西苏:论克拉丽斯、李思佩特

September 18, 2013

但是有一个克拉丽斯的声音非说不可,「大海,大海,」为了让我的贝壳张开,大海正在呼唤我,大海!正在呼唤我,海水!呼唤我回去,然后我去那里,波浪,我重新呼唤我到她那里。

为了容许一个物象以其陌生状态进入,从灵魂来的光亮必须被放进每个眼神,外面的光亮与内部的光亮混杂一块。一种看不见的氛围环绕那些被仔细观看的人们形成。在景象之前观看,观看是为了不断地看见,在眼睛的描述之前—这并不是召魂术。这是它者的智慧!它本身就是一种艺术;有各种途径让所有的物象以它们的不同的陌生感进入我们的邻近。这些途径就是要求被接近的地区,每个地区都具有一种适当的耐心。

有一种对蛋卵的耐心,一种对于玫瑰花的耐心,一种对于每个特殊动物的耐心,一种对于品种的耐心,各色各样的耐心,要实践,要发展。我有一些准备要成熟的耐心。还有一些正要绽放蓓蕾的耐心,还有一些似乎已经生根的耐心。我觉得某些的克拉丽斯的阅读将各种生命实存的泥土挖掘如此之深,以致所有的耐心都在那里百花怒放。各种耐心就是生育者。

有一种耐心给予专注。这种专注很简洁,活跃,慎重,温暖,几乎感觉不到,无法让人思维,就像眼神的重新点燃,规律地,二十一天的夜晚,对着厨房的窗户,至少一个蛋卵具有生命实存。它们给予专注:一无作为,不扰乱,填补,更换,佔据这个空间。听任这个空间存在。微妙地思维。引导知情的眼光与喜爱的眼光的混合朝向。一个脸孔。用一个谨慎,自信,专注的询问环绕它,调适接收,守望它,经过一段长时间,直到贯穿生命的本质。

有时,我们仅有一个耐心—因此不再有别的东西。我们忘记,我们没有给予这个世界生命,我们开始而且没有完成。这个没有花朵,没有动物,没有地质学,没有物象的世界,厌倦透顶。

我们需要万物。所有的物象,自始至终。每样曾经发生过的事情,每样能够发生的事情。我们需要各种耐心的时间,为了接近万物,直到它们靠近我们,我们跟它们在一块,在它们之前,互相各自给予。

当我们听任自己去思维,时间就成形。我们从来没有这个时间,我们焦虑。但是有这个时间,在底下,数量多到不可数,跟我们的要求成比例。只要思维,思维,再思维就绰绰有余。我们就到达这个来源。思维给予时间。所有的万物,即使最微细的物象,它们都充满时间:就是要由我们来思维它。

克拉丽斯思维:首先思维到厨房。有一棵蘋果树在那里。克拉丽斯以如此的锐智呼唤这个蘋果树,以致对于这棵蘋果树对于我们而言,表征,包括的一切。同时,在蘋果树,具有这个被许诺的维持。我们验证这棵蘋果树,用我们全部的生命实存。就这样,这棵蘋果树具有生命实存。

万物依旧没有名字,她吸引它们,花朵,水果,所有那些匿名的,全部的,还没有被呼唤的物象,每样物象都有其时辰,她让它们存在那里,在我们之前,在相同的瞬间,我们验证它们如何存在,它们如何在那里成长,以及它们如何还依旧存活在那里。

在厨房,在整个文本的从头到尾,有各种手及风景。在手掌的风景里,在具有窗户与句子的文本里,每个句子展开,进入另外一个惊奇。

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拉康:意义的解释

December 19, 2015

THE INTERPRETATION OF MEANING

意义的解释

From the mid-1950s Lacan started questioning the nature of meaning as
an effect of psychoanalytic interpretation. Locating the point of departure
for any type of analytic interpretation in The Interpretation of Dreams
(1900a) he insisted that Freud’s discovery of the meaning of a dream
always entails the revelation of the dream(er)’s unconscious wish (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:319–320). Therefore, the interpretation of dreams and,
by extension, of any formation of the unconscious, is focused on the
emergence of the repressed desire sustaining it.30

从1950年中业,拉康开始询问意义的特性,作为是精神分析的解释的影响。当他定位出发点的位置,作为任何种类的精神分析的解释,在弗洛伊德的“梦的结析”,拉康坚持,弗洛伊德的发现梦的意义,总是涵盖作梦者的无意识的愿望的启示。因此,梦的解析,延伸而言,就是无意识的任何形成的解析,都是以维持这个解析的被压抑的欲望的出现作为基础。

Because Freud had explained dreams, parapraxes and neurotic
symptoms as fulfilments of a repressed wish, Lacan contended that the
formations of the unconscious simultaneously conceal and satisfy a
particular desire, which can only be uncovered via a calculated use of
interpretations (ibid.: 326).

因为弗洛伊德已经解释梦,倒错行为,与神经症的症状。拉康主张,无意识的形成,既隐藏,又满足特殊的欲望。这个欲望仅能够被发现,经有估算地使用解释。

In other words, the meaning of a symptom
correlates with its underlying desire and this motive only becomes
apparent when the symptom has been properly interpreted. If
interpretation can be conceived as a process whereby meaning is accorded
to a certain phenomenon, the interpretation of meaning, the meaning to
be allocated to meaning, is that it coincides with the expression of a
desire. This is why Lacan, in his Seminar VI on Desire and its
Interpretation, portrayed the analyst as somebody who assists analysands
in giving birth to their desire (Lacan 1958–59: session of 1 July 1959).
This is also why he replied to the philosophical question as to the meaning
of meaning (what does meaning mean?) with the statement ‘meaning
escapes’ (Lacan 1975d[1973]:11).31

换句话说,症状的意义跟它的作为基础的欲望息息相关。这个动机变成明显,仅有当症状已经适当地被解释。假如解释能够被构想,作为是过程。在那里,意义被给予某个现象,意义的解释,意义被分配给意义是,它巧合与欲望的表达。这就是为什么拉康,在他的第6研讨班,“论欲望与其解释“,描绘分析家作为某个帮助分析者的人,当他们诞生他们的欲望。这也是为什么他回答哲学的问题,关于意义的意义(”意义“意味着什么?”用这个陈述:“意义闪躲不定”。

Like desire, meaning is constantly
shifting, and despite the fact that language always carries meaning, it is
incapable of fixating it. Inasmuch as the analysand’s demands are
embedded in language, their desire will always be articulated in these
demands (desire will speak through the verbalizations), but the demands
will never fully articulate their desire. ‘Although it always shows through
demand…desire is nonetheless beyond it’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:269).
Desire (meaning) is always articulated, but never fully articulatable (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:329–330). Or, as Lacan put it in 1973: meaning is always
fleeting from the cask of language (Lacan 1975d[1973]:11).

就像欲望,意义不断地转换。尽管这个事实:语言总是带着意义,语言并无法固定意义。因为分享者的要求被镶嵌于语言,他们的欲望将总是被表达在这些要求里(欲望将会言说,通过文辞表达)。但是要求将永远不会充分地表达他们的欲望。“虽然欲望总是通过要求显现,欲望仍然超越要求”。欲望(意义)总是被表达,但是从来没有充分地被表达。如同拉康在1973年表达它,意义总是从语言的棺材瞬间而过。

As his work progressed Lacan separated the effect of meaning (sens)
from the emergence of signification (signification). In ‘The Agency of
the Letter’ he hinted at this conceptual difference when stating that ‘the
value of the image [in Egyptian hieroglyphics, for instance] as signifier
has nothing whatever to do with its signification’ (1977g[1957]:159).

随着他的研究的进展,拉康将意义的影响,跟意义的出现分开。在“信息的代理”,他暗示,在他的观念的差异,当他陈述:意象的价值(譬如,埃及的象征文字),因为能指根本就没有任何关系,跟意义。“

Whereas the signification of a certain image may be ‘vulture’, its meaning
may be the letter ‘A’. Meaning is what results from the translation of
one text into another, whereas signification, in its dependence upon
common-sense understanding, does not require any form of transcription.
Convergent on the production of meaning (desire), and not on
signification, interpretation (deciphering) can therefore also be compared
to a process of translation.32 Moreover, once a message has been
deciphered, once its meaning has been revealed, one can still fail to
understand it.

无论某个意象的意义上多么的“贪心“,它的意义可能是”A”这个字母。意义就是从一个文本翻译成为另外一个文本的结果。虽然意义,由于依靠共同常识的理解,并没有要求任何铭记的形式。汇集在意义(欲望)的产生,而不是汇集在意义。解释(解析)因此也能够被比喻为翻译的过程。而且,一旦一个讯息被解析,一旦它的意义已经被揭露,我们依旧没有理解它。

Meaning does not necessarily give rise to signification,
although signification annihilates meaning. The Biblical story of Daniel’s
interpretation of the writing on the wall serves as a good example of
this.33 Daniel translated God’s Aramaic words ‘Mene, Mene, Tekel,
Upharsin’ as ‘Numbered, Numbered, Weighed, Broken’ but it did not
make the Babylonians any wiser.

意义未必要产生意涵。虽然意涵毁灭意义。丹尼尔的解释圣经的故事,书写在墙壁上,充当这个的很好的例子。丹尼尔的翻译阿拉梅克的文字“‘Mene, Mene, Tekel,
Upharsin’ ,翻译成为“被形成数目,被形成数目,被压倒,被破碎“。但是巴比伦人还是不清楚那是啥意思。

After Daniel had revealed to King
Belshazzar what the words represented, the Babylonians were still puzzled
about their significance.34 Hence, the revelation of the meaning of a coded
message does not eradicate the question as to what it refers to, or why it
has been produced in the first place. The acknowledgement of a desire
does not solve the mystery surrounding its origin and object. But finding
the signification of a message does imply that the meaning of that message
disappears, to the extent that it can no longer be interpreted in a variety
of ways.

在丹尼尔已经显露给贝萨扎国王知道这些字代表什么,巴比伦人依旧困惑,关于它们的意涵。因此,符码讯息的意义的启示并没有抹除这个问题,关于它提到什么,或是为什么它首先曾经被产生。欲望的被承认并没有解决环绕它的起源与客体的神秘。但是找到讯息的意涵确实暗示:那个讯息的意义消失。甚至,它不再能够用各色各样的方式被解释。

In relation to clinical practice Lacan was adamant that ‘interpretation
is on the side of meaning and goes against signification’ (Lacan 1973
[1972]:37). The analyst needs to ensure that the analysand’s messages
(dreams, symptoms, demands, etc.) are deciphered in such a way that
the elusiveness of meaning (the ethereal character of desire) is maintained.
Whereas meaning keeps desire open, signification kills it because there
is nothing left to desire anymore.

关于临床的实践,拉康坚决主张,解释在意义的这一边,而且违背意涵。分析家需要保证:分析者的讯息(梦,症状,要求,等等)都被解析,用这样的方式,以致意义的闪躲(欲望的空灵特性“被维持。虽然意义让欲望保持开放,意涵杀死它。因为没有任何东西被剩余下来可以欲望。

This idea was already present in Lacan’s works from the early 1950s,
when he pondered the value of ‘naming’ desire as a psychoanalytic action.
In Seminar I he was quite appreciative of Strachey’s idea (1934) that the
analyst’s interventions should be confined to naming the pervasive yet
inexpressible aspects of the analysand’s discourse (Lacan 1988b [1953–
54]:188).

这观念已经出现在拉康的著作,从1950年代开始。当他沉思“命名”欲望的价值,作为是精神分析的行动。在第一研讨班,他相当赏识史特拉奇的观念:分析家的介入不应该被限制于命名分析者的辞说的这个瀰漫而又无法表达的层面。

Yet one year later, in a discussion of The Interpretation of
Dreams, he claimed that ‘behind what is named, there is the unnameable’
and that everything ‘revealed as nameable is always on the level of the
dream-work’, ‘a symbolisation, with all its laws, which are those of
signification’ (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:211). In other words, naming is
part and parcel of the psychic process that transforms a latent, unconscious
wish into a manifest dream-content: the dream-work proceeds from the
repressed (the unnameable) to the expressible (the nameable).35 Since
the interpretation of dreams follows the opposite route, from manifest to
latent, it is precisely the naming, the formulation of the wish that should
be unravelled.

可是,一年以后,在讨论“梦的解释”,他宣称:在被命名的东西的背后,有这个无法被命名的的东西,每样被显露作为可命名的东西,总是在梦的运作的层面。这样的象征化,具有它的一切法则,它们是意涵的法则。换句话说,命名心灵过程的部分与包裹,它转换一个潜在,无意识的愿望,成为是明显的梦的内容。梦的运作前进,从被压抑的东西(无法被命名的东西),到可表达的东西,(可命名的东西)。因为梦的解释遵相反的途径,从明显到潜在,它确实就是命名。应该被揭发的愿望的阐述。

Challenging his audience, Lacan accordingly averred:
‘[W]hat we are looking for in the interpretation of the dream, [is] this x,
which in the end is desire for nothing. I defy you to bring me a single
passage from the Traumdeutung which concludes—this is what the
subject desires’ (ibid.: 211). None the less, Lacan continued to use the
naming of desire as an interpretive act, yet changing the connotation of
naming from ‘defining’ and ‘designating’ (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:329)
to ‘creating’, ‘recognising’ ‘restoring’ and ‘bringing into existence’
(Lacan 1988c [1954–55]:228–229; 1958–59: session of 26 November
1958).

因为拉康挑战他的听众,他因此主张:“在梦的解析里,我们正在寻找的东西,是这个未知数x。最后,这个未知数x就是空无的欲望。我挑衅你们带给我作为结论的段落,从’梦的解析‘ –这就是主体的欲望。可是,拉康继续使用欲望的命名,作为是解释的行动,可是,改变命名的外延意义,从”命名“与”指明“,改变成为”创造“与”体认“,”恢复“,”使存在“。

To illustrate how his procedure differed from the prevalent tactics of
interpretation within ego-psychology Lacan intermittently referred to a
case-example adduced by Ernst Kris in an influential paper on interpretation
(Kris 1951). The case concerned an academic in his thirties who had come
to see Kris because he experienced great difficulty in publishing the results
of his researches, thus reducing his chances for promotion, due to the
belief that he was always copying other people’s ideas.36

为了解释他的程序的差别,跟自我心理学的盛行的解释的策略的差别。拉康不断地提的一个个案,由克利斯提出的个案,在具有影响力的论文,探讨解释。这个个案关系到他的三十年代的知识份子,他前来探望克利斯,因为他经历巨大困难,要出版他的研究的成果。因此,减少他被升级的机会。由于这个信仰:他总是处理其他人们的观念。

One day the patient
reported that just before he was about to embark on a new project for
publication he had discovered a book in the library containing a blueprint
of the thesis he was on the verge of publishing. When Kris compared the
text in the library with his patient’s views he concluded that, despite some
similarities, his analysand had projected his fantasy of plagiarism onto the
book. Kris told the man that he was not plagiarizing, that his anxiety was
completely unjustified, and that it originated in an infantile wish for a
successful father. Kris waited for the patient’s response and after a lengthy
silence the young man said:

有一天,病人报导说:就在他即将从事新的出版计划,他在图书馆发现一本书,包含他即将出版的一个论文的蓝图。当克利斯比较图书馆的文本,跟病人的观点,他下结论说:尽管某些的类似,他的分析者已经投射他的剽窃的幻想,进入这本书里。克利斯告诉这个人:他并没有剽窃,他的焦虑完全没有理由,他的焦虑起源于婴孩时的愿望,要成为成功的父亲。克利斯等待病人的回应,经过漫长的沉默后,年轻人说:

Every noon, when I leave here, before luncheon, and before returning
to my office, I walk through X street [a street well known for its small
but attractive restaurants] and I look at the menus in the windows. In
one of the restaurants I usually find my preferred dish—fresh brains.
(ibid.: 23)

每个中午,当我离开这里,在午餐之前,在回到我的办公室。我走过X街道,那个街道因为有小而迷人的餐厅著名。我观看窗户上的菜单。在其中一家餐厅,我通常找到我最喜欢的一道菜—新鲜的脑髓。

Kris did not elaborate on this peculiar testimony, but for Lacan it
signalled the analysand’s recourse to an acting-out as a result of Kris’
spurious interpretation. His verification of the analysand’s fear incited him
to interpret the problem as having no basis in reality: ‘You may think that
you are copying somebody’s ideas, but I can assure you that this is not the
case!’ In Lacan’s reading, this interpretation could be termed correct as
regards the factual reality of the analysand’s situation, but it simultaneously
suffocated the analysand’s desire to plagiarize.

他并没有建构这个特殊的证词。但是,对于拉康,它意味着分析者诉诸于行动演出,由于克利斯的假的解释。他的验证分析者的恐惧,刺激他解释这个难题,作为是没有现实的基础。“你可以认为,你正在抄袭别人的观念,但是我告诉你,情况并不是这样!“用拉康的阅读,这个解释可以被称为是正确,关于分析者的情境的实际上的现实。但是,它同时窒息分析者想要剽窃的欲望。

When resorting to the
consumption of fresh brains, the analysand tried to preserve his desire,
against his analyst’s demand that he exchange it for an acceptance of the
facts.37 By eating fresh brains the analysand addressed himself with his
desire to the analyst after the latter had neutralized it by his interpretation.38

当诉诸于新鲜脑髓的消费时,分析者尝试保留他的欲望,对抗他的分析家的要求:他应该交换他的欲望,交换对于事实的接纳。凭借新鲜的脑髓,分析者自己处理他对于分析家的欲望,经过分析家用他的分析,对于他的欲望保持中立。

Although Kris’ intervention was geared towards the analysand’s desire
(his wish), it was at once an attempt to efface it in favour of the young
man’s adaptation to the reality of his situation. As an alternative to Kris’
interpretation (‘Rest assured, you do not steal’) Lacan proposed in ‘The
Direction of the Treatment’ an intervention whereby the analysand would
come to avow his desire to steal whilst acknowledging that the object of
this desire is ‘nothing’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:239). Rather than an actingout,
this restoration of the analysand’s desire around the object ‘nothing’
would have triggered a further analytical exploration of its dialectical
relationship with the desire of the Other, and its continuous transitions
(metonymical) from one inadequate object to another.

在克利斯的介入触动朝向分析者的欲望(他的愿望),它既是一种想要抹除它的企图,以赞同年轻人的适应他的情况的现实。作为克利斯的解释的替代品,(请放心,你并没有剽窃)。拉康建议,在他的“治疗的方向“,分析者将会逐渐宣称他想要剽窃的欲望的介入。另一方面,他又承认,这个欲望的客体是空无。非但没有激情行动,分析者的欲望的恢复,环绕这个客体,”空无“本来会触发更进一步的精神分析的探索,对于它的辩证的关系,跟大他者的欲望,以及它的继续的转换,(换喻的转换),从一个不充分的客体,到另外一个不充分的客体。

Although it demonstrates on the one hand how the analyst smothers
the analysand’sdesire with ‘true’ interpretations and on the other how a
proper psychoanalytic intervention should operate, Lacan’s critique of
Kris’ case-example is also potentially misleading, as it may foster the
view that the analyst ought to tell the analysand what he believes he
desires or, even more radically, that he desires nothing.39 Because such
an inference contradicts Lacan’s ideas that the analysand is the chief
interpreter, that the analyst should not name the patient’s desire, and that
naming means restoring rather than defining, it should be avoided. But
how should the analyst facilitate the emergence of the analysand’s desire
and its interpretations? In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ Lacan
formulated the following abstruse guideline:

虽然它一方面证明,分析家如何窒闷分析者的欲望,用“真实“的解释。另一方面,它也证明,一个合适的精神分析的介入应该如何运作。拉康对于克利斯的个案的例子也是潜在地具有误导,因为它可能培养这个观点:分析家应该告诉分析者,他相信他欲望的东西,甚至更加强烈地,他欲望空无。因为这样的推理,抵触拉康的观念:分析者是主要的解释者,分析家不应该命名病人的欲望,命名意味著恢复,而不是定义。命名应该被避免。但是分析家如何方便分析者的欲望的出现与其解释?在”治疗的方向“,拉康阐述以下的奥秘的引导:

In order to decipher the diachrony of unconscious repetitions,
interpretation must introduce into the synchrony of the signifiers
that compose it something that suddenly makes translation possible…
(ibid.: 233)

为了解无意识的重复的二分法,解释必须介绍某件东西西,进入组成解释的这些能指共时性。突然让翻译成为可能的某件东西。

What Lacan called ‘the diachrony of unconscious repetitions’ in this
passage is nothing else than the mechanism controlling the changing
manifestations of a symptom over a certain period of time. For instance,
the academic described by Kris had regularly pinched sweets and books
during his adolescence, so that his current symptom of plagiarism was just
another avatar of an insistent unconscious core. Interpretation does not
entail finding and offering the signification of the analysand’s history of
symptoms, as in Kris’ explanation that all his symptoms were rooted in a
wish to incorporate his father’s penis (Kris 1951:23), but discovering the
representations (signifiers) that preside over each of the symptoms (‘the
synchrony of the signifiers’) and translating these representations in such
a way that the analysand’s desire becomes apparent.

当拉康在这个段落里,称为是“无意识的重复的二分法”的东西,实实在在就是控制症状的正在逐渐改变的展示,经过某个时间的时期。譬如,克利斯描述的学院人士曾经规律地盯着糖果与书籍,在他的青春期。这样,他目前的剽窃的症状,仅是一个坚持的无意识的核心的另外一次灵显现。解释并没有涵盖找到与发现分析者的症状的历史的意涵,如同在克利斯的解释:所有他的症状都根源于想要合并他的父亲的阴茎的愿望。而是涵盖要发现再现表象,操控每一个症状的能指,(各个能指的共时性),然后翻译这些再现表象,用这样一个方法,让分析者的欲望变得明显。

In the former case the
symptoms are regarded as representations whose signification should be
revealed, whereas in the latter the symptoms function as significations in
themselves, as products of a pathological interpretation whose principles
should be clarified. Unlike the traditional methods of interpretation, which
proceed from representation to signification, Lacan advocated an approach
proceeding from signification to representation and to desire.
More specifically, Lacan contended that the translation of the
synchronous signifierswill only occur if interpretation introduces
something into that synchrony.40 It is not enough for the analysand to
realize which set of representations has governed each of his symptoms
since the onset of his illness.

在前者的情况,症状被认为是再现表现,它们的意涵应该被显示。而在后者,症状发挥功能,作为本身就是意涵。如同病例的解释的产物。它们的原则应该被澄清。不像传统的解释的方法:从再现表现前进到意涵。拉康主张一个方法,从意涵前进到再现表象,然后到欲望。更加明确地说,拉康主张,共时性的能指的翻译会发生,仅是当解释介绍某件东西进入那个共时性。这并不足够让分析者体会到,哪一组再现表象曾经统辖他的每个症状,自从他的疾病的开始以来。

These representations need to be translated
into a desire (their meaning), and the analyst can only ensure that the
translation will not follow the same paths as those that have led to the
appearance of the symptoms if she intervenes in such a way that the set
is being reorganized. The process can be compared to the precipitation
of a substance in a saturated solution as a result of the addition of a
reacting agent.

这些再现表象需要被翻译成为欲望(它们的意义)。分析家仅是告诉,这个翻译将不会遵循相同的途径,跟那些曾经导致症状的出现的相同的那些途径。用这样的方式,以致这组症状正在被体认。这个过程能够被比喻成为在饱满的解决里,物质的突然产生,由于反应的代理者的增加的结果。

The analyst’s interpretation serves as a reacting agent
which facilitates the precipitation of the analysand’s desire out of the
saturated solution of her unconscious repetitions. Analytic interpretation
is what separates desire from a recurrent series of alienating symptomatic
demands, which prompted Lacan to designate its essential status as a cut
(coupure) (Lacan 1958–59: session of 1 July 1959; 1970:70). When and
how often this cut should be performed, and whether it should be
effectuated via a temporal or linguistic punctuation or via the introduction
of a signifier, is for the analyst to decide.41

分析者的解释充当是反应的代理者,让分析者的欲望的突然产生变得方便,从她的无意识的重复的饱满的解决。精神分析的解释,就是将欲望跟重现的系列的疏离的症状的要求,分离的东西。这引起拉康将它的基本的地位,指明作为是切割。这个切割何时及用何种方法应该被执行,以及它是否应该被实践,经由时间或语言的中断,或经由能指的介绍,这要由精神分析家作决定。

As Lacan pointed out in ‘The
Direction of the Treatment’, the analyst is free in the timing, frequency
and choice of his interpretations (Lacan 1977i[1958]:228).42
Being free in the timing also implies that the analyst does not have to
postpone his interpretations until the analysand has developed a
sufficiently strong transference.

如同拉康指出,在“治疗的方向“,分析家在他的解释的时机,频率与选择,可自由运用。在时机的自由运用暗示着,分析家并没有必要拖延他的解释,直到分析者已经发展充分的强烈的移情。

Against Freud’s recommendation in ‘On
Beginning the Treatment’ that not ‘until an effective transference has
been established in the patient, a proper rapport’, should the analyst
disclose ‘to him the hidden meaning of the ideas that occur to him’ (Freud
1913c: 139), Lacan underscored that such an adjournment of
interpretations will automatically reduce their impact, because once the
transference has been established the analysand will hear every
interpretation as coming from the person he has identified the analyst
with (Lacan 1977i[1958]:231).43

对抗弗洛伊德的推荐,在“论治疗的开始“:直到病人身上,有效的移情已经被建立,一个适当的关系,分析家才应该给他揭露他想到的隐藏的观念的意义。”拉康强调,这样的解释的拖延将会自动地减少他们的冲突。因为一旦移情已经被建立,分析者将会听见每个解释,作为是来自他认同为是分析家的这个人。

Supporting Freud’s early intervention
in his case-study of the Rat Man (Freud 1909d), Lacan maintained that
before the transference has been well established, the analyst should bring
about a rectification of the subject’s relations with the real, even if this
triggers an aggravation of the symptoms (Lacan 1977i[1958]:237). In
Lacan’s opinion Freud’s shocking interpretation of the Rat Man’s
compulsive fear as the derivative of an unconscious wish to harm his
father need not be dismissed as an indoctrination, but applauded as an
ingenious mapping of the Rat Man’s subjective position.

支持弗洛伊德的早期的介入,在他的“鼠人的个案研究,拉康主张,在移情确实被建立之前,分析家应该导致主体跟实在介的关系的矫正,即使这会触发症状的恶化。依拉康之见,弗洛伊德的令人震撼的解释”鼠人“的强迫性恐惧,作为是无意思的愿望的衍生物。为了伤害他的父亲。这种解释并没有需要被排斥为是灌输。而应该被称赞为是机智地描绘”鼠人“的主观的立场。

‘Rectification
of the subject’s relations with the real’ does not entail forcing the
analysand to face the reality of his condition, but it entails enabling him
to acknowledge the motive supporting the place he adopts in his speech.
If Freud had put himself on the side of reality, he would have told the
Rat Man: ‘Despite the fact that you think you are a criminal, I can tell
you that you have never committed a serious criminal offence’. Yet putting
himself on the side of the subject’s relations with the real, he said: ‘If
you think you are a criminal, you’d better start recognizing the nature of
the unconscious crimes you have committed’.

主体跟实在界的关系的矫正,并没有涵盖要强迫分析家面对他的情况的现实。但是,它涵盖让分析家能够承认这个动机,支持他在他的言说里採用的位置的动机。假如弗洛伊德当时曾经将他自己,放置在现实的这一边,他本来会告诉“鼠人“说:「尽管你认为你是罪犯的这个事实,我能够告须你,你从来没有犯过严重的刑罚的罪。」可是,假如弗洛伊德将他自己放置在主体跟实在界的关系的这一边,你最好开始体认出你曾经犯过的无意识的罪的特性。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:玛哪人格

December 18, 2015

第四章
THE MANA-PERSONALITY
玛哪食粮-人格
374 My initial material for the discussion that now follows is
taken from cases where the condition that was presented in the previous chapter as the immediate goal has been achieved, namely the conquest of the anima as an autonomous complex, and her transformation into a function of relationship between the conscious and the unconscious.

我最初讨论的材料,现在随之而来的是从这些个案获得。在这些个案里,在先前的章节被呈现,作为是立即的目标的条件,已经被完成。也就是说,对阿尼玛的征服,作为具有自主权的情结,以及阿尼玛转化成为意识与无意识之间的关系的功能。

With the attainment of this goal it becomes possible to disengage the ego from all its en¬tanglements with collectivity and the collective unconscious. Through this process the anima forfeits the daemonic power of an autonomous complex; she can no longer exercise the power of possession, since she is depotentiated.

随着这个目标的获得,要将自我跟所有它跟集体与集体无意识的纠缠里脱离出来,就成为可能。通过这个过程,阿尼玛伪装具有自主权的情结的恶魔的力量。她不再运用着魔的力量,因为她被废除潜力。

She is no longer the guardian of treasures unknown; no longer Kundry, daemonic Messenger of the Grail, half divine and half animal; no longer is the soul to be called “Mistress,” but a psychological function of an intuitive nature, akin to what the primitives mean when they say, “He has gone into the forest to talk with the spirits” or “My snake spoke with me” or, in the mythological language of in¬fancy, “A little bird told me.”

她不再是未知财宝的监护人;不再是肯得力,圣杯的恶魔般的信使,一半是神性,一半是动物,她不再是应该被称为“情妇”的灵魂。而是直觉的天性的心理的功能,类似原始民族的意义,当他们说,「他已经进入森林,跟精灵谈话」,或「我的蛇跟我谈话」,或用婴孩的神话的语言,「一只小鸟告诉我」。

375 Those of my r:eaders who know Rider Haggard’s description
of “She-who-must-be-obeyed” will surely recall the magical power of this personality. “She” is a mana-personality, a being full of some occult and bewitching quality (mana), endowed with magical knowledge and power. All these attributes natu¬rally have their source in the naIve projection of an unconscious self-knowledge which, expressed in less poetic terms, would run somewhat as follows: “I recognize that there is some psychic fac¬tor active in me which eludes my conscious will in the most in¬credible manner.

我的那些读者,他们知道哈加得的描述“必须被服从的她”,将确实回想起这个人格的魔术般的力量。“她”是玛哪食粮-人格,充满某个奥秘与令人著魔的特质的人物。所有这些属性当然拥有它们的来源,在无意识的自性的知识的天真的投射。当她们用比较不那么诗意的方式表达,她们将运作如下:「我体认出,有某种的心灵的因素活跃在我身上,这个因素匪夷所思地并非我的意识的意志所能控制。」

227

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

It can put extraordinary ideas into my head, induce in me unwanted and unwelcome moods and emotions, lead me to astonishing actions for which I can accept no respon¬sibility, upset my relations with other people in a very irritating way, etc.

