, what’s more, the whole truth, if he can—but how, alas, could he? We demand of him the whole truth about what he knows. But, in fact, what is sought—especially in legal testimony—is that on the basis of which one can judge his jouissance. The goal is that jouissance be avowed, precisely insofar as it may be unavowable. The truth sought is the one that is unavowable with respect with respect to the law that regulates jouissance.

容我們直截了當地說,真理就是原先的「實存」,關於這個術語,哲學家海德格曾經上窮碧落下黃泉般地探索。猶如希伯來文的Emet,這個術語道地是真理的術語,是公平正義的起源。即使在我們的時代,法庭上的證人被要求說真實的話,僅僅就是真實的話。而且是盡可能是全部的實話。問題是他怎麼可能呢?我們要求他說出全部他所知道的真實的話,但是事實上,我們所尋求到的,特別是在法庭的證詞,只是判斷證人是否憑良心的歡爽說出真相。問題是,即使對著聖經公開宣稱,那種公開宣稱也不見得就是憑著良心的歡爽。我們所要尋求的真相,往往是無法公開宣稱出來,因為良心的歡爽隸屬於法律的規範,必然會有隱瞞。

It is also in that sense that, in Kant’s terms, the problem is raised of what a free man should do when one proposes to him all the jouissance if he denounces the enemy who the tyrant fears is disputing his jouissance. From the imperative that nothing pathetic should dicate testimony, must we deduce that a free man ought to tell the tyrant the truth, even if that means delivering the enemy or rival into the tyrant’s hands by his truthfulness? The reservations sparked in all of us by Kant’s answer, which is affirmative, stem from the fact that the whole truth is what cannot be told. It is what can only be told on the condition that one doesn’t push it to the edges, that one only half-tells ( mi-dire) it.

用康德的術語來說,那種困境牽涉到一個難題:當一位自由人被要求發乎良心的歡爽時,他應該做何選擇?假如他正在指控的敵人,是暴君最為畏懼,卻正在爭辯說他要發乎良心的歡爽作證詞。由於法律要求作證詞時,要據實以告,不受私情干擾,我們一定會推論出,一位自由人應該對暴君說實話,即使那意味著,說實話會將敵人或對方送進暴君的虎口。康德的回答是肯定的,但我們大家內心都難免還是有所保留,這起源於這個事實:全部的真相就是不能夠據實以告。說出的部份是無關緊要,就是不要引起大禍。我們只好似真似假地說。

Yet another thing restrains ( ligote) us regarding the status of truth: the fact that jouissance is a limit. This is related to the very structure that was evoked by my “ quadripodes” at the time at which I constructed them for you—jouissance is questioned , evoked, tracked, and elaborated only on the basis of a semblance.

可是,關於真理的地位,還有一件事約束著我們。那就是,良心的歡爽有一個限制。容我用「四個階段」的結構來加以說明:良心的歡爽是真理的冒充偽裝,中間要經歷質疑、召喚、追蹤、裝扮等四個階段。

Love itself, as I stressed last time, is addressed to the semblance. And if it is true that the Other is only reached if it attaches itself, as I said last time, to a, the cause of desire, then love is also addressed to the semblance of being. That there-being is not nothing. It is attributed to that object that is a.

如我上一次強調的,愛的本身面臨的對象是冒充偽裝。如我上次所說,如果大它者要先連接到小客體,這個欲望的原因,我們才能夠接近它,那麼愛所面臨的對象,也是主體存在的冒充偽裝。那個冒充偽裝的存在並不是空無,它可追根究底到那個小客體。

Shouldn’t we find anew here the trace that, insofar as such, it (cor)responds to some imaginary? I have expressly designated that imaginary as I ( lI), insolated here from the term “ imaginary.” It is only on the basis of the clothing of the self-image that envelops the object cause of desire that the object relationship is most often sustained—that is the very articulation of analysis.

我們在此難道不應該重新找到那個對應或回應於想像界的小客體的蹤跡?我曾經簡明地指出,作為自我主體的「想像界」,跟一般「想像」的術語,是兩碼子事。只有根據小客體作為欲望的原因,來裝扮自我的表面形象,我們才能夠維持這樣的客體關係。這是精神分析學清楚表明的。

The affinity of a to its envelope is one of the major conjunctions put forward by psychoanalysis. To me it essentially introduces a point about which we must be suspicious.

