Archive for October, 2012

精神分析伦理学:善的功用

October 30, 2012

Ethic 218

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XVII 第17章

The function of the good
善的功用

SAINT AUGUSTINE AND SADE
圣奥古斯丁与萨德

MEMORY, FACILITATION, RITE
记忆,促进引导,仪式

THE SUBJECT, ELISION OF A SIGNIFIER
主体,能指的省略

THE TEXTILE FAB L E
织物的寓言

UT I L I T Y AND JOUISSANCE
实用与欢爽

We have reached the barrier of desire then, and, as I indicated last time, I
will speak about the good. The good has always had to situate itself on that
barrier. I shall be concerned today with the way in which psychoanalysis
enables one to articulate that situation.

我们因此已经到达欲望的这个阻碍。如同我上次指示的,我将会谈论有关善。善总是曾经必须定位它自己在那个阻碍。今天,我将会关心这个方式,以那个方式,精神分析让我们能够表达那个情况。

I will speak then about the good, and perhaps what I have to say will be
bad in the sense that I don’t have all the goodness required to speak well of
it. I won’t perhaps speak too well of it because I am myself not quite well
enough to speak at that high level the subject requires. But the idea of nature
that I have told you about means that I will not be stopped by such an accidental
contingency. I simply ask you to excuse the presentation if at the end
you are not completely satisfied.

我因此将会谈论到善。或许我必须要说的东西将会是不好的,因为我并没有拥有所有必要的善意,来推崇它。我或许将不会太称赞它,因为我自己并没有的善意来以主体要求的高层次来谈论。但是我曾经告诉你们的自然的观念意味着,我将不会受到一种意外的偶然性阻挡。我仅是要求你们包容这个呈现,假如最后,你们并没有完全满意。

The question of the good is as close as possible to our sphere of action. All
exchanges between men and especially interventions of the type we engage
in are usually placed under the tutelage and authority of the good – the perspective
is a sublime one, indeed a sublimated one. Now sublimation could
be defined from a certain point of view as an opinion in the Platonic sense of
the term, an opinion arranged in such a way as to reach something that might
be the object of science, but that science doesn’t manage to reach where it is
to be found. A sublimation of any kind, even including that universal, the
good itself, may be momentarily in this brief parenthesis considered to be a
phony science.

善的问题尽可能靠近我们的行动的领域。人际之间的所有的交换,特别是我们精神分析从事的这种介入,通常是被放置在善的守护与权威之下。这个观点是崇高的观点,确实是一个被升华的观点。现在,升华能够从某个观点来定义,作为柏拉图的术语的意义的一种意见。这一种意见被以这种方式安排,这样它才能够到达它将能够被发现的地方。任何种类的升华,甚至包括那个普遍性,善待本身可能暂时处于这个简短的括号里,它被认为是一门伪科学。

Everything in your analytical experience suggests that the notion and finality
of the good are problematic for you. Which good are you pursuing precisely
as far as your passion is concerned? That question concerning our
behavior is always on the agenda. At every moment we need to know what
our effective relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to cure.

你们精神分析经验的一切暗示着,善的这个观念与最终性,对于你们而已,是颇为棘手。就你们的激情而言,你们正在追寻哪个善?关于我们的行为的那个问题总是处于讨论议程。随时,我们都需要知道,我们跟行善的欲望的实际关系是什么,跟想要治疗别人的欲望是什么。

We have to deal with that as if it were something that is likely to lead us
astray, and in many cases to do so instantly. I will even add that one might
be paradoxical or trenchant and designate our desire as a non-desire to cure.
Such a phrase is meaningful only insofar as it constitutes a warning against
the common approaches to the good that offer themselves with a seeming
naturalness, against the benevolent fraud of wanting-to-do-one’s-best-for-the subject.

我们必须处理那个,好像那是某件可能会引导我们迷失的东西,在许多情况,很可能马上这样做。我将甚至补充说,我们可能是悖论,或是锐利,并且指定我们的欲望,作为是没有欲望想要治疗别人。这样一个词语仅有在形成一个警告时,它才具有意义。它警告不要采有共同的途径来接近善,虽然这些途径提供它们自己,具有表面上的自然。它也警告不要从事善意的欺骗,想要替主体善尽自己最大力量。

But in that case what do you want to cure the subject of? There is no doubt
that this is central to our experience, to our approach, to our inspiration –
wanting to cure him from the illusions that keep him on the path of his
desire. But how far can we go in this direction? Moreover, even if these
illusions are not respectable in themselves, the subject still has to want to
give them up. Is the limit of resistance here simply individual?

但是在那个情况,你们想要替主体治疗什么?无可置疑地,这是我们精神分析经验,我们的方法,我们的启发的核心。我们想要治疗他,免除让他在欲望途径踽行的幻觉。但是我们朝这个方向能够前进多远?而且,甚至这些幻觉本身并没有可尊敬之处,主体依旧必须想要放弃它们。抗拒的限制在此仅是个人的吗?

Here the question of different goods’ is raised in their relation to desire.
All kinds of tempting goods offer themselves to the subject; and you know
how imprudent it would be for us to put ourselves in a position of promising
the subject access to them all, to follow “the American way.” It is nevertheless
the possibility of having access to the goods of this world that determines
a certain way of approaching psychoanalysis – what I have called “the American
way.” It also determines a certain way of arriving at the psychoanalyst’s
and making one’s demand.

在此,关于欲望的不同善行的问题被提出。各种诱人的善行呈现它们自己给主体。你们知道这将是多么不谨慎,假如我们将我们自己放置于这个立场:跟主体承诺要接近所有这些诱人善行,要追求「美国人的方式」。可是,这是可能的,接近这个世界的善行:决定某种接近精神分析的方式—我所谓的「美国人的方式」。它也决某种方式:获得精神分析家的善行,并且提出自己的要求。

Before entering into the problem of different goods, I would like to sketch
out the illusions on the path of desire. Breaking these illusions is a question
of specialized knowledge – knowledge of good and evil indeed – that is located
in this central field whose irreducible, ineradicable character in our experience
I have attempted to show you. It is bound up with that prohibition, that
reservation, that we explored specifically last year when I spoke to you about
desire and its interpretation. I pointed to its essential character in the notion
of “he didn’t know,” which is in the imperfect tense in French and which
remains centrally within the field of enunciation, or in other words within
the deepest relationship of the subject to signifying practice. That is to say,
the subject is not the agent but the support, given that he couldn’t even
calculate the consequences. It is through his relationship to signifying practice
that, as a consequence, he emerges as subject.

在探讨不同善行的问题之前,我想要描绘出在欲望途径的这些幻觉。打破这些幻觉需要专门的知识—确实是善与恶的知识—它位于这个核心领域—我曾经企图跟你们显示,在我们精神分析经验,这个核心领域具有无法化减,无法抹除的特性。它跟去年我们明确探究的那个禁忌,那个保留息息相关,当我跟你们谈论关于欲望与其解释。我指向它的基本特性,使用「他不知道」的这个观念。这个观念是法文的未完成式文法,它的中心始终保持在表述的领域里面。或是换句话说,保持在主体跟能指化的实践的最深层关系。也就是说,主体并不是这个代理者,而是这个支持者,假如考虑到他甚至无法估算到这些结果。凭借他跟能指化实践的关系,他结果出现作为主体。

Moreover, to refer to that fantasmic experience that I chose to produce
before you so as to exemplify the central field involved in desire, don’t forget
the moments of fantasmic creation in Sade, moments in which one finds
expressed directly – in diabolically jubilatory terms that make it intolerable
to read – the idea that the greatest cruelty is that the subject’s fate is displayed
before his eyes with his full awareness of it. The plot against the victim is openly hatched in front of him.

而且,我提到我选择在你们面前产生那个幻见的的经验,为了强调欲望牵涉的核心领域。请你们不要忘记,萨德创造幻见的那些时刻。在那些时刻,我们发现这个观念直接地被表达,用恶魔般欢欣的术语,让人不忍卒睹。这个观念是:最大的残酷就是主体的命运被展示在他眼前,让他充分知道。对受害者不利的计谋,在他面前明目张胆地被设计。

The value of this fantasm is that it confronts the subject with the most radical kind of interrogation, with a final “he didn’t know,” insofar as expressed thus in the imperfect tense, the question asked is too much for him. I just ask you to recall the ambiguity revealed by linguistic experience in connection with the French imperfect. When one
says “a moment later and the bomb exploded (iclatait),” that may mean two
contradictory things in French, namely, either the bomb did, in fact, explode
or something happened which caused it not to explode.

这个幻见的价值是,它让主体面对这个最强烈种类的质疑,用一个最后的「他并不知道」,它因此被表达,用未完成式的意涵。被询问的这个问题,太过沉重,他无法承受。我仅是要求你们回忆一下,法文的未完成式,由语言经验显示的这个模糊暧昧。当我们说,「再过一下子,炸弹会爆炸」。这句话在法文意味着两个矛盾的事情:换句话说,要就是炸弹实际上爆炸,要不就是某件事情发生,阻止炸弹没有爆炸。

We have now reached the subject of the good. The subject is in no sense
new, and one has to admit that thinkers from earlier periods, whose concerns
may for one reason or another seem dated to us, nonetheless sometimes formulate
the issues in interesting ways. I have nothing against bringing them
to your attention, however strange they may seem when presented here out
of context in an apparently abstract form that doesn’t seem designed to arouse
our interest. Thus, when Saint Augustine writes the following in Book VII,
Chapter XII, of his Confessions, I think it deserves far more than an indulgent
smile.

我们现在已经到达这个善行的主体。这个主体并不新颖,我们必须承认,较早期的思想家,因为某种理由,我们可能觉得他们的关怀似乎很新潮。他们用有趣的方式说明这个问题。我并不反对提醒你们注意他们,无论他们看起来是多么奇怪,当我在此呈现他们,用显而易见是摘要形式的文本,因为这种摘要形式似乎并不是被设计要引起我们的兴趣。因此,当圣奥古斯丁在他的「忏悔录」第七册第十二章,书写以下文字,我认为它应该获得的,不仅是让人会心的微笑。

That everything that is, is good, because it is the work of God.

每样存在的东西都是善,因为那是上帝的杰作。

I understood that all corruptible things are good, and that they wouldn’t be corruptible if they were sovereignly good; no corruption would occur if they were not good. For if they were of sovereign good, they would be incorruptible, and if they had no good in them, there would be nothing in them capable of being corrupted, since corruption injures that which it corrupts, and it can only injure it if diminishes good.

我理解,所有会腐败的东西都是善。假如它们是至高的善,它们就不会腐败。假如它们并不是善,没有腐败会发生。因为它们隶属于至高的善,它们就不会腐败。假如它们本质没有善,它们内部就没有东西会被腐败。因为腐败伤害它所腐败的东西,只有当善被减少时,腐败才会伤害它。

And now we come to the core of the argument in the French version of the
Garnier edition.

现在我们来到噶尼尔编辑的法文版争论的核心。

Thus either corruption causes no damage, which cannot be upheld, or all things
that are corrupted lose some good, which is undeniable. That if they had lost everything that was good, they would no longer exist at all. Or in other words, if they continued to live without being susceptible to corruption any longer, they would be in a more perfect state than they were before having lost all that was good about them, since they would remain forever in an incorruptible state.

因此,要就是腐败都不会引起损害。这无法自圆其说,要不就是所有被腐败的东西丧失某些的善,这是无可否认的。假如它们已经丧失一切的善,它们将根本就不再存在。或者,换句话说,假如它们继续存在,而没有再承受腐病,它们将会是处于更加完美的状态,比起它们先前的状态,在已经丧失所有关于它们的善之前,因为它们将会始终处于一种无法腐败的状态。

I assume that you grasp the core and indeed the irony of this argument, and moreover that it is precisely the question that interests us. If it is unbearable to realize that everything that is good is extracted from the heart of all things, what can we say of that which remains, which is, after all, something, something different? The question goes echoing down through the centuries and down through human experience. We find it again in The Story of Juliette, with the difference that it is attached, as it should be, to the question of the Law, and in a no less odd way. I would like to draw your attention to this oddness because it is the oddness of a structure that is at issue. Sade writes as follows:

我认为你们理解这个核心,以及确实就是这个争论的反讽。而且,确实就是这个问题让我们感到興趣。假如这是让人无法忍受,当我们体认到,每件善的东西是从所有事情的核心抽离出来,对于剩馀的东西,那毕竟是某件不同的东西,我们能够说些什么呢?这个问题迴响了好几世纪,贯穿人类的经验。我们再次在「朱莉叶特的故事」里找到它,差别是,如同它所应该的,它跟法律的问题挂钩。以同样古怪的方式,我想要提醒你们注意这个古怪,因为受到争议的结构就是这个古怪。萨德书写如下:

Tyrants are never born out of anarchy. One only ever sees them rise up in the
shadow of laws; they derive their authority from laws. The reign of law is, therefore, evil; it is inferior to anarchy. The greatest proof of this position is the obligation of any government to plunge back into anarchy whenever it wants to remake its constitution. In order to abrogate its ancient laws, it is obliged to establish a revolutionary regime in which there are no laws. Under this regime new laws are eventually born, but the second is less pure than the first since it derives from it, since the first good, anarchy, had to occur, if one wanted to achieve the second good, the State’s constitution.

暴君从来就不是从无法无天中诞生。我们永远仅是看见他们在法律的阴影里崛起。他们从法律获得权威,因此,法律的统治是邪恶,法律的统治比无法无天还要糟糕。这个立场的最大证据是:每当政府想要重新铸造它的基本结构,它就有义务回归到无法无天。为了废除它的古代法律,它有义务建立一个革命的无法无天的政权。在这个政权下,新的法律最后被诞生,但是第二个法律不像第一个法律那么纯净,因为它从后者演变过来,因为第一个善,无法无天,必须发生,假如我们想要完成第二个善,国家的基本大法。

I give you this as a fundamental example. The same kind of argument,
formulated by minds that were certainly very remote from one another in
their concerns, clearly shows that some form of necessity must exist there
that gives rise to this sort of logical stumbling along a certain path.

我给予你们这个,作为是一个基本的例子。这个相同种类的争论,说明它们的两位人物,彼此的关注焦点确实风马牛不相及,却清楚地显示:某种必要的形式必须存在,才会产生这种沿着某种途径踉跄而行的逻辑。

As far as we are concerned, the question of the good is articulated first of
all in its relationship to the Law. On the other hand, nothing is more tempting
than to evade the question of the good behind the implication of some
natural law, of some harmony to be found on the way to the elucidation of
desire. Yet our daily experience proves to us that beneath what we call the
subject’s defenses, the paths leading to the pursuit of the good only reveal
themselves to us constantly, and I would add, in their original form, in the
guise of some alibi on the part of the subject. The whole analytical experience
is no more than an invitation to the revelation of his desire; and it changes
the primitiveness of the relationship of the subject to the good compared to
everything which up to that point had been articulated by the philosophers.
One has undoubtedly to look closely, for it seems at first that nothing is
changed, and that with Freud the compass still points toward the register of
pleasure.

就我们而言,善的问题首先被表达,在它跟法律的关系。在另一方面,最诱人入胜的,莫过于逃避善的这个问题:这个善隐藏在某个自然法则的暗示背后,朝向诠释欲望的途中,某种和谐能够被找到,它所给予的暗示背后。可是,我们的日常经验,跟我们证明,在我们所谓的主体的各种防卫底下,通往善的追求的这些途径,不断地跟我们显露它们。我将补充说,在它们原先的形式,在主体这方面,是某种藉口的伪装。整个的精神分析经验仅仅就是邀请来启示他的欲望。跟直到当时曾经被哲学家表达的一切比较起来,它改变了主体跟善的关系的原始性。我们无可置疑地必须仔细观看,因为它起初看起来,没有事情被改变。随着弗洛依德,这个罗盘依旧指向快乐的这个铭记。

I have emphasized this since the beginning of the year: from the origin of
moral philosophy, from the moment when the term ethics acquired the meaning
of man’s reflection on his condition and calculation of the proper paths to
follow, all meditation on man’s good has taken place as a function of the
index of pleasure. And I mean all, since Plato, certainly since Aristotle, and
down through the Stoics, the Epicureans, and even through Christian thought
itself in Saint Thomas Aquinas.

自从年初以来,我曾经强调这个:从道德哲学的起源,从伦理学这个术语获得人对意义的反思的时刻开始,反思人的情境,并估算所要追寻的合宜的途径,所有对于人的善行的沉思都发生,作为是快乐的指数的功用。我的意思是所有的哲学,自从柏拉图以降,确实来说,是自从亚里斯多德以降,一直斯多亚学派,伊壁鸠鲁学派,甚至是表现在圣汤玛士、阿奎那诞基督教思想本身。

As far as the determination of different goods
is concerned, things have clearly developed along the paths of an essentially
hedonist problematic. It is only too evident that all that has involved the
greatest of difficulties, and that these difficulties are those of experience. And
in order to resolve them, all the philosophers have been led to discern not
true pleasures from false, for such a distinction is impossible to make, but
the true and false goods that pleasure points to.

就不同的善的决定而言,事情曾经清楚地发展,沿着基本上是棘手的享乐主义的途径。这是显而易见的,所有都曾经牵涉到最大困难,这些困难都是经验的困难。为了解决它们,所有的哲学家曾经被引导要去觉察,觉察不真实的快乐跟虚假的快乐,为了让这样的区别不可能划分,而是快乐所指向的真实与虚假的善行。

Doesn’t Freud’s articulation of the pleasure principle give us an advantage,
a reward in terms of knowledge and clarity?

弗洛依德的表达这个快乐原则,难道不是给予我们一个利益?用知识与清晰的术语而言,给予我们一个酬劳?

Isn’t it in a definitive way profoundly different from the meaning previously
given to pleasure by anyone else?

这难道不是用一个明确的方式,这个方式跟先前别人给予快乐的意义,大相迳庭?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Sosie 02

October 29, 2012

Sosie 02
The Seminar of Jacques Lcan
拉康研讨班
Book II:The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Techniques of Psychonalaysis
第二册:自我:弗洛依德理论与精神分析的技术
XXI Sosie
第21章 双重人
T H E W O M A N . O B J ECT O F E X C H A N G E
女人,交换的客体
M E . W H O K I C K S Y O U OUT ‘
我,谁踢你出去
T H E S P L I TT I N G S [DEDOUBLEMENTS] O F
T H E O B S E S S I O N AL
妄想症患者的分裂

In the course of history,there have always been two contracts of a very
different nature. in this order. For the Romans. for instance, the marriage of
people who have a name. who really have one.,hat of the patricians. the nobles – the ignobiles are precisely those who don’t have a name – had a highly
symbolic character. guaranteed it by ceremonies of a special nature – I do not
want to enter into an elaborate description of the confarreatio.

在历史的过程,在这个秩序,曾经总是有两种属于不同性质的契约。譬如,对于罗马人,拥有头衔的人的婚姻,他们确实拥一个头衔,那就是贵族的头衔。非贵族确实就是那些没有头衔的人,他们拥有较高的符号象征的特性,凭借特别性质的典礼来保证它—我并不想要从事精细的描述这些婚姻的仪式。

For the plebeians there was also a kind of marriage. which was based simply on mutual contract. and constituted what Roman society technically called concubinage. Now it is precisely the institution of concubinage which. starting with a certain wavering in society. was generalised. and. in the final period of Roman history. one even sees concubinage established in the higher strata. with the aim of maintaining an independent social status for the partners. and especially for their goods. In other words. it is when the woman begins to emancipate herself. when she has the right to property as such. when she becomes an individual in society. that the Significance of marriage begins to be abraded.

对于这些平民,也有一种婚姻,仅是根据互相的契约作为基础,并且形成罗马社会技术上称之为妾。现在,确实就是妾的这个体制,从社会的某摇摆态度开始,被笼统化。在罗马历史的最后时期,我们甚至看到在较高阶层,妾的地位被确立,为了要给伴侣维持一种独立的社会地位,特别的为了她们的财物。换句话说,当女人开始解放她们自己,当她们拥有财产本身的权利,当她们成为社会的公民,婚姻的意义开始被抹除。

At bottom. the woman is introduced into the symbolic pact of marriage as the
object of exchange between – I wouldn’t say ‘men’. although it is men who
effectively are supports for it – between lineages. fundamentally androcentric
lineages. To understand the various elementary structures is to understand
how these objects of exchanges. the women. circulate between these lineages.

追根究底,女人被介绍进入婚姻的盟约,作为交换的客体—我不愿意说是男人之间的交换的客体,虽然实际上是男人在支持它—而是处族群之间的交换的客体,基本上是男性中心的族群。理解各种基本的结构,就是理解这些交换的客体,这些女人,在这些族群里流通。

Judging from experience. this can only happen within an androcentric and
patriarchal framework. even when the structure is secondarily caught up in
matrilineal ancestries.

从经验判断起来,这种事情仅有在男性中心及父权的架构里,才会发生。甚至当这个结构是次级地套陷于母系亲属的祖先。

The fact that the woman is thus bound up in an order of exchange in which
she is object is really what accounts for the fundamentally conflictual
character. I wouldn’t say without remedy. of her position – the symbolic order
literally subdues her,transcends her.

女人因此跟交换的秩序息息相关。在这个秩序里,她是客体。这个事实解释为什么会有这个基本上是冲突的特性。我不愿毫无保留地说是她的地位—符号界的秩序实质上压制她,超越她。

The all men of Proudhon is here the universal man. who is both the most
concrete and the most transcendent man. and that’s the impasse into which
the woman is pushed by her specific function in the symbolic order. For her,
there’s something insurmountable. let us say unacceptable. in the fact of being
placed in the position of an object in the symbolic order. to which. on the other
hand. she is entirely subjected no less than the man. It is indeed because she has a relation of the second degree to this symbolic order that the god is embodied in man or man in the god. except for conflict. and. of course. there is always conflict.

普鲁东的所有的人在此是普遍性的人。这个人既是最具体,也是最超越的人。就是这个僵局,女人被她在符号秩序的明确功用所逼迫进入的僵局。
对于女人,有某件东西无法被克服,我们不妨说是无法被接受。事实上,她被放置在符号界的客体的位置。在另一方面,她跟男人一样,完全隶属于符号界的秩序。这确实是因为她跟符号界的关系是次级贷,神祗被具体表现在男人身上,或是男人被具体表现在神祗身上,除了冲突,当然,冲突总是存在。

In other words. in the primitive form of marriage. if a woman isn’t given. or
doesn’t give herself. to a god. to something transcendent. the fundamental
relation suffers every form of imaginary degradation. and that is what does
happen. because we aren’t. and haven’t been for a long time. cut out to embody gods. When times were still hard, there was the master. And that was the great period of the women’s rights movement – The woman isn’t an object of property How is it that adultery is punished in so dissymmetric a manner? Are we slaves?

换句话说,在婚姻的原始的形式,假如一个女人没有奉献给予神祗,或自己没有奉献于神祗,奉献给某件超越的东西,这个基本的关系会因为想象的堕落的形态而遭受痛苦。那就是确实发生的情况。因为我们天性不适合,长久以来就无法适合来代表神祗。当时机艰困时,就会出现主任。那就是女权运动的伟大时期。女人并不是财产的客体。通奸如何以如此不均称的方式被惩罚?我们是奴隶吗?

After some progress, we’ve reached the stage of the rival, the relation of the
imaginary mode. One mustn’t think that our society, through the emancipation
of the-said women is privileged in this respect. The most naked rivalry
between men and women is eternal, and its style is laid down in conjugal
relations. Only a few German psychoanalysts believe that the sexual struggle is characteristic of our times.