这个因素能够将特殊的观念放进我的脑袋,在我身上引起不被渴望,不受欢迎的心情与情感,引导我从事令人惊奇的行动。对于这个令人惊奇的活动,我无法接受任何的责任。这个因素扰乱到我跟其他人们的关系,用非常令人懊恼的方式,等等。

I feel powerless against this fact and, what is worse, I am in love with it, so that all I can do is marvel.” (Poets often call this the “artistic temperament,” un poetical folk excuse themselves in other ways.)

我感觉没有力量对抗这个事实。更加糟糕的的是,我爱上它。这样,我所能够做的事情就是惊奇。(诗人经常称这个为“艺术家的性情”,没有诗意的人们则是用其它方式,替他们找遁词。

376 Now when the anima loses her mana, what becomes of it?
Clearly the man who has mastered the anima acquires her mana, in accordance with the primitive belief that when a man kills the mana-person he assimilates his mana into his own body.

现在,当阿尼玛丧失她的玛哪食粮,它会发生什么事? 显而易见地,掌控阿尼玛的这个人,获得她的玛哪食粮,以符合原始人的信仰:当一个人杀死玛哪食粮的人,他吸收他的玛哪食粮进入他自己的身体。

377 Well then: who is it that has integrated the anima? Obvi-
ously the conscious ego, and therefore the ego has taken over the mana. Thus the ego becomes a mana-personality.

呵呵,到底是谁融合这个阿尼玛?显而易见地,是意识的自我。因此,自我接管玛哪食粮。因此,自我变成是玛哪食粮的人格。

但是,

But the mana¬personality is a dominant of the collective unconscious, the well¬known archetype of the mighty man in the form of hero, chief, magician, medicine-man, saint, the ruler of men and spirits, the friend of God.

但是,玛哪食粮的人格是集体无意识的支配者,伟大人物的著名的原型,以英雄,酋长,魔法师,巫医,圣人,人与精灵的统治者,上帝的朋友的方式。

378 This masculine collective figure who now rises out of the
dark background and takes possession of the conscious personal¬ity entails a psychic danger of a subtle nature, for by inflating the conscious mind it can destroy everything that was gained by coming to terms with the anima. It is therefore of no little prac¬tical importance to know that in the hierarchy of the unconscious the anima occupies the lowest rank, only one of many pos¬sible figures, and that her subjection constellates another collec¬tive figure which now takes over her mana. Actually it is the figure of the magician, as I will call it for short, who attracts the man a to himself, i.e., the autonomous valency of the anima. Only in so far as I unconsciously identify with his figure can I imagine that I myself possess the anima’s mana. But I will infal¬libly do so under these circumstances.

男性的集体人物现在从黑暗的背景产生,然后拥有意识到人格。他涵盖微妙的特性的心灵的危险。因为凭借膨胀意识的心灵,它能够毁灭每一样被获得的东西,由于跟阿尼玛互相妥协。它因此具有相当实用的重要性,假如我们知的,在无意识的阶层,阿尼玛占据最低的地位。仅是许多可能的人物之中的一位。阿尼玛的臣服汇集另外一个集体的人物。这个人物现在接管她的玛哪食粮。实际上,这是魔术家的人物,如同我简短地称呼它。这位魔术家将会吸引这个玛哪到他自己身上。这是阿尼玛的具有自主权的价值。仅有当我无意识地认同他的人物,我才能够想像我自己拥有阿尼玛的玛哪。但是,我将毫无错误地这样做,在这些情况之下。

379 The figure of the magician has a no less dangerous equiva-
lent in women: a sublime, matriarchal figure, the Great Mother, the All-Merciful, who understands everything, forgives every¬thing, who always acts for the best, living only for others, and never seeking her own interests, the discoverer of the great love, just as the magician is the mouthpiece of the ultimate truth. And just as the great love is never appreciated, so the great wis¬dom is never understood. Neither, of course, can stand the sight of the other.

魔术家的人物在女人身上,拥有一个同样危险的相等物。一个崇高的婚姻的人物,伟大的母亲,仁慈心肠者,她理解一切事情,原谅一切事情,她总是表现最好行为,仅是我别人而活,从来没有寻求她自己的兴趣,她是伟大的爱的发现者。正如魔术家是最终的真理的代言人。正如伟大的爱从来没有被赏识,伟大的智慧也从来没有被理解。当然,伟大的爱与伟大的智慧无法忍受互相目睹。

380 Here is cause for serious misunderstanding, for without a
doubt it is a question of inflation. The ego has appropriated 228

381
382

THE MANA-PERSONALITY
something that does not belong to it. But how has it appropri¬ated the mana? If it was really the ego that conquered the anima, then the mana does indeed belong to it, and it would be correct to conclude that one has become important. But why does not this importance, the mana, work upon others? That would surely be an essential criterion! It does not work because one has not in fact become important, but has merely become adulter¬ated with an archetype, another unconscious figure. Hence we must conclude that the ego never conquered the anima at all and therefore has not acquired the mana. All that has happened is a new adulteration, this time with a figure of the same sex corresponding to the father-imago, and possessed of even greater power.

在此是严重误解的原因。因为假如无可置疑地,这是自我膨胀的问题。自我已经占有某件并不属于它的东西。但是自我如何占有玛哪食粮?那么玛哪食粮确实是属于自我。那是正确的,假如我们的结论是:我们已经成为重要。但是,为什么这个重要,这个玛哪没有运作在别人身上?那确实是一个基本的标准!玛哪没有运作,确实不是因为我们事实上没有变得重要,而是我们仅是变得跟一种原型混杂,跟另外一个无意识的人物混杂。因此,我们必须下结论:自我从来没有征服阿尼玛,因此,自我从来没有获得阿尼玛。所有曾经发生的事情,是新的混杂。这次是跟相同性别的人物的混杂。它对应于父亲的意象,并且拥有更大的力量。
From the power that binds all creatures none is free Except the man who wins self-mastery! 1
无人能免除约束所有动物的力量,
除了赢得自我掌控的人
Thus he becomes a superman, superior to all powers, a demigod at the very least. “I and the Father are one”-this mighty avowal in all its awful ambiguity is born of just such a psychological moment.

因此,他成为超人,比起所有的力量还优秀,至少是半神性的人。「我与天父成为一体—这个伟大的宣誓,尽管含混模糊,就是诞生于如此心灵的时刻。」

In the face of this, our pitiably limited ego, if it has but a spark of self-knowledge, can only draw back and rapidly drop all pretence of power and importance. It was a delusion: the conscious mind has not become master of the unconscious, and the anima has forfeited her tyrannical power only to the extent that the ego was able to come to terms with the unconscious. This accommodation, however, was not a victory of the con¬scious over the unconscious, but the establishment of a balance of power between the two worlds.

面对这个时刻,我们有限得可怜的自我,即使它具有仅是认识自性的火花,自我仅能够缩回,然后迅速地抛弃权力与重要性的伪装。那个伪装是个幻觉:意识的心灵还没有成为无意识的掌控者。仅有当自我能够跟无意识达成妥协,阿尼玛才算是已经放弃她的暴君的权力。可是,这个包容并不是意识战胜无意识。而是建立权力的平衡,在两个世界之间。

Hence the “magician” could take possession of the ego only because the ego dreamed of victory over the anima. That dream was an encroachment, and every encroachment of the ego is followed by an encroachment from the unconscious:

因此,这位“魔术家”能够拥有自我,仅是因为自我梦想战胜阿尼玛。那个梦想是一种侵犯。而自我的每次的侵犯后面都跟随着从无意识的侵犯。
Changing shape from hour to hour I employ my savage power.2

每个时刻改变形状,
我运用我的野性的权力。

1 Goethe, “Die Geheimnis~e: Ein Fragment,” 1ine~ 191-9%.
2 Faust, trans. by Louis MacNeice, p. 282 (Part 11, Act V), modified.
229

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS Consequently, if the ego drops its claim to victory, possession by the magician ceases automatically. But what happens to the mana? Who or what becomes mana when even the magician can no longer work magic? So far we only know that neither the conscious nor the unconscious has mana, for it is certain that when the ego makes no claim to power there is no possession, that is to say, the unconscious too loses its ascendency. In this situation the inana must have fallen to something that is both conscious and unconscious, or else neither. This something is the desired “mid-point” of the personality, that ineffable some¬thing betwixt the opposites, or else that which unites them, or the result of conflict, or the product of energic tension: the com¬ing to birth of personality, a profoundly individual step for¬ward, the next stage.

结果,假如自我抛掉它对战胜的宣称,被魔术家的拥有就会自动地停止。但是,这个玛哪食粮会发生什么事?阿尼玛会成为谁?或会成为什么?当即使谁魔术家都不再能够运用魔术?迄今,我们仅是知道,无论是意识,或是无意识,它们都没有拥有阿尼玛?因为确定的是,当自我并没有宣称要有权力时,拥有就不存在。换句话说,无意识也丧失它的优越性。在这个情况,玛哪食粮一定是已经掉入某件既是意识,又是无意识的东西。或者,两者都没有。这个某件东西就是人格的被渴望的“中间点”。那是无情的某件东西,处于对立力量的中间。或者是统合它们的东西,或是冲突的结果,或是能源的紧张的产物:人格的诞生,是深刻的个人前进的一步,下一个阶段。

383 I do not expect the reader to have followed this rapid survey
of the whole problem in all its parts. He may regard it as a kind of preliminary statement leading up to the more closely rea¬soned analysis which now follows.

我并不期待读者钜细无遗地遵循这整个难题的迅速审视。读者可能将它视为是一种初级的陈述,将会导致跟随而来的更加合理一致的分析。

384 The starting-point of our problem is the condition which re-
sults when the unconscious contents that are the efficient cause of the animus and anima phenomenon have become sufficiently assimilated to the conscious mind. This can best be represented in the following way: the unconscious contents are, in the first instance, things belonging to the personal sphere, similar per¬haps to the fantasy of the male patient quoted above. Subse¬quently, fantasies from the impersonal unconscious develop, containing essentially collective symbols more or less similar to the vision of my woman patient.

我们的难题的出发点就是结果的情况,当无意识的内容已经充分地被吸收到意识的心灵。因为无意识的内容是阿尼玛斯与阿尼玛的现象的有效的原因。这用以下的方式,最能够被代表:无意识的内容,在第一个情况,是属于个人的范围的事情。或许类似于以上引述的男性病人的幻想。随意,从非个人的无意识的幻想开始发展,包含基本上是集体的象征,相当类似于我的女病人的幻景。

These fantasies are not so wild and unregulated as a naive intelligence might think; they pur¬sue definite, unconscious lines of direction which converge upon a definite goal. We could therefore most fittingly describe these later series of fantasies as processes of initiation, since these form the closest analogy. All primitive groups and tribes that are in any way organized have their rites of initiation, often very highly developed, which play an extraordinarily important part in their social and religious life.3 Through these ceremonies boys are made men, and girls women. The Kavirondos stigma¬tize those who do not submit to circumcision and excision as “animals.” This shows that the initiation ceremonies are a magical means of leading man from the animal state to the human state.
lllag¬3 Cf. Webster, primitive Secret Societies (1908).

这些幻想并不是如天真的聪明人所以为,是狂乱而没有规范。他们追寻明确的,无意识的方向脉络。 这些方向脉络汇集朝向一个明确的目标。我们因此最为合适地描述这些后来系列的幻想,作为是成年礼的过程。因为它们形成最靠近的类比。所有的原始的团体与部落,都拥有他们的成年礼的仪式。经常说高度被发展。它们扮演特殊重要的角色,在他们的社会与宗教的生活。通过这些典礼,男孩成为成年人,女孩成为女人。卡危洛罗道斯人认为那些人们是有污点的,假如他们并没接受割包皮与切阴蒂的仪式,作为是“动物”。这显示,成年礼是魔术的工具,引导人们从动物的状态,到成为人的状态。
23°

THE MANA-PERSONALlTY
They are clearly transformation mysteries of the greatest spiritual significance. Very often the initiands are subjected to excruciating treatment, and at the same time the tribal myster¬ies are imparted to them, the laws and hierarchy of the tribe on the one hand, and on the other the cosmogonic and mythical doctrines. Initiations have survived among all cultures. In Greece the ancient Eleusinian mysteries were preserved, it seems, right into the seventh century of our era. Rome was flooded with mystery religions. Of these Christianity was one, and even in its present form it still preserves the old initiation ceremonies, somewhat faded and degenerated, in the rites of baptism, confirmation, and communion. Hence nobody is in a position to deny the enormous historical importance of initia¬tions.

它们显而易见是具有最伟大的精神的意义的转化的神秘。经常,参加成年礼的人们被隶属于严苛的对待,同时,部落的神秘被传授给他们。一方面,这是部落的这些法则与阶层。另一方面,这是宇宙起源与神秘的信条。成年礼曾经存活于所有的文化里。在希腊,古代的阿留西尼人的神秘被保存下来,似乎,一直到我们的时代的第七世纪。罗马泛滥着各种的神秘的宗教。基督教是这些宗教的其中一个。即使在它目前的形式,基督教依旧保留古老的成年礼的仪式,虽然有点褪色与退化,在洗礼的仪式里,坚信礼,与见证礼。因此,没有人拥有这个立场来否认,成年礼具有巨大的历史的重要性。

385 Modern men have absolutely nothing to compare with this
(consider the testimonies of the ancients in regard to the Eleu¬sinian mysteries). Freemasonry, l’ Eglise gnostique de la France} legendary Rosicrucians, theosophy, and so forth are all feeble substitutes for something that were better marked up in red let¬ters on the historical casualty list. The fact is that the whole symbolism of initiation rises up, clear and unmistakable, in the unconscious contents.

假如我们考虑到,关于阿留西尼人的神秘,古代人的那些证词。现代人们绝对没有拥有任何可以跟这个相提并论的东西。同理教,玫瑰经教派,神秘教派,等等,都是某件东西的微弱的替代品。在历史的伤亡的名单,它们被用红色字母标记。

The objection that this is antiquated su¬perstition and altogether unscientific is about as intelligent as remarking, in the presence of a cholera epidemic, that it is merely an infectious disease and exceedingly unhygienic. The point is not-I cannot be too emphatic about this-whether the initiation symbols are objective truths, but whether these un¬conscious contents are or are not the equivalents of initiation practices, and whether they do or do not influence the human psyche. Nor is it a question of whether they are desirable or not. It is enough that they exist and that they work.

有人反对说,这是古代的迷信,完全不合乎科学。这种反对的合理性,就像是面临霍乱瘟疫时,侃侃而谈说,那是流行疾病,极端不卫生。重点并不是—对于这点,我无论如何强调也不过分—成年礼的象征是客观的真理与非,重点是,这些无意识的内容是或不是成年礼的实践的相等物。它们影响或没有影响人类的心灵。问题也不是它们是否被渴望与否。他们存在,它们发挥效用,这就足够了。

386 Since it is not possible in this connection to put before the
reader in detail these sometimes very lengthy sequences of im¬ages, I trust he will be content with the few examples already given and, for the rest, accept my statement that they are logi¬cally constructed, purposive sequences. I must own that I use the word “purposive” with some hesitation. This word needs to be used cautiously and with reserve. For in mental cases we come across dream-sequences, and in neurotics fantasy- sequences, which run on in themselves with no apparent aim or purpose.

关于这点,因为不可能在读者面前,详细提出这些有时相的冗长的系列的意象。我相信读者将会满意于已经被举出的少数的例子。其余的部分,请读者接受我的陈述,它们按照逻辑被建构,具有目的的系列。我必须承认,我使用“有目的”这个字词,有点犹豫。这个字词需要谨慎而且保留地被使用。因为在精神的个案里,我们遭遇梦的系列。在神经症,幻想的系列。它们在自己本身运作,并没有明显的目标或目的。
231

‘tHE RELAT10NS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The young man whose suicide fantasy I gave above was in a fair way to produce a string of aimless fantasies, unless he could learn to take an active part and to intervene consciously. Only thus could there be orientation to a goal. From one point of view the unconscious is a purely natural process without de¬sign, but from another it has that potential directedness which is characteristic of all energy processes. When the conscious mind participates actively and experiences each stage of the process, or at least understands it intuitively, then the next image always starts off on the higher level that has been won, and purposive¬ness develops.

我以上给予的年轻人的自杀的幻想,很合理会产生一连串的无目的地幻想。除非他能够学会主动参与,并且意识地介入。仅有这样,才能够有到达目标的定向。从某个观点,无意识是一个纯粹自然的没有设计的过程。但是,从另外一个观点,它具有那种潜力的引导,那是所有的能源的过程的特征。当意识的心灵主动参与,并且经验这个过程的每个阶段。或至少直觉地理解它。那么,下一个意象总是在已经被赢得的较高的层次开始。然后具有目的感地发展。

387 The immediate goal of the analysis of the unconscious,
therefore, is to reach a state where the unconscious contents no longer remain unconscious and no longer express themselves in¬directly as animus and anima phenomena; that is to say, a state in which animus and anima become functions of relationship to the unconscious. So long as they are not this, they are autono¬mous complexes, disturbing factors that break through the con¬scious control and act like true “disturbers of the peace.” Be¬cause this is such a well-known fact my term “complex,” as used in this sense, has passed into common speech.

无意识的精神分析的当下的目标,因此是要到达一个状态。在那个状态,无意识的内容不再保持是无意识,也不再间接地表达它们自己,作为是阿尼玛斯与阿尼玛的现象。换句话说,在这一个状态,阿尼玛斯与阿尼玛变成是跟无意识的关系的功能。只有它们并不是这个功能,它们就是具有自主权的情结,扰乱的因素突破意识的控制,并且行动,像个真实的和平的“扰乱者”。因为这是如此众所周知的事实,我的术语“情结”,被用在这个意义,已经成为通俗的言说。

The more “com¬plexes” a man has, the more he is possessed; and when we try to form a picture of the personality which expresses itself through his complexes we must admit that it resembles nothing so much as an hysterical woman-i.e., the animal But if such a man makes himself conscious of his unconscious contents, as they appear firstly in the factual contents of his personal unconscious, and then in the fantasies of the collective unconscious, he will get to the roots of his complexes, and in this way rid himself of his possession. With that the anima phenomenon comes to a stop.

一个人拥有更多的“情结”,他就越被著魔。当我们尝试形成人格的画面。这个人格表达它自己,通过他的情结。我们必须承认,它最类似的东西,莫过于癔症的女人,譬如,动物。但是,假如一个人让他自己知道他的个人的无意识,然后在集体无意识的幻想里,他将会到达他的情结的根源。用这个方式,他替自己摆脱掉他的著魔。随着摆脱著魔,阿尼玛的现象就逐渐停止。

388 That superior power, however, which caused the possession
-for what I cannot shake off must in some sense be superior to me-should, logically, disappear with the anima. One should then be “complex-free,” psychologically house-trained, so to speak. Nothing more should happen that is not sanctioned by the ego, and when the ego wants something, nothing should be capable of interfering. The ego would thus be assured of an im¬pregnable position, the steadfastness of a superman or the sub¬limity of a perfect sage. Both figures are ideal images: Napoleon on the one hand, Lao-tzu on the other.

可是,引起著魔的那个较为优秀的力量—因为我无法摆脱的东西,在某个意义上,必须比我优秀—在逻辑上,应该是会随着阿尼玛消失。我们因此应该“免除-情结”,心理上接受在家训练。凡是没有被自我认可的东西,就不应该发生。当自我想要某件东西时,没有任何东西能够干涉。自我因此将会确定具有免除被攻击的立场,超人的坚定,或是完美圣者的崇高。两个人物都是理想的形象:一方面是拿破仑,另一方面是老子。
232

THE MANA-PERSONALITY
Both are consistent with the idea of “the extraordinarily potent,” which is the term that Lehmann, in his celebrated monograph,4 uses for his definition of mana. I therefore call such a personality simply the mana-personality. It corresponds to a dominant of the collective un¬conscious, to an archetype which has taken shape in the human psyche through untold ages of just that kind of experience. Primitive man does not analyse and does not work out why an¬other is superior to him. If another is cleverer and stronger than he, then he has mana, he is possessed of a stronger power; and by the same token he can lose this power, perhaps because someone has walked over him in his sleep, or stepped on his shadow.

两者都是一贯的,跟”特殊的潜力的观念。这是雷曼使用的术语,在他的著名的论文,作为他对于玛哪食粮的定义。我因此称每一位这样的人格,仅是“玛哪食粮人格”。它对应于集体无意识的支配因素,对应于在人类的心灵已经成型的原型,通过无数的年代的仅是那种的经验。原始民族并没有分析,也没有理解,为什么另外一个人格比他优秀。假如另外一个人格比他更加聪明,更加强壮,那么他拥有玛哪食粮。他拥有更加强壮的力量。同样地,他能够丧失这个力量,或是因为某个人曾经在他睡觉时,从他上面走过,或是踩踏他的阴影。

389 Historically, the mana-personality evolves into the hero and
the godlike being,5 whose earthly form is the priest. How very much the doctor is still mana is the whole plaint of the analyst! But in so far as the ego apparently draws to itself the power belonging to the anima, the ego does become a mana-personal¬ity. This development is an almost regular phenomenon.

从历史上看,这个玛哪-人格进化成为英雄,以及类似神性的人。他们的人间的形态就是僧侣。医生有多少程度是玛哪人格,那是精神分析为了惋叹不已!但是因为自我显而易见将属于阿尼玛的力量归属他自己,自我确实变成玛哪-人格。这个发展几乎是规律的现象。

I have never yet seen a fairly advanced development of this kind where at least a temporary identification with the archetype of the mana-personaJity did not take place. It is the most natural thing in the world that this should happen, for not only does one ex¬pect it oneself, but everybody else expects it too.

我从来没有看见过一个诸如其类的非常进步的发展。在那里,至少,暂时地认同玛哪-人格的原型,并没有发生。这是世界上最自然的事情,这种事情应该发生。因为我们不但自己期望它,而且每位其他的人也期望它。

One can scarcely help admiring oneself a little for having seen more deeply into things than others, and the others have such an urge to find a tangible hero somewhere, or a superior wise man, a leader and father, some undisputed authority, that they build temples to little tin gods with the greatest promptitude and burn incense upon the altars.

我们几乎忍不住地稍微崇拜我们自己,因为我们已经比起别人更加深刻地看见事。其余的人们渴望想要在某个地方,找到一位具体的英雄,或是一位比较优秀的聪明的人,一位领导者与父亲,某个无可争议的权威。所以,他们非常迅速地建造庙宇,给小型的铝制的众神像,并且在祭坛上,点燃香火。

This is not just the lamentable stupidity of idolaters incapable of judging for themselves, but a natural psychological law which says that what has once been will always be in the future. And so it will be, unless conscious¬ness puts an end to the naIve concretization of primordial im-ages. I do not know whether it is desirable that consciousness should alter the eternal laws; I only know that occasionally it does alter them, and that this measure is a vital necessity for some people-which, however, does not always prevent these same people from setting themselves up on the father’s throne and making the old rule come true. It is indeed hard to see how one can escape the sovereign power of the primordial images.

这不仅是崇拜偶像者的令人哀叹的愚蠢,他们不能够独立从事判断。但是,这是一个自然的心理的法则说:曾经一度存在的东西,将总是在未来。它将总是在未来,除非意识结束这种天真的具体表现原始的意象。我并不知道,它是否被渴望,意识竟然改变这些永恒的法则。我仅是知道,偶然,意识确实改变永恒的法则。这个衡量至关紧要,对于某些人们。可是,这些人们并未总是阻止这些相同的人们,不要在父亲的王位上建立他们自己,并且不让古老法则成为真实。我们确实很困难看出,我们如何能够逃避这个原初的意象的统辖的力量。

4 Lehmann, Mana (1922).
5 According to popular belief, the Most Christian King could cure epilepsy with his mana by the laying on of hands.
233

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

390 Actually I do not believe it can be escaped. One can only
alter one’s attitude and thus save oneself from naively falling into an archetype and being forced to act a part at the expense of one’s humanity. Possession by an archetype turns a man into a flat collective figure, a mask behind which he can no longer de¬velop as a human being, but becomes increasingly stunted. One must therefore beware of the danger of falling victim to the dominant of the mana-personality. The danger lies not only in oneself becoming a father-mask, but in being overpowered by this mask when worn by another. Master and pupil are in the same boat in this respect.

实际上,我并不相信,它能够被逃避。我们仅能够改变我们的态度,因此,拯救我们自己不要天真地掉入一种原型,不要被迫扮演一个角色,而牺牲人性作为代价。被某个原型著魔,会将一个人转换成为一个扁平的集体的人物,在这样一个面具背后,他不再发展,作为一个人。而是变成越来越低劣。我们因此必须小心这个危险:成为玛哪-人格的支配者的受害者。这个危险不但在于自己变成父亲-面具,而且在于我们会被这个面具压倒,当这个面具被另外一个人所戴时。老师与学生在这方面,是命运相同。

391 The dissolution of the anima means that we have gained in-
sight into the driving forces of the unconscious, but not that we have made these forces ineffective. They can attack us at any time in new form. And they will infallibly do so if the conscious attitude has a flaw in it. It’s a question of might against might. If the ego presumes to wield power over the unconscious, the un¬conscious reacts with a subtle attack, deploying the dominant of the mana-personality, whose enormous prestige casts a spell over the ego. Against this the only defence is full confession of one’s ‘weakness in face of the powers of the unconscious. By opposing no force to the unconscious we do not provoke it to attack.

阿尼玛的瓦解意味著,我们已经获得洞见,对无意识的驱动的力量。但是并不意味着,我们已经让这些力量没有效力。他们能够随时攻击我们,以新的形态。他们没有错误地这样做,假如无意识的态度本身具有暇疵。问题是:强权对抗强权。假如自我胆敢运用力量控制无意识,无意识会反应,用微妙的攻击,运用玛哪-人格的这个支配者。它的巨大的威望对于自我投下魔力。对抗这个魔力,唯一的防卫是充分坦白自己的弱点,当面临无意识的力量。凭借不对无意识反对任何力量,我们才不会引起它攻击。

392 It may sound rather comical to the reader if I speak of the
unconscious in this personal way. I hope I shall not arouse the prejudice that I regard the unconscious as something personal. The unconscious consists of natural processes that lie outside the sphere of the human personality.

读者听起来,可能相当滑稽,假如我谈论无意识,用这个私人的方式。我希望我将不会引起这个偏见:我将无意识视为是某件个人的东西。无意识在于自然的过程,横展在人的人格的范围之外。

Only our conscious mind is “personal.” Therefore when I speak of “provoking” the uncon¬scious I do not mean that it is offended and-like the gods of old-rises up to smite the offender in jealous anger or revenge. What I mean is more like an error in psychic diet which upsets the equilibrium of my digestion. The unconscious reacts auto¬matically like my stomach which, in a manner of speaking, wreaks its revenge upon me.

仅有我们的意思是“个人”的。因此,当我谈论“触发“无意识,我并没有意味著,它被冒犯—像古老的众神一样—它产生是为了要用妒忌的愤怒或报复,打击冒犯者。我的意思更像是心灵饮食的错误,因为它扰乱我的消化的平衡。无意识自动地反应行动,就像是我的胃。以言说的方式,我的胃对我发表它的报复。

When I presume to have power over the unconscious, that is like a dietary solecism, an unseemly attitude which in the interests of one’s own well-being were bet¬ter avoided. My unpoetical comparison is, if anything, far too mild in view of the far-reaching and devastating moral effects of a disordered unconscious. In this regard it would be more fitting to speak of the wrath of offended gods.

当我假定对于无意识拥有权力时,那就像饮食的笨拙行为,以不合宜的态度。为了我们自己的幸福的利益,它们最好被避免。我的欠缺诗意的比较,未免太过于温和,假如从深远而毁灭性的道德的影响,对于失序的无意识。关于这一点,那将是更加的适合,假如我们谈论被冒犯的众神的愤怒。
234

THE MAN A-PERSONALITY

393 In differentiating the ego from the archetype of the mana-
personality one is now forced, exactly as in the case of the anima, to make conscious those contents which are specific of the mana¬personality. Historically, the mana-personality is always in pos¬session of the secret name, or of some esoteric knowledge, or has the prerogative of a special way of acting-quod licet Jovi, non licet bovi-in a word, it has an individual distinction.

当我们区别自我跟玛哪人格的原型的不同 我们现在被迫,确实在阿尼玛的情况,要让那些内容知道,玛哪人格的那些明确的内容。从历史而言,玛哪人格总是拥有秘密的名字,或是拥有奥秘的知识,或是拥有特别方式的特权:acting-quod licet Jovi, non licet bov(乔比被容许,未必每个人都容许)—总之,它拥有个人的区别。

Conscious realization of the contents composing it means, for the man, the second and real liberation from the father, and, for the woman, liberation from the mother, and with it comes the first genuine sense of his or her true individuality. This part of the process corresponds exactly to the aim of the concretistic primitive initi¬ations up to and including baptism, namely, severance from the “carnal” (or animal) parents, and rebirth in novam infantiam, into a condition of immortality and spiritual childhood, as formulated by certain mystery religions of the ancient world, among them Christianity.

对于这男人,组成这个区别的内容,在意识的实现,意味着第二次与真实地从父亲解放。对于女人,意味着从母亲解放。随着解放而来,是第一次真诚的他或她的个体性的感觉。这个过程的这个部分确实对应于具体的原始民族的成年礼的目标,甚至包含洗礼。换句话说,跟“具体化身”或动物的父亲脱离。婴孩般的重生进入永生与精神的童年的情况。如同古代世界的某些神秘的宗教所阐述,其中包含基督教。

394 It is now quite possible that, instead of identifying with the
man a-personality, one will concretize it as an extramundane “Father in Heaven,” complete with the attribute of absoluteness -something that many people seem very prone to do.

现在,这是完全可能的,非但没有认同玛哪-人格,我们将会具体表现它,作为是非世俗的“天上的父亲”,再加上绝对化的属性—这些很多人们倾向于做的事情。

This would be tantamount to giving the unconscious a supremacy that was just as absolute (if one’s faith could be pushed that far!), so that all value would flow over to that side.6 The logi¬cal result is that the only thing left behind here is a miserable, inferior, worthless, and sinful little heap of humanity. This so¬lution, as we know, has become an historical world view.