小客體跟它的表面的自我形象的密切關係,是精神分析學所提出的幾個重要的聯合之一。對於我而言,這個關係基本上會產生一個可疑之點,我們必須要注意到。

This is where the real distinguishes itself. The real can only be inscribed on the basis of an impasse of formalization. That is why I thought I should provide a model of it using mathematical formalization, inasmuch as it is the most advanced elaboration we have by which to produce signifierness. The mathematical formalization of signifierness runs counter to meaning—I almost said “ a contre-sens.” In our times, philosophers of mathematics say “ it means nothing” concerning mathematics, even when they are mathematicians themselves, like Russell.

那就是真實界顯現出來的地方。真實界只有在形式化的公式形成僵局時,它的銘記才會顯現出來。那就是為什麼我應該用數學的形式化公式,提供一個真實界的模式,這是我們用來產生意符意義的最先進的建構方法。意符的數學的形式化公式,跟意義相對並存,容我誇張地說,有時是「矛盾並存」。在我們的時代,數學的哲學家,甚至他們本身也是數學家,如羅素,談到數學時說到:「數學別無意義」。

And yet, compared to a philosophy that culminates in Hegel’s discourse—a plentitude of contrasts dialectized in the idea of an historical progression, which, it must be said, nothing substantiates for us—can’t the formalization of mathematical logic, which is based only on writing, serve us in the analytic process, in that what invisibly holds bodies is designated therein?

可是,跟在黑格爾的真理論述登峰造極時的哲學比較起來,數學邏輯的形式化公式,無數的符號演算,難道不是可以用來詮釋精神分析經驗的過程?正如黑格爾的正反合的歷史辯證法的進展,演算了一大堆的對比符號,雖然沒有幾樣可以讓我們在現實中驗證的,但是具體的事物背後的隱形力量,難道不是隱隱約約地顯現嗎?

If I were allowed to give an image for this, I would easily take that which, in nature, seems to most closely approximate the reduction to the dimensions of the surface writing requires, at which Spinoza himself marveled—the textual work that comes out of the spider’s belly, its web. It is a truly miraculous function to see, on the very surface emerging from an opaque point of this strange beings, the trace of these writings taking form, in which one can grasp the limits, impasses, and dead ends that show the real acceding to the symbolic.

容許我以一個意象具體說明:數學公式化的寫作要求一個表面的向度,似乎最酷似這個表面的向度的情境,就是本文的作品像一張蜘蛛網,是從蜘蛛的肚子裡吐出來,對這個現象,哲學家史賓諾莎本人都大吃一驚。看到這些寫作的痕跡逐漸成形,像是蜘蛛這樣的奇怪動物從某一個模糊的地方,綿綿吐出一大張蜘蛛網,
這真是令人歎為觀止的功用!從這些寫作的痕跡,我們能夠理解到限制、困境、及進退兩難顯示,真實世界如何委曲求全於意符世界。

That is why I do not believe that it was in vain that I eventually came up with the inscriptions a, the $ o the signifier, A, and ψ. Their very writing constitutes a medium that goes beyond speech, without going beyond language’s actual effects. Its value lies in centering the symbolic, on the condition of knowing how to use it, for what? To retain a congruous truth—not the truth that claims to be whole, but that of the half-telling, the truth that is borne out by guarding against going as far as a vowal, which would be the worst, the truth that becomes guarded starting right with the cause of desire.

這就是為什麼我不相信,我是白費力氣,當我最後終於想出這一些符號銘記,諸如小客體a,意符世界被禁制的主體$,大它者A,及被閹割的陽具Φ。它們的寫作形成一種媒介,超越言語的限制,卻還是保持在語言的實際的效果之內。它們的價值在於意符符號專注於如何使用的情況。為了什麼呢?為了要保持一個和諧的真理,不是宣稱是整體的真理,而是半真半假的真理。這個真理的驗證,在於它小心警覺提防不要公開承認。那是最糟糕的情況,真理直接從欲望的原因開始,就必須要小心警覺提防。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com
a

A love letter 6

May 4, 2010

A love letter 6
一封情書
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡

If the unconscious has taught us anything, it is first of all that somewhere in the other it knows ( ca sait). It knows because it is based precisely on those signifiers with which the subject constitutes himself.

假如無意識曾經教導我們什麼,首先就是,在大它者的某個地方,它知道。它知道,因為它建立在意符或能指的基礎上,那是主體賴以組成自己的內涵。

Now that leads to a conclusion, because it is difficult for whoever souloves not to think that everything in the world knows what it has to do. If Aristotle props up his God with the unmoving sphere on the basis of which everyone must pursue his good, it is because that sphere is supposed to know what is good for it. That is what the break ( faille) induced by scientific discourse obliges us to do without.