经过一些进步之后,我们已经到达敌意的这个阶段,想象的模式的关系。我们一定不要认为,我们的社会在这方面是具有特权的,由于所谓的女人的解放。男人与女人之间最赤裸的敌意是永久的,它的风格被奠定在婚姻的关系。仅有一些德国的精神分析家相信,性的斗争表现为们时代的特性。

When you’ve read Livy, you’ll know the scandal which a very remarkable trial of a case of poisoning caused in Rome, from whence it transpired that in every patrician family it was par for the course for women to poison their husbands, and that they were dropping off like flies. Feminine rebellion didn’t start yesterday.

当你们阅读李维,你们将会知道这个丑闻:在罗马,一个毒杀亲夫的引人注意的审判。从那里被发现,在每个贵族的家庭,女人毒死亲夫的比例差不多相等。她们就像苍蝇般离开。女性的反叛并不是从昨天才开始的。

From master to slave and rival, there is only one dialectical step – the
relations of the master to the slave are essentially reversible. and the master
sees very quickly his dependency in relation to his slave become established.
Today we have come up with a new subtlety. thanks to the introduction of
psychoanalytic ideas – the husband has become the child. and for some time
now women have been taught to treat him well. Along this path. we’ve come
full circle. we are returning to the state of nature.

从主人到奴隶与对手,仅有一个辩证法的步骤—主人成为奴隶的关系,基本是可以倒转的。在跟他的奴隶的关系,主人很快地看出他的依靠变成确立。今天,我们已经遭遇一种新的微妙依靠,由于精神分析观念的介绍。丈夫已经变成小孩,过段时间后,现在女人已经被教导要善待他。沿着这条途径,我们已经绕了一整圈,我们渐渐回答自然的状态。

That’s the conception some people entertain of the legitimate intervention of psychoanalysis into what is called human relations. and which. disseminated through the mass media teaches all ‘.and sundry how to behave so that there’s peace at home – the woman plays the role of the mother, and the man that of the child.

那就是某些人怀抱的这个观念,对于精神分析的合法介入所谓的人类的关系。通过媒体的传播,这个观念用各色各样的方式教导如何行为,这样家庭才会有和平。女人扮演母亲的角色,男人则是扮演小孩的角色。

Having said this, the profound meaning of the myth of Amphitryon, which is
so polyvalent. so enigmatic that one can give it a thousand interpretations. is
the following – for the situation to be tenable, the position must be triangular.
For the couple to keep to the human level, there has to be a god there. Love flows towards the universal man. towards the veiled man, for whom every ideal is only an idolatrous substitute. and this is that famous genital love which makes our Sundays and which we affect to scorn.

说完这个,安菲特瑞恩的神话的深刻意义,这个神话具有多面价值,如此深不可测,以致我们能够给它上千个诠释,跟随而来要谈的是:为了让这个情况能够自圆其说,这个位置必须三角形。为了让夫妻维持在人类的层次,必须要有一个神祗。爱情流动朝向普遍性的人,朝向这个被遮蔽的人。每个理想都仅是崇拜他的替代物。这就是著名的性器官的爱,形成我们的星期日,我们伪装藐视它。

Reread what Balint says about this – you’ll find that when authors are
somewhat rigorous and experimental,they reach the conclusion that this
famous love is nothing at all. Genital love turns out to be absolutely
unassimilable to a unity that is the fruit of an instinctual maturation. In effect,
to the extent that this genital love is conceived as dual. in which any notion of
the third party. of speech. of god. is absent, it is fashioned in two pieces. Primo, the genital act. which. as everyone knows. doesn’t last long – it’s nice but it
doesn’t last – and it doesn’t secure anything.

请重新阅读巴林特所说关于这个—你们将会发现,当作者态度严谨而且实证,他们获得这个结论: 这个著名的爱情什么都不是。性器官的爱,结果成为完全无法被吸收到一个一致性:结果是本能的成熟。实际上,,甚至这个性器官的爱被构想成为是双重性。在这个双重性里,第三者,话语,神祗的任何观念是欠缺的。它用两个区块来铸造。原初是性器官的行动,众所周知,那并不会持续很久—它很美好,但是持续不久—它没有获得任何东西。

Secundo. tenderness. Whose origins are found to be pregenital. Such is the conclusion to which the most fair-minded come. when they don’t get beyond the dual relation to secure the norm of human relations.

其次是情感温存。它的起源被发现是前性器官。那些美好心灵的人们所构想的结论是这样,虽然他们没有超越这个双重性的关系,为了获得人类关系的正式名份。

I’ve reminded you of some basic truths. Now we are going to see what turns up in Plautus and Moliere.

我已经提醒你们某些基本的真相。现在,我们将看出,在普劳塔斯与莫里哀会此现些什么。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Sosie 01

October 29, 2012

Sosie 01
The Seminar of Jacques Lcan
拉康研讨班
Book II:The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Techniques of Psychonalaysis
第二册:自我:弗洛依德理论与精神分析的技术
XXI Sosie
第21章 双重人
T H E H U S B A N D . T H E W I F E A N D T H E G O D
丈夫、妻子与上帝
T H E W O M A N . O B J ECT O F E X C H A N G E
女人,交换的客体
M E . W H O K I C K S Y O U OUT ‘
我,谁踢你出去
T H E S P L I TT I N G S [DEDOUBLEMENTS] O F
T H E O B S E S S I O N AL
妄想症患者的分裂

Who’s read Amphitryon?
Today we will be concerned with the ego. We are approaching the question
of the ego from another angle than the one we adopted last year. Last year, we
dealt with it in connection with the phenomenon of transference. This year, we
are trying to understand it in relation to the symbolic order.
今天,我们将会关心自我。我们从另外一个角度接近这个问题,不同意我们去年採取的角度。去年,我们处理它,关于移情的现象。今年,我们正在尝试了解它,有关符号象征的秩序。

Man lives, in the midst of a world of language, in which that phenomenon
called speech occurs. We believe that analysis takes place in this environment.

人生活在语言的世界里。话语的现象就发生在那里。我们相信,精神分析发生在这个环境。

If we don’t situate this environment clearly in relation to other environments,
which also exist, the real environment, the environment of imaginary mirages,
one obliges analysis to deviate either towards interventions bearing on the real
– a trap one falls into but rarely – or, on the contrary, by placing in our opinion
an unwarranted emphasis on the imaginary. By following this thread of
Ariadne we are brought today to Moliere’s play, Amphitryon.

假如我们并没有清楚地定位这个环境,跟其他环境的关系,这个实在界的环境,它也存在,它是想象的幻景的环境,我们会强迫精神分析偏离,不是朝向跟实在界有关的介入—我们掉入这个陷阱,虽然次数不多—或是,相反地,凭借根我们的看法,毫无保证帝强调想象界。由于追随阿瑞达尼丁的迷宫线索,我们今天被引导来到莫里哀的戏剧,安菲特莱恩。

1
I made an allusion to Amphitryon in the presence of our visitor, Moreno, when I
said to him that it must surely be the case that our wives cheat on us with God
from time to time. It is one of those lapidary formulae which one can use in the
course of a joust. It deserves a little closer examination.

一、
在我们的访客,摩瑞诺的面前,我提到安菲特瑞恩,当晚跟他说,情况确实是,我们的妻子有时利用上帝欺骗我们。那是宝贵的金玉良言,在夫妻的争吵中,我们能够使用。它应该值得让我们更加仔细检视。

Surely you must see that the function of the father is only as crucial as it is
within the whole of analytic theory because it is to be found on several levels.
We have already been able to see, taking the Wolfman, what distinguishes the
symbolic father, what I call the name of the father, from the imaginary father, the rival of the real father, in so far as he is endowed, poor man, with all sorts of layers, just like everybody else. Well then, this distinction warrants being taken up on the level of the couple.

的确,你们一定看出,父亲的功用仅是当它在精神分析的整体理论里,才会重要。因为它能够在好几个层次被发现。以「狼人」为例,我们已经能够看出,区别符号界的父亲,我所谓父亲之名,跟想象界的父亲,对实在界父亲的敌人,他们的不同之处。因为这位可怜的人,他被赋予各种层面,就像其他每个人一样。呵呵,这个区别在夫妻的层次,保证可以探究一番。

In truth, fine minds, solid minds – you meet up with some like that,
punctuating history – have already been stirred up by the relations between
marriage and love. These things are in general treated in a playful, racy, cynical style. There’s a good old French tradition of that, and that may well be the best way of dealing with it, in any case, as far as the practical side of everyday life is concerned. But one of the more serious thinkers can be observed to have one day come upon marriage and love, and not taken them lightly.

事实上,美好的心灵,坚强的心灵—你们会邂逅一些像那样的心灵在历史上不时出现—他们已经是受到婚姻与爱情之间的关系的干扰。这些事情一般是用遊戏,淫荡,嘲讽的风格来处理。有一个很好的古老法国传统,那很有可能是最好的方法来处理它,无论如何,就日常生活的实际层面而言。但是,我们能够观察到,有一位更加严肃的思想家,有一天,他邂逅婚姻与爱情,而且认真看待它们。

I highly recommend you read Proudhon – he had a solid mind, and you
rediscover in him the assured emphasis of the Church Fathers. He had thought, at a little distance, about the human condition, and tried to get close to
something far more tenacious as well as far more fragile than one thinks,
namely fidelity. He arrived at this question – what can be the motive for fidelity,
apart from having given one’s word? But often one gives one’s word lightly.

我高度推荐你们阅读普鲁东—他的心灵非常坚强,你们在他身上重现发现教会父亲的这个确实的强调。他保持一点距离,来思维人类的情境,并且尝试靠近比我们认为,某件更加是持久,以及更加脆弱的东西。换句话说,忠诚。他到达这个问题—除了曾经给予承诺,忠诚的动机会是什么?但是往往我们给予承诺时,并不是很真心。

And if it weren’t given in such a manner, it is probable that it would be given far
more infrequently, which would noticeably hold up the flow of things, good
and worthy, in human society.

若非承诺是这种方式给予,很有可能,它被给予的次数不会那么多。显而易见地,在人类的社会里,那将会支持事情的变卦,美好而值得的事情。

As we have remarked, that doesn’t prevent it from being given and from
bearing all its fruits. When it is broken, not only does everyone get upset, and
indignant, but it has consequences, whether we like it or not. That is precisely
one of the things which we are taught by analysis, and by the exploration of this unconscious in which speech continues to propagate its waves and its
destinies. How can one justify this speech, so impudently engaged in, and
properly speaking, as no serious mind has ever doubted, untenable?

如同我们曾经谈论过,那并不会阻止承诺无法被给予,及无法产生所有它的结果。当承诺被打破,每个人不但感到懊恼及愤怒,而且它具有各种结果,无论我们喜欢它与否。那确实是我们被精神分析教导的东西之一。凭借对于无意识的探究,在那里,话语继续传播它的波浪及它的命运。我们如何能够证明这个话语的合理?当如此不谨慎地被从事的话语,适当地说,认真的心灵从来没有怀疑,这个话语是难以自圆其说。

Let us try to overcome the romantic illusion, that it is perfect love, the ideal
value which each of the partners acquires for the other, which upholds human
commitment. Proudhon, whose every thought runs counter to romantic
illusions, tries, in a style which might at first pass for mystical, to give fidelity its
due within marriage. And he finds the solution in something which can only be
recognised as a symbolic pact.

让我们尝试克服这个浪漫的幻想,它是每位伴侣要求对方的完美的爱情,理想的价值。它支持人类的奉献。普鲁东的每个思想,跟浪漫的幻想互相辉映。他尝试给予忠诚在婚姻里应得的地位,这种风格起初被认为是神秘的。他找到这个解答,在某件仅能够被体认出来,作为符号象征的盟约。

Let us look at it from the woman’s perspective. The love the wife gives her
spouse is not directed at the individual, not even an idealised one – that’s the
danger of what is called life in common, idealisation isn’t tenable – but at a
being beyond. The love which constitutes the bond of marriage, the love which
properly speaking is sacred, flows from the woman towards what Proudhon
calls, all men. Similarly, through the woman, it is all women which the fidelity of
the husband is directed towards.

让我们从女人的角度来观看它。妻子给予她的配偶的爱,并不是朝向个人,甚至不是朝向一个理想化的个人—那是所谓的共同生活的危险,理想化是无法自圆其说—而是目标朝着一个超越的生命实存。形成婚姻的契约的爱情,适当来说,这个爱情是神圣的,它从这个女人流向普鲁东所谓的所有的人。同样地,这个女人,丈夫的忠诚是朝向所有的女人。

This may seem paradoxical, But in Proudhon all isn’t aIle, it isn’t a ,
quantity. it is a universal function. It is the universal man. the universal
woman. the symbol. the embodiment of the partner of the human couple.

这看起来或许是悖论,但是普鲁东的「所有」,并不是全部。它并不是一个数量,它是一个普遍性的功用。这个普遍性的男人,这个普遍性的女人,这个符号象征,人类夫妻的伴侣的化身。

So the pact of speech goes far beyond the individual relation and its
imaginary’ vicissitudes – there’s no need to look very deep into experience to
grasp it. But there is a conflict between this symbolic pact and the imaginary
relations which proliferate spontaneously within every libidinal relation. all
the more so when what intervenes belongs to the order of Verliebtheit.

所以,话语的盟约远超过个人的关系,及它的想象的命运变化—我们没有必要深入到精神分析经验,才会理解它。但是,有一种冲突,处于符号象征于想象的关系之间。后者自动自发地在每个力比多的关系里扩散。当所介入的东西属于「迷恋」的秩序时,它更加是如此。

This conflict subtends. one might say. the great majority of the conflicts in that
milieu within which the vicissitude of the bourgeois destiny is unravelled. Since it occurs within the humanist perspective of the realisation of the ego. and as a consequence within the alienation proper to the ego. All one needs do is observe to see that this conflict exists. but in order to understand the reason for it,one must go further. Our reference-point will be the anthropological data brought forward- by ‘Levi-Strauss.

我们不妨说,这个冲突跟在那个环境里的大多数的冲突相对立。在那个环境里,布尔乔亚的命运的变迁被解散开了。因为它发生在自我的实现的人道主义的观点里面,结果,是在自我本体的异化范围里面。我们所需要的做的是观察,以便看出,这种冲突存在,但是为了了解它的这个理由,我们必须更加深入。我们的指涉点将是由列文、史特劳斯所提出的人类学的资料。

You now that the elementary structures are naturally the most complicated.
and that those which are said to be complex. in the milieu we live in. ostensibly
appear to be the most simple. We think ourselves to be free in our conjugal
choice. anyone can marry anyone else. this is a profound illusion. despite it being inscribed in law. In practice. the choice is guided by preferential elements which. although veiled. are nonetheless essential. The interest of so-called elementary structures is to show us the structure of these preferential elements in all their complexities.
你们现在知道,这些「基本的」结构自然是最复杂。而在我们生活的环境,那些据说是复杂的那些结构,很夸张地看起来是最简单。我们认为我们自己是自由的,在我们的婚姻选择里,「任何人都能够跟任何其他人结婚」。这是一个深刻的幻觉,尽管它被铭记在法律里。实际上,选择受到偏爱的因素的引导,虽然这些因素被遮蔽,它们仍然是基本的。所谓的基本的结构就是要跟我们显示,这些偏爱的因素的结构,在所有这些复杂性里。

Now. Levi-Strauss shows that. in the structure of the alliance. the woman.
who defines the cultural order as against the natural order. is the exchange
object. just as speech. which is in effect the original object of exchange. is.
Whatever,the goods. the qualities and the statuses which are transmitted along the matrilineal line. Whatever the authorities with which a so-called matriarchal order is invested. the symbolic order. in its initial operation. is
androcentric. That’s a fact.

现在,列文、史特劳斯显示:在结盟的结构,女人定义文化秩序,对照于自然秩序,这个女人是这个交换的客体,正如话语是交换客体。实际上,话语是最原初的交换的客体。无论这些货物是什么,这些特质与这些地位被传递,沿着母系的系谱。无论所谓的母系秩序被投注的权威是什么,这个符号象征秩序,在它的最初的运作,是男性为中心的。那是一个事实。

It is a fact which. of course. hasn’t failed to receive all manner of correctives
in the course of history. but for all that it remains no less fundamental. and in
particular allows us to understand the dissymmetrical position of the woman in
the bonds of love. and especially in their most pre-eminentiy socialised form.
namely the conjugal bond.

当然,在历史的过程,这一个事实一定曾经接受各色各样的修正。但是尽管那样,它始终是同样的基本。特别是,它让我们能够理解,在爱情的契约里,女人的不均称的立场。特别是在他们最显著的社会化的形式,换句话说,婚姻的契约。

If these things were seen on their level. and with some rigour. many
phantoms would be dispelled just like that.

假如这些事情根据这个层次,严谨地来看待,许多的魅影将会像那样烟消云散。

The modem idea of marriage as a pact of mutual consent is certainly a
novelty,introduced within the framework of a religion of salvation.,which
gives pride of place to the individual soul. It covers over and masks the original
structure. the primarily sacred nature of marriage. This institution exists today
in a compacted form.,some features of which are so solid and so tenacious that social revolutions are not about to make its pre-eminence and signification disappear. But at the same time, some features of the institution have in
history, been erased.

婚姻的现代观念,作为是互相同意的盟约,确实是新奇,在救赎的宗教的架构里被介绍。这种救赎的宗教给予这个个人的灵魂,一个尊荣的地位。他涵盖并且遮蔽这个原先的结构,婚姻的原初的神圣的特性。这个体制今天以一种精鍊的方式存在,它的某些特征是如此的坚固,如此的牢靠,以致于社会革命,都没有打算要让它的优先地位及意义消失。但是同时地,历史中的体制的某些特征已经被抹除。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Less than nothing 05

October 29, 2012

Less than nothing 05
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章

THE “MAGICAL FORCE” OF REVERSAL

倒转的「魔术力量」

The contrast with Hegel is thus striking. If Hegel’s underlying axiom is that “the
result of an untrue mode of knowledge must not be allowed to run away into an empty nothing”41 (note the prohibitive mode: “must not be allowed to …”!)—i.e., that, through the work of “tarrying with the negative,” every outbreak of negativity can be accounted for (rendered intelligible) in a narrative of meaning and thus aufgehoben in an encompassing infinite totality—for Heidegger, it is a formal (a priori) characteristic of Dasein’s finitude that every meaningful engagement will finally “run away into an empty nothing”: all our
meaningful engagements are just so many contingent attempts to postpone the inevitable; heroic acts against the background of the ultimate nullity of all human endeavor. Does this critique of Hegel hold up however?

跟黑格尔的对照因此耐人寻味。假如黑格尔的作为基础的公理是:「知识的非真实的模式的结果,一定不要被容许逃走进入空洞的空无」(请注意这个禁止的模式:「一定不要被容许、、、」!)–譬如,凭借「逗留否定性」的研究,否定的暴发能够被说明,(让人能理解),以意义的描述,因此在涵盖一切的有限性里被「勾销」–对于海德格,这是生命实存的有限性的正式的(由果推因)的特性,每个意义的参与最后「逃走进入空洞的空无」:我们所有的意义的参与仅是如此众多偶然性的企图,要拖延这个无可避免的事情。英勇的行动,对抗所有人类的企图的这个最后的徒劳。可是,对黑格尔的这个批判能自圆其说吗?

On a first approach, it may well appear justified—as Pippin has noted, when, in a famous passage from the Foreword to the Phenomenology, Hegel provides the most outstanding formulation of the reversal of the negative into a higher positivity, of the resurrection of the infinite life after death, he has recourse to a very strange term: “Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical force [Zauberkraft] that converts it into being.”42

根据最初的途径,它很有可能自圆其说—如同皮宾曾经注意到,在一篇著名的段落,从「精神现象学」前言,黑格尔供应最杰出的说明,对于负面性的倒转成为更高的积极性,在死亡之后,永恒生命的复活,他曾经诉诸于一个非常奇怪的术语:「仅有凭借直视否定性,并逗留在否定性,精神才是这个力量。这个逗留在否定性是这个魔术的力量,将它转变成为生命的实存。」

Effectively, it is “as if Hegel cannot help giving away his dodge and his own
uncertainty with that revealing (most un‐Hegelian) word or Freudian slip,
Zauberkraft”43—an admission that there is something magical, something like the intervention of a deus ex machina, in the dialectical reversal of the negative into the positive. This is why we need to be very precise in circumscribing this reversal. It is a commonplace about Hegel that he criticized the idea of the Crusades for confounding the possession of the spiritual Truth of Christianity with the possession of the physical site of Christ’s tomb, the place of his crucifixion and resurrection. However, here again, the choice is not an immediate one: in order to experience the spiritual Truth of Christianity one has to first occupy the tomb and experience its emptiness—only in this disappointment, through this failure‐in‐triumph, does one reach the insight that, in order to “live in Christ,” it is not necessary to travel to faraway lands and occupy empty tombs, since Christ is already here whenever there is Love between his followers. To recast this experience in the terms of the Rabinovitch joke:

实际上,这个「好像黑格尔禁不住地屈从于他的逃避及他自己的不确定性,用那个启示的字词(相当非黑格尔式)或是弗洛依德的口误—这是一种承认:有某件魔术的东西,某件像是天外救星deux ex machine 的介入,从否定性倒转成为肯定性。这就是为什么我们需要非常确实来限定这个倒转。这是关于黑格尔的一个共同的地方,他批评十字军东征的这个观念,因为它混淆了基督教的精神真理的拥有,跟耶稣基督的坟墓的实质地点的拥有,他的被钉上十字架及复活的地点。可是,在此的这个选择并不是一个当下的选择:为了经验基督教的这个精神的真理,我们必须首先佔有这个坟墓,并且经验它的空洞。仅有凭借在胜利中的失败,这个失望,我们才获得这个洞见:为了「生活在基督的圣灵里」,我们并不需要旅行到遥远的土地,并且佔有那些空洞的坟墓。因为每当他的信徒之间存有爱心,基督就已经在那里。为了重新铸造这个经验,用拉宾诺维奇的笑话:

“We are going to Jerusalem to find Christ’s tomb and to dwell in the presence of
divinity.”

「我们将去耶路撒冷找到耶稣基督的坟墓,并且驻居在神圣的存在里。」

“But what you will discover in Jerusalem is that the tomb is empty, that there is
nothing to find, that all you have is yourselves, the community of visiting Christians …”

「但是你们将会在耶路撒冷发现的是,坟墓的空洞,找不到任何东西,你们所拥有的是你们自己,拜访基督徒的社区、、、」

“Well, this community of spirit is the living Christ, and this is what we were really
looking for!”

「呵呵,精神的社区就是活着的耶稣基督,这就是我们确实正在寻找的!」

The same goes for the resurrection itself: “Christ will be resurrected!” “But we, his followers who wait for him, see nothing …” “True, you don’t see—but what you don’t see is that the spirit of this community of yours, the love that bonds you, is the resurrected Christ!” And likewise even more so for the topic of the Second Coming: nothing will “really happen,” no God will miraculously appear; people will just realize that God is already here, in the spirit of their collective.

