Archive for March, 2013

Dream, imagination and existence

March 31, 2013

Dream, imagination and existence
夢,想像,與存在

Michel Foucault
米契、傅科

An Introduction to Ludwig Binswanger’s “Dream and Existence”
作為賓萬吉的「夢與存在」的導言

當我到達成年階段,我看見一道始終沒有保護欄杆的樓梯逐漸浮現並且擴大,在生與死之間分享的這道牆壁,被投注著獨特的分離的力量:這就是這個夢、、、現在看見黑暗消退,生命以嚴酷的寓言的禁欲主義的形態,變成是特殊力量的征服。憑藉這些力量,我們感覺自己被混淆地跨越過。但是我們僅是不完整地表達,欠缺忠誠,殘酷的感覺,與毅力。
Rene Char, Fureur et Mystere

在這些導言的頁數,我們並沒有打算依照耳熟能詳的序言的悖論,重新追蹤賓萬吉本人在「夢與存在」採取的途徑。無可之疑地,這個文本的困難暗示我們這樣做。但是它的困難對於它的省思的脈絡太過於基本,以致於無法被用熱誠的前言予以減緩,即使這位「心理學家」在省思的王國,始終總是王儲。思想的原初的形式是他們自己的導言:他們的歷史是他們容許的僅有的一種闡釋。而他們的命運是僅有的一種批判。

可是,我們企圖要在此詮釋的,也並不是在它的歷史當中。在令外一本著作,我們將嘗試定位存在的分析,在當代對於人的省思的發展當中,並且嘗試顯示,憑藉觀察朝向人類學的現象學的偏離,什麼基礎可被建議作為對人的具體的省思。在此,這些導言的談論僅有一個目的:為了呈現一個分析的形式,它的目標並不是成為一門哲學,它的目的並不是成為一門心理學,一種分析的形式作為根本,相關於各種具體,客觀,與試驗的知識。最後,這一種分析的形式的原則與方法,從一開始,僅是受到它們的目標的絕對的特權所決定:人,或者說,人的生命實存。

人類學的運行維度因此會受到限制。這樣一個事業將人類學與任何種類的心理的實證主體相提並論。後者宣稱要窮盡人的意義的內涵,憑藉「自然人」的觀念。它重新定位人類學在本體論省思的範圍之內。本體論的省思的主題是生命實存的存在。儘管如此,這種的人類學僅有顯示,人類的分析能夠被表達,根據生命實存的分析,它才能夠自圓其說。作為各種基礎的問題所在,它必須在後者定義前者的可能性的這些情況。作為振振有理的問題所在,它必須規劃人類學的適當維度,與自動自發的意義。

讓我們暫且這樣說(保留一些以後修正),人類僅僅就是本體論分析的實際而具體的內容,作為生命實存的朝向世界的超驗的結構。因此,這個基本的對立,跟實證知識,試驗性分析,與自然的省思的秩序的人類事實的任何智慧的對立,並沒有將人類學提到哲學沉思的某些先驗的形式。研究的主題是人類的「事實」,假如我們瞭解所謂的事實,並不是自然的宇宙的某個客觀的部分,而是一種存在的真實的內容。這種存在是活生生的自身,以及經驗的自身。它體認出它自己,或是喪失它自己,在一個既是它自己計畫的豐富,又是它的情境的「因素」。人類學因此稱它自己為「事實的科學」,憑藉以嚴謹的方式發展朝向世界的存在的生命實存的內容。拒絕這樣一種研究,乍然一看,是因為我們無法定義它,作為科學或是省思,因為它看起來既不像是實證的知識,又沒有供應先驗認知的內容,拒絕這樣的研究,等於是忽略這個計畫的基本意義。

我們覺得這是值得的,暫時追尋省思的這條途徑,並且看出人的現實界是否可能證明可以接近,僅是從外在於區別心理學與哲學。人類以其生命實存的方式,是否可能不是到達人的唯一工具。

在當代人類學,我們覺得賓萬吉的方法似乎是一條捷徑。他克服本體論與人類學的問題,憑藉直接探討具體的生命實存,探討它的發展與它的歷史的內容。因此,藉由生命實存的結構的分析,藉由具有某某名字,曾經旅行過某某歷史的生命實存,他繼續地來回移動,在人類學的形式與生命實存的本體論情況之間。他繼續地跨越過一條似乎難以劃定的分界線。或者說,他看見它不停地被跨越過,被一種具體的生命實存。在這種生命實存當中,夢與生命實存的真實極限被展示出來。因此,沒有一樣東西會是更加錯誤,比起在賓萬吉的分析當中,看出一種應用,將哲學與生命實存的觀念與方法,應用到臨床經驗的「資料」。對於他而言,問題是要憑藉回到具體的個人身上,啟明這個位置,生命實存的形式與情況表達的位置。正如人類學抗拒任何要將它區分為哲學與心理學的企圖,賓萬吉的生命實存的分析,避免任何先驗的區別本體論與人類學。我們避免這種區別,不去減少它,或讓它成為不可能。它重新被定位在一種研究的終端,這種研究的出發點的特性,並不是憑藉一種分界線,而是憑藉跟具體的生命實存的遭遇。

的確,這種遭遇,同樣確定的,這個地位,最後被指定給本體論的情況,會形成難題。但是我們將那個議題留給下次。我們僅是想要顯示,我們能夠立刻進入賓萬吉的各種分析,並且到達我們指明的東西, 憑藉的方法同樣原初,同樣基本,跟他自己到達他的病人的生命實存採用的方法。迂回地繞過海德格哲學,並不是某種入會的儀式,可能展開一道門,進入生命實存的分析的奧秘主義。哲學的問題在此,但是它們並不是預設的情況。

因此,我們可能免除不用一種總結「存在與時間」的導言,用好幾個段落。我們自由地隨意地前進。我們的建議僅是要在「夢與生命實存」的邊緣書寫。

這篇1930年的論文的主題—完全屬於生命實存的分析的賓萬吉的第一篇文本—比較不是夢與生命實存,而是生命實存作為對於它的本身的樣子,能夠在夢裡被解釋:夢的生命的模式的實存,在那裡,它用一種有意義的方式宣佈它自己。可是,這難道不是一種賭博?想要限定生命實存的實證內容,憑藉提到一種模式,在那個模式,它最少參與這個世界?假如夢確實包括對它是特別的意義,它們將會顯現它們自己,用一種特權的方式,在那個夢的時刻?當意義的網路似乎凝結,在那裡,證據籠罩,在那裡,存在的形式最為模糊?

依我們之見,這個悖論繼續「夢與生命實存」的主要興趣。賓萬吉給予夢的暗示的意義的特權,是加倍地重要。它定義分析的具體進展,朝向生命實存的基本形式:夢的分析並沒有停止在符號象徵的解釋的層次。相反地,從一個外在的解釋開始,這依舊僅是解釋的一種方法。它沒有逐漸演變成一門哲學,它能夠到達對於生命實存的結構的理解。夢的意義繼續運用它自己,從生命實存的模式的外表的秘密訊息。在另一方面,在這個文本裡,夢的經驗的這個具有特權的地位,默默地涵蓋想像的整個的人類學,它要求一種新的定義,對於意義與符號象徵之間的關係,意象與表達之間的關係。總之,一種新的方式來構想意義如何被展示。

在以下的幾頁,我們將會專注於這個難題的這兩個面向。隨著賓萬吉留置它們,不做澄清,情況愈加是如此。我們確實並沒有正在設法分期償還貸款。相反地,我們正在嘗試以這種方式表達「體認」出一種思想脈絡是什麼樣子?這種思想脈絡帶給我們它意在言外的東西,而又希望適當保持謙虛,對待它的歷史。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 71

March 29, 2013

Ethic 71

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

VI
第五章

On the moral law
论道德法则

THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
实践理性的批判

PHILOSOPHY IN THE BOUDOIR
闺房哲学

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
十戒

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
致罗马人的使徒书

What if we brought a simple soul into this lecture hall, set him down in the
front row, and asked him what Lacan means.

假如我们带进一个简单的灵魂进入这个演讲厅,请他坐在前排,然后询问他,拉康在说些什么。

The simple soul will get up, go to the board and will give the following
explanation: “Since the beginning of the academic year Lacan has been talking
to us about das Ding in the following terms. He situates it at the heart of
a subjective world which is the one whose economy he has been describing
to us from a Freudian perspective for years. This subjective world is denned
by the fact that the signifier in man is already installed at the level of the
unconscious, and that it combines its points of reference with the means of
orientation that his functioning as a natural organism of a living being also
gives him.”

这位简单的灵魂将会起来,走到讲台,然后发表以下的解释「自从学年的开始,拉康就一直谈论有关「物象」,用以下的术语。他定位它在一个主体世界的核心。这个世界的经济活动,好几年来,他一直跟我们描述,从弗洛依德的观点。这个主体的世界被涵盖在这个事实里:在人身上的这个能指已经被安装在无意识的层面,它组合它的指称点,用定向的工具,他作为一个生物生命的自然有机体的功用,给予他的定向。

Simply by writing it on the board and putting das Ding at the center, with
the subjective world of the unconscious organized in a series of signifying
relations around it, you can see the difficulty of topographical representation.
The reason is that das Ding is at the center only in the sense that it is excluded.
That is to say, in reality das Ding has to be posited as exterior, as the prehistoric
Other that it is impossible to forget – the Other whose primacy of position
Freud affirms in the form of something entfremdet, something strange to
me, although it is at the heart of me, something that on the level of the
unconscious only a representation can represent.

仅是凭借将它书写着黑板上,并且将「物象」放置在中心,拥有无意识的主体的世界。这个世界被组织者一系列的环绕它的能指化的关系。你们能够看出拓扑图形再现的这个困难。这个理由是,「物象」处于核心的意义仅是,它被排除。换句话说,在现实界,「物象」必须被提出,作为外在者,作为是史前的大他者,以致于不可能忘记。弗洛依德肯定大他者的地位的原初性,用某件异化entfremdet的形式,某件我觉得奇怪的东西,虽然在我的核心,某件在无意识的层面,仅有符号再现能够代表的东西。

1
I said “something that only a representation can represent.” Do not look
upon that as a simple pleonasm, for “represent” and “representation” here
are two different things, as the term Vorstellungsreprasentanz indicates. It is a
matter of that which in the unconscious represents, in the form of a sign,
representation as a function of apprehending – of the way in which every representation is represented insofar as it evokes the good that das Ding brings
with it.

我说,「 仅有符号再现能够代表的东西」。请不要将那个看着是一个简单的累赘词。因为「代表」与「符号再现」在此时两个不同的东西,如同Vorstellungsreprasentanz 这个术语所指示。这是一个在无意识代表的东西,用符号的形式,符号再现则是作为理解的功用,每个符号再现所被代表的方式,因为它召唤「物象」与之俱来的这个善行。

But to speak of “the good” is already a metaphor, an attribute. Everything
that qualifies representations in the order of the good is caught up in refraction,
in the atomized system that the structure of the unconscious facilitations
imposes, in the complex mechanism of a signifying system of elements. It is
only in that way that the subject relates to that which presents itself on the
horizon as his good. His good is already pointed out to him as the significant
result of a signifying composition that is called up at the unconscious level
or, in other words, at a level where he has no mastery over the system of
directions and investments that regulate his behavior in depth.

但是谈论到这个「善行」,已经是一个隐喻,一个属性。每样赋予符号再现特质的东西,在善行的秩序,被套陷在折射里,在原子化的系统里,无意识的各种设备的结构赋加的系统,在元素的能指化的系统的复杂机制里。仅有以这种方式,主体跟在那个领域呈现它自己作为善行的东西,扯上关系。他的善行已经被跟他指出,作为是能指化的组成的意义的结果。这个能指化的组成被召唤,在无意识的层面。或是换句话说,在那个层面,他对于规范他的甚度行为的指示与投注的系统,并无法掌控。

I will use a term here that only those who have present in their minds the
Kantian formulas of The Critique of Practical Reason will be able to appreciate.
I invite those who do not have them present in their minds or who have
not yet encountered what is, from more than one point of view, an extraordinary
book to make good their memories or their general knowledge.

我将使用一个术语,仅有那些在他们心灵里,拥有康德「实践理性的批判」的公式的那些人,才能够赏识这个术语。我邀请那些在心灵里并没有拥有它们的那些人,或还不曾遭遇一本特殊的书,从不仅一个观点,来改善他们的记忆或他们的一般知识。

It is impossible for us to make any progress in this seminar relative to the
questions posed by the ethics of psychoanalysis if you do not have this book
as a reference point.

我们不可能在这个研讨班有任何的进展,相对于精神分析伦理学提出的问题,假如你们没有拥有这本书,作为一个指称点。

So as to motivate you to look at it, let me emphasize that it is certainly
extraordinary from the point of view of its humor. To remain poised at the
limit of the most extreme conceptual necessity produces an effect of plenitude
and content as well as of vertigo, as a result of which you will not fail to sense
at some point in the text the abyss of the comic suddenly open up before you.
Thus I do not see why it is a door that you would refuse to open. We will in
any case see in a minute how we can open it here.

为了激发你们的动机来观看它,让我强调,从它的幽默的观点,它确实是特别的。在最极端的观念的必要的极限保持镇定,产生一种丰富,内容与晕眩的效果。由于这个结果,你们将一定会在文本的某个点感觉到,滑稽的深渊在你们面前展开。因此,我不明白为什么你们会拒绝打开这道门。无论如何,我们将会马上看出,我们在此如何能够打开它。

It is then, to be explicit, the Kantian term Wohl that I propose in order to
designate the good in question. It has to do with the comfort of the subject
insofar as, whenever he refers to das Ding as his horizon, it is the pleasure
principle that functions for him. And it does so in order to impose the law in
which a resolution of the tension occurs that is linked to something that,
using Freud’s phrase, we will call the successful lures – or, better yet, the
signs that reality may or may not honor. The sign here is very close to a
representative currency, and it suggests an expression that I incorporated
into one of my first lectures, that on physical causality, in a phrase that begins
one of its paragraphs, i.e., “more inaccessible to our eyes that are made for
the signs of the money changer.”

因此,简明地说,我建议的康德的术语Wohl ,为了指明这个受到质疑的这个善行。它必须跟主体的舒适有关系。因为每当他提到物象,作为他展开领域,那是快乐原则替他发挥功用。它这样做,为了赋加紧张的疏解发生在那里的法则。它跟用弗洛依德的术语来说,我们所谓的成功的引诱的东西有关系。或是,更好的是,现实或许尊崇或或不尊崇的符号有关系。在此的这个符号非常靠近一个符号再现的流通。它暗示一种表达,我合并进入我最初的一次演讲。在物理的因果律,用其中一个段落的开始的词语,譬如,「我们的眼睛更加无法靠近,因为我们的眼睛天生是看金钱改变物的符号。」

Let me carry the image further. “The signs of the money changer” are
already present at the base of the structure which is regulated according to
the law of Lust and Unlust, according to the rule of the indestructible Wunsch
that pursues repetition, the repetition of signs. It is in that way that the
subject regulates his initial distance to das Ding, the source of all Wohl at the
level of the pleasure principle, and which at its heart already gives rise to
what we may call das Gut des Objekts, the good object – following the Kantian
example, as the practitioners of psychoanalysis have not failed to do.

让我将这个意象更加深入。「金钱改变物的符号」已经被呈现在结构的底端,它被规范,依照欲望与没有欲望的法则,依照无法毁灭的追求重复的Wunsch的法则,符号的重复的法则。以那种方式,主体规范他的最初跟物象的距离,所有Wohl 的来源,在快乐的原则的层面。在它的核心,它已经产生我们所谓的好的客体,遵照康德的例子,如同精神分析的实践者一定会这样做。

On the horizon, beyond the pleasure principle, there rises up the Gut, das
Ding, thus introducing at the level of the unconscious something that ought
to oblige us to ask once again the Kantian question of the causa noumenon.
Das Ding presents itself at the level of unconscious experience as that which
already makes the law. Although it is necessary to give this verbal phrase,
“makes the law,” the emphasis it receives in one of the most brutal games of
elementary society and that is evoked in a recent book by Roger Vailland. It
is a capricious and arbitrary law, the law of the oracle, the law of signs in
which the subject receives no guarantee from anywhere, the law in relation
to which he has no Sicherung, to use another Kantian term. That is also at
bottom the bad object that Kleinian theory is concerned with.

在展开领域,超越快乐原则,出现这个物象,因此在无意识的层面,介绍某件应该强迫我们再次询问康德的问题 causa noumenon.. 物象呈现它自己在无意识经验的层面,作为已经是「制作法则」的东西。虽然这是必要的,给予这个文词的词语「制作法则」,它接收的强调,在初级社会的最残酷的遊戏。在最近的一本书,由罗杰、维拉德引用。这是一个任性而随意的法则,预言的法则,符号的法则。在那里,主体没有从任何地方接收保证。相关于这个法则,它并没有拥有Sicherung,,使用康德的另外一个术语。那也是追根究底,是克来恩理论念兹在兹的坏客体。

Although it must be said that at this level das Ding is not distinguished as
bad. The subject makes no approach at all to the bad object, since he is
already maintaining his distance in relation to the good object. He cannot
stand the extreme good that das Ding may bring him, which is all the more
reason why he cannot locate himself in relation to the bad. However much
he groans, explodes, curses, he still does not understand; nothing is articulated
here even in the form of a metaphor. He produces symptoms, so to
speak, and these symptoms are at the origin of the symptoms of defense.

虽然我们必须说,在这个层面,物象并没有辨认是坏蛋。主体根本没有接近这个坏蛋客体,因为他已经正在维持他的距离,跟这个善的客体的关系。他无法忍受物象可能带给他的这个极端的善。这尤其是这个理由,为什么他无法将他自己定位在跟这个坏有关。无论他如何呻吟,暴跳,诅咒,他依旧并不理解,在此没有一样东西被表达,即使是以隐喻的形式。他产生病征,可以这样说。这些病征处于防卫的病征的起源。

And how should we conceive of defense at this level? There is organic
defense. Here the ego defends itself by hurting itself as the crab gives up its
claw, revealing thereby the connection I developed between the motor system
and pain. Yet in what way does man defend himself that is different from an
animal practising self-mutilation? The difference is introduced here by means
of the signifying structuralization in the human unconscious. But the defense
or the mutilation that is proper to man does not occur only at the level of
substitution, displacement or metaphor – everything that structures its gravitation
with relation to the good object. Human defense takes place by means
of something that has a name, and which is, to be precise, lying about evil.

我们应该如何构想这个层次的防卫。有机体的防卫。在此,自我防卫它自己,凭借伤害它自己,如同螃蟹放弃它的脚爪,因此显露我发展的这个关联,处于这个动力的系统与痛苦之间的关联。可是,人用什么不同于动物的实践自我切除的方式防卫他自己? 在此被介绍的差异,凭借能指化的结构主义化,在人类的无意识。但是这种防卫,或人本体的切除,并没有发生在替换,代换或隐喻的层次。每样架构它的引力的东西,相对于这个善的客体。人类的防卫发生,凭借某件具有名字的东西,确实地说,那就是对于邪恶说谎。

At the level of the unconscious, the subject lies. And this lying is his way
of telling the truth of the matter. The ορθός λόγος of the unconscious at this
level – as Freud indicates clearly in the Entwurf in relation to hysteria – is
expressed as πρώτον ψεύδος, the first he.

在无意识的层面,,主体说谎。这个谎言是他道出事情的真理的方式。在这个层面,无意识的ορθός λόγος被表达,作为第一个他,如同弗洛依德在有关歇斯底里症的「大纲」清楚指示灯。

Given the amount of time I have been discussing the Entwurf withyou, do
I need to remind you of the example that he gives of a female patient called
Emma, whom he doesn’t mention elsewhere and who is not the Emma of the
Stuthes on Hysteria? It is the case of a woman who has a phobia about going
into stores by herself because she is afraid people will make fun of her on
account of her clothes.

假如考虑到我一直跟你们讨论这个「轮廓」,我有需要提醒你们这个例子,他给予一位名叫艾玛的女性病人的例子。他在别的地方并没有提到她。她并不是「歇斯底里症研究」的那位艾玛。在这个个案,这个女人害怕单独进入商店,因为他害怕人们会嘲笑她,因为他的衣服。

Everything is related to an early memory. At the age of twelve she went
into a store and the shop assistants apparently laughed at her clothes. One of
them attracted her and even stirred her in some strange way in her emerging
puberty. Behind that we find a causal memory, that of an act of aggression
she suffered in a shop at the hands of a Greis. The French translation, modeled
on the English, which was itself particularly careless, says “shopkeeper”
– but an old fogey is involved, an elderly man, who pinched her somewhere
under her dress in a very direct manner. This memory thus echoes the idea
of a sexual attraction experienced in the other.

每样东西都跟早期的记忆有关。在12岁时,她进入一家商店,店员明显地嘲笑她的衣服。其中一位店员吸引她,甚至用某种奇怪的方式,在她刚进入青春期时,让她激动。在那个背后,我们找到一个因果的记忆,一个侵凌性的行动的记忆,她在商店遭受痛苦的记忆,在一位Greis的手中。这个词语的法文翻译,模拟英文,它的本身是粗心,粗心的店员。但是牵涉到一个老派人物,一位老人。他直接地捏着她在身体内部。这个记忆因此回响性的吸引到这个观念,在另外一人身上经验到。

All that remains in the symptom is attached to clothes, to the mockery of
her clothes. But the path of truth is suggested in a masked form, in the
deceiving Vorstellung of her clothes. In an opaque way, there is an allusion to
something that did not happen on the occasion of the first memory, but on
the second. Something that wasn’t apprehended in the beginning is apprehended
retroactively, by means of the deceitful transformation – proton pseudos.
Thus in that way we have confirmation of the fact that the relationship
of the subject to das Ding is marked as bad – but the subject can only formulate
this fact through the symptom.