可是,混淆卻因此而產生,因為熱愛靈魂的主體很難不這樣認為,宇宙萬物都能知道它必須做些什麼。亞里斯多德的上帝的觀念,是以一個靜止的地球作為基礎,然後依照這個基礎,每個人追求他的至善,因為那個地球應該知道,什麼對自己是最好的利益。可是,現在科學真理卻發現,地球不是靜止不動,而是繞著太陽運轉。這個宇宙觀的分歧迫使我們揚棄亞里斯多德至善的觀念。

There is no need to know why—we no longer have any need whatsoever for the knowledge Aristotle situates at the origin. In order to explain the effects of gravitation , we don’t need to assume the stone knows where it must land. Imputing a soul to animals makes knowing the act par excellence of nothing other than the body—you see that Aristotle wasn’t completely off the wall—except that the body is made for an activity, an ενεργεμγ, and that somewhere the entelechy of this body is based on the substance he calls the soul.

沒有需要去知道為什麼,對於亞里斯多德的宇宙起源的知識,我們就是不再有任何絲毫需要。我們不需要假定石頭知道它一定會掉落在哪裡,我們才能夠解釋地心引力的影響。將靈魂賦予動物,會使認知成為一種道道地地就是身體的活動。你們明白,亞里斯多德還不至於那麼糊塗,會看不出這一點。問題是,身體原是為活動而創造的,這個身體的活動的整體一致,還需要以他所謂的靈魂的物質為基礎。

Analysis allows for this confusion by restoring the final cause, by making us say that, as concerns everything at least related to speaking beings, reality is like that—in other words, phantasmatic. Is that something that can, in any way whatsoever, satisfy scientific discourse?

精神分析學考慮到這種身體與靈魂的混淆,恢復最終的原因,使我們明白,至少與說話主體有關的事情,真相就是那樣,換句話說,就是一廂情願的幻想。這種說法能在哪一方面,使科學的真理論述能自圓其說?

There is, according to analytic discourse, an animal that happens to be endowed with the ability to speak ( qui se trouve parlant) and who, because he inhabits the signifier, is thus a subject of it. Henceforth, everything is played out for him at the level of fantasy, but at the level of a fantasy that can be perfectly disarticulated in a way that accounts for the following—that he knows a lot more about things than he thinks when he acts. But this isn’t tantamount to the beginnings of a cosmology.

依照精神分析學的真理論述,有一種動物恰好稟賦有說話的能力,並且因為居住在意符的世界,也是一個意符的主體。從此,他的所作所為,都是以意符世界產生的幻見的層次。但是這個幻見的層次卻脫離原有的真實世界,而自成一個幾乎就是真實的世界。這說明以下的情境:他對於自己正在做些什麼,他的腦筋所思想的,遠不如他實際所知道。可是,這個情境並不就是等於是宇宙洪荒開始時的情境。

That is the eternal ambiguity of the term “ unconscious.” Certainly, the unconscious is presupposed on the basis of the fact that there is, somewhere in the speaking being, something that knows more about things than he does, but this is not an acceptable model of the world. Psychoanalysis, insofar it derives its very possibility from the discourse of science, is not a cosmology, though it suffices for man to dream for him to see reemerge this immense bric-a-brac, this cluttered storeroom with which he has to make do, which assuredly makes a soul of him, a soul that is occasionally lovable when something is willing to love it.

那就是「無意識」這個術語永遠會模糊不清的原因。的確,無意識所根據的理論基礎是:人作為一個說話主體,身上有某個部位知道事情的原委,遠超過他的理智所知道的。可是,在意符的世界,這並不是大家所接受的認知模式。精神分析學能夠成立,是起源於它作為一門科學的真理論述,所以它並不是一種宇宙起源學,儘管它的種種表現,足夠引起人們期盼它能使宇宙起源的真實面貌重現。這樣,人才能夠成為具有靈魂的主體。靈魂有時是蠻可愛的,假如有人願意愛它的話。問題是,精神分析學只能以科學的真理論述,在宇宙起源的巨大古董室,在這雜亂的儲藏室,將就地翻箱倒篋。

A woman can, as I said, love in a man only the way in which he faces the knowledge thanks to which ( dont) he souloves. But, concerning the knowledge thanks to which (dont) he is, the question is raised on the basis of the fact that there is something, jouissance, regarding which ( dont) it is not possible to say whether a woman can say anything about it, whether she can say what she knows about it.