相同的道路适用于复活的本身:「基督将会复活!」「但是我们,他的信徒等待他,什么都没有看见、、、」「确实地,你们没有看见—但是你们没有看见的东西是,属于你们的这个社区的精神,团结你们的爱,那就是耶稣基督的复活!」同样地,对于「二次再来」的主题,更是如此。没有什么「将会确实发生」,没有上帝将会奇迹般地出现。人们将仅是体会到,上帝已经在这里,在他们的集体的精神里。

Christopher Nolan’s film The Prestige (2006)—a story about the deadly rivalry
between two magicians, the lower‐class Alfred Borden and the upper‐class Robert Angier, in fin de siècle London—can, surprisingly, help us to grasp clearly this “magical” aspect of Hegelian dialectics.

克利陀弗、诺兰的影片「顶尖对决」(2006)—在两位魔术家之间敌意难解的故事,低层的波顿,跟高层安吉尔,在世纪末的伦敦—令人惊奇地,这个故事能够帮助我们清楚地理解黑格尔辩证法的「魔术」的一面。

The film can be read as an allegory of the struggle for Hegel’s legacy between Right and Left Hegelians. The two magicians compete over who can deliver the
best performance of the “Transported Man” trick; Borden, the first to perform it,
disappears into a box, bounces a ball to another box across the stage, and instantly reappears within the second box to catch the ball. Blackmailed into revealing the source of his trick to Angier, Borden gives him one clue, the name of an inventor: “Tesla.” (This, we later learn, is a lie: Borden simply used his twin brother to replace him.) Angier travels to Colorado Springs to meet Nikola Tesla and learn the secret of Borden’s illusion.

这个影片能够被阅读为一个寓言:在右派与左派的黑格尔主义者之间,争夺黑格尔的遗产。这两位魔术家互相競争,谁最能够表现出「人被运输」的魔术。波顿首先表演,消失进入一个箱子,弹出一个球越过戏台,到另外一个箱子,然后瞬间重新消失在第二个箱子里,为了捉住这个球。由于被恐吓要被揭露他的魔术的来源给安吉尔,波顿给他一个线索,发明者的名字:「忒斯拉」(我们后来知道,这是一个谎言:波顿仅是利用他的孪生兄弟来替代他。)安吉尔旅行到科罗拉多温泉区去会见尼古拉、忒斯拉,并且获知波顿幻法魔术的秘密。

Tesla constructs a teleportation machine, but the device fails to work. Angier then learns from Borden’s notebook that he has been sent on a wild‐goose chase. Feeling he has wasted his money, he returns to Tesla’s lab and discovers that the machine can in fact create and teleport a duplicate of any item placed in it. When Tesla is forced to leave Colorado Springs, Angier is left with the machine. In a letter, Tesla warns Angier to destroy it. Angier refuses to do so and returns to London to begin a final set of 100 performances with his new act, “The Real Transported Man,” in which he disappears under huge arcs of electricity and
“teleports” fifty yards from the stage to the balcony in a second.

忒斯拉建造一台运输机器,但是这台机器无法运作。然后,安吉尔从波顿的笔记获知,他已经被派遣去追逐野鹅。由于感觉他浪费金钱,他回到忒斯拉的实验室,并且发现这个机器实际上创造并且传真运输放置里面的任何东西的复制品。当忒斯拉被迫离开科罗拉多温泉区,听任安吉尔处理那台机器。在一封信里,忒斯拉警告安吉尔毁灭它。安吉尔拒绝这样做,并且回到伦敦,开始用他的新的行动表演100个魔术表演的最后一齣。「真实地运输人」。在这齣表演,他消失在巨大的电虹管下,然后瞬间传真运输五十码,从舞台到观众看台。

Borden attends Angier’s performance and is baffled; he slips backstage and finds Angier inside a water tank, with a padlock on the latch that prevents his escape. At the film’s end, the mortally wounded Angier reveals his secret to Borden: each time he disappeared during the illusion, he fell through a trap door into the tank and drowned; the machine created a duplicate who teleported to the balcony and basked in the applause. Angier says he suffered to become great—a philosophy Borden thought Angier had never learned.

波顿出席安吉尔的表演,感到困惑。他悄悄到后台,发现安吉尔在一个水槽里,栓栏有把大锁让他无法逃避。在影片结束时,安吉尔的致命的受伤让波顿知道他的秘密。每次他在幻法魔术消失时,他从一个陷阱的门掉入水槽,然后淹溺。机器创造一个复制人,他被传送到观众看台,然后陶醉于掌声中。安吉尔说,他为了成为伟大而遭受痛苦。这个哲学,波顿认为安吉尔从来没有学到。

The class rivalry between the upper‐class Angier and the lower‐class Borden is
reflected in, among other things, the different ways in which they organize the illusion: Borden uses his twin brother to replace him, while Angier does it with the help of true scientific wizardry (he really is redoubled). There is a celebration of the aristocratic ethic of sacrifice (against cheap lower‐class trickery) at work here: for the sake of his art, Angier undergoes the terrible pain of drowning during each performance.

上流阶层的安吉尔与下层阶层的波顿,有阶级的敌意被反映在许多事情上。他们组织幻象的方式有差异。波顿使用他的双胞兄弟来替代他,而安吉尔则是凭借真是的科学的巫术来完成(他确实是被复制)。在此,庆贺贵族的牺牲的伦理在运作:为了他的艺术的缘故,安吉尔在每次的表演,都经历淹溺的可怕的痛苦。

Therein resides Angier’s revenge: Borden thinks that only he is ready to truly suffer to become great (when he loses some fingers on his hand, his twin brother also cuts off the same fingers to remain indiscernible from him, etc.); however, at the end, he is forced to admit that beneath Angier’s corrupted‐aristocrat attitude there is a much more terrible sacrifice—each performance is paid for with a suicide.

安吉尔的报复就在那里。波顿认为他为了成为伟大,他就是准备要真实地承受痛苦(当他丧失他的手上的手指头,他的双胞胎兄弟也切掉相同的几隻手指,为了保持跟他没有区别,等等)。可是,最后,他被迫承认,在安吉尔的腐败的贵族的态度,有一种更加可怕的牺牲—每次都表演都用自杀作为代价。

Early in the film, when a magician performs a trick with a small bird which
disappears in a cage on the table, a small boy in the audience starts to cry, claiming that the bird has been killed. The magician approaches him and finishes the trick, gently producing a live bird out of his hand—but the boy is not satisfied, insisting that this must be another bird, the dead one’s brother. After the show, we see the magician in a room behind the stage, bringing in a flattened cage and throwing a squashed bird into a trash bin—the boy was indeed correct. The film describes the three stages of a magic performance: the setup, or the “pledge,” where the magician shows the audience something that appears ordinary
but is probably not, making use of misdirection; the “turn,” where the magician makes the ordinary act extraordinary; and the “prestige,” where the effect of the illusion is produced.

在影片的初始,一位魔术家用一隻鸟表演一个魔术。这隻鸟消失于桌上的笼子,观众中一位男孩开始哭叫,宣称这隻鸟已经被杀死。魔术家走近他,然后结束这个魔术,从他的手里拿出一隻活的鸟—但是这位男孩并不满意,坚持说,那是另外一隻鸟,死去的鸟的兄弟。在这次表演之后,我们看到这位魔术家在舞台幕后的房间,带进一个扁平的鸟笼,然后将一隻被压扁的鸟丢进垃圾桶—那位男孩确实说对了。这部影片描述魔术表演的三个阶段:设计,或是「宣告」,魔术家跟观众显示某件看起来特别的东西,但是可能并不普通,由于使用错误的方向。其次是转折,魔术家让普通的动作看起来特别。最后是威望,幻景的效果被产生。

Is not this triple movement the Hegelian triad at its purest? The thesis (pledge), its catastrophic negation (turn), and the magical resolution of the catastrophe (prestige)? The catch, as Hegel was well aware, is that in order for the miracle of the “prestige” to occur, somewhere there must be a squashed bird—in The Prestige, it is Angier’s drowned body.

这难道不是黑格尔正反合的三个动作,处于最纯净的状态?这个主题(宣告),它的灾难性的否定(转折),然后是灾难的魔术般的解决(威望)?黑格尔知道得很清楚,这个要领是,为了让这个「威望」的奇迹发生,某个地方,必须要有一隻被压扁的鸟—在「威望」那里。那就是安吉尔的被淹溺的身体。

We should thus have no qualms about admitting that there is something of the
“cheap magician” about Hegel, in his trick of synthesis, of Aufhebung. Ultimately, there are only two ways to account for this trick, like the two versions of the vulgar bad news/good news medical joke: (1) the good news is good, but it concerns another subject (“The bad news is that you have a terminal cancer and will die in a month. The good news is: you see that beautiful nurse over there? I’ve been trying to get her into bed for months; finally, yesterday, she said yes and we made love the whole night like crazy …”); (2) the good news is bad news for the subject, but from a different perspective (“The bad news is you have
severe Alzheimer’s. The good news is: you have Alzheimer’s, so you will have forgotten the bad news by the time you get home”).

我们应该没有疑惧,关于承认,关于黑格尔有某位「廉价的魔术家」,在他的综合,勾销的魔术。最后,仅有两个方法来解释这个魔术,就像通俗的好坏消息医疗笑话的两个版本,但是它关系到另外一个主体,。(坏消息是,你罹患末期癌症,一个月内会死掉。好消息是,你看到那边那位美丽的护士吗?好几个月来,我曾经尝试拐诱她上床,最后昨天她答应了。我们一整天疯狂地作爱。第二个版本是,对于主体,好消息就是坏消息,但是从不同的观点,你罹患老年痴呆症,所以你将会忘掉这个坏消息,在你回家之前。)

The true Hegelian “synthesis” is the synthesis of these two options: the good news is the bad news itself—but in order for us to see that, we have to shift to a different agent (from the bird which dies to the one which replaces it; from the cancer‐ridden patient to the happy doctor, from Christ as individual to the community of believers). In other words, the dead bird remains dead, it really dies; likewise in the case of Christ, who is reborn as another subject, as the Holy Ghost.

真实的黑格尔的「综合」,就是这两个选择的综合:好消息是坏消息的本身—但是为了让我们看出,我们必须转移到一个不同的代理哲(从死掉的鸟到替代它的鸟,从罹患癌症的病人,到快乐的医生,从耶稣基督作为个人,到信徒的社区)。换句话说,死去的鸟始终是死了,它确实死掉。在耶稣基督的情况,凡是重生的人,就是另外一个主体,作为神圣的鬼魂。

We are dealing here with jokes in which we arrive at the final line only through a
dialogic undermining of a preceding position, an undermining which unexpectedly involves our subjective standpoint.44

我们在此正在处理这些笑话。在这些笑话里,我们仅是凭借一种对话的逐渐损坏一个先前的立场,来到达这个最后的底线。这种逐渐损坏出乎意料之外地牵涉到主体的观点。

The basic idea of Hegel’s dialectic is, on the contrary, that this dialogic process is not just subjective but is inscribed in the reality of the “Thing itself”: the tension which is reflected in the dialogue is constitutive of reality—this is how Hegel’s thesis that the path to truth is part of truth itself should be conceived. Even the remark allegedly made by Brecht in Sidney Hook’s apartment, apropos the accused at the Moscow show trials in the 1930s, can be recast in these terms: In 1935 Brecht visited Hook’s house in Manhattan. When Hook raised the question of the recent arrest and imprisonment of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and thousands of others, Brecht is alleged by Hook to have replied calmly in German: “The more innocent they are, the more they deserve to be shot.” As Hook tells it, he then handed Brecht his hat and coat. Brecht left “with a sickly smile.”45

相反地,黑格尔辩证法的基本观念是,这个对话的过程不仅是主体性,而且被铭记着「物自体」的现实界:被反映在对话里的紧张构成现实界。这就是黑格尔的「正题」:通往真理之路是真理本身的部分。这个「正题」应该被构想。甚至1930年代,布莱特在雪梨、胡克的公寓所宣称的这个谈论,关于在莫斯科的样板审判的这位被告,能够用这些术语来重新铸造。在1935年,布莱特拜访胡克在曼哈顿的家。当胡克提出这个问题: 最近,基诺威夫,卡梅尼夫,以及上千的其他人的被逮捕和监禁,据胡克宣称,布莱特镇定地以德语回答:「他们越是无辜,他们越应该被抢毙。」依照胡克的说法,他於是将他的帽子和外套交给布莱特,布莱特带着「病态的微笑」离开。

Brecht’s statement is thoroughly ambiguous—it can be read as a standard assertion of radical Stalinism (your very insistence on your innocence, your refusal to sacrifice yourself for the Cause, bears witness to your guilt, which resides in giving preference to your individual interests over the larger interests of the Party), or it can be read in a radically anti‐Stalinist manner: if they were in a position to plot the assassination of Stalin and his entourage, and were “innocent” (that is, did not grasp the opportunity), then they really deserve to die for having failed to rid us of Stalin.

布莱特的陈述是彻底的模糊暧昧—它能够被阅读作为是激进的史达林的标准的主张(你们坚持你们的无辜,你们拒绝为了理想牺牲你们自己,就见证到你们的罪行。这个罪行在于你们偏爱你们的个人的興趣,胜过于党的更大的興趣)。或是它能够被阅读,以一个激烈的反对史达林的方式: 假如他们的立场是要计划谋杀史达林及他的随从(换句话说,没有捉住机会),并且是无辜的,那么,他们确实应该为了没有替我们铲除史达林而被处死。

The true guilt of the accused is thus that, instead of rejecting the very ideological framework of Stalinism and ruthlessly acting against Stalin, they narcissistically fell in love with their victimization and either protested their innocence or became fascinated by the ultimate sacrifice they could make for the Party by confessing to non‐existent crimes. The properly dialectical way to grasp the
imbrication of these two meanings would be to start with the first reading, followed by the common‐sense moralistic reaction to Brecht: “But how can you say something so ruthless?

这些被告的真实的罪行因此是,他们没有拒绝史达林的意识形态的架构,并且残酷地採取行动反对他,他们自恋地爱上他们成为受害者。他们要就抗议他们的无辜,要不就是著迷于他们能够为了党成为最后的牺牲,去坦承并不存在的罪行。这种恰到好处的辩证法,来理解这两个意义的层层掩盖,将是从第一重阅读开始,后面跟随着对布莱特的普通常识的道德的反应:「你们如何能够说出如此残酷的事情?

Surely such a logic, demanding a blind self‐sacrifice to satisfy the accusatory whims of the Leader, can only function within a terrifying and criminal totalitarian system—it is surely the duty of every ethical subject to fight such a system with all means possible, including the physical removal, murder if necessary, of the totalitarian leadership?” “Yes, so you can see how, if the accused were innocent, they deserve all the more to be shot—they effectively were in a position to rid us of Stalin and his henchmen, and missed this unique
opportunity to spare humanity from his terrible crimes!”46

的确,如此的逻辑,要求盲目的自我牺牲,来满足领袖的控诉的妄想。这仅是在一个可怕而犯罪的集权的制度里,它才能够运作。这确实每位伦理的主体的责任,要尽其一切工具,来跟这样一个制度战斗,包括实质上移除集权当领导,若有必要的话,就谋杀吗?」「是的,所以你们能够看出,假如被告是无辜的,他们更加应该被枪毙—他们实际上处于这个立场,要替我们除掉史达林及他的党羽,而他们没有掌握这个机会,来替人道主义避免他的可怕的罪行!」

The same ambiguity can be discerned in the infamous statement attributed to
various Nazi leaders: “When I hear the word ‘culture,’ I reach for my pistol.” The Nazi’s intended meaning was probably that he was ready to defend high German culture with arms, if necessary, against the Jews and other barbarians; the true meaning, however, is that he is himself a barbarian who explodes with violence when confronted with true works of culture.47

相同的模糊暧昧能够被觉察,在被归属于各种的纳粹的领导者,这个恶名昭彰的陈述:「当我听到文化这个字词,我伸手去拿我的手枪。」纳粹的意图的用意很可能是,他准备用武器来捍卫德国文化,来对抗犹太人及其他野蛮民族,,假如必要的话。可是,这个真实的意义是,他自己是一种充满暴力的野蛮人,当他面临文化的真实的作品。

Hegel’s version of “infinite judgment” is thus different from Kant’s—there is a
negation of negation (of the Rabinovitch type) at work in its most famous example, “the Spirit is a bone”: (1) the Spirit is a bone; (2) this is nonsense, there is an absolute contradiction between these two terms; (3) well, the Spirit is this contradiction. One can see the opposition between this procedure and the paradox of identity as identified by Hegel, where the very occurrence of an identical term causes surprise: A rose is … (we expect a predicate, but get) a rose. The Hegelian move is to treat this surprise/paradox as constitutive of identity: there is surprise (and a temporal logic) in both cases, but of a different kind.48

黑格尔对于「永恒审判」的说法,因此跟康德的说法大异其趣。有一种否定的否定之运作 (属于拉宾诺维奇的方式),在它最著名的例子,「精神即骨头」:1、精神是骨头; 2、这是无意义,在这两个术语之间,有一个绝对的悖论; 3、嗯,精神就是这个悖论。我们能够看出这个对立,处于程序跟黑格尔辨认出来的认同的悖论之间的对立。在那里,一个认同术语的发生会引起惊奇。玫瑰花、、、(我们期望述词,但是获得)是玫瑰花。黑格尔的动作是要对待这个惊奇与悖论,作为是认同的形成:在两个情况,都有一个惊奇(和一个时间段逻辑),但是种类不同。

This in turn means that Heidegger’s notion of death as the ultimate point of
impossibility that cannot be dialectically “sublated” or included in a higher totality is no argument against Hegel: the Hegelian response is just to shift the perspective in order to recognize this negativity itself in its positive aspect, as a condition of possibility: what appears as the ultimate obstacle is in itself a positive condition of possibility, for the universe of meaning can only arise against the background of its annihilation. Furthermore, the properly dialectical reversal is not only the reversal of negative into positive, of the condition of impossibility into the condition of possibility, of obstacle into enabling agency,
but, simultaneously, the reversal of transcendence into immanence, and the inclusion of the subject of enunciation in the enunciated content.

这反过来意味着,海德格对于死亡的观念,作为不可能的最后的点,无法用辩证法「勾消」,或是被包括在一个更高的整体性里。这并不是要反对黑格尔的论点。黑格尔的回应,仅是转移这个观点,为了体认出这个否定性的本身,在它的肯定的一面,作为是可能的情况:出现作为这个最后的阻碍,本身是可能的一个肯定的情况。因为意义的宇宙仅能够产生,对抗它自己被毁灭的背景。而且,这个合宜的辩证法的倒转,不但是否定被倒转成为肯定,不可能的情况被倒转成为可能的情况,阻碍被倒转成为促进的代理,而且,同时地,超验被倒转成为内在性,表述的主体被包括在被表述的内容里。

This reversal‐into‐itself—the shift in the status of what‐is‐at‐stake from sign to
Thing, from predicate to subject—is crucial for the dialectical process: what first appears as a mere sign (property, reflection, distortion) of the Thing turns out to be the Thing itself. If the Idea cannot adequately represent itself, if its representation is distorted or deficient, then this simultaneously signals a limitation or deficiency of the Idea itself. Furthermore, not only does the universal Idea always appear in a distorted or displaced way; this Idea is nothing but the distortion or displacement, the self‐inadequacy, of the particular with regard to itself.

这个倒转成为它自身—岌岌可危的地位,从符号转变成为「物象」,从述词转变成为主词—这对辩证法过程是很重要的;首先出现作为仅是「物象」的符号(属性,反思,扭曲),结果成为「物象」的本身。假如这个「理念」无法适当地代表它自己,假如它的再现被扭曲或是欠缺,那么这同时表示一种限制或是「理念」本身的欠缺。而且,这个普遍性的「理念」不但总是出现,以一个扭曲或被替换的方式,而且这个「理念」仅仅就是扭曲或是替换,这个自性的不足,关于它自己的这个特殊性。

This brings us to the most radical dimension of the (in)famous “identity of
opposites”: insofar as “contradiction” is the Hegelian name for the Real, this means that the Real is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is impossible and the obstacle which prevents this direct access; the Thing which eludes our grasp and the distorting screen which makes us miss the Thing. Is this not how trauma works? On the one hand, trauma is the X that the subject is unable to approach directly, that can only be perceived in a distorted way, through some kind of protective lens, that can only be alluded to in a
roundabout way, never confronted head on, etc.

这引导我们来到这个最激进的维度:这个著名的「对立的认同」,因为这个「悖论」就是黑格尔对实在界的名字,这意味着,实在界同时就是「物象」,不可能直接进入的物象,阻止这个直接进入的这个阻碍,让我们捉摸不定的这个「物象」及这个扭曲的帘幕,让我们错过这个「物象」。这难道不是创伤如何运作吗?在一方面,创伤就是这个未知数X,主体无法直接靠近的未知数X,它仅能用扭曲的方式来感觉,通过某种的保护的透镜。它仅能被提到,以一个迂回的方式,永远不是正面面对,等等。

On the other hand, however, for a subject who has experienced a traumatic shock, the trauma also functions as the very opposite of the inaccessible Thing‐in‐itself which eludes its grasp: it functions as something here, in me, that distorts and disturbs my perspective on reality, twisting it in a particular way. A woman who has been brutally raped and humiliated not only cannot directly recall the rape scene; the repressed memory of the rape also distorts her approach to reality, making her oversensitive to some of its aspects, ignoring others and so on.

可是,在另一方面,一个曾经经历创伤惊吓动主体,这个创伤也发挥功用,作为是它无法掌握的不可接近的物象本身的对立物。它在此发挥功用,作为某件东西,在我身上,扭曲而且扰乱我对现实界的观点,扭曲它,以一个特别的方式。一个曾经遭到残酷强暴及羞辱的女人,不但无法直接回忆起这个强暴场景,而且被强暴的被压抑记忆也扭曲她的对于现实界的接近,让她对于现实界的某些方面过分敏感,忽略其他,等等。

And is not this shift structurally homologous to that of the Rabinovitch joke quoted above? The very problem (obstacle) retroactively appears as its own solution, since what prevents us from directly accessing the Thing is the Thing itself. The only change here lies in the shift of perspective. In exactly the same way, the final twist in Kafka’s parable “Before the Law” relies on a mere shift of perspective: the man from the country, confronted with the door of the Law that prevents his access to the terrifying Thing (the Law), is told that from the very beginning the door was there only for him, in other words that he was from the beginning included in the Law—the Law was not just the Thing which fascinated his gaze, it always already returned his gaze. And, to go a step further, the gap that separates me from God is the gap that separates God from himself: the distance is not abolished (I do not miraculously rejoin God), it is merely displaced into God himself.

这个转变难道不是在结构上,跟以上引述的拉宾诺维奇的笑话的转变是同质性?这个问题(阻碍)反动地出现,作为它自己的解决,因为阻止我们无法直接接近这个「物象」的东西,就是「物象」的本身。在此,这个唯一的改变在于观点的这个改变,方式确实相同,在卡夫卡的寓言「法律之前」,这个最后的变形,仅是依靠观点的改变; 从乡下来的这个人,面对法律之门,这道门阻止他无法进入这个可怕的「物象」(法律)。他被告诉,从一开始,这道门在那里,就是等待他。换句话说,他从一开始就被「包括」在法律里。法律不仅是吸引他的凝视的这个「物象」,它总是已经回报他的凝视。为了更进一步,分开我跟上帝的这个差距,就是分开上帝跟他自己的这个差距。这个距离并没有被废除 (我并没有奇迹般地跟他融合),它仅是被替换成为上帝本身。

Yet another way to articulate this key moment is in the more traditional terms of the dialectical tension between the epistemological and the ontological dimensions: the gap that separates the knowing subject from the known object is inherent to the object itself, my knowing a thing is part of a process internal to the thing, which is why the standard epistemological problem should be turned around: not “How is my knowledge of the thing possible?” but “How is it that knowledge appears within the thing as a mode of the thing’s relating to itself?” With regard to God, the problem is not “How can I know God?” but “How
and why does God generate in humans knowledge about himself?” that is, how does my knowledge (and ignorance) of God function within God himself? Our alienation from God is God’s self‐alienation. When we lose God, it is not only that God abandons us, God abandons
himself.