在这个病征一切剩余的东西都跟衣服联系一块,跟她的衣服的嘲讽联系一块。但是真理的途径以一个被遮蔽的方式暗示,用她的衣服的欺骗的表象Vorstellung。用一个模糊的方式,提到某件并不是发生在第一次记忆的场合的事情,而是在第二次记忆。起初某件事情并没有被理解,现在反弹地被理解,凭借欺骗性的转变proton pseudos.。 因此以那种方式,我们拥有这个事实的证词:主体跟物象的关系被标记为不好,但是主体仅能够说明这个事实,经由这个病征。

That is what the experience of the unconscious has forced us to add to our
premises when we take up again the question of ethics as it has been posed
over the centuries, and as it has been bequeathed us in Kantian ethics, insofar
as the latter remains, in our thought if not in our experience, the point to
which these questions have been brought.

那就是为什么无意识的经验强迫我们增加到我们的假设,当我们再一次从事伦理学的问题,依照几世纪来,它曾经被提出,依照它在康德伦理学,曾经被遗传。因为后者始终保持在这个店,这些问题被提出的这个点,在我们的思想,甚至在我的经验。

The way in which ethical principles are formulated when they impose
themselves on consciousness or when about to emerge from preconsciousness,
as commandments, has the closest relationship to the second principle
introduced by Freud, namely, the reality principle.

伦理的原则被说明的方式,当它们赋加它们自己在意识,或是当即将从前意识出现,作为十戒。它跟弗洛依德介绍的第二原则有密切关系,换句话说,现实原则。

The reality principle is the dialectical correlative of the pleasure principle.
One is not simply, as one at first imagines, the application of the consequence
of the other; each one is really the correlative of the other. Withiout this
neither one would make any sense. Once again we are led to deepen the
reality principle in a way I suggested in connection with the experience of
paranoia.

现实原则是快乐原则的辩证的相关。如同我们起初想象,前者不仅应用后者的结果,每一个原则确实就是另外一个的相关。假如没有这个相关,没有一个具有意义。再一次,我们被引导深化现实原则,用我建议的方式,跟偏执狂的经验。

As I have already told you, the reality principle isn’t simply the same as it
appears in the Entwurf, the testing that sometimes takes place at the level of
the ω system or the Wahmehmungsbevmsstsein system. It doesn’t function only
on the level of that system in which the subject, probing in reality that which
communicates the sign of a present reality, is able to adjust correctly the
deceptive emergence of the Vorstellung as it is provoked by repetition at the
level of the pleasure principle. It is something more. Reality faces man – and
that is what interests him in it – both as having already been structured and
as being that which presents itself in his experience as something that always
returns to the same place.

如同我已经告诉你们,现实原则不仅跟它出现在「大纲」相同,这个测试有时发生在Wahmehmungsbevmsstsein 的系统的ω 系统的层面。在那个系统,主体在现实中探测沟沟一个目前现实的符号的东西,它能够正确地调整Vorstellung
欺骗性的出现,如同它被快乐原则的层面的重复召唤。不仅是如此。人类面对现实解,那就是为什么他对它感到興趣。既是作为已经被架构,而且作为是呈现它自己在他的经验,作为是总是回到相同地方的东西。

I pointed it out when I was discussing the case of President Schreber. The
function of the stars in the delirious system of that exemplary subject shows
us, just like a compass, the polar star of the relation of man to the real. The
history of science makes something similar seem plausible. Isn’t it strange,
paradoxical even, that it was the observations of shepherds and Mediterranean
sailors of the return to the same place of an object which might seem to
interest human experience least, namely, a star, that revealed to the farmer
when he should sow his seeds? Think of the important role that the Pleiades
played for Mediterranean navigators. Isn’t it remarkable that it was the
observation of the return of the stars to the very same places that, repeated
over the centuries, led to the structuralization of reality by physics, which is
what we mean by science? The fruitful laws involved came down to earth
from the sky, to Galileo from the physics of the peripatetic philosophers.
However, from that earth, where the laws of the heavens had been rediscovered,
Galilean physics returned to the sky by demonstrating that the stars are
by no means what we had believed them to be, that they are not incorruptible,
that they are subject to the same laws as the terrestrial globe.

我指出它,当我正在讨论苏瑞伯庭长的个案。在那个作为典范的主体的谵妄系统,那些星辰的功用跟我们显示,就像罗盘,人跟实在界的关系的北极星。科学的历史让某件类似的东西显得似乎合理。这难道不是奇怪,甚至是矛盾吗?牧羊人与地中海的水手的观察,他们回答一个目标的相同的地方,这个目标,人类的经验根本不感興趣的目标。换句话说,一颗星星,对农夫显示他什么时候应该播种。请你们思考一下这个重要的角色,对于地中海的航海者,北斗星扮演的角色。它们促成物理学的现实界的结构化。这就是我们所谓的科学吗?牵涉到这个成果的法则从天空落实地面,从亚里斯多德学派的哲学家的物理学,到伽利略。可是,从那个地名,在那里,天上掉法则曾经重新被发现。伽利略带物理学回到天空,他证明星辰绝非是我们曾经相信的那个样子。它们并非不可腐败,它们跟地面的地球一样,都隶属于相同的法则。

Furthermore, if a decisive step in the history of science was already taken
by Nicolas of Cuse, who was one of the first to formulate the idea that the
stars were not incorruptible, we know something else, we know that they
might not be in the same place.

而且,假如在科学的历史上,一个决定性的步骤,已经由库斯的尼古拉所採取。他是最早一位说明这个观念:星辰并非不可腐败。我们某件别的东西,我们知道,星辰并不是总是在相同的地方。

Thus that first demand that made us explore the structuralization of the
real down through history in order to produce a supremely efficient and
supremely deceptive science, that first demand is the demand of das Ding –
it seeks whatever is repeated, whatever returns, and guarantees that it will
always return, to the same place – and it has driven us to the extreme position
in which we find ourselves, a position where we can cast doubt on all places,
and where nothing in that reality which we have learned to disrupt so admirably
responds to that call for the security of a return.

因此第一个要求强迫我们探索自古以来的实在界的结构,为了产生一个非常有效而是非常欺骗性的科学。那一个要求就是「物象」的要求。它寻找任何被重复的东西,任何回转而且保证它总是会回转的东西,回到相同的地方。它曾经驱使我们到极端的位置,在那里,我们发现我们自己,处于一个位置,在那里,我们对于所有的地方都给予怀疑。在那里,我们已经学会如此高明地中断的那个现实界,没有一样东西回应回转的安全的那个呼唤。

Yet it is to this search for something that always returns to the same place
that what is known as ethics has attached itself over the centuries. Ethics is
not simply concerned with the fact that there are obligations, that there is a
bond that binds, orders, and makes the social law. There is also something
that we have frequently referred to here by the term “the elementary structures
of kinship” – the elementary structures of property and of the exchange
of goods as well. And it is as a result of these structures that man transforms
himself into a sign, unit, or object of a regulated exchange in a way that
Claude Levi-Strauss has shown to be fixed in its relative unconsciousness.、
That which over generations has presided over this new supernatural order
of the structures is exactly that which has brought about the submission of
man to the law of the unconscious. But ethics begins beyond that point.

可是,它回应这个对某件东西的寻找,这个东西总是回到相同的位置。过去几世纪来,众所周知作为伦理学的东西跟它自己连接一块。伦理学是一种默契,用来约束,规范,及制定法则。也有某件东西,我们在此经常提到,使用这个术语「亲属的基本结构」,财产的基本结构于货物的交换的基本结构。由于这些结构的结果,人们将他们自己转变成为一个受到规范的交换的一个符号,单位,或客体,用的方式,克劳德、史特劳斯曾经显示是固定的方式,在它的相对的无意识。过去几世代来,曾经掌控这个结构的新的超自然的秩序的东西,确实就是促成人屈服于无意识的法则。但是伦理学从超越那个点开始。

It begins at the moment when the subject poses the question of that good
he had unconsciously sought in the social structures. And it is at that moment,
too, that he is led to discover the deep relationship as a result of which that
which presents itself as a law is closely tied to the very structure of desire. If
he doesn’t discover right away the final desire that Freudian inquiry has discovered
as the desire of incest, he discovers that which articulates his conduct
so that the object of his desire is always maintained at a certain distance. But
this distance is not complete; it is a distance that is called proximity, which
is not identical to the subject, which is literally close to it, in the way that one
can say that the Nebenmensch that Freud speaks of as the foundation of the
thing is his neighbor.

它开始于当主体提出那个善的问题,他曾经无意识地在社会的结构里寻求。就在那个时刻,他也被引导去发现那个深度关系。由于那个结果,呈现它自己作为法则的东西,跟欲望的结构息息相关。假如他没有立刻发现这个最后的欲望,弗洛依德的研究曾经发现的最后的欲望,作为是乱伦的欲望。他发现,那个清楚表达他的行为的东西,他的欲望的客体总是被维持在某个距离。但是这个距离并不完整,这是一个所谓的邻近的距离。它跟几乎靠近它的主体并不相同。这种方式,我们能够说,弗洛依德提到的这个Nebenmensch ,作为是这个物象的基础,那就是他的邻人。

If at the summit of the ethical imperative something ends up being articulated
in a way that is as strange or even scandalous for some people as “Thou
shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” this is because it is the law of the relation
of the subject to himself that he make himself his own neighbor, as far as his
relationship to his desire is concerned.

假如在伦理命令的颠峰,某件东西结束时被表达,用同样奇怪,或是甚至同样丑闻的东西,对于某些人,那就是「爱你的邻居如同你自己」。这是因为主体跟他自己的关系,他让他自己成为他自己的邻居,就他跟他的欲望的关系而言。

My thesis is that the moral law is articulated with relation to the real as
such, to the real insofar as it can be the guarantee of the Thing. That is why
I invite you to take an interest in what I have called the high point of the
crisis in ethics, and that I have designated from the beginning as linked to
the moment when The Critique of Practical Reason appeared.

我的主题是, 道德法则被表达,跟实在界本身的关系,跟实在界,因为它会是物象的保证。那就是为什么我邀请你们感到興趣,对于我所谓的论理学的危机的高点。我从一开始就指明它,作为是跟这个时刻息息相关,当「实践理性的批判」出现时。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

德勒兹:内在性

March 25, 2013

In his novels, Alexander lernet-Holenia places the event in an in-between time that could engulf entire armies. The singularities and the events that constitute a life coexist with the accidents of the life that corresponds to it, but they are neither grouped nor divided in the same way.
王立秋
亚历山大•莱尔内特-荷勒尼亚在其小说中就把事件置于能够吞没所有军队的时间之间。建构非特指生命的独特性和事件与与之非特指生命相关的特指(the)生命之事故并存,但二者并不以相同的方式划分归类。

雄伯
亚历山大•莱尔内特-荷勒尼亚在其小说中,就把事件置于能够让千军万马灰飞烟灭的中介时间里。建构非特指生命的独异性和事件,与跟它对应的特指的生命之事故共同存在,但二者的聚集与分裂的方式并不相同。

They connect with one another in a manner entirely different from how individuals connect.
It even seems that a singular life might do without any individuality, without any other
concomitant that individualizes it.

王立秋
它们一种与个体相互联结的方式截然不同的方式相互联结。看起来,非特指的独特生命甚至可以脱离个(体)性而存在,而无需任何使之个体化的伴随物。

雄伯
它们互相联接的方式,跟个体之间的联接方式,完全迴异。似乎,一个独异性的生命可以免除不用个体性,免除不用任何其他让它个体化的伴随物。

For example, very small children all resemble one another and have hardly any individuality, but they have singularities: a smile, a gesture, a funny face—not subjective qualities.
王立秋
比如说,很小的孩子彼此相像且少有个性,但他们却有独特性:一个微笑,一个姿态,一个鬼脸——而这些并非主体的特质(qualities)。

雄伯
比如说,小孩子彼此相像,而且几乎没有个体性,但他们却有独异性:一个微笑,一个姿态,一个鬼脸——而这些并非主体性的特质。

Small children, through all their sufferings and weaknesses, are infused with an immanent life that is pure power and even bliss.
王立秋
小孩子,通过其苦难与孱弱,被注入了非特指的内在生命,后者是纯粹的力量甚至是极乐。

雄伯
小孩子,通过其苦难与孱弱,被注入了非特指的内在生命,后者是纯粹的力量,甚至是幸福。

The indefinite aspects of in a life lose all indetermination to the degrees that they fill out a plane of immanence or, what amounts to the same thing, to the degree that they constitute the elements of a transcendental field ( individual life, on the other hand, remains inseparable from empirical determinations。)
王立秋
非特指生命不定的面貌失去了所有定项(determination)到了(这些面貌)已超出内在性的平面的程度,或者换个说法,到了构建出超验领域之要素的程度(与此相对地,个体生命仍未与经验的定项相分离)。

雄伯
在非特指生命的那些非特指面向,丧失所有的非决定因素。甚至它们填补内在性的层面,或甚至填补相等于相同之物的东西。甚至,它们构成超验领域的各种要素(在另一方面,个体的生命,跟经验的决定因素,始终无法分开。)

The indefinite as such is the mark not of an empirical indetermination but of a determination by immanence or a transcendental determinability. The indefinite article is the indetermination of the person only because it is determination of the singular.
王立秋
如此的无定性(the indefinite)并非某一经验定项的标记,而是某种出自内在性的定项,或某种超验的决定性(determinability)的标记。不定冠词即人的不确定性,这只是因为它是独特性的定项。

雄伯
非特指的生命本身,并非是某一经验的非决定因素的标记,而是受到内在性的决定因素的标记,或是超验的决定因素的标记。A Life 的这个不定冠词(A),仅是因为它是这个独异性的决定因素,才是这个人的非决定因素。

The One is not the transcendent that might contain immanence but the immanent contained within a transcendental field. One is always the index of a multiplicity: an event, a singularity, a life…
王立秋
特指的一个(the One)并非可包括内在性的超越者,而只是为超验领域所涵盖的超越者。一则永远是某种多样性的索引:一个事件,一种独特性,一个生命……

雄伯
特指的「这个一」并不是可能包含内在性的这个超验物,而是被包含在超验领域的这个内在物。「一」总是多重性的指标:一个事件,一个独异性,一个非特指生命、、、

Although it is always possible to invoke a transcendent that falls outside the plane of immanence, or that attributes immanence to itself, all transcendence is constituted solely in the flow of immanent consciousness that belong to the plane. Transcendence is always a product of immanence.

王立秋
尽管使超越者超出内在性平面或使内在性归于自身总是可能的,但是,一切超越性都仅由属此平面的内在意识流所建构。[5]超越性永远是内在性的产物。

雄伯
虽然我们总是有可能,召唤一个掉落在内在性层面之外的超验物,或是将内在性归属于它自身的超验物,但是仅有在属于那个层面的内在性意识到流动当中,一切的超验才被构成。超验总是内在性的产物。
(超验物与超验不同;前者在经验世界,而后者在内在性,在超验领域。)

A life contains only virtuals. it is made up of virtualities, events, singularities. What we call virtual is not something that lacks reality but something that is engaged in a process of actualization following the plane that gives it to its particular reality.

王立秋
非特指的生命只包含虚存物(virtuals)。它为虚拟性(virtuality)、事件、独特性所建构。我们称之为虚存的不乏现实性,却是那跟随给它特定现实性的平面,参与实在化进程之物。

雄伯
非特指生命仅是包含虚拟物,它由各种虚拟之物,事件,独异性等组成。我们所谓的虚拟物,并不是欠缺现实性的某件东西,而是从事于实践的某件东西,这个实践跟随着赋予它的特别的现实性的层面。

The immanent event is actualized in a state of things and of the lived that make it happen. The plane of immanence is itself actualized in an object and a subject to which it attributes itself.
王立秋
内在事件在(属于)事物及使之发生地生者的国度(state)现实化。内在性平面自身也在客体及其归属的主体中实在化。

雄伯
内在性事件在事情的状态里被实践,在让它发生的生活过的事情的状态里被实践。内在性的层面本身被实践,在它归属自己的属性的客体与主体里。

But however inseparable an object and a subject may be from their actualization, the plane of immanence is itself virtual, so long as the events that populate it are virtualities.
王立秋
但无论客体与主体是如何地不可与其实在化分离,内在性平面自身始终是虚存的,只要居于其间的事件还是虚拟性的。

雄伯
但是客体与主体,跟其实践,无论多么难解难分,内在性的层面本身是虚拟的,只要驻居它那里的事件是各种虚拟之物。

Events or singularities give to the plane all their virtuality, just as the plane of immanence gives virtual events their full reality. The event considered as non-actualized *indefinite) is lacking in nothing.
王立秋
事件与独特性给这个平面以其完全的虚拟性,正如内在性平面给虚存事件以其完整的现实性。所谓非-实在化(不定)的事件不存在匮乏之处。

雄伯
事件或独异性将它们一切的虚拟性,给予这个层面,正如内在性的这个层面,赋予虚拟事件它们的全部的现实性。被认为是没有被实践的非特指性的事件,样样不欠缺。

It suffices to put it in relation to its concomitants: a transcendental field, a plane of immanence, a life, singularities.

王立秋
只要把它置于与其伴随物的关系中就已经足够:一个超验领域,一个内在性平面,一个生命,诸独特性。

雄伯
只要将事件,跟事件的伴随之物扯上关系,就绰绰有余:一个超验领域,一个内在性层面,一个非特指生命,各种的独异性。

A wound is incarnated or actualized in a state of things or life ; but it is itself a pure virtuality on the plane of immanence that leads us into a life. My wound existed before me; not a transcendence of the wound as higher actuality, but its immanence as a virtuality always within a milieu (plane or field).
王立秋
创伤在事物或生命的国度肉身化或实在化;但它自身就是引导我们走向无定生命的内在性平面之上的一种纯粹的虚拟性。我的创伤在我之前就已经存在:不是作为更高实在性的创伤之超越性,而是其作为永居其(平面或领域)中的虚拟性。

雄伯
在事情的状态,或生命的状态,创伤被具体表现或实践,但是在引导我们进入非特指生命的内在性层面,创伤本身是纯粹的虚拟。我的创伤比我早先存在,不是作为更高的实践的创伤的超验,而是作为虚拟之物的它的内在性,总是在一个环境(层面或领域)之内。

[6]在界定超验领域之内在性的虚存物与使之实在化使之转变为超越之物(something transcendent)的可能形式之间,存在很大差别。

[注]由于急着了结以前拖欠的东西,没有细查出处校对术语,大家多多指正……自Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence Essay on A Life, Translated by Anne Boyman, ZONE BOOKS,2001,pp.25-34.

——————————————————————————–

[1] “就像我们把光反射回那些使之传出的表面,倘若光不受反射地经过,它也就不可能显现”(亨利•柏格森:《材料与记忆》,纽约:区域图书,1988年版,第36页)。

[2] 参见让-保罗•萨特,他假定了一个无主体——此主体与客观、绝对而内在的意识无涉——的超验领域:相应于此,主客体均为“超越者”(《自我的超越性》,巴黎:弗朗,1966年版,第74-87页)。至于詹姆士,见大卫•拉布亚德的分析,《威廉•詹姆士处的意识密流》,载《哲学》第46期(1995年4月号)。

[3] 这已经出现在《自然哲学》第二版序言中:“纯粹运动的机制绝非恒定,而是过程,并非存在,而是生命”(《第一哲学选集》,巴黎:弗朗,1964年版,第274页)。关于费希特处生命的概念,参见《极乐生活指南》,巴黎:奥比埃,1944年版以及马提雅尔•格鲁尔特的评论。

[4] 狄更斯:《我们共同的朋友》,纽约:牛津大学出版社,1989年版,第443页。

[5] 即使是埃德蒙•胡塞尔也承认:“世界的存在对意识来说必需是超验的,即使是在起源的依据之中,且必须保持对它的超验。但这并不改变这样一个事实,即一切超越性仅由与生命不可分割的意识之生命(life of consciousness)所建构。”(《笛卡尔式的沉思》,巴黎:弗朗,1947年版第52页)。而这将是萨特文本的起点。

[6] 参见乔•布苏克:《资本》,巴黎:书圈,1955年版。

德勒兹:内在性生命

March 24, 2013

[法]吉尔•德勒兹 著
王立秋 试译

What is a transcendental field? It can be distinguished from experience in that it doesn’t refer to an object or belong to a subject (empirical representation).