这将是相等于是给予无意识一个同样是绝对的崇高地位,(假如一个人的信仰能够被逼迫到那个程度!)这样,所有的价值将会流动到那一边。逻辑的结果是,在此唯一被剩余下来的东西,将是一个悲惨,没有价值,而且有原罪的一点人性。我们知道,这种解决已经变成是历史的世界观。

6 “Absolute” means “cut off,” “detached.” To assert that God is absolute amounts to placing him outside all connection with mankind. Man cannot affect him, or he man. Such a God would be of no consequence at all. We can in fairness only speak of a God who is relative to man, as man is to God. The Christian idea of God as a “father in Heaven” puts God’s relativity in exquisite form. Quite apart from the fact that a man can know even less about God than an ant can know of the contents of the British Museum, this urge to regard God as “abso¬lute” derives solely from the fear that God might become “psychological.” This would naturally be dangerous. An absolute God, on the other hand, does not concern us in the least, whereas a “psychological” God would be real. This kind of God could reach man. The Church seems to be a magical instrument for protecting man against this eventuality, since it is written: “It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.”
235

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396

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
As I am moving here on psychological ground only, and feel no in-clination whatever to dictate my eternal truths to the world at large, I must observe, by way of criticizing this solution, that if I shift all the highest values over to the side of the unconscious, thus converting it into a summum bonum, I am then placed in the unfortunate position of having to discover a devil of equal weight and dimensions who could act as the psychological counterbalance to my summum bonum. Under no circum-stances, however, will my modesty allow me to identify myself with the devil. That would be altogether too presumptuous and would, moreover, bring me into unbearable conflict with my highest values. Nor, with my moral deficit, can I possibly afford it.

因为我在此仅是在心理学的领域移动,并且没有感觉有任何倾向,要将我的永恒的真理,指示给一般的世界。我必须观察,凭借批评这个解决方法,假如我转移所有最高的价值,转移到无意识的这边,那么我会将它转移成为是是“最崇高的善”。我因此被放置在不幸的立场,我必须发现一位同等份量,同等维度的恶魔。他能够行为,依照心理的反-平衡,跟我的“最崇高的善”。可是,无论如何,我的谦虚将不会容许我认同于这个恶魔。那将是过度逾越,而且,将会将我带人无法忍受的冲突,跟我最高的价值。即使用我的道德的借贷,我也不可能供应得起。

On psychological grounds, therefore, I would recommend that no God be constructed out of the archetype of the mana-personality. In other words, he must not be concretized, for only thus can I avoid projecting my values and non-values into God and Devil, and only thus can I preserve my human dignity, my specific gravity, which I need so much if I am not to become the unresisting shuttlecock of unconscious forces. In his dealings with the visible world, a man must certainly be mad to suppose that he is master of this world. Here we follow, quite naturally, the principle of non-resistance to all superior forces, up to a cer¬tain individual limit, beyond which the most peaceful citizen becomes a bloody revolutionary.

因此,根据心理学的理由,我将推荐:从玛哪-人格的原型,上帝不应该被建构出来。换句话说,上帝一定不要被具体表现。因为仅有这样,我才能够避免投射我的价值与非-价值,进入上帝与魔鬼身上。仅有这样,我才能保持我的人的尊严,我的明确的地心引力。我如此地需要它们,假如我不想要成为无法抗拒的无意识的力量的羽毛球。当一个人在处理可看得见的世界时,他一定是疯狂,他才会假设:他是世界的主人。在此,我们跟随,相当自然地,非抗拒的原则,对于所有的较优秀的力量。一直到某个个人的限制。超越这个限制,即使是最和平的市民也变成是流血的革命份子。

Our bowing down before law and order is a commendable example of what our general atti-tude to the collective unconscious should be. (“Render unto Caesar. … “) Thus far our obeisance would not be too diffi-cult. But there are other factors in the world to which our con-science does not give unqualified assent-and yet we bow to them. Why? Because in practice it is more expedient than the reverse. Similarly there are factors in the unconscious with re-gard to which we must be worldly-wise (“Resist not eviL” “Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of unrighteous-ness.” “The children of this world are in their generation wiser than the children of light.” Ergo: “Be ye therefore wise as ser¬pents and harmless as doves.”)

我们的遵循法则与秩序是可称赞的例子,这是我们的一般对于集体无意识的态度应该的样子。(凯撒的归因凯撒)。迄今,我们的服从将是不会太过于困难。但是,世界上还有其他因素,我们的良心不会给予无条件的认同—可是,我们还是屈从它们。为什么?因为实际上,屈从比起反抗是更加方便。同样地,在无意识,有一些因素,关于这些因素,我们必须要有世俗的智慧。(”识时务者为俊杰”, “好汉别擋人财路“,”园滑者腾达,坚守原则者不得志”),如艾苟所说:”“学习蛇般狡猾,鸽子般无害“。

The mana-personality is on one side a being of superior wis¬dom, on the other a being of superior will. By making conscious the contents that underlie this personality, we find ourselves obliged to face the fact that we have learnt more and want more than other people. This uncomfortable kinship with the gods, as we know, struck so deep into poor Angelus Silesius’ bones that it sent him flying out of his super-Protestantism, past the precari¬ous halfway house of the Lutherans, back to the nethermost womb of the dark Mother-unfortunately very much to the det¬riment of his lyrical gifts and the health of his nerves.

玛哪-人格在一方面是优秀智慧的人物;另一方面,他说优秀意志1的人物。凭借让作为人格基础的内容被知道,我们发现我们自己被迫面对这个事实:我们比起别人已经学习更多,而且想要的更多。这个不幸的跟众神做亲属,我们知道,会让可怜的安吉拉 西列席思如此刻骨铭心,以致这让他从超级-基督教脱离出来,穿越恶魔们的不稳定的中途之家,回到黑暗的大地之母的阴间子宫。结果,让他的抒情的天赋与神经的健康大受损害。

236

397
398

THE MANA-PERSONALITY
And yet Christ, and Paul after him, wrestled with these same problems, as a number of clues still make evident. Meister Eck-hart, Goethe in his Faust, Nietzsche in his Zamthustm, have again brought this problem somewhat closer to us. Goethe and Nietzsche try to solve it by the idea of mastery, the former through the figure of the magician and ruthless man of will who makes a pact with the devil, the latter through the masterman and supreme sage who knows neither God nor devil. With Nie-tzsche man stands alone, as he himself did, neurotic, financially dependent, godless, and worldless.

可是,追随他之后的耶稣基督,圣保罗,则是博斗这些相同的难题,如同许多的线索依旧表明的。欧克哈得,歌德在他的“浮士德”“尼采在他的“扎拉哲思特拉”, 都再次地尝试要解决这个难题。,凭借掌控的观念。前者通过魔法师的人物,与意志的无情的人,他跟恶魔订下盟约,后者通过智慧大师与崇高的圣贤,他既不知道上帝,也不知道恶魔。对于尼采,人是单独站立,如同他自己所为,神经症,财政上依赖,没有神,没有世界。

This is no ideal for a real man who has a family to support and taxes to pay. Nothing can argue the reality of the world out of existence, there is no miraculous way round it. Similarly, nothing can argue the effects of the un¬conscious out of existence. Or can the neurotic philosopher prove to us that he has no neurosis? He cannot prove it even to himself.’ Therefore we stand with our soul suspended between formidable influences from within and from without, and some-how we must be fair to both. This we can do only after the meas-ure of our individual capacities. Hence we must bethink our-selves not so much of what we “ought” to do as of what we can and must do.

这并不是现实的人的理想。因为他有家庭要供养,有税金要偿付。世界的现实的存在,是无可争议的事实。没有什么奇迹的方式可以绕过他。同样地,无意识的影响的存在,也是无可争议的。难道神经症的哲学家能够跟我们证明,他并没有神经症吗?他甚至无法跟他自己证明。因此,我们站立,灵魂却悬置在可怕的影响,来自内部与来自外部。用某种方法,我们必须公平处理两者。我们能够这样做,仅有经过我们的个人的能够的衡量。因此,我们必须三思而后行,不是思维我们“应该“怎么做,而是思维我们”能够“以及”必须“做什么。

Thus the dissolution of the mana-personality through con-scious assimilation of its contents leads us, by a natural route, back to ourselves as an actual, living something, poised between two world-pictures and their darkly discerned potencies. This “something” is strange to us and yet so near, wholly ourselves and yet unknowable, a virtual centre of so mysterious a constitu-tion that it can claim anything-kinship with beasts and gods, with crystals and with stars-without moving us to wonder, without even exciting our disapprobation. This “something” claims all that and more, and having nothing in our hands that could fairly be opposed to these claims, it is surely wiser to listen to this voice.

因此,玛哪-人格的瓦解,经由吸收它的内容会引导我们,经由自然的途径,回到我们自己,作为一个实际的活生生的东西,平衡于两个的世界-画面之间,以及它们的黑暗中被区别的潜力。这个“某件东西“对于我们是奇怪的,可是又如此靠近,完全就是我们,可是,又无法被知道。这一个虚拟的中心,是如此神秘的构造,以致于它能够宣称任何事情—包括跟野兽与众神是亲属,跟水晶球与星球是亲属是亲属。但是,它又没有感动我们去惊奇,甚至没有激发我们的遣责。这个“某件东西”宣称那一切,而且更多。由于我们手边并没有拥有任何东西能够公平地反对这些宣称,倾听这个声音确实是比较明智之举。

237、

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
399 I have called this centre the self. Intellectually the self is no
more than a psychological concept, a construct that serves to ex¬press an unknowable essence which we cannot grasp as such, since by definition it transcends our powers of comprehension. It might equally well be called the “God within us.” The begin¬nings of our whole psychic life seem to be inextricably rooted in this point, and all our highest and ultimate purposes seem to be striving towards it. This paradox is unavoidable, as always, when we try to define something that lies beyond the bourn of our understanding.

我曾经称这个中心为自性。从知识层面言,自性仅是一个心理的观念,一个建构,用来表达无法被知道的本质。我们无法理解这个本质的本身。因为定义上,它超越我们的理解的力量。自性很有理由同样被称为“我们内在的上帝”。我们整个的心灵的生活的开始,似乎无可摆脱地根源于这一点。所有我们的最高与最后的目的,似乎是朝向它而追寻。这个悖论是无可避免的,如同经常那样,当我们尝试定义某件超越我们的理解的范围的东西。

400 I hope it has become sufficiently clear to the attentive reader
that the self has as much to do with the ego as the sun with the earth. They are not interchangeable. Nor does it imply a deifica¬tion of man or a dethronement of God. What is beyond our un¬derstanding is in any case beyond its reach. When, therefore, we make use of the concept of a God we are simply formulating a definite psychological fact, namely the independence and sover¬eignty of certain psychic contents which express themselves by their power to thwart our will, to obsess our consciousness and to influence our moods and actions.

我希望它已经变得充分地清楚,对于专注的读者,自性跟自我有密切的关系,如同太阳跟地球。它们是无法互相交换。它也没有暗示人的成为神,或上帝被废黜。超越我们的理解力的东西,无论如何,就是我们的理解力无法理解。因此,当我们使用上帝的这个观念,我们仅是阐述一个明确的心理的事实。换句话说,某些心灵的内容的独立与统治。它们表达它们自己,凭借它们的力量,阻碍我们的意志,著魔我们的意识,并且影响我们的心情与行动。

We may be outraged at the idea of an inexplicable mood, a nervous disorder, or an uncon¬trollable vice being, so to speak, a manifestation of God. But it would be an irreparable loss for religious experience if such things, perhaps even evil things, were artificially segregated from the sum of autonomous psychic contents. It is an apotro¬paic euphemism7 to dispose of these things with a “nothing but” explanation. In that way they are merely repressed, and as a rule only an apparent advantage is gained, a new twist given to illusion.

我们可能感到愤怒,想到不可思议的心情,神经症的失序,或无法控制的邪恶的存在。也就是说,上帝的展示。但是,这将是无可弥补的损失,对于宗教的经验。假如这些事情,或许即使是邪恶的事情,用人为方式,跟具有自主权的心灵的众多内容分离开来。这是一种幸运的委婉语,为了摆脱这些仅是解释的东西。用那个方式,他们仅是感到沮丧。通常,仅是表面的利益被获得,耽溺幻觉的新的变种。

The personality is not enriched by it, only impover¬ished and smothered. What seems evil, or at least meaningless and valueless to contemporary experience and knowledge, might on a higher level of experience and knowledge appear as the source of the best-everything depending, naturally, on the use one makes of one’s seven devils. To explain them as mean¬ingless robs the personality of its proper shadow, and with this it loses its form. The living form needs deep shadow if it is to appear plastic. Without shadow it remains a two-dimensional phantom, a more or less well brought-up child.

这个人格并没有因为它而变得丰富。仅是变得贫瘠而闷窒。对于当代人的经验与知识,
看起来邪恶的东西,或至少看起来是没有意义与没有价值的东西,在更高的经验与知识的层次,似乎是最佳的一切的来源,它们自然地依靠我们解释我们的七个恶魔的用途。为了解释它们,作为是无意义,让人格丧尸它的适当的阴影。随着这个丧失,它丧失它的形式。活生生的形式需要深度的阴影,假如它想要看起来有弹性。假如没有阴影,它始终是两个维度的魅影。类型被良好教育的小孩。
238

THE MANA-PERSONALITY

4°1 Here I am alluding to a problem that is far more significant
than these few simple words would seem to suggest: mankind is, in essentials, psychologically still in a state of childhood-a stage that cannot be skipped. The vast majority needs authority, guid¬ance, law. This fact cannot be overlooked. The Pauline over¬coming of the law falls only to the man who knows how to put his soul in the place of conscience. Very few are capable of this (“Many are called, but few are chosen”). And these few tread this path only from inner necessity, not to say suffering, for it is sharp as the edge of a razor.

在此,我正提的一个更加重要的难题,比丘这些少数的简单的字词表面所暗示的:在本质上,人类的心理依旧处于小孩的状态。并且无法被跳跃过。广大的俗众需要权威,引导,法律。这个事实无法被忽略。保罗教派克服法律,仅是知道如何将他的灵魂取代良心的人才做得到。很少人能够这样做。(“许多人被召唤,但是少数人被选择”)。这些少数的人踏上这个途径,仅是由于内心的需要,遑论的痛苦的需要。因为它像剃刀一样的锐利。

4°2 The conception of God as an autonomous psychic content
makes God into a moral problem-and that, admittedly, is very uncomfortable. But if this problem does not exist, God is not real, for nowhere can he touch our lives. He is then either an historical and intellectual bogey or a philosophical sentimental¬ity.

上帝的观念,作为具有自主权的心灵的内容,让上帝成为是道德的难题 .我们承认,这个难题是非常令人不舒服.但是,假如这个难题并不存在,上帝并非真实,因为上帝根本就没有碰触我们的生活.上帝要就是一个历史的知识的邪恶的精神,要不就是哲学的情绪化表现.

4°3 If we leave the idea of “divinity” quite out of account and
speak only of “autonomous contents,” we maintain a position that is intellectually and empirically correct, but we silence a note which, psychologically, should not be missing.

假如我们完全不考虑”神性”的观念,然后仅是谈论”自主权的内容”,我们主张一个立场:保持知识与经验的独立.但是我们让一个在心理上不应该被漏掉的注意保持沉默.

By using the concept of a divine being we give apt expression to the peculiar way in which we experience the workings of these autonomous contents: We could also use the term “daemonic,” provided that this does not imply that we are still holding up our sleeves some concretized God who conforms exactly to our wishes and ideas. Our intellectual conjuring tricks do not help us to make a real¬ity of the God we desire, any more than the world accommodates itself to our expectations. Therefore, by affixing the attribute “divine” to the workings of autonomous contents, we are admit¬ting their relatively superior force. And it is this superior force which has at all times constrained men to ponder the inconceiv¬able, and even to impose the greatest sufferings upon themselves in order to give these workings their due. It is a force as real as hunger and the fear of death.

凭借使用神性的存在的观念,我们给予合宜的解释,给这个特殊的方式.用这个方式,我们经验这些具有自主权的内容的运作.我们也能够使用这个术语”恶魔”,只要这个术语没有暗示着:我们依旧保有某个具体化的上帝.他确实符合我们的愿望与观念.我们的知识的召唤的技俩并没有帮助我们将我们欲望的上帝成为现实.正如世界并没有接纳我们的期望.因此,凭借合并”神性”的属性,到具有自主权的内容的运作. 我们正在承认:它们的比较优秀的力量.就是这个比较优秀的力量,自始至终,
约束人们要沉思这个无法被构想的东西,甚至赋加最大的痛苦在他们自己身上,为了给予这些运作他们应得的东西.这一个力量跟饥饿与对应死亡的恐惧一样的真实.
4°4 The self could be characterized as a kind of compensation of
the conflict between inside and outside. This formulation would not be unfitting, since the self has somewhat the character of a result, of a goal attained, something that has come to pass very gradually and is experienced with much travail. So too the self is our life’s goal, for it is the completest expression of that fateful combination we call individuality, the full flowering not only of the single individual, but of the group, in which each adds his portion to the whole.

自性能够被表现特征,作为是一种内部与外部之间的冲突的补偿.这种阐释将不会不适合.因为自性拥有内容的特性,拥有获得目标的特性。这个某件东西非常逐渐地发生,并且勤奋地被经验到。所以,自性就是我们的生活的目标,因为自性是最完整的表达,对于我们所谓的个体化的那个命定的组合。不但是独异性的个人,也是团体的盛放花朵。在团体里,每一个独异性个人增加他的部分给整体。

239

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
405 Sensing the self as something irrational, as an indefinable ex-
istent, to which the ego is neither opposed nor subjected, but merely attached, and about which it revolves very much as the earth revolves round the sun-thus we come to the goal of indi¬viduation. I use the word “sensing” in order to indicate the ap¬perceptive character of the relation between ego and self. In this relation nothing is knowable, because we can say nothing about the contents of the self. The ego is the only content of the self that we do know.

理解自性作为某件非理性的东西,作为是无法被定义的存在,自我对于这个存在,既不是对立,也不是隶属。而仅是附著。关于这个无法被定义的存在,它经常环绕,如同地球环绕太阳。因此,我们到达个体化的目标。我使用“理解”这个字词,为了指示自我与自性之间的关系,具有非统觉的特性。

The individuated ego senses itself as the object of an unknown and supraordinate subject. It seems to me that our psychological inquiry must come to a stop here, for the idea of a self is itself a transcendental postulate which, although justi¬fiable psychologically, does not allow of scientific proof. This step beyond science is an unconditional requirement of the psy¬chological development I have sought to depict, because with-out this postulate I could give no adequate formulation of the psychic processes that occur empirically. At the very least, there¬fore, the self can claim the value of an hypothesis analogous to that of the structure of the atom. And even though we should once again be enmeshed in an image, it is none the less power¬fully alive, and its interpretation quite exceeds my powers. I have no doubt at all that it is an image, but one in which we are contained.

个体化的自我理解它自己,作为是一个未知而早先注定的主体。我觉得,我们的心理学的研究在此必须停顿一下。因为自性的观念本身是一个超验的假设。虽然从心理学来说,它能自园其说,它并没有容许提出科学的证据。超越科学的这个步骤,是我曾经尝试描述的心理学的发展的无条件的要求。

406 I am deeply conscious that in this essay I have made no ordi-
nary demands on the understanding of my reader. Though I have done my utmost to smooth the path of understanding, there is one great difficulty which I could not eliminate, namely the fact that the experiences which form the basis of my discussion are unknown to most people and are bound to seem strange.

我深深知道,在这篇论文,我对于我的读者的理解力的要求,是特殊的。虽然我已经尽我全力要让理解的途径顺畅。还是有一个巨大的困难,我无法减少。换句话说,形成我的讨论的基础的这些经验,对于大部分的人们是前所未闻,因此注定听起来古怪。

Consequently I cannot expect my readers to follow all my conclusions. Although every author naturally prefers to be understood by his public, yet the interpretation of my observa¬tions is of less moment to me than the disclosure of a wide field of experience, at present hardly explored, which it is the aim of this book to bring within reach of many. In this field, hitherto so
dark, it seems to me that there lie the answers to many rid¬dles which the psychology of consciousness has never even ap¬proached. I would not pretend to have formulated these answers with any degree of finality. I shall, therefore, be well satisfied if my essay may be counted as a tentative attempt at an answer.

结果,我无法期望我的读者遵循我所有的结论。虽然每位作者天性上都喜欢被大众理解。可是,我的观察的解释,并不那么重要,对于我,比起揭露对广大的经验。在目前,它几乎没有被人探索。这就是本书的目的,要将它带给大多数的人们知道。在这个领域,它迄今是黑暗领域。我觉得,对于许的谜团的解答就在那里。意识的心理学甚至还没有接近那里。我将不假装已经获得最后结论,对于这些回答的阐述。我因此将非常满意,假如我的论文可能被认为是试验性的企图,要获得答案。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康:解释的意义

December 15, 2015

THE MEANING OF INTERPRETATION
解释的意义

In the first sentence of the preface to his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan wrote
that the ‘surrounding circumstances’ of his text ‘had some effect on it’
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:30). He ensuingly revealed how the French
psychoanalytic community had recently split following the creation of a
training institute, the official party line preventing him and his followers
from speaking at a formal gathering of francophone psychoanalysts in
Rome.8 According to Lacan the dissension had occurred when certain
members of the French group had tried to impose a series of rigid training
rules, yet a Bulletin of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA)
makes clear that in reality the debate hinged on the incompatibility
between Lacan’s habit of conducting sessions of variable length and the
existing professional standards (Eissler 1954:267–290).

在“罗马辞说”的序言的第一个句子,拉康书写到:他的文本的“周遭的环境”对它具有某些的影响“。拉康随后显示,法国的精神分析的社团最近分裂,跟随着训练的学院的创立之后。官方的学派阻止拉康与他的追随者不能在罗马的讲法语的正式的聚会里演讲。依照拉康的说法,这个异端争议会发生,是因为某些的法国团体的成员曾经尝试赋加一系列的严格的训练的规则。可是,国际精神分析协会的公告澄清:实际上,跟这个争议息息相关的是这个不合谐,拉康的习惯主导长短不一的咨商时间,与现存的专业的标准之间的不和谐。

Lacan’s unruly
behaviour constituted a thorn in the side of many an IPA council member,
the more so that he had apparently promised to abide by the deontological
code without effectively doing so (ibid.: 276).

拉康的粗鲁的行为构成一个眼中钉,在国际精神分析协会的成员的这一边。更加是如此,因为拉康明显地承诺要支持废除本体论的符码,虽然他并没有实际这样做。

In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan minimized the historical controversy
surrounding his idiosyncratic technique in favour of a sustained theoretical
defence of its application, yet the vehemence with which he endorsed
the variable-length session, against the formalism advocated by the
establishment, indicates the issue’s crucial importance within
contemporary psychoanalytic circles. Lacan’s principal argument in
support of variable-length sessions was that the analyst’s manipulation
of time functions as an interpretive intervention in so far as it punctuates
the analysand’s speech. In the first chapter of the ‘Rome Discourse’ he
put it as follows:

在“罗马辞说“,拉康轻视环绕他的怪诞的技术的历史的争论,以赞同用理论持续地辩护他的怪诞的技术的运用。可是,他热烈地替他的长短不一的咨商时间背书。对抗精神分析体制所主张的形式主义。拉康指示这个议题的至关紧要,在当代的精神分析的内圈里面。拉康的主要的论点,支持长短不一的咨商时间,是因为分析家的对于时间的操控,充当是解释的介入。因为它中止分析者的言说。在”罗马辞说“的第一章节,拉康的表达如下:

It is therefore, a beneficent punctuation, one which confers its
meaning on the subject’s discourse. This is why the adjournment
of a session—which according to present-day technique is simply
a chronometric break and, as such, a matter of indifference to the
thread of the discourse—plays the part of a metric beat which has
the full value of an actual intervention by the analyst for hastening
the concluding moments.
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:44)

因此,这是一个有利的中止,赋予它的意义给主体的辞说的中止。这就是为什么咨商时间的中止扮演计时节拍的角色—依照目前的技术,仅是时钟的中止。作为这样的中止,对于辞说的脉络表示漠视。计时节拍扮演的角色,对于分析家的具有实际的介入的充分的价值,因为他可以加快作为结论的时刻。

Further in the text he added that analysands inevitably experience the
analyst’s suspension of the session as a punctuation of their discourse
(ibid.: 98). So if interpreting equals punctuating the analysand’s speech,
suspending the session will have effects similar to those induced by more
traditional forms of interpretation.

在文本里,更加深入地,拉康补充说:分析者无可避免地经验到分析家的悬置咨商时数,作为是他们的辞说的中止。所以,假如解释相等于是中止分析者的言说,悬置咨商时数将会具有影响,类似由更加传统的解释的形式产生的影响。

In Lacan’s view, professional
regulations about analytic time-keeping, such as ‘Every session lasts 50
minutes’, were just arbitrary rules imposed by anonymous authoritarian
bodies on both the analyst and the analysand, depriving the analyst of
the possibility to use the interpretive power of time in a responsible and
calculated fashion to the benefit of the analytic treatment.

从拉康的观点,专业的规范关于时间的长短,譬如“每个咨商时间延续50分钟“,那仅是任意性的规则,被匿名的权威的团体赋加在分析家与分析者身上。这些规则剥夺分析家的可能用时间作为解释的力量,用负责而经过估算的方式,结果有利于精神分析的治疗。

Complying
with a preset working-time is worse than manipulating it, because in the
former case it is impossible to control the effects of the session’s
interruption on the analysand’s condition (ibid.: 99). Partly because Lacan
transformed an agreed professional standard into a flexible technical tool,
partly because his innovation was perceived as stretching the limits of
the analyst’s power over the patient, high representatives of the IPA
considered his practice unacceptable, and refused to give way on this
point when Lacan’s group applied for a new official recognition during
the early 1960s.9

同意目前的工作时间,更加糟糕于操控工作时间。因为在前者的情况,我们不可能控制咨商时间的中断的影响,对于分析者的情况。部分是因为拉康转换一个共识的专业的标准,成为具有弹性的技术性的工具。部分是因为他的创新被感觉是延长分析家的对于病人的权力的限制。国际精神分析协会的高级代表都认为拉康的做法无法被接受。并且拒绝让步,针对这一点。当拉康的团体在1960年代早期,申请新的官方的承认。

Precision is not a liberating factor and conjecture does not pre-empt
rigour, Lacan argued (ibid.: 74, 98). No matter how rebellious to any type
of formalism, he believed that the analysts’ temporal interventions could
be presented in rigorous and unambiguous terms. For the development of
this new clinical formalization, Lacan took his lead from his own theory
of logical time, in which he had distinguished between the ‘instant of the
glance’, the ‘time for comprehending’, and the ‘moment of concluding’,
on the basis of an analysis of the sophism of the three prisoners (Lacan
1988a[1945]).10

拉康主张:准确性并不是解放的因素,推测并没有让严谨松绑。无论对于任何种类的形式主义的反叛,拉康相信,精神分析家的时间的介入能够被呈现,用严谨而不模糊的术语。对于这个新的临床的正式化的发展,拉康从他自己的逻辑时间的理论带头前进。在逻辑时间里,拉康区别“瞥见的瞬间“,”理解的时间“,与”作为结论的时间“,他以三位囚犯的诡辩的分析作为基础。

Because each prisoner’s freedom is dependent upon the
reduction of the time for comprehending, after the instant of the glance,
Lacan averred that the analyst’s suspension of the session should always
be geared towards the precipitation of the moment of concluding and thus
towards the reduction of the time for comprehending (Lacan
1977e[1953]:48).11 This is why, in the above citation, he described the
value of an analytic intervention as hastening the concluding moments.
With their interpretations analysts need to ensure that the amount of time
analysands spend on understanding, brooding and plotting is reduced to a
minimum.

因为每位囚犯的自由依靠理解时间的减少,经过瞥见的瞬间之后,拉康主张,分析家的悬置咨商时间应该总是被发动,朝向结论的时刻的突然来临,因此朝向理解的时间的减少。这就是为什么,在以上的引述里,拉康描述精神分析介入的价值,作为是加速结论时刻的来临。随着他们的解释,分析家需要保证:分析者花费在理解,沉思与计谋的时间的数量,被化减到最小量。

These mental activities are considered counter-productive
because just as in the story of the three prisoners they bar the roads to
freedom.12 To put Lacan’s principle in more psychological terms: through
her interpretations, including the suspension of the session, the analyst
has to facilitate and accelerate decision-making processes in the analysand;
he has to urge the analysand to make decisions about his life in line with
his desire, despite the fact that he does not master all the knowledge
necessary to be sure that these decisions are right.13

这些精神的活动被认为是跟生产相反,因为正如在三位囚犯的故事,他们阻碍了自由之路。用更加心理学的术语来表达拉康的原则:经由她的解释,包括悬置咨商时间,分析家必须方便而且加速做决定的过程,在分析者身上。分析家必须建议分析者从事决定,关于他的生活,以符合他的欲望。尽管这个事实:他并没有掌控所有必要的知识,以便确定,这些决的是正确的。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, compressing the time for
comprehending facilitates the moment of concluding because it stimulates
‘the meditation of the subject [the analysand] towards deciding the
meaning [sens] to attach to the original event’ (ibid.: 48).14 A necessary
mediating factor between the analyst’s interventions and the analysand’s
conclusions, the crystallization of meaning is the first corollary of an
appropriate analytic interpretation.15 Lacan accordingly underlined that
psychoanalysis is ‘an action whose effects are entirely dependent on
meaning’ (ibid.: 33).

用拉康的治疗的观念来说,将理解的时间压缩,有利于结论的时刻。因为它刺激主体(分析者)的沉思,朝向决定要跟原初的事件连系一块的意义。在分析家的介入与分析者的结论之间的必要的中介的因素,意义的具体化,就是合适的精神分析的解释的最初的结果。拉康因此强调:精神分析师一个行动,这个行动的结果完全依靠意义。

Yet, against all odds, he also intimated that this
dependency of the analytic effects on meaning does not imply that
analysts are expected to reveal the meaning of their analysands’ symptoms
through their interpretations. The content of the analyst’s interpretations
is not tailored to the meaning of what the analysand is suffering from.
When interpreting the analyst is not supposed to tell the patient what his
symptoms mean.

可是,即使面对不利情况,拉康也主张,精神分析的依靠意义的影响,并没有意味着:精神分析家被期望揭示他们的分析者的症状的意义,通过他们的解释。分析者的解释的内容并没有被附加在分析者的遭受痛苦的内容的意义。当从事解释时,分析家并没有被认为应该告诉病人,他的症状是什幺意义。

During the 1950s, Lacan stressed on numerous
occasions that symptoms are legible and need to be deciphered (Lacan
1977f [1955]:127, 133; 1977g[1957]:159–160; 1977h[1957–58]:184,
194), but this process of exegesis (Lacan 1977e[1953]:70) should not be
read as an activity whereby the analyst discovers or guesses the meaning
of the analysand’s symptoms and offers the results of his quest to the
patient.16 After all, were that to be a requirement it would be difficult to
see how the analyst’s suspension of the session could function as an
interpretation, since these scansions contain not a single meaningful detail
about the patient’s symptoms and life history.