可是,另外一种方法来表达这个关键点时刻,用辩证法的紧张的更加传统的术语,这个紧张处于认识论与本体论的维度之间。分开知道的主体跟这个被知道的主体的这个差距,是客体本身的内在本质。我知道一件东西,是这个东西的内部的过程。这就是为什么标准的认识论的问题,应该被倒转过来。不是「我对这个东西的知识如何成为可能?」,而是「知识如何出现在这个东西里面,作为这个东西跟它自己的关系?关于上帝,这个问题并不是「我如何能够认识上帝?」,而是「上帝如何以及为何在人类有关他自己的知识里产生?」换句话说,我对上帝的知识(及我的无知)如何在上帝本身里面发挥功用?我们跟上帝的异化,就是上帝的自我异化。当我们丧失上帝,那不但是上帝放弃我们,而且是上帝放弃他自己。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Less than nothing 04

October 24, 2012

Less than nothing 04
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章
LACAN, MARX, HEIDEGGER
拉康、马克思、海德格

Such a shift also lies at the very heart of the Hegelian relationship between lies and truth. Winston Churchill was right when he characterized truth not as something we search for, but as something upon which, occasionally, we accidentally stumble: “Men stumble over the truth from time to time, but most pick themselves up and hurry off as if nothing happened.”

这样一种转变就在于黑格尔的关系的核心,处于谎言与真理之间。温斯顿、邱吉尔说得没有错,当他表现真理的特性,不是作为某件我们寻找的东西,而是作为某件偶尔我们会邂逅的东西。「人有时邂逅真理,但是大部分人善待一下,然后匆匆离开,好像没有发生什么事。

A psychologically intuitive person may be able to recognize immediately—from
a slight change of tone or of gesture—when somebody has started to lie; but perhaps what one needs much more is someone able to recognize when, in the generalized babble of daily communication, a person stumbles upon truth (or, rather, when the truth starts to talk in or through the babble)—not, of course, factual truth, but subjective truth, which can also (even as a rule does) express itself in the guise of a (factual) lie.

一位具有心理直觉的人可能能够立刻体认出来—从语调或姿态的轻微改变—当某个人已经开始说谎,但是或许我们更加需要的是某个人能够体认出,在日常沟通的一般性的蠢话里,什么时候一个人邂逅真理, (或者,什么时候真理开始用蠢话或通过蠢话谈论)–当然,那并不是事实的真理,而是主观性的真理。这个真理也能够表达它自己,伪装成(实际的)的谎言。

The reason is that, at their most radical, lies are not a simple denial of truth; they serve a much more refined protective function: to render the truth palpable, tolerable. During World War II, Churchill quipped: “In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies.” And since, in a way, life itself, especially love, is permanent warfare, lying is what keeps the world together. Joseph de Maistre wrote: “if we want to teach an error, we should … always begin with a truth.”24 De Maistre had in mind how even the most cruel sacrificial rituals of pagan religion implicitly harbor a correct insight into the efficacy of sacrifice brought out in its true form by Christianity. However, from a Hegelian standpoint, we should invert this statement: “if we want to teach a truth, we should always begin with an error.”

这个理由是,在它们最激烈时,谎言并不是对于真理的单纯的否定。它们充当一种更加精炼的保护功用:将真理变得具体化,可容忍。在二次大战期间,邱吉尔开玩笑说:「在战时,真理是如此的珍贵,以致于她应该受到一群谎言护卫的伴从。因为在某方面,生命本身,特别是爱,就是永久的战争,谎言就是团结这个世界的东西。约瑟夫、梅思特瑞写到:「假如我们想要教导一个错误,我们应该总是从真理开始。」梅思特瑞心中所想的是,即使是异教徒宗教最残酷的牺牲的仪式都含蓄地怀抱著一个正确的洞见,看到牺牲的有效性,由基督教用它的真实的形式显露出来。可是,从黑格尔的观点,我们应该倒转这个陈述:「假如我们想要教导一个真理,我们应该总是从一个错误开始。」

The basic strategy of Brecht’s celebrated adaptive cunning, exemplified by his
behavior during his interview by the House Un‐American Activities Committee (HUAC), is to “lie with (partial) truth”: while all Brecht’s answers to the Committee were factually true, he tailored the facts to create a false overall impression (in short: that he was not a dedicated communist propagandist, but just an anti‐fascist democrat). The principle underlying Brecht’s strategy is best expressed in his cynical reply to the reproach that he acted like a coward:

布莱特的著名的适应的狡狯的基本策略,可由他的行为作为典范,在非美裔活动委员会的採访过程。那个策略就是「用(部分)真理说谎。虽然布莱特对于委员会的回答,实际上是真实的,他裁剪这些事实来创造虚假的全面性印象(总之:他并不是一位全心全意的共产党的宣导者,而仅是反对法西斯主义的民主党员)。作为布莱特的策略的基础的原则,可由他嘲讽地回答这个谴责:他的行为像个懦夫,表现的最为淋漓尽致。

“My profession is not a hero, but a writer.” The problem here, of course, is that being a hero—that is, having courage—is precisely not a profession, but a
characteristic that can be displayed in any situation where what is at stake is what Badiou calls fidelity to a Truth‐Event. Brecht’s stance should be contrasted to that of Dashiell Hammett, who found himself in a similar predicament at the same time: called to testify before the HUAC, he was asked if he really was a trustee for a fund that the Communist Party of the USA had organized to protect its persecuted members and sympathizers.

「我的专业并不是英雄,而是作家。」当然,在此的问题是,作为英雄—换句话说,具有勇气—并不是一种专业,而是一种能够在任何情境表达特性。在那里,岌岌可危的是巴迪欧所谓的对于真理事件的忠诚。布莱特的态度应该对照于达西尔、汉梅特的态度,后者发现他自己同时处于类似的困境:被号召在非美裔活动委员会作证,他被询问他是否是美国共产党组织的基金会信托人,这个基金会是为了保护它受到迫害的成员及同情者。

The truth was that he knew nothing about the fund, but he was too proud to answer truthfully, since this would have implied that he recognized the authority of the HUAC and accepted the need to defend himself; so he refused to answer (and was duly sent to prison where, after only two weeks, the guards began to address him as “Sir”—proof of the extraordinary power and dignity of his personality). Both Brecht and Hammett lied, but where Brecht lied with (partial) truth, Hammett lied to save his dignity and truthfulness.25

事实上,他对这个基金会一无所知,但是他太骄傲,以致没有真实地回答。因为这本来会暗示,他承认非美裔活动委员会的权威,并且接受替他自己辩护的需要。所以他拒绝回答(然后按规定被送入监狱,在那里,仅经过两个星期后,警卫开始称呼他为「先生」–证明他具有他的人格的特别权力与权威)。布莱特与汉梅特都说谎,但是布莱特用部分的真理说谎,而汉梅特说谎说为了拯救他的尊严及忠实。

No wonder that Georg Lukács, Brecht’s great Marxist opponent, displayed more ethical courage than Brecht when, after the crushing of the Hungarian rebellion at the end of 1956, he was arrested by the Soviets, who offered him freedom on one condition: they had tapes of his phone conversations with the other members of the Imre Nagy government and they knew that he had expressed his disagreement with some of the government’s anti‐socialist measures—all the Soviets wanted from him was to restate these disagreements publicly. Lukács declined, knowing perfectly well that to state the factual truth under such
conditions would have been to lie.

难怪布莱特的马克思的伟大对手,乔治、鲁凯克,展示比布莱特更具有伦理的勇气,经过1956年结束,匈牙利的反叛被压制后,他被苏联逮捕,然后被释放,其中一个条件是:他们拥有他跟印马、纳吉政府官员的电话谈话的录音带。他们知道他曾表达他并不赞同某些政府的反对社会主义的措施。苏联所要从他那里得到的就是公开重新陈述这些的不赞同。鲁凯克婉拒,因为他清楚地知道,在这些条件下,陈述这个实际的真理,那将会是说谎。

In his first Seminar, Lacan defines error as a habitual embodiment of truth: “as long as the truth will not be revealed in its entirety, that is to say, in all probability till the end of time, it will be in its nature to propagate itself in the guise of error: error is thus a constitutive structure of the revelation of being as such.”26

在他的研讨班,拉康定义错误,作为真理的习惯性化身:「只要真理没有完整地显示,换句话说,很有可能,直到生命结束。真理的特性将会以伪装错误的方式宣导自己:错误因此是生命实存本身的启示的组成结构。」

The reference here, of course, is to the Freudian universe in which truth articulates itself as a rupture of the normal or regular flow of our speech or activity: the truth leaks out in the guise of slips of the tongue, failures to act, etc. Lacan wants to draw a strict distinction between this Freudian procedure and the Hegelian dialectic in which truth also arises out of errors, through the
self‐sublation of the latter: Hegelian truth is the absolute disclosure which can only be formulated at the end of history, when the historical process is fully actualized, while Freudian truth is partial, fragmentary, always just a rupture in the flow of ignorance, never the revealed totality.

当然,在此的指称是提到弗洛依德的宇宙。在那里,真理标达它自己,作为我们话语或活动的正常或规律的流露:真理以伪装成口误,没有採取行动等方式,泄露出来。拉康想要严格地区别,弗洛依德的程序跟黑格尔的辩证法,在后者,真理也是从错误中产生,经由错误的自我钩销:黑格尔的真理就是,绝对的辞说仅能在历史的结束被说明,当历史的过程充分地被实现。而弗洛依的真理是部分,片断,总是一种断裂,在无知中流动,从来就不是被显示的完整性。

The problem here is that since psychoanalysis thus lacks the final
point of total revelation which would enable it to firmly distinguish truth from error, how can it be sure that the other discourse which the psychoanalytic interpretation discerns beneath the discourse of méprise is not just another discourse of misrecognition? Aware of the problem, for a couple of years Lacan effectively insisted on a homology between psychoanalysis and Hegelian Absolute Knowing: the only difference being that the psychoanalyst is more modest, aware that we cannot ever reach the point of accomplished
symbolization/revelation.

在此的这个问题是,因为精神分析因此缺乏完整启示的最后的时刻,这个时刻将会让他能够坚定地区别真理跟错误。这如何能够确定?精神分析的解释,在meprise之下觉察出来的另外一个辞说,并不仅是误认的另外一个辞说?因为知道这个问题,两三年后,拉康实际上坚持一种同质性,处于精神分析与黑格尔绝对知识之间的同质性。唯一的差别是,精神分析家更加谦卑,因为他知道,我们永远无法到达完整的符号象征与启示的那个时刻。

(Later, Lacan resorted to the classic Freudian answer: the proof of the truth of a psychoanalytic interpretation is its own symbolic efficacy, the way it transforms the subject.) However, such a reading of Lacan as a “weak Hegelian,” still faithful to the Hegelian goal and merely postponing indefinitely the final reconciliation, is stricto sensu wrong—that is, wrong with regard to Hegel. In other words, the very notion of Absolute Knowing as accomplished symbolization, the full revelation of Being, etc., totally misses the point of the Hegelian “reconciliation” by turning it into an Ideal to be reached, rather than something that is always already here and should merely be assumed. Hegelian temporality is crucial here: we enact “reconciliation” not by way of a miraculous healing of wounds, and so forth, but by recognizing “the rose in the cross of the present,” by realizing that reconciliation is already accomplished in what we (mis)perceived as alienation.

(后来,拉康诉诸于这个古典的弗洛依式的回答:精神分析解释的真理的证据,是它自己的符号象征的有效性。它改变主体的方式。)可是,如此阅读拉康,作为是「软弱的黑格尔」,依旧是忠实于黑格尔的目标,并且仅是不定期地拖延这个最后的「协和」,这种阅读严格而言是错误的。换句话说,关于黑格尔,这样的阅读是错误的。也就是说,绝对知识的这个观念,作为被完成的符号象征,生命实存的充分实现,等等,完全错认黑格尔「协和」的时刻。因为他将它转变成为一种要被抵达的理念,而不是某件「总是已经在此,而且应该仅是被假定的东西」。黑格尔的时间性在此时重要的:我们拟定「协和」,并不是凭借对于创伤的奇迹般的治疗,等等。而是凭借体认出「目前的这个十字架的这朵玫瑰花」,凭借体会到,协和总是被完成,在我们所感觉或错误感觉作为异化的东西。

Consequently, Hegel does deal with symptoms—in the sense that every universality in its actualization generates an excess which undermines it. The Hegelian totality is by definition “self‐contradictory,” antagonistic, inconsistent: the “Whole” which is the “True” (Hegel: “das Ganze is das Wahre”) is the Whole plus its symptoms, the unintended consequences which betray its untruth. For Marx, the “totality” of capitalism includes crises as its integral moments; for Freud, the “totality” of a human subject includes pathological symptoms as indicators of what is “repressed” in the official image of the subject.

结果,黑格尔处理病征—意思是,在实现它的每个普遍性,产生一种毁灭它的过渡。黑格尔的完整性在定义上是「自我矛盾」,具有敌意,不一贯的:这个「整体性」,就是这个「实在」,就是这个「整体性」加上它的病征,这些意料之外的结果,泄露出它的非真理。对于马克思,资本主义的的这个「完整性」包括危机,作为它的完整的时刻。对于弗洛依德,一位人类主体的「完整性」包括病态的病征,作为主体的正式意象所被潜抑的病征的指标。

The underlying premise is that the Whole is never truly whole: every notion of the Whole leaves something out, and the dialectical effort is precisely the effort to include this excess, to account for it. Symptoms are never just secondary failures or distortions of the basically sound System—they are indicators that there is something “rotten” (antagonistic, inconsistent) in the very heart of the System.

作为基础的假设是,「这个整体性从来就不是真正的整体」。整体性的每个观念漏掉某件东西,而辩证的努力确实就是努力要包括这个过渡,为了解释它。病征从来就不仅是次要的失败或是这个基本健全的系统的扭曲—它们是指标:在系统的中心,有某件「腐烂」的东西(具有敌意而且不一贯)。

This is why the anti‐Hegelian rhetoric which insists on how Hegel’s totality misses the details which stick out and destroy its equilibrium misses the point: the space of the Hegelian totality is the very space of the interaction between the (“abstract”) Whole and the details that elude its grasp, although they are generated by it. So what if Hegel’s thought is not a metaphysics, but a form of
pataphysics in Alfred Jarry’s sense, a thinking of pathological incidents which inevitably disturb the inner logic of a process?

这就是为什么反对黑格尔的措词坚持,黑格尔的整体性错过这些突显出来的细节,并且毁灭它的平衡。这种措词错过这个要点:黑格尔的整体性的空间就是这个互动的空间,处于(抽象的)整体性与无法让它理解的细节之间,虽然它们都被它产生。所以,假如黑格尔的思想并不是形上学,而是阿弗瑞、杰瑞所说的超形上学,那会怎样?后者是病态意外地思想,无可避免地扰乱过程的内在逻辑。

The paradigmatic case of Understanding, of its “abstract” reasoning, is thus not
primarily the isolated analysis of objects and processes, or a blindness to the complex dynamic Whole within which an object is located (even Stalin was well aware of this topic, with his endless variations on the motif of how “everything is connected with everything else”), but rather a blindness to the structural role of symptoms, of excesses and obstacles, a blindness to the productive role of these obstacles. For example, at the level of Understanding, crises appear as obstacles to capitalism’s smooth functioning, obstacles that can and should be avoided by the adoption of intelligent economic policies.

理解,也就是抽象推理的典范的情况,因此并不是原初就是客体与过程的孤立分析,或是对于复杂的动力的整体性视而不见。在这个整体性里面,客体被找出(即使史达林清楚知道这个议题,不断地变化这个主题:每样东西如何跟每样其他东西发生关联。)而是相反地,对于病征,对于过分与阻碍的的结构性角色视而不见,对于这些阻碍的生产性角色视而不见。譬如,在理解的层次,危机出现,作为资本主义的顺畅运作的阻碍。这些阻碍能够而且应该被避免,凭借採用明智的经济政策。

Likewise, for Understanding, the “totalitarian” character of the communist regimes of the twentieth century appears as a regrettable consequence of “neglecting” the central role of democratic decision‐making, not as a necessary feature of the twentieth‐century communist project as such. “Understanding” is thus inherently utopian (in the ideological sense of the term): it dreams of, say, a society based on money, but in which money would not be an instrument of fetishistic alienation and exploitation, but would simply mediate the exchange between free individuals; or of a society based on parliamentary democracy which would fully and effectively represent the people’s will and so on.

同样地,对于理解,对于二十世纪的共产党政权的「集权」特性,出现作为一个令人遗憾的结果,由于「忽略」民主的决定的中心的角色,不是作为二十世纪的共产党的计划本身的一种必须的特征。「理解」因此在本质上是乌托邦(从这个术语的意识形态来说):譬如,它梦想一个以金钱作为基础的社会,但是在这个社会,金钱将不会是物神化的异化及剥削的工具。或是梦想一个以议会的民主为基础的社会,它会充分而有效地代表人民的意志,等等。

So Hegel “cannot think the symptom” insofar as we understand the Cunning of
Reason in its traditional teleological sense, as a hidden rational order controlling historical contingency, manipulatively exploiting particular moments in order to realize its hidden universal goal. However, the moment we take into account the retroactivity of universal necessity—the fact that each “use” of particular moments for some universal goal, as well as this goal itself, emerge retroactively in order, precisely, to “rationalize” the symptomal excess—we can no longer accept the Hegelian Cunning of Reason in its standard sense.

所以,黑格尔「无法思考这个病征」,因为我们了解理性的狡狯,处于它的传统的目的论的意义,作为隐藏的理性的秩序,控制历史的偶然性,操控地利用特别的时刻,为了体现它的隐藏的普遍性目标。可是,当我们一考虑到普遍性需要的反动—对于某些普遍性的目标,以及这个目标本身的特别时刻的每个使用,会反动地出现,为了,确实是为了理性化这个病征的过度—我们不再能够接受黑格尔的标准意义的理性的狡狯。

In his early, Maoist‐phase Theory of Contradiction, Badiou wrote: “To the
nothing‐new‐under‐the‐sun, the thinking of revolt opposes the ever new insurgent red sun, under the emblem of which the unlimited affirmative hope of rebellious producers engenders ruptures.” This upbeat statement is supplemented by a much more ominous‐sounding one: “There is the radically New only because there are corpses that no trumpet of Judgment will ever reawaken.”27 The shocking brutality of this last statement should not blind us to its truth: if we really want to assert a radical break, we must abandon the Benjaminian notion of retroactive redemption, of a revolutionary act which redeems all past suffering and defeats—as the Christians say, the dead should be left to bury the dead.

在他的早期的毛泽东时期的「悖论的理论」,巴迪欧写到:「对于这个阳光底下无新事,反叛的思想反对这个永远是新被颠覆的红太阳,这它的旗帜下,反叛的生产者的无限的肯定的希望,产生断裂。」这个乐观的陈述被伴随着一个听起来更加是恶兆的陈述:「这个强烈的新太阳存在,仅是因为最后审判的号角将永远唤不醒那些尸体。最后这句陈述的令人震惊的残酷,不应该让我们视而不见它的真理:假如我们确实想要主张一个强烈的突破,我们必须放弃反动的救赎,这个班杰明的观念。这个革命的行动救赎所有过去的痛苦与失败—如同基督教徒所说,应该留下死者来埋葬死者。

No Cunning of Reason can retroactively justify present suffering, as in the Stalinist idea, elaborated by Merleau‐Ponty in Humanism and Terror, that the good life of the communist future will justify the cruelty of the contemporary revolutionary process.

没有理性的狡狯能够反动地证明目前的痛苦是应该,如同在史达林的观念,由梅洛庞帝在「人文主义与恐怖」所建构。共产党的未来的美好生活将会证明,当代的革命过程的残酷是应该的。

Robert Pippin is the only thinker today who heroically defines his goal as the
promotion of “bourgeois philosophy,” that is, the philosophy of legitimizing and analyzing the “bourgeois” way of life centered on the notion of autonomous and responsible individuals leading a safe life within the confines of civil society. The problem, of course, comes back to the skeleton in the closet of every bourgeois society: Pippin as a Hegelian (the US Hegelian) should know that, for Hegel, modern bourgeois society could only have arisen through the mediation of Revolutionary Terror (exemplified by Jacobins); furthermore, Hegel is also aware that, in order to prevent its own death by habituation (immersion in the life of particular interests), every bourgeois society needs to be shattered from time to time by war.

罗伯、皮宾是今天唯一的思想家,英勇地定义他的目标,作为是提升「布尔乔亚哲学」,换句说,合理化并且分析布尔乔亚的生活方式。这种生活方式专注于自主而负责的个人,在文明社会的范围里,过著安全的生活。当然,这个问题会回到每个布尔乔亚的社会,都具有不可告人的恐怖秘密。皮宾作为一位黑格尔学派(美国式的黑格尔学派)应该知道,对于黑格尔,现代的布尔乔亚的社会能够产生,仅是经由革命的恐怖的中介 (由雅克宾的恐怖断头台作为典范)。而且,黑格尔也知道,为了阻止它自己习焉不察的死亡,(耽溺于特别興趣的生活),每个布尔乔亚的社会都需要有时用战争予以粉碎。

A problem such as “can excesses like Auschwitz be justified, economized, as
necessary detours on the road towards a free society, can they be aufgehoben as moments of historical progress?” is, therefore, from a strict Hegelian perspective, badly posed: it presupposes a position of external substantial teleology that is precluded by Hegel.

在朝向自由社会的途中,诸如像奥斯威兹集中营这样的过度能够证明是合理,而且精简为必要的迂回吗?它们会是作为历史的进展的时刻的「钩消」吗?因此,从严格的黑格尔的观点,它被很不恰当地提出:它预先假定一个外在的实质目的论的立场,这是黑格尔所预示的。

There is no substantial historical Spirit weighing up in advance the costs and benefits of a prospective historical catastrophe (e.g., is the massacre of European Jewry a price worth paying for the unprecedented peace and prosperity of postwar Europe?): it is only actual humans, caught up in a historical process, who generate a catastrophe which can then give birth to new ethico‐political awareness, without any claim that this unintended result in any way “justifies” or legitimizes the enormous suffering that led to it.

没有实质的历史的精神预先衡量这些代价及利益,对于一个未来的历史的灾难(譬如,对于欧洲犹太人的屠杀,难道不是一个代价,偿付给战后欧洲史无前例的和平与繁荣?)仅是实际的人类被套陷于历史的过程,这些人类产生的灾难因此能够产生新的伦理-政治的觉醒,而没有宣称:这个意图之外的结果证明合理,或合法化曾经导致它的巨大痛苦。

Measured in this way, no historical progress is “worth the price”: all one can say is that the ultimate outcome of historical catastrophes is sometimes a higher ethical awareness which one should accept with humility and in memory of the blood spilled on the path to realizing it. Such “blessings in disguise” are never guaranteed in advance, which is why, insofar as a symptom is the point of “irrationality” of the existing totality, a point which cannot be subsumed under any figure of totalizing Reason, we should invert Marx’s famous formula of recovering the “rational core” of Hegel’s dialectic and boldly propose to recover its irrational core.