何谓超验领域?通过这样的经验我们可以将其辨识出来,即,它既不指涉某个客体也不属于某一主体(基于经验的再现)。

雄伯说
何谓超验领域?超验经验领域能够被区别,跟经验并不相同,因为它并没有不指涉某个客体,也不属于某一主体(基于经验的再现)。
(经验会指涉客体,属于主体,而超验邻域则没有这种情况)。

It appears therefore as a pure stream of a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflective impersonal consciousness, a qualitative duration of consciousness without a self.
王立秋译
因此,超验领域是作为纯主体意识流,作为前反思的客观意识,作为无自我的意识质量区间(a qualitative duration of consciousness)而出现的。

雄伯
因此,超验领域出现,作为非属于主体的意识流,作为具有反思能力之前的无人称的意疏隔一段时间的彭前来看我,带来一些影片及余德慧的文稿。其中有一篇关于德勒兹的内在性生命,余德慧是用阐述方式进行。为了看懂他在说些什么,我在网络下载到一篇英文版及第一章中译。对照之余,不禁自己也将它译成中文,以求甚解。

德勒兹:《内在性:非特指的一个生命》
2009-05-25 14:05:56
内在性:非特指的一个生命
IMMANENCE: A LIFE

识,作为不具自性的意识的品质逗留期间。
(纯主体意识流,与非属于主体的意识流,意思刚好颠倒。)

It may seem curious that the transcendental be defined by such immediate givens: we will speak of a transcendental empiricism in contrast to everything that makes up the world of the subject and object.

王立秋译
这看起来很奇怪,即超验之物为这样的直接给定之物所界定:我们将谈论那种与组成主客体世界的一切事物相对的超验的经验论。

雄伯
耐人寻味的是,这个超验邻域竟然是由如此当下的指称来定义:我们将会谈论一种超验的经验论,对比于组成主体与客体的世界的一切事物。
(超验的经验论,与组成主体与客体的世界的一切事物并不相同,可作为对比。)

There is something wild and powerful in this transcendental empiricism that of course not the element of sensation ( simple empiricism),for sensation is only a break within the flow of absolute consciousness.

王立秋译
在这种超验的经验论中,存在某种狂野、有力之物,当然,这并非感觉(简单经验论)的要素,因为感觉不过是绝对意识流中的一个裂缝。

雄伯
在这种超验的经验论中,存在某种狂野、有力之物,当然,此物并非感知(简单经验论)的要素,因为感知不过是绝对意识流中的一个裂缝。

It is, rather, however close two sensations may be, the passage from one to the other as becoming, as increase or decrease in power ( virtual quantity).

王立秋译

相反,它是从一种感觉到另一种感觉之间的通道(passage),而无论两种感觉如何相近,它表现为生成、以及力量上的增减(虚拟的量)。

雄伯
相反地,无论两种感知是多么靠近,这个狂野的有力之物指示从某个感知到另外一种感知的经过,作为是生成,作为是力量的增加或减少(虚拟的数量)

Must we then define the transcendental field by a pure immediate consciousness with neither object nor self, as a movement that neither begins or ends?( Even Spinoza’s conception of the passage or quantity of power still appeals to conscious.)

王立秋译
如此说来,我们是否必须用那无客体亦无自我,作为无始无终之运动而出现的纯粹的直接意识,来界定超验领域呢?(甚至斯宾诺莎关于此通道的概念及力量的量化,也不得不诉诸意识。)

雄伯
因此,我们难道一定要定义超验的领域,凭借既无客体,又无自性的纯粹当下的意识?将它定义为既没有开始,也无结束的运动?(即使史宾诺莎的经过或力量属量的观念,依旧诉诸于意识.)

But the relation of the transcendental field to consciousness is only conceptual one. Consciousness becomes a fact only when a subject is produced at the same time as the object, both being outside the field and appearing as “transcendents.”

王立秋
然而,超验领域与意识的关系,只是概念上的。只有主体与其客体同时被生产,且都
外在于超验领域,并显现作为“超越者(transcendents)”时,意识才成为一个事实。

雄伯
然而,超验领域与意识的关系,只是概念上的关系。只有主体与客体同时被生产,这个客体既外在于超验领域,又显现作为“超验物(transcendents)”时,意识才成为一个事实。

Conversely, as long as consciousness traverses the transcendental field at an infinite speed everywhere diffused , nothing is able to reveal it.

王立秋
相反,只要意识以无限的速度穿越超验领域四处扩散,那么,就没有什么能使它显现。

雄伯
相反地,只要意识以无限的速度,四处扩散地穿越超验领域,那么,就没有什么东西能够揭示意识。

It is expressed, in fact, only when it is reflected on a subject that refers it to objects.
王立秋

[1]事实上,只有反映在把意识指向客体的主体身上,意识才得到表达。

雄伯
[事实上,只有当意识被反映在主体身上,这个主体将意识指向客体时,意识才得到表达。

That is why the transcendental field cannot be defined by the consciousness that is coextensive with it, but removed from any revelation.

王立秋
这就是为什么超验领域不能为与之共存的意识所界定而远离一切显现。

雄伯
这就是为什么超验领域不能为与之共存的意识所界定,而必须必须被移除,无法被揭示。

The transcendent is not the transcendental .Were it not for consciousness the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes all transcendence of the subject and of the object.

王立秋
超越者并非超验之物。如果不是因为意识,超验领域将被界定为一个纯粹的内在性平面(a pure plane of immanence),因为它回避一切主体和客体的超越性(transcendental)。

雄伯
超验物并非超验领域。如果不是因为意识,超验领域将被定义为一个纯粹的内在性平面,因为它闪避主体和客体的所有的超验性。

Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject.
王立秋
[2]绝对的内在性是自在的(in itself):它不在某物之中也不对某物存在;它既不依赖于客体,也不归属于主体。

雄伯
绝对的内在性存在于它的自身,它并不存在于某物,针对某物,它并没有依靠一个客体,或归属于一个主体。

In Spinoza,immanence is not immanence to substance; rather, substance and modes are in immanence.
王立秋
在斯宾诺莎那里,内在性并非对实体之内在性(并非内在于实体);相反,实体和样式,都处在内在性中。
雄伯
在斯宾诺莎那里,内在性并非归属于实体之内在性;相反,实体和样式,都处在内在性中。

When the subject or the object falling outside the plane of immanence is taken as a universal subject or as any object to which immanence is attributed, the transcendental is entirely denatured, for it then simply redoubles the empirical (as with Kant), immanence is disturbed, for it then finds itself enclosed in the transcendent.
王立秋
当超出内在性平面的主体或客体被视作普遍的主体或任一具备内在性的客体之时,超验之物也就完全变性,因为这样一来它就只是简单地强化经验之物;内在性也被扭曲,因为这样一来,内在性也就被封存于超越者内部。

雄伯
当掉落在内在性层面之外的主体或客体,被认为是普遍性的主体,或是被归属具有内在性的客体时,这个超验的领域完全丧失其特性。因为这样一来它仅是加倍这个经验之物(如同康德的做法),内在性因此受到扰乱,因为它因此发现它自己被封闭于这个超验物里。

Immanence is not related to Something as a unity superior to all things or to a Subject as an act that brings about a synthesis of things: it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence.
王立秋
内在性与作为统一体而优先于一切事物的某物,与作为对事物进行综合的行动之主体均无关:只有在内在性出对自身而言之外不再对任何事物内在时,我们才能谈论内在性平面。

雄伯
内在性跟作为优越于一切事物的统一体的某物并没有关系,跟作为导致事物综合的行动的主体也没有关系。只有当内在性不再是归属于任何事物的内在性,而仅是归属于它自身的内在性,我们才能够谈论到内在性的层面。

No more than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness can the plane of immanence be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it.
= The plane of immanence cannot be defined by a subject or an object that is able to contain it, any more than the transcendental field is defined by consciousness.
王立秋
超验领域不能用意识来界定,也不能由能够包含它的主体或客体来定义。
雄伯
内在性的层面无法能够由包含它的主体或客体来定义,正如超验的领域不由意识来定义。

We will say of pure immanence that it is A Life,and nothing else. It is not immanence to life ,but the immanent that is in nothing is itself is a life.

王立秋
因此我们说,纯粹的内在性就是非特指的一个生命,而非其他。它亦非对生命的内在性(内在于生命),不内在于任何事物的内在性本身就是一个生命。

雄伯
关于纯粹内在性,我们的说法是:它是个「生命体」,不是别的。它并非是属于生命的内在性, 而是不处于任何事物之中的这个内在物,本身就是生命体。

A life is the immanence of immanence, absolute immanence: it is complete power, complete bliss.
王立秋
非特指的一个生命是内在性之内在性,绝对的内在性:它是完整的力,完整的极乐(bliss)。

雄伯
生命体就是内在性的内在性,绝对的内在性。它是完整的力量,完整的幸福。

It is to the degree that he goes beyond the aporias of the subject and the object that Johann
Fichte, in his last philosophy, presents the transcendental filed as a life, no longer dependent on a Being or submitted to an Act –it is an absolute immediate consciousness whose very activity no longer refers to a being but ceaselessly posed a in a life.
王立秋
约翰•费希特在其晚期哲学中已经达到了这样的程度,他超越主客体的两难困境而把超验领域表述为不再依赖于某一存在不再屈从于某一行动的一个生命——它是一种纯粹的直接意识,其运动不再指向某个存在,而是无休止地以一个生命的身份出现。

雄伯
在他的晚期哲学,约翰•费希特呈现这个超验的存在,作为一种生命体。他甚至超越作为主体与客体的困境。这个生命体不再依赖一种「生命实存」或屈从于一种「行动」–这是一种绝对的当下的意识。这个意识的活动不再涉及一个生命实存,而是在生命体当中不停地被提出。

The transcendental field then becomes a genuine plane of immanence that re-introduces Spinozism into the heart of the philosophical process.

王立秋
[3]于是,超验领域就变成了内在性的真实平面,把斯宾诺莎主义再次引入哲学进程的核心当中。

雄伯
这个超验领域因此就成为内在性的真诚层面,它将斯宾诺莎思想重新介绍进入哲学的过程的核心。

Did Maine de Biran not go through something similar in his “last philosophy” (the one he was too tired to bring to fruition) when he discovered beneath the transcendence of effort, an absolute immanent life? The transcendental field is defined by a plane of immanence,and the plane of immanence of a life.
王立秋
在梅恩•德•比朗《最后的哲学》(在这项计划上,他太过厌倦以至于没有取得成果)中,当他在努力地超越性下发现绝对内在的生命时,难道他没有说过类似的话么?超验领域为内在性平面所界定,内在性平面则为非特指的生命所界定。

雄伯
梅恩•德•比朗在他的《最后的哲学》,当他在努力的超验底下,发现一种绝对的内在的生命,他难道不是曾经历某件类似的东西(这个东西,他已经心力交瘁,没有追根究底)?这个超验的领域被定义,被内在性的层面与生命体的内在性层面定义。

What is immanence? A life…No one has described what a life is better than Charles Dickens, if we take the indefinite article as an index of the transcendental.
王立秋
内在性是什么?非特指的一个生命……如果我们把这个不定冠词(the indefinite article)当做超验之物的索引,那么,关于非特指的生命是什么,没人比查尔斯•狄更斯描绘得更好了。

雄伯说
内在性是什么?一个生命体……对于这个生命体是什么,查尔斯、狄更斯的描述最为淋漓尽致,假如我们将「A life」的这个不定冠词A,作为是超验领域的指标。

A disreputable man, a rogue, held in contempt by everyone, is found as he lies dying. Suddenly, those taking care of him manifest an eagerness, respect, even love, for his slightest sign of life
王立秋
一个声名狼藉的人,一个受人鄙视的流氓,垂死的时候被人发现了。突然,那些照看他的人,对他最轻微的生命迹象,也生出了渴望和尊敬,甚至,爱。

雄伯
一个声名狼藉的人,一个众人鄙视的坏蛋,垂死的时候被人发现了。只要他稍有生命迹象,突然,那些照看他的人,也都对他表示渴望和尊敬,甚至,爱。

Everybody bustles about to save him, to the point where ,in his deepest coma, this wicked man himself senses something soft and sweet penetrating him.
王立秋
每个人都急着救他,以至在深昏迷状态中,这个邪恶的家伙也感到某种轻柔和甜蜜将他渗透。

雄伯
每个人都忙东忙西来拯救他,甚至在他深度昏迷状态中,这个邪恶的傢伙自己也感到某种温情和甜蜜将他渗透。

But to the degree that he comes back to life, his saviors turn colder, and he becomes once again mean and cruede.
王立秋
然而,他一活转过来,救他的人也随即变得冷淡,而他自己又变得卑鄙、残忍。

Between his life and his death, there is a moment that is only that of a life playing with death.
王立秋
在其生死之间,存在这样一个时刻,此时,只有一个非特指的生命在与死亡游戏。
雄伯
在他的生死之间,存在这么一个时刻,一个跟死亡遊戏的生命体的时刻。

The life of the individual gives way to an impersonal and yet singular life that releases a pure event freed from the accidents of internal and external life, that is, from the subjectivity and objectivity of what happens: a “ Homo tantum” with whom everyone emphasizes and who attains a sort of beatitude.
王立秋
[4]个体的生命让位于无人称的独特生命,后者则从内部的(internal)永恒生命的事故(accidents)中,也就是说,从事件的主体性和客体性中解放出,释放出一种纯粹的事件:“homo tantum(只是人)”,每个人都强调这点并从中得到了某种至福(beatitude)。

雄伯
这个个人的生命,被一种无人称,可是有具有独特性的生命取代。后者释放一个免除内部与外部生活的纷扰的纯粹的事件。换句话说,这个纯粹事件免除发生状况的主观性与客观性:他是人人同情的「纯净的人」,他获得一种纯粹幸福的状态。

It is a haecceity no longer of individuation but of singularization: a life of pure immanence, neutral, beyond good and evil, for it was only the subject that incarnated it in the midst of things that made it good or bad.

王立秋
这是一种不再个性化(individuation)而独特化(singualarization)的存在的个体性(haecceity):纯粹内在性的生命,中性而超越于善恶之外,因为只有置身事物当中,使之肉身化得的那个主体,才能使之成善成恶。

雄伯
这种特质,不再是个体化的特质,而是特异性的特质:一种纯粹内在性的生命,保持中立,超越善与恶。因为仅有在事物当中具体表现它的主体,才会让它成为善或恶。

The life of such individuality fades away in favor of the singular life immanent to a man who no longer has a name, though he can be mistaken for no other. A singular essence, a life…
王立秋
而如此个性的生命已然消退,取代它的是对(内在于)不再具名之人内在的独特生命,尽管这个人可能被错当为他人。一个独特的本质,一个非特指的生命……
雄伯
如此属于个体化的生命消退,让位于一位不再具有名字的人的内在性的特异生命。尽管后者有时会被误解成为没有名字。他是一个特异的本质,一个生命体。

But we shouldn’t enclose life in the single moment when individual life confronts universal death. A life is everywhere, in all the moments that a given living subject goes through and that are measured by given lived objects: an immanent life carrying with it the events or singularities that are merely actualized in subjects and objects.
王立秋
但我们也不应该把生命禁锢在个体生命遭遇普世死亡的独特时刻。非特指的生命无处不在,在为给定的生活(living)主体所经历的一切时刻以及为给定的生活(lived)客体所衡量的一切时刻皆如此:非特指的内在生命所携带的事件或独特性只有在主体和客体处才能实现。

雄伯
但我们也不应该把生命封闭在个体生命遭遇普世死亡的独特时刻。生命体无处不在,存在于某个特定的生命主体经历的所有的时刻,所有这些时刻根据某些曾经被生活过的客体来衡量。这一种内在性的生命,随之带着各种事件与特异性,它们仅有在主体与客体身上实践。

This indefinite life does not itself have moments, close as they may be one to another, but only between –times where one sees the event yet to come and already happened, in the absolute of an immediate consciousness.

王立秋
如此不确定的生命本身并不各自占有某一时刻而相互封闭,而只在于时间之间(between-times),时刻之间(between-moments);它并不发生或继起,而只是提供空无时刻的无限性,在这一时刻我们可以看到,事件即将来临而尚未发生,在绝对的直接意识之中。

雄伯
而这个不特定的生命本身并没有这些时刻,虽然它们(这些时刻)彼此非常靠近,但是仅是处于中间的时刻。在这些中间时刻,我们看见将会发生的事件与已经发生的事件,在当下意识的绝对当中。

Ethic 199

March 22, 2013

Ethic 199

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XV
第14章

FRAGMENTED AND INDESTRUCTIBLE
碎片化与不可毁灭

3
It is Sade’s approach that concerns us now, insofar as it points the way to my
neighbor’s space in connection with what I will call – thereby paraphrasing
the title of the work of his that is called Ideas on the Novel – the idea of a
technique oriented toward a sexual jouissance that is not sublimated.

现在我们关心的是萨德的方法,因为它指示这个途经,前往我的邻居的空间,关于我所谓的—因此诠释萨得所谓「小说的观念」的著作的标题—技巧的观念,取向于朝向一种并没有被升华的性的欢爽。

This idea shows us all kinds of lines of divergence, to the point that it gives
rise to the idea of difficulty. Consequently, it will be necessary for us to
evaluate the scope of the literary work as such. And isn’t that quite a detour,
which will definitely set us back again, and haven’t I been criticized for being
slow for some time now?

这个观念跟我们显示各种的分叉,甚至它产生这个困难的观念。结果,我们将有必要评估文学著作本身的范围。那难道不是一个很大的迂回,一定会让我们回转。我难道不是曾被批评,因为现在已经缓慢一段时间?

To finish rapidly with this further refinement, I will need to evoke several
directions from which Sade’s work may be grasped, if only to indicate the
one that I am choosing.

为了更加精炼地快速完成这个,我将需要召唤好几个方向。从那里,萨德的著作可以被理解,即使仅是为了指示我正在选择的这个方向。

Is this work a form of witness? A conscious or unconscious witness? Don’t
think in terms of the psychoanalytic unconscious here; I mean by “unconsious”
here the fact that the subject Sade wasn’t fully aware of the conditions
in which he as nobleman found himself, during the period from the beginning
of the French Revolution and down through the Terror, which he was
to live through only to be banished to the asylum at Charenton, apparently
at the will of the First Consul.

这部著作是见证的形式吗?一种意识与无意识的见证?请不要用在此地精神分析的无意识的术语来思维。我所指的「无意识」,在此意味着,萨德这位主体并没有充分地知道这些情况。他作为一位贵族发现自己处在这个情况,从法国大革命的开始,一直到恐怖时期,他应该经历这段时期,结果被放逐到查瑞顿的精神病院,显而易见地,听从第一领事的意志。

In truth, Sade seems to me to have been fully aware of the relationship of
his work to the attitudes of the type I called the man of pleasure. The man
of pleasure as such bears witness against himself, by publicly confessing the
extremes to which he may go. The great joy with which he recalls the emergence
of this tradition historically is a clear sign of the point the master always
reaches when he doesn’t bow his head before the being of God.

事实上,我觉得萨德似乎充分地知道他的著作与我所谓的快乐之人的这种态度有关系。快乐之人本身见证到对自己的不利,由于公开告白他可能採取的极端行为。他興高采烈地回想起这个传统在历史上出现,是一个清楚的指标,主人总是到底的指标,当他并不屈从于上帝的存在。

There is no reason to hide in any way the realistic side of Sade’s atrocities.
Their developed, insistent, extravagant character is so obvious and constitutes
such a challenge to credibility that the idea that this is an ironic discourse
becomes quite plausible. It is nevertheless true that the things involved
are commonly found in the works of Suetonius, Dion Cassius and others.
Read the Memoirs on the Great Days in Auvergne by Esprit Flechier, if you
want to learn what a great Lord at the beginning of the seventeenth century
could get up to with his peasants.

没有理由用任何方式隐藏萨德的残酷的现实的一面。它们被发展的坚持的奢侈的人物,是如此的明显,并且组成如此一个挑战,对于这个可信度:这是一种反讽的辞说的这个观念变的相当合理。可是,这是真实的,牵涉到的事情在苏顿尼斯顿,笛安、卡修斯及其他作者的著作里被找到。请大家阅读一下弗列奇尔的「奥伯尼的辉煌日子回忆录」,假如你们想要获知在十七世纪的开始,一位伟大的领主能够如何主宰他的农奴。

We would be quite wrong to think that, in the name of the self-restraint
the fascinations of the imaginary impose on our weakness, men are incapable
in certain situations of transgressing given limits without knowing what they
are doing.

我们将是完全错误,假如我们认为,以自我约束的名义,想象界的著迷赋加在我们的弱点之上的自我约束。在某些的情况,人们不能够逾越某些特定的限制,而不知道他们正在做些什么。

In this connection, Freud helps us out with that absolute lack of subterfuge,
that total absence of “knavery” that characterizes him, when he doesn’t
hesitate to make the point in Civilization and Its Discontents that there is noth
ing in common between the satisfaction a jouissance affords in its original state
and that which it gives in the indirect or even sublimated forms that civilization
obliges it to assume.

关于这点,弗洛依德帮助我们,用绝对不是蒙混的东西,表现他的特性是完全地欠缺「恶棍」。他毫不犹豫地发表这点,在「文明及其不满」。在原初状态的欢爽供应的满足,跟它以间接或甚至是升华的方式给予的满足之间,没有丝毫相同的地方。后者是文明强迫我们拥有的的满足。

In one place he doesn’t disguise his view of the fact that those jouissances
which are forbidden by conventional morality are nevertheless perfectly
accessible and accepted by certain people, who live under a given set of conditions
and whom he points to, namely, those whom we call the rich – and it
is doubtless the case that, in spite of obstacles that are familiar to us, they
sometimes make the most of their opportunities.