如我所說,女人之所以愛男人,是因為那個男人能夠認知到隸屬於自己的靈魂,並且熱愛自己的靈魂。但是,關於這個隸屬於自己的靈魂的存在之愛的認知,發生了一個問題,那就是靈魂之愛,也就是存在之愛,是一種歡爽。關於這個歡爽,女人內心是否知道是一回事,嘴巴是否說得出來,又是另一回事。

At the end of today’s lecture, I have thus arrived, as always, at the edge of what polarized my subject, namely, whether the question of what she knows about it can be raised. That is no different from the question whether the term she gets off on ( don’t elle jouit) beyond all this “ playing” ( jouer) that constitutes her relationship to man—the term I call the Other, signifying it with an A—whether this term knows anything. For it is in this respect that she herself as subjugated ( sujette) to the Other, just as much as man.

今天的演講結束時,如平常一樣,我已經講到人作分裂主體的兩極的邊緣,換句話說,人對於自己分裂的認知,究竟懂多少的問題會被提出來。這個問題等於是在問:女人對於愛這個術語的期盼,是否超越它在意符界的「扮演」?對於組成她自己跟男人的關係,跟我所謂的大它者的關係,用字母A作為大它者的意符的關係,愛這個術語是否懂得自己的意涵。因為在這一方面,女人隸屬於大它者,如同男人也同樣隸屬於大它者。

Does the Other know?
問題是:大它者知道嗎?

There was someone named Empedocles—as if by chance, Freud uses him from time to time like a corkscrew—of whose work we know but three lines but Aristotle draws the consequences of them very well when he enunciates that, in the end, God was the most ignorant of all beings according to Empedocles, because he knew nothing of hatred. That is what the Christians later transformed into floods of love. Unfortunately, that doesn’t fit, because not to know hatred in the least is not know love in any way either. If God does not know hated, according to Empedocles, it is clear that he knows less about it than morals.

古希臘有一位哲學家恩比多克勒斯,湊巧地,佛洛伊德也時常提到他,充當激情的愛的典範。他遺留下來的作品只有三行,但是亞里斯多德從這三行借題發揮成許多結論。他宣告說,依照恩比多克勒斯的說法,追根究底,上帝是宇宙萬物中最純樸無知,因為他不曉得什麼叫恨。那就是後來轉變成為基督徒的說不盡的愛。不幸地,這樣的轉變前後並不一致,因為根本不知道什麼叫恨的人,也根本不知道什麼叫愛。假如依照恩比多克勒斯的說法,上帝不知道什麼叫恨,那顯而易見,我們人類對於恨的理解,遠勝過於上帝。

The upshot is that one could say that the more a man can believe a woman confuses him with God, in other words, what she enjoys, the less he hates ( haie), the less he is (est) –both spellings are intended—and since, after all, there is no love without hate, the less he loves.

結論是:我們可以說,男人越是相信女人把他跟上帝混淆,換句話說,把他跟她的仰慕混淆,他就恨得越少,他的靈魂的存在就越少,也就是他愛得越少。這裡的兩個拉丁拼字haie 跟est是殊途同歸,畢竟,沒有恨,就沒有愛。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com

A love letter 5

May 3, 2010

A love letter 5
一封情書
Encore by Jacques Lacan
拉岡:再來

Next I made an allusion to courtly love, which appeared at the time at which homosexual amusement had fallen into supreme decadence, in that sort of impossible bad dream known as feudalism. At that level of political degeneracy, it must have become perceptible that, for woman, there was something that could no longer work at all.

其次,我要提到宮廷之愛,它出現在同性戀的娛樂頹廢到極致的時代,是眾所周知的帝王封建制度,匪夷所思的神奇夢想。在那個政治墮落的時代,大家一定可以感受到,對於女人而言,總是有某個地方不太對勁。

The invention of courtly love is not at all the fruit of what people are historically used to symbolizing with the ‘ thesis-antithesis-synthesis.” There wasn’t the slightest synthesis afterward, of course—in fact, there never is. Courtly love shone as brightly as a meteor in history and afterward we witnessed the return of all the bric-a-brac of a supposed renaissance of stale antiquities. Courtly love has remained enigmatic.