以这种方式来衡量,没有历史的进步是「值得这个代价」:我们所能够说的是,历史灾难的最后的结果,有时是一个更高的伦理的觉醒,那是我们应该谦卑地接受的,来纪念在实现它的途中的浴血成河。诸如的因祸得福从来没有被预先被保证。这就是为什么,当病征是现存整体性的「非理性」的点。这个点无法被包括在整体化的理性的任何数字里。我们应该倒转马克思的著名的公式,恢复黑格尔的辩证法的理性的核心,并且大胆地建议要恢复它的非理性的核心。

But, again, are we not contradicting here Lacan’s explicit critique of the Hegelian
“Cunning of Reason”? Does not Lacan advocate Marx’s “materialist reversal of Hegel”: what Hegel cannot think is the radical sense of a symptom which undermines from within any Cunning of Reason?

但是,除外,我们难道不是在此反驳拉康的明确的批判黑格尔的「理性的狡狯」?拉康难道不是主张马克思的「唯物论对黑格尔的颠覆」:黑格尔无法想到的是,病征的积极意义从内部损坏理性的任何狡狯?

For Marx, the totality of Reason (which asserts its reign through its
“cunning”) is undermined in its symptom (the proletariat as the “unreason within the domain of Reason,” as the non‐sense that no cunning can legitimate and/or rationalize).

对于马克思,理性的整体性(主张它的统治,通过它的狡狯)在它的病征里被损坏 (普罗阶级,作为理性领域内部的非理性,作为没有狡狯能够合法化,以及,或理性化的无意义。)

This dimension of the symptom as “the return of truth as such into the gap of a certain knowledge” is highly differentiated in Marx’s critique, even if it is not made explicit there.

病征的维度,作为「真理本身的回来,进入某种知识的差距」,在马克思的批判里,被高度地被区别,即使它在那里并没有被弄得很明确。

And one can say that a part of the reversal of Hegel that he carries out is constituted by the return (which is a materialist return, precisely insofar as it gives it figure and body) of the question of truth. The latter actually forces itself upon us … not by taking up the thread of the ruse of reason, a subtle form with which Hegel sends it packing, but by upsetting these ruses (read Marx’s political writings) which are merely dressed up with reason.28

我们能够说,马克思能够实现的黑格尔的颠覆,是由这个回转所形成,(这是一种唯物论的回转,确实是因为它给予它形象与身体),对于真理的问题。后者确实强迫它自己在我们身上,不是凭借从事理性的狡计的脉络,一种微妙的形式,黑格尔用来将它渐渐封住,而是凭借颠覆这些狡计(请阅读马克思的政治著作)这些狡计仅是用理性来包装。

Marx “invents the symptom” when he conceptualizes the position of the proletariat as the material “figure and body” which gives body to the “un‐reason” of the totality of Reason (the modern Rational State) conceptualized and legitimized by Hegelian Knowledge. Marx thus sees through the Hegelian trick of legitimizing exploitation and other horrors as necessary moments of the progress of Reason (Reason using evil human passions as means to actualize itself), denouncing it as the legitimization of a miserable social reality which is merely “dressed up with reason.” As such, the “message” of the symptom is:

马克思「发明这个病征」,当他概念化普罗阶级的立场,作为物质的「形象与身体」,它产生整体性的这个「非理性」(现代的理性国家),用黑格尔的知识予以概念化及合理化。马克思因此看透黑格尔的合理化剥削及其他恐怖的诡计,作为是理性进展的必要的时刻,(理性使用邪恶的人类激情,充当工具,来实践它自己),抨击它,作为悲惨的社会的现实的合理化.这种社会的现实仅是用理性来装扮。作为这样一个社会,病征的讯息是:

“Men, listen, I am telling you the secret. I, truth, speak.”29 In a symptom, “it
speaks,” the subject is surprised by it, taken aback, caught with his pants down; a symptom is thus something that cannot be attributed to any subject or agent. The temptation to be resisted here—the very temptation of the Cunning of Reason—is to surmise another meta‐Subject or Agent who organizes these apparent failures and mistakes, turning them into steps towards the final Truth.

「人啊,请倾听,我正在告诉你们这个秘密,我作为真理,在言说。」在病征里,「它在言说」,主体被它所惊吓,大吃一惊,连裤子都来不及穿上。这样一种病征,因此是某件无法被归属于任何主体或代理者的东西。在此,应该被抗拒的诱惑—理性的狡狯的这个诱惑—它应该想像另外一个形上-主体,或的形上-代理者。他们组织这些表面的失败及错误,将他们转变成为朝向最后的真理的步骤。

The Cunning of Reason is the desperate wager of trusting in history, the belief that the big Other guarantees its final happy outcome—or, as Lacan put it in his acerbic way:

理性的狡狯是在历史中信托这个信仰的赌注:大他者保证它的最后的快乐的结果—或是,如同拉康以它他的辛辣方式表达:

The discourse of error—its articulation in action—could bear witness to the truth against the apparent facts themselves. It was then that one of them tried to get the cunning of reason accepted into the rank of objects deemed worthy of study. Unfortunately, he was a professor … Remain content, then, with your vague sense of history and leave it to clever people to found the world market in lies, the trade in all‐out war, and the new law of self‐criticism on the guarantee of my future firm. If reason is as cunning as Hegel said it was, it will do its job without your help.30

错误的辞说能够见证真理—它在行动里的表达—来对抗这些外表达事实本身。就在那时,其中一个事实让理性的狡狯被接受,进入被认为是值得研究的客体的阵营。不幸地,他是一位教授—请你们满足于你们模糊的历史感觉,并且将它留给精明的人用谎言去创办这个世界市场,这是全面性战争的行业,以及创办自我批判的新的法律,对于我的未来的公司。假如理性像黑格尔所说的那样的狡狯,它将会尽它的职责,而没有你们的帮助。

A symptom is, on the contrary, that which undermines the big Other, that in which the big Other reveals its gaps, inconsistency, failure, impotence. When Lacan writes, “I, truth, speak,” this does not mean that the substantial “big Other” in me speaks, but, on the contrary, that the big Other’s failure breaks through. Error is the partial un‐truth which can be sublated into a subordinate moment of the truth of Totality, while a symptom is a partial break‐through of the repressed truth of the Totality, a truth which belies totality. Lacan here opposes error and mistake (méprise): while, in the Hegelian dialectical process, truth arises through error, in the psychoanalytic process, it arises from a mistake (or, rather,
mis‐apprehension)—truth says: “Whether you flee from me in deceit or think you can catch me in error, I will catch up with you in the mistake from which you cannot hide.”31

相反地,一个病征是损坏大他者的东西。在病征里,这个大他者显示它的差距,不一贯性,失败,无能。当拉康写到,「我,作为真理,在言说」,这并不意味着,我身上的实质上的大他者在言说,而是相反地,这个大他者的失败作为突破。错误是这个能够被钩消的部分的非真理,被钩消成为一个隶属于整体性的真理的时刻。而病征是整体性的被潜抑的真理的部分的突破。这一种真理虚假地代表整体性。拉康在此反对犯错及错误:在黑格尔的辩证法的过程,真理通过错误产生,在精神分析的过程,真理从错误中产生(或者说,从错误的理解中产生)–真理言说:「无论你们是否欺骗地逃避我,或是认为你们能够在错误中捉住我,我将会在错误中迎头赶上你们,你们无所逃避这个错误。

When I am in error, I hold as true something that is not true; in a symptom, on the contrary, truth appears in what I hold as least true, most contingent, unworthy of universality. Again, truth says:

当我犯错时,我认为某件非真实的东西是真实的。相反地,在病征里,真理出现在我认为是最不真实,最偶发性,不值得普遍性的东西里,

I wander about in what you regard as least true by its very nature: in dreams, in the way the most far‐fetched witticisms and the most grotesque nonsense of jokes defy meaning, and in chance—not in its law, but rather in its contingency. And I never more surely proceed to change the face of the world than when I give it the profile of Cleopatra’s nose.32

我漫遊在你们认为根据它的特性是最不真实的地方:在梦境里,以最机智灵巧的方式,抗拒意义的笑话的无意义的方式,在无常生活里,不是在它的法则里,而是相反地在它的偶发性里。我从来没有如此确定地前进,为了改变世界的面貌,比起当我给予这个世界,克里奥佩脱拉这位埃及女王的鼻子的美丽轮廓。

The implications of such a radical notion of the symptom are much more
far‐reaching than it may appear: the symptom is not a secondary expression of some substantial content already dwelling deep in the subject—on the contrary, the symptom is “open,” coming from the future, pointing towards a content that will only come to be through the symptom.33 Recall Lacan’s statement that “woman is a symptom of man”—does this mean that, vulgari eloquentia, a woman comes to ex‐sist only when a man selects her as a potential object of libidinal investment? So what is she prior to this investment?

对于病征如此强烈的观念所暗示,比起病征的表面更加深远。病征并不是某种实质的内容的一个次级的表达,这个实质内容深深驻居于主体身上。相反地,病征是「开放性」,来自未来,指向一个仅是经由病征而逐渐成为的内容。请大家回忆一下拉康的陈述:「女人是男人的病征。」–这难道不是意味着,仅有当男人选择女人,作为力比多的投注的一个潜在的客体时,女人才逐渐存在?那么,在这个投注之前,女人是什么?

What if we conceive the idea of a symptom that pre‐exists what it is a symptom of, so that we can consider women as symptoms wandering around in search of
something to attach themselves to as symptoms—or even just being satisfied with their role as empty symptoms?34 One can effectively claim that a woman who withdraws from sexual contact with men is a symptom at its purest, a zero‐level symptom—a nun, for example, who, in rejecting becoming the symptom of a particular man (her sexual partner), posits herself as the symptom of Christ, the man (ecce homo).

假如我们构想预先存在的病征的观念,作为病征形成的东西,那会怎么样?这样,我们能够将女人认为是病征,到处漫遊寻找某件东西来连系她们自己,作为病征?或是甚至满足于她们的角色,作为空洞的病征?我们能够有效地宣称:从跟男人的性接触撤退的女人,是最纯净,零度状态的病征。譬如,修女,当她们拒绝成为某特特别男人的病征,(她的性的伴侣),提出她自己,作为耶稣基督的病征,瞧!这个人!

This notion of the paradoxical pre‐existence of a symptom can also be given a
Benjaminian twist. In the middle of Tchaikovsky’s “Francesca da Rimini” (eleven minutes into it), there is a passage which sounds almost like Bernard Herrmann, a kind of flight into the future; then the standard Romanticism recovers itself. It is really as if Tchaikovsky produced here a symptom in the early Lacanian (or Benjaminian) sense of a message from the future, something that its own time lacked the proper means to hear or understand.

病征的矛盾地先前存在的观念,也能够被给予一个班杰明式的变种。在柴可夫斯基的Francesca da Rimini (有十一分钟),有一个听起来几乎像是伯纳、赫曼的讯息:某种逃避到未来。然后,标准的浪漫主义恢复它自己。这确实是好像柴可夫斯基在此产生一种病征,在早期的拉康式或班杰明式的从未来传递的讯息的意义。某件它自己的时代欠缺适当的工具来倾听或了解的东西。

(This is how modernism works: what were originally fragments of an organic Whole are autonomized—the same goes for Joan Miró’s paintings.) No wonder that this is the music used for the ballet sequence at the end of Torn Curtain—a kind of revenge of Herrmann whose score Hitchcock discarded—a scene in which the “repressed returns.” (Did he choose this piece?)35

这是现代主义运作的方式:原先是有机体的整体的碎片,被赋予自主权。相同的道理可适用于米罗的图画。)无论这是被使用作巴蕾舞系列的音乐,在「被撕破的帘幕」–某种的赫曼的报复,他的乐谱被希区考克抛弃—在那里,被压抑者会回来(他确实选择这首曲子吗?)

There is a nice anecdote about a Latin American poet who modified the political
tenor of his poetry according to whoever was his most recent mistress: when she was a proto‐fascist rightist, he celebrated military discipline and patriotic sacrifice; when he got involved with a pro‐communist woman, he started to celebrate guerrilla warfare; later, he moved on to a hippy mistress and wrote about drugs and transcendental meditation.

关于拉丁美洲的诗人,有一个美好轶事,他修改他的诗的政治的语调,依照他最近的情妇是谁而定:当情妇是支持法西斯的右派,他就赞扬军事的纪律及爱国的牺性。当跟他缠绵的是支持共产党的女人,他开始赞扬游击队的战斗。后来,他转到一位嬉皮的情妇,并且书写毒品及超验的沉思。

This is what “woman as a symptom of man” means, not merely that a man uses a woman to articulate his message—on the contrary, woman is the determining factor: man orients himself towards his symptom, he clings to it to give consistency to his life. And the Hegelian Cunning of Reason works in a similar way: it is not that Reason is a secret force behind the scenes using human agents for its purposes: there are nothing but agents following their particular purposes, and what they do “auto‐poetically” organizes itself into a larger pattern.

这就是所谓的「女人作为男人的病征」。意思并不是,男人使用女人来表达他的讯息。相反地,女人就是决定的因素。男人定向他自己,朝向他的病征。他坚持这个病征,为了给予他的生命一贯性。黑格尔的理性的狡狯以类似的方式运作。并不是理性是幕后的秘密力量,使用人的代理者充当它的目的,而是它们仅是代理者,追寻它们的特别的目的。它们的作为,「自动诗意化」,组织它自己成为一个更大的模式。

But did not Heidegger propose a much more radical critique of the Hegelian Cunning of Reason, in a way which differs radically from Marx’s critique (and which enables us to recognize in Marx himself the presence of the Hegelian notion of history as the story of dialectical redemption36)?

但是海德难道不是建议一个更加激进的批判,对于黑格尔的理性的狡狯。用的方式跟马克思的批判强烈差异。(后者让我们能够体认出,在马克思身上,存在着黑格尔的历史的观念,作为是辩证法的救赎的故事。

For the Cunning of Reason to be operative, there is no need to resuscitate any transcendent rational agency; particular contingent finite facts must be
accounted for not in terms of any such higher power, but in terms of their own
intelligibility, which is the true “infinite” immanent to the finite itself. The contrast with Heidegger’s own full assertion of finitude could not be clearer. Heidegger deploys all the consequences of such a radical assertion of finitude, up to and including a series of self‐referential paradoxes.

为了让理性的狡狯运作,并没有需要苏醒任何的超验的理性的代理。特别是偶然性的有限的事实必须被解释,不是用任何更改的权力的术语,而是用它们的理解性。这个理解性是有限本身的内在具有的真实的「永恒」。这跟海德格自己对有限性的充分主张对照起来,是再清楚不过了。海德格运作对于有限性的强烈主张的所有的结果,一直到包括一系列的自我指涉的悖论。

His claim is that the ultimate failure, the breakdown of the entire structure of meaning, the withdrawal from engagement and care—in other words the possibility that the totality of Dasein’s involvements “collapses into itself; the world has the character of completely lacking significance”37—is the innermost possibility of Dasein, that Dasein can succeed in its engagement only against the background of a possible failure: “the interrelational structure of the world of Care can fail in such a catastrophic way that Dasein will appear not as the world‐embedded, open‐to‐meaning, engaged agent in a shared world that it is, but, all at once as it were, the null basis of a nullity.”38 Here Heidegger is not just making the decisionist‐existentialist point about how “being a subject means being able to fail to be one,” how the choice is ours and utterly contingent, with no guarantee of success.39

他的宣称是,最后的失败,意义的整个结构的崩溃,从参与跟操虑撤退—换句话说,很有可能,生命实存的牵涉的整体性崩溃到它自己里面。这世界拥有完全缺乏意义的这个特性—这是生命实存的最内在的可能性。生命实存能够成功地参与它,仅是对抗可能失败的背景:「操虑的世界的相互关系的结构,以如此灾难的方式失败,以致于生命实存本身将会出现,不是作为被镶嵌的世界,开放给意义,参与的代理者,在一个分享的世界。那是空无存在的空无的基础,但是看起来是突然发生。在此,海德格并不仅是发表决定主义与存在主义的观点,关于「成为主体如何就是失败于成为主体」,选择如何属于我们,并且完全是偶然性,并么没有成功的保证。

His point is rather that the historical totality‐of‐meaning into which we are
thrown is always already, “constitutively,” thwarted from within by the possibility of its utmost impossibility. Death, the collapse of the structure of meaning and care, is not an external limit which, as such, would enable Dasein to “totalize” its meaningful engagement; it is not the final quilting point that “dots the i” of one’s life span, enabling us to totalize a life story into a consistent, meaningful narrative.

相反地,他的观点是,我们被抛掷进入的意义的历史的整体性,总是已经是「结构性」从内部被阻碍,由于它的最大的不可能性的可能性。死亡就是意义与操虑的崩溃,死亡并不是一个外在的限制,它本身会让生命实存整体化它的意义的参与。死亡并不是最后的缝合点,替我们的生命期限增添细节,让我们将一生的故事整体化成为一个一贯性的意义的描述。

Death is precisely that which cannot be included in any meaningful totality, its meaningless facticity is a permanent threat to meaning, its prospect a reminder that there is no final way out.40 The consequence of this is that the choice is not a direct choice between success and failure, between authentic and
inauthentic modes of existence: since the very notion that one can successfully totalize one’s life within an all‐encompassing structure‐of‐meaning is the ultimate inauthentic betrayal, the only true “success” Dasein can have is to heroically confront and accept its ultimate failure.

死亡确实是无法被包括在任何的意义的整体性里。死亡的没有意义的现实性,。对意义是一个永久的威胁,死亡的远景是一种残馀物,没有最后的出口。这样的结果是,选择并不是一个直接的选择,处于成功与失败之间的选择,处于生命存在的真诚与不真诚模式之间的选项。因为我们能够成功地整体化我们的生命,在意义的全面涵盖结构里,这个观念上最后不真诚的背叛,生命实存能够拥有的这个唯一真诚的成功。那就是要英勇地面对并且接受它的最后的失败。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Less than nothing 03

October 23, 2012

Less than nothing 03
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8
第八章
THE LACANIAN PROSOPOPOEIA
拉康的人格化

The mode of appearance of this Cunning of Reason is irony, which for Hegel lies at the very core of dialectics: “All dialectics lets hold that which should hold, treats it as if it fully holds [lässt das gelten, was gelten soll, als ob es gelte], and, in this way, it lets it destroy itself—the general irony of the world.”14

理性的狡狯的外表的模式是反讽。对于黑格尔,这种反讽在于辩证法的核心。「所有的辩证法让应该成立的东西成立,对待它好像它充分地成立。以这种方式,它让它毁灭它自己—世界的一般反讽。

With his method of questioning, Socrates merely pushes his opponent‐partner to make his abstract idea more concrete (“what do you mean by justice, by happiness …?”), and, in this way, lets him reveal the inconsistency of his
position and lets this position destroy itself. The method does not impose external standards onto an idea, it measures the idea by its own standards and lets it destroy itself through its own self‐explication. When Hegel writes that womankind is “the everlasting irony of the community,”15 does he thereby not assert the feminine character of irony or dialectics?16 What this means is that the very presence of Socrates, his questioning attitude, transforms the speech of his partner into prosopopoeia:

用他的质疑的方法,苏格拉底逼迫他的对手将他的抽象理念变得更加具体(「你说的正义是什么意思,快乐是什么意思?」)以这种方式,他让他显示他的立场的不一贯性,并且让这个立场毁灭它自己。这个方法并没有赋加外在的标准进入一个观念,它衡量这个观念,凭借它自己的标准,然后让它毁灭它自己,通过它自己的自我表述。当黑格尔写到:「女人是社会的永恒反讽」,他难道不是在主张,反讽或辩证法具有女性的特性吗?这句话的意思是,苏格拉底的存在,他的质疑的态度,转变他的对手的话语成为人格化:

When the participants in a conversation are confronted with Socrates, their words all of a sudden start to sound like quotes and clichés, like borrowed voices; the participants are confronted with the abyss of what authorizes them in their speech, and the moment they try to rely on the usual supports of authorization, authorization fails. It is as if an inaudible echo of irony adds itself to their speech, an echo which hollows out their words and their voice, and their voice appears as borrowed and expropriated.17

当对话中的这些参与者面对苏格拉底,他们的文词突然开始听起来像是引言及陈旧词语,像是借用的声音。参与者面临这个差距,在他们的话语中授权他们差距。当他们尝试依靠权威的通常支持,权威就失灵。好像反讽的隐藏共鸣增添它自己到他们的话语,这一种共鸣掏空他们的话语及他们的声音。他们的声音似乎是借用而且是被盗用。

Recall the proverbial scene of a man making a speech in front of his wife, boasting of his great exploits, evoking high ideals, etc., and his wife silently observing him with a barely concealed mocking smile—her silent presence has the effect of ruining the pathos of his speech, of unmasking him in all his misery. It is in this sense that, for Lacan, the Socratic irony announces the subjective position of the analyst: does not the same hold also for the analytic session?

请回顾一下这个凡俗的场景:某个人在他妻子面前发表言说,侃侃而谈他的伟业,召唤崇高的理想,等等,而他的妻子带着露骨的嘲讽微笑旁观—她的沉默的存在具有这个效果:毁灭他的演说的悲情,揭发他所有的悲惨。就是从这个意义,对于拉康,苏格拉底的反讽宣布精神分析家的主体性立场:对于精神分析的谘商,相同的场景不也适用?

Recall Umberto Eco’s analysis of Casablanca, where he draws attention to
a strange habit of the Resistance hero Victor Laszlo: in every scene, he orders a different drink, a Pernod, a cognac, a whisky. But why? Is this to be read as an indication that, beneath the image of a heroic anti‐fascist fighter, there dwells a refined, decadent hedonist?

请回顾一下艾可的分析「北非谍影」。他提醒大家注意反抗军的英雄维克、拉斯洛的一个奇怪的习惯:在每个场景,他点一杯不同的饮料,波诺酒、白兰地、维士忌。但是为什么?这难道不应该被阅读,作为一种指示:在英雄式的反对法西斯的鬥士的意象底下,潜在著一位高雅、颓废的享乐主义者?

No: it is simply that the scriptwriters did not treat Victor Laszlo as a psychologically consistent personality, but as a composite of multiple clichés.
And it is the same in subjective reality: the mysterious “depth of personality” has to be demystified as the illusory effect of prosopopoeia, of the fact that the subject’s discourse is a bricolage of fragments from different sources.

不:那仅是因为这些剧本作家并没有对待维克、拉斯洛,作为一位心理上具有一贯性的人物,而是作为多重陈词的综合体。在主体性的现实界,情况也是相同:神秘的「人格的深度」必须被解除神秘化,作为是这个事实的人格化的幻觉:主体的辞说是根据不同来源的碎片的併贴。

The status of prosopopoeia in Lacan changes radically with the shift in the status of the analyst from being the stand‐in for the “big Other” (the symbolic order) to being the “small other” (the obstacle which stands for the inconsistency, failure, of the big Other). The analyst who occupies the place of the big Other is himself the medium of prosopopoeia: when he speaks, it is the big Other who speaks (or, rather, keeps silence) through him; in the intersubjective economy of the analytic process, he is not just another subject, he occupies the empty place of death. The patient talks, and the analyst’s silence stands for the absent meaning of the patient’s talk, the meaning supposed to be contained in the big Other. The process ends when the patient can himself assume the meaning of his speech.