在某个地点,他并没有伪装他的看见这个事实:那些被传统道德禁止的欢爽,对于某些人,仍然是唾手可得。他们生活在某个特定的条件之下,他指向的那些人。换句话说,我们所称的富有人家。无可置疑的是这个情况,尽管我们耳熟能详的这些阻碍,他们有时善为利用这些机会。

To make things clear, let me use this passage to make an incidental remark,
similar to the remarks Freud makes on the subject, but that are often omitted
or neglected. The security of jouissance for the rich in our time is greatly
increased by what I will call the universal legislation of work. Just imagine
what social conflicts were like in times past. Try to find something equivalent
nowadays not at the frontiers of our societies, but within them.

为了澄清事情,让我使用这个段落,发表偶然的谈论,类同于弗洛依德对于这个议题发表的谈论,但是那往往被忽略或忽视。在我们时代,对于富人,欢爽的安全大为增加,由于我称为的工作的普遍立法。请你们想象一下,在过去的时代,社会的冲突像是什么样子。请你们尝试找到今天某件相等的东西,不是在我们的社会的边界,而是在里面。

And now a point on the value of Sade’s work as witness of reality. Shall we
investigate its value as sublimation? If we consider sublimation in its most
developed form, indeed in the fiercest and most cynical form in which Freud
took pleasure in representing it, namely, as the transformation of the sexual
instinct into a work in which everyone will recognize his own dreams and
impulses, and will reward the artist for having given him that satisfaction by
granting the latter a fuller and happier life – and for giving him in addition
access to the satisfaction of the instinct involved from the beginning ~ if we
seek to grasp the work of Sade from this perspective, then it’s something of
a failure.

现在谈论一个观点,对于萨德的著作作为现实界的见证的价值。我们将研究它的价值作为升华?假如我们考虑升华,以它的最发展的形式,的确,以最凶猛而反讽的形式。弗洛依德很乐意以这种形式代表它,换句话说,作为性的本能被转变成为一部作品,在那里,每个人将会体认出他自己的梦想与冲动。他们将会给予艺术家酬劳,因为曾经给予他那种满足,凭借给予后者一个充实而快乐的一生,因为给予他除了接近从开头牵涉到的本能的满足,假如我们尝试理解萨德的作品,从这个观点,那么是它是有点失败。

It’s something of a failure, if one thinks of the amount of time poor Sade
spent either in prison or interned in special institutions. As for the work
itself, at least The New Justine along with The Story of Juliette had a great deal
of success during his lifetime in an underground form, a success of the night,
a success of the damned. But I won’t insist on that here. If I refer to it, it is
so as to cast some light on those sides of Sade that are worth illuminating.

那是有点失败,假如我们想到可怜的萨德花费在监狱或被拘留在特别的精神病院的时间的数量。至于作品的本身,至少「新贾斯丁」与「朱丽叶的故事」,在他活着时候,就非常成功,以秘密流传的方式,夜间的成功,受诅咒者的成功。但是我在此并不坚持那点。假如我提到它,那是为了启明萨德值得启蒙的那些面向。

Let us now try to see how we should situate Sade’s work. It has been called
an unsurpassable body of work, in the sense that it achieves an absolute of
the unbearable in what can be expressed in words relative to the transgression
of all human limits. One can acknowledge that in no other literature, at no
other time, has there been such a scandalous body of work. No one else has
done such deep injury to the feelings and thoughts of mankind. At a time
when Henry Miller’s stories make us tremble, who would dare rival the licentiousness
of Sade? One might indeed claim that we have there the most scandalous
body of work ever written. Thus, as Maurice Blanchot puts it, “Isn’t
that a reason for us to be interested in it?”

让我们现在尝试看看,我们应该如何定位萨德的作品。它曾经被称为是无以伦比的作品体系。因为它完成一种不可忍受者的绝对,在能够被表达,用相对于所有人类限制的逾越的表达。我们能够承认,没有其他文学,没有其他时代,曾经有过如此丑闻的作品体现。没有其他人曾经对人类的感觉与思想造成如此深的伤害。在亨利、米勒的小说让我们不寒而栗的时代,有谁敢于匹敌萨德的放浪形骸?我们确实会宣称,我们在那里拥有有史以来最丑闻的作品体系。因此,如同莫里斯,布朗肖所表达的,「这难道不就是我们应该对它感到興趣的原因?」

And we are interested in just that way here. I urge you to make the effort
to read the book in which two articles by Blanchot on Lautreamont and Sade
are to be found. They constitute a part of the material to be put in our file.

我们在此仅是对那种方式感到興趣。我建议你们应该努力去阅读这本书,在那里,有两篇布朗肖写的文章能够被找到,探讨劳瑞曼与萨德。他们形成应该被放置在我们的档案的材料的部分。

That is certainly saying a lot then. It seems, in fact, as if one cannot conceive
of an atrocity that isn’t to be found in Sade’s catalogue. The assault on
one’s sensibility is of a kind that is literally stupefying; in other words, one
loses one’s bearings. As far as this is concerned, one might even say that the
effect in question is achieved artlessly, without any consideration for an economy
of means, but through the accumulation of details and perepetia, to
which is added a whole stuffing of treatises and rationalizations whose contradictions
are of particular interest to us and that we can analyze in detail.

那确实是道尽一切。事实上,似乎我们无法构想一种残酷,在萨德的目录里找不到。对于我们的理智的攻击,实质上令人惊骇莫名。换句话说,我们丧失我们镇定。就那件事情而言,我们甚至可以说,受到质疑的影响,自然地被完成,没有考虑到财富的经济力。而是凭借累积细节与逆转。然后再增加一堆论文与理性。它们的悖论,我们特别感到興趣,我们能够详细地分析。

It takes a crude mind to assume that the treatises are simply there to make
the erotic passages acceptable. Even minds that are far subtler have attributed
to such treatises, dubbed digressions, a loss of suggestive tension on the level
that the subtler minds in question – I am thinking of Georges Bataille –
consider to be that of the works’ true value, namely, their power to open up
the possibility of the assumption of being on the level of immorality.

只有那些头脑简单的人才会认为,那些论文摆在那里,仅是为了让色情的段落让人可以接受。即使是心灵更加细腻的人们,对这样的论文,被称为的离题,归咎于丧失暗示的张力,在这个层次,受到质疑的这些细腻的心灵—我想对的是乔治、巴岱尔,他们认为是这些作品的真实的价值的丧失,换句话说,丧失他们开展这个可能性的力量:处于不道德层次的假设。

That’s a mistake. The real problem is something else. It is nothing else but
the response of a being, whether reader or writer, at the approach to a center
of incandescence or an absolute zero that is physically unbearable. The fact
that the book falls from one’s hands no doubt proves that it is bad, but literary
badness here is perhaps the guarantee of the very badness or mauvamta,
as it was still called in the eighteenth century, that is the object of our investigation.

那是一种错误。真正的问题是某件别的东西。那实实在在就是一个生命实存的回应,无论是读者或作家,当他们接近炙热的中心,或是身体无法承受的绝对的零度。书本从我们手中掉落的这个事实,无可置疑证明,它是不好的,但是在此的文学到不好,或许就是这个不好的保证,如同它在十八世纪依旧被称呼的,那就是我们研究的对象。

As a consequence, Sade’s work belongs to the order of what I shall
call experimental literature. The work of art in this case is an experiment that
through its action cuts the subject loose from his psychosocial moorings – or
to be more precise, from all psychosocial appreciation of the sublimation
involved.

结果,萨德的作品属于我将所谓的试验性文学的秩序。在这种情况的艺术的著作是一种试验,通过它的行动,将主体跟他的心理与社会的停泊处切割开来。或是更确实地说,跟所有牵涉到的升华的心理与社会的赏识切割开来。

There is no better example of such a work than the one which I hope some
of you at least are addicted to – addicted to in the same sense as “addicted to
opium” – namely, the Songs of Maldoror by Lautroamont. And it is only
fitting if Maurice Blanchot combines the points of view he presents us with
on these two authors.

这类作品的最好例子就是我们希望能们有些人至少耽溺于的作品。你们耽溺于他们的意义,如同耽溺于鸦片烟。换句话说,劳瑞曼的「斗牛士之歌」。这是非常合宜的,只要莫里斯、布朗肖将他呈现给予我们的观点,联接到这两位作者。

But with Sade the social reference is retained, and he claims to valorize
socially his extravagant system, whence his astonishing avowals that suggest
incoherence and lead to a multiple contradiction, which one would be wrong
to ascribe purely and simply to the absurd. The absurd has recently become
a somewhat too convenient category. One respects the dead, but I can’t avoid
noting the indulgence shown by a certain Nobel Prize winner to all the mumbo
lumbo on the topic.1 That prize is a wonderful universal reward for “knavery”; its honor roll bears the stigmata of a form of abjection in our culture.

但是随着萨德,这个社会的资料被保留。他宣称从社会角度推崇他的奢侈的制度。在那里,他的令人惊奇的宣誓,这个宣誓暗示着不一贯,并导致多重的矛盾。我们将会是错误,假如我们将这个矛盾单纯地归属于荒谬。这种荒谬最近已经变成一个相对方便的范畴。我们遵敬死者,但是我无法避免注意到,有某位诺贝尔奖金的得奖者显示的溺爱,给予对那个议题的小说家阿伯特、卡谬。那个奖金是对于「恶棍」的奇妙的普遍性酬劳,它的尊荣的名单见证到我们文化的卑下的形式的伤痕。

By way of conclusion, I will focus on two terms that point to the next stage
in our project.

作为结论,我将集中两个指向我们计划下一阶段的两个术语。

When one approaches that central emptiness, which up to now has been
the form in which access to jouissance has presented itself to us, my neighbor’s
body breaks into pieces. Proclaiming the law of jouissance as the foundation
of some ideally Utopian social system, Sade expresses himself in italics
in the nice little edition of Juliette published recently by Pauvert, though it
is still a book that circulates surreptiously: “Lend me the part of your body
that will give me a moment of satisfaction and, if you care to, use for your
own pleasure that part of my body which appeals to you.”

当我们接近那个中心的空洞,迄今,它一直是这个形式,在这个形式里,接近欢爽曾经呈现它自己给我们,我的邻居的身体成为破碎。宣告欢爽的法则作为某种的理想乌托邦的社会系统的基础。萨德用斜体字表达他自己,在「朱丽叶」的小版本,最近由包伯特出版,虽然它依旧是一本书,秘密地流通。「借给我们你的身体的这个部分,将会给我们片刻的满足。假如你愿意使用我的身体讨你喜欢的那个部分,来满足你的快乐。」

We find in this formulation of the fundamental law, which expresses the
side of Sade’s social system that claims to be socially viable, the first considered
manifestation of something that we psychaoanlysts have come to know
as part object.

在这个基本法则的说明里,我们发现,它表达萨德的社会制度的这面,宣称职社会是行得通的,我们精神分析家逐渐知道作为部分客体的东西,这是第一个被认为的证明。

But when the notion of part object is articulated in that way, we imply that
this part object only wants to be reintegrated into the object, into the already
valorized object, the object of our love and tenderness, the object that brings
together within it all the virtues of the so-called genital stage. Yet we should
consider the problem a little differently; we should notice that this object is
necessarily in a state of independence in a field that we take to be central as
if by convention. The total object, our neighbor, is silhouetted there, separate
from us and rising up, if I may say so, like the image of Carpaccio’s San
Giorgio degli Schiavone in Venice, in the midst of a charnel house figure.

但是当这个部分客体的观念以那种方式被表达,我们暗示,这个部分客体仅是想要被合并成为那个客体,成为这个已经被推崇的客体,我们爱与温柔的客体,在它里面,聚拢性器官阶段的所有品德的客体。可是,我们应该用稍微不同方式考虑这个问题,我们应该注意到,这个客体必须处于独立的状态,在我们认为是中心的领域,好像是根据传统。整个的客体,我们的邻居,在那里被描绘轮廓,跟我们分开,然后浮现。容我这样说,就像是卡帕西欧在威尼斯的San
Giorgio degli Schiavone 的意象,处于藏尸所的人物中间。

The second term that Sade teaches us concerns that which appears in the
fantasm as the indestructible character of the Other, and emerges in the figure
of his victim.

萨德教导我们的第二个术语,跟幻见出现的东西有关,作为是大他者的不可毁灭的特性,以他的受害者的人物出现。

Whether in Justine itself or in a certain Sadean posterity that is less than
distinguished, namely, that erotic or pornographic posterity, which recently
produced one of its finest works, The Story of 0~, the victim survives the
worst of her ordeals, and she doesn’t even suffer in her sensual power of
attraction, that the author never ceases evoking, as is always the case in such
descriptions; she always has the prettiest eyes in the world, the most pathetic
and touching appearance. That the author always insists on placing his subjects
under such a stereotyped heading poses a problem in itself.

无论是在贾斯丁,或是在某本萨德的比较不那么著名的后继者,也就是色情或性爱小说的后继者,最近出版的最精彩的一本「欧小姐的故事」。这位受害者经历各种考验,存活下来。她甚至没有遭受她的迷人的性感力量,作者从来没有停止召唤,如同在这些描述的情况当中。她总是拥有世界上最美丽的眼眸,最令人垂怜,最动人的外表。作者总是坚持将他的主角放置在如此典型的标题之下,这本身就形成问题。

It seems that whatever happens to the subject is incapable of spoiling the
image in question, incapable even of wearing it out. But Sade, who is different
in character from those who offer us these entertaining little stories, goes
further, since we see emerge in him in the distance the idea of eternal punishment.
I will come back to this point, because it amounts to a strange contradiction
in a writer who wants nothing of himself to survive, who doesn’t even
want any part of the site of his tomb to remain accessible to men, but wants
it instead to be covered with bracken. Doesn’t that indicate that he locates in
the fantasm the content of the most intimate part of himself, which we have
called the neighbor, or in other words the metipsemus?

似乎,无论主角发生什么事情,他都不能够破坏这个受质疑的意象,甚至不能够磨损它。但是萨德的人物跟那些提供我们这些娱乐的小故事的那些人物不同。萨德更加深入,因为我们看见在他的身上,永恒处罚的观念从远处出现。我将回头谈论这点,因为它相等于是一个奇怪的悖论,在一位作家身上。他并不想要他身上的任何东西存活下来。他甚至不想要他的坟墓地点的任何部分,让人们能够接近。相反地,他想要他的坟墓被蔓草盖住。那难道不是指示,他在幻见中找到他自己最亲密的部分的内容。我们称为的邻居,或是换句话说metipsemus?

I will finish my lecture today on a point of detail. By what deep attachments
is it that a certain relationship to the Other, that we call Sadistic,
reveals its true connection to the psychology of the obsessional? – the obsessional,
whose defenses take the form of an iron frame, of a rigid mold, a
corset, in which he remains and locks himself up, so as to stop himself having
access to that which Freud somewhere calls a horror he himself doesn’t know.
March 30, 1960

今天,我将完成我的演说,讨论细节的点。凭借怎样的深度的亲感,跟大他者的某种关系,我们称为是萨德式。它显示它的真实的关系,跟妄想症的心理学的关系?妄想症患者,他的防卫採取铁框架的形式,严格铸模的形式,这是一种紧身衣,他始终在那件紧身衣里,将自己锁在里面,为了阻止他自己不要接近弗洛依的在某个地方称为所他自己都不知道的恐怖。

1960年,3月30日

Ethic 197

March 20, 2013

Ethic 197

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XV
第14章

SADE, HIS FANTASM AND HIS DOCTRINE
萨德,他的幻见及他的信条

METIPSEMUS
重复

FRAGMENTED AND INDESTRUCTIBLE
碎片化与不可毁灭

2
Sade is at this limit, and insofar as he imagines going beyond it, he teaches
us that he cultivates its fantasm with all the morose enjoyment – I will come
back to this phrase – that is manifest in that fantasm.

萨德在这个极限。因为他想象超越它,他教导我们,他培养它的幻见,用所有的阴悒的享乐。我将回头来谈这个词句。它被展现在那个幻见上。

In imagining it, he proves the imaginary structure of the limit. But he also
goes beyond it. He doesn’t, of course, go beyond it in his fantasm, which
explains its tedious character, but in his theory, in the doctrine he advances
in words that at different moments in the work express the jouissance of
destruction, the peculiar virtue of crime, evil sought for evil’s sake, and, in
the last instance, the Supreme-Being-in-Evil – a strange reference made by
the character of Saint-Fond, who proclaims in The Story of Juliette his renewed
but not particularly new belief in this God.

当他想象它时,他证明这个极限的想象的结构。但是他也超越它。当然,他并没有在他的幻想里超越它。这解释它的沉闷的特性。但是在他的理论,在他提出的这个信条,用著作的不同时空,表达毁灭的欢爽的词语,犯罪的特殊品德,为了邪恶的缘故寻求邪恶。在最后的例子,邪恶中的崇高的生命实存—由圣芳德的人物奇怪的指称,他在「朱莉叶的故事」宣称他更新,但是并没有特别新的信仰这个上帝。

This theory is called in the same work the System of Pius VI, the Pope
who is introduced as one of the characters in the novel. Taking things even
further, Sade lays out a vision of Nature as a vast system of attraction and
repulsion of evil by evil. Under these circumstances the ethical stance consists
in realizing to the most extreme point this assimilation to absolute evil,
as a consequence of which its integration into a fundamentally wicked nature
will be realized in a kind of inverted harmony.

这个理论在相同的著作里被称为啥皮尔斯六世的系统。这位教皇被介绍,充当小说的一位人物。萨德更深入地探究事情,他安排自然的幻景,作为一种广泛的吸引与排斥系统,被邪恶吸引与排斥的系统。在这些情况之下,伦理的态度在于体会到最极端的程度,被吸收到绝对的邪恶。由于这个的结果,它的合并进入一个基本邪恶的自然,将会被实现,以一种倒错的和谐。

I am just pointing to something that appears not as stages of thought in
search of a paradoxical formulation, but much more as its wrenching apart,
its collapse, in the course of a development that created its own impasse.

我正在指出某件东西,它出现不少作为思想的阶段,寻找矛盾的阐释,而是作为跟它挣脱开,它的崩溃。在发展的过程,创造它自己的僵局。

Can’t one nevertheless say that Sade teaches us, in the order of symbolic
play, how to attempt to go beyond the limit, and how to discover the laws of
one’s neighbor’s space as such? The space in question is that which is formed
when we have to do not with this fellow self whom we so easily turn into our
reflection, and whom we necessarily implicate in the same misrecognitions
that characterize our own self, but this neighbor who is closest to us, the
neighbor whom we sometimes take in our arms, if only to make love to. I am
not speaking here of ideal love, but of the act of making love.

可是,我们难道不能说,萨德教导我们,在象征的遊戏,如何企图超越这个极限,如何发现我们的邻居的空间本身的法则?受到质疑的空间就是被形成的空间,当我们必须处理的,并不是这个人的自性,我们如此容易将他转变成为我们的反思。我们必然将他牵涉在相同的误认,表现为每自己自性的特征。而是最靠近我们的这位邻居。我们有时用手臂拥抱的邻居。只要仅是为了做爱,我在此谈论到的并不是理想之爱,而是做爱的行动。

We know well how the images of the self may frustrate our propulsion into
that space. Don’t we have something to learn about the laws of this space
from the man who enters it with his atrocious discourse, given that the imaginary
capture by the image of one’s fellow man functions as a lure there?

我们清楚知道,自我的各种意象可能会让我们的推动力量进入那个空间。我们难道没有某件东西可以学习,关于这个空间的法则,从进入它的这个人,用他的残酷的辞说,假如考虑到想象界的补捉,凭借我们的同胞的意象,在那里充当陷阱?

You can see where I am taking you. At the precise point to which I attach
our inquiry, I am not prejudging what the other is. I simply emphasize the
lures of one’s fellow man because it is from this fellow as such that the misrecognitions which define me as a self are born. And I will just stop for a
moment and refer to a little fable in which you will recognize my personal
touch.

你们能够看出我正引导你们去哪里。在这个确实的时刻,我将我的研究联系一块,我并没有对于他者是什么有所偏见。我仅是强调我们自己同胞的陷阱,因为从这个人的本身开始,定义我作为自性的这些误认诞生。我仅是将暂停一下,提及一个小寓言,在那里,你们将会认出我的个人的接触。

I once spoke to you about a mustard pot. If I draw three pots here, I simply
demonstrate that you have a whole row of mustard or jam pots. They stand
on shelves and are numerous enough to satisfy your contemplative appetites.
Note that it is insofar as the pots are identical that they are irreducible. Thus
at this level we come up against the condition of individuation. And that’s as
far as the problem usually goes, namely, that there is this one, which isn’t
that one.

我有次跟你们提到一个芥末罐。假如我在此画三个芥末罐,我仅是证明,你们拥有一整排的芥末罐或果酱罐。它们放置在架上,数量多到足够满足你的沉思的胃口。请注意,因为这些芥末罐是相同的,它们无法被还原。因此在这个层次,我们遭遇个人主义的情况。就那个难题通常而言,换句话说,是这个难题,而不是那个难题。

Naturally, the affected quality of this little trick doesn’t escape me. But do
try to understand the truth it hides, like all sophisms. I don’t know if you
have noticed that the etymology of the French word meme (self) is none other
than metipsemus, which makes this meme in moi-meme redundant. The phonetic
evolution is from metipsemus to meme – that which is most myself in
myself, that which is at the heart of myself, and beyond me, insofar as the
self stops at the level of those walls to which one can apply a label. What in
French at least serves to designate the notion of self or same (meme), then, is
this interior or emptiness, and I don’t know if it belongs to me or to nobody.