宮廷之愛的發明,完全不是歷史上習慣於用「正、反、合」辯證法可以解釋的結果。當然,後來根本也沒有什麼「合」,事實上,從來就沒有什麼「合」。宮廷之愛在歷史上曾經像流星一般閃耀一時,然後我們就見證到繁文縟節的男歡女愛的復古之風。宮廷之愛的出現始終是個謎團。

Here there is a little parenthesis—when one gives rise to two ( quand un fait deux), there is never a return. They don’t revert to making one again, even if it is a new one. Aufhebung is one of philosophy’s pretty little dreams.

這裡有一個小插曲,雖然男歡女愛的方式一變再變,無所謂復古不復古。即使是一種新潮的方式,其實是老早就曾經盛行過。「棄存揚新」在哲學上,只是一廂情願的美夢。

After the meteor of courtly love, what relegated courtly love to its original futility came from an entirely different partition. It required nothing less than scientific discourse, that is, something that owes nothing to the presuppositions of antiquity’s soul.

在宮廷之愛盛行一時之後,導致它回復到原來的男歡女愛,那一種完全不同的時代區隔。它需要道道地地的科學的真理探討,才能區別出來,換句話說,不要對古代人的歡愛靈魂預先存有定見。

And it is from that alone that psychoanalysis emerged, namely, the objectivation of the fact that the speaking being still spends time speaking to no avail (en pure perte).He still spends time speaking for a purpose that is among the shortest-lived—the shortest-lived, I say, because it is no more than still ( encore) underway. In other words, it will continue only as long as it takes for it to finally be resolved—that’s what we have coming to us—demongraphically.

只有從科學的態度出發,精神分析學才有發揮之處。換句話說,說話的主體依舊花費時間喋喋不休,精神分析學將這個事實當著一個研究對象。主體依舊花費時間為一個短暫的目標喋喋不休。我說這個目標是短暫,因為它僅僅是旋起旋落地進行。換句話說,主體的花言巧語只是為了一時的求歡,歡愛過後,就忘得一乾二淨。

That is not at all what will fix man’s relationship with women. It is Freud’s genius to have seen that. Freud, what a funny name—Kraft durch Freud, it’s a whole platform! It is the funniest leap in the sacred farce of history. One could, perhaps, while this turning-point lasts, have an inkling of something that concerns the Other, insofar as woman deals with it.

這根本不是修補男歡女愛的正途。佛洛伊德一眼看出這一點,真是先知先覺。佛洛伊德的名字本身就饒有趣味,「歡樂帶來力量」,這可是男歡女愛的整個舞台!郎有意女有情,卻裝出一板正經的假道學,在此可是向前邁出一大步。即使是在態度正在轉變的時刻,人們可能已經略微感受到,要跟女人求歡做愛,總要有個大它者,才能名正言順地進行。

I am providing now an essential complement to something that has already been very clearly seen, but that would be clarified by seeing by what pathways it was seen.

我現在對於已經顯而易見的事實,再提出一個重要的補充說明,讓大家可以看見,男歡女愛還需要一位大它者的仲介,是怎樣顯現出來。

What was seen, but only regarding men, is that what they deal with is object a, and that the whole realization of the sexual relationship leads to fantasy. It was seen, of course, regarding neurotics. How do neurotics make love? That is the question with which people began . They couldn’t help but notice that there was a correlation with the perversions—which supports my a , because a is what is there as the cause, whatever the said perversion.

關於男人,顯而易見的是,他們處理的對象是小客體。整個性關係的實現都會導致性幻想。當然,這在精神官能症患者,看得更為清楚。精神官能症患者如何做愛呢?人們開始問這個問題。他們不得不注意到,精神官能症患者的做愛跟變態有些關聯。這跟我所提出的小客體不謀而合,因為小客體可以充當他性幻想的原因,無論他的變態是哪一種。

What is amusing is that Freud at first attributed the perversions to women—see the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality. That is truly a confirmation that, when one is a man, one sees in one’s partner what one props oneself up on, what one is propped up by narcissistically.

耐人尋味是,佛洛伊德起初將變態狂歸咎於女人(請參照「有關性的理論的三篇論文」)。這個論點的確可以獲得證實,當主體是男人,他會在性伴侶身上看到支撐自己的自戀,以及被自己的自戀所支撐的東西。

But people had the opportunity after that to notice that the perversion, such as we believe we discern them in neurosis, are not that at all. Neurosis consists in dreaming, not perverse acts. Neurotics have none of the characteristics of perverts. They simply dream of being perverts, which is quite natural, for how else could they attain their partner?