在1950年代,拉康在许多场合强调:症状是可以理解的,并且需要被解释。但是解释学的这个过程,不应该被阅读作为是一个活动,凭借这个活动,分析家发现或猜测分析者的症状的意义,然后提供他的追寻的结果给病人。毕竟,假如那是成为一个要求条件,我们将会很困难看出,分析者的悬置咨商时间,发挥功能作为解释。因为这些审视并没有包含意义的细节,关于病人的症状与一生的历史。

The motive behind this precept revives the contentious relationship
between transference and suggestion I have discussed in the previous
chapter of this book. Despite his insistence on the importance of the
analyst’s exegesis of the patient’s formations of the unconscious Lacan
believed that detailing their meaning has an objectifying and alienating
effect on the analysand. If analysts were to disclose the meaning of the
analysands’ symptoms in their interpretations, they would convey
knowledge about the origin of these symptoms to their patients, implicitly
telling them that as analysts they are capable of understanding the
problems at hand. Long before the introduction of the supposed subject of knowing, Lacan criticized this interpretive style for its suggestive impact.

这个信条的背后的动机,重新唤醒移情与暗示之间的具有争议性的关系。我在本书的先前的章节曾经讨论过。尽管他坚持这个重要性:分析家对于病人的无意识的形成的信念。拉康相信,详细列出他们的意义,具有客观化与疏离的效果,对于分析者。假如分析家想要在他们的解释里,揭露分析者的症状的意义,他们将会传递关于这些症状对于他们的病人的起源的意义。分析家暗示地告诉分析者,作为分析家,他们能够理解手边的难题。在介绍被认为应该知道的主体之前,拉康早就批评过这个解释的风格,因为它具有暗示的影响。

In Seminar I, for instance, he underscored that interpretation,
despite its being predicated upon the action of speech, should not count
as an intellectual activity (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:274). He vilified Anna
Freud’s proposition to use interpretation as a means of educating the ego
for its hidden intellectualist tendencies, which can only be detrimental
to the advancement of the treatment (ibid.: 65–67).17 In ‘Variations of
the Standard Treatment’ he put it even more bluntly:

譬如,在第一研讨班,拉康强调:介入,尽管介入是根据言说的行动来陈述,介入不应该被认为是知识的活动。拉康抨击安娜 弗洛伊德的建议要使用解释,作为是教育自我的工具,以寻找它的隐藏的知识的倾向。这个建议是有害的,对于治疗的进展。在“标准治疗的变化“,拉康甚是更加坦直地表达:

This knowledge [of the analyst] has without doubt much increased
…but one must not pretend to have distanced oneself from an
intellectualist analysis in this way, unless one acknowledges that the
communication of this knowledge to the subject [the analysand] only
functions as a suggestion to which the criterion of truth is alien.
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:337)

分析家的这个知识无可置疑地已经大量增加,但是我们一定不要假装,用这个方式,我们已经让自己跟知识的精神分析保持距离。除非我们承认,这个知识的沟通给主体(分析者),仅是发挥功能,作为是建议。对于这个建议,真理的标准的外来的。

After his conceptualization of the supposed subject of knowing, Lacan
repeated his admonition in the phrase that the analyst is never to identify
with this supposed subject of knowing (Lacan 1961–62: session of 22
November 1961; 1966–67: session of 21 June 1967).18

经过他建构被认为是应该知道的主体的观念,拉康重复他的警告,用这个表达:分析家才从来就不应该认为被认为是应该知道的主体。

In a similar vein, Lacan disqualified all analytic attempts at
understanding the analysand’s problems. ‘To interpret and to imagine
one understands are not at all the same things. It is precisely the opposite’
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:73). Two years later, in Seminar III, he stated:
‘It’s always at the point where they [students] have understood, where
they have rushed in to fill the case in with understanding, that they have
missed the interpretation that it’s appropriate to make or not to make’
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:22). An even more provocative assertion appeared
in Seminar IV, in the context of a discussion of Freud’s case of Little
Hans (Freud 1909b):

以同样的心情,拉康认为所有的精神分析的企图,并没有资格要理解分析者的难题。“解释与想像我们会理解,根本就不同一码事。它们确实是背道而驰。两年以后,在第三研讨班,拉康陈述:「总是在这个时刻,学生们已经理解,他们已经冲进来,要用理解填补这个个案,他们已经错过这个解释,从事这个解释或不从事这个解释,都是合适的。」一个更加挑衅的主张,出现在第四研讨班,在弗洛伊德的“小汉斯”的个案的讨论的内文:

This observation [of Little Hans] unfolds entirely within the register
of misunderstanding. I will add that this is the case with all types
of creative interpretation between two subjects. This is the way
one has to expect interpretation to develop, it is the least abnormal
of all, and it is precisely in the gap of this misunderstanding that
something else will develop, that will have its fecundity.
(Lacan 1994[1956–57]:341)

对于小汉斯的这个观察,完全展开,在误解的铭记的内部。我将补充说,两个主体之间,就各自的创造性的解释,都是这个情况。这就是这个方式,我们必须期望解释发展。这是最没有异常的东西。它确实就在这个误解的差距里,某件其他的东西将会发展,将会拥有它的成果。

Additional comments on the inherent dangers of understanding abound
in Lacan’s seminars from the 1960s and 1970s, and one of the reasons
why he eventually decided to dissolve his own school was that he believed
his pupils to be too convinced that they understood the meaning of his
words.19 As his work progressed, Lacan argued that apart from nurturing
suggestion and proceeding from the analyst’s own fantasies and
prejudices, understanding is a response to the analysand’s demands (to
be understood), whereas these demands need to be maintained (supported,
propped up) and questioned in their signifying structure (Lacan
1991b[1960–61]: 234–235; 1977i[1958]:255).

针对理解的本质上的危险的额外的评论,充斥在拉康从1960年代到1970年代的研讨班。其中一个理由,拉康为什么最后决的解散他自己的学派是,他相信他的学生太过于相信,他们理解他的话语的意义。随着他的研究的进展,拉康主张,除了滋养暗示与从分析家自己的幻想与偏见前进,理解是一种反应,对于分析者的要求(为了被理解)。而这些要求需要被维持,(被支持,被支撑),然后被质疑,在他们的成为能指的结构里。

But how are analysts supposed to interpret then if they ought to avoid
offering meaning, producing knowledge and conveying understanding?
What is left of the classic definition of interpretation as an act of translation
or explanation that facilitates insight into a certain matter through the
revelation of meaning?20 Although he retained the notion of meaning to
represent the proper effect of analytic interpretations, Lacan rejected all
the standard approaches to interpretation and presented an alternative
based on Hindu linguistic philosophy and Zen Buddhism.

但是,精神分析家如何被认为当时是解释,假如他们忘记避免提供意义,产生知识与传递理解?解释的古典的定义作为翻译的行的,剩余什么?或作为解释的行动,方便洞察力进入某个事件,通过意义的启示,剩余什么?虽然拉康保留意义的观念,为了代表精神分析解释的适当的影响,拉康拒绝所有的标准的接近解释的方法,并且呈现一个替代选择,以印度的语言哲学与佛教禅宗作为基础。

Through these two oriental traditions he discovered ‘resonance’ as a new feature of
speech. Due to this characteristic, speakers can say something without
effectively saying it on the level of the statement; they can induce ideas
in the mind of the listener which are the opposite of those included in the
text of the transferred message. This is how Lacan explained ‘resonance’
as an appropriate interpretive tool in his ‘Rome Discourse’:

通过这两个东方的传统,拉康发现“共鸣”,作为言说的新的特征。由于这个特色,言说者能够说某件东西,但是没有有效地说出它,在陈述的层面。他们能够诱导出观念,在倾听者的心里。这些观念是被包含在被传递的讯息的文本里。这是拉康解释“共鸣”的方式,作为合适的解释的工具,在他的“罗马辞说”。

There is…no doubt that the analyst can play on the power of the
symbol by evoking it in a carefully calculated fashion in the
semantic resonances of his remarks. This is surely the way for a
return to the use of symbolic effects in a renewed technique of
interpretation in analysis. In this regard we could take note of what
the Hindu tradition teaches about dhvani, in the sense that this
tradition stresses the property of speech by which it communicates
what it does not actually say. (Lacan 1977e[1953]:82)

无可置疑地,精神分析家能够扮演象征的力量,凭借召唤它,用仔细估算的方式,在他的谈论的语意的共鸣里。这确实就是这个方式,回转到象征的影响的使用,用精神分析里解释的更新的技术。关于这一点,我们能够注意印度传统教导我们的东西,关于dhvani,用这个传统强调言说的属性。凭借这样的言说,它沟通它没有实际说出的东西。

According to Pandey’s Indian Aesthetics, a volume from which Lacan
distilled most of his information on Hindu linguistics, dhvani is the power
of words to invoke something else than what they literally say. Pandey’s
example, which Lacan dutifully copied, runs as follows (Pandey 1950:
219–220; Lacan 1977e[1953]:82).21 A young courting couple agrees to
meet in a secluded garden on the bank of a river.

依照潘帖伊的“印度的美学”,从这一本书,拉康过滤大部分他的资讯,有关印度的语言学。Dhvani是文字的力量,召唤某件其他的东西,除了它们实质所说的内容。潘帖伊的例子,拉康按部就班地抄写,内容如下:一对年轻的求婚的伴侣同意在隐蔽的花园会面,在河流的堤岸。

Waiting for her boyfriend,
the girl notices how a religious man she knows is approaching their hideout.
For obvious she wants the man to disappear as quickly as
possible, yet she does not want to tell him off explicitly. Having decided to
drive him away without showing her true intentions, she says: ‘O religious
minded man! you can now roam freely over this place. For the dog, of
whom you were so afraid, has been killed today by the proud lion, who, as
you know very well, lives in the impervious thicket on the bank of Godavari’
(Pandey 1950:220).

正在等待她的男友时,这位女孩注意到,她认识的一位宗教僧侣正走靠近他们的隐藏处。因为很明显地,她想要这个僧侣尽快地消失。可是,她不想要明确地叫他走开。因为她已经决定要驱赶他走开,但是又不显露她的意图。她说:「哦,宗教心灵的人!你现在能够自由地漫游到这个地方。因为这条狗,你如此地害怕它,今天已经被高傲的狮子杀死。你清楚知道,这只高傲的狮子,居住在浓密的森林里,在高达凡立河的堤岸。

If the man, after hearing the girl’s words, decides to
run off as fast as he can, it is, Pandey argues, ‘because of the negative
meaning understood by him in a positive statement’ (ibid.: 220). In Lacan’s
reading of this passage, the man flees because he hears something the
girl’s words do not actually say. She says ‘You can now roam freely’, but
he hears ‘I need to get out of this place as soon as possible’.

假如这个人,听完女孩的话语后,决的尽快地跑开,潘帖伊主张,那是因为他理解的负面的意义,用正面的陈述。在拉康阅读这个段落时,这个人跑离开。因为他听见女孩的话语没有实际表达出的某件东西。她说:「你现在能够自由地漫游」。但是他听见:「我需要尽可能快速地离开这个地方。」

At the end of his ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]:106–107) Lacan
adduced another, slightly different example of the resonances of speech
from the teachings of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, which he had
borrowed from T.S.Eliot’s The Waste Land (1974[1922]).22 When the
threefold offspring of Praja-pati had completed their training in sacred
knowledge with their father, they wanted him to say something. To the
gods (deva) Praja-pati responded with the syllable ‘Da’ and when asked
whether they had understood the gods said: ‘Yes, we have understood.
You said to us “control yourselves” (damyata)’.
在“罗马辞说”的结束,拉康补充另外一个稍微不同的例子,说明言说的共鸣。从“奥义书”的教导里。他从艾略特的“荒原”借用过来。当普拉杰-帕帝的三重后代已经完成他们跟父亲的训练,关于神圣的知识。他们想要他说出某件事情。普拉杰-帕帝回应众神,用这个音节“达”。当众神被问他们是否理解,众神说:「是的,我们已经理解。你跟我们说,控制你们自己“

Upon which Praja-pati
said: ‘Yes, you have understood’. To the men (manusya), Praja-pati replied
with the same syllable ‘Da’ and they too said they had understood: ‘You
said to us “give” (datta). Praja-pati replied: ‘Yes, you have understood’.
Finally, Praja-pati told the demons (asurah) ‘Da’ and they said: ‘We
have understood. You said to us “be compassionate” (dayadhvam)’.
Prajapati said: ‘Yes, you have understood’ (Radhakrishnan 1953:289–291).

听完这话,普拉杰 帕帝说:「你们已经理解。」对这些人们,普拉杰 帕帝回答,用相同的音节,“达“。他们也说他们已经理解。「你对我们说”给予“。普拉杰 帕帝回答:「是的,你们已经理解。」最后,普拉杰 帕帝告诉恶魔”达“,他们说:「我们已经理解。你跟我们说,“要悲悯!」普拉杰 帕帝说:「是的,你们已经理解。」

Like the previous example, this story shows how the addressees understand something the speaker has not actually said. In addition it demonstrates how
each of the three groups attach a different meaning to the same signifier, in
a way that is presumably concomitant with their different status as gods,
men and demons. However, in this example it is unclear what the speaker
wants his listeners to understand. Whilst the girl on the river bank evidently
wanted the religious man to disappear, Praja-pati’s intention remains a
mystery. Or rather it seems that whatever the meaning his children attribute
to his words, he is happy to go along with it.23

就像先前的例子,这个故事显示,被对谈者理解某件言说者并没有实际说出的东西。除外,它证明这三个团体的每一个都附属一个不同的意义,给相同的能指。用的方式被认为是伴随着他们不同的地位,作为众神,作为人,与作为恶魔。可是,在这个例子里,并不清楚的是,言说者想要听者理解什么。虽然河流堤岸的女孩显而易见是想要宗教僧侣消失,普拉杰 帕帝的意图始终是个神秘。或者说,似乎,他的小孩归属于他的话语的意义,他很乐意同意那个意义。

Neither in his ‘Rome Discourse’ nor in any other spoken or written
intervention did Lacan detail the implications of this passage from the
Upanisads for psychoanalytic practice. None the less, it appears to me
that Praja-pati’s response is more indicative of Lacan’s take on the analytic
employment of the resonances of speech during the early 1950s than the
parable of the girl and the religious man. In Pandey’ s illustration of dhvani
the girl knows perfectly well which meaning she wants to imbue the
religious man with, and unless he is stupid he will not hesitate to run.

无论是在他的“罗马辞说“或是任何其他的口说或文字的介入,拉康都没有详细说明从”奥义书“的这个段落的暗示,作文精神分析的实践。仍然地,我觉得,普拉杰 帕帝的回应更加是指示著拉康的从事精神分析的运用言说的共鸣,在1950年代期间。而不是指示著女孩与宗教僧侣的寓言。在潘帖伊的插图版的dhvani,这位女孩完全知道她想要给予宗教僧侣的意义。除非他愚蠢,他将毫不犹豫地跑开。

The girl is betting on the proverb that a nod is as good as a wink to a blind
horse, and if it had turned out that the man needed more than a word to be
wise, it is likely that she would have had recourse to a less subtle tactic for
making him leave. The meaning she wants him to acknowledge is
unambiguous, despite the fact that her words cover this meaning with the
veils of courtesy and modesty. Put differently, she does not want to impose
herself, but her words are nevertheless extremely suggestive.

这位女孩赌信这个格言:对于一匹瞎马,棍子跟眨眼一样有用。假如结果是,这个人需要的不仅是智慧之语,很可能,她本来想要诉诸于比较不那么含蓄的策略,用来让他离开。她想要他承认的意义上清楚明白。尽管这个事实:她的话语掩盖这个意义,用礼貌与谦虚的这个面纱。换句话说,她并不想要赋加自己,但是她的话语仍然极端具有暗示性。

In Praja-pati’s words, the resonances are much more obscure, and he
does not seem to expect his listeners to read his ‘Da’ in a particular way.
One could argue that his eternal wisdom allows him to know that the
three categories of his offspring will hear his ‘Da exactly as he wants
them to hear it. But we do not know whether this is indeed the case.
Perhaps he was sure about the effects of his words, perhaps he had no
intentions whatsoever, perhaps he just wanted his children to gain
understanding, regardless of its nature and consequences. In this respect,
Praja-pati’s intervention is much less suggestive than the girl’s response
to the religious man.

用普拉杰 帕帝的话来说,共鸣是更加模糊。他似乎并没有期望他的听众阅读他的“达“,用特殊的方式。我们能够主张,他的永恒的智慧让他能够知道,他的三个范畴的后代,将会听见他的”达“,确实依照他想要他们听见的。但是,我们并不知道这是否确实就是这个情况。或许,他确的他的话语的影响。或许,他根本就没有意图。或许,他刚刚想要他的小孩获得理解,尽管它的特性与结果。在这方面,普拉杰 帕帝的介入比较没有那么暗示性,比起女孩的回答宗教僧侣。

On the one hand Praja-pati satisfies his children’s
demand to tell them something, but when he starts to talk he does not
really say anything. The meaning of what he says is fleeting; it remains
‘in abeyance’ until it is pinned down by his listeners. This procedure
tallies with the Zen technique Lacan evoked in the opening paragraphs
of Seminar I:

一方面,普拉杰 帕帝满足他的小孩的要求告诉他们某件事情。但是当他开始谈论时,他并没有确实说出任何东西。他说的内容的意义是瞬间的,意义始终处于“悬置“,直到被他的倾听者钉住。这个程序跟禅宗的技巧不谋而合。拉康在第一研讨班的开头的段落,引用的禅宗的技巧:

The master breaks the silence with anything—with a sarcastic remark,
with a kick-start. That is how a buddhist master conducts his search
for meaning, according to the technique of zen. It behoves the students
to find out for themselves the answer to their own questions.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:1)

大师用任何东西打破沉默—用嘲讽的谈论,用提醒。这就是佛教大师从事他对于意义的追寻。依照禅宗的技巧。学生有这个必要自己去找出他们的问题的答案。

Although analytic treatment is by no means a relationship between master
and student, the fact that the Zen-master believes that the students possess
all the knowledge necessary to answer their questions relieves him of
the task to produce that knowledge in a suggestive, objectifying fashion,
bringing his interventions very close to those Lacan described as analytic
interpretations. In sum, the meaning of interpretation, as Lacan conceived
it during the early 1950s, is that it sets meaning in motion on the side of
the analysand whilst being in itself a meaningless intervention.

虽然精神分析的治疗绝非是主人与学生之间的关系,禅宗大师相信:学生拥有所有的必要回答他们的问题的知识的这个事实,让大师免除这项工作,用暗示,客观化的方式,产生那个知识。并且将他的介入非常靠近拉康所描述的那些介入,作为是精神分析的解释。总之,依照拉康所构想的,在1950年代,解释的意义是:它触动意义,在分析者这一边。另一方面,它本身就是没有意义的介入。

The consequence of this approach is that interpreting, as an activity
by which meaning is accorded to a certain event, takes place in the analysand rather than the analyst.24 As Freud put it at the end of ‘On
Beginning the Treatment’, the analyst ‘supplies the amounts of energies’
and ‘shows him [the patient] the paths along which he should direct
those energies’ (Freud 1913c:143), but that is as far as the analyst’s
interventions go. In Lacan’s outlook of the 1950s the analyst supplies a
signifier, which is by its very nature meaningless, and facilitates the
analysand’s (re)integration of that signifier into an already existing series
of signifiers (a circuit of knowledge).

这个方法的结果,解释,作为活动。凭藉这个活动,意义被给予某个事件。发生在分析者,而不是分析家。如同弗洛伊德表达它,在“治疗的开始”,分析家供应大量的能源,并且跟病人显示这些途径。沿着这些途径,他应该引导那些能源。但是就分析家的介入而言,在拉康在1950年代的观点,分析家供应一个能指,这个能指绝非是无意义的,并且方便分析者的重新合并那个能指,进入已经存在的系列的能指(知识的循环)。

Consequently, a new meaning will
arise, which should encourage the liberating ‘moment of concluding’.
In setting out the coordinates of this new interpretive style, Lacan
also attacked the positions of his contemporaries. Despite its prominence
within mainstream psychoanalysis, he repudiated the analyst’s
interpretation of the patient’s ego-resistance, because he was convinced
that it transformed the analytic process into an imaginary struggle between
two parties striving for recognition (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:51).25 For
the same reason he rejected the analyst’s interpretation from ego to ego
in the here-and-now of the clinical setting.

结果,一个新的意义将会产生。这个新意义将会鼓励解放“结论的时刻”。当拉康安排这个新的解释的风格的座标时,他也攻击他的当代人的立场。尽管这个立场这主流精神分析里,占优势。拉康排斥分析家的解释病人的自我的抗拒。因为他相信,解释将精神分析的过程,转化成为想像的奋斗,处于两个伴侣奋斗要获得承认。因为同样的理由,拉康排斥分析家的解释,从自我到自我的解释,在临床的背景的此地此刻。

Taking his lead from a paper
by Margaret Little on countertransference (Little 1951) in which she
reported the instance of an analyst interpreting the analysand’s present
state of mind (a mixture of anxiety, confusion and depression) by referring
it back to the analyst’s own current interests (‘You think that I, your
analyst, am jealous of you’), Lacan argued that the ‘analyst here believes
himself authorised to offer …an interpretation from ego to ego, or from
equal to equal…whose foundation and mechanism cannot in any way be
distinguished from that of projection’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:32).26

从探讨小玛格丽特的讨论反-移情开始,在那篇文章里,她报导分析家解释分析者的目前的心灵状态作为例子(混合焦虑,混乱与沮丧),并且凭借回溯到分析家自己的目前的興趣(“你认为我作为分析家是妒忌你)。拉康主张,在此的分析家相信他自己被授权提供从自我到自我的解释,或是从对等者到对等者的解释。他们的基础与机制根本就无法被区别,跟投射的基础与机制。

Because they merely reflect the analyst’s presumptuous use of ‘inside
knowledge’, Lacan opposed even more vehemently all types of
interpretations that circumvent the analysand’s discourse. With biting
sarcasm he declared in ‘Variations of the Standard Treatment’ how it had
become ‘standard’ practice amongst analysts to seek out the analysand’s
truth by interpreting her gait, his grooming, her position on the couch, his
borborygmi, her way of shaking hands, etc. (Lacan 1966b[1955]:337).

因为他们仅是反映分析家的大胆的使用“内部的知识“。拉康甚至更加激烈地反对各种的解释,因为解释绕过分析者的辞说。尖刻嘲讽地,在”标准治疗的变化“,拉康宣称, 解释已经变成是标准的实践,在分析家当中,为了寻求分析者的真理,凭借解释她的态度,她的关注,她在躺椅上的立场,他的腹鸣音,她的握手的方式,等等。

As long as these behaviours operate beyond language, as long as analysands
do not give them a place within their discourse, the meaning ascribed to
them (resistance or compliance, denial or acceptance) simply mirrors the
analyst’s symptomatic use of his alleged clinical expertise. Finally, Lacan
also desacralized the popular idea of moving from ‘surface’ to ‘deep’
interpretations (Fenichel 1941[1938–39]:44–46). In his opinion, the
analysand’s speech is a multilayered surface showing traces of recent as
well as foregone conflicts on each level. Lacan did not believe one had to
remove the dust of everyday life in order to discover the repressed treasures.

只要这些行为运作超越语言,只有分析者并没有给予他们一个位置,在他们的辞说里,被归属于它们的意义(无论是抗拒或是顺从,否认或接受),仅是反应出分析家的症状地使用他被宣称的临床的专业。最后,拉康也亵渎通俗的观念:从“表面“到”深处“的解释。依照他的意见,分析者的言说是多重层面的表面,显示最近与以往的冲突,在每个层面。拉康并不相信,我们必须移除日常生活的灰尘,为了发泄被压抑的财宝。

He did not think the surface to be superficial, nor depth to be hidden beneath
the surface. This is why, in Seminar I, he advised his audience to take up
the study of geology: ‘My dear fellows, you wouldn’t believe what you
owe to geology. If it weren’t for geology, how could one end up thinking
that one could move, on the same level, from a recent to a much more
ancient layer?’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:74).27

他并不认为表面就是浮浅,深处也不隐藏在表面之下。这就是为什么,在第一研讨班,他劝告他的听众要从事地质学的研究。「亲爱的听众,你们将不会相信你们归功于地质学的东西。假如不是因为地质学,我们如何作为思维的结论:我们能够移动,在相同的层面,从最近移动到更加古代的层面?」

Lacan’s wrath was as much unleashed by the analysts’ interpretive tactics
as by the inappropriateness of their interpretations. For instance, in his
discussion of Little’s example, he admitted that the analyst’s interpretation
‘hadn’t failed to have some effect, since he [the analysand] had instantly
recovered his spirits’ (ibid.: 31).

拉康的愤怒同样无所忌惮,关于分析家的解释的策略,跟他们的解释的不合宜。譬如,在他讨论小玛格丽特的例子,他承认,分析家的解释并非完全没有某些效果,因为分析者曾经瞬间恢复他的精神)。

The analysand had accepted the analyst’s
intervention, it had effectuated a radical change in his condition and the
analysis had continued for another year. Yet to Lacan the clinical impact
of the interpretation did not prove that it was correct or, better, that it was
a precise evaluation of the source of the analysand’s problems. Little herself
conceded in her article that the interpretation may have been accurate in
terms of the analyst’s feelings towards the patient, but that it did not capture
the essence of the patient’s grief, his acceptance of it having been fostered
by his identification with the analyst (Little 1951:32).

分析者已经接纳分析家的介入,这已经造成强烈的改变,在他的情况。精神分析已经继续又另外一年。可是,对于拉康,这个解释的临床的冲突并没有证明:它是正确的。或者,更加贴切地说,它是准确地评估分析者的难题的来源。小玛格丽特的自己在她的文章里承认:解释可能已经是正确的,用分析家对于病人的感觉的术语来说。但是解释并没有捕获病人的痛苦的本质,他对于痛苦的接受已经被培养,由于他认同分析家。

Having observed that inappropriate interventions can have amazing
clinical effects, Lacan re-read an influential study by Glover on ‘The
Therapeutic Effect of Inexact Interpretation’ (1931) in order to ascertain
the status of true, correct interpretations.28 The most important conclusion
he drew from Glover’s article is that an interpretation can be analytically
correct without conveying the factual reality of an analysand’s condition,
and vice versa.

当拉康观察到,不适当的介入会令人惊奇的林场的影响,他重新阅读格洛维的具有影响力的研讨“论不明确的介入的治疗的影响”。为了确实,真实,正确的解释。最重要的结论,他从格洛维的文章获得的结论是,解释能够是精神分析是正确,但是没有传递实际上的现实,对于分析者的情况,等等。

In Little’s example, the analyst’s interpretation was
incorrect in spite of the fact that it may very well have been an adequate
representation of a present state of affairs. Conversely, Lacan assessed
Freud’s interpretations in the case of the Rat Man as factually inexact,
yet nevertheless correct with regard to the mental condition of his patient
and the overall progress of the treatment (Lacan 1977e[1953]:88;
1977i[1958]: 237).29

在小玛格丽特的例子,分析家的解释是不正确的,尽管这个事实:它很有理由曾经是充分的代表,对于目前的情况。相反地,拉康凭估弗洛伊德的解释,在“鼠人”的个案,作为是事实上是不确实的。可是,它仍然是正确,关于他的病人的精神的情况,与治疗的全面的进展。

To decide whether an interpretation is correct one
should not judge its correspondence with a factual reality. Nor can the
correctness of an interpretation be inferred from its immediate benefits
for the analysand, whether the disappearance of the symptoms, a general
change of attitude, or the emergence of new plans for the future. Hence,
the truth value of an interpretation depends neither on its relationship
with reality, nor on its healing power, even less on the analysand’s
acceptance or refusal.

为了决定解散是否正确,我们不应该判断它的是否跟实际是现实一致。解释的正确也不能够被推论,从它的当下对于分析者的利益,无论症状的消失,态度的一般的改变,或是新计划的出现到未来。因此,解释的真理的价值,既不是依靠跟现实的关系,也不是依靠它治疗的力量,甚至不是依靠分析者的接纳或拒绝。

Volunteering to formulate a different criterion for assessing the truth
(correctness) of an analytic interpretation, and relying on Freud’s exposition
of the topic in ‘Constructions in Analysis’ (1937d), Lacan stated in Seminar
I: ‘I consider the proof of the correctness of an interpretation to lie in the
confirmatory material the subject supplies.

拉康自愿去阐述不同的标准,为了评估精神分析的解释的真理(正确性),并且依靠弗洛伊德的说明这个议题“精神分析的建构”。拉康在第一研讨班陈述:「我认为解释的正确性的证据:在主体供应的证实的材料里说谎」。

And even that needs to be put
more subtly’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:31). In ‘The Direction of the
Treatment’ he subsequently confirmed the validity of his own interpretation
when writing that ‘it is not the conviction with which it is received that
matters, since the conviction will be found rather in the material that will
emerge as a result of the interpretation’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:234). A more
‘subtle’ picture did not emerge until 1966, in Seminar XIV on The Logic of
the Fantasy (1966–67). Here Lacan argued that if an interpretation’s only
effect is the analysand’s production of more material it still falls under the
rubric of suggestion. For interpretations to be correct, he claimed, they
need to have an effect of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session of 14 December
1966; 1970–71: session of 13 January 1971).

甚至,那需要被表达得更加微妙些。在“治疗的方向”,他随后证实他自己的解释的正确性,当他写到,“重要的并不是它被接受的信念,由于解释的结果。直到1966年,一个更加”微妙“的画面才出现。在第14研讨班,”幻见的逻辑“。在此,拉康主张,假如一个解释的唯一的结果,是分析者产生更多的材料,它依旧失败,在暗示的组织下。为了让解释正确,他宣称,它们需要拥有真理的影响。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:差异化技术

December 12, 2015

III
THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THE EGO AND
THE FIGURES OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
自我与无意识的人物之间的差异化的技术
341 I owe it to the reader to give him a detailed example of the
specific activity of animus and anima. Unfortunately this mate¬rial is so enormous and demands so much explanation of sym¬bols that I cannot include such an account within the compass of this essay. I have, however, published some of these products with all their symbolical associations in a separate work,1 and to this I must refer the reader. In that book I said nothing about the animus, because at that time this function was still unknown to me.

我归功于读者,要给予他详细的举例阿尼玛与阿尼玛斯的明确的活动。不幸地,这个材料是如此巨大,并且要求如此多的解释象征,以致于我无法包括这样的描述,在这篇论文的范围里面。可是,我曾经出版一些的这些产物,以及它们的象征的联想,在一本分开的著作。我必须跟读者提到这个。在那本书,我根本没有说到阿尼玛。因为在当时,我还不知道这个功能。

Nevertheless, if I advise a woman patient to associate her unconscious contents, she will always produce the same kind of fantasy. The masculine hero figure who almost unfailingly ap¬pears is the animus, and the succession of fantasy-experiences demonstrates the gradual transformation and dissolution of the autonomous complex.