当然,我明白这个小诡计的受到影响的品质。但是请设法理解它隐藏的真理,像所有的诡辩一样。我并不知道你们是否注意到,法文meme(自性)这个词语的词源,实实在在就是metipsemus,它使moi-meme的这个meme成为多余。这个语音的进化是从metipsemus 到meme。在我自己最属于我自己的东西,属于我自己核心的东西,超越我,因为自性停止在那些墙壁的层次。我们能够应用一个标签到那些墙壁。在法文至少用来指明自性的观念,或是相同的meme,那么这个内部,或空洞,我不知道它是否属于我,或不属于任何人。

That’s what the use of my sophism signifies; it reminds me that my neighbor
possesses all the evil Freud speaks about, but it is no different from the
evil I retreat from in myself. To love him, to love him as myself, is necessarily
to move toward some cruelty. His or mine?, you will object. But haven’t I
just explained to you that nothing indicates they are distinct? It seems rather
that they are the same, on condition that those limits which oblige me to
posit myself opposite the other as my fellow man are crossed.

那是我的诡辩的用途指明的东西,它提醒我,我的邻居拥有弗洛依德谈论的所有的邪恶。但是它跟我在我自己身上撤退下来的邪恶没有什么差别。为了爱他,为了爱他如我自己,这是必要的移动朝向某种残酷。他的残酷?或是我的残酷?你们将反对地问。但是我难道不是刚刚跟你们解释,没有一样东西指示它们是不同的?相反地,它们似乎是相同,只要强迫我自己跟他者对立,作为我的同胞的那些限制被跨越。

And here I should make my approach clear. Panic drunkenness, sacred
orgy, the flagellants of the cults of Attis, the Bacchantes of the tragedy of
Euripides, in short, all that remote Dionysionism lost in a history to which
reference has been made since the nineteenth century with the expectation of
restoring, beyond Hegel, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, the vestiges still available
to us of the sphere of the great Pan, in an apologetic, utopian and apocalyptic
form that was condemned by Kierkegaard and not less effectively by
Nietzsche – that’s not what I mean when I speak of the sameness (memete) of
someone else and myself. That is by the way why I finished the seminar
before last with the evocation of the statement that is correlative to the rending
of the veil of the temple, namely, Great Pan is dead.

在此,我应该澄清我的方法。惊慌的酒醉,神圣的狂欢,阿提斯的信徒的鞭打者,尤利皮底斯的悲剧的女僧侣,总之,所有的戴奥尼修斯神丧失于历史中。自从十九世纪以来,提到她们被带著这个期望,超越黑格尔,齐克果,与尼采,我们依旧拥有这个预示:在伟大的森林之神的领域,以一种抱歉,乌托邦与启示录录的形式,那是齐克果所谴责,同样有效地被尼采谴责。那并不是我的意思,当我谈论到某个其他人跟我自己的相同。顺便说一下,那就是为什么我完成上上次的研讨班,召唤这个陈述:这个陈述跟神庙的面纱的撕开有关,换句话说,伟大的森林之神已死。

I will say no more today. It’s not just a question of my prophesying in my
turn, but I will take an appointment with you for the time when I will have
to try to justify why and from what the Great Pan died, and at the precise
moment no doubt that the legend points to.

今天我将不再多说。问题不仅是轮到我的预言,而是我将接受我跟你们的约会,因为这个时间我将必须证明伟大的森林之神为什么死亡及因为什么死亡,无可置疑地,就在传说指向的那个确实的时刻。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 191

March 18, 2013

Ethic 191

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XV
第14章

The jouissance of transgression
逾越的欢爽

THE BARRIER TO JOUISSANCE
欢爽的阻碍

THE RESPECT OF THE IMAGE OF THE OTHER
尊敬大他者的意象

SADE, HIS FANTASM AND HIS DOCTRINE
萨德,他的幻见及他的信条

METIPSEMUS
重复

FRAGMENTED AND INDESTRUCTIBLE
碎片化与不可毁灭

I announced that I would talk about Sade.
我宣布我要谈论萨德。

It is not without some vexation that I take up the subject today because of
the break for the vacation, which will be a long one.

我今天探讨这个议题,不是没有一次懊恼。因为假期的休息将会很长。

I would like at least during this lecture to clear up the misunderstanding
that might occur because we are dealing with Sade, and it might be thought
that that constitutes a wholly external way of looking upon ourselves as pioneers
or militants embracing a radical position. Such a view implies that, as a result
of our function or profession, we are destined to embrace extremes, so to
speak, and that Sade in this respect is our progenitor or precursor, who supposedly
opened up some impasse, aberration or aporia, in that domain of
ethics we have chosen to explore this year, and that we would be well-advised
to follow him.

我至少想要在这个演讲当中,澄清可能发生的误解,因为我们正在处理萨德。大家可能认为,那会形成一个完全是外在的方式,看待我们自己,作为是前驱者,或拥抱激进立场的好战份子。这样一个观点暗示:由于我们的功用或专业的结果,我们注定要拥抱所谓的极端的立场。在这方面,萨德是我们的前辈或先锋。他被认为展开某个僵局,偏离或窘迫,在伦理学的那个领域,我们选择来从事今年的探索。我们最好遵循他。

It is very important to clear up that misunderstanding, which is related to
a number of others I am struggling against in order to make some progress
here before you.

澄清那个误解是非常重要的。它跟许多其他我正在克服的误解有关系,为了在此,在你们面前,从事某些进展。

The domain that we are exploring this year isn’t interesting for us only in
a purely external sense. I would even say that up to a certain point this field
may involve a certain degree of boredom, even for such a faithful audience
as you, and it’s not to be neglected – it has its own significance. Naturally,
since I am speaking to you, I try to interest you; that’s part of the deal. But
that mode of communication which binds us together isn’t necessarily calculated
to avoid something that the art of the teacher normally proscribes. When
I compare two audiences, if I managed to interest the one in Brussels, so
much the better, but it isn’t at all in the same way that you here are interested
in my teaching.

今年我们正在探索的这个领域,我们并不仅是从纯粹外在意义感到興趣。我甚至说,直到某个程度,这个领域可能牵涉到某个程度的无聊,即使对于像你们这样的忠实的听众。这不应该受到忽略。它拥有它自己的重要性。当然,因为我正在跟你们谈论,我尝试让你们感到興趣,那是交易的部分。但是,让我们聚集一块的沟通的那个模式,未必是经过算计要避免教学的艺术正常指定的东西。当我比较两种听众,假如我成功地让布鲁塞尔的听众感到興趣,这样更好。但是那跟你们在此对我的教学感到的興趣根本不相同。

If I adopt for a moment the point of view of what one finds in the situation,
not so much of the young analyst, as of the analyst beginning his practice –
and it’s such a humanly sensitive and valid position – I would say that it is
conceivable that what I am attempting to articulate under the title of the ethics
psychoanalysis comes up against the domain of what might be called analysis’s pastoral letter.

假如我暂时採用无们在这个情境发现的东西的观点,不是年轻精神分析家的观点,而是开始他的执业的精神分析家的观点。这是一个合乎人性的敏感而正确的立场。我不妨说,可以想象得到,我正在企图表达的东西,以精神分析伦理学的标题,遭遇到这个领域,所谓的精神分析的佈道书简的领域。

Even then I am ascribing to what I am aiming at its noble name, its eternal
name. A less flattering name would be the one invented by one of the most
unpleasant authors of our time, “intellectual comfort.” The question of “How
does one proceed?” may, in effect, lead to impatience and even disappointment,
when one is faced with the need to approach things at a level, that, it
seems, is not that of our technique on the basis of which a great many things
are to be resolved – or such at least is the promise. A great many things
perhaps, but not everything. And we shouldn’t necessarily turn our eyes away
from those things that our technique warns us constitute an impasse or even
a gap, even if all the consequences of our action are in question.

甚至因此我正在将它的高贵的名字,它的永恒的名字,归属于我正在追寻的东西。一个比较负面的名字将是我们当代一位最令人不愉快的作者所杜撰,「知识的安逸」。「我们如何进行下去」这个问题,实际上导致不耐烦,甚至失望,当我们面对这种需要,要从某个层次探索事情,这个层次似乎并不是我们的技巧的层次。以它作为基础,许多事情应该被解决。或是至少这个承诺应该被解决。或许是许多事情,但是并不每一件事情。我们不应该转开我们的眼睛,避看我们的技术警告我们的事情,它们形成一个僵局,或甚至一个差距,即使我们行动的所有结果都受到置疑。

As for this young person who is beginning his practice as an analyst, I
would call what is involved here his skeleton; it will give his action a vertebrate
solidarity, or the opposite of that movement toward a thousand forms
which is always on the point of collapsing in on itself and of becoming caught
up in a circle – something that a certain number of recent explorations give
the image of.

至于这个年轻人,他正在开始他的执业,作为精神分析家。我将称为是在此牵涉到他的支持背景的东西。它将给他的行动一种脊柱的稳定,或是朝向上千的形态的那个动作的对立。那总是本身摇摇欲坠,总是即将被套陷在圆圈里。这个东西,某些最近的探索给出它的意象。

It is, therefore, not a bad idea to expose the fact that something may degenerate
from the expectation of assurance – which is doubtless of some use in
the exercise of one’s profession – into a form of sentimental assurance. It is
as a result of this that those subjects whom I take to be at a crossroads in
their existence turn into prisoners of an infatuation that is the source of both
an inner disappointment and a secret demand.

因此,揭露这个事实,并不是一个不好的点子。某件东西可能会从确定性的期待退化下来。无可置疑的,它具有某些用途,在我们的专业的运用。它退化成为一种情感的确定性的形式。由于这个的结果,我认为是那些在他们的生存处于十字路口的那些主体,证明是某种著迷的囚犯,这种著迷既是内在失望,又是秘密的要求的来源。

And if we are to make any progress, this is what the perspective of the
ethical ends of psychoanalysis, whose significance I am trying to demonstrate
here, has to combat. It is something one encounters sooner rather than later.

假如我们想要有所进展,这是精神分析的伦理学的目标必须要克服的东西。。它的重要性,我正在尝试在此证明。这个东西,我们很快就会遭遇,而不是等到后来。

1
Our path thus far has led us to a point that I will call the paradox of jouissance.

我们的途径迄今引导我们到底我所谓的欢爽的悖论。

The paradox of jouissance introduces its problematic into that dialectic of
happiness which we analysts have perhaps rashily set out to explore. We have
grasped the paradox in more than one detail as something that emerges routinely
in our experience. But in order to lead you to it and relate it to the
thread of our discussion, I have chosen this time the path of the enigma of
its relation to the Law. And this is something that is marked by the strangeness
of the way the existence of this Law appears to us, as founded on the
Other as I have long taught you.

欢爽的悖论介绍它的难题成为快乐的辩证法,我们精神分析家或许已经轻率地探索。我们曾经理解这个悖论,用不仅是在我们的精神分析精验例行出现的某件东西的细节。但是为了引导你们到它那里,并且将它跟我们讨论的脉络联上关系,我这次选择它跟法则的关系的迷团的途径。这是某件被标示为陌生性的东西,那是这个法则的存在给我们显现的方式,依据其他的法则作为基础,那是我长久以来教导你们的。

In this we have to follow Freud; not the individual with his atheistic
profession of faith, but the Freud who was the first to acknowledge the value
and relevance of a myth that constituted for us an answer to a certain fact
that was formulated for no particular reason, but that has wide currency and
is fully articulated in the consciousness of our time – though it went unnoticed
by the finest minds and even more so by the masses – I mean the fact
we call the death of God.

在这点,我们必须遵循弗洛依德,不是拥有他的无神论专业信仰的个人,而是首先承认神话的价值与相关性的第一人。对于我们,这个神话形成对于某个事实的回答。这个事实并没有特别的理由被阐释。但是却广泛被流传,而且在我们时代的意识里,充分地被表达。虽然它受到即使是最高贵的心灵的忽视,甚至被大众忽视,我指的是我们所谓的上帝已死的这个事实。

That’s the problematic with which we begin. It is there the sign appears
that I presented to you in my graph in the form of S (O). Situated as you
know in the upper left section, it signifies the final response to the guarantee
asked of the Other concerning the meaning of that Law articulated in the
depths of the unconscious. If there is nothing more than a lack, the Other is
wanting, and the signifier is that of his death.

那就是我们开始的难题。就在那里,这个讯息出现,我用我的图形呈现给与你们,以S(0)的形式。如你们所知,它被定位在左上方,它指明这个最后的回应,对于大他者要求的保证,关于那个法则的意义,在无意识的深处,被表达的法则的意义。假如仅是一个欠缺存在,大他者是欠缺,这个能指就是大他者死亡的能指。

It is as a function of this position, which is itself dependent on the paradox
of the Law, that the paradox of jouissance emerges. This I will now try to
explain.

作为这个立场的一个功用,它的本身依靠法则的悖论,欢爽的悖论出现。我现在将尝试解释这个。

We should note that only Christianity, through the drama of the passion,
gives a full content to the naturalness of the truth we have called the death of
God. Indeed, with a naturalness beside which the approaches to it represented
by the bloody combats of the gladiators pale. Christianity, in effect,
offers a drama that literally incarnates that death of God. It is also Christianity
that associates that death with what happened to the Law; namely, that
without destroying that Law, we are told, but in substituting itself for it, in
summarizing it, and raising it up in the very movement that abolishes it –
thus offering the first weighty historical example of the German notion of
Aufhebung, i.e., the conservation of something destroyed at a different level
– the only commandment is henceforth “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as
thyself.”

我们应该注意,仅有基督教,通过激情的戏剧,给予充分的内容,给我们所谓的上帝已死的真理的自然性。的确,在这种真理的自然性旁边,由斗技场斗士的流血格斗所代表的方法相形失色。实际上,基督教提供一个戏剧,实质上具体表现出上帝已死。也是基督教将上帝之死跟法则所发生的事情联想一块。换句话说,假如没有毁灭那个法则,我们被告诉,而是以自己来替换它,当我们替法则总结时,将法则提升,在废除它的动作中,因此提供最初具有份量的例子,对于德文的「勾销」的观念。在不同层次被毁灭的东西的保存。唯一的教喻因此就是「你应该爱你的邻居如你自己。」

The whole thing is articulated as such in the Gospel, and it is there that we
will continue on our way. The two notions, the death of God and the love of
one’s neighbor, are historically linked; and one cannot overlook that fact
unless one attributes to everything that occurred in history in the Judeo-
Christian tradition as constitutionally just a matter of chance.

整个的事情本身在福音书被表达,就在那里,我们将继续我们的途径。有两个观念,上帝的死亡与自己的邻居之爱,在历史上息息相关。我们不能忽略那个事实,除非我们归功于历史上犹太人发生的每件事情—基督教的传统在本质上仅是偶然发生的事情。

I am aware of the fact that the message of the believers is that there is a
resurrection in the afterlife, but that’s simply a promise. That’s the space
through which we have to make our way. It is thus appropriate if we stop in
this pass, in this narrow passage where Freud himself stops and retreats in
understandable horror. “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” is a commandment
that seems inhuman to him.

我知道这个事实:信仰者的讯息是,死后的生命会复活。但是那仅是一个承诺。通过那个空间,我们必须前进我们的途径。因此这是合宜的,假如我们在这个隘口停止,在这个狭窄的通道。在那里,弗洛依德自己停止而且明白地恐惧撤退:「你们应该爱你们的邻居如同你们自己」,对于他而言,这个命令似乎不合人性。

Everything he finds objectional is summed up in this phrase. As the examples
he cites confirm, it is in the name of the most legitimate ευδαιμονία on all
levels that he stops and rightly acknowledges, when he reflects on the commandment’s meaning, the extent to which the historical spectacle of a humanity
that chose it as its ideal is quite unconvincing, when that ideal is measured
against actual accomplishments.

他发现反对的每样东西,可用这个词句来总结。如同他引述的例子证实,就在最合法的ευδαιμονία ,在他停止与他适当地承认的所有的层次,当他反思命令的意义,人性的历史的景象选择它充当理想,相当难以说服人的程度。当那个理想被衡量,对抗实际的成就。

I have already referred to what it is that arouses Freud’s horror, arouses
the horror of the civilized man he essentially was. It derives from the evil in
which he doesn’t hestitate to locate man’s deepest heart.

我已经提到它召唤起弗洛依德的恐惧的本质,召唤他本质上作为文明人的恐惧。它从这个邪恶演变而来。在邪恶那里,他没有犹豫地定位人的内心最深处。

I don’t really need to emphasize the point where I bring my two threads
together to form a knot. Man’s rebellion is involved here, the rebellion of
Jederman, of everyman, insofar as he aspires to happiness. The truth that
man seeks happiness remains true. The resistance to the commandment “Thou
shalt love they neighbor as thyself” and the resistance that is exercised to
prevent his access to jouissance are one and the same thing.

我并没有真的需要强调这点, 在那里,我聚拢我的两的脉络,形成一个环结。人的反叛在此被牵涉,每个人的反叛,因为他渴望快乐。人寻求快乐的这个真理始终是真实的。对于「你应该爱你的邻居如同你自己」这个命令的抗拒,跟被运用为了阻止他接近欢爽的抗拒,是完全相同的事情。

Stated thus, this may seem an additional paradox, a gratuitous assertion.
Yet don’t you recognize there what we refer to in the most routine way each
time we see a subject retreat from his own jouissance? What are we drawing
attention to? To the unconscious aggression that jouissance contains, to the
frightening core of the destrudo, which, in spite of all our feminine affectations
and quibbles, we constantly find ourselves confronting in our analytical
experience.

从这种方式被陈述,这似乎是额外的悖论,无缘由的主张。可是,你们难道没有体认出,我们用最日常的方式提到的东西,每次我们看到一个主体从他自己的欢爽撤退? 我们正注意到什么?注意到欢爽所包括的无意识的侵凌性,注意到毁灭的可怕核心。尽管我们所有的女性的情感与争吵,我们不断地发现我们自己在精神分析经验,面临这个毁灭的可怕核心。

Whether or not this view is ratified in the name of some preconceived view
of nature, it is nevertheless true that at the heart of everything Freud taught,
one finds the following: the energy of the so-called superego derives from the
aggression that the subject turns back upon himself.

无论这个观点是否被认同,以自然的某个预先构想的观点,这仍然是真实的,在弗洛依德教导的每件事情的核心,我们找到以下:所谓的超我的精力从这个侵凌性获得,主体将这个侵凌性还击在自己身上。

Freud goes out of his way to add the supplementary notion that, once one
has entered on that path, once the process has been begun, then there is no
longer any limit; it generates ever more powerful aggression in the self. It
generates it at the limit, that is to say, insofar as the mediation of the Law is
lacking. Of the Law insofar as it comes from elsewhere, from the elsewhere,
moreover, where its guarantor is lacking, the guarantor who provides its warranty,
namely, God himself.

弗洛依德刻意出来补充这个辅助的观念,一旦我们已经进入那条途径,一旦这个过程已经开始,就不再有任何限制。它产生越来越强烈的侵凌性,在自性身上。它在限制处产生它,换句话说,法则的中介是欠缺的。因为这个法则来自别的地方,而且来自这个别的地方,在那里,法则的保证书欠缺的,提供它的保证的保证者,也就是上帝的本身。

To say that the retreat from “Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” is
the same thing as the barrier to jouissance, and not its opposite, is, therefore,
not an original proposition.

说出从「你应该爱你的邻居如同你自己」的这个撤退,等于是说相同的事情,跟「欢爽的阻碍」,而不是它的相反,因此,并不是一个原初的命题。

I retreat from loving my neighbor as myself because there is something on
the horizon there that is engaged in some form of intolerable cruelty. In that
sense, to love one’s neighbor may be the crudest of choices.

我从爱我的邻居如同我自己撤退,因为在地平线有某件东西,以无法忍受的残酷的形态正在进军。以那种意义,爱我们的邻居如同我们自己可能是最残酷的选择。

That, then, is the nicely whetted edge of the paradox I am asserting here.
No doubt in order to give it its full weight, one should take it step by step,
so that by understanding the way in which that intimate line of demarcation
appears, we may not so much know as feel the ups and downs to be found
on its path.

我正在从主张的这个悖论,它的边缘因此被精致地激化。无可置疑,为了给予它充分的重量,我们应该逐步地从事它。所以,凭借了解,亲密的分水岭出现,我们与其说是知道,不然说是感觉到在其途中能够找到它的起伏。

We have, of course, long learned to recognize in our analytical experience
the jouissance of trangression. But we are far from knowing what its nature
might be. In this respect our position is ambiguous. Everybody knows that
we have restored full civil rights to perversion. We have dubbed it a compo
nent drive, thereby employing the idea that it harmonizes with a totality, and
at the same time shedding suspicion on the research, which was revolutionary
at a certain moment in the nineteenth century, of Krafft-Ebing with his monumental
Psychopathia Sexualis, or also on the work of Havelock Ellis.