在拉康,人格化的地位强烈地跟随精神分析家的地位的改变而变化,从代表这个「大他者」(符号象征的秩序)的立场,改变成为这个「小他者」(这个阻碍代表大他者的这个不一贯性,失败)。精神分析家佔有大他者的位置,他本身是人格化的媒介:当他言说时,那是大他者通过他在言说,(或者,相反地,保持沉默)。在精神分析的过程的互为主体性的活动,他不仅是另外一个主体,他佔有死亡的这个空洞的位置。病人谈话,这个意义应该被包括在大他者里。这个过程结束,当病人自己能够假设他的话语的意义。

The analyst as the “small other,” on the contrary, magically transforms the words of the analysand into prosopopoeia, de‐subjectivizing his words, depriving them of the quality of being an expression of the consistent subject and his intention‐to‐mean. The goal is no longer for the analysand to assume the meaning of his speech, but for him to assume its non‐meaning, its nonsensical inconsistency, which implies, with regard to his own status, his de‐subjectivization, or what Lacan calls “subjective destitution.”

相反地,精神分析家作为「小他者」,魔术般地转移分析者的这些文词成为人格化,除掉他的文词典主体性,剥夺这些文词的这个特质:作为一贯性的主体的表达,及呈现意义的意图。这个目标不再是要分析者担负起他的言谈的意义,而且要他担负起它的无意义,它的无意义的不一贯性。这暗示着,关于他自己的地位,他的除掉主体化,或是拉康所谓的「主体化的贫瘠」。

Prosopopoeia is defined as “a figure of speech in which an absent or imaginary
person is represented as speaking or acting.” The attribution of speech to an entity commonly perceived to be unable to speak (nature, the commodity, truth itself …) is for Lacan the condition of speech as such, not only its secondary complication. Does not Lacan’s distinction between the “subject of the enunciation” and the “subject of the enunciated” point in this direction? When I speak, it is never directly “myself” who speaks—I have to have recourse to a fiction which is my symbolic identity. In this sense, all speech is “indirect”: “I love you” has the structure of: “my identity as lover is telling you that it loves you.”18

人格化被定义为「言谈的人物,一位缺席或想象的人被代表作为言说或行动。」言谈的被归属于一个实体,共同被感觉没有能力言谈的实体,(自然,货物、真理本身、、、)对于拉康,这是这个言谈本身的情况,不仅是它的次级併发症。拉康的区别「表述的主体」跟「被表述的主体」难道不是指向这个方向?当我言谈,那从来就不直接是「我自己」在言谈—我必须诉诸于一种幻想,这个幻想是我的符号象征的认同。从这个意义,所有的言说都是「间接」:「我爱你「拥有这个结构:「我作为情人的认同正在告诉你,它爱你。」

The implication of prosopopoeia is thus a weird split of which Robert
Musil was aware: the “man without properties” (der Mann ohne Eigenschaften) has to be supplemented with properties without man (Eigenschaften ohne Mann), without a subject to whom they are attributed.

人格化的这个暗示因此是罗伯特、莫思尔知道的一种古怪的分裂:这位「没有特性的人」必须被补充没有人的特性,没有一个被特性归属地主体。

There are two correlative traps to be avoided here, the rightist and the leftist
deviations. The first, of course, is the pseudo‐Hegelian notion that this gap stands for a “self‐alienation” which I should strive to abolish ideally and then fully assume my speech as directly my own. Against this version, one should insist that there is no I which can, even ideally, assume its speech “directly,” by‐passing the detour of prosopopoeia. Wearing a mask can thus be a strange thing: sometimes, more often than we tend to believe, there is more truth in the mask than in what we assume to be our “real self.”

有两个相关的陷阱在此应该被避免,右派份子跟左派份子的偏离。当然,前者是虚假的黑格尔的观念:这个差距代表一种「自我的异化」,在理想上,我应该努力废除这个「自我异化」,然后充分地担负起我的言说,作为直接是我自己的言说。相对应这种说法,我们应该坚持,并没有「我」在理想上能够「直接地」担负起它的言谈,凭借绕过人格化的迂回。戴着面具因此有时是件奇怪的事情:有时,我们经常倾向于相信,在面具,比起在我们认为是我们「真正的自性」,具有更多的真理。

Think of the proverbial shy and impotent man who, while playing an interactive video game, adopts the screen identity of a sadistic murderer and irresistible seducer—it is all too simple to say that this identity is just an imaginary supplement, a temporary escape from his real‐life impotence. The point is rather that, since he knows that the video game is “just a game,” he can “reveal his true self,” do things he would never do in real‐life interactions—in the guise of a fiction, the truth about himself is articulated.

请想想那位世俗的害羞而性无能的人,当他在玩一个互动的电脑遊戏,採用一位虐待狂及迷人的诱拐者的帘幕身份—这样说是过于简化:这个身份仅是想象的补充,一个暂时的逃避,逃避他在现实生活的无奈。相反地,重点是, 因为他知道这个电脑遊戏「仅是遊戏」,他能够「显露他的真实的自我」,做他永远不会做的事情,在真实生活的互动里—伪装一个幻想,关于他自己的真理被表达。

Therein lies the truth of a charming story like Alexandre Dumas’s The Man in the Iron Mask: what if we invert the topic according to which, in our social interactions, we wear masks to cover our true face? What if, on the contrary, in order for us to interact in public with our true face, we have to have a mask hidden somewhere, a mask which renders our unbearable excess, what is in us more than ourselves, a mask which we can put on only exceptionally, in those carnivalesque moments when the standard rules of interaction are suspended? In short, what if the true function of the mask is not to be worn, but to be kept hidden?19

一个迷人的故事的真理就在这里,就像杜拉斯的「铁假面人」:假如我们倒转这个主体,情况会怎样?依照这个主题,在我们社交的互动里,我们戴着面具来隐藏我们的真实的脸孔?相反地,假如为了让我们在大庭广众跟我们真实的脸孔互动,我们必须戴着隐藏某处的面具,这一个面具让我们自己身上不仅是我们自己的东西,成为无法忍受的过度,这一个面具,我们仅是偶然才戴上,在那些嘉华年会的时刻,当互动的标准规则被悬置?总之,假如面具的真实的功用不能够被戴上,而是被保持隐藏,会发生怎样的事?

The opposite trap is to elevate “that through which I speak” into an authentic site of Truth, so that “something in me deeper than myself, the Truth itself, speaks through me.”

这个相反的陷阱就是要提升「通过它我言说的这个人」,成为一个真诚的真理的地点,这样「某件在我身上比我更深度的东西,这个真理的本身,通过我言说。」

This is the Jungian version, involving a distinction between my Ego and the Self, a much broader ground of my subjectivity, with the task being to progress from my Ego to my true Self. Against this version, one should assert that that which speaks through me is fundamentally a lie.20 The temptation here, of course, is to say that it is not the other through whom I speak, but that the Other itself speaks through me: the ultimate prosopopoeia is the one in which I myself am the other, the means used by X to speak.

这就是荣格的说法,牵涉到区别我的「自我」与「自性」,我的主体性更加宽广的场域,拥有这个工作的存在要从我的「自我」进展到我的真实的「自性」。相对应这个说法,我们应该主张,通过我言说的这个人基本上是一个谎言。当然,在此的诱惑是要说:并不是通过这个他者,我言说,而是大他者本身通过我在言说。最后的人格化就是我在大他者里面,我自己就是大他者,被x用来言说的工具。

Does, then, the key dialectical reversal apropos prosopopoeia go from the subject talking through others to the subject itself as the site through which the Other speaks? The shift from me speaking through some figure of the Other to the I itself as prosopopoeia? From “I cannot tell the truth about myself directly; this most intimate truth is so painful that I can only articulate it through another, by adopting the mask, talking through the mask, of another entity,” to “truth itself is talking through me”? This reversal involves the dialectical shift from predicate to subject—from “what I am saying is true” to “truth is talking through me.”

因此,关于人格化,这个关键点辩证法的倒转,难道从通过别人言谈到主体,转变成为主体的本身,作为是通过这个地点,大他者言说?从我通过某个大他者的人物言说,到这个「我」的本身作为人格化?从「我无法直接说出有关我自己的真理,这个最亲密的真理是如此令人痛苦,以致我仅能表达它,通过另外一个实体,以採用这个面具,通过这个面具,言谈另外一个实体」,到「真理本身就通过我言说」?这种倒转牵涉辩证法的转变,从述词到主体—从「我正在言说的是真理」,到「真理正在通过我言说」。

And, furthermore, is not this shift also clearly sexualized? Woman is man’s
prosopopoeia: she is man’s symptom, she has no substance of her own, she is a mask through which man speaks (more precisely, as Otto Weininger demonstrated, a mask through which the fallen nature of man speaks). Woman cannot relate to truth as an inherent value, she cannot tell the truth; however, truth can speak in or through her. The reversal from “I speak the truth” to “I, the truth, speak” occurs with woman’s identification with the truth: men tell the truth, while in woman, truth itself speaks.

而且,这个转变难道不也是清楚地被性化?女人是男人的人格化:女人是男人的病征,她并没有拥有她自己的特质,她是一个面具,通过这个面具,男人言说(更贴切地说,如若奥图、维宁吉证明,通过一个面具,人的这个堕落的天性言说)。女人无法跟真理有关作为一个天生的价值,她无法说出真理。可是,真理能够在女人身上或通过他言说。这个倒转,从「我言说真理」,到「我作为真理言说」,发生在女人对于真理的认同:男人说出真理,而女人是真理本身在言说。

The “primordial prosopopoeia” is effectively that of the symbolic order itself, of the subject (constituting itself through) assuming a symbolic mandate—or, as Lichtenberg put it in one of his aphorisms: “There is a transcendent ventriloquism that makes people believe that something that was said on earth came from heaven.” In one of the Marx brothers’ films, Groucho, caught telling a lie, answers angrily: “Whom do you believe, your eyes or my words?” This apparently absurd logic renders perfectly the functioning of the symbolic order in which the symbolic mask matters more than the direct reality of the
individual who wears it. It involves the by now familiar structure of what Freud called “fetishistic disavowal”: “I know very well that things are the way I see them, that the person in front of me is a corrupt weakling, but I nonetheless treat him respectfully, since he wears the insignia of a judge, so that when he speaks, it is the law itself which speaks through him.”

这个「原始的人格化」实际上是符号象征秩序的人格化,是主体担负起符号象征的委任的人格化,(通过这个委任构成它自己)–或是,如同李天伯格所说,在他的其中一个警语:「有一位超验的腹语演员让人们相信,在地球上所被说的东西,来自于天上。」在导演马克兄弟的其中一部影片,格劳宙被揭发正在说谎言,他愤怒地回答:「你们相信谁?你们的眼睛,还是我们的话语?」这种明显的荒谬的逻辑将符号秩序的功用表现得淋漓尽致。在符号象征秩序里,符号象征的面具重要性超过于戴着面具的个人的直接现实性。这牵涉到,现在大家耳熟能详的弗洛依德所谓的「物神化的不承认」的结构,「我清楚知道,事情是我看见它们的样子,在我面前的这个人是一位腐败的懦夫,但是我仍然尊敬地对待他,因为他戴着法官的标志,所以当他言谈时,是法律的本身通过他在言说。」

So, in a way, I really do believe his words, not my eyes. This is where the cynic who believes only hard facts falls short: when a judge speaks, there is in a way more truth in his words (the words of the institution of law) than in the direct reality of the person of judge; if one limits oneself to what one sees, one simply misses the point. This paradox is what Lacan aims at with his les non‐dupes errent (those in the know err): those who refuse to let themselves get caught in the symbolic fiction and believe only what they see with their own eyes are those who err most. What the cynic misses here is the efficiency of the symbolic
fiction, the way it structures our (experience of) reality. A corrupt priest preaching on goodness may be a hypocrite, but if people endow his words with the authority of the Church, they may inspire them to perform good deeds.

所以,在某方面,我确实相信他的话语,而不是我的眼睛。这是仅相信具体事实的讽世者无法理解的部分:当法官言说,在他的话语里,有某种更多的真理(法律的制度的话语),超过法官这个人的直接现实界。假如我们限制我们自己于我们所看见的东西,我们仅是错过这个重点。这个悖论是:拉康用「知道者犯错」所要表达的目的是:那些拒绝让他们自己被套陷于符号象征的幻想的人们,他们仅是相信他们用自己的眼睛所看见的人们,他们犯的错误最严重。讽世者在这里所错过的是,符号象征的幻想的有效性。它作为我们的现实界的经验的架构。一位宣导善行的腐败的僧侣可能是一位伪君子,但是假如人们赋予他的话语,具有教会的权威,这些话语启发人们去实现善的行为。

Here one should take note of a certain paradox: it is precisely when “I speak”—when I perceive myself as the agent of my speech—that, effectively, “the big Other speaks through me,” that I am “spoken,” since my speech acts are totally regulated by the symbolic order in which I dwell. And, conversely, the only way for me to bring my subjective position of enunciation into words is to let myself be surprised by what I say, to experience my own words as a case of “it speaks in/through me.” This is what happens in the case of a symptom: in it, my true subjective position finds a way to articulate itself against my will and intention. The opposition is thus not directly between “I speak” and “the Other speaks through me,” since these are the two sides of the same coin. When “it speaks” through me, it is not the big Other which speaks: the truth that articulates itself is the truth about the failures, gaps, and inconsistencies of the big Other.21

在此,我们应该注意某个悖论:确实是当「我言说」时,当我感觉我自己,作为言说的代理者,实际上,这个大他者通过我言说时,我被言说,因为我的话语的行动完全被规范,被我驻居的符号象征的秩序规范。相反地,唯一的方法让我将我主体性的表达立场带进文字,就是要让我自己受到我所说的内容惊讶,为了经验我自己的文字,作为是「大他者在我身上及通过我言说」的情况。这就是病征状况所发生的事情。我的真实的主观性的立场找到一种方式表达它自己,违背我的意志及意图。这个对立因此并不是直接处于「我言说」与「大他者通过我言说」之间,因为这些是相同钱币的两面。当「它通过我言说」,那并不是大他者言说:表达它自己的真理是关于大他者的失败,差距,不一贯的真理。

The Talmud says: “The one who quotes properly brings redemption to the world.” Is this not literally the formula of Stalinist argumentation? Freud also emphasizes that the unconscious in dreams can only quote—dreams are like a parrot, they are the ultimate prosopopoeia, just repeating speech fragments qua remnants of the day, while also, of course, submitting them to cruel cuts and rearrangements in order to squeeze its message into them. (The underlying premise of quotation: the big Other is always there, everything
is already written, so all that we can say should, if true, be supported by a quotation.)

塔尔木说:「引述的这个人适当地带来救赎给世界。」实质上,这难道不是史达林主义的论述的公式吗?弗洛依德也强调,在梦中的无意识仅能够引述—梦就像一隻鹦鹉,它们是最后的人格化,仅是重复片断的话语,作为当日电残渣。当然,梦也将这些残渣承受残酷的切割及重新安排,为了将它的讯息压挤进入它们。(引言的作为基础的假设是:大他者总是在那里,每样东西已经被书写,所以,我们能够说,所有应该受到引言支持的一切,假如它们是真实的话。

This—and not the ridiculous notion of some mysterious Spirit secretly pulling the strings to guarantee a happy outcome—is what the Hegelian “Cunning of Reason” amounts to: I hide nothing from you, I renounce all “hermeneutics of suspicion,” I do not impute any dark motives to you, I just leave the field free for you to deploy your potential and thus destroy yourself. There is more than superficial word‐play in the resonance between List der Vernunft (Cunning of Reason) and Lust der Vernunft (Pleasure of Reason): the Cunning of
Reason only works, the subject only allows itself to get caught in the trap of reason, if it is bribed by some surplus‐pleasure, and it is this surplus that is brought out by the analytic stance.

这相当等于是黑格尔的「理性的狡狯」–并不是某个神秘的精灵操控,来保证一个快乐的结果,这种荒谬的观念—我什么都没有跟你们隐藏,我仅是留下这个战场让你们自由运作你们的潜力,因此毁灭你们自己。这不仅是表面的文字遊戏,迴响于「理性的狡狯」与「理性的快乐」之间:理性的狡狯仅能运作,主体仅能让它自己被套陷于理想的陷阱,假如它被某种过剩快乐所贿赂。就是这种过剩,被精神分析的态度揭露出来。

It is easy to discern here the unexpected proximity of the Hegelian master to the
analyst, to which Lacan alludes: the Hegelian Cunning of Reason means that the Idea realizes itself in and through the very failure of its realization. It is worth recalling the sublime reversal found in Charles Dickens’s Great Expectations: when, as a young man, Pip is described as a “fellow of great expectations,” everybody perceives this as a prediction of his future worldly success. At the novel’s end, however, when Pip abandons London and returns to his modest childhood community, we realize that he lived up to the prediction that marked his life only by finding the strength to leave behind the vain thrill of London’s
high society, and thereby authenticate the notion of his being a “man of great expectations.”

我们在此很容易觉察黑格尔的主人,出乎意料地邻近精神分析家。拉康提到精神分析家时说:黑格尔的理性的狡狯意味着,理念实现它自己,在实现它的失败里,并且通过这个失败。值得一提的是,在查理、狄更生的小说「崇高期望」,被找到的翻转:作为年轻人,皮普被描述为一位「被期望很高的人」,每个人都觉得这是一种他的未来世俗成就的预测。可是,在小说结束时,当皮普放弃伦敦,回到他谦卑的童年的社区,我们体会到,他实践标示他一生的这个预测,仅是凭借找到这个力量将伦敦高级社会的虚荣刺激抛置背后,因此让他成为「崇高期望」的人的这个观念真诚地实现。

Furthermore, as befits a Hegelian novel, the ending of Great Expectations is deeply ambiguous in a way which evokes the radical ambiguity of the Hegelian
reconciliation—here is the novel’s last paragraph, describing Pip and Estella meeting again at the ruins of Satis House:

而且。如同跟黑格尔式的小说相符,「崇高期望」的结局在某方面极度暧昧。它召唤黑格尔的统合的极度暧昧。在此时小说的最后一段,描述皮普于艾斯特拉再次会面,在萨提斯莊园的废墟。

“We are friends,” said I, rising and bending over her, as she rose from the bench.
“And will continue friends apart,” said Estella. I took her hand in mine, and we went out of the ruined place; and, as the morning mists had risen long ago when I first left the forge, so the evening mists were rising now, and in all the broad expanse of tranquil light they showed to me, I saw no shadow of another parting from her.

「我们是朋友」,我说,站起并且俯身向她,当她从长椅起来,「然后,我们将继续当分开的朋友」,艾斯特拉说。我用我的手握着她的手,然后我们走出这个废墟之地,早晨的迷雾现在散开,在它们透露给予我的那广裘的宁静之光辉里,我看不到任何另外一层分开我们的阴影。

How are we to read the last words, “I saw no shadow of another parting from her”? Do they mean that Estella and Pip will never part, that they will stay together forever, or that it is only at this moment that Pip did not (or could not) see the shadow of a future parting?

我们应该如何阅读最后的几个字「我看不到任何另外一层分开我们的迷雾。」它们难道意味着,艾斯特拉跟皮普将永远不会分开吗?他们将永远在一块吗?或是仅是在这个时刻,皮普并没有(或无法)看见分开他们的这个阴影。

Even more interestingly, we now know that this ending was a revised second
version: in the original ending, Estella has remarried and Pip remains single; following the advice of certain friends (Edward Bulwer‐Lytton, Wilkie Collins), Dickens wrote a more upbeat ending, suggesting that Estella and Pip would marry. Many critics not only found this new ending a concession to popular taste; some even proposed their own new ending—here is G. B. Shaw’s version, describing what happens after Estella and Pip run into one another and then part again: “Since that parting, I have been able to think of her without the old unhappiness; but I have never tried to see her again, and I know I never
shall.”

更加耐人寻味的,我们现在知道,这个结局是一种修正过的第二版。在原先的结局,艾斯特拉重新结婚,而皮普始终是单身。听从某些朋友的劝告 (艾德华、薄维尔、莱顿、维基、柯林斯),狄更生描写一个更加乐观的结局,暗示着:艾斯特拉跟皮普将会结婚。许多批评家不但发现这个新的结局迎合大众的口味,有些批评家甚至建议他们自己的新结局—在此,萧伯纳德版本,描述所发生的事情,在艾斯特拉与皮普互相邂逅,然后再次分开:「自从上次分开,我一直能够想到她,而没有往常的不快乐,但是我从来没有尝试再次见到她。我知道我将永远不会见到她。」

There is an ambiguity here again: “I know I never shall”—shall what? See Estella
again or try to see her again (which leaves open the prospect of an unpremeditated encounter)? Another attempt was made by Douglas Brooks‐Davies, who resolved the ambiguity of Dickens’s second ending by opting for the pessimistic version: when Estella and Pip are leaving the garden together, “the evening sunlight of the moment when I left Satis holding Estella’s hand was so bright that it banished all shadows—even the metaphorical shadow of the parting that we were soon (and permanently) to endure.”

在此再次有一种模糊暧昧:「我知道我将永远不会」–将永远不会什么呢?再次见到她,或是尝试再见到她(这展开这个不期而遇的远景)?另外一个企图由道格拉斯、达维斯所从事,他解决狄更生的第二次结局的模糊暧昧。「当我握著艾斯特拉的手离开萨提斯时,当时的黄昏馀晖是如此的灿烂,它驱除了所有的阴影—甚至是分开的隐喻的阴影,我们不久(及永远)要忍受的阴影。

However, this dispelling of the ambiguity does not work because, in a way, it is superfluous, it says too much—in an exact parallel with Hegel’s “Absolute Knowing,” where we also see “no shadow of another parting from it”: it, of course, includes its own historicity; however, to say this explicitly is already to say too much and involves a regression to historicism. The denouement of Great Expectations thus relies on a kind of Hegelian reflexivity: what changes in the course of the hero’s ordeal is not only his character, but also the very ethical
standard by which we measure his character.

可是,模糊暧昧的驱散并没有行得通,因为以某种方式,这是多馀的,它说得太多,确实地对比于黑格尔的「绝对知识」。在那里,我们也看到「没有另外一场跟它分开的阴影」。当然,它包括它自己的历史。可是,明确地说这个,总是已经说得太多,并且牵涉到倒退回历史。「崇高期望」的结局因此依靠某种黑格尔的反射作用:在主角受到考验的过程,所改变的不仅是他的性格,而且是伦理的标准,根据这个标准,我们衡量他的性格。

In his review of Badiou’s Ethics, Terry Eagleton wrote:
There is a paradox in the idea of transformation. If a transformation is deep‐seated enough, it might also transform the very criteria by which we could identify it, thus making it unintelligible to us. But if it is intelligible, it might be because the transformation was not radical enough. If we can talk about the change then it is not full‐blooded enough; but if it is full‐blooded enough, it threatens to fall outside our comprehension. Change must presuppose continuity—a subject to whom the alteration occurs—if we are not to be left
merely with two incommensurable states; but how can such continuity be compatible with revolutionary upheaval?22

评论巴迪欧的「伦理学」时,特瑞、依格列敦写到:
在转变的这个观念,有一个悖论。假如转变足够根深蒂固,它也转变我们用来衡量它们的这些标准,因此让我们无法理解它。但是它可以被理解,那可能是因为转变并没有足够强烈。假如我们能够谈论关于这个改变,那并没有充分热血奔腾。但是假如是充分热血奔腾,它威胁会崩塌到我们无法理解。改变必须假设连续性—发生到主体身上的改变—假如我们不想要仅是处于两个无法衡量的状态。但是如此的连续性如何能够跟革命性的颠覆互相和谐?