可是,假如我劝告女性病人联想她的无意识的内容。她将会总是产生相同种类的幻想。几乎一定会出现的男性的英雄人物,就是阿尼玛斯。幻想的经验纷至沓来,证明这个具有自主权的情结的逐渐转化与瓦解。

342 This transformation is the aim of the analysis of the uncon-
scious. If there is no transformation, it means that the determin¬ing influence of the unconscious is unabated, and that it will in some cases persist in maintaining neurotic symptoms in spite of all our analysis and all our understanding.

转化是无意识的精神分析的目标。假如没有转化,这意味着,无意识的作为决定的影响不曾稍减。在某些的个案,它将持续维持神经症的征状,尽管我们所有的分析与所有我们的理解。

Alternatively, a com¬pulsive transference will take hold, which is just as bad as a neu¬rosis. Obviously in such cases no amount of suggestion, good will, and purely reductive understanding has helped to break the power of the unconscious. This is not to say-once again I would like to emphasize this point very clearly-that all psycho¬therapeutic methods are, by and large, useless. I merely want to stress the fact that there are not a few cases where the doctor has to make up his mind to deal fundamentally with the uncon¬scious, to come to a real settlement with it. This is of course something very different from interpretation.

代替地,强迫性的移情将会掌控。这跟神经症一样的糟糕。显而易见地,在这些的情况,无论再多的暗示,善意,与纯粹还原的理解,都没有帮助,为了破解无意识的力量。这并不是说—我再次想要非常清楚地强调这一点—所有精神分析的治疗方法,大体上,是没有用的。我仅是想要强调这个事实,在有一些的个案,医生必须下定他的决心,从基本上处理无意识,确实地跟无意识达成和解。当然,会有某件跟解释不同等的东西。
212

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION
In the latter case it is taken for granted that the doctor knows beforehand, so as to be able to interpret. But in the case of a real settlement it is not a question of interpretation: it is a question of releasing uncon¬scious processes and letting them come into the conscious mind in the form of fantasies. We can try our hand at interpreting these fantasies if we like. In many cases it may be quite impor¬tant for the patient to have some idea of the meaning of the fantasies produced. But it is of vital importance that he should experience them to the full and, in so far as intellectual under-standing belongs to the totality of experience, also understand them. Yet I would not give priority to understanding.

这后者的情况,这被视为理所当然,医生应该事先知道,为了要能够解释。但是在真实和解的情况,问题并不是解释。问题是要释放无意识的过程,然后让无意识的这些过程进入意识的心灵,用幻想的形式。我们能够尝试解释这些幻想,假如我们想要的话。在许多个案,这可能相当重要,让病人稍微知道被产生的幻想的意义。但是,至关紧要的是,病人应该彻底地经验它们并且理解它们。因为知识的理解属于经验的整体性。可是,我并没有给理解这个优先顺序。

Naturally the doctor must be able to assist the patient in his understand¬ing, but, since he will not and indeed cannot understand every¬thing, the doctor should assiduously guard against clever feats of interpretation. For the important thing is not to interpret and understand the fantasies, but primarily to experience them. Alfred Kubin has given a very good description of the uncon¬scious in his book Die andere Seite)’ that is, he has described what he, as an artist, experienced of the unconscious.

当然,医生必须要能够帮助病人从事他的理解。但是,因为病人不愿意理解,与确实无法理解一切事情。医生应该小心翼翼地防卫灵巧的解释的技巧。因为重要的事情并不是要解释,与理解幻想。而是主要要经验幻想。库斌曾经给予无意识很好的描述,在他的书“Die andere Seite”。在书里,他曾经描述,作为艺术家,他曾经经验的无意识。

It is an artistic experience which, in the deeper meaning of human ex-peripnce, is incomplete. I would like to recommend an attentive reading of this book to everybody who is interested in these questions. He will then discover the incbmpleteness I speak of: the vision is experienced artistically, but not humanly. By “hu¬man” experience I mean that the person of the author should not just be included passively in the vision, but that he should face the figures of the vision actively and reactively, with full consciousness. I would level the same criticism at the authoress of the fantasies dealt with in the book mentioned above; she, too, merely stands opposite the fantasies forming themselves out of the unconscious, perceiving them, or at best passively endur¬ing them. But a real settlement with the unconscious demands a firmly opposed conscious standpoint.

这是一个并不完整的艺术的经验,在人类的经验的更加深刻的意义。我想要推荐专注阅读这本书,给予每一位对这些问题感到兴趣的人。他因此将会发现我谈论到的这个不完整: 这个幻景从艺术层面被经验到,而不是从人性的层面。所谓“人类的”经验,我的意思是,作者的这个人不应该仅是被动地被包含在幻景里。代替的,他应该面对幻景里的各个人物,主动而反应地,带着充分的意识。我将相同的批评朝向以上被提到的这本书,被处理的各种幻想的女作者。她也仅是站立在幻想的对面,这些幻想从无意识出来形成它们自己。但是,跟无意识的真实的和解,要求坚决地对立的意识的观点

343 I will try to explain what I mean by an example. One of my
patients had the following fantasy: He sees his fiancee running down the road towards the river. It is winter) and the river is frozen. She runs out on the ice) and he follows her. She goes right out) and then the ice breaks) a dark fissure appears) and he is afraid she is going to jump in. And that is what happens: she jumps into the crack) and he watches her sadly.

我将设法解释我的意思,用一个例子。我的一位病人拥有以下的幻想:他看见他的未婚妻跑下道路,朝向河流。那是冬天,河流冰冻。她在冰地上跑着,他跟随着她。她一直跑着,然后冰地破裂。出现黑暗的破裂。他害怕她将会跳下去。那就是所发生的事情: 她跳进那个破裂。他悲伤地观看她。
213

344

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
This fragment, although torn out of its context, clearly shows the attitude of the conscious mind: it perceives and pas-sively endures, the fantasy-image is merely seen and felt, it is two¬ dimensional, as it were, because the patient is not sufficiently in-volved. Therefore the fantasy remains a flat image, concrete and agitating perhaps, but unreal, like a dream.

这个片断,虽然是从它的文本撕裂出来,清楚地显示意识的心灵的态度:意识感知并且被动地忍受,幻想的意象仅是被看见,被感觉。幻想的意象是所谓的两个维度。因为病人并没有充分地牵涉。因此,幻想始终是平面的幻想,或许具体而令人激动。但是不真实,如同梦一般。

This unreality comes from the fact that he himself is not playing an active part. If the fantasy happened in reality, he would not be at a loss for some means to prevent his fiancee from committing suicide. He could, for instance, easily overtake her and restrain her bodily from jumping into the crack. Were he to act in reality as he acted in the fantasy, he would obviously be paralysed, either with horror, or because of the unconscious thought that he really has no objection to her committing suicide.

这个非真实来自这个事实:他自己并没有扮演主动的角色。假如幻想发生在现实,他将不会感到茫然,找不到方法来阻止未婚妻不要自杀。譬如,他能够轻易地追赶上她,控制她的身体不要跳跃进入裂口。假如他在现实採取行动,如同他在幻想里,他将会明显地感到麻痹。一方面,由于恐惧;另一方面,因为无意识的想法,他确实并不反对她的自杀。

The fact that he remains passive in the fantasy merely expresses his attitude to the activity of the unconscious in general: he is fascinated and stupefied by it. In reality he suffers from all sorts of depressive ideas and convictions; he thinks he is no good, that he has some hopeless hereditary taint, that his brain is degenerating, etc. These negative feelings are so many auto-suggestions which he accepts without argument. Intellectually, he can understand them perfectly and recognize them as untrue, but nevertheless the feelings persist.
在幻想里,他始终是被动的这个事实,仅是表达他的态度,对于一般的无意识的活动: 他对它感到著迷与麻痹。在现实里,他遭受各种的沮丧的想法与信念。他认为他一无是处,他拥有一些没有希望的遗传的习性,他的脑逐渐恶化,等等。这些负面的感觉,是如此众多的自动的暗示。他接受这些暗示,没有争论。在知识方面,他能够完全地理解它们,并且体认它们,作为并不真实,但是感觉仍然持续存在。

They cannot be attacked by the intellect be¬cause they have no intellectual or rational basis; they are rooted in an unconscious, irrational fantasy-life which is not amenable to conscious criticism. In these cases the unconscious must be given an opportunity to produce its fantasies, and the above fragment is just such a product of unconscious fantasy activity. Since the case was one of psychogenic depression, the depression itself was due to fantasies of whose existence the patient was to¬tally unconscious. In genuine melancholia, extreme exhaustion, poisoning, etc., the situation would be reversed: the patient has such fantasies because he is in a depressed condition. But in a case of psychogenic depression he is depressed because he has such fantasies.

它们无法受到知识的攻击,因为它们并没有知识或理性的基础。它们根源于无意识,非理性的幻想的生活。它无法被意识的批评所修正。在这些个案里,无意识必须被给予机会来产生它的幻想。以上的片断,仅是无意识的幻想的活动的产物。因为这个情况是心理原因的沮丧的其中一个产物,沮丧的本身是由于这些幻想。病人完全不知道这些幻想的存在。在真实的忧郁症者,极端的心力交瘁,中毒,等等,这个情况会倒转过来。病人拥有这些幻想,因为他处于感到沮丧的情况。但是,在心理原因的沮丧的个案,他感到沮丧,是因为他拥有这样的幻想。

My patient was a very clever young man who had been intellectually enlightened as to the cause of his neurosis by a lengthy analysis. However, intellectual understanding made no difference to his depression. In cases of this sort the doctor should spare himself the useless trouble of delving still further into the causality; for, when a more or less exhaustive under-standing is of no avail, the discovery of yet another little bit of causality will be of no avail either.

我的病人是一位非常聪明的年轻人。他在知识方面曾经受到启蒙,关于他的神经症的原因,经过一段漫长的精神分析。可是,知识的理解对于他的沮丧并没有帮助。在这种的个案里,医生应该替他自己省免这个无用的费心,更进一步地探索因果律。因为当相当穷尽一切都理解都没有用的时候,另外一个小小的因果律的发现,将也是没有用的。

214

345
346
347

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION
The unconscious has simply gained an unassailable ascendency; it wields an attractive force that can invalidate all conscious contents-in other words, it can withdraw libido from the conscious world and thereby produce a “depression,” an abaissement du niveau mental (Janet). But as a result of this we must, according to the law of energy, expect an accumulation of value-i.e., libido-in the unconscious.

无意识仅是获得无法被攻击的提升。它发挥迷人的力量,能够让所有的意识的内容成为无效—换句话说,它能够将力比多从意识到世界撤退下来,因此产生“沮丧”(精神力量的消减)詹尼的术语。但是,由于这个的结果,我们必须依照能源的法则,期望价值的累积,譬如,力比多,累积在无意识。

‘‘’‘’‘

Libido can never be apprehended except in a definite form; that is to say, it is identical with fantasy-images. And we can only release it from the grip of the unconscious by bringing up the corresponding fantasy-images. That is why, in a case like this, we give the unconscious a chance to bring its fantasies to the sur-face. This is how the foregoing fragment was produced. It is a single episode from a long and very intricate series of fantasy-images, corresponding to the quota of energy that was lost to the conscious mind and its contents.

力比多永远无法被预期,除了用明确的形式。换句话说,力比多认同于幻想的意象。我们仅能够释放力比多,从无意识的掌控里,凭借将对应的幻想的意象显示出来。那就是,在像这样的个案,我们给予无意识一个机会,将它的幻想带到表面。这就是前述的片断被产生的方式。这是从漫长而复杂的系列的幻想的意象的轶事,它对应于丧失于意识的心灵与其内容的能源的配额。

The patient’s conscious world has become cold, empty, and grey; but his unconscious is acti-vated, powerful, and rich. It is characteristic of the nature of the unconscious psyche that it is sufficient unto itself and knows no human considerations. Once a thing has fallen into the uncon-scious it is retained there, regardless of whether the conscious mind suffers or not. The latter can hunger and freeze, while everything in the unconscious becomes verdant and blossoms.

病人的意识的世界将会变得寒冷,空虚,与灰色。但是,他的无意识被触动起来,强大而丰富。它是无意识的心灵的特性的特征,它自给自足,并且不知道任何的人的考虑。一旦一件东西掉入无意识里,它就被保留在那里。无论意识到心灵遭受痛苦与否。后者能够饥饿与冰冻。而无意识的每样东西都变成丰富与开花。

So at least it appears at first. But when we look deeper, we find that this unconcern of the unconscious has a meaning, in-deed a purpose and a goal. There are psychic goals that lie be¬yond the conscious goals; in fact, they may even be inimical to them. But we find that the unconscious has an inimical or ruth¬less bearing towards the conscious only when the latter adopts a false or pretentious attitude.

所以,至少,它起初看起来是这样。但是,当我们更加深入观看,我们发现,无意识的这个无动于衷具有意义,确实具有目的与目标。有些心灵的目标在于意识的目标之外。事实上,这些目标可能对它们并不友善,或是怀着残酷,对待意识,仅有当后者採用虚假与伪装的态度。

The conscious attitude of my patient is so one-sidedly intel¬lectual and rational that nature herself rises up against him and annihilates his whole world of conscious values. But he cannot de-intellectualize himself and make himself dependent on an¬other function, e.g., feeling, for the very simple reason that he has not got it. The unconscious has it. Therefore we have no alternative but to hand Over the leadership to the unconscious
and give it the opportunity of becoming a conscious content in the form of fantasies.

我的病人的意识的态度是如此的单边地知识与理性,以致于自然自己就会起来反对他,并且消灭他的意识到价值的整体的世界。但是,他无法替他自己解除知识,并让他自己依靠另外一个功能,例如,感觉。理由很简单,他还没有获得它。无意识获得它。 因此,我们没有别的选择,除了就是将领导权递交给无意识。然后,给予无意识这个机会,以幻想的形式,成为意识的内容。
215

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
If, formerly, my patient clung to his intel¬lectual world and defended himself with rationalizations against what he regarded as his illness, he must now yield himself up to it entirely, and when a fit of depression comes upon him, he must no longer force himself to some kind of work in order to forget, but must accept his depression and give it a hearing.

假如,先前,我的病人紧捉住他的知识的世界,并且辩护他自己,用理性来对抗他认为是他的疾病的东西。他现在必须完全屈服于他。当一阵的沮丧侵袭他,他一定不再强迫他自己从事某种工作,为了遗忘。但是必须接受他的沮丧,然后倾听它。

348 Now this is the direct opposite of succumbing to a mood,
which is so typical of neurosis. It is no weakness, no spineless surrender, but a hard achievement, the essence of which consists in keeping your objectivity despite the temptations of the mood, and in making the mood your object, instead of allowing it to become in you the dominating subject. So the patient must try to get his mood to speak to him; his mood must tell him all about itself and show him through what kind of fantastic analo¬gies it is expressing itself.

现在,这就是屈服于心情的直接的对立。这是神经症者的典型。它并不是弱点,并不是没有脊椎骨的投降。而是坚强的成就。这个成就的本质在于保持你的客观性,尽管心情的诱惑。当你将你的心情成为你的客体,而不是让它成为你身上的作为决定的主体。
所以,病人必须尝试要他的心情跟他言说。他的心情必须告诉他,所有关于它自己的一切,然后显示给他看,凭借它正在表达它自己的某种的幻想的类比。

349 The foregoing fragment is a bit of visualized mood. If he had
not suceeded in keeping his objectivity in relation to his mood, he would have had, in place of the fantasy-image, only a crip¬pling sense that everything was going to the devil, that he was incurable, ete. But because he gave his mood a chance to express itself in an image, he succeeded in converting at least a small sum of libido, of unconscious creative energy in eidetic form, into a conscious content and thus withdrawing it from the sphere of the unconscious.

前述的片段是被拟想的心情的片断。假如他当时没有成功地保持他的客观性,跟他的心情的关系,他本来会拥有仅是一个令人挫折的感觉,每样事情都糟糕透顶,他是无可救药,等等,而不是幻想的意象。但是因为他给予他的心情一个机会表达它自己,使用意象,他成功地至少转移一小部分的力比多,无意识的创造的能源,以视觉影像的方式

350 But this effort is not enough, for the fantasy, to be com-
pletely experienced, demands not just perception and passivity, but active participation. The patient would comply with this de¬mand if he conducted himself in the fantasy as he would doubt¬less conduct himself in reality. He would never remain an idle spectator while his fiancee tried to drown herself; he would leap up and stop her. This should also happen in the fantasy.

但是这个努力并不足够,因为幻想,为了要完全被经验到,要求不仅是感知与被动,而且要求主动的参与。病人将会同意这个要求,假如他用幻想来表现他自己。如同他将会无可置疑地、在现实里表现他自己。他将永远不会保持是一个懒散的观众,当他的未婚妻尝试淹死自己。他将会跳跃起来阻止他。这也应该发生在幻想里。

If he succeeds in behaving in the fantasy as he would behave in a simi¬lar situation in reality, he would prove that he was taking the fantasy seriously, i.e., assigning absolute reality value to the un¬conscious. In this way he would have won a victory over his one¬sided intellectualism and, indirectly, would have asserted the validity of the irrational standpoint of the unconscious.

假如他成功地在幻想里行为,如同他将会在现实里的类似情况行为,他将会证明,他正在将这个幻想认真看待。指定绝对的现实,给无意识。用这个方式,他本来会赢得胜利,胜过他的单边的知识主义。然后间接地,他本来会主张无意识的非理性的观点的正确性。
216

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION

351 That would be the complete experience of the unconscious demanded of him. But one must not underestimate what that actually means: your whole world is menaced by fantastic irreal¬ity. It is almost insuperably difficult to forget, even for a mo¬ment, that all this is only fantasy, a figment of the imagination that must strike one as altogether arbitrary and artificial. How can one assert that anything of this kind is “real” and take it seriously?

那将是对他要求的无意识的完整的经验。但是,我们一定不要低估那个经验的实质的意义:你整个的世界受到幻想的非现实的威胁。那几乎无法克服的困难,要忘记,即使暂时忘记,所有这一切都是幻想,想像的虚拟之物,它给予我们的印象,作为完全的任意与人为。我们如何能够主张,诸如其类的事情是“真实”,然后认真地看待它?

352 We can hardly be expected to believe in a sort of double life,
in which we conduct ourselves on one plane as modest average citizens, while on another we have unbelievable adventures and perform heroic deeds. In other words, we must not concretize our fantasies. But there is in man a strange propensity to do just this, and all his aversion to fantasy and his critical depreciation of the unconscious come solely from the deep-rooted fear of this tendency.

我们几乎无法被期望要相信一种双重的生活。在这个双重的生活里,我们在某个层面的行为,作为是谦虚的一般的市民。而在另外一个层面,我们拥有匪夷所思的冒险,并且执行英雄般的行为。换句话说,我们一定不要实现我们的幻想。但是,在人身上,有一个奇异的习性,就是要这样做。所有他对于幻想的厌恶,与他批评地贬低无意识,仅是来自根深蒂固的恐惧这个倾向。

Concretization and the fear of it are both primitive su¬perstitions, but they still survive in the liveliest form among so¬called enlightened people. In his civic life a man may follow the trade of a shoemaker, but as the member of a sect he puts on the dignity of an archangel. To all appearances he is a small trades¬man, but among the freemasons he is a mysterious grandee. An¬other sits all day in his office; at evening, in his circle, he is a reincarnation of Julius Caesar, fallible as a man, but in his offi¬cial capacity infallible. These are all unintentional concretiza¬tions.

对于这个倾向的具体实现与恐惧,两者都是原始的迷信。但是,它们依旧以最生动的形式,存活于所谓的开明的人们。在他的文明的生活,一个人可能遵循鞋匠的行业,但是,作为是教派的成员,他摆上天使长的尊严。从外表看来,他是微不足道的商人,但是在兄弟会里,他是一位神秘的的贵族。还有另外一位,整他坐在办公室里,晚上,在他的圈子里,他是凯撒大帝的具体化身。作为一个人,他可能犯错,但是就他的官方的能力而言,他绝无错误。这些都是没有意图的具体实现。

353 As against this, the scientific credo of our time has developed
a superstitious phobia about fantasy. But the real is what works. And the fantasies of the unconscious work, there can be no doubt about that. Even the cleverest philosopher can be the vic¬tim of a thoroughly idiotic agoraphobia. Our famous scientific reality does not afford us the slightest protection against the so¬called irreality of the unconscious.

对照这个,我们这个时代对于科学的信念已经发展一种迷信的恐惧,关于幻想。但是,真实界就是运作的东西。无意识到幻想运作得通。关于这点,这是无可置疑的。即使是最聪明的哲学家有时也会是彻底白痴般的公共场合恐惧症的受害者。我们的著名的科学的现实并没有供应我们丝毫的保护,对抗所谓的无意识的非现实。

Something works behind the veil of fantastic images, whether we give this something a good name or a bad. It is something real, and for this reason its mani¬festations must be taken seriously. But first the tendency to con-cretization must be overcome; in other words, we must not take the fantasies literally when we approach the question of inter¬preting them.

某件东西运作在幻想的意象的面纱的背后。无论我们给予这个某件东西一个好的名字或坏的名字。它是某件真实的东西。因为这个理由,它的展示必须被认真地看待。但是,首先,想要具体实现的这个倾向必须被克服。换句话说,我们一定不要将幻想实质看待,当我们探他解释它们的问题。

217

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS the
While we are in the grip of the actual experience, the fantasies cannot be taken literally enough. But when it comes to understanding them, we must on no account mistake semblance, the fantasy-image ,,~ such, for the operative proc¬ess underlying it. The semblance is not the thing itself, but only its expression.

当我们处于实际经验的掌控,幻想越是用实质看待越好。但是当提到理解它们时,我们绝对不要误解类似物,幻想的意象的本身,误当著是作为幻想的基础的运作的过程。这个类似物并非是事情的本身。而仅是它的表达。

354 Thus my patient is not experiencing the suicide scene “on
another plane” (though in every other respect it is just as con¬crete as a real suicide); he experiences something real which looks like a suicide. The two opposing “realities,” the world of the conscious and the world of the unconscious, do not quarrel for supremacy, but each makes the other relative. That the real¬ity of the unconscious is very relative indeed will presumably arouse no violent contradiction; but that the reality of the con¬scious world could be doubted will be accepted with less alac¬rity. And yet both “realities” are psychic experience, psychic semblances painted on an inscrutably dark back-cloth. To the critical intelligence, nothing is left of absolute reality.

因此,我的病人并没有正在经验自杀的场景,“在另外一个层面”。(虽然在每个其他方面,这是同样的具体,如他真实的自杀)。他经验某件看起来像是自杀的真实的东西。这两个对立的“现实”,意识的世界与无意识的世界,并没有争吵要获得优胜。但是,每一个世界都让另外一个世界成为相对。无意识的现实确实是非常相对,在假设上,并不会引强烈的矛盾。但是,意识的世界的现实能够受到怀疑,将会比较不那么渴望地被接受。可是,两个“现实”都是心灵的经验,心灵的类似物,被印刷在模糊地黑暗的背景的画布上。对于具有批判智慧的人,绝对的现实,并没有剩余任何东西。

355 Of the essence of things, of absolute being, we know nothing.
But we experience various effects: from “outside” by way of the senses, from “inside” by way of fantasy. We would never think of asserting that the colour “green” had an independent exist¬ence; similarly we ought never to imagine that a fantasy¬experience exists in and for itself, and is therefore to be taken quite literally. It is an expression, an appearance standing for something unknown but real. The fantasy-fragment I have men¬tioned coincides in time with a wave of depression and despera¬tion, and this event finds expression in the fantasy.

关于事情的本质,绝对存在的本质,我们一无所知。但是,我们经验各种的影响:从“外面”,经由各种感官,从“内面”,经由幻想。我们将永远不会想到主张:“绿”的颜色拥有独立的存在。同样地,我们永远不应该想像,一个幻想的经验存在于本身或独立存在。幻想的经验因此应该被相当实际地看待。幻想经验是代表某件未知,但却是真实的东西的一个表达,一个表象。我已经提到的幻想的片断,在时间上,巧合于沮丧或绝望的浪潮。这个事件在幻想里获得表达。

The patient really does have a fiancee; for him she represents the one emo¬tiona llink with the world. Snap that link, and it would be the end of his relation to the world. This would be an altogether hopeless aspect. But his fiancee is also a symbol for his anima, that is, for his relation to the unconscious. Hence the fantasy simultaneously expresses the fact that, without any hindrance on his part, his anima is disappearing again into the unconscious. This aspect shows that once again his mood is stronger than he is. It throws everything to the winds, while he looks on without lifting a hand. But he could easily step in and arrest the an1ma.

这位病人确实拥有一位未婚妻。对于他而言,未婚妻代表情感上跟世界的联接。假如将这个联接中断,那将是他跟世界的关系的结束。那将是完全的没有希望的层面。但是他的未婚妻也是他的阿尼玛的象征。换句话说,作为他跟无意识的关系的象征。因此,这个幻想同时表达这个事实:假如没有他这方面的任何阻碍,他的阿尼玛会再次逐渐消失进入无意识。这个层面显示:再次,他的心情比他的存在更加强烈。他的心情将每件事情听由命运播弄。另一方面,他在旁观看,没有出手帮助。但是,他本来能够轻易地介入 并且阻止阿尼玛。

356 I give preference to this latter aspect, because the patient is
an introvert whose life-relationship is ruled by inner facts. Were he an extravert, I would have to give preference to the first as¬pect, because for the extravert life is governed primarily by his relation to human beings.

我给予偏爱,对于这个后者的层面。因为病人是一位内倾的人,他的生活的关系,受到内部的事实的统辖。假如他是一位外倾的人,我本来会必须给予偏爱,给第一个层面。因为对于外倾的人,生活主要是受到他跟人的关系所统辖。
218

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION
He might in the trough of a mood do away with his fiancee and himself too, whereas the introvert harms himself most when he casts off his relation to the anima, i.e., to the object within.

他在心情的泥泞里,可能废除他的未婚妻与他自己本身。在另一方面,这位内倾的人将会伤害他自己,当他抛弃他跟他的阿尼玛的关系,譬如,跟内部的客体的关系。

357 So my patient’s fantasy clearly reveals the negative move-
ment of the unconscious, a tendency to recoil from the conscious world so energetically that it sucks away the libido from con¬sciousness and leaves the latter empty. But, by making the fantasy conscious, we stop this process from happening unconsciously. If the patient were himself to participate actively in the way de¬scribed above, he would possess himself of the libido invested in the fantasy, and would thus gain added influence over the un¬conscIOUS.

所以,我的病人的幻想清楚地显示无意识的负面的动作,如此精力充沛地从意识的世界退缩下来的倾向,以致于它从意识吸干力比多,然后让意识成为空无。但是,凭借让幻想成为意识,我们阻止这个过程,不要无意识地发生。假如病人自己想要主动地参与以上被描述的方式,他将会拥有被投注于幻想的力比多,他因此将会获得被补充的影响,对于无意识。

358 Continual conscious realization of unconscious fantasies, to-
gether with active participation in the fantastic events, has, as I have witnessed in a very large number of cases, the effect firstly of extending the conscious horizon by the inclusion of numer¬ous unconscious contents; secondly of gradually diminishing the dominant influence of the unconscious; and thirdly of bringing about a change of personality.

无意识的幻想的继续在意识层面实现,再加上积极的参与幻想的事件,如同我在许多的个案里见证到的,具有的影响,首先就是延伸意识的视阔,凭借包含许多的无意识的内容。其次就是逐渐的减少无意识的支配的影响。第三是,包含导致人格的改变。

359 This change of personality is naturally not an alteration of
the original hereditary disposition, but rather a transformation of the general attitude. Those sharp cleavages and antagonisms between conscious and unconscious, such as we see so clearly in the endless conflicts of neurotic natures, nearly always rest on a noticeable one-sidedness of the conscious attitude, which gives absolute precedence to one or two functions, while the others are unjustly thru,,>t into the background. Conscious realization and experience of fantasies assimilates the unconscious inferior functions to the conscious mind-a process which is naturally not without far-reaching effects on the conscious attitude.

人格的改变当然并不是原初的遗传的性情的轮替。相反地,它是一般的态度的转化。那些明显的分裂与敌意,存在于意识与无意识之间,譬如,我们如此清楚地看见,在神经症者的天性的无穷尽的冲突里。它们几乎总是依靠意识的态度的显著的单边性。这个意识态度给予绝对的优先性,给其中一两个功能。另一方面,其余的功能并不公正地被抛弃进入背景。幻想在意识层面的实践与经验,吸收无意识的低劣的功能,到意识的心灵—这一个过程当然并非每有深远的影响,对于意识的态度。

360 For the moment I will refrain from discussing the nature of
this change of personality, since I only want to emphasize the fact that an important change does take place. I have called this change, which is the aim of our analysis of the unconscious, the transcendent function. This remarkable capacity of the human psyche for change, expressed in the transcendent function, is the principal object of late medieval alchemical philosophy, where it was expressed in terms of alchemical symbolism. Herbert Sil¬berer, in his very able book Problems of Mysticism and Its Sym-bolism) has already pointed out the psychological content of al-chemy.

目前,我将节制不去讨论人格改变的特性。因为我仅是想要强调这个事实:重要的改变确实发生。无曾经称这种改变,为超验的功能。因为那是我们对于无意识的精神分析的目的。人类心灵具有改变的明显的能力,在超验的功能里被表达出来。它是中世纪晚期的炼金术哲学的主要的目标。在那里,它被表达,用炼金术的象征主义。赫伯特 西贝瑞,在他的精炼的书“神秘主义的难题与其象征主义”,已经指出炼金术的心理的内容。

363
361
362

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

It would be an unpardonable error to accept the current view and reduce these “alchymical” strivings to a mere matter of alembics and melting-pots. This side certainly existed; it repre¬sented the tentative beginnings of exact chemistry. But alchemy also had a spiritual side which must not be underestimated and whose psychological value has not yet been sufficiently appreci¬ated: there was an “alchymical” philosophy, the groping precur-sor of the most modern psychology. The secret of alchemy was in fact the transcendent function, the transformation of personality through the blending and fusion of the noble with the base components, of the differentiated with the inferior functions, of the conscious with the unconscious.