当然,我们长久以来学会这位们的精神分析经验体认逾越的欢爽。但是我们丝毫不知道它的特性是什么。在这一方面,我们的立场是暧昧的。众所周知,我们将完整的公民权利恢复成为变态。我们称它为成分的冲动,因此使用这个观念:它与整体性和谐,同时又对于这个革命性的研究流露怀疑。在十九世纪的某个时刻,克拉夫特、阿炳的研究,用它伟大的「精神病理的性」,或怀疑哈维拉克、阿利斯的研究。

Incidentally, I don’t want to fail to give the latter’s work the kind of thumbs
down I think it deserves. It offers amazing examples of a lack of systematicity
– not the failure of a method, but the choice of a failed method. The so-called
scientific objectivity that is exhibited in books that amount to no more than
a random collection of documents offers a living example of the combination
of a certain “foolery” with the sort of “knavery,” a fundamental knavery,
that I invoked last time as the characteristic of a certain kind of thought
known as left-wing, without excluding the possibility of its spreading its stain
to other domains. In short, if I recommend reading Havelock Ellis, it is simply
in order to show you the difference, not just in results but in tone, that
exists between such a futile mode of investigation and what Freud’s thought
and experience reintroduce into the domain – it’s simply a question of
responsibility.

偶然地,我一定想要给予后者的研究我认为它应得到不赞同。它提供一些令人惊奇欠缺系统化的例子。不是方法的失败,而是选择一种失败的方法。在书里展示的所谓的科学的客观性,相当于仅仅是任意的文集提供活生生的例子,组合某种的「愚行」跟某种的「恶棍」,一种基本的恶棍。我上次召唤,作为表现众所周知的左翼的某种思想的特征,没有排除这个可能性:它扩展它的污点到其他的领域。总之,假如我推荐阅读哈维拉克、阿利斯,那仅是为了跟你们显示这个差异,不仅用结果,而用语气,这个差异存在于徒劳的研究模式,与弗洛依的的思想与经验重新介绍到这个领域的东西之间。那仅是责任的问题。

We are familiar with the jouissance of transgression, then. But what does it
consist of? Does it go without saying that to trample sacred laws under foot,
laws that may be directly challenged by the subject’s conscience, itself excites
some form of jouissance? We no doubt constantly see the strange development
in a subject that might be described as the testing of a faceless fate or as a
risk that, once it has been survived by the subject, somehow guarantees him
of his power. Doesn’t the Law that is defied here play the role of a means, of
a path cleared that leads straight to the risk? Yet if the path is necessary,
what is the risk that is involved? What is the goal jouissance seeks if it has to
find support in transgression to reach it?

因此,我们对于逾越的欢爽耳熟能详。但是它由什么组成?它难道不是自不待言?将神圣的法则践踏在脚下,可能会被主体的良性挑战的法则,它的本身激发某种的欢爽?无可置疑,我们不断地看见奇怪的发展,在可能被描述作为是没有脸孔的命运的测试的主体,或是作为一种冒险,一旦主体经历它活下来。用某种的方式替他保证他的权利。在此被挑衅的法则难道不是扮演一个工具的角色,被清理的途径,直接导致冒险?可是,假如这个途径是必须的,牵涉到的冒险是什么?欢爽寻找到目标是什么?假如它必须在逾越中找到支持,为了到达它?

I leave these questions open for the moment so as to move on. If the subject
turns back on his tracks, what is it that guides this backtracking? On this
point, we find a more motivated response in analysis; we are told that it is
the identification with the other that arises at the extreme moment in one of
our temptations. And by extreme here I do not mean it has to do with
extraordinary temptations, but with the moment when one perceives their
consequences.

我暂时留下这些问题,没有回答,为了继续前进。假如主体回转他的轨道,是什么引导他从事回转追踪?对于这点,我们在精神分析找到一个更加具有动机的回答。我们被告知,在极端的时刻,对于大他者的认同产生,在我们的其中的一个诱惑。凭借这里的极端,我并不意味着它跟特别的诱惑有关系,而是跟我们感知它们的结果的时刻有关系。

We retreat from what? From assaulting the image of the other, because it
was the image on which we were formed as an ego. Here we find the convincing
power of altruism. Here, too, is the leveling power of a certain law of
equality – that which is formulated in the notion of the general will. The
latter is no doubt the common denominator of the respect for certain rights
– which, for a reason that escapes me, are called elementary rights – but it
can also take the form of excluding from its boundaries, and therefore from
its protection, everything that is not integrated into its various registers.

我们从什么撤退?从攻击大他者的意象撤退,因为就是根据这个意象,我们被形成作为一个自我。在此,我们发现利他主义的令人信服的力量。在此就是某个平等法则的夷平力量。它在普遍性意志的观念里被说明。后者无可置疑是对于某些权利的尊敬的共同结果。但是它也採取从它的边界排除的形式。因此,从它的保护,排除一切没有合并进入它的各种的铭记里。

And the power of expansion is also seen in what I expressed last time as
the utilitarian tendency. At this level of homogenization, the law of utility,
as that which implies its distribution over the greatest number, imposes itself
in a form that is effectively innovative. It is an enchanting power, scorn for
which is sufficiently indicated in the eyes of us analysts when we call it philanthropy,
but which also raises the questions of the natural basis of pity in
the sense implied by that morality of feeling which has always sought its
foundation there.

扩展到力量也被看见,在我上次表达作为功利主义的倾向。在同质化的这个层次,利用的法则,作为暗示它的分配,对于最大多数的人们,赋加它自己,以非常有效地革新的形式。这是一个迷人的力量,藐视这个力量,充分地指示,在我们精神分析家的眼中,当我们称它为慈善。但是它也提出这个问题:根据感觉到那个道德暗示的意义,同情的自然的基础是什么?因为感觉总是在那里寻找它的基础。

We are, in effect, at one with everything that depends on the image of the
other as our fellow man, on the similarity we have to our ego and to everything
that situates us in the imaginary register. What is the question I am
raising here, when it seems to be obvious that the very foundation of the law
“Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” is to be found there?

实际上,我们跟每一样依靠他者作为我们同胞的意象的东西一致。依靠我们拥有的类似我们的自我,类似每一样将我们定位在想象的铭记的东西。我在此正在提出的问题是什么?当显而易见地,它似乎是法则的基础:「你应该爱你的邻居如你自然」,应该在那里被找到吗?

It is indeed the same other that is concerned here. Yet one only has to stop
for a moment to see how obvious and striking the practical contradictions are
– individual, inner contradictions as well as social ones – of the idealization
expressed relative to the respect that I formulated for the image of the other.
It implies a certain continuity and filiation of problematic effects on the religious
law, which is expressed and manifested historically by the paradoxes of
its extremes, i.e., the extremes of saintliness, and moreover by its failure on
the social level, insofar as it never manages to achieve fulfillment, reconciliation,
or the establishment on earth of what is promised by it.

这确实相同的他者在此被牵涉到。可是,我们只要暂停一刻,我们就会看出那些实际的矛盾是多么明显与引人注意。个人的内在的矛盾以及社会的矛盾,理想化的矛盾被表达,相对于我阐释的对于他者的意象的尊敬。它暗示着某些的继续与孝顺,对于宗教的法则的问题重重的影响。它在历史上被表现与显示,凭借它的极端的悖论。譬如,圣者的极端,而且凭借它在社会层次的失败。因为它从来没有成功于完成实现,协调,或是在世界上建立被它许诺的东西。

To emphasize the point even more strongly, I will refer directly to something
that seems to be opposed to this denunciation of the image, that is to
the statement which is always listened to with a kind of more-or-less amused
purr of satisfaction, “God made man in his own image.” Religious tradition
once again reveals more cunning in pointing to the truth than the approach
of psychological philosophy imagines.

为了更加强烈地强调这一点,我将直接提到某件东西,似乎是跟这个意象的抨击对立的东西,跟这个陈述对立。这个陈述总是被倾听,带着某种满意的有趣的口哨。「上帝以他的形象创造人类」。宗教的传统再一次显示更加的狡猾,指向这个真理,比起精神分析哲学想象的方法。

You can’t get away with answering that man no doubt paid God back in
kind. The statement in question is of the same inspiration, the same body,
as the holy book in which is expressed the prohibition on forging images of
God. If this prohibition has a meaning, it is that images are deceitful.
Why is that? Let’s go to what is simplest: if these are beautiful images –
and goodness only knows that religious images always correspond by definition
to reigning canons of beauty – one doesn’t notice that they are always
hollow images. Moreover, man, too, as image is interesting for the hollow
the image leaves empty – by reason of the fact that one doesn’t see in the
image, beyond the capture of the image, the emptiness of God to be discovered.
It is perhaps man’s plenitude, but it is also there that God leaves him
with emptiness.

你们无法闪躲这个回答:人类无可置疑地用同样方式回报上帝。受到质疑的这个陈述属于相同的灵感,相同的身体,作为这本圣书,上帝的铸造的意象的禁止被表达。假如这个禁止具有意义,那是因为这些意象具有欺骗性。为什么是那样呢?让我们探究即使是单纯的东西:假如有这些美丽的意象,只有天晓得,那些宗教的意象总是用定义对应美的支配信条。我们没有注意到,它们总是空洞的意象。而且,人类也是空洞的意象,因为空洞的人对意象感到興趣,意象让他们显得空洞。凭借这个事实:我们并没有在意象看见应该被发现的上帝的空洞,超越这个意象的补捉。这或许是人类的丰富性,但是也是在那里,上帝留置人类于空洞当中。

Now God’s power resides in the capacity to advance into emptiness. All of
that gives us the figures of the apparatus of a domain in which the recognition
of another reveals itself as an adventure. The meaning of the word recognition
tends toward that which it assumes in every exploration, with all the accents
of militancy and of nostalgia we can invest in it.

Sade is at this limit.

现在上帝的力量驻居在前进进入空洞的这个能力。所有这一切给予我们一个领域的工具的那些人物。在这个领域,另外一个领域的体认显示它自己,作为一种冒险。「体认」这个字词的意义倾向于在每个探索它所认为的东西,以各种强调好战与怀旧,我们能够投注在它上面。

萨德就在这个极限。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 188

March 16, 2013

Ethic 188
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XIV
第14章

KANTI A N TALES
康德的故事

4
Before I take up the question next time, I would like to end today by making
you sense this in connection with a contemporary example, namely, Kant’s,
which I have already devoted some time to – and it’s not for nothing that it
is contemporary with Sade.

在我下次从事这个问题之前,我今天想要结束,让你们理解这点,关于当代的一个例子。换句话说,康德的例子。我曾经专注一段时间在这个例子。它跟萨德是同时代,并非没有意义。

In the example in question Kant claims to prove the weight of the Law,
formulated by him as practical reason, as something that imposes itself in
purely reasonable terms, that is to say, divorced from all pathological affect,
as he puts it, which means with no motive that appeals to the subject’s interest.
This is a critical exercise that will bring us back to the very center of the
problem we are addressing today.

在受到置疑的这个例子,康德宣称证明法则的重量,由他阐释的作为实践理性的法则,作为某件东西赋加它自己本身,用纯粹理性的术语。换句话说,跟所有的病理的情意脱离。如他所表达它。这意味著,不具有讨好主体的興趣的动机。这是一个批评性的运用,将会带领我们回到我们今天正在处理的难题的核心。

Let me remind you that Kant’s example is made up of two little stories.
The first concerns the individual who is placed in the situation of being executed
on his way out, if he wants to spend time with the lady whom he desires
unlawfully – it’s not a waste of time to emphasize this, because even the
apparently simplest details constitute traps. The other case is that of someone
who lives at the court of a despot and who is put in the position of either
bearing false witness against someone who, as a result, will lose his life or of
being put to death himself if he doesn’t do it.

让我提醒你们,康德的例子由两个小故事组成。第一个故事牵涉到这个个人,他被放置在这个情境:当他走出时,他会被执行死刑。假如他想要花时间跟他非法欲望的这位女人在一块。这并不是时间的浪费,强调这点。因为即使显而易见的单纯的细节,都会形成陷阱。另外一个情境是,某个人生活于暴君的法庭,他被迫做这个选择:要就作虚假的证词,对于某人不利。结果,这个人将会丧失他的生命。要不,假如他不做这个证词,他自己会被处死。

Thereupon, Kant, our dear Kant, tells us in all his innocence, his innocent
subterfuge, that in the first case everyone, every man of good sense, will say
no. For the sake of spending a night with a woman, no one would be mad
enough to accept an outcome that would be fatal to him, since it isn’t a question
of combat but of death by hanging. For Kant, the answer to the question
is not in doubt.

因此,康德,我们亲爱的康德,告诉非常纯真地我们,他的纯真的错误的例子。在第一个例子,每个人,每个具有清楚理智的人,都会说不。为了花费一个晚上跟一位女人在一块,没有人会如此疯狂,以致接受对他将会是致命的结果。因为这并不是博斗的问题,而是吊死刑的问题。对于康德,这个问题的回答并没有受到置疑。

In the other case, whatever the degree of pleasure promised as a result of
bearing false witness or whatever the harshness of the penalty following the
refusal to bear such witness, one can at least assume that the subject stops to
reflect for a moment. One might even conceive that, rather than bear false
witness, the subject will envisage accepting his own death in the name of the
so-called categorical imperative. In effect, if an assault on the goods, the life,
or the honor of someone else were to become a universal rule, that would
throw the whole of man’s universe into a state of disorder and evil.
Can’t we stop here and offer our critique?

在另外一个情况,无论由于作虚假证词的结果,被许诺的快乐有多高,或是跟随着拒绝做虚假证词的惩罚有多严厉,我们至少能够假定,主体会停下来反思一下。我们甚至可以构想,非但没有做虚假见证,主体将会构想接受他自己的死亡,以所谓的范畴的命令。实际上,假如对于货物,生命,或是某个人的恐惧的攻击,变成普遍性的法则,那将会将整个的人的宇宙完全陷入混乱与邪恶。我们在此难道不能停下来提供我们的批判?

The striking significance of the first example resides in the fact that the
night spent with the lady is paradoxically presented to us as a pleasure that
is weighed against a punishment to be undergone; it is an opposition which
homogenizes them. There is in terms of pleasure a plus and a minus. I will
not quote the worst examples – in his Essay on Negative Greatness, Kant
discusses the feelings of the Spartan mother who learns of the death of her
son on the field of honor. And the little mathematical calculation Kant makes
concerning the pleasure the family derives from the glory, from which one
has to deduct the pain felt at the boy’s loss, is quite touching. But it is important
to note that one only has to make a conceptual shift and move the night
spent with the lady from the category of pleasure to that of jouissance, given
that jouissance implies precisely the acceptance of death – and there’s no need
of sublimation – for the example to be ruined.

第一个例子引人注意的重要性,在于这个事实:跟那个女人在一块的夜晚很矛盾地被呈现给予我们,作为一种被衡量的快乐,对比于需要被经历的惩罚。这是一种让它们同等化的对立。用快乐的术语来说,有加法与减法。我将不引述最糟糕的例子。在他的论文「负面的伟大」 康德讨论史巴达人作为母亲的感觉。当她知道她的儿子死于荣誉战场。康德所做到这个小小的数学的计算,关于家庭从这个荣誉获得的快乐。从那里,我们必须推论丧失儿子感觉到的痛苦。这是相当感人的。但是重要的是要注意到,我们只要做一个观念的改变,将跟女人在一块度过一个夜晚,从快乐的范畴移动到欢爽jouissance的范畴,假如考虑到,欢爽确实暗示着接受死亡。那就没有升华的需要,为了让这个例子被毁灭。

In other words, it is enough for jouissance to be a form of evil, for the whole
thing to change its character completely, and for the meaning of the moral
law itself to be completely changed. Anyone can see that if the moral law is,
in effect, capable of playing some role here, it is precisely as a support for the
jouissance involved; it is so that the sin becomes what Saint Paul calls inordinately
sinful. That’s what Kant on this occasion simply ignores.

换句话说,让欢爽成为是邪恶的形式,就足够让整个事情完全改变它的特性,足够让道德法则本身的意义完全地被改变。任何人都能够看出,假如道德法则实际上能够在此扮演某个角色,那确实是作为牵涉到的欢爽的支持。所以这个原罪就成为圣保留所谓的极度的原罪。那是在这个场合,康德仅是忽略的东西。

Then there is the other example, whose little errors of logic should not,
between ourselves, be overlooked. The circumstances involved are somewhat
different. In the first case, pleasure and pain are presented as a single packet
to take or leave, in consideration of which one avoids the risk and gives up
jouissance. In the second case, there is pleasure or pain. It’s not insignificant
that I underline it, for this choice is destined to produce in you a certain
effect of a fortiori, as a result of which you may be deceived about the real
significance of the question.

因此,还有另外一个例子。我们私下而言,它的逻辑的小错误不应被忽略。牵涉到的环境是相当不同。在第一个情境,快乐与痛苦被呈现作为单一包裹,要就接受,要不然拉倒。由于考虑到这个,我们避避这个冒险,并且放弃欢爽。在第二个情况,快乐或痛苦,由你选择。我强调它,并非不重要,因为这个选择注定会在你们身上产生某种更显著理由的效应。由于这个效应的结果,你们可能会被欺骗,关于这个问题的真实的意义。

What’s at issue here? That I attack the rights of another who is my fellow
man in that statement of the universal rule, or is it a question of the false
witness as such?

在此受到争议的什么?我攻击另外一个人的权利。他是我的同胞,就普遍性法则的那个陈述而言。或是问题会使这个虚假的证词本身?

And what if I changed the example a little? Let’s talk about true witness,
about a case of conscience which is raised if I am summoned to inform on my
neighbor or my brother for activities which are prejudicial to the security of
the state. That question is of a kind that shifts the emphasis placed on the
universal rule.

万一我稍微改变这个例子,结果是如何?让我们谈论真实的证人,关于一个良心的个案。这个个案被提出,假如我被召唤去告知我的邻居,或我的兄弟,因为一些对于国家的安全有威胁的活动。那个问题属于会改变放置在普遍性原则的强调。

And I who stand here right now and bear witness to the idea that there is
no law of the good except in evil and through evil, should I bear such witness?

我现在站在这里,见证这个观念:没有善的法则存在,除了在邪恶当中,或通过邪恶。我应该作这个见证吗?

This Law makes my neighbor’s jouissance the point on which, in bearing
witness in this case, the meaning of my duty is balanced. Must I go toward
my duty of truth insofar as it preserves the authentic place of my jouissance,
even if it is empty? Or must I resign myself to this he, which, by making me
substitute forcefully the good for the principle of my jouissance, commands
me to blow alternatively hot and cold? Either I refrain from betraying my
neighbor so as to spare my fellow man or I shelter behind my fellow man so
as to give up my jouissance.
March 20, I960

这个法则让我的邻居的欢爽成为这个要点,当我在这个情况作见证时,我的责任的意义被平衡。我必须朝向我的真理的责任迎向前去吗?因为它保持我的欢爽的真诚的位置,即使那是空洞的位置?或是,我必须顺从于这个他,凭借强迫我用这个善替换我的欢爽的原则,他命令我轮流地选择前者及后者。我要就是抑制著不要背叛我的邻居,为了替我的同胞免过一劫。或是我躲藏在我的同胞背后,为了放弃我的欢爽。
1960年,3月20日

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 182

March 16, 2013

Ethic 182
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XIV
第14章

FOOL AND KNAVE
傻瓜与恶棍

THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH
关于真理的真理

WHY JOUISSANCE IS EVIL1
为什么欢爽是邪恶

SAINT MARTIN
圣马丁

KANTI A N TALES
康德的故事

2
To the extent that a sensitive subject such as ethics is not nowadays separable
from what is called ideology, it seems to me appropriate to offer here some
clarification of the political meaning of this turning point in ethics for which
we, the inheritors of Freud, are responsible

像伦理学这样的敏感议题,跟今天所谓的意识形态会混淆不清。我觉得这是适当的,在此提供某些的澄清,对于伦理学的这个转捩点的政治意义。我们作为弗洛依德的继承人,要负这个责任。

That is why I spoke of master-fools. This expression may seem impertinent,
indeed not exempt from a certain excess. I would like to make clear here what in my view is involved.

那就是为什么我谈到主人-傻瓜。这个表达似乎并不中肯。确实无法免除某种的过度。我想要在此澄清我认为会牵涉到的东西。

There was a time, an already distant time right at the beginning of our
Society, you will remember, when we spoke of intellectuals in connection
with Plato’s Meno. I would like to make a few condensed comments on the
subject, but I believe they will prove to be illuminating.

有段时间,已经非常遥远的时间,在我们的社会的开始,你们将会记得,当我们谈论到关于柏拉图的「芝诺」的知识份子。我想要从事几句精炼的评论,对于这个议题。但是我相信它们证明是具有启发性。

It was noted then that, for a long time now, there have been left-wing
intellectuals and right-wing intellectuals. I would like to give you formulas
for them that, however categorical they may appear at first sight, might
nevertheless help to illuminate the way.

我们因此注意到,现在有段长时间,曾经有左派的知识份子与右派的知识份子。我想要给予你们有关他们的公式。乍然一看,他们它们似乎非常范畴性质,可是,它们有助于启发途径。

“Fool” (sot) or, if you like, “simpleton” (demeuri) – quite a nice term for
which I have a certain fondness – these words only express approximately a
certain something for which the English language and its literature seem to
me to offer a more helpful signifier – I will come back to this later. A tradition
that begins with Chaucer, but which reaches its full development in the
theater of the Elizabethan period is, in effect, centered on the term “fool.”2
The “fool” is an innocent, a simpleton, but truths issue from his mouth
that are not simply tolerated but adopted, by virtue of the fact that this “fool”
is sometimes clothed in the insignia of the jester. And in my view it is a
similar happy shadow, a similar fundamental “foolery,” that accounts for the
importance of the left-wing intellectual.