The properly Hegelian solution to this dilemma is that a truly radical change is self‐relating: it changes the very coordinates by means of which we measure change. In other words, a true change sets its own standards: it can only be measured by criteria that result from it. This is what the “negation of negation” is: a shift of perspective which turns failure into true success.

对于这个两难困境的合宜的黑格尔式解决是,一个确实强烈的改变是关系到自己:它改变这些座标,凭借它们,我们衡量改变。换句话说,一个真实的改变竖立它自己的标准。它仅能凭借造成它的这些标准来衡量。这就是「否定的否定」的意义:观点的改变将失败转变成为成功。

And does the same not go for the Freudian Fehlleistung (acte manqué)—an act which succeeds in its very failure? Robert Pippin is right to emphasize that “the realization that only in such ‘failure’ is there success (success at being Geist) is an achievement like no other” in the history of philosophy.23

相同的道理难道不适用于弗洛依德的口误—这一种行动在它的失败,成功地表达?罗伯特、皮品正确地强调:「成功仅是存在于失败」的这个体会(精神成功),在哲学上是一种无与伦比成就。

This is where the standard reproach to Hegel (that he fails to fully confront negativity, failure, collapse, etc., since there is always a mechanism of redemption built into the dialectical process which guarantees that the utter failure will magically be converted into its opposite) falls short: the story of the Hegelian dialectical reversal is not the story of failure as a blessing in disguise, as a (painful but necessary) step or detour towards the final triumph that retroactively redeems it, but, on the contrary, the story of the necessary failure of every success (of every direct project or act), the story of how the only “success” the subject can gain is the reflexive shift of perspective which recognizes success in failure itself.

这就是对于黑格尔的标准谴责,并没有一针见血的地方,(他没有充分地面对负面性,失败,崩溃,等等,因为总是有一个救赎的机械结构被镶嵌进入辩证法的过程。这个过程保证,表达的失败将会魔术般地被转移成为成功):黑格尔的辩证法的倒转并不是失败的故事,作为因祸得福,作为一个痛苦但是必须的步骤,或是朝向胜利的迂回,这个胜利反动地救赎它。而是,相反地,这时每个直接目标或行动的成功,必然会失败的故事,主体能够获得的唯一的「成功」,就是观点的反射的转变,它在失败的本身体会出成功。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Less than nothing 02

October 22, 2012

Less than nothing 02
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8 第八章

THE CUNNING OF REASON
理性的狡狯

Where then do we stand with regard to Absolute Knowing? When, in his writings
around the Rapport de Rome, Lacan himself defines the conclusion of a treatment as the position of Hegelian Absolute Knowing, how are we to read this together with Lacan’s insistence on human finitude, on the irreducible future antérieur that pertains to the process of symbolization (every conclusion involves a gesture of precipitation; it never occurs “now,” but in a now viewed backwards)?

关于绝对知识,我们的立场因此在哪里?拉康在他环绕「罗马迴响」的著作里,他自己定义治疗的结论,作为是黑格尔的绝对知识的立场。我们应该如何阅读这个,跟拉康对于人类有限性的坚持,及对于无法还原的「未来的早先存在」的坚持?后者归属于符号象征化的过程。(每个结论都牵涉突然发生的姿态。「现在」永远没有发生,而是一种回顾观看的现在。)

Take the following passage: “What is realized in my history is neither the past definite as what was, since it is no more, nor even the perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior as what I will have been, given what I am in the process of becoming.”4 But the same goes for Hegel—when he adopts the position of the “end of history,” presenting us with a coherent narrative about the entirety of history, he does not simply look at the past from the present position; although he prohibits philosophy from speculation about the future and restricts it to comprehending what is the case, past and present, the position from which he enacts the final “reconciliation” has a futural dimension of its own, that of a “future perfect” from which the present itself is seen from a minimal distance, in its accomplished form:

请看以下的段落:「在我的历史所被实现的东西,既不是明确的过去,作为过去的实存,因为它现在不再存在。甚至也不是直到现在的完成,在我目前的样子。而是未来的预先存在,作为我将会形成的样子,假如考虑到我目前的样子,正处于生成的过程当中。」但是相同的东西也适用于黑格尔—当他採取「历史的终结」的这个立场,他呈现给予我们一致性的描述,关于历史的整体性,他并不仅仅从现在的立场观看过去,虽然他禁止哲学不要去沉思未来,并且限制哲学用以理解实际的情况,过去跟现在。从这个立场,他拟定这个最后的「协商」。这个立场就具有属于它自己的未来的维度,「未来完成式」的维度。从那里,目前本身被看见,从一个小量的距离,在它被完成的形式。

It is a present that raises itself, it is essentially reconciled, brought to consummation through the negation of its immediacy, consummated in universality, but in a consummation that is not yet achieved, and which must therefore be grasped as future—a now of the present that has consummation before its eyes; but because the community is posited now in the order of time, the consummation is distinguished from this “now” and is
posited as future.5

这一个现在提升它自己,它基本上被协调,通过它的当下性,被带到极致,在普遍性中被达到极致,但是处于一种尚未被完成的极致。它因此必须被理解作为未来。这一种目前的现在,在它的眼前获得极致。但是因为这个社会现在以时间的秩序被提出,这个极致被区别出来,跟这个「现在」,并且被提出作为未来。

This “future perfect” is that of accomplished symbolization, which is why, in his
Rapport de Rome, Lacan systematically identifies the conclusion of the analytic treatment with Hegelian “Absolute Knowing”: the aim of the treatment is to achieve the same “future perfect” of accomplished symbolization. Each day’s edition of Le Monde, the most prestigious (and proverbially haughty) French daily newspaper, appears in the early afternoon of the previous day (for example, the issue for July 4 is on sale around 3 p.m. on July 3), as if the editors wanted to signal a simultaneous move of precipitation and delay:

这个「未来完成」是被完成的符号象征的未来完成。那就是为什么在他的「罗马的迴响」,拉康系统地辨认精神分析治疗的结论,跟黑格尔的「绝对知识」的差异。知疗的目标是要获得这个相同符号象征化的「未来完成」。Le Monde 的每天都版本,最具有威望的法国日报(在当地颇有名声),它在前一天的下午就出现,(譬如,七月四日的这期,在七月三日的下午三点左右,就开始销售),好像编辑想要预示突然发生与拖延的同时性动作:

they write from eternity, observing events from a point later than that of other daily newspapers caught up in immediate “live” reporting; however, simultaneously, they are able to see the present itself from its immediate future (i.e., in its true potential, not only the way it appears in its chaotic immediacy)—so, you can learn already in the afternoon of July 3 how things look from the perspective of July 4. No wonder Le Monde is accused of arrogance: this coincidence of delay and precipitation effectively betrays its pretense to
standing for a kind of “Absolute Knowing,” in contrast to its rivals which merely report fleeting opinions.

他们从永恒书写,从后来的一个时刻观察事情,这个时刻晚于其他的日报,因为它们套陷于当下的「现场」报导。可是,同时地,他们能够看见这个目前的本身,从它的当下的未来(譬如,在它真实的潜力,不但是它出现的方式,处于它的过时的当下性)–所以,你们已经能够获知,在七月三日的下午。拖延与突然发生的巧合,有效地泄露出它的伪装代表一种「绝对知识」,对照于它的競争对手,它们仅是报导暂时的意见。

So when, in his Rapport de Rome, Lacan refers to Absolute Knowing, we should look closely at how he conceives this identification of the analyst with the Hegelian master, and not succumb to the temptation of quickly retranslating Absolute Knowing into the accomplished symbolization.

所以,在「罗马迴响」,拉康提到绝对知识,我们应该仔细观看,他如何构想精神分析家的认同黑格尔的主人,并且不屈服于这个诱惑:将绝对知识快速地重新翻译成为完成的符号象征化。

For Lacan, the analyst stands for the Hegelian master, the embodiment of Absolute Knowing, insofar as he renounces all forcing (forçage) of reality
and, fully aware that the actual is already in itself rational, adopts the stance of a passive observer who does not intervene directly in the content, but merely manipulates the scene so that the content destroys itself, when confronted with its own inconsistencies.

对于拉康,精神分析家代表黑格尔的主人,绝对知识的化身,因为他放弃现实界的强力,并且充分知道,这个现实界本身已经是理性的,而採用一个被动的观察者的态度。这位观察者并没有在内容直接介入,尔仅是操控这个场景,这样内容会毁灭它自己。当它面临它自己的不一贯性。

This is how one should read Lacan’s indication that Hegel’s work is “precisely what we need to confer a meaning on so‐called analytic neutrality other than that the analyst is simply in a stupor”6—it is this neutrality which keeps the analyst “on the path of non‐action.”7

这是我们应该阅读拉康的指示:黑格尔的研究确实我们所需要的,给予一种意义,给所谓的精神分析的中立性。而不是精神分析家仅是处于麻痹的状态—就是这种中立性,保持精神分析家处于没有行动的途径。

The Hegelian wager is that the best way to destroy an enemy is to leave the field free for him to deploy his potential, so that his success will be his failure, since the lack of any external obstacle will confront him with the absolutely inherent obstacle of the inconsistency of his own position:

黑格尔的赌注是,毁灭敌人最好的办法是将战场留给他充分运用他的潜力。这样,他的成功将会是他的失败,因为任何外在阻碍的欠缺,将会让他面临这个绝对的本质上的阻碍,他自己的立场的不一贯性的阻碍。

Cunning is something other than trickery. The most open activity is the greatest
cunning (the other must be taken in its truth). In other words, with his openness, a man exposes the other in himself, he makes him appear as he is in and for himself, and thereby does away with himself. Cunning is the great art of inducing others to be as they are in and for themselves, and to bring this out to the light of consciousness. Although others are in the right, they do not know how to defend it by means of speech. Muteness is bad, mean cunning. Consequently, a true master [Meister] is at bottom only he who can provoke the other to transform himself through his act.8

狡狯是某件不仅是诡计。「最公开的活动就是最伟大的狡狯」(他者必须在它的真理被看待)。换句话说,用他的公开,人暴露他身上的他者,他让他者出现,因他者在他里面,及作为他,因此废除他自己。狡狯是这个伟大的艺术,将其余的人,化减成为他们原来的本质及作为他们自己。为了显露这个给意识知道。虽然其余的人是正确的,他们并不知道如何凭借言说防卫它。沉默是糟糕的,意味着狡狯。结果,一位真正的主人骨子里仅是这种人,他能够「提供他者,为了转变他自己,经由他的行动」。

The wager of the Hegelian Cunning of Reason thus involves not so much a trust in the power of Reason (we can take it easy and withdraw—Reason will ensure that the good side wins out), as a trust in the power of “unreason” in every determinate agent which, left to itself, will destroy itself: “If reason is as cunning as Hegel said it was, it will do its job without your help.”9 The Cunning of Reason thus in no way involves a faith in a secret guiding hand guaranteeing that all the apparent contingency of unreason will somehow contribute to the harmony of the Totality of Reason; if anything, it involves a trust in un‐Reason, the certainty that, no matter how well‐planned things are, somehow they will go wrong. This is what Lacan meant by his statement that “a letter always reaches its
destination”: there is no repression without the return of the repressed, every
totality‐of‐meaning is always disturbed by its symptom.

黑格尔的理性的狡狯的赌注因此牵涉到的,并不是信任理性的力量(我们能够轻松对待并且撤退—理性将会保证,善的这边将会赢),而是信任「非理性」的力量,在每个决定性的代理者。当听任自自主时,它会毁灭它自己。假如理想是像黑格尔所说的那样狡狯,它将会尽它的职责,而不需要你的帮助。理性的狡狯因此丝毫没有牵涉到信任一隻秘密的导引的手。这隻手保证,非理性的所有的表面的偶然性,将会用某种方法促成理性的完整性的和谐。无论如何,它牵涉到对非理性的信任。这个确定性,无论事情多么机关算尽,它们不知为何就是会出错。这就是拉康的意思,当他陈述:「一封信总是会抵达它的目的地」。每有压抑,必有受压抑者的回来。意义的每个整体性总是会受到它的病征扰乱。

So what about the obvious counter‐argument that this reference to Hegel is
operative only in the early Lacan, for whom the goal of the psychoanalytic cure is the complete symbolization (“symbolic realization”) of symptoms, and no longer for the Lacan who becomes aware of the “barred” big Other? For the Lacan of the 1950s, focused on the symbolic, the success of the analytic treatment relies on the liberating power of “symbolic realization,” of listening to and assuming the “I, truth” which “speaks” in and through the unconscious symptoms. In a Hegelian mode, Lacan asserts the link, identity even, between language and death: in language, immediate reality is mortified or idealized in its notional sublation, and insofar as the symbolic order is sustained by death drive “beyond the
pleasure‐principle,” one has to “subjectivize one’s own death,” to recognize in it the only master to be obeyed, and thereby to get rid of all other master figures.10

所以,这个明显的相反的论点是什么?提到黑格尔仅是在早期拉康运作。对于早期拉康,精神分析的治疗的目标是将病征完整地符号象征化(符号象征的实现),现在不再适用中期拉康,他已经知道「被画杠的大他者」。对于1950年代的拉康,由于专注于这个符号界,精神分析治疗的成功依靠著「符号象征的实现」的解放力量,倾听并且担负起「我作为言说的真理,在无意识的病征并且通过病征。以黑格尔的模式,拉康主张这个连接,甚至是认同,在语言与死亡之间。在语言,当下的现实界,被羞辱或是理想化,在它的观念上的钩消。因为符号象征的秩序是凭借死亡冲动来维持,超越快乐原则,我们必须将自己的死亡主体化,为了在它里面体认这位应该被服从的唯一的主人,因此废除所有其他的主人的人物。

The late Lacan, now focused on the Real, introduces the irreducible tension between the symbolic and the real of death: “It is possible that all language is made [to enable us] not to think death which, effectively, is the least thinkable thing.”11 Far from being the operator of death, language is here conceived as a defense against—a screen protecting us from—the confrontation with death.12 Since this tension is irreducible, the goal of analysis is no longer Lacan’s version of Hegelian Absolute Knowing, namely the ideal of a total symbolization in which the subject gets rid of its imaginary ego; it is now its very opposite (as deployed in the seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis)—the subject’s heroic “forcing”
of the symbolic prohibition, his or her confrontation with the “Black Sun” of the Real Thing.

晚期拉康现在专注于实在界,介绍这个无法化减的紧张,处于符号界与死亡的实在界之间。「很有可能,所有的语言都是人为,为了让我们能够不要想到死亡。实际上,死亡是最没有被想到的东西。」语言根本就不是死亡的运作者,语言在此被构想成为一种防卫—一种保护我们的帘幕—免于跟死亡面对。因为这个紧张的无可化减,精神分析的目标不再是拉康对于黑格尔的绝对知识的看法。换句话说,在整体的符号象征化的理想,主体废除它的想象的自我。现在,它恰恰相反(依照在精神分析的伦理学研讨班的运作)–主体的英雄式的强力突破符号象征的禁忌,自己去跟实在界的物象的「黑太阳」面对。

Lacan’s idea of the end or goal of the analytic treatment passes through three main phases which vaguely fit the triad of symbolic, Real, and imaginary: first, the symbolization of the symptoms; then, the violent encounter with the Real; finally, the modest amelioration of our daily psychic economy. Lacan’s limitation is clearly discernible in how, in his last decades, he tends to oscillate between two poles which are both “worse,” as Stalin would have put it. Sometimes (exemplarily in his reading of Antigone), he conceives of the ethical act as a kind of “forcing,” a violent act of transgression which cuts into imaginary and symbolic semblances and makes the subject confront the terrifying Real in
its blinding destructive power—such traumatic encounters, such penetrations into the forbidden or damned domain, in Antigone, are called ate, and can only be sustained for a brief moment.

拉康的精神分析的治疗的目的或目标的观念,经历三个阶段。这三个阶段大约相对应于符号界,实在界,想象界的三角座。首先,病征的符号象征化,然后,跟实在界的猛烈遭遇,最后,日常的心灵的活动的谦卑的缓和。拉康的极限清楚地被觉察出来,在他的晚期的几十年,他如何倾向于摇摆于都是糟糕的两极之间。如同史达林本来会这样表达它。有时,(他阅读安提戈尼,可作为典范),他构想伦理的行动,作为某种的强力突破。一种侵凌性的猛烈行动,切入想象界与符号界的真理类似物,并且让主体面对这个可怕的实在界,由于它具有令人盲目的毁灭的力量—这种创伤的遭遇,如此的贯穿进入该诅咒的领域的禁地,在安提戈尼,它们被称为是「高傲ate」。它仅能够被维持简短的时间。

These authentic moments are rare; one can only survive them if one soon returns to the safe domain of semblances—truth is too painful to be sustained for more than a passing moment. At other times (especially in his ruminations about the symptom towards the end of his life), Lacan adopts the opposite (but effectively complementary) attitude of wisdom: the analyst never knows what will happen when he pushes analysis too far and dissolves the analysand’s symptoms too radically—one can get more than one expected, a local interpretive intervention into a particular symptomal formation can destabilize the subject’s entire symbolic economy and bring about a catastrophic disintegration of his world.

这些真诚的时刻是罕见的。我们仅有马上回到真理类似物的安全领域,我们才能存活那些时刻。真理是太令人痛苦,无法被维持超过短暂的时刻。在其他时刻(特别是在他反芻思考有关朝向他的生命的结束的病征),拉康採用智慧的相反的态度(但是实际上互补):精神分析家永远不知道将会发生什么事情,当他将精神分析过分推进,并且过分强烈地瓦解分析者的病征—我们能够获得超过我们所期望的,一个局部的解释的介入,进入特别的病征的形成,能够除掉主体的整个的符号象征活动,并且导致他的世界的灾难式的瓦解。

The analyst should thus remain modest and respect appearances without taking them too seriously; they are ultimately all we have, all that stands between us and the catastrophe. It is easy to see how these two stances complement each other: they rely on a (rather Heideggerian) image of human life as a continuous dwelling in “inauthentic” semblances, interrupted from time to time by violent encounters with the Real. (What this entire field encompassing the two stances excludes is the Christian “work of love,” the patient work of continuous fidelity to the encounter with the Real.) This modest approach of merely “making life a little bit easier,” of diminishing suffering and pain, forgetting about capitalized Truth, makes the late Lacan almost a Rortyan, and clearly reverses his earlier fidelity to the biblical prescription:

精神分析因此应该始终要表现谦卑而尊敬的外表,而不要过分认真看待。他们最后就是我们所拥有的,处于为民与灾难之间的一切。我们很容易看出,这两个态度如何互相补充:它们依靠人类生活的意象(相当海德格模式),作为是连续地驻居于「非真诚」的真理类似物。有时被跟实在界的遭遇打断。(涵盖这两个态度的这整个的领域所排除的东西,是基督教的「爱的工作」,连续地忠诚于实在界的遭遇的耐心的工作。)这种谦卑的方法仅是让生活成为稍微舒适一点,减少受难与痛苦,忘记已经被大写化的真理,让晚期拉康几乎成为罗帝的自由主义者,很清楚地倒转他早期的忠实于圣经的指令。

But if God so clothes the grass of the field, which is alive today and tomorrow is
thrown into the furnace, will He not much more clothe you? You of little faith! Do not worry then, saying, “What will we eat?” or “What will we drink?” or “What will we wear for clothing?” For the Gentiles eagerly seek all these things; for your heavenly Father knows that you need all these things. But seek first His kingdom and His righteousness, and all these things will be added to you. So do not worry about tomorrow; for tomorrow will care for itself. Each day has enough trouble of its own. (Matthew 6:30–4)

但是假如上帝如此地装扮这个领域的草地,这个领域今天欣欣向荣,明天就被抛进火炉,他将不是也会这样装扮你?你们的信仰,何其渺小也!请不要因此忧虑地说:「我们将吃什么?」或「我们将喝什么?」或「我们将穿什么衣服?」因为世俗之人渴望地所有这些东西。为了你们的天堂,天父知道,你们需要所有这一切。但是假如你们首先寻求上帝的天国跟他的正义,所有这一切将增加到你们身上。所以,请不要忧虑明天,因为明天将会照顾它自己。每一天都有属于它自己的充分的麻烦。(圣经马修篇 6:30-4)

Lacan often refers to these lines in order to denigrate healing as the primary goal of psychoanalytic treatment: health comes par surcroît—in addition or in excess, and by itself, as an unintended bonus. Insofar as health concerns the organism and its homeostasis, not Truth, its status is pathological in the Kantian sense, so that Lacan’s motto can also be expressed in terms of focusing on ethical duty and ignoring utilitarian concerns: do your duty, and happiness and the Good will take care of themselves. There are many variations of this attitude, best rendered by the saying “Take care of the pennies, and the pounds will take care of themselves,” which should be inverted into:

拉康时常提到这几行,为了贬低疗效,作为精神分析治疗的最初目标:健康自会来临—增加或是过度,并且本身作为一种并非意图的红利。因为健康关心这个有机体及它的新陈代谢的平衡,而真理没有这样的关系。在康德的解释,真理的地位是受到经验染污的。所以拉康的箴言也能够被表达,用集中于伦理的责任,及忽略功利主义的关系。假如你们尽到你们的职责,快乐跟善会照顾它们自己。关于这个态度还有许多不同说法,最淋漓尽致的是这个格言:「假如你们照顾小钱,大钱会照顾它们自己」,这句格言应该被倒转成为:

Take care of the sounds (signifiers), and the sense (signified) will take care of itself. Lacan aims at the heroic stance of “Take care of the truth, and the healing will take care of itself”: confront the Truth, risk everything, ignore the consequences, and health will come par surcroît … In short: confront the Real, and reality will take care of itself. Do not compromise your desire, and your needs and demands will be provided for.

假如你们照顾这些声音(能指),那么意义(所指)将会照顾它自己。拉康目标是这个英雄式的态度:「假如你们照顾真理,那么疗效会照顾它自己」。假如你们面对真理,冒一切的危险,忽略那些结果,健康自会照顾它自己。假如你们不要妥协你们的欲望,你们的需求与要求将会充足无虞。

There is, however, a fundamental ambiguity which pertains to this attitude: does it mean that one should ignore health and focus on the essential, on the patient’s articulation and assumption of the Truth of his or her desire, or does it mean, in a more refined way, that psychic health is “essentially a by‐product”? In the latter case, health remains the true goal of the treatment, the point is simply that it is counter‐productive, self‐destructive even, to make it a direct goal—one should work on other things and count on health emerging as a by‐product. But if this is the case, should we not also invert the motto accordingly: take care of the pathological reality, and the Real will take care of itself? Be modest, try to help the patient by easing his suffering, and the Truth will emerge by itself?