这将是不可原谅的错误,假如我们接受目前的观点,并且将这些“炼金术”的奋斗,化减成为仅是高脚杯与溶炉。这一面确实是存在,它代表确实的化学的试验的开始。但是,炼金术也拥有精神的一面,一定不要被低估。它的心理的价值还没有充分地被赏识。“炼金术”的哲学确实存在,他们是现代心理学的模索前进的先驱者。炼金术的秘密事实上是超验的功能。人格的转化,通过高贵成分与卑下成分,被差异化的功能跟低劣的功能,意识与无意识的融合与混合。

But, just as the beginnings of scientific chemistry were hope¬lessly distorted and confused by fantastic conceits and whimsi¬calities, so alchemical philosophy, hampered by the inevitable concretizations of the still crude and undifferentiated intellect, never advanced to any clear psychological formulation, despite the fact that the liveliest intuition of profound truths kept the medieval thinker passionately attached to the problems of al-chemy. No one who has undergone the process of assimilating the unconscious will deny that it gripped his very vitals and changed him.

但是,正如科学的化学的开始,没有希望地受到幻想的自负与奇思异想所扭曲与混淆。炼金术哲学,受到无可避免的具体表现,对于这个依旧是粗测没有差异化的知识的阻碍,它从来没有前进到任何清楚的心理学的阐述。尽管这个事实:深奥真理的这个最生动的直觉让中世纪的思想家狂热地探索炼金术的难题。凡是曾经经历无意识的吸收的过程的人,没有人会否认,它掌握他的生命,并且改变他。

I would not blame my reader at all if he shakes his head
dubiously at this point, being quite unable to imagine how such a quantite negligeable as the footling fantasy given above could ever have the slightest influence on anybody. I admit at once that in considering the transcendent function and the extraordinary influence attributed to it, the fragment we have quoted is any¬thing but illuminating. But it is-and here I must appeal to the benevolent understanding of my reader-exceedingly difficult to give any examples, because every example has the unfortunate characteristic of being impressive and significant only to the in¬dividual concerned. Therefore I always advise my patients not to cherish the naive belief that what is of the greatest significance to them personally also has objective significance.

我根本不愿意责备读者,假如他在这个时候怀疑地摇摇头。
因为他不能够想像这样一个“受到忽略的特质”,作为以上被给予的愚蠢的幻想,如何可能具有丝毫的影响,对于任何人。我立即承认,当我们考虑这个超验的功能,与被归属于它的特殊的影响,我们曾经引述的片断,绝非具有启发性。但是,这确实是非常困难,要给出任何例子—我必须诉诸于读者的宽容的理解。因为每个例子都具有不幸的特性:仅有对相关的个人,才显得生动而重要。因此,我总是劝告我的病人不要怀抱这个天真的信仰:对于他们个人而言,是非常重要的东西,也具有客观的价值。

The vast majority of people are quite incapable of putting themselves individually into the mind of another. This is indeed a singularly rare art, and, truth to tell, it does not take us very far. Even the man whom we think we know best and who assures us himself that we understand him through and through is at bottom a stranger to us.

大多数的人们完全不能够以个人的立场想像另外一个人的心灵。这确实是独特而罕见的艺术。它对于我们的帮助并不大。即使是我们认为我们最熟悉的那个人,他让我们安心,我们彻底地理解他。追根究底,他对于我们是位陌生人。

220

364
365

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION
He is different. The most we can do, and the best, is to have at least some inkling of his otherness, to respect it, and to guard against the outrageous stupidity of wish-ing to interpret it.

他与人不同。我们充其量所能做的,就是至少对于他的另外一面略有所知,然后尊重他的另外一面,并且警戒着不要犯下重大的愚蠢错误,希望去解释他。

I can, therefore, produce nothing convincing, nothing that would convince the reader as it convinces the man whose deep-est experience it is. We must simply believe it by reason of its analogy with our own experience. Ultimately, when all else fails, the end-result is plain beyond a doubt: the perceptible change of personality. With these reservations in mind, I would like to present the reader with another fantasy-fragment, this time from a woman. The difference from the previous example leaps to the eye: here the experience is total, the observer takes an active part and thus makes the process her own. The material in this case is very extensive, culminating in a profound trans-formation of personality. The fragment comes from a late phase of personal development and is an organic part of a long and continuous series of transformations which have as their goal the attainment of the mid-point of the personality.

我因此没有产生任何足以说服的东西。没有任何东西将会说服读者,如同它说服那个人,因为那是他的最深刻的经验。最后,当所有其他方法都失效,最后的结果是无可怀疑的明白:人格的可以被感知的改变。我在心里怀着这些保留,我想要呈现给读者,用另外一个幻想的片断。这次是来自一位女人。跟先前的例子的差异跃上眼前:在此的经验是完整的。观察者主动地参与,因此让这个过程成为是她自己的过程。在这个个案的材料非常广泛,在人格的深刻的转化达到高潮。这个片断来自个人发展的晚期,是漫长而连续的转化的系列的有机体的部分。这些转化拥有人格的中介点的获得,作为他们的目标。

‘’

It may not be immediately apparent what is meant by a “mid-point of the personality.” I will therefore try to outline this problem in a few words. If we picture the conscious mind, with the ego as its centre, as being opposed to the unconscious, and if we now add to our mental picture the process of assimilat-ing the unconscious, we can think of this assimilation as a kind of approximation of conscious and unconscious, where the centre of the total personality no longer coincides with the ego, but with a point midway between the conscious and the uncon-scious.

“人格的中介点”是什么意思,可能不是马上显而易见。我将因此尝试描绘这个难题的轮廓,用简短几个字。假如我描绘意识的心灵,以自我作为它的中心,作为跟无意识的对立。假如我们现在补充我们的精神的画面 用吸收无意识的过程,我们能够将这个吸收,视为是意识与无意识的一种靠近。在那里,完整的人格的中心不再巧合于自我,而且具有一个中途的点,处于意识与无意识之间。

This would be the point of new equilibrium, a new cen¬tering of the total personality, a virtual centre which, on ac-count of its focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation. I freely admit that visualizations of this kind are no more than the clumsy attempts of the unskilled mind to give expression to in-expressible, and well-nigh indescribable, psychological facts. I could say the same thing in the words of St. Paul : “Yet not I live, but Christ liveth in me.”

这将是新的平衡的点,完整人格的新的中心,一个虚拟的中心。因为它的焦点的立场,处于意识与无意识之间。它替人格保证一个新的而且更加确实的基础。我自由地承认,对于这种的拟想仅是没有技巧的心灵的笨拙的企图,要给予表达,对于这些无法表达,几乎无法被描述的心理的事实。我能够说相同的事情,用圣保罗的话语:「可是,并不是我活著,而是基督活在我的身上。」
221

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

Or I might invoke Lao-tzu and appropriate his concept of Tao, the Middle Way and creative centre of all things. In all these the same thing is meant. Speaking as a psychologist with a scientific conscience, I must say at once that these things are psychic factors of undeniable power; they are not the inventions of an idle mind, but definite psychic events obeying definite laws and having their legitimate causes and effects, which can be found among the most widely differing peoples and races today, as thousands of years ago. I have no theory as to what constitutes the nature of these processes. One would first have to know what constitutes the nature of the psyche. I am content simply to state the facts.

或者,我可以引用老子的话,并且赏识他对于道的观念,中庸之道,与万物的创造的中心。在所有这一切里,相同的意思被表达。作为一位心理学家的言说,具有科学的良心。我必须立刻说,这些事情都是无可否认的力量的心灵的因素。它们并不是懒惰的心灵的杜撰,而是明确的心灵的事件,服从明确的法则,并且拥有他们的合法的原因与影响。这些原因与影响能够被找到,在今天的分散各地的不同的民族与种族。如同好几千年前。我没有理论,关于是什么形成这些的程序的特性。我们首先必须知道,是什么形成心灵的特性。我仅是满足于陈述这些事情。

366 Coming now to our example: it concerns a fantasy of in-
tensely visual character, something which in the language of the ancients would be called a “vision.” Not a “vision seen in a dream,” but a vision perceived by intense concentration on the background of consciousness, a technique that is perfected only after long practice.2 Told in her own words, this is what the patient saw:

我现在谈到我们的例子:它关系到强烈视觉的人物的幻想,在古代人的语言里,这件事情被称为是“幻象”。不是在梦里被看见的“幻象”,而是被强烈的专注感知的幻象,在意识的黑板上。这一个技术只有经过漫长的练习之后,才被改进。用她自己的话语来说,这就是病人所看见的东西:

“I climbed the mountain and came to a place where I saw
seven red stones in front of me) seven on either side) and seven behind me. I stood in the middle of this quadrangle. The stones were flat like steps. I tried to lift the four stones nearest me. In doing so I discovered that these stones were the pedestals of four statues of gods buried upside down in the earth. I dug them up and arranged them about me so that I was standing in the mid¬dle of them. Suddenly they leaned towards one another until their heads touched) forming something like a tent over me. I myself fell to the ground and said) ‘Fall upon me if you must! I am tired.’ Then I saw that beyond) encircling the four gods) a ring of flame had formed. After a time I got up from the ground and overthrew the statues of the gods. Where they fell) four trees shot up. A t that blue flames leapt up from the ring of fire and began to burn the foliage of the trees. Seeing this I said) ‘This must stop. I must go into the fire myself so that the leaves shall not be burned.’ Then I stepped into the fire. The trees vanished and the fiery ring drew together to one immense blue flame that carried me up from the earth.”

“我爬上山,来到一个地方。在那里,我看见七块红色石头在我面前。左右两边各七块石头,在我背后有七块石头。我站立在这个四方形的中间。石头像台阶一样地平坦。我尝试举起最靠近我的四块石头。当我这样做时,我发现,这些石头是四座神的雕像的塑像,颠倒地被埋在地里。我挖掘它们出来,然后安排它们在我四周。这样,我正站立在他们的中间。突然地,他们互相倾靠起来。直到他们的头碰触一块,形成某件像是在我上方的帐篷。我自己倒在地上,然后说:「假如你们必须倾倒,就倾倒在我身上吧!我精疲力尽!」然后,我看见,有四位天神环绕天际,形成火焰的环圈。过一阵子,我从地上站立起来,推倒众神的雕像。在他们倾倒的地方,四棵树矗立出来。看见那个景象,蓝色的火焰从火的环圈跳跃出来,然后开始燃烧树的叶子。当我看见这个景象,我说:「这必须停止。我自己必须走进火里,这样,这些叶子才不会被燃烧。」然后,我走进火里。树木就消失,烈火的环圈聚集一块,成为一个巨大的蓝色的火焰。这个火焰带着我脱离地球。

367 Here the vision ended. Unfortunately I cannot see how I can
make conclusively clear to the reader the extraordinarily inter- esting meaning of this vision.

在此,幻象结束。不幸地,我无法看见我如何能够让读者彻底的明白这个幻象的这个特别有趣的意义。

2 [This technique is elsewhere called “active imagination.” Cf. “The Transcend¬ent Function,” pars. l66ff., and Mysterium Coniunctionis, pars. 706 and 749ff• -EDlTORS.]
222

368
369

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION
The fragment is an excerpt from a long sequence, and one would have to explain everything that happened before and afterwards, in order to grasp the signifi¬cance of the picture. At all events the unprejudiced reader will recognize at once the idea of a “mid-point” that is reached by a kind of climb (mountaineering, effort, struggle, etc.). He will also recognize without difficulty the famous medieval conun¬drum of the squaring of the circle, which belongs to the field of alchemy.

这个片断是从一段长的系列的摘要。我们本来必须解释之前之后发生的一切,为了要理解这个画面的意义。无论如何,不带有偏见的的读者将会立即体会到,“中间点”的观念,它凭借攀爬而抵达(爬山,努力,奋斗,等等)。他将也毫无困难地会体认出这个著名的中世纪的困难的难题:将园形弄成四方形。这属于炼金术的领域。

Here it takes its rightful place as a symbol of individ¬uation. The total personality is indicated by the four cardinal points, the four gods, i.e., the four functions which give bearings in psychic space, and also by the circle enclosing the whole. Overcoming the four gods who threaten to smother the individ¬ual signifies liberation from identification with the four func¬tions, a fourfold nirdvandva (“free from opposites”) followed by an approximation to the circle, to undivided wholeness. This in its turn leads to further exaltation.

在此,它需要它的合适的位置,作为个体化的象征。完整的人格被指示,被四个主要的点,四个神,等等,这四个功能,在心灵的空间,给予关联。而且,凭借园圈封闭整体。克服这四个神,他们威胁要闷死个人。这意味着解放,从认同这四个功能解放。这是四重的免除对立。后面,跟随着接近园圈,接近没有被分裂的整体。轮过来,这导致更进一步的提升。

I must content myself with these hints. Anyone who takes the trouble to reflect upon the matter will be able to form a rough idea of how the transformation of personality proceeds. Through her active participation the patient merges herself in the unconscious processes, and she gains possession of them by allowing them to possess her. In this way she joins the conscious to the unconscious. The result is ascension in the flame, trans¬mutation in the alchemical heat, the genesis of the “subtle spirit.” That is the transcendent function born of the union of opposites.

我必须满足于这些暗示。任何愿意费心来思维这个事情的人,将能够形成一个粗略的观念:人格的转化如何进行。凭借她的主动的参与,病人融合她自己于无意识的过程。她获得拥有它们,凭借让它们能够拥有她。用这个方式,她将意识跟无意识联接。结果是火焰的上扬,在炼金术的热量里。“微妙精神”的起源。那就是超验的功能,从对立力量的结合里产生。

I must recall at this point a serious misunderstanding to which my readers often succumb, and doctors most commonly. They invariably assume, for reasons unknown, that I never write about anything except my method of treatment. This is far from being the case. I write about psychology. I must there¬fore expressly emphasize that my method of treatment does not consist in causing my patients to indulge in strange fantasies for the purpose of changing their personality, and other nonsense of that kind. I merely put it on record that there are certain cases where such a development occurs, not because I force anyone to it, but because it springs from inner necessity.

在这个时候,我必须提醒我的读者与医生,最普遍经常承受的一个严重的误解。他们一成不变地认为,因为未知的理由,我从来没有书写到任何除了我的治疗方法以外的东西。情况根本就不是这样。我书写关于心理学。我因此必须生动地强调:我的治疗的方法并不是在于引起我的病人耽溺于奇异的幻想,为了改变他们的人格。,以及其他诸如其类的无稽之谈。我仅是将它记录下来,有某些的情况,这样的发展会发生。并不是因为我强迫任何人这样做,而是因为它起源于内在的必要性。

For many of my patients these things are and must remain double Dutch. In¬deed, even if it were possible for them to tread this path, it would be a disastrously wrong turning, and I would be the first to hold them back. The way of the transcendent function is an individual destiny.

对于许多我的病人,这些事情都是双重,而且必须是双重地各走各的。的确,即使这是可能的,让他们追踪这个途径。那将是一个灾难式的错误的转弯。我将是第一位要阻止他们。超验功能的途径是个人的命运。

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THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

But on no account should one imagine that this way is equivalent to the life of a psychic anchorite, to aliena¬tion from the world. Quite the contrary, for such a way is possi¬ble and profitable only when the specific worldly tasks which these individuals set themselves are carried out in reality. Fanta¬sies are no substitute for living; they are fruits of the spirit which fall to him who pays his tribute to life. The shirker expe¬riences nothing but his own morbid fear, and it yields him no meaning.

但是,无论如何,我们都不应该想像,这个方法相等于是心灵的隐士的生活,跟世界疏离。恰恰相反地,因为这样的方法是可能的,有利益的,只有当这些个人指定给他们自己的明确的世俗的工作,在现实里被实现。幻想并不是生活的替换品。幻想是精神的成果。这些精神的成果掉落于尊重生活的人的身上。逃避生活的人仅能经验到他自己的病态的恐惧。这种恐惧不会给他产生任何的意义。

Nor will this way ever be known to the man who has found his way back to Mother Church. There is no doubt that the mysterium magnum is hidden in her forms, and in these he can live his life sensibly. Finally, the normal man will never be burdened, either, with this knowledge, for he is everlastingly content with the little that lies within his reach. Wherefore I entreat my reader to understand that I write about things which actually happen, and am not propounding methods of treat¬ment.

这个方法也将永远不会那个人所知,因为他已经找到回到教会之母的途径。无可置疑地,神秘主义被隐藏在她的形式里。在这些形式里,他能够合理地过着他的生活。最后,正常的人将永远不会对这个知识觉得是负担。因为他永远满足于他能够掌握的那点东西。虽然我恳求我的读者理解,我书写确实发生的事情。我并不是在提倡治疗的方法。

37° These two examples of fantasy represent the positive activity
of anima and animus. To the degree that the patient takes an active part, the personified figure of anima or animus will disap¬pear. It becomes the function of relationship between conscious and unconscious.

这两个幻想的例子代表阿尼玛与阿尼玛斯的正面的活动。随著病人主动地参与,阿尼玛与阿尼玛斯的人格化的人物将会消失。它变成是意识与无意识之间的关系的功能。

But when the unconscious contents-these same fantasies-are not “realized,” they give rise to a negative activity and personification, i.e., to the autonomy of animus and anima. Psychic abnormalities then develop, states of possession ranging in degree from ordinary moods and “ideas” to psy¬choses. All these states are characterized by one and the same fact that an unknown “something” has taken possession of a smaller or greater portion of the psyche and asserts its hateful and harm¬ful existence undeterred by all our insight, reason, and energy, thereby proclaiming the power of the unconscious over the con¬scious mind, the sovereign power of possession. In this state the possessed part of the psyche generally develops an animus or anima psychology. The woman’s incubus consists of a host of masculine demons; the man’s succubus is a vampire.

但是,当无意识的内容—这些相同的幻想—并没有被实现,它们产生负面的活动与人格表现。譬如,产生阿尼玛与阿尼玛斯的自主权。心灵的异常因此发展,拥有的状态范围不一,从普通的心情与“观念”,到精神病都有。所有这些状态的特征是同一个事实:一个未知的“某件东西”已经占有心灵的更小或更大的部分。并且主张它的令人讨厌与伤害的存在,没有受的我们所有的洞察力,理性,与能源的阻止。它们因此宣称具有无意识的力量,胜过意识的心灵。它们拥有统辖的权力。在这个状态,心灵的被拥有的部分发展阿尼玛斯,或阿尼玛的心理学。女人的男性恶魔就包含许的的男性的恶魔。男性的女性恶魔就是吸血鬼。

!l71 This particular concept of a soul which, according to the
conscious attitude, either exists by itself or disappears in a func¬
tion, has, as anyone can see, not the remotest connection with the Christian concept of the soul.

依照意识的态度,灵魂的特殊的观念,要就是存在于本身,要不就是消失于功能。如同任何人都能看出,灵魂的特殊的观念,跟基督教的灵魂的观念,并没有丝毫的关系。

224

THE TECHNIQUE OF DIFFERENTIATION

372 The second fantasy is a typical example of the kind of con-
tent produced by the collective unconscious. Although the form is entirely subjective and individual, the substance is none the less collective, being composed of universal images and ideas common to the generality of men, components, therefore, by which the individual is assimilated to the rest of mankind. If these contents remain unconscious, the individual is, in them, unconsciously commingled with other individuals-in other words, he is not differentiated, not individuated.

第二个幻想是集体无意识产生的那种内容的典型例子。虽然这个形式完全主观与个人,这个物质仍然是集体。因为它由普世的意象与观念组成,那是通俗的人们所共有的意象与观念。
因此,凭借这些成分,个人被吸收到其余的人类。假如这些内容始终是无意识,个人在它们身上,会无意识地跟其他的个人融合。换句话说,他并没有被差异化,并没有被个体化。

373 Here one may ask, perhaps, why it is so desirable that a man
should be individuated. Not only is it desirable, it is absolutely indispensable because, through his contamination with others, he falls into situations and commits actions which bring him into disharmony with himself. From all states of unconscious contamination and non-differentiation there is begotten a com¬pulsion to be and to act in a way contrary to one’s own nature. Accordingly a man can neither be at one with himself nor accept responsibility for himself.

在此,我们可能会问,为什么它如此被渴望,以致一个人竟然要被个体化。它不但是被渴望,它绝对是无可免除的。因为通过跟别人的污染,他掉落进入各种情境,并且从事一些跟他自己不相和谐的行动。从无意识的污染与没有差异化的所有的状态,一个强迫症被产生,想要成为,想要行动,用跟自己的天性相反的方式。因此,一个人既无法跟他自己保持一致,又无法接受对他自己的责任。

He feels himself to be in a degrading, unfree, unethical condition. But the disharmony with himself is precisely the neurotic and intolerable condition from which he seeks to be delivered, and deliverance from this condition will come only when he can be and act as he feels is conformable with his true self.

他感觉自己处于退化,不自由,不伦恋的情况。但是,跟他自己的不和谐,确实是神经症与不可容忍的情况。他尝试要从这个情况被解脱出来,然后脱离这个情况将会来临,只有当他能够成为而且能够行动,依照他的感觉。他才能跟他真实的自性相一致。

People have a feeling for these things, dim and uncertain at first, but growing ever stronger and clearer with progressive development. When a man can say of his states and actions, “As I am, s’o I act,” he can be at one with himself, even though it be difficult, and he can accept responsibility for him¬self even though he struggle against it. We must recognize that nothing is more difficult to bear with than oneself.

人们对于这些事情会有感觉,起初始模糊而且不确定,但是随着逐渐的发展,变得越来越强烈,越来越清楚。当一个人能够说到他自己的状态与行动,「我行动,依照我生命的本质。」他能够跟他自己相一致,即使非常困难。他能够接受对于自己的责任,即使他奋斗对抗它。我们必须体认,要跟自己和谐相处确实是最困难不过的事情。

You sought the heaviest burden, and found yourself,” says Nie¬tzsche.) Yet even this most difficult of achievements becomes pos¬sible if we can distinguish ourselves from the unconscious con¬tents. The introvert discovers these contents in himself, the extravert finds them projected upon human objects. In both cases the unconscious contents are the cause of blinding illusions which falsify ourselves and our relations to our fellow men, mak¬ing both unreal. For these reasons individuation
.is indispensable for certain people, not only as a therapeutic necessity, but as a high ideal, an idea of the best we can do

「你们寻求最沉重的负担,然后你们发现就是你们自己,」尼采说。可是,即使最困难的成就也是成为可能,假如我们能够区别我们自己跟无意识的内容。内倾型的人发现这些内容在他自己身上。外倾型的人发现这些内容被投射在人类的客体上。无论哪一种情况,无意识的内容都是令人目盲的幻觉的原因。这些幻觉让我们自己与我们跟同胞的关系成为虚假,让两者都成为不真实。因为这些理由,个体化对于某些人们是无可避免的。不但是作为必要的治疗,而且作为崇高的理想,我们能够做到的最佳的理念。
225

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND’ THE UNCONSCIOUS

Nor should I omit to remark that it is at the same time the primitive Christian ideal of the Kingdom of Heaven which “is within you.” The idea at the bottom of this ideal is that right action comes from right thinking, and that there is no cure and no improving of the world that does not begin with the individual himself. To put the matter drastically: the man who is pauper or parasite will never solve the social question.

我也不应该忽略没有谈论到,个体化同时也是原始的基督教的天上王国的理想。那个天上王国就在你的内心深处。在这个理想的底端的观念是,正当的行动来自正当的思维。对于世界的治疗或对于世界的改进,都是从个人自己开始。说得更加激烈些:贫困或寄生的人将永远无法解决社会的问题。

超越移情的原则

December 4, 2015

BEYOND THE TRANSFERENCE PRINCIPLE
超越移情的原则

At the end of this chapter I feel obliged to say something about the
strategies of transference in psychotic and perverse patients, and their
proper management within the constraints of Lacanian psychoanalysis.
For the majority of the aforementioned conceptions apply to neurotic
(obsessional or hysterical) patients and cannot be extrapolated without
modification to other clinical structures. As I have already pointed out in
the two previous chapters, extensive theoretical discussion and concrete
technical advice on these matters must not be expected from the study of
Lacan’s works, the apparent standstill of his genius being even more
conspicuous in the playground of perversion than in the arena of
psychosis.

在这个章节的结束,我感觉有义务说某件事情,关于在精神病与倒错症的病人的移情的策略。以及他们的适当的治疗,在拉康的精神分析的约束之内的合适的管理。因为大多数以上提到的观念,适用于神经症者(妄想症或癔症)的病人。并且必须要有对于其他的临床的结构的修正,这些观念才能被列举。如同我已经指出,在这两个前述的章节,延伸的理论的讨论与对于这些事情的具体的技术的劝告,我们一定不要期望从拉康的著作的研究获得。他的天才的明星的停滞,甚至更加显而易见,在倒错症的游乐场域,比起在精神病的斗技场。

Scrutiny of Lacan’s Seminar III, The Psychoses (1993[1955–56]) and
its corollary, the ecrit ‘On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment
of Psychosis’ (1977h[1957–58]), suffices to observe his reluctance in
classifying the psychotic’s peculiar interactions with others as transference.
After having claimed in his ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]:68) that the
psychotic’s freedom of speech, prevaricating recognition, poses an obstacle
to transference, Lacan described in Seminar III how Schreber’s paranoid
relations with all the masculine characters in his surroundings can be
regarded as transference, simultaneously indicating that the notion ‘is
undoubtedly not to be taken in quite the sense that we usually mean’ (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:31).

仔细审查拉康的第三研讨班,“精神病者”,以及它的发展的成果,“论文集”里的“精神病的可能治疗的基本问题”,我们充分观察到拉康很不愿意将精神病者跟别人的特殊的互动,归类作为移情。在他的“罗马辞说”,拉康曾经宣称,精神病的言说的自由,闪烁地难以体认,会形成移情的阻碍。拉康在第三研讨班描述,许瑞伯的妄想症他周遭环境的男性的人物的关系,能够被认为作为移情,同时又指示,这个观念无可置疑地不应该用我们通常的意涵看待。

Returning to the structure of Schreber’ s delusions at
the end of the seminar, he added that the disturbed relationships with others
within the delusional system are clearly connected to a transference
mechanism (ibid.: 310), which does not imply that the persecutory
relationships constitute a transference in themselves.63
Without resolving the issue Lacan simply referred to Schreber’s
‘delusional “transferences”’ [sic] in his seminal text on psychosis (Lacan
1977h[1957–58]:190), dismissing the bulk of the psychoanalytic
literature on transference and psychosis as an instance of the swiftness
with which ‘psychoanalysts claim to be able to cure psychosis in all
cases where a psychosis is not involved’ (ibid.: 192).64

在研讨班1的结束,当拉康回的许瑞伯的幻觉的结构时,他补充说,跟别人的受的困扰的关系,在妄想症的系统里,跟移情的机制确实明显地息息相关。这个移情的机制并没有暗示着,迫害的关系本身形成移情。拉康并没有解决这个问题,在他论精神病的研讨班的文本,他仅是提到许瑞伯的“幻觉的移情”。他将一大堆的精神分析论移情与精神病的文献,排斥作为是灵巧的例子。灵巧地,精神分宣称能够治疗精神病,在精神病其实并没有被牵涉在内的个案里。

At the very end of
his text, Lacan revealed that his preliminary question to any possible
treatment of psychosis introduced ‘the conception to be formed of the
handling, in this treatment, of the transference’, yet he refused to enter
that area of research because his aim had been to ‘return to’ and not to
go ‘beyond Freud’ (ibid.: 221). Lacan addressed the issue of psychosis
on a regular basis in later years, without gathering up the loose threads
of his previous explorations.

在他的文本的结束,拉康显示,他的最初的问题,针对任何可能的精神病的治疗,介绍即将被形成的观念,关于在这个治疗里的移情的处理。可是他拒绝进入这个研究的领域。因为他的目的一直是“回到”而不是去“超越弗洛伊德”。在晚年,规律地,拉康处理精神病的这个议题,但是,他并没有收集他先前的探索的松散的脉络。

The most oft-quoted and perhaps the only valuable statement on
psychosis and transference within Lacan’s later work is his 1966
introduction to the French translation of Schreber’s memoirs (Lacan
1996b[1966]).65 On a theoretical level Lacan instated a new opposition
between the subject that is represented by a signifier for another signifier,
i.e. the already conceptualized divided subject () of the unconscious,
and the subject of jouissance purportedly underpinning the structure of
paranoia (ibid.: 2).66

在拉康晚年的研究,最经常被引用,或许是唯一有价值的陈述,针对精神病与移情,是他1966年的介绍法文的翻译许瑞伯的回忆录。根据理论的层面,拉康开启一个新的对立,在被另外一个能指所代表的能指的主体,与欢爽的主体之间的对立。前者是无意识的已经被概念化的分裂的主体。后者是刻意作为妄想症者的结构的基础。

From a practical viewpoint he impelled
psychoanalysts working with psychotics to adapt themselves to a clinical
constellation which puts them ‘in the position of object of a sort of
mortifying erotomania’, similar to the place Schreber assigned to Flechsig
in his delusional constructions (ibid.: 4). The upshot of this constellation
would be that the psychoanalyst is not invested with a transference signifier supporting the supposed subject of knowing, but with an
imaginary ‘persona’ subjugated to the unsavoury intentions of an
infatuated stalker.

从实践的观点,拉康推动研究精神病者的精神分析适应临床的汇集,让精神病者处于某种令人羞辱的色情狂的客体的立场。类似于他的幻觉的建构里,许瑞伯指定给弗列西格的位置。这个汇集的结果将是,精神分析家并没有被投注赋有移情-能指,用来支持被认为是应该知道的主体。而是被投注赋有想像的“人格面具”,被隶属于著迷的潜行者的不良的意图。

142 Jacques Lacan and the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis
These scant indications conjure up the picture I outlined in the first
chapter of this book, of the psychotic patient whose lack of ignorance
excludes the supposed subject of knowing and prefigures a destructive,
competitive, imaginary bond. On the question of how to deal with this
type of transference, Lacanian psychoanalysts have formulated a plethora
of clinical guidelines, often based on what they have learnt from their
private experience with single case-studies. The following series of ideas
is a summary of what I consider to be the most important technical
features. The series does not pretend to be exhaustive, and clinicians are
encouraged to approach these ideas as recommendations and not as
established principles or hard-and-fast rules, in keeping with Freud’s
warning in the opening paragraphs of ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(1913c:123).