「傻瓜」或是「笨蛋」,这是我有点喜欢的一个很好的术语。这些字词仅是大约表的某种东西。我觉得英文语言及其文章似乎提供更加有帮助的能指。我后来再回头谈论这个。从乔塞开始时的传统,但是到达它充分的发展,在伊莉莎白时期的戏院。实际上,它集中在傻瓜这个术语。「傻瓜」是一位纯真者,一个笨蛋,但是真理从他的嘴巴发出,不仅被容忍,而且被採纳,由于这个事实:这位「傻瓜」有时穿着弄臣的标志。我认为,这是一个同样的快乐的阴影,一个基本的「傻瓜动作」,解释为什么左派知识份子的重要性。

And I contrast this with the designation for that which the same tradition
furnishes a strictly contemporary term, a term that is used in conjunction
with the former, namely, “knave” – if we have the time, I will show you the
texts, which are numerous and unambiguous.

我用这个指称跟这个对照。这个相同的传统供应给它一个非常当代的术语。这一个术语被使用,跟前者有关联,也就是「恶棍」。假如我们有时间,我将跟你们显示这些无数而清楚的文本。

At a certain level of its usage “knave” may be translated into French as
valet, but “knave” goes further. He’s not a cynic with the element of heroism
implied by that attitude. He is, to be precise, what Stendhal called an
“unmitigated scoundrel.” That is to say, no more than your Mr. Everyman,
but your Mr. Everyman with greater strength of character.

在它的用途的某个层次,「恶棍」可以被翻译成为法文,作为valet,但是「恶棍」意义更深。他并不是一位愤世者,具有那个态度暗示的英雄主义的因素。准确地说,他史坦达尔所谓的「实实在在的坏蛋」。换句话说,仅仅是你们的日常人物,但是你们的日常人物具有较强的人格力量。

Everyone knows that a certain way of presenting himself, which constitutes
part of the ideology of the right-wing intellectual, is precisely to play
the role of what he is in fact, namely, a “knave.” In other words, he doesn’t
retreat from the consequences of what is called realism; that is, when required,
he admits he’s a crook.

众所周知,某种呈现他自己的方式,形成右派知识份子的意识形态的部分。那确实就是要扮演他实质上所谓的「恶棍」的角色。换句话说,他并没有从所谓的现实主义的结果撤退下来。换句话说,当被要求的时候,他承认他是骗子。

This is only of interest if one considers things from the point of view of
their result. After all, a crook is certainly worth a fool, at least for the entertainment
he gives, if the result of gathering crooks into a herd did not inevitably
lead to a collective foolery. That is what makes the politics of rightwing
ideology so depressing.

只有当我们从他们的结果的观点来考虑事情,这才会引起興趣。毕竟,犯罪者确实值得当傻瓜,至少,对于他给予的娱乐,假如将骗子聚集成一群,并不必然导致形成一个傻瓜集团。那就是为什么右翼的意识形态的政治如此令人沮丧的地方。

But what is not sufficiently noted is that by a curious chiasma, the “foolery”
which constitutes the individual style of the left-wing intellectual gives
rise to a collective “knavery.”

但是并没有充分被注意到的是,凭借一个耐人寻味的罅隙,这个「傻瓜行为」形成左翼知识份子的个人风格,产生一个「恶棍集团」。

What I am proposing here for you to reflect on has, I don’t deny, the
character of a confession. Those of you who know me are aware of my reading
habits; you know which weeklies lie around on my desk. The thing I
enjoy most, I must admit, is the spectacle of collective knavery exhibited in
them – that innocent chicanery, not to say calm impudence, which allows
them to express so many heroic truths without wanting to pay the price. It is
thanks to this that what is affirmed concerning the horrors of Mammon on
the first page leads, on the last, to purrs of tenderness for this same Mammon.

我不否认,我在此跟你们建议要反思的问题,拥有忏悔的特质。你们那些了解我的人们,知道我的阅读习惯,你们知道我的书桌上摆着怎样的周刊。我必须承认,我最喜欢的东西,是恶棍集团的景象被展示在它们上面。那个纯真的骗术,更不用说,镇定的不谨慎。让他们表达这么多的英雄式的真理,而没有想要付出代价。由于这个,关于在第一页,对于财神的恐惧所被肯定的东西,在最后一页,导致对于这位相同的财神温情讨好。

Freud was perhaps not a good father, but he was neither a crook nor an
imbecile. That is why one can say about him two things which are disconcerting
in their connection and their opposition. He was a humanitarian –
who after checking his works will contest that? – and we must acknowledge
it, however discredited the term might be by the crooks on the right. But,
on the other hand, he wasn’t a simpleton, so that one can say as well, and we
have the texts to prove it, that he was no progressive.

弗洛依德或许并不是一位好父亲,但是他既不是骗子,也不是白痴。那就是为什么关于他我们能够说两件令人困窘的事情,跟他们有关,也对他们不利。他是一位人道主义者。阅读过他的著作之后,有谁会怀疑这点?我们必须承认它,无论这个术语是多么不光彩,由于右翼知识份子这部的骗子。但是在另一方面来说,他并不是傻瓜。所以,我们也能够说,我们拥有文本来证明它。他并不是什么进步份子。

I am sorry but it’s a fact, Freud was in no way a progressive. And as far as
this is concerned, there are even some extraordinarily scandalous things in
his writings. From the pen of one of our guides, the little optimism manifested for the perspectives opened by the masses is certainly apt to shock, but it is indispensable for us to remember that, if we want to know where we stand.

我很抱歉,这是一个事实。弗洛依德根本不是进步份子。就这个术语而言,在他的著作里,甚至还有一些特别丑闻的事情。从我们一位引导者的笔端,这个小小的乐观主义被展现,作为群众展开的观点。它确实倾向于令人震撼,但是这是无可免除的,我们要记住,假如我们想要知道我们的立场在哪里。

You will see in what follows the usefulness of such remarks, which may
appear crude.

你们将会看出,跟随在这些的谈论的用途之后是什么,那看起来可能你简陋。

One of my friends and patients had a dream which bore the traces of some
yearning or other stimulated in him by the formulations of this seminar, a
dream in which someone cried out concerning me, “But why doesn’t he tell
the truth about truth?”

我的一位朋友与病人曾做过一个梦。那个梦带有某些渴望的痕迹,由于这个研讨班的阐述在他的身上所激发。在这一个梦当中,某个人大声喊叫关于我,「他为什么不说出有关真理的真理?」

I quote this, since it is an impatience that I have heard expressed by a great
many in other forms than dreams. The formula is true to a certain extent – I
perhaps don’t tell the truth about truth. But haven’t you noticed that in
wanting to tell it – something that is the chief preoccupation of those who
are called metaphysicians – it often happens that not much truth is left?
That’s what is so risky about such a pretension. It is a pretension that so
easily lands us at the level of a certain knavery. And isn’t there also a certain
“knavery,” a metaphysical “knavery,” when one of our modern treatises on
metaphysics, under this guise of the truth about truth, lets a great many
things by which truly ought not to be let by?

我引述这个,因为这是一种不耐烦,我曾经听过被许多人表达,用不仅是梦的方式。这个公式真实到某个程度。我或许没有说出有关真理的真理。但是你们难道没有注意到,当我想要说出它时,那是某件东西,那些所谓的形上物理学家的主要关注,经常发生的是,并没有很多真理被留下?那就是有关如此的伪装,如此岌岌可危。那一种伪装如此容易让我们降落到某种恶棍的层次。难道不是也有某种的「恶棍」,形上学的「恶棍」,当一篇探讨形上学的现代论文,以有关真理的真理作为伪装,让很多不应该被引导的事情被引导?

I am content to tell the truth of the first stage and to proceed step by step.
When I say that Freud is a humanitarian but not a progressive, I say something
true. Let’s try to follow the thread and take another true step.

我很满足地说出第一阶段的真理,并且逐步前进。当我说弗洛依德是一位人道主义者,而不是一位进步份子。我说出某件真实的东西。让我们尝试追寻这个脉络,採取另外的真实的步骤。

We started out from the truth, which we must take to be a truth if we
follow Freud’s analysis, that we know God is dead.

我们从真理开始,我们必须将这个真理视为是一个真理,假如我们遵循弗洛依德的精神分析,我们知道上帝已经死了。

However, the next step is that God himself doesn’t know that. And one
may suppose that he never will know it because he has always been dead.
This formula nevertheless leads us to something that we have to resolve here,
to something that remains on our hands from this adventure, something that
changes the bases of the ethical problem, namely, that jouissance still remains
forbidden as it was before, before we knew that God was dead.

可是,下一步就是,上帝自己并不知道自己已经死了。我们可能认为,上帝永远不会知道它,因为他总是已经死了。可是,这个公式引导我们到某件我们在此必须要解决的东西。引导我们到某件从这个冒险开始就一直在我们手中的东西,某件改变伦理学问题的基础的东西。换句话说,享乐jouissance依旧始终被禁止,如同以前那样。在我们知道上帝已经死亡之前。

That’s what Freud says. And that’s the truth – if not the truth about truth,
then at least the truth about what Freud has to say.

那就是弗洛依德所说的。那就是真理—虽然并不是有关真理的真理。至少是有关弗洛依德必须说出的真理。

As a result, if we continue to follow Freud in a text such as Civilization
and Its Discontents, we cannot avoid the formula that jouissance is evil. Freud
leads us by the hand to this point: it is suffering because it involves suffering
for my neighbor.

结果,假如我们继续遵循弗洛依德,在「文明与其不满」这样的文本。我们无法避免这个公式:欢爽是邪恶。弗洛依德引导我们的手到达这一点。这是痛苦,因为它牵涉到作为我的邻居的痛苦。

This may shock you, upset certain habits, cause consternation among the
happy souls. But it can’t be helped; that’s what Freud says. And he says it at
the point of origin of our experience. He wrote Civilization and Its Discontents
to tell us this. That’s what was increasingly announced, promulgated, publicized,
as analytical experience progressed. It has a name; it’s what is known
as beyond the pleasure principle. And it has effects that are by no means
metaphysical; they oscillate between a “certainly not” and a “perhaps.”

这可能让你们惊吓,扰乱某些习惯,引起快乐的灵魂们困窘。但是这是不得已的事,那就是弗洛依德所说的内容。他说出它,在我们精神分析经验的起源的时刻。他写「文明及其不满」来告诉我们这些。那是逐渐被宣佈,被陈述,被公开的东西,随着精神分析经验的进展。它有一个名字;那就是众所周知的「超越快乐原则」。它具有的影响决非是形上学。它们摇摆于「当然没有」与「或许」之间。

Those who like fairy stories turn a deaf ear to talk of man’s innate tendencies
to “evil, aggression, destruction, and thus also to cruelty.” And Freud’s
text goes on: “Man tries to satisfy his need for aggression at the expense of
his neighbor, to exploit his work without compensation, to use him sexually
without his consent, to appropriate his goods, to humiliate him, to inflict
suffering on him, to torture and kill him.”3

那些喜欢仙女童话故事的人们,拒绝倾听这种谈论:「人的本质具有邪恶,侵凌性,毁灭的倾向,因此也具有残酷的倾向。」弗洛依德的文本继续说:「人尝试满足他的侵凌性的需求,以牺牲他的邻居作为代价,剥削他的工作,没有给予补偿,没有经过人家同样就利用他的性,侵夺他的货物,羞辱他,给予对方痛苦,折磨及杀死他。

If I hadn’t told you the title of the work from which this passage comes, I
could have pretended it was from Sade. Moreover, my upcoming lecture will,
in effect, concern the Sadean account of the problem of morality.
For the time being, we will stick to Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents
concerns the effort to rethink the problem of evil once one acknowledges that
it is radically altered by the absence of God. This problem has always been
avoided by the moralists in a way that is literally calculated to arouse our
disgust once we have been alerted to the terms of the experience.

假如我当时没有告诉你们我引述的这个段落的这本著作的书名,我本来可以伪装那是从萨德引述而来。而且,我即将来临的这场演说,事实上,将会牵涉到萨德对于道德问题的描述。目前,我们将会留在弗洛依德这里。「文明及其不满」牵涉到这个努力,要重新思考邪恶的问题,一旦我们承认,它因为上帝的缺席而会强烈地改变。这个问题总是被道德家避免,用的方式实质上被设计要引起我们的厌恶,一旦我们已经警觉到这个经验的这些术语。

Whoever he might be, the traditional moralist always falls back into the
rut of persuading us that pleasure is a good, that the path leading to good is
blazed by pleasure. The trap is striking, for it has a paradoxical character
that lends it its air of audacity. One is, so to speak, swindled in the second
degree; one assumes there is just a hidden drawer, and one is pleased to have
found it, but one is screwed even more when one has found it than if one
hadn’t even suspected its existence. Something that is relatively rare, for
everyone can see that there’s something fishy.

无论他是谁,传统的道德家总是掉回这个窠臼,说服我们,快乐的是好的。通往善的途径受到快乐所标示。这个陷阱引人注意,因为它具有一种矛盾的特性,有助于它的胆大妄为的气氛。可以说,我们受到二级程度的欺骗。我们认为,有一个隐藏的抽屉,我们很高兴已经找到它。但是我们甚至更加地受到挫败,当我们已经找到它,比起假如我们从来没有怀疑过它的存在。某件东西相对地稀少,因为每个人都能看出,有某件出乎意料之外的东西。

What does Freud have to say about this? Even before the formulations of
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, it is evident that the first formulation of the
pleasure principle as an unpleasure principle, or least-suffering principle,
naturally embodies a beyond, but that it is, in effect, calculated to keep us
on this side of it rather than beyond it. Freud’s use of the good can be summed
up in the notion that it keeps us a long way from our jouissance.

关于这点,弗洛依德必须说什么?即使是在「超越快乐原则」阐释之前,显而易见地,快乐原则的首次阐释作为不快乐原则,或最少量痛苦原则,它自然地具体表现一种超越。但是事实上,它被设计要保持我们在它的这一边,而不是超越它。弗洛依德使用善可以被总结在这个观念里,它让我们跟我们的「欢爽」距离遥远。

Nothing is more obvious in our clinical experience. Who is there who in
the name of pleasure doesn’t start to weaken when the first half-serious step
is taken toward jouissance? Isn’t that something we encounter directly everyday?
One can understand, therefore, the dominance of hedonism in the moral
teachings of a certain philosophical tradition, whose motives do not seem to
us to be absolutely reliable or disinterested.

在我们的临床经验,这是最明显不过的事情。以快乐的名义,有谁没有开始软化,当最初的半严肃的步骤被採取,朝向欢爽?这难道不是我们日常生活直接遭遇到的东西?我们因此能够理解享乐主义的优势,在某个哲学传统的道德的教喻。我们觉得它们的动机似乎并不绝对可靠,或公正。

In truth, it isn’t because they have emphasized the beneficial effects of
pleasure that we criticize the so-called hedonist tradition. It is rather because
they haven’t stated what the good consisted of. That’s where the fraud is.

事实上,这并不是因为它们曾经强调快乐的有利的效果,我们批评这个所谓的享乐主义的传统。相反地,是因为它们并没有陈述这个善由什么组成。那就是欺诈所在。

In the light of this one can understand that Freud was literally horrified by
the idea of love for one’s neighbor. One’s neighbor in German is der Nachste.
“Du sollst den Nachsten lieben wie sich selbst” – that’s how the commandment,
“Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself,” is expressed in German.
Freud underlines the excessive side of this by means of an argument that
starts from several different points, which are, in fact, one and the same.

从这个观点,我们能够理解,弗洛依德实质上受到惊吓,对于邻居之爱的观念。我们的邻居在德文是der Nachste. “Du sollst den Nachsten lieben wie sich selbs。那就是十戒用德文表达的方式,弗洛依德强调这个的过度的一面,凭借一个从好几个不同观点出发的论点。事实上,那些不同观点就是相同的观点。

In the first place, the neighbor, whose fundamental nature is, as you have
seen, revealed in Freud’s writings, is bad. But that’s not all there is to it.
Freud also says – and it shouldn’t make you smile just because it is expressed
in a somewhat sparse manner – my love is something precious and I’m not
going to give it whole to whomever claims to be what he is, simply because
he happened to come by.

首先,如你们曾经看见,在弗洛依德的著作显示的邻居的基本特性是不好的。但是那并不是它的全部内涵。弗洛依德也说(你们可能会心一笑,因为它被表达,用故作轻松的态度):「我的爱是某件珍贵的东西,我没有要将它全部给予任何他宣称是他生命本质的人,仅是因为他偶然经过。」

Freud makes comments about this that are quite right, moving comments
on the subject of what is worth loving. He reveals how one must love a friend’s
son because, if the friend were to lose his son, his suffering would be intolerable.

弗洛依德对于这个发表相当正确的评论,动人的评论,针对什么值得爱的这个议题。他显示,我们必须如何爱一位朋友的儿子,因为万元朋友丧失他的儿子,他的痛苦将会无法忍受。

The whole Arisotelian conception of the good is alive in this man who
is a true man; he tells us the most sensitive and reasonable things about what
it is worth sharing the good that is our love with. But what escapes him is
perhaps the fact that precisely because we take that path we miss the opening
on to jouissance.

整个的亚里斯多德的善的观念,在作为一位真实的人的这个人身上生龙活现。他告诉我们最敏感最合理的事情,关于什么值得分享我们的爱的善行。但是他没有理解的是,或许这个事实:确实是因为你採取那条途径,我们错过通往欢爽的入口。

It is in the nature of the good to be altruistic. But that’s not the love of thy
neighbor. Freud makes us feel this without articulating it fully. We will now
attempt, without forcing anything, to do so in his stead.

它在于利他主义的善的特性里。但是那并不是对你的邻居之爱。弗洛依德让我们感觉这个,但是并没有充分表达它。我们现在将会企图代替他这样做,没有丝毫强迫。

We can found our case on the following, namely, that every time that
Freud stops short in horror at the consequences of the commandment to love
one’s neighbor, we see evoked the presence of that fundamental evil which
dwells within this neighbor. But if that is the case, then it also dwells within
me. And what is more of a neighbor to me than this heart within which is
that of my jouissance and which I don’t dare go near? For as soon as I go near
it, as Civilization and Its Discontents makes clear, there rises up the unfathomable
aggressivity from which I flee, that I turn against me, and which in
the very place of the vanished Law adds its weight to that which prevents me
from crossing a certain frontier at the limit of the Thing.

我们能够将我们的个案以下作为基础。换句话说,每次弗洛依德恐惧地突然停止,对于邻居之爱的命令的结果,我们看到驻居在这个邻居之内的那个基本的邪恶的存在被召唤。但是假如情况是这样,那么它也驻居在我之内。对我而言,这个邻居,除了这个心之外,还有什么?在这个心之内,是我的欢爽的邻居,我不敢靠近?当我一靠近它,如同「文明及其不满」所清楚表达的,产生这个深不可测的侵凌性,我避之唯恐不及。我转而攻击我。就在这个消失的法则的位置,它增加它的重量,到阻止我不能跨越某个边界的东西,在物象的限制。

As long as it’s a question of the good, there’s no problem; our own and our
neighbor’s are of the same material. Saint Martin shares his cloak, and a great
deal is made of it. Yet it is after all a simple question of training; material is
by its very nature made to be disposed of – it belongs to the other as much
as it belongs to me. We are no doubt touching a primitive requirement in the
need to be satisfied there, for the beggar is naked. But perhaps over and
above that need to be clothed, he was begging for something else, namely,
that Saint Martin either kill him or fuck him. In any encounter there’s a big
difference in meaning between the response of philanthiropy and that of love.

只要这是善的问题,就没有难题。我们自己与我们邻居的难题是属于相同的材料。圣马丁分享他的外衣,赋予它许多的价值。可是,它毕竟是一个训练的单纯问题。材料是根据它自己的特性被迫要被处理。它属于大他者,如同它属于我。我们无可置疑,碰触到一个原始的要求,在那里被满足的需要。因为乞丐是赤裸的。但是或许尤其重要的是,那个穿上衣服的需要。他正在乞求某件其他的东西。换句话说,圣马丁要就杀死他,要不就跟他作爱。无论是什么遭遇,意义上有很大的差异,在慈善的回应与爱的回应之间。

It is in the nature of the useful to be utilized. If I can do something in less time and with less trouble than someone near me, I would instinctively do it
in his place, in return for which I am damned for what I have to do for that
most neighborly of neighbors who is inside me. I am damned for having
assured him to whom it would cost more time and trouble than me, what
precisely? – some measure of ease that only means something because I imagine
that, if I had that ease or absence of work, I would make the best possible
use of it. But it is far from proven that I would know how to do so, even if I
had all the power required to satisfy myself. Perhaps I would simply be bored.