但是後來,人們有機會注意到,諸如我們在精神官能症患者身上所覺察出來的變態狂,根本不是那個樣子。精神官能症患者的病因在於做白日夢,而不是變態的行為。精神官能症患者並沒有變態狂的病徵。他們只是幻想自己變成變態狂,這是很自然的事,因為除了幻想之外,他們如何得到他們的性伴侶呢?

People then began to meet perverts—they’re the ones Aristotle didn’t want to see at all costs. There is in them a subversion of behavior based on a savoir-faire, which is linked to knowledge (savoir), knowledge of the nature of thins—there is a direct connection between sexual behavior and its truth, namely, its amorality. Put some soul at the beginning of that—amorality…

於是,人們開始跟變態狂相會面,儘管他們是亞里斯多德的倫理學最不願意見到的人物。他們以機智靈活,顛覆正常的行為。而機智靈活跟知識,跟事情的實質真相的知識有關聯。他們發現性行為跟它的真相有直接的關聯,換句話說,這個真相超越在道德之外。性行為的開始要先有靈魂,這個靈魂超越在道德之外。

There is a morality—that is the consequence—of sexual behavior. The morality of sexual behavior is what is implicit in ( sous-entendu) everything that has been said about the Good.

可是性行為會有後果,就是它必須接受的道德的規範。性行為的這個道德規範,可以從非禮勿視、非禮勿動等合宜行為看出端倪。

But endlessly saying good things leads to Kant where morality shows its true colors. That is what I felt I needed to lay out in an article, “ Kant with Sade”—morality admits that it is Sade.

但是侃侃而談合宜行為,會形成哲學家康德所謂的「道德的真實面貌」。那就是我覺得我有需要發表的一篇論文:「康德與沙德」:道德發揮到極致的僵化與變態,跟沙德將性放縱到極致的變態,沒什麼兩樣。

You can write Sade however you like: either with a capital S, to render homage to the poor idiot who gave us interminable writings on that subject—or with a lower-case s, for, in the final analysis, that’s morality’s way of being agreeable, and in old French, that is what that means—or, still better, you can write it as cade, since one must, after all, say that morality ends at the level of the id ( ca), which doesn’t go very far. Stated differently, the point is that love is impossible and the sexual relationship drops into the abyss of nonsense, which doesn’t in any way diminish the interest we must have in the Other.

沙德這個名字如何縮寫,隨你們高興:你可以用大寫字母S,來對他白癡般的愚行表示敬意,因為他對於性放縱的不屈不橈的寫作令人感佩。你也可以用小寫的所有格的s ,來表示性放縱是一種令人愉悅的道德,在古法文,這是道德的原意。或者,更好的是,你們可以寫成cade,因為法文的cade 跟ca(本我)前後一致,表示性放縱就是本我的表現。換句話說,重點是,愛是不可能,性關係會陷入一種無聊的欲望衝動。因此,對於大它者的興趣不得不油然而生。

What we want to know—in what constitutes feminine jouissance insofar as it is not wholly occupied with man, and even insofar, I will say, as it is not, as such, at all occupied with him—what we want to know is the status of the Other’s knowledge ( son savoir).

我們想要知道的是,是什麼形成女人的性的歡爽?因為女人的性的歡爽的對象不完全是男人,容我誇張地說,有時根本不是男人。所以,我們想要知道的是,對於大它者的認知,在女人的性的歡爽,居於怎樣的地位?

雄伯譯
32hsiun@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com

A love letter 4

May 1, 2010

A love letter 4
一封情書
Encore by Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉岡:再來

Now, in order to rest a little, I’m going to allow myself to read to you what I wrote to you a while ago, on what? I wrote from the only place where it is possible to speak of love.

現在,為了休息一下,容我閱讀一張我不久以前我寫你們的信。內容是什麼呢?我寫作的立場,使我方便談論愛是什麼。

Indeed, people have done nothing but speak of love in analytic discourse. How can one help but sense that, with respect to everything that can be articulated now that scientific discourse has been discovered, it is purely and simply a waster of time? What analytic discourse contributes—and perhaps that is, after all, the reason for its emergence at a certain point in scientific discourse—is that to speak of love is in itself a jouissance.