这些有限的指示让人想起我在本书的第一章节描绘的画面。关于精神病的病人,他的无知的欠缺排除被认为应该知道的主体,并且预先构想一位毁灭的,競争的,想像的默契。针对这个问题:如何处理这种移情?拉康派的精神分析已经阐释临床的指导方针的丰富内容。这些指导方针的基础是他们已经学习到的东西,从他们对于单一的个案研究的私人经验。以下的观念的系列,就是我认为是最重要的专业技术的特征的总结。这个系列并没有伪装穷尽一切。临床医生被鼓励探讨这些观念,作为是1推荐,并且并不是作为被建立的原则,或牢不可破的规则。以符合弗洛伊德的警告,在“论治疗的开始”的开头的段落。

It is first of all believed that analysts run the risk of invigorating the
‘mortifying erotomania’ when helping to disclose the signification of
the psychotic’s experiences. Like Schreber, who suffered immensely from
the realization that ‘All nonsense cancels itself out’ (Schreber 1988
[1903]:151–152), psychotics are engulfed by the significance of their
condition, and do not benefit from people who question or solidify this
significance. More radically than in the case of neurotics, the analyst
ought to abstain from being a mind-reader or seer, because this position
consolidates the psychotic’s mental state and seriously jeopardizes the
analytic setting (Alquier et al. 1992:171). By contrast, analysts are held
to offer an address (Broca 1984:50), a stable place at which the psychotic
patient can call, and which they occupy in the function of secretaries or
witnesses of the psychotic’s experiences (Soler 1987).

人们起初相信,精神分析家冒着这个危险:激发这个“令人羞辱的色情狂”,当他们帮忙显露出精神病的经验的意义。就像许瑞伯,他遭受巨大痛苦,由于体会到,“一切的无意义取消它的本身”。精神病者被他们的情况的意义吞没,并且没有获得利益,从那些质疑或巩固这个意义的人们。比起神经症的个案更加强烈地,分析家应该自我节制,不要成为是阅读心术者,或是预言家。因为这个立场巩固精神病者的精神状态,并且严重地危害精神分析的背景。对照起来,精神分析家被认为要提供一个地址,一个稳定的位置,让精神病的病人能够拜访。他们占据这个位置,以秘书的功能,或是作为精神病这的经验的见证者。

Additionally Lacanian psychoanalysts have reached an agreement on
the importance of the clinician’s calculated restrictiveness with regard
to the psychotic’s intrusive jouissance. Because symbolic castration does
not operate in psychotic patients, jouissance has not been severed from
the Other (Miller 1993:11), which compels psychotics to an existence as
mere objects for the whimsical jouissance of the Other.

除外,拉康派的精神分析家已经达成一个共识,针对临床医生的被估算的限制的重要性,关于精神病的闯入的欢爽。因为象征的阉割并没有运作,在精神病的病人。欢爽并没有被切除,跟大他者。大他者逼迫精神病者过著仅是客体的存在,以满足大他者的幻想的欢爽。

To counter this
painful situation, Lacanian analysts have attempted to regulate the Other’s
overwhelming jouissance by imposing a set of symbolic rules, through
which certain aspects of the psychotic’s jouissance, such as the recourse
to self-mutilation, are being prohibited, and others are being enforced.
In curtailing the psychotic’s jouissance analysts epitomize a semblance
of castration, which is meant to be conducive to the creation of an artificial
space of desire and a socially adapted lifestyle.

为了对付这个令人痛苦的情况,拉康派的精神分析家曾经企图要规范大他者的压倒性的欢爽,凭借赋加一套的象征的规则。通过这些规则,某些的精神病的欢爽的层面,诸如诉诸于自我-切除,是被禁止。还有其他的欢爽正在被执行。当精神分析家缩减精神病者的欢爽时,他描绘出一个阉割的类似物。这个阉割的类似物被用来导致创造人为的欲望的空间,以及适应社会的生活方式。

Strategies of transference 143

The semblance of
castration can be implemented via the analyst’s radical ‘No!’ as a response
to particular expressions of the psychotic’s jouissance (Silvestre 1984:56),
or it can be effectuated more surreptitiously through the analyst’s demand
that patients engage in new social bonds and make themselves accessible
to new encounters (Broca 1985, 1988).

阉割的类似物能够被利用,经由分析家的强烈的“不!”,作为回应精神病的欢爽的特殊的表达。或是,它能够更加秘密地被实现,通过精神分析的要求。这样,病人参与新的社会的默契,并且让他们自己可以接近新的遭遇。

As regards the encouragement of
specific outlets for the psychotic’s jouissance, Lacanians have valued
the analyst’s role as a clinical Maecenas for the artistic projects in which
patients may indulge (Soler 1987:31). Whether painting, writing or any
other type of creative activity, these forms of expression contribute to
the fixation of the psychotic’s jouissance, which in turn increases the
chances for developing social competence.

关于对于精神病者的欢爽,明确的发泄的鼓励,拉康派临床重视分析家的角色,作为是临床的马西纳,因为病人可能耽溺其中的艺术的计划。无论是绘画,写作,或任何其他种类的创造的活动,这些形式的表达,促成精神病者的精神分析的欢爽的固著。反过来,精神病这的欢爽的固著增加发展社交胜任能力的机会。

Finally, on the vicissitudes of the transference in cases of perversion,
even Lacan’s followers have maintained their silence. Relying on Lacan’s
1959 statement that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate,
interpretable, analyzable…on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16) and Andre’s argument that perverts approach their
analysts as supposed subjects of enjoying, presenting themselves as
supposed subjects of knowing (Andre 1984:18; 1993:56), I intimated at
the end of Chapter 1 that analysts will have the utmost difficulty in treating
perverse patients, because they somehow display an image of themselves.

最后,针对在倒错症者的个案,移情的起伏变化,即使是拉康的跟随者也主张他们的沉默。他们依靠拉康在1957年的陈述:倒错症确实是某件表达,可以解释,可以分析的东西,跟神经症处于完全相同的层面。安德鲁的主张:倒错症者接近他们的分析家,作为被认为应该享乐的主体,他们呈现自己,作为被认为应该知道的主体。我在第一章的结束时主张,精神分析家将会遭遇最大的困难,当他们处理倒错症的病人。因为他们用某种方式展示他们自己的意象。

Analysing the perverse patient on the same level as a neurotic would
imply that the analyst endeavours to twist the pervert’s fantasy in such a
way that it becomes reinvested with desire at the expense of jouissance.
This seems only feasible if analysts explicitly refuse the attributed position
of supposed subject of enjoying by avoiding any complicity with the
pervert’s strategies and (re)emphasizing their own desire to know, notably
about what the pervert so ardently pretends to know about jouissance.

分析倒错症的病人,根据跟神经症者相同的层次,将会意味著,精神分析家企图扭曲倒错症者的幻想,用这样一种方式,以致它变得被投注欲望,以欢爽作为代价。这似乎是行得通,条件是分析家明确地拒绝这个被归属的立场,作为被认为应该享乐的主体。凭借跟倒错症者的策略作为共谋。并且重新强调他们自己想要知道的欲望。特别是关于倒错症者如此热烈地伪装要知道欢爽。

Challenging the pervert’s knowledge, exposing its inadequacies,
incoherence and inconsistencies, may then lead to the pervert’s
acknowledgement that some knowledge does escape subjective mastery,
and the renewed installation of the supposed subject of knowing. Whereas
the supposed subject of knowing needs to fall at the end of the neurotic’s
analysis, the installation of this function may thus constitute the terminus
of the pervert’s analytic itinerary. In both cases the cure is indeed ‘effected
by love’ (McGuire 1974:12–13) and therefore situated ‘on precisely the
same level’ (Lacan 1977a[1959]:16), but whilst in the neurotic
compartment love needs to travel from necessity to contingency, in the
perverse arrangement it needs to emerge as a necessity. In other words, the analysis of a pervert may be regarded as finished if he manages to
comply with the necessities of love.

挑战倒错症者的知识,暴露这个知识的不足够,不一贯与不一致,可能会导致倒错症者的承认:某些知识确实是主体无法掌控的,并且重新安置被认为应该知道的主体。虽然被认为应该道的主体需要掉落,在神经症者的精神分析的结束。这个功能的安置因此可能形成倒错症者的精神分析的旅行的终点站。在两种情况,治疗确实是由于爱所造成,因此被定位在确实是相同的层面。但是,在神经症的间隔里,爱需要旅行,从必要性到偶然性。然而,在倒错症者的安排里,爱需要出现,作为是必要性。换句话说,倒错者的精神分析可能会被认为是被完成,假如他成功地同意爱的必要性。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:个体化

December 1, 2015

PART TWO
INDIVIDUA TION
第二部分
个体化
I
THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
无意识的功能
266 There is a destination, a possible goal, beyond the alterna-
tive stages dealt with in our last chapter. That is the way of in¬dividuation. Individuation means becoming an “in-dividual,” and, in so far as “individuality” embraces our innermost, last, and incomparable uniqueness, it also implies becoming one’s own self. We could therefore translate individuation as “coming to selfhood” or “self-realization.”

有一个目的地,一个可能的目标,超越上一章,我们处理的轮换的阶段。那是个体化的方式。个体化意味着称为一个“个人”。因为“个体性”包含我们最内部,最后,跟无与伦比的独异性,个体化也暗示着成为我们自己的自性。 我们因此将个体化翻译成为“回到自性”或“实践-自性”。

267 The possibilities of development discussed in the preceding
chapters were, at bottom, alienations of the self, ways of divest¬ing the self of its reality in favour of an external role or in fa¬vour of an imagined meaning. In the former case the self retires into the background and gives place to social recognition; in the latter, to the auto-suggestive meaning of a primordial image.

在前述的章节讨论的发展的可能,追根究底,是自性的替换。
用这些方式,将自性剥除它的现实,以赞同外在的角色,或赞同被想像的意义。在前者,自性隐退到背景,然后让位给社会的体认。在后者,自性让位给原初的意象的自动-暗示的意义。

In both cases the collective has the upper hand. Self-alienation in favour of the collective corresponds to a social ideal; it even passes for social duty and virtue, although it can also be misused for egotistical purposes. Egoists are called “selfish,” but this, nat¬urally, has nothing to do with the concept of “self” as I am using it here.

在两种情况,集体意识占优势。自性被异化,以赞同集体意识,符合社会的理想。它甚至被认为是社会的责任与品德。虽然它也能够被误用,充当自我中心的目的。自我主义被称为“自私”,但是,这当然没有丝毫关系,跟“自性”的观念,依照我在这里使用的。

On the other hand, self-realization seems to stand in op¬position to self-alienation. This misunderstanding is quite gen¬eral, because we do not sufficiently distinguish between individ¬ualism and individuation. Individualism means deliberately stressing and giving prominence to some supposed peculiarity rather than to collective considerations and obligations.

另一方面,实践-自性似乎跟自性被异化处于对立状态。这个误解是相当普遍,因为我们并没有充分区别个人主义与个体化。个人主义意味着刻意强调并且给予优先性,对于某个被认为的特殊性,而不是给予集体的考虑与义务。

But in¬dividuation means precisely the better and more complete ful-
filment of the collective qualities of the human being, since ade¬quate consideration of the peculiarity of the individual is more conducive to a better social performance than when the pecul¬iarity is neglected or suppressed.

但是个体化意味着,人类的集体的特质的更好,而且更加完整的实现。因为充分地考虑到个人的特殊性,会导致更好的社会的成绩,比起当特殊性被忽略或压制。

173

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
The idiosyncrasy of an individ¬ual is not to be understood as any strangeness in his substance or in his components, but rather as a unique combination, or grad¬ual differentiation, of functions and faculties which in them¬selves are universal. Every human face has a nose, two eyes, ete., but these universal factors are variable, and it is this variability which makes individual peculiarities possible. Individuation, therefore, can only mean a process of psychological development that fulfils the individual qualities given; in other words, it is a process by which a man becomes the definite, unique being he in fact is. In so doing he does not become “selfish” in the ordi¬nary sense of the word, but is merely fulfilling the peculiarity of his nature, and this, as we have said, is vastly different from ego¬tism or individualism.

个人的怪癖不应该被理解,作为任何奇异的东西,在他的物质或在他的成分里。相反地,而是作为独异的组合,或逐渐的差异化,对于在他们自己身上,属于普世性的功能与能力的组合或逐渐差异化。每个人的脸孔拥有一个鼻子,两个眼睛,等等。但是这些普世的因素是具有变数的。就是这个变数让个人的特殊性成为可能。因此,个体化仅能意味著心理发展的过程,它实践被给予的个人的特殊性。换句话说,凭借这个体化的过程,一个人成为明确的独异性的生命实存,他事实上具有这样的生命实存。当他这样做时,他并没有成为普通用法的“自私”。而仅仅是实践他的天性的特殊性。如同我们已经说过,这是跟自我中心或个人主义是大相迳庭的。

~68 Now in so far as the human individual, as a living unit, is
composed of purely universal factors, he is wholly collective and therefore in no sense opposed to collectivity. Hence the individ¬ualistic emphasis on one’s own peculiarity is a contradiction of this basic fact of the living being. Individuation, on the other hand, aims at a living co-operation of all factors. But since the universal factors always appear only in individual form, a full consideration of them will also produce an individual effect, and one which cannot be surpassed by anything else, least of all by individualism.

现在,因为作为活生生的单位,个人由纯粹的普世的因素组成。他完全是集体,因此跟集体意识丝毫没有处于对立。因此,个体化的强调一个人自己的特殊性,是违背这位活生生的人的这个基本的事实。另一方面,个体化目标朝着作为各种因素的活生生的合作。但是,因为普世的因素总是仅以个体的形式出现,充分地考虑它们也将产生一个个人的效果。这个个人的效果无法被任何其他东西超越,个体化尤其没有被超越。

269 The aim of individuation is nothing less than to divest the
self of the false wrappings of the persona on the one hand, and of the suggestive power of primordial images on the other. From what has been said in the previous chapters it should be suffi¬ciently clear what the persona means psychologically. But when we turn to the other side, namely to the influence of the collec¬tive unconscious, we find we are moving in a dark interior world that is vastly more difficult to understand than the psychology of the persona, ,vhich is accessible to everyone. Everyone knows what is meant bv “putting on official airs” or “playing a social role.”

个体化的目标实实在在就是,一方面,将自性剥除掉人格面具的虚假的装扮;另一方面,并剥除掉原初的意象的暗示的力量。从前面几个章节曾经说过的,这应该是充分地清楚,人格面具在心理所意味的东西。但是,当我们转向另外一边,也就是,转向集体无意识的影响。我们发现我们正在移动,朝向黑暗的内部的世界。这个黑暗的内部的世界是极端地难以理解,比起人人可以接近的人格面具的心理学。众所周知,“官方人物的装模作样”或“扮演社会角色”是啥意思。

Through the persona a man tries to appear as this or that, or he hides behind a mask, or he may even build up a definite persona as a barricade. So the problem of the persona should present no great intellectual difficulties.

通过人格面具,一个人尝试出现,作为这个或那个角色。或是他隐藏在面具背后。或是他甚至累积明确的人格面具,作为是堡垒。所以,人格面具的难题,应该不会呈现太大的知识的困难。

174

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

270 It is, however, another thing to describe, in a way that can be
generally understood, those subtle inner processes which invade the conscious mind with such suggestive force. Perhaps we can best portray these influences with the help of examples of men¬tal illness, creative inspiration, and religious conversion.

可是,这是另外一回事,当我们要决定那些微妙的内部的过程,用通常能够被理解的方式。那些微妙的内部的过程侵犯到意识的心灵,用如此暗示的力量。或许,我们最善于描绘这些影响,假如我们凭借精神疾病的人们,创造性的启发,与改变宗教信仰者的案例作为帮助。

A most excellent account-taken from life, so to speak-of such an inner transformation is to be found in H. G. Wells’ Christina Alber¬ta’s Father.a Changes of a similar kind are described in Leon Daudet’s eminently readable L’Heredo. A wide range of mate¬rial is contained in William James’ Varieties of Religious Expe¬rience.

在威尔斯的“阿布拿塔的父亲”,我们能够找一个非常优秀的描述,也就是,关于这样的内部的转化。类似种类的改变被描述,在利昂 都德的通俗读物“希瑞德”。广泛的材料被包含在威廉 詹姆斯的“宗教经验杂谈”。

Although in many cases of this kind there are certain external factors which either directly condition the change, or at least provide the occasion for it, yet it is not always the case that the external factor offers a sufficient explanation of these changes of personality. We must recognize the fact that they can also arise from subjective inner causes, opinions, convictions, where external stimuli play no part at all, or a very insignificant one. In pathological changes of personality this can even be said to be the rule.

虽然在这种的许多个案里,有某些的外在的因,若不是直接地制约这个改变,就是至少供应改变的场合。可是,未必总是这个情况,外在的因素提供充分的解释,对于人格的这些改变。我们必须承认这个事实:他们也能够起源于主体的内部的原因,意见,信念。在那里,外在的刺激根本没有扮演角色。或是仅扮演不重要的角色。在人格的病理的改变,这甚至能够被说成是常规。

The cases of psychosis that present a clear and simple reaction to some overwh~lming outside event belong to the exceptions. Hence, for psychiatry, the essential aetiological factor is the inherited or acquired pathological disposition. The same is probably true of most creative intuitions, for we are hardly likely to suppose a purely causal connection between the falling apple and Newton’s theory of gravitation.

精神病的个案呈现清楚而单纯的反应,多余某个压倒性的外边的事件。这些精神病的个案属于例外。因此,对于精神分裂症,这个基本的病因的因素就是这个被继承或被获得的病理的性情。就大部的分创造性的直觉而言,相同的事情可能是真实的。因为我们几乎不可能假设有一个纯粹的因果的关联,在掉落的苹果与牛顿的地心引力的理论。

Similarly all religious conversions that cannot be traced back directly to sug¬gestion and contagious example rest upon independent interior processes culminating in a change of personality. As a rule these processes have the peculiarity of being subliminal, i.e., uncon¬scious, in the first place and of reaching consciousness only grad¬ually. The moment of irruption can, however, be very sudden, so that consciousness is instantaneously flooded with extremely strange and apparently quite unsuspected contents.

同样地,所有的宗教的改变,无法直接被追踪到暗示。传染的例子依靠独立的内部的过程,在人格的改变里达到高潮。通常,这些过程拥有成为升华的特殊性,譬如,首先是成为无意识的特性,其次,才仅是逐渐地到达意识的特性。可是,发作的时刻有时是很突然的。这样,意识瞬间泛滥着极端奇怪而表面上完全无可怀疑的内容。

That is how it looks to the layman and even to the person concerned, but the experienced observer knows that psychological events are never sudden. In reality the irruption has been preparing for many years, often for half a lifetime, and already in childhood all sorts of remarkable signs could have been detected which, in more or less symbolic fashion, hinted at abnormal future developments.

那就是对于外行人看起来的样子,甚至对于相关的这个人。但是,有经验的观察者知道,心理的事件从来就不是突然的。事实上,这个发作已经酝酿好几年了。经常是酝酿大半生。在童年时期,已经有各色各样的明显的迹象,本来能够被觉察出来。用相当象征的方式,在异常的未来的发展里被暗示出来。

a [Concerning the origin of this novel in a conversation between Wells and lung. cf. Bennet, What lung Really Said, p. 93.-EDITORS.]
175

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
I am reminded, for instance, of a mental case who refused all nourishment and created quite extraordinary difficulties in con¬nection with nasal feeding. In fact an anaesthetic was necessary before the tube could be inserted. The patient was able in some remarkable way to swallow his tongue by pressing it back into the throat, a fact that was quite new and unknown to me at the time. In a lucid interval I obtained the following history from the man. As a boy he had often revolved in his mind the idea of how he could take his life, even if every conceivable measure were employed to prevent him.

譬如,我想起一个精神病的个案。他拒绝所有的滋养,并且引起相当特殊的困难,关于鼻腔的餵食。事实上,麻醉是必要的,这样管子才能够被插入。病人以相当明显的方式能够吞下他的舌头,将舌头压到喉咙里面。在当时,这对于我是相当新颖而未曾听过的一个事实。间隔一段清楚的期间,我获得这个人的以下的历史。当他男孩时,他经常在他的心里萦绕这个想法:他如何能够拿掉他的生命,即使每个可以构想的措施都被运用来阻止他。

He first tried to do it by holding his breath, until he found that by the time he was in a semi¬conscious state he had already begun to breathe again. So he gave up these attempts and thought: perhaps it would work if he refused food. This fantasy satisfied him until he discovered that food could be poured into him through the nasal cavity. He therefore considered how this entrance might be closed, and thus it was that he hit upon the idea of pressing his tongue back¬wards. At first he was unsuccessful, and so he began a regular training, until at last he succeeded in swallowing his tongue in much the same way as sometimes happens accidentally during anaesthesia, evidently in his case by artificially relaxing the mus¬cles at the root of the tongue.

他首先尝试凭借摒住呼吸来做它。直到他发现,在他处于半-意识的状态时,他已经开始又再呼吸。所以,他放弃这些企图,并且认为,假如他拒绝食物,或许行得通。他满足于这个幻想,直到他发现,食物能够被注入他的身体,经验鼻腔的洞口。他因此考虑到,这个入口如何能够被封闭。因此,他突然想到这个点子:将他的舌头压退回去。起初,他并没有成功。所以,他开始规律地训练。直到最后,他成功地吞下他的舌头,就像有时意外发生的事情,在麻醉时。显而易见地,在他的个案,他人为地松开舌头的根本的肌肉。

:71 In this strange manner the boy paved the way for his future
psychosis. After the second attack he became incurably insane. This is• only one example among many others, but it suffices to show how the subsequent, apparently sudden irruption of alien contents is really not sudden at all, but is rather the result of an unconscious development that has been going on for years.

用这个奇异的方式,这位男孩替他的未来的精神病铺路。在第二次疾病发作后,他变成无可治疗地疯狂。这是众多的例子当中的唯一的一个。但是它足够显示,外来的内容的随后的表面上突然的发作,确实一点儿也不突然。相反地,它是无意识发展的结果,已经进行好几年了。

l72 The great question now is: in what do these unconscious
processes consist? And how are they constituted? Naturally, so long as they are unconscious, nothing can be said about them. But sometimes they manifest themselves, partly through symp¬toms, partly through actions, opinions, affects, fantasies, and dreams. Aided by such observational material we can draw indi¬rect conclusions as to the momentary state and constitution of the unconscious processes and their development. We should not, however, labour under the illusion that we have now dis- covered the real nature of the unconscious processes. We never succeed in getting further than the hypothetical “as if.”

现在,这个大问题是:这些无意识由什么组成?它们如何被组成?当然,只要它们是无意识,关于它们,我们无法说出任何东西。但是有时,它们展示它们自己,部分通过症状,部分通过行动,意见,情感,幻想,与梦。由于受的这些观察的材料的帮助,我们能够获得间接的结论,关于无意识的过程与发展的暂时的状态与组成结构。可是,我们不应该努力工作,带着这个幻觉:我们现在已经发现无意识的过程的真实特性。我们永远不会成功地更加地深入,除了就是假设的“好像”。
176

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
273 “No mortal mind can plumb the depths of nature”-nor
even the depths of the unconscious. We do know, however, that the unconscious never rests. It seems to be always at work, for even when asleep we dream. There are many people who de¬clare that they never dream, but the probability is that they simply do not remember their dreams. It is significant that peo¬ple who talk in their sleep mostly have no recollection either of the dream which started them talking, or even of the fact that they dreamed at all. Not a day passes but we make some slip of the tongue, or something slips our memory which at other times we know perfectly well, or we are seized by a mood whose cause we cannot trace, etc. These things are all symptoms of some con¬sistent unconscious activity which becomes directly visible at night in dreams, but only occasionally breaks through the inhi¬bitions imposed by our daytime consciousness.

自然的深度,非凡夫的心灵所能探测,遑论无意识的深度。可是,我们确实知道,无意识从来没有休息。无意识似乎总是在运作当中。因为即使当我们睡觉时,我们也在作梦。有许人们宣称,他们从来没有作梦。但是很可能是,他们仅是不记得他们的梦。重要的是,在睡觉中谈话的人们,大部分并没有记得让他们谈话的那个梦,或甚至不记得这个事实:他们做过梦。每一天过去,我们总是会有些口误,或某件事情从我们的记忆溜掉。还有些时刻,我们清楚地知道这个记忆,或我们著迷于某个情绪变化。这个情绪变化的原因,我们无法追踪,等等。这些东西都是某个一贯性的无意识的活动的症状。它们在夜晚的梦里直接可以看见。但是仅1偶然地突破压抑,由我们的白天的意识赋加的压抑。

274 So far as our present experience goes, we can lay it down that
the unconscious processes stand in a compensatory relation to the conscious mind. I expressly use the word “compensatory” and not the word “contrary” because conscious and unconscious are not necessarily in opposition to one another, but comple¬ment one another to form a totality, which is the self. According to this definition the self is a quantity that is supraordinate to the conscious ego. It embraces not only the conscious but also the unconscious psyche, and is therefore, so to speak, a personal-ity which we also are.

就我们目前的经验而言,我们能够确定地说,无意识的过程跟意识的心灵处于互补的关系。我生动地使用这个字词“互补地”,而不是“相反地”。因为意识与无意识未必是处于互相对立的状态。而是互相辅助,为了形成完整性。那就是“自性”。依照这个定义,自性是一个数量,早先存在于意识的自我的数量。自性不但包含意识,而且包含无意识的心灵。因此,自性可以说是我们生命实存的人格。

It is easy enough to think of ourselves as possessing part-souls. Thus we can, for instance, see ourselves as a persona without too much difficulty. But it transcends our powers of imagination to form a clear picture of what we are as a self, for in this operation the part would have to comprehend the whole. There is little hope of our ever being able to reach even approximate consciousness of the self, since however much We may make conscious there will always exist an indeterminate and indeterminable amount of unconscious material which be¬longs to the totality of the self. Hence the self will always remain a supraordinate quantity.

我们足够容易将我们自己视为是拥有部分-灵魂。因此,譬如,我们能够没有太大的困难,看待我们自己,作为是一个人格面具。但是这个人格面具超越我们的想像的力量,为了形成一个清楚的画面,对我我们的生命实存,作为自性。因为在这个运作里,部分灵魂将必须理解整体性。我们几乎没有什么希望能够到达大约地理解这个自性。因为我们如努人让意识知道,总是存在着未被决定,无法被决定的无意识的材料的数量。它们属于自性的整体。因此,自性将总是早先存在于数量。

275 The unconscious processes that compensate the conscious
ego contain all those elements that are necessary for the self¬177
of the psyche as a whole. On the personal level, these are the not consciously recognized personal motives which ap¬pear in dreams, or the meanings of daily situations which we have overlooked, or conclusions we have failed to draw, or affects we hav~ not permitted, or criticisms we have spared our¬selves.

补偿意识的无意识的自我的过程,包含所有那些元素,对于自性,作为整体的心灵,是必要的元素。那些元素意识地组成我们忽略的日常的情境,或我们没有获得的结论。或是我们没有容许的情感,或我们让自己省免的批评。

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS regulation But the more we become conscious of ourselves through self-knowledge, and act accordingly, the more the layer of the personal unconscious that is superimposed on the collective un¬conscious will be diminished. In this way there arises a con¬sciousness which is no longer imprisoned in the petty, oversensi¬tive, personal world of the ego, but participates freely in the wider world of objective interests.

但是,我们越是知道我们自己,通过认识自性,然后採取行动。被超级赋加在个人的无意识的层面,就越加地被减少。用这个方式,就产生一个意识,不再被囚禁于狭窄的过度敏感的个人的自我的世界,而是自由地参与更加广泛的客观利益的世界。

This widened consciousness is no longer that touchy, egotistical bundle of personal wishes, fears, hopes, and ambitions which always has to be compensated or corrected by unconscious counter-tendencies; instead, it is a function of relationship to the world of objects, bringing the individual into absolute, binding, and indissoluble communion with the world at large. The complications arising at this stage are no longer egotistic wish-conflicts, but difficulties that con¬cern others as much as oneself.

被扩宽的意识不再是那个敏感,自我中心的那堆个人的愿望,恐惧,希望,与企图心。它们总是必须被补偿或改造,被无意识的相反的倾向。代替地,这是跟客体的世界的关系的功能,将个人带进绝对的联结,以及无法解决的沟通,跟一般的世界。从这个阶段产生的併发症,不再是自我中心的愿望—冲突。而是跟别人,也跟自己息息相关的各种困难。

At this stage it is fundamentally a question of collective problems, which have activated the collec¬tive unconscious because they require collective rather than per¬sonal compensation. We can now see that the unconscious pro¬duces contents which are valid not only for the person concerned, but for others as well, in fact for a great many people and pos-sibly f0r all.

在这个阶段,基本上的问题是集体的难题。它们触动集体无意识,因为它们要求集体,而不是个人的补偿。我们现在看见,无意识产生的一些内容是有效的,不但对于相关的个人,而且对于别人。事实上,对于许多的人们,可能对于所有的人们。

276 The Elgonyi, natives of the Elgon forests, of central Africa,
explained to me that there are two kinds of dreams: the ordi¬nary dream of the little man, and the “big vision” that only the great man has, e.g., the medicine-man or chief. Little dreams are of no account, but if a man has a “big dream” he summons the whole tribe in order to tell it to everybody.

非州中部的阿甘森林的阿甘尼伊土著,跟我解释,有两种的梦:小人物的普通的梦,跟仅有伟大的人,如巫医或酋长,才拥有的幻景”。缈小的梦是微不足道。但是,假如一个人拥有“伟的的梦”,他召唤整个的部落,为了将梦告诉每个人。

277 How is a man to know whether his dream is a “big” or a
“little” one? He knows it by an instinctive feeling of signifi¬cance. He feels so overwhelmed by the impression it makes that he would never think of keeping the dream to himself. He has to tell it, on the psychologically correct assumption that it is of general significance. Even with us the collective dream has a feeling of importance about it that impels communication. It springs from a conflict of relationship and must therefore be built into our conscious relations, because it compensates these and not just some inner personal quirk.

一个人如何能够知道,他的梦是“伟大”或“缈小“?他知道它,凭借本能的感觉重要感。他感觉被这个重要感的印象压倒,以致于他将不会想到将这个梦据为己有。他必须告诉这个梦。根据心理上是正确的假设:这个梦具有普遍的重要性。即使对于我们,集体的梦拥有一种关于它的重要的感觉,驱使沟通。它起源于关系的冲突,因此,必须被建造成为我们的意识的关系。因为它补偿这些关系,并且不仅是某个内在的个人的习性。

178

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

278 The processes of the collective unconscious are concerned
not only with the more or less personal relations of an individ¬ual to his family or to a wider social group, but with his relations to society and to the human community in general. The more general and impersonal the condition that releases the uncon¬scious reaction, the more significant, bizarre, and overwhelming will be the compensatory manifestation. It impels not just pri¬vate communication, but drives people to revelations and con¬fessions, and even to a dramatic representation of their fantasies.