它在这个能够被利用的有用途的特性里。假如我能够做某件事情,在较少的时,较少的麻烦,比起靠近我的某个人,我本能地会代替他去做它。为了回报这个,我被诅咒因为我必须做的事情,因为在我之内的邻居的最邻近的东西。我被诅咒,因为曾经让他确定,他将会耗费比我更多的时间与麻烦。那确实是什么?某个程度的自在,仅是意味着某件事情,因为我想象,假如我拥有那个自在,或工作的欠缺,我会尽量利用它。但是这根本没有被证明,我会知道如何这样做。即使我拥有所有被要求的力量,来满足我自己。或许,我仅是感到无聊。

Consequently, by granting others such power, perhaps I am just leading
them astray. I imagine their difficulties and their sufferings in the mirror of
my own. It is certainly not imagination that I lack; it is, if anything, tenderness,
namely, what might be called the difficult way, love for one’s neighbor.
And here again you may note how the trap of the same paradox occurs to us
in connection with the so-called discourse of utilitarianism.

结果,凭借给予别人如此的力量,或许我正在引导他们迷失。我想象他们的困难与他们的痛苦,在我自己的镜子里。这确实不是我欠缺的想象,那是温柔,也就是说,所谓的困难的方式,对于邻居之爱。在此,你们可能注意到,这个相同悖论的陷阱发生到我们身上,关于所谓的功利主义的辞说。

I began my lectures this year with the onerous topic of the utilitarians, but
the utilitarians are quite right. They are countered with something that, in
effect, only makes the task of countering them much more difficult, with a
sentence such as “But, Mr. Bentham, my good is not the same as another’s
good, and your principle of the greatest good for the greatest number comes
up against the demands of my egoism.” But it’s not true. My egoism is quite
content with a certain altruism, altruism of the kind that is situated on the
level of the useful. And it even becomes the pretext by means of which I can
avoid taking up the problem of the evil I desire, and that my neighbor desires
also. That is how I spend my life, by cashing in my time in a dollar zone,
ruble zone or any other zone, in my neighbor’s time, where all the neighbors
are maintained equally at the marginal level of reality of my own existence.
Under these conditions it is hardly surprising that everyone is sick, that civilization
has its discontents.

我今年开始我的演讲,从功利主义这个难以承担的议题。但是功利主义并不完全正确。它们被反驳,用某件实际上仅是让反驳它们的这个工作更加困难。用一个句子,譬如,「但是,边沁先生,我的最大多数人的善,跟另外一个人的最大多数的善并不相同。你的最大多数人的最大的善,跟我的自我主义的要求相冲突。」但这不是真实的。我的自我主义相当满足于某种的利他主义。这种利他主义被定位在有用途的层次。这甚至变成是这个藉口,凭借这个藉口,我能够避免从事我欲望的邪恶的难题,我的邻居也渴望的邪恶。那就是我度过我一生的方式。凭借将我的时间,在金元地区,卢比地区,或任何其他地区,兑换成现金,在我的邻居的时间。在那里,所有的邻居同样被维持在我自己的经验的现实界的边缘。在这些情况之下,每个人都生病,自是不足为奇,文明有其不满。

It is a fact of experience that what I want is the good of others in the image
of my own. That doesn’t cost so much. What I want is the good of others
provided that it remain in the image of my own. I would even say that the
whole tiling deteriorates so rapidly that it becomes: provided that it depend
on my efforts. I don’t even need to ask you to go very far into your patients’
experience: if I wish for my spouse’s happiness, I no doubt sacrifice my own,
but who knows if her happiness isn’t totally dissipated, too?

这是一个经验的事实,我想要的东西就是别人的善,用我自己的形象。那并没有花费许多。我想要的东西,就是别人善,只要它始终是在我自己的形象里。我甚至说,整个的瓦恶化得如此之快,以致它变成:只要它依靠我自己的努力,我甚至不需要要求你们到远处,进入你们的病人的经验。假如我希我获得我的配偶的幸福,我无可置疑地,牺牲我自己的幸福。但是有谁知道,他的幸福是否也完全地被扩散?

Perhaps the meaning of the love of one’s neighbor that could give me the
true direction is to be found here. To that end, however, one would have to
know how to confront the fact that my neighbor’s jouissance, his harmful,
malignant jouissance, is that which poses a problem for my love.

或许,对于邻居之爱的意义,能够给予我这个真实的方向,能够在这里被找到。可是,为了这个目标,我们将必须知道如何面对这个事实:我们的邻居的欢爽,他的伤害人的,恶意的欢爽,是对于我的爱形成一种难题。

It wouldn’t be difficult at this point to take a leap in the direction of the
excesses of the mystics. Unfortunately, many of their most notable qualities
always strike me as somewhat puerile.

在这个时刻,这将不会很困难从事一个跳跃,朝著神秘主义的过度。不幸地,许多他们最引人注意的特质总是给我的印象,作为是相当幼稚。

No doubt the question of beyond the pleasure principle, of the place of the
unnameable Thing and of what goes on there, is raised in certain acts that
provoke our judgment, acts of the kind attributed to a certain Angela de
Folignio, who joyfully lapped up the water in which she had just washed the
feet of lepers – I will spare you the details, such as the fact that a piece of
skin stuck in her throat, etc. – or to the blessed Marie Allacoque, who, with
no less a reward in spiritual uplift, ate the excrement of a sick man. The
power of conviction of these no doubt edifying facts would vary quite a lot if
the excrement in question were that of a beautiful girl or if it were a question
of eating the come of a forward from your rugby team. In other words, the
erotic side of things remains veiled in the above examples.

无可置疑,超越快乐原则的这个问题,无以名状的物象的位置,以及那里所进行的东西,在某些的引起我们的判断的行动里被提出,那些行动被归属于某些的降福天使。我就跟你们省略过细节。譬如这个事实,一块皮被塞在她的喉咙,等等。或是被归属于被祝福的玛丽亚、阿拉克奎。他拥有同样的一个酬劳,在精神的提升,他吃病人的粪便。这些无可置疑具有启蒙的事实的信心的力量,变化各有千秋,假如受到置疑的这个粪便是一位美丽女孩的粪便,或是假如他吃的是你们的足球队的前锋的精液。换句话说,事情的性爱的一面,始终被遮蔽在以上的例子里。

That is why I will have to back up a little. We are now on the threshold of
exploring something which has after all attempted to break down the doors
of the hell within. Its claim to do so is clearly much greater than ours. Yet it
is our concern, too. And that is why, in order to show you step by step the
ways in which access to the problem of jouissance may be envisaged, I will
lead you through what someone by the name of Sade has had to say about it.

那就是为什么我将必须稍微支持一下。我们现在处于探索某件东西的门槛,毕竟 这个东西曾经企图冲破内部地狱的那些门。显而易见,它宣称如此做,比起我们的宣称伟大得多。可是,这也是我们的关心。那就是为什么,为了逐步跟你们显示,接近欢爽的难题可能被拟想的方式。我将引导你们通过以萨德之名的某个人所必需说到它的事情。

I would certainly need a couple of months to talk about Sadism. I will not
talk about Sade as eroticist, for he is definitely an inferior eroticist. The path
of jouissance with a woman is not necessarily to subject her to all the acts
practiced on poor Justine. On the other hand, in the domain of the articulation
of ethical questions, it seems to me that Sade has some very solid things
to say, at least in connection with the problem that currently concerns us.

我确实需要两三个月来谈论萨德主义。我将不会谈论萨德作为性爱狂。因为他明确是一位差劲的性爱狂。跟一位女人的欢爽的途径,未必是强迫她从事对于可怜的贾斯丁所做的行动。在另一方面,在伦理问题的表达的领域,我觉得,萨德拥有某些的正确的话要说,至少关于目前跟我们息息相关的难题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 179

March 13, 2013

Ethic 179
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

XIV
第14章

Love of one’s neighbor
邻居之爱

A SPECIAL GOD
特别的上帝

FOOL AND KNAVE
傻瓜与恶棍

THE TRUTH ABOUT TRUTH
关于真理的真理

WHY JOUISSANCE IS EVIL1
为什么欢爽是邪恶

SAINT MARTIN
圣马丁

KANTI A N TALES
康德的故事

You know that last time I picked up my discussion with you by connecting
it to my lecture to the Catholics.

你们知道,上次我从事跟你们的讨论,凭借将它联接的我对基督教的演说。

Don’t imagine that that was an easy way out. I didn’t merely serve up again
what I had to say in Brussels; I didn’t tell them half of what I told you.

请不要想象那是容易的解决方式。我并不仅仅再次提供我在布鲁塞尔所必需说的。我告诉他们的,还不及我告诉你们的一半多。

What I laid out last time concerning the death of God the Father will lead
us to another question today, one that will show you Freud situating himself
directly at the center of our true experience. For he doesn’t attempt to evade
the issue by making generalizations about the religious function in man. He
is concerned with the way in which it manifests itself to us, that is to say, in
the commandment which is expressed in our civilization in the form of the
love of one’s neighbor.

上次我舖陈的东西,关于上帝这位父亲之死,将会引导我们到另外一个问题。这个问题将会跟你们显示弗洛依的定位他自己直接处于我们的真实的经验的核心。因为他并没有企图要逃避这个问题,凭借概念化人的宗教的功用。他很关心这它跟我们证明它自己的个方式。换句话说,以邻居之爱的形式,在我们的文明所被表达的十戒。

1
Freud confronts this commandment directly. And if you take the time to
read Civilization and Its Discontents, you will see that that is where he begins,
where he remains throughout, and where he ends up. He talks of nothing
but that. What he has to say on the subject should under normal circumstances
make our ears ring and set our teeth on edge. But that doesn’t happen.
It’s a funny thing, but once a text has been in print for a certain period
of time, it allows the transitory vertigo that is the vital source of its meaning
to evaporate.

弗洛依德直接面对这个十戒。假如你们花费时间阅读「文明及其不满」,你们将会看出,那是他开始的地方。他从头到尾留在那里,结束在那里。他仅就是谈论那个。对于这个议题,他必须说的内容,在正常的情况下,引起我们的耳朵的共鸣,让我们咬牙切齿。但是那并没有发生。那是一件好笑的事情,但是一旦文本被出版有一段时期,它让瞬间的晕眩能够蒸发掉,虽然那晕眩是它的意义的重要的来源。

So I will try to reanimate the meaning of Freud’s lines today. And since
that will lead me toward some pretty potent notions, all I can do is ask language,
what Freud would call logos, to lend me a measured tone.

所以,我今天将尝试重心激发弗洛依德的文里行间的意义。因为这将会引导我朝向某个美丽的潜在的观念。我所能够做的是要求语言,弗洛依德所谓的神喻logos,帮助我维持持平的语调。

God, then, is dead. Since he is dead, he always has been. I explained to
you Freud’s theory on the topic, namely, the myth expressed in Totem and
Taboo. It is precisely because God is dead, has always been dead, that it was
possible to transmit a message via all those beliefs which made him appear to
be still alive, resurrected from the emptiness left by his death in those noncontradictory gods whom Freud indicates proliferated above all in Egypt.

上帝因此是死了。因为上帝已死,他总是一直存在。我跟你们解释弗洛依德对于这个议题的理论。换句话说,在「图腾与禁忌」被表达的神话。确实因为上帝已死,他才始终存在,才可能经由那些信仰传递一个讯息。这个讯息让他显得生龙活虎,他从他的死亡所遗留的空无当中复活。弗洛依德指出,在那些并非矛盾的众神,特别是在埃及,数目繁多。

The message in question is that of a single God who is both the Lord of
the universe and the dispenser of the light that warms life and spreads the
brightness of consciousness. His attributes are those of a thought which regulates
the order of the real. It is Akhenaton’s God, the God of the secret
message that the Jewish people bears by reason of the fact that, by assassinating
Moses, it reenacted the archaic murder of the father. That, according
to Freud, is the God to whom the sentiment, of which only a few are capable,
is addressed, namely, amor intellectualis Dei.

受到质疑的这个讯息是单一上帝的讯息。上帝既是宇宙的主人,也是温暖生命与扩散意识的明亮的光的分配者。上帝的属性是规范实在界的秩序的思想的属性。那是阿肯内顿的上帝,犹太人们怀具的秘密讯息的上帝。由于这个事实:凭借暗杀摩西,它重新扮演过古时的弑父。依照弗洛依德,对于上帝表达的情感,仅有少数的人们能够拥有,换句话说,对于上帝的知性的爱。

Freud also knows that, although that love is articulated now and then in
the thought of such exceptional men as the famous polisher of lenses who
lived in Holland, it is nevertheless not of such great importance; it didn’t
prevent the construction in the same period of Versailles, a building whose
style proves that the Colossus of Daniel with the feet of clay was still standing
upright, as is still the case, although it had collapsed a hundred times.

弗洛依德也知道,虽然爱有时被表达,在特殊的人们的思想,譬如那位著名的居住在荷兰的镜片磨亮者。爱仍然没有居有如此重要的地位。它并没有阻止在梵尔赛宫的相同时期的建筑。这个建筑物的风格证明,丹尼尔的巨像,泥塑的脚依旧直立在那里,如同常有的情况,虽然它曾经崩塌上百次。

No doubt a science has been erected on the fragile belief I was discussing,
namely, the one that is expressed in the following terms, which always reappear
at the horizon of our aims: “The real is rational, the rational is real.”

无可置疑,对于我正在讨论的脆弱的信仰,曾经建立起一种智慧。换句话说,用以下的术语被表达的这个智慧。这些术语总是重新出现在我们的目标的展望领域:「实在界是理性的,理性就是实在。」

It’s a strange thing that if the science in question has made use of the belief,
it has nevertheless remained subservient, remained in the service of the colossus
I just referred to, the one that has collapsed a hundred times and is still
there. The fervent love that a solitary individual like Spinoza or Freud may
feel for the God of the message has nothing to do with the God of the believers.
Nobody doubts that, and especially the believers themselves, who, whether
Jews or Christians, have never failed to cause Spinoza trouble.
But it is odd to see that for some time now, since it became known that
God was dead, the believers involved practice ambiguity. By referring to the
dialectical God, they are seeking an alibi for the crisis of confidence in their
faith. It is a paradoxical fact, which hadn’t occurred before in history, that
the torch of Akhenaton functions nowadays as an alibi for the disciples of
Ammon.

奇怪的事情是,受到质疑的这个智慧曾经使用这个信仰,可是,它始终是顺服的,始终服务于我提到的那个巨像,曾经崩塌过上百次的巨像,它依旧在那里。这个狂热的爱,一位孤独的个人,像史宾诺莎或弗洛依德,他们可能感觉到对上帝的狂热的爱,因为这个讯息的上帝跟信仰者的上帝,根本扯不上任何关系。没有人怀疑,特别是信徒的本身,无论是犹太教或是基督教,他们始终都会引起史宾诺莎的麻烦。但是古怪的,当我们看见,现在有段时间,因为众所周知,上帝已经死了。牵涉到的信仰者实践模糊暧昧。凭借提到辩证法的上帝,他们正在寻求一种藉口,替他们的信仰的信任的危机。这是一个矛盾的事实,在历史上从未发生过,阿肯内顿的火炬今天充当一种藉口,替亚门教的门徒。

And I don’t say this to slander the historical role played by the God of the
believers, the God of the Judeo-Christian tradition. That the message of
Akhenaton’s God was preserved in the tradition of the latter made it worthwhile
for Moses the Egyptian to be confused with the Mithanite, with the
Moses whose Thing, speaking from the burning bush, affirmed himself to be
a special God – not the only God, note, but a special God, compared to whom all the others don’t count. I don’t want to emphasize more than necessary the
line I am pursuing today on this point; it’s not, strictly speaking, that it is
forbidden to honor other gods, but you musn’t do it in the presence of the
God of Israel – the distinction is no doubt important for historians.

我说这些,并不是要诋毁信徒的上帝扮演的历史的角色,犹太教与基督教传统的上帝。阿肯内顿的上帝被保留着后者的传统,让摩西,这位埃及人,跟米太拿提混淆一块,跟摩西的物象,从燃烧的树丛里言说,他肯定他自己是一位特别的神。请注意,并不是唯一的神,而是一位特别的上帝。跟这位上帝比较起来,所有其他的神变得微不足道。我并不想要并非必要地强调我今天追寻的这一行,针对这个点。严格来说,并不是因为它被禁止,为了尊崇其他的神。但是你们一定不要以色列的上帝的面前这样做—对于历史学家,这个区别是重要的。

We who are trying to articulate Freud’s thought and experience so as to
give them their due weight and importance, we will articulate it in the following
form: if this Symptom-God, this Totem-God or taboo, is worthy of our
pondering the claim to turn him into a myth, it is because he was the vehicle
of the God of truth. It is by means of the former that the truth about God
could come to light, namely, that God was really killed by men, and that
once the thing was reenacted, the primitive murder was redeemed. Truth
found its way via him who the Scriptures no doubt call the Word, but also
the Son of Man, thereby admitting the human nature of the Father.

我们正在尝试表达弗洛依德的思想与经验,为了给予它们应有的份量与重要性。我们将会用以下的形式来表达它:假如这个病症-上帝,这个图腾-上帝,或禁忌-上帝,值得我们沉思这个宣称,将他转变成为神话。那是因为他是真理的上帝的工具。凭借前者,关于上帝的真理能够启蒙智慧。换句话说,上帝确实是被人们杀死。一旦这件事情重新被扮演,原始的谋杀被救赎。真理经由上帝找到它的途径,无可置疑,圣经称上帝为道,而且是人的儿子。因此承认天父具有人性。

Freud does not overlook the No/Name-of-the-Father. On the contrary, he
speaks about it very well in Moses and Monotheism – in a contradictory way
clearly, if you fail to take Totem and Taboo for what it is, namely, a myth;
and he says that in human history the recognition of the function of the
Father is a sublimation that is essential to the opening up of a spirituality
that represents something new, a step forward in the apprehension of reality
as such.

弗洛依德并没有忽视父亲的否定或父亲之名。相反地,他清楚地谈论它,在「摩西与一神教」。显而易见是以悖论的方式。假如你不将「图腾与禁忌」就其实质来看待:换句话说,一种神话。他说,在人类的历史,对于父亲的功用的体认是一种升华。它是重要的,用来开始代表某件新的东西的精神,一个向前的步骤,在理解现实界的本身。

Freud also doesn’t overlook – far from it – the real father. It is desirable
according to Freud that in the course of the adventure of the subject, there
is, if not the Father as God, then at least the Father as good father. I will
read you some time the passage in which Freud speaks almost tenderly of the
exquisiteness of that virile identification which flows from the love for the
father and from his role in the normalization of desire. But that result only
occurs in a favorable form as long as everything is in order with the No/
Name-of-the-Father, that is to say, with the God who doesn’t exist. The
resulting situation for this good father is a remarkably difficult one; to a
certain extent he is an insecure figure.

弗洛依德也没有忽视这个真实的父亲—根本没有忽视。依照弗洛依德,这是被渴望的,在主体的冒险的过程,即使没有像上帝这样的父亲,至少会有一位好父亲。改天,我将跟你们阅读这个段落,弗洛依德几乎是温柔地谈论到精力充沛的认同的精致。它从对父亲的爱与从他对欲望的正常化流露出。但是那个结果仅会发生,以有利的形式,只要每件事情都跟父亲的否定或父亲之名井然一致。换句话说,跟并不存在的上帝井然一致。对于这个好的父亲的结果的情况,是一个非常困难的情况。到某个程度,他是一个不安全的人物。

We know this only too well in practice. And it is also articulated in the
Oedipus myth – although the latter also shows as well that it is preferable for
the subject himself to be unaware of these reasons. But he now knows them,
and the fact of knowing them is precisely that which has certain consequences
in our time.

在精神分析实践,我们对这个一清二楚。在伊狄浦斯神话,它也被表达,虽然后者也清楚地知道,最好让主体自己对于这些理由一无所知。但是他现在知道他们,知道他们这个事实,确实是在我们的时代拥有某些的结果。

These consequences are self-evident. They can be seen in common speech
and, indeed, in the speech of the analyst. If we want to complete the task we
have given ourselves this year, it is only fitting that we articulate them.

这些结果是自明的。它们在普通的谈话当中能够被看出,的确,在精神分析家的言谈当中。假如我们想要完成我们今年给予我们自己的这个工作,这仅是合适的,我们表达它们。

Let me note in passing that as the first person to demystify the function of
the Father, Freud himself couldn’t be a thoroughly good father. I don’t want
to dwell on it today; it is something we can sense through his biography,
it could be the topic of a special chapter. Suffice it to characterize him as
what he was, a bourgeois whose biographer and admirer, Jones, calls “uxorious.”
As we all know, he wasn’t a model father.

让我们顺便注意,弗洛依德作为祛除父亲的功用的神秘的第一个人,他自己不可能是一个十全十美的父亲。今天,我并不想要详述它;这是某件我们能够通过他的传记及来理解。那可能的一个特别章节的题目。让我将他表现特性作为他以前的样子,这样就够了。他是一位布尔乔亚,他的传记家与崇拜者,琼斯,称他为「宠妻大丈夫」。如众周知,他并不是模范父亲。

There, too, where he was truly the father, the father of us all, the father of
psychoanalysis, what did he do but hand it over to the women, and also
perhaps to the master-fools? As far as the women are concerned, we should
reserve judgment; they are beings who remain rich in promise, at least to the
extent that they haven’t yet lived up to them. As for the master-fools, that’s
another story altogether.

在他确实表现作为父亲的地方,作为我们大家的父亲,精神分析的父亲。他所做的就是将它递交给这些女人。或许,也递交给傻瓜主子?就那些女人而言,我们不应该保留判断。她们是始终充满承诺的人类,至少,她们还没有实践这些承诺。至于傻瓜主子,那完全是另一个故事。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com