的確,精神分析學除了談論愛,還能談什麼?我們忍不住地感覺到,自從科學的真理論述被發現以來,大家侃侃而談的,純然不都是虛擲時光?精神分析學的貢獻,換句話說,它可以在科學的真理論述,盤據有一席之地的原因,是因為談論愛是什麼,本身就是歡爽。

That is assuredly confirmed by the tangible effect that saying whatever ( comes to mind) –the very watchword of the analysand’s discourse—is what leads to the Lustprinzip, what leads to it most directly, without requiring the accession to the higher spheres that constitutes the foundation of Aristotelian ethics.

在諸如歇斯底里症等患者的真理論述中,他們所以如此侃侃而談,如此坦然地發揮快樂原則,如此不受亞里斯多德倫理學的高貴理性的拘束,這些顯而易見的事實,確實是在證明,談論愛是什麼,本身就是歡爽。

The Lustprinzip is, in effect, based only on the coalescence of a with S( A).

事實上,快樂原則只是建立在小客體跟被大它者禁制的主體的結合上。

A is barred by us , of course. That doesn’t mean that it suffices to bar it for nothing to exist thereof . If by S(A) I designate nothing other than woman’s jouissance, it is assuredly because it is with that I am indicating that God has not yet made his exit.

當然,我們被大它者所禁制。那並不意味著,我們被禁制到動彈不得。我說主體被大它者禁制,我指的道道地地就是女人的歡爽。那確實是因為我要指明,上帝依舊還沒有從人間退出。

That is more or less what I wrote for you. What was I, in the end, writing for you? The only thing one can write that is a bit serious—a love letter.

那就是我寫的信件的大概內容。我最後給你們寫的是什麼?唯一我們能夠寫的就是一板正經的情書。

I’m one of those people who doesn’t give the psychological prepositions, thanks to which all of that lasted so long, a good reputation. Still, it is hard to see what the fact of having a soul should be a scandal for thought—if it were true. If it were true, the soul could not be spoken except on the basis of what allows a being—speaking being, to call it by its name—to bear what is intolerable in its world, which assumes that the soul is foreign to it, in other words, phantasmatic. Which considers the soul to be here—in other words, in this world, owing only to its patience and courage in confronting it. That is confirmed by the fact that, up until our time, the sould has never had any other meaning.

對於長久以來作為傳統心理學理論基礎的假設,我是少數不予茍同的其中一位。可是,這還是很令人費解,為什麼人擁有靈魂對於思想而言,要會是一項醜聞,假如這項醜聞是事實的話。假如那是事實,那麼靈魂要用怎樣的方式表現出來?難道不是根據人作為存在的主體,是一個言談的存在?難道不是作為一個言談的存在,必須要承受自己個體世界的種種不堪?難道這不是預先假定,靈魂處於身體之外,換句話說,是幻影般的存在?難道這不是認為靈魂處在這裡,換句話說,處在這個肉身的世界,只有耐心跟勇敢地面對它時,它才會顯現出來?直到我們這個時代,靈魂就是被當著是靈魂,別無其它意義,難道不是昭然若揭?

It is here that ilanguage, ilanguage in French must help me out—not, as it sometimes does, by offering me a homonym, like d’eux for deux or peut, which must be there to serve some purposes for us—but simply by allowing me to say that one “ souloves” ( dme). I soulove, you soulove, he souloves, You see here that we can rely only on writing, especially if we include “ I so love soulove.”

在此,那個國際語,由法語演變而來的國際語,一定有助於理解我的意思。我指的不是我平常慣用的同音異詞,如d’eux與 deux,或 peut 與peu, 或是這個 il peut peu(我無可奈何), 這些同音異詞當然不無幫助。不過,我現在只是借用國際語來說我們的「靈魂之愛」。我愛靈魂,你愛靈魂,他愛靈魂。你瞧!我們在此只能依靠文字來表達,特別是假如我們想要表達是:「我如此熱愛靈魂之愛!」

The soul’s existence can thus be thrown into question ( mise en cause) –that’s the right term with which to ask whether it’s not an effect of love. In effect, as long as the soul souloves the soul( l’dme dme l’dme),sex is not involved. Sex doesn’t count here. The elaboration from which the soul results is “ homosexual,” as is perfectly legible in history.