可是,有一个基本的模糊暧昧,跟这个态度有关:它难道不是意味着,我们应该忽略健康并且专注于这个基本的真理,在病人的表达跟假设是他自己的真理?或是它难道不是意味着,以更加精炼的方式,心灵的健康「基本上是副产品」?就后者的情况而言,健康始终是治疗的真实的目标。重点仅是:这个违逆生产性,自我毁灭性,甚至将它当成一个直接的目标—我们应该从事其他事情,并且依靠健康出现作为副产品。但是假如情况是这样,我们难道不是因此也应该倒转这个箴言:假如你们照顾病态的现实界,实在界自豪会照顾它自己?假如你们谦卑,尝试帮助病人,凭借减轻他的痛苦,那么真理自然会出现?

Furthermore, this biblical formula can also be considered a denial of the
unconscious: “seek first His kingdom and His righteousness, and all these things will be added to you”—by whom? By God, who will do the work behind the scenes, in the same way He “clothes the grass of the field.”13 Lacan’s thesis that “God is unconscious” is endowed here with a new meaning: do your duty, and God will be the mole, the agent of that subterranean unconscious “weaving of the spirit” which will create the conditions for my act to succeed. In other words, does Lacan himself not rely here on some kind of Cunning of Reason which will help the patient achieve health without directly looking for it?

而且,这个圣经的公式也能够被认为是对无意识的一种否认:「假如你们首先寻求上帝的天国及他的正义,那么所有这些东西将会增加到你们身上。」–由谁来增加呢?由上帝,他会从事幕后的这个工作,就像他装扮这个领域的草地。拉康的「上帝是无意识」的主题,在这里被赋予一种新的意义:假如你们尽到你们的职责,上的将会是这个幕后推手。潜在的无意识的代理者,灵魂的编织者。他将会创造这些条件,让我的行动成功。换句话说,拉康他自己在此难道不是依靠某种理想的狡狯。这个理性的狡狯将会帮助病人完成健康,而没有直接照顾体?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

齐泽克论拉康

October 20, 2012

Less than nothing
少甚于无

Slavoj Zizek
斯拉夫、齐泽克

CHAPTER 8 第八章

Lacan as a Reader of Hegel

拉康作为黑格尔的读者

[The] question of the termination of an analysis is that of the moment at which the subject’s satisfaction is achievable in the satisfaction of all—that is, of all those it involves in a human undertaking. Of all the undertakings that have been proposed in this century, the psychoanalyst’s is perhaps the loftiest, because it mediates in our time between the care‐ridden man and the subject of absolute knowledge.1

精神分析的终结的问题,是所有的满足当中,主体的满足被完成的时刻。换句话说,在人类的的追求,它牵涉到所有的满足当中。在这个世纪来,曾经被建议的所有的这些追求,精神分析家的追求或许是最崇高的,因为它在我们的时代,中介于充满焦虑的人与具有绝对知识的主体之间。

This passage from Rapport de Rome contains in nuce Lacan’s program of the early
1950s—a program that every professional philosopher would undoubtedly dismiss as nonsense: namely, to bring together Heidegger (who defines “care” as the fundamental feature of finite Dasein) and Hegel (the philosopher of infinite Absolute Knowledge in which the Universal and the Particular are fully mediated).2

从「罗马的迴响」的这个段落包括拉康在1950年代的计划。这个计划,每个哲学家无可置疑将会排斥为无意义。那就是融合海德格(他定义焦虑为有限的生命实存的基本特征)与黑格尔(无限的绝对知识的哲学家,在绝对知识里,普遍性与特殊性充分地被中介。)

The Lacanian analyst as a figure of Absolute Knowing? Is not this thesis restricted to a specific historical moment (the early 1950s), when Hegel’s influence on Lacan (mediated by Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite) was at its peak? Did not Lacan soon move from Hegel to Kant, insisting on the
inaccessible (“impossible”) character of the Real that forever resists symbolization, on the subject’s unsurpassable separation from the cause of its desire?

拉康的精神分析家,作为一位绝对知识的人物吗?这个命题难道不会被限制于一个明确的历史的时刻(1950年代早期),当黑格尔对拉康的影响正达到颠峰(由柯杰维与海泼莱特中间导引)?拉康难道不是从黑格尔转向康德,坚持实在界这个无法进入的特性(不可能界)。因为这个实在界永远是在抗拒被符号象征化,对于主体的无法被克服的分离,跟他的欲望的原因。

Is not the best description of Lacan’s central project that of a critique of pure desire, where the term “critique” is to be understood in its precise Kantian sense: maintaining the gap that forever separates every empirical (“pathological”) object of desire from its “impossible” object‐cause whose place has to remain empty?

拉康的中心的计划的最好描述,难道不就是「纯粹欲望的批判」的计划?在那里,「批判」应该被了解,根据它的准确的康德的意义:维持这个差距,这个差距永远分离欲望的每个经验的客体,跟它的「不可能的」的客体的原因,因为这个客体的原因的位置必须是空无?

And is not what Lacan calls “symbolic castration” this very gap which
renders every empirical object unsatisfactory? Indeed, in the following paragraphs of the Rapport de Rome itself, Lacan already outlines the “limits within which it is impossible for our teaching to ignore the structuring moments of Hegel’s phenomenology”:

拉康所谓的「符号象征的阉割」,难道不就是这个使得每个的经验的客体令人不满意的差距?的确,在「罗马的迴响」本身的随后的几个段落,拉康已经概述「这些限制,在这些限制里,我们的教学不可能忽略黑格尔的现象学的这个结构化的运动」。

But if there is still something prophetic in Hegel’s insistence on the fundamental
identity of the particular and the universal, an insistence that reveals the extent of his genius, it is certainly psychoanalysis that provides it with its paradigm by revealing the structure in which this identity is realized as disjunctive of the subject, and without appealing to the future.

但是,假如依旧还有某件东西具有预言性质,在黑格尔坚持基本的认同于特殊性与普遍性。这种坚持显示他的天才的广度。那确实是精神分析供应它的典范给他,凭借显示这个结构。在这个结构,这个认同被实现,作为是主体的中断,而没有诉诸于未来。

Let me simply say that this, in my view, constitutes an objection to any reference to totality in the individual, since the subject introduces division therein, as well as in the collectivity that is the equivalent of the individual. Psychoanalysis is what clearly relegates both the one and the other to the status of mirages.3

让我简单地说,依我之见,这形成一种反对,对于任何提到个人的整体性。因为主体介绍这个分裂在里面,以及在相当于是这个个人的集体性里。精神分析清楚地分配前者与后者到幻影的地位。

We are thereby back in familiar waters: Hegelian self‐consciousness, the subject of absolute notional self‐mediation which supersedes or devours every alterity, versus the Lacanian divided subject of the unconscious, by definition separated from its Cause.

我们因此回答耳熟能详的领域:黑格尔的自我意识,绝对观念化的自性的中介的主体。这个自性的中介取代并且吞没每个它者,相对于拉康的无意识的分裂的主体,在定义上,它跟它的原因被分离。

It is not enough, however, to reduce Hegel to his grand formulae (the Absolute not only as Substance but also as Subject; the actuality of the rational; Absolute Knowing; the self‐canceling force of negativity; etc.) and then to quickly reject him as the most extreme expression of the modern delirium of the total subjective‐notional mediation or appropriation of all reality. One should display, apropos Hegel himself, what the author of one of the best books on Hegel, Gérard Lebrun, called the “patience of the notion” (La patience du concept, the book’s title): to read Hegel’s theoretical practice en détail, in miniature, following all his dialectical cuts and turns.

可是,光是将黑格尔还原成为他的的伟大的公式,并不足够 (这个绝对知识不仅作为物质,而且作为主体,理性的实际表现。这个绝对知识,负面的取消自性的力量,等等),然后很快地拒绝他,作为这个现代的谵妄的最极端的表达,主体在观念上整体性地中介与佔用所有的现实界。关于黑格尔本身,我们应该展示,雷布伦所谓的「观念的耐心」,他是研究黑格尔的论著的其中一位作者。详细地阅读黑格尔的理论的实践,遵照他所有的辩证法的切割与转折。

The wager of such an operation is double: it can ground the (only serious) critique of Hegel, the immanent critique that measures him by his own standards, analyzing how he realizes his own program; but it can also serve as a means to redeem Hegel, to unearth the actual meaning of his great programmatic maxims as opposed to the standard understanding of them.

这样的运作所冒的危险是双倍的:它能够建立对于黑格尔的批判(仅是严重的批判)的基础,这种内在性的批判根据他自己的标准评价他,分析他如何实现他自己的计划。但是它也能够充当是一种工具来拯救黑格尔,挖掘出他的伟大的发展的箴言的实际意义,迴异于对这些箴言的标准的理解。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神分析的行动 49

October 20, 2012

精神分析的行动 49

Psychoanalytic Act

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

Seminar13: Wednesday 13 March 1968

的确,在此有一个机会进入某件东西。通过这个东西,语言影响被建议给予我们作为客体,以清楚的方式。因为它从这个辩证法排除,如同在传统哲学的探问的结束,它曾经被建构。这让我们对于主体所牵涉的东西,获得可能、穷尽、及完整的还原的途径。因为它是陈述这个真理的东西,宣称给予最后的论断,对于这些公式的辞说。这个物自体in-itself ,en-soi 的特性注定会被还原成为它自体for itself,pour-soi。而在绝对知识的结束时,它自体pour-soi 会涵盖每样牵涉到这个物自体en-soi的东西。这些东西是不同的,根据这个事实:精神分析教导我们,因为能指的影响,主体仅是被建立,作为分裂。而且是以无法还原的形态为之。这是某件东西,从我们身上召唤所被牵涉的东西,在作为语言影响的主体。这个方法如何能够被接近,精神分析家在里面扮演的角色,确实是某件作为重要的基础的东西。

实际上,假如在知识所被牵涉的东西总是留下一个残渣,在某方面是构成它的地位的残渣—关于伴侣被提出的第一个问题,难道不就是精神分析的工作?关于在那里的伴侣,我并不是作为帮助的伴侣,而是作为工具的伴侣,为了让某件事情发生。我们不妨说,在精神分析结束时,主体知道这种构成的分裂。对于主体而言,某件东西会展开,这个东西无法被称为是别的,或不同于激情的行动passage a l’acte 。我们不妨说,这是一种被启蒙的激情的行动。确实是根据知道这个事实,在每个行动里,有某件东西,他无法理解作为主体。这个行动在那里会有意外,让我们暂时这样说,在这个行动的结束,这个实现至少被遮蔽,关于他必须要完成什么,从这个行动,作为属于他自己的实现。

在精神分析的结束,这会将精神分析家所发生的事情,完成摆放在一边,在已经被完成的工作。以某种天真的询问,我们似乎能够说,凭借将这个pour-soi的充分而简单的实现摆放一边,在这个被认为是禁欲主义的工作,它的术语能够被构想,作为知识。这个知识至少将会被实现,对于另外一个知识。换句话说,为了让这个被发现是这个运作的伴侣的这个主体,建立它的架构并且授权它的过程。

这就是它的过程吗?的确,我不妨说,在掌控这项工作时,精神分析家关于它学习良多。这难道意味着,无论如何,他就是运作的这个人,以某种方式沾沾自喜成为是被实现的知识的这个真诚的主体?对于这个回答的明确反对是:精神分析排斥穷尽一切的知识,而且在主体本身的这个层次,因为在精神分析的工作,他被迫参与其中。

在精神分析,岌岌可危的根本不是「了解你自己gnothi seauton」 ,而是对于这个「了解你自己gnothi seauton」的极限的理解。因为这个极限确实是属于逻辑本身的特性,因为它被铭记在语言的影响,它总是将它自己留在外面。结果,因为它让主体能够被这样地建构,这个被排除的部分意味着,由于属于它自己的特性,主体要就是,仅是凭借忘记在体认的这个运作,他首先被决定的东西,要不就是甚至凭借在这个决定理解他自己,作为否认。我的意思是,由于无法体认出它,仅是看见它产生,以一种基本的否认。

换句话说,我们发现我们自己,拥有两种形式的重要基模,明确地说,就是癔症与妄想症。从那里,精神分析经验开始。这些基模在此仅是作为例子,说明,展开,而且是因为神经症基本上是被建构,根据欲望跟要求的关系。我们发现我们自己面临跟我上次产生的相同的逻辑的基模,当我跟你们显示数量化是什么的架构。这个架构连接我们能够给予的这个复杂的方法,关于这个主体与这个述词。在此,它们将会被铭记,以被潜抑的能指S的形式,因为它代表这个主体,对于另外一个能指S(0)。让我们给予这个能指这个共同系数0, 因为在这个能指,主体事实上必须体认出他自己,或是没有体认出他自己。在那里,它被铭记,作为固定主体在大它者的领域的某个地方。这个大它者领域的公式如下:$(-S V S (0)。对于每个主体,它属于分裂的性质,在此,确实地,跟我们能够说明的同样的方式,每个人是聪明(m V w),为民拥有这个断裂的选择,在这个「没有人」跟「成为聪明」之间。我们基本上拥有这个。如同最初的精神分析经验教导我们,癔症患者,在她的最后的表达,在她的基本的特性,完全是真诚的,假如真诚的意思是「仅是在自身之内,找到自己的法则」。它被维持在一个能指化的肯定,对于我们而言,那看起来像是戏剧,看起来像是喜剧。事实上,对于我们而言,她以这种方式呈现她自己,作为真诚$(-S V S (0)。没有人能够理解什么被牵涉,在癔症患者的这个结构。假如他没有相反地看待它,作为是主体最坚定及最自主性的地位。这个主体被表达在这个能指,条件是第一个,决定它的第一个,始终不是单独被遗忘,而是无知于这个事实:它被遗忘。虽然这是相当诚恳地处于被描述为妄想症的结构,主体产生这个岌岌可危的能指,因为那是他的真理,但是却用基本的否认供应它。通过这个否认,他宣告他自己作为并不是他确实表达的东西。他承认他是在说明。结果,他仅是建立他自己在述词的层次,这个述词被维持,由于它伪装是某件别的东西。他仅是说明他自己,由于没有体认,凭借否定本身所指示的方式。他用这个否定来支持它,凭借这个代表的形式,这个没有体认被完成。

因此,就是从这个同质性,从一个跟在书写时所被铭记物的并列,从这个进展中所被赋加的东西,越来越被建立。在辞说里,这种进展强迫它被给予的丰富性,凭借必须将自己匹配从多样性来到我们的东西,这些观念的变化,被赋加我们之上的数学的进展。就是从铭记的形式的这个同质性—譬如,我正在提到弗瑞吉的「观念的书写」。如同你们知道,展开他就足够了。作为观念的书写,为已经给予你们一些例子。因为我们正在尝试以弗瑞吉开始,将述词的形式铭记在这个书写,不但是在历史上,而且因为这个事实:在历史中,它们自圆其说。它们被铭记在所谓的述词的逻辑,第一级的逻辑。换句话说,它并没有促成述词层次的数量。

让我们说,为了再次从事我们的例子,实际上,重要的是不要过于忽略它,我上次的使用这个幽默的普遍性的肯定:所有的人都是聪明的。在他的「观念的书写」,弗瑞吉时常书写它的方式,用水平线的形式提出,这个单纯的命题内容,换句话说,能指被聚拢在一块的方式,而没有对它们要求任何东西,除了就是句法的正确性。凭借他放置在左边的一条直杠,他标示所谓的暗示,判断语的存在。从这条直杠的铭记开始,命题的内容被肯定,或是通过到所谓的论断的阶段。在此,某件东西的存在,我们能够翻译为「这是真实的」,我们确实必须翻译它。这个「这是真实的」,确实是对我们而言,岌岌可危的是逻辑,它并没有以任何方式应该值得被认为是技术层面的初级逻辑。因为这个术语已经被使用在逻辑的建构。它明确地指明仅是凭借联结真理的价值,才能运作的东西。确实是因为这个理由,很有理由被称为是初级逻辑的东西,假如这个术语没有已经被使用的话,我们将称之为次级逻辑。这并不意味着较低劣的逻辑。而是作为主体的构成的逻辑。对于我们而言,这个「这是真实的」处于我们将要放置某件并非是论断的立场的层次。实际上,确实就是在这里,对于我们而言,真理是受到质疑。∀(Fx)-∃x-(Fx)→双重的否定,这个小小的空洞,这个凹面,某种方式的空洞化。在此,弗瑞吉保留下来,为了在它里面指示我们将要看出的东西。这就是为什么对他似乎是无法免除的,要确实它的正确的地位,对于他的「观念的书写」。就是在这里,某件运作的东西将会来临,在此,它运作于被铭记的命题,在这个内容的标题:「所有的人都是聪明的」,我们将要以这个方式铭记,譬如,

凭借放置这个「聪明的」,作为这个函数,在此,人作为他所谓的在函数里的主张。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神分析的行动 48

October 18, 2012

精神分析的行动 48

Psychoanalytic Act

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

Seminar13: Wednesday 13 March 1968

什么是成为精神分析家?朝著这个目标,我今年正在告诉你们的东西,将会前进,在精神分析行动的标题下。

奇怪的是,有些被送给我的讯息当中,因为我要去它们,我感谢那些好意来送给我讯息,奇怪的是,以下的讯息有时会突然冒出。我正在这里做某件应该被认为是靠近某种哲学的反思。或许,仍然在某些的课堂,像上一次,当然,假如经常来听我的辞说的那些人都确实无法理解,那充分地警告你们,岌岌可危的是某件其它东西。经验,一个经验总是某件最近曾经获得迴响的东西。这个经验证明,在某个研究的秩序被产生的心灵的状态,被描述为哲学的经验。它对所谓的逻辑的这门科学的整个的确实的表达,本身杆格不入。在这个迴响,我甚至召唤并且保留这个幽默的判断。这样一个企图,适当来说说,是要带进曾经被建构作为逻辑的东西,带进课堂,带进所被赋加的东西,作为哲学的韵文化。那是某件类似技术人员的企图心。他们最后的口号,在各种震耳欲聋的抗拒中,是在控诉那些人,在整体上,他们正在尝试贡献这个更加明确的辞说,我自己的辞说是其中的一部分,在结构主义的标题之下。总之,这根据这个共同的特征区别出来,适当来说,就是以所被构成的东西作为客体,不是根据组成科学的普通的客体的东西的标题,换句话说,那个东西,我们一劳永逸地保持充分的距离,为了要孤立实在界,作为形成一个特别的领域,而是要适当地专注于所被组成的东西,作为语言的影响。

将语言的影响作物客体,实际上,确实是能够被认为是结构主义的共同的因素。确实地,关于这点,思想找到它的基础,它的角落,它的逃避方式,它的狂喜的形式,从某件环绕这点而尝试成为具体化的东西,以及为了恢复到它,那是什么?古代的主题,在不同的标题之下,总是发现它们自己环绕着每个辞说最为興盛,因为这确实就是哲学的骨干。换句话说,保持自己在辞说的运用时具有某种的影响。这个辞说一定会来到这种平庸的方式,被定位的确是所在,这种没有运作意味着,唯一被留置在外面,被减少的,确实就是这个影响。

现在,我们很困难不注意到,精神分析提供特有的平台来从事这样的反思。

精神分析实际上是什么?我偶然地在一篇文章,在我的精神分析文集找到的这篇文章,标题是:「标准治疗的变数」。为了书写某件东西,我今天早上费心将它抽取出来。为了询问自己在精神分析牵涉到什么,因为确实地,问题是要显示,这些变数被定义,被建立。这预先假设有某件典型的东西。这确实是要改正某种的方式,将「典型type」这个字词,跟精神分析的有效性的字词联系在一块。我书写这篇文章。因此我说,偶然地,「这个标准很少被陈述,因为它被认为是同义反复。」在老早以前,标准就是这样,在十多年前—我书写,「精神分析,无论标准与否,就是我们期望从精神分析家获得的治疗。」

「很少被陈述」,因为事实上,实际上,人们对某件东西退缩。如我书写的,这个东西不但同义反复,而且会成为或召唤这个某件未知,模糊,而无法还原的东西,它确实就在于精神分析家的品质化。

可是,请观察,这确实是所被牵涉的东西,当你们想要验证某个人是否是正确的,当他宣称曾经经历精神分析。你去到谁那里?那个人是精神分析家否?这是某件悬而未决的问题。假如为了某个理由—这些理由确实是应该被展开,用一个大的疑问号—这个人并没有资格自称是精神分析家,一种怀疑主义至少会被产生,关于无论对或错,从精神分析经验,主体授权他自己,这确实就是精神分析岌岌可危的地方。

实际上,并没有其他的标准。但是确实就是这个标准,问题是如何定义它,特别是当问题是要区别精神分析跟这个更加广义的东西。它的限制始终是不确定的。那就是所谓的心理治疗学。

让我们解析「心理治疗学」这个字词。我们将会看到它被定义,根据某件东西,psycho的意思是psychology心理学。换句话说,至少能够被说的是一种材料,它的定义隶属于某种的争议。我的意思是,没有东西更加模糊,比起人们所要称为心理学的一致性。因为心理学的一致性仅是从一系列的指称,获得它的地位。有些指称似乎令人安心,因为它们跟它是外来的。换句话说,是跟它最为相反的东西,譬如,作为属于这个有机体。或是相反地,根据一系列的限制的建立。实际上,这些限制让所被获得的东西,譬如,处于某些试验性的情况,在实验室的环境里,是相当不适当的,确实是无法运用,当岌岌可危的是某件更加混淆的东西,被称为是「治疗」。

治疗。众所周知这会召唤起风格与迴响的这个多样性。它的这个中心被「暗示」的这个术语给予。至少那是它们的全部。这个行动所被提到的东西,某个个人的行动,正在以各种方式运用。这些方式确实无法宣称已经获得它们充分的定义。在这个水平线,在这些实践的极限,我们将会拥有这个一般性的观念,整体上所谓的,已经相当本明确定位作为是身体的技术。在另一方面,我们将会拥有、、、我的意思是,在许多文明里,被展现作为被传承的东西,以这个狂乱的形式,在我们的时代,人们很乐意强调,作为印度的技术,或是所谓的不同的瑜伽的形态。在另外一个极端,撒马利亚人的帮助,混淆地在这个领域迷失自己,在这些差距里,那是灵魂的提升;确实是!耐人寻味的是,将它看作是在广告中被从事,在精神分析结束时,被认为应该被产生的东西。这个耐人寻味的情感,被描述为某种善心的运用。

精神分析让我们开始,从目前是我们的唯一的坚定的时刻。它随着精神分析家而发生。这个「随着」在此必须被了解,以工具性的意义。或是至少我正在建议,你们应该以那种方式了解它。

这是如何发生,某件东西存在,它无法被定位,除了跟随一位精神分析家。如同亚里斯多德所说,根本不是因为我们应该说,他告诉我们,「灵魂在思想」,而是「人跟随他的灵魂在思想」,明确地指示著,就是这个意义应该被给予这个「随着」。换句话说,工具性的意义。耐人寻味地,当我在某个地方提到亚里斯多德的指称,事情似乎已经具有混淆的影响,对于读者,无可置疑地,是因为缺乏对于亚里斯多德的指称的体认。

随着精神分析家,精神分析贯穿进入这个岌岌可危的某件东西。假如无意识存在,假如我们定义它,至少表面上,经过这些年来,在这个领域的漫长的前进,进入无意识的领域,适当来说,就是要找到自己,在能够被定义为语言影响的层次。从这个意义,第一次,我们能够表达,这个影响能够用某种方式跟主体孤立出来。知识存在,因为在此知识是典型的语言影响构成的东西。知识被具体表现,而正在拥有这个辞说的主体却不知道它。从这个意义,知道这个知识,等于就是跟知识所包括的东西,处于共同维度。那就是要在这个知识里成为共犯。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com