靈魂的存在因此會受到質疑。質疑一詞並不誇張,因為我們就是要質疑,愛與靈魂的存在,孰先孰後?事實上,只要一個靈魂愛上另外一個靈魂,如同星光交會時互放光亮,性並一定要牽涉在內。性在此時並沒有那麼重要。這種靈魂相愛產生的激情,有時候會是同性戀,這種例子在歷史上不勝枚舉。

What I said earlier about the soul’s courage and patience in bearing the world is the true warrant ( repondant) of what makes Aristotle, in his search for the Good, come up with following—each of the beings in the world can only orient itself toward the greatest being by confounding its good, its own good, with that with which the Supreme Being shines. What Aristotle evokes with the term ψιλοι, namely, what represents the possibility of a bond ( lien) of love between two of these beings, can also, manifesting the tension toward the Supreme Being, be reversed in the way in which I expressed it—it is in their courage in bearing the intolerable relationship to the Supreme Being that friendsψιλοι, recognize and choose each other. This ethics is manifestly ‘ beyondsex” ( hors—sexe), so much as that I would like to give it the accent that Maupassant provides by enunciating somewhere in his work the strange term “ Horla.” The ‘ Beyondsex” ( Horsexe) is the man about whom the soul speculated.

我剛才說到關於靈魂需要耐心及勇氣,才能承受世界的種種不堪,跟亞里斯多德尋求及構想的善不謀而合。他認為世界上的每一個存在主體,都會追尋最偉大的善的存在,然後將它與最崇高的存在所照耀的善交融在一起。亞里斯多德用「靈魂」這個術語所召喚的精神,換句話說,代表兩個存在主體之間的愛的契合,一方面,顯示朝向最崇高的存在的激情,另一方面,倒轉我先前所表達的愛與靈魂的孰先孰後。承受肉身世界的種種不堪,跟最崇高的善發生關聯,就在於兩個「靈魂」互相友善,互相交會,互放光亮時,所展現的耐心及勇氣。這個倫理學顯而易見是「超越性別之愛」。我不妨再強調一次,這個術語是法國作家莫泊桑在他的小說「奧爾拉」最先表達。這個「超越性別之愛」,就是靈魂所朝思夢想的人。

But it turns out that women too are in soulove (dmoureuses), in other words, that they soulove the soul. What can that soul be that they soulove intheir partner, who is nevertheless homo to the hilt, from which they cannot get away? That can only, in effect, lead them to this final term—and it is not for nothing that I call it as I do—as it is said in Greek, hysteria, namely, to play the part of the man ( faire l’homme) , as I have said, being thus hummosexual or beyondsex themselves—it being henceforth difficult for them not to sense the impasse that consists in the fact that they love each other as the same ( elles se mement) in the Other, for, indeed, there is no need to know you are other to be there ( il n’y a pas besoin de se savoir Autre pour on etre.)

但是結果證明,女人也有靈魂之愛,換句話說,她們以靈魂熱愛靈魂。當她們以靈魂愛另一個主體的靈魂,而另一個主體的靈魂卻是相同性別,她們彼此無法逃離,那個靈魂會是什麼樣子? 事實上,那只可能通往這個最後的術語「歇斯底里之愛」,我可不是無緣無故取這個術語,因為它在希臘文的原意就是「歇斯底里」。換句話說,如同男人自己的「同志之愛」或「超越性別之愛」。因此,他們很難視若無睹自己所陷入的僵局,因為他們互相熱愛,如同熱愛大它者,而此時你們雙方就是彼此的大它者。

So that the soul may come into being, woman is differentiated from it right from the beginning. She is called woman ( on la dit-femme) and defamed ( diffame.) The most famous ( fameux) things that have come down to us about women in history are, strictly speaking, what one can say that is infamous ( infamant). It is true that she retains the honor of Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchuses. There’s no need to speak of Cornelia to analysis, who hardly ever think of her, but speak to them of any old Cornelia and they’ll tell you that it won’t be very good for her children, the Gracchuses ( Gracques) –they’ll tell whoppers ( craques) until the end of their existence.

為了讓靈魂有存在空間,從一開頭就要區別出來,女人跟靈魂是兩碼子事。她被稱之為女人,然後被污名化。歷史上流傳下來最名聲遠播的事蹟,嚴格來說,也是我們聽過的最惡名昭彰。的確,她現在還保有被尊稱為格雷丘斯家族的生母柯涅麗亞的榮銜。但是我們沒有必要跟精神分析師提到柯涅麗亞,他們對她不屑一顧。我假如跟他們提到任何柯涅麗亞的名字,他們會告訴你,這對她的後代,也就是格雷丘斯的後代,是一種污辱。他們會扯一個彌天大謊,直到他們死時都還不知道。

That was the beginning of my letter, an amusement.

這就是我這一封情書的開端,娛樂諸位一下。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com