跟集体无意识的过程息息相关的,不仅是个人跟他的家庭的相当个人的关系,而且跟更加广泛的社会团体,跟一般的人的社会。释放无意识的反应的情况,更加一般性与非个人,补偿的证明越加是重要,古怪与压倒。它不但驱使私人的沟通,而且驱使人们获得启示与坦白,甚至驱使人们获得他们的幻想的戏剧性的再现表象。

279 I will explain by an example how the unconscious manages
to compensate relationships. A somewhat arrogant gentleman once came to me for treatment. He ran a business in partnership with his younger brother. Relations between the two brothers were very strained, and this was one of the essential causes of my patient’s neurosis. From the information he gave me, the real reason for the tension was not altogether clear. He had all kinds of criticisms to make of his brother, whose gifts he certainly did not show in a very favourable light. The brother frequently came into his dreams, always in the role of a Bisma\rck, N apo¬leon, or Julius Caesar. His house looked like the Vatican or Yil¬diz Kiosk. My patient’s unconscious evidently had the need to exalt the rank of the younger brother. From this I concluded that he was setting himself too high and his brother too low. The further course of analysis entirely justified this inference.

我将以一个例子解释,无意识如何成功地补偿关系。一位相当傲慢的绅士有一次前来找我就诊。他跟他的弟弟合股经营一家生意。两个兄弟之间的关系非常紧张。这是我的病人的神经症的基本原因之一。从他给予我的资讯,紧张的真正原因并不完全清楚。他对他的兄弟做各种的批评。他的兄弟的天赋并没有显示有利的观点。兄弟经常进入他的梦,总是以俾斯麦,拿破仑,或凯撒大帝的角色。他的房屋看起来像是梵帝岡,或土耳其宫殿。我的病人的无意识显然拥有这个必要性,要提升年轻弟弟的地位。从这里,我下结论:他正在将他自己提升太高,将他的弟弟贬得太低。精神分析的更进一步原因完整证实这个推测。

280 Another patient, a young woman who clung to her mother
in an extremely sentimental way, always had very sinister dreams about her. She appeared in the dreams as a witch, as a ghost, as a pursuing demon. The mother had spoilt her beyond all reason and had so blinded her by tenderness that the daugh¬ter had no conscious idea of her mother’s harmful influence. Hence the compensatory criticism exercised by the unconscious.

另外一位病人,一位年轻女士紧捉住她的母亲,以一个极端情感的方式,她总是拥有一个古怪的关于母亲的梦。她在梦里出现,作为女巫,作为追逐的恶魔。母亲已经破坏她,非理性所能形容,并且对她爱护有加,让她茫然。女儿无法意识到她的母亲的有害的影响。因此,无意识运作补偿的批评。

281 I myself once happened to put too low a value on a patient,
both intellectually and morally. In a dream I saw a castle perched on a high cliff, and on the topmost tower was a balcony, and there sat my patient. I did not hesitate to tell her this dream at once, naturally with the best results.

我自己有一次恰好过分低估一位病人,在知识与道德方面。在梦里,我看见一个城堡,座落在高的悬崖。在楼塔的顶端有一个阳台。我的病人坐在那里。我立即毫不犹豫地告诉他这个梦。当然,结果非常好。

285
286
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS the case

282 We all know how apt we are to make fools of ourselves in
front of the very people we have unjustly underrated. Naturally 179
the case can also be reversed, as once happened to a friend of mine. While still a callow student he had written to Virchow, the pathologist, craving an audience with “His Excellency.” When, quaking with fear, he presented himself and tried to give his name, he blurted out, “My name is Virchow.”

我们都知道,我们多么容易愚弄我们自己,就在我们不公正地低估那些人们的前面。当然,这个情况能够被倒转。如同我的朋友发生的事情。当他还是没有经验的学生时,他曾经写信给维州,这位病理学家,渴望“他的阁下’ 作为他的听众。当他恐惧激动地,他出现并且尝试报出他的名字,他模糊喊出,“我的名字是维州。”

Whereupon His Excellency, smiling mischievously, said, “Ah! So your name is Virchow too?” The feeling of his own nullity was evidently too much for the unconscious of my friend, and in consequence it instantly prompted him to present himself as equal to Vir¬chow in grandeur.

这是,这位阁下恶意地微笑着说:“你的名字也是维州?“。他自己的微不足道的感觉显然太过强烈,不适合于我的朋友的无意识。结果,它立即激发他介绍他自己,作为是跟伟大的维州相等。

283 In these more personal relations there is of course no need
for any very collective compensations. On the other hand, the figures employed by the unconscious in our first case are of a definitely collective nature: they are universally recognized he¬roes.

在这些更加是个人的关系,当然并没有需要从事任何集体的补偿。在另一方面,在我们第一个个案被运用的人物,属于明确的集体的特性:它们是普世被体认的英雄。

Here there are two possible interpretations: either my pa¬tient’s younger brother is a man of acknowledged and far¬reaching collective importance, or my patient is overestimating his own importance not merely in relation to his brother but in relation to everybody else as well. For the first assumption there was no support at all, while for the second there was the evi¬dence of one’s own eyes. Since the man’s extreme arrogance affected not only himself, but a far wider social group, the com¬pensation availed itself of a collective image.

在此,有两个可能的解释:要就是我的病人的弟弟,是一位被承认与具有深远的重要性的人。要不然就是,我的病人正在过分高估他自己的重要性,不仅跟他的弟弟的关系,而且跟每一位其他的人的关系。对于第一个假设,并没有任何的支持,对于另外一个假设,拥有自己的眼光的证据。因为这个人的极端的高傲,不仅伪装他自己,而且伪装更加广泛的社会的团体。这个补偿利用集体的意象。

284 The same is true of the second case. The “witch” is a collec-
tive image; hence we must conclude that the blind dependence of the y.oung woman applied as much to the wider social group as it did to her mother personally. This was indeed the case, in so far as she was still living in an exclusively infantile world, where the world was identical with her parents.

相同的道理就第二个个案也是一样。“女巫”是一个集体的意象。因此,我们必须做结论:年轻女人的盲目的依靠,同样可以运用到更加广泛的社会团体,如同它运用到她的个人的母亲。这确实是这个情况,因为她依旧还生活在专属婴孩的世界。在那里,世界跟她的父母亲认同。

These examples deal with relations within the personal orbit. There are, how¬ever, impersonal relations which occasionally need unconscious compensation. In such cases collective images appear with a more or less mythological character.

这些例子处理跟个人的轨道的关系。可是,有些非个人的关系,有时需要无意识的补偿。在这些情况,集体意象出现,具有相当神话的特性。

Moral, philosophical, and religious problems are, on account of their universal validity, the most likely to call for mythological compensation. In the aforementioned novel by H. G. Wells we find a classical type of compensation: Mr. Preemby, a midget personality, discovers that he is really a reincarnation of Sargon, King of Kings. Hap¬pily, the genius of the author rescues poor old Sargon from path¬ological absurdity, and even gives the reader a chance to appre-
ciate the tragic and eternal meaning in this lamentable affray.

道德,哲学,与宗教的难题,因为它们具有普世的正确,它们最有可能要求神话的补偿。在前述的威尔斯的小说,我们找到一个古典的补偿的类型: 普瑞比先生,具有渺小的人格,发现到,他确实是萨冈,王中之王的具体化身。快乐地,作者的天份将这个可怜的老萨冈,从病理的荒谬拯救出来。甚至给予读者,赏识悲剧与永恒的意义,在这个令人哀悼的争吵。

180

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
Mr. Preemby, a complete nonentity, recognizes himself as the point of intersection of all ages past and future. This knowledge is not too dearly bought at the cost of a little madness, provided that Preemby is not in the end devoured by that monster of a
primordial image-which is in fact what nearly happens to him.

普瑞比先生,是完全的非实体,他体认他自己,作为是从古至今,跟未来的交会点。这个知识的得来付出不太高昂的代价,那就是
稍微有点疯狂。只要普瑞比最后并没有被原始意象的怪物吞没。这事实上是他几乎发生的事情。

The universal problem of evil and sin is another aspect of
our impersonal relations to the world. Almost more than any other, therefore, this problem produces collective compensa¬tions. One of my patients, aged sixteen, had as the initial symp¬tom of a severe compulsion neurosis the following dream: He is walking along an unfamiliar street. It is dark) and he hears steps coming behind him. With a feeling of fear he quickens his pace. The footsteps come nearer) and his fear increases. He begins to run. But the footsteps seem to be overtaking him. Finally he turns round) and there he sees the devil. In deathly terror he leaps into the air and hangs there suspended. This dream was repeated twice, a sign of its special urgency.

邪恶与原罪的普世的难题,是非个人的跟世界的关系的另一个层面。因此,几乎超过任何其他层面,这个难题产生集体的补偿。我的其中一位病人,16岁,拥有严重的强迫神经症的症状,用以下的梦: 他正在沿着不熟悉的街道行走。天很黑,他听见背后有脚步声。带着恐惧的感觉,他加快他的脚步。脚步越来越近,他的恐惧增加。他开始跑步。但是脚步似乎追赶他。最后,他转过头,他看见这个恶魔。惊骇万分地,他跳跃到空中,然后悬挂在空中。这个梦被重复两次,它具有特别的迫切性的迹象。

It is a notorious fact that the compulsion neuroses, by reason of their meticulousness and ceremonial punctilio, not only have the surface appearance of a moral problem but are indeed brim¬full of inhuman beastliness and ruthless evil, against the inte¬gration of which the very delicately organized personality puts up a desperate struggle.

这是一个恶名昭彰的事实:强迫性的神经症者,凭借他们的讲究细节,与仪式的规范。他们不但拥有道德难题的表面表象,而且确实充满着非人类的残酷的邪恶的野性。精致组织的人格,竖立起拼命的奋斗,对抗残酷的人格的合并。

This explains why so many things have to be performed in ceremonially “correct” style, as though to counteract the evil hovering in the background. After this dream the neurosis started, and its essential feature was that the patient had, as he put it, to keep himself in a “provisional” or “uncontaminated” state of purity. For this purpose he either severed or made “invalid” all contact with the world and with everything that reminded him of the transitoriness of human existence, by means of lunatic formalities, scrupulous cleansing ceremonies, and the anxious observance of innumerable rules and regulations of an unbelievable complexity. Even before the patient had any suspicion of the hellish existence that lay before him, the dream showed him that if he wanted to come down to earth again there would have to be a pact with evil.

这解释为什么如此多的东西必须被执行,用仪式方面“正确”的风格,好像为了反抗邪恶萦绕在背景。经过这个梦后,神经症开始,它的早期的特征,如同病人自己表达它,病人必须保持他自己处于“暂时”或“没有被污染”的纯净的状态。为了这个目的,他要就是跟这个世界的接触分离,要不就是让世界的接触成为无效。跟每一样会让他想起人类存在的短暂,凭借疯狂的正式仪式,费心清理的各种仪式,并且焦虑地遵守无数的规则,与匪夷所思的复杂的规定。即使在病人怀疑展开他面前的这个恶魔的存在之前,这个梦跟他显示:假如他想要再次回到现实,他将必须跟恶魔订合约。

~87 Elsewhere I have described a dream that illustrates the com-
pensation of a religious problem in a young theological student.l 1
involved in all sorts of difficulties of belief, a not un¬common occurrence in the man of today. In his dream he was the pupil of the “white magician,” who, however, was dressed in black.

在别的地方,我曾经描述一个梦,解释宗教的难题的补偿,在一位年轻的神学院的学生身上。在各种各样的信仰的困难。在今天的人们,这也是常见的事情。可是,在他的梦里,“白人魔法师”的学生却穿着黑色的衣服。
“Archetypes of the Collective Unconscious,” par. 71•

181

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

After having instructed him up to a certain point, the white magician told him that they now needed the “black magi¬cian.” The black magician appeared, but clad in a white robe. He declared that he had found the keys of paradise, but needed the wisdom of the white magician in order to understand how to use them. This dream obviously contains the problem of oppo¬sites which, as we know, has found in Taoist philosophy a solu¬tion very different from the views prevailing in the West. The figures employed by the dream are impersonal collective images corresponding to the nature of the impersonal religious prob¬lem. In contrast to the Christian view, the dream stresses the relativity of good and evil in a way that immediately calls to mind the Taoist symbol of Yin and Yang.

经过教导他,到达某个时刻,这位白人魔法师告诉他,他们现在需要“黑人魔法师”。黑人魔法师出现,但是穿着白人的衣袍。他宣称:他已经找到天堂的钥匙。但是需要白人魔法师的智慧。为了理解如何使用它们。这个梦显而易见1包含对立力量的难题。我们知道,对立力量的难题,在道家哲学,曾经找到一个解答,非常不同于西方流行的观点。梦所运用的人物,是非个的宗教的难题。跟基督教的观点对照之下,这个梦强调善与恶的相对性,它的方式立即让人想起阴与阳的道家的象征•。

288 We should certainly not conclude from these compensations
that, as the conscious mind becomes more deeply engrossed in universal problems, the unconscious will bring forth corre¬spondingly far-reaching compensations. There is what one might call a legitimate and an illegitimate interest in imper¬sonal problems. Excursions of this kind are legitimate only when they arise from the deepest and truest needs of the indi¬vidual; illegitimate when they are either mere intellectual curi¬osity or a flight from unpleasant reality. In the latter case the uncot;lscious produces all too human and purely personal com¬pensations, whose manifest aim is to bring the conscious mind back to ordinary reality.

根据这些补偿,我们确实不应该下结论说:随着无意识心灵变得更加专注于普世的难题,无意识将会因此导致深远的补偿。这里存在着我们所谓的合法与不合法的利益,在非个人的难题。这样的远足是合法的,仅有当它们起源于个人最深与最真实的需求。它们是不合法的,当它们仅是知识的好奇心,或仅是逃避不愉快的现实。在后者的情况,无意识产生太过人性与纯粹个人的补偿。它们的明显的目标是要将意识的心灵带回普通的现实。

People who go illegitimately mooning after the infinite often have absurdly banal dreams which en¬deavour to damp down their ebullience. Thus, from the nature of the compensation, we can at once draw conclusions as to the seriousness and rightness of the conscious strivings.

不合法地前往沉香永恒的人们,经常拥有陈腐得荒谬的梦。这些梦企图淹没他们的激情。因此,从补偿的天性,我们能够立即获得结论,关于意识的奋斗的严肃与正确性。

289 There are certainly not a few people who are afraid to admit
that the unconscious could ever have “big” ideas. They will ob¬ject, “But do you really believe that the unconscious is capable of offering anything like a constructive criticism of our Western mentality?” Of course, if we take the problem intellectually and impute rational intentions to the unconscious, the thing be¬comes absurd. But it would never do to foist our conscious psy¬chology upon the unconscious.

确实有许多人们害怕承认,无意识能够具有“伟大”的观念。他们反对说:「但是,你确实相信,无意识能够提供任何像是建设性的批评,对于我们西方人的精神?」当然,假如我们以知识看待这个难题,然后灌输理性的意图给无意识,这件事情就变得荒谬。但是这将是行不通的,假如我们将我们的意识的心理学强迫进入无意识。

Its mentality is an instinctive one; it has no differentiated functions, and it does not “think” as we understand “thinking.” It simply creates an image that an¬swers to the conscious situation.

无意识的心灵上本能的心灵;它没有差异化的功能。它没有“思维”,如同我们理解的“思维”。它仅是创造一个意象,回应意识情况的意象。

182

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
This image contains as much thought as feeling, and is anything rather than a product of ra¬tionalistic reflection. Such an image would be better described as an artist’s vision. We tend to forget that a problem like the one which underlies the dream last mentioned cannot, even to the conscious mind of the dreamer, be an intellectual problem, but is profoundly emotional. For a moral man the ethical prob¬lem is a passionate question which has its roots in the deepest instinctual processes as well as in his most idealistic aspirations.

这个意象包含思维与感觉。这个意象绝非是理性的反思的产物。这样的意象最好是被描述作为艺术家的幻景。我们倾向于忘回家,像这样的难题,作为上次被提到的梦的基础,即使对于作梦者的意识的心灵,不可能是知识的难题,而是深度情绪的难题。对于一个道德的人,伦理的难题是一个激情的问题,它根源于最深的本能的过程,以及根源于他最理想的渴望。

The problem for him is devastatingly real. It is not surprising, therefore, that the answer likewise springs from the depths of his nature. The fact that everyone thinks his psychology is the meas¬ure of all things, and, if he also happens to be a fool, will inevi¬tably think that such a problem is beneath his notice, should not trouble the psychologist in the least, for he has to take things objectively, as he finds them, without twisting them to fit his subjective suppositions. The richer and more capacious natures may legitimately be gripped by an impersonal problem, and to the extent that this is so, their unconscious can answer in the same style. And just as the conscious mind can put the question, “Why is there this frightful conflict between good and evil?,” so the unconscious can reply, “Look closer! Each needs the other. The best, just because it is the best, holds the seed of evil, and there is nothing so bad but good can come of it.”

对于他的难题是强烈地真实。因此,这并不令人惊奇,这个答案同样起源于他的天性的深处。每个人思维他的心理学的这个事实,就是一切事情的衡量。假如他也刚好是一位傻瓜,他必然会认为,这样的难题是不值得他的注意,根本就不应该让心理学家感到费心。因为他必须客观地看待事情,当他发现这些难题,但是并没有将它们扭曲,以符合他的主观的假设。非个人的难题合法所掌握的天性,越是丰富与任性,甚至事实就是如此,他们的无意识越是用相同的方式来回答。正如意识的心灵能够提出问题,「为什么善与恶之间会有如此令人害怕的冲突?」无意识能够回答说:「请你更加仔细观看!每一个都需要另外一个。即使是最好的东西,也拥有邪恶的种种,仅是因为它是最好。一件事情,无论如何之坏,它总是会产生善的事情。

29° It might then dawn on the dreamer that the apparently in-
soluble conflict is, perhaps, a prejudice, a frame of mind condi¬tioned by time and place. The seemingly complex dream-image might easily reveal itself as plain, instinctive common sense, as the tiny germ of a rational idea, which a maturer mind could just as well have thought consciously. At all events Chinese phi¬losophy thought of it ages ago.

作梦者可能恍然大悟,这个表面上无法解决的冲突,或许是一个偏见,一个心灵的框架,受到时间与地方的制约。这个看起来复杂的梦的意象,作为是理性观念的小小的种子,假如他是一位更加成熟心灵的人,他本来同样能够从意识构想出来。无论如何,中国的哲学很久以前,就已经想到它。

The singularly apt, plastic config¬uration of thought is the prerogative of that primitive, natural spirit which is alive in all of us and is only obscured by a one¬sided conscious development. If we consider the unconscious compensations from this angle, we might justifiably be accused of judging the unconscious too much from the conscious stand¬point. And indeed, in pursuing these reflections, I have always started from the view that the unconscious simply reacts to the
conscious contents, albeit in a very significant way, but that it lacks initiative.

思想的异常地灵活,弹匣的融合,就是原始的自然的精神的特权。这个自然精神在我们每个人身上都存活着,除非被单边的意识的发展所模糊。假如我们从这个角度来考虑无意识的补偿,我们可能很有理由被控诉太过于用意识的观点来判断事情。的确,当我追寻这些反思时,我总是从这个观点开始:无意识的反应,仅是针对意识的内容,虽然用非常重要的方式,但是它欠缺创意。

183

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
It is, however, far from my intention to give the impression that the unconscious is merely reactive in all cases. On the contrary, there is a host of experiences which seem to prove that the unconscious is not only spontaneous but can ac¬tually take the lead. There are innumerable cases of people who lingered on in a pettifogging unconsciousness, only to become neurotic in the end. Thanks to the neurosis contrived by the unconscious, they are shaken out of their apathy, and this in spite of their own laziness and often desperate resistance.

可是,我绝对没有这个意图,要给予这个印象:无意识仅是在所有的情况里才反应。相反地,有许多的经验似乎证明:无意识不但是自动自发,而且能够作为引导。有无数人们的个案,一直留连,保持琐碎的无意识。结果,他们最后成为神经症者。由于被无意识设计的神经症,他们被动摇,摆脱他们的冷漠。尽管他们的懒惰,尽管他们经常绝望地抗拒。

291 Yet it would, in my view, be wrong to suppose that in such
cases the unconscious is working to a deliberate and concerted plan and is striving to realize certain definite ends. I have found nothing to support this assumption. The driving force, so far as it is possible for us to grasp it, seems to be in essence only an urge towards self-realization. If it were a matter of some general teleological plan, then all individuals who enjoy a surplus of un¬consciousness would necessarily be driven towards higher con¬sciousness by an irresistible urge.

可是,依我的观点,这将是错误的,假如我们认为,在这些情况,无意识正在运作,针对一个刻意而一致的计划。并且正在奋斗,为了实现某个明确的目的。我找不到任何东西来支持这个假设。这个驱动的力量,似乎本质上仅是朝向自我实现的渴望,就我们可能理解它而言。假如问题是某个一般的目的论的计划,那么所有享受过剩的无意识的个人,将必然会被驱使朝向更高的意识,被无法抗拒的渴望。

That is plainly not the case. There are vast masses of the population who, despite their no¬torious unconsciousness, never get anywhere near a neurosis. The few who are smitten by such a fate are really persons of the “higher” type who, for one reason or another, have remained too long on a primitive level. Their nature does not in the long run tolerate persistence in what is for them an unnatural torpor.

很明显,情况并不是这样。有很多的人们,尽管他们的恶名昭著的无意识,从来没有到达靠近神经症以外的地方。有些被命运咬啮的人们,他们确实是“更高”种类的人们。因为某个理由,他们始终保持在原初的层次太久。他们的天性最后并没有容忍持续停留在对他们而言是不自然的麻痹的状态。

As a result of their narrow conscious outlook and their cramped existence they save energy; bit by bit it accumulates in the un¬conscious and finally explodes in the form of a more or less acute neurosis. This simple mechanism does not necessarily conceal a “plan.” A perfectly understandable urge towards self-realization would provide a quite satisfactory explanation. We could also speak of a retarded maturation of the personality.

由于他们的狭窄的意识的外观,与他们的扭曲的存在的结果,他们节省能源。最后爆炸,用相当强烈的神经症的方式。这个简单的机械结构,并未必隐藏一个“计划”。一个非常可以理解的渴望,朝向自我实现,将会供应一个相当令人满意的解释。我们也谈论道人格的迟缓的成熟。

292 Since it is highly probable that we are still a long way from
the summit of absolute consciousness, presumably everyone is capable of wider consciousness, and we may assume accordingly that the unconscious processes are constantly supplying us with contents which, if consciously recognized, would extend the range of consciousness. Looked at in this way, the unconscious appears as a field of experience of unlimited extent. If it were merely reactive to the conscious mind, we might aptly call it a psychic mirror-world.

很有可能地,我们拒离绝对意识的山顶,还依旧有一段长距离。我们假定每个人都都能够具有更加广泛的意识。我们因此假定,无意识的过程不断地供应我们内容。这些内容假如被体认的话,将会延伸意识的范围。假如用这个方式观看这些内容,无意识似乎是无限范围的经验的领域。假如无意识仅是对于意识心灵的反应,我们可能轻易地称它为心灵的镜子世界。

184

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
In that case, the real source of all contents and activities would lie in the conscious mind, and there would be absolutely nothing in the unconscious except the distorted reflections of conscious contents. The creative process would be shut up in the conscious mind, and anything new would be nothing but conscious invention or cleverness. The empirical facts give the lie to this. Every creative man knows that spon¬taneity is the very essence of creative thought. Because the unconscious is not just a reactive mirror-reflection, but an in¬dependent, productive activity, its realm of experience is a self¬contained world, having its own reality, of which we can only say that it affects us as we affect it-precisely what we say about our experience of the outer world. And just as material objects are the constituent elements of this world, so psychic factors constitute the objects of that other world.

在那个情况,所有的内容与活动的来源将会在于意识的心灵。将绝对没有任何东西在无意识里,除了被扭曲的反映意识的内容。创造的过程将会被关闭,在意识的心灵。任何新的东西将仅是意识的发明,或灵巧表现。试验性的事实显示情况并非如此。每个创造的人都知道,自动自发就是创造的思想的本质。因为无意识并不仅是反动的镜子-反应。而是独立,产生的动作,它的经验的领域是包容自己的世界,拥有它自己的现实。关于这个现实,我们仅能说,它影响我们,如同我们影响它—确实是我们所说的内容,关于我们在这个外在世界的经验。正如材料的客体是这个世界的形成的元素。心灵的因素组成那里另外的世界的客体。

293 The idea of psychic objectivity is by no means a new discov-
ery. It is in fact one of the earliest and most universal acquisi¬tions of humanity: it is nothing less than the conviction as to the concrete existence of a spirit-world. The spirit-world was cer¬tainly never an invention in the sense that fire-boring was an invention; it was far rather the experience, the conscious accept¬ance of a reality in no way inferior to that of the material world.

心灵的客体的观念,绝非是新的发现。事实上,它是最早与最普世的人类的获得的东西。那实实在在就是信念,关于精神世界的具体的存在。精神世界确实从来不是发明,如同钻木取火是发明。相反地,这个经验,意识的接受现实,比起物质世界的现实,丝毫不逊。

I doubt whether primitives exist anywhere who are not ac¬quainted with magical influence or a magical substance. (“Mag¬ical” is simply another word for “psychic.”) It would also ap¬pear that practically all primitives are aware of the existence of spirits.2 “Spirit” is a psychic fact. Just as we distinguish our own bodiliness from bodies that are strange to us, so primitives-if they have any notion of “souls” at all-distinguish between their own souls and the spirits, which are felt as strange and as “not belonging.”

我怀疑,原始人们是否存在任何地方,他们对于魔兽的物质的魔术的影响并不熟稔。(魔术仅是“心灵”的另一个字)。这也是显而易见地,几乎所有的原始人们都知道精神的存在。“精神”是心理的事实。正如我们区别我们自己的身体,跟我们陌生的身体。原始人们区别他们自己的灵魂与精神—假如他们拥有“灵魂”的任何观念—这些灵魂与精神都被感觉是奇怪,作为“并不属于”。

They are objects of outward perception, whereas their own soul (or one of several souls where a plurality is as¬sumed), though believed to be essentially akin to the spirits, is not usually an object of so-called sensible perception. After death the soul (or one of the plurality of souls) becomes a spirit which survives the dead man, and often it shows a marked dete- rioration of character that partly contradicts the notion of per¬sonal immortality.

它们是外在感官的客体。虽然他们自己的灵魂(或其中一个灵魂,在那里,多数的灵魂被假设),虽然它被相信基本上类似精神。它通常使用所谓的理性感知的客体。在死亡之后,灵魂(或多数灵魂的其中一个),变成精神。它比死人活得长久。经常它显示人格的明显的恶化,这个人格部分抵触个人的永恒的观念。
2 In cases of reports to the contrary, it must always be borne in mind that the fear of spirits is sometimes so great that people will actually deny that there are any spirits to fear. I have come across this myself among the dwellers on Mount Elgon.
185

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The Bataks,3 of Sumatra, go so far as to assert that the people who were good in this life turn into malign and dangerous spirits. Nearly everything that the primitives say about the tricks which the spirits play on the living, and the general picture they give of the revenants) corresponds down to the last detail with the phenomena established by spiritualistic experience. And just as the communications from the “Beyond” can be seen to be the activities of broken-off bits of the psyche, so these primitive spirits are manifestations of unconscious com¬plexes.4

苏马特拉的巴塔克人甚至过分地主张:在这一生善良的人们,转变成为恶意而危险的精神。关于这些诡计,精神玩弄活生生的人们,以及他们给出的画面,关于死人回转,原始人们所说的东西,几乎每一样,都详细地对应于这些观念,被精神经验建立的现象。正如从“超验世界”的沟通,能够被视为是心灵的断裂的碎片的这些活动。这些原始的精神都是展示无意识的情结的展示。

The importance that modern psychology attaches to the “parental complex” is a direct continuation of primitive man’s experience of the dangerous power of the ancestral spirits. Even the error of judgment which leads him unthinkingly to assume that the spirits are realities of the external world is carried on in our assumption (which is only partially correct) that the real parents are responsible for the parental complex. In the old trauma theory of Freudian psychoanalysis, and in other quarters as well, this assumption even passed for a scientific explanation. (It was in order to avoid this confusion that I advocated the term “parental imago.” 5)

现代心理学依附于“父母的情结”,这个重要性是直接地延续原始人的经验,对于祖先的精神的危险的力量的经验。即使是判断的错误,不经思索地引导他假设:精神上外在世界的现实。这个判断的错误被执行,在我们的假设(仅是部分正确的假设),真实的父母亲要负责父母的情结。在弗洛伊德的精神分析的古老的创伤的理论,以及其他的部门,这个假设甚至被认为是科学的解释。(那是为了避免这个混淆,我主张“父母意象”的这个术语)。

294 The simple soul is of course quite unaware of the fact that
his nearest relations, who exercise immediate influence over him, create in him an image which is only partly a replica of themselves, while its other part is compounded of elements de¬riv~d from himself.

单纯的灵魂当然完全不知道这个事实:他的最亲近的亲属,他们对于他运用当下的影响,在他身上创造一个意象。这个意象仅是部分复制他们自己。它的其他部分,则是由从他自己得了的元素组成。

The imago is built up of parental influences plus the specific reactions of the child; it is therefore an image that reflects the object with very considerable qualifications. Naturally, the simple soul believes that his parents are as he sees them. The image is unconsciously projected, and when the par¬ents die, the projected image goes on working as though it were a spirit existing on its own. he primitive then speaks of pa¬rental spirits who return by night (revenants), while the mod¬ern man calls it a father or mother complex.

这个意象被建造,由父母的影响被建造,加上小孩的明确的反应。它因此是这个意象,反应具有相当的特质的客体。当然,单纯的灵魂相信:他的父母的本质如同他看见他们。这个意象无意识地被投射。当父母亲死亡时,被投射的意象继续运转,好像它是一个独立存在的精神。原始人因此谈论父母亲的精神。他们在夜间回来。现代的人们则是称它为父亲或母亲情结。

3 Warnecke, Die Religion der Batak (1909).
4 CL “The Psychological Foundations of Belief in Spirits.”
5 [This term was taken up by psychoanalysis, but in analytical psychology it has been largely replaced by “primordial image of the parent” or “parental archetype. “-EDITORS.]
186

THE FUNCTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUS

295 The more limited a man’s field of consciousness is, the more numerous the psychic contents (imagos) which meet him as quasi-external apparitions, either in the form of spirits, or as magical potencies projected upon living people (magicians, witches, etc.). At a rather higher stage of development, where the idea of the soul already exists, not all the imagos continue to be projected (where this happens, even trees and stones talk), but one or the other complex has come near enough to con¬sciOllsness to be felt as no longer strange, but as somehow “be¬longing.”

人的意识的领域越是受到限制,心灵的内容的数量越是多。心灵的内容跟他会面,作为伪-外在的魅影。要就是以精神的形式,或是以魔法的潜力,被投射在活人身上(魔法师,巫师,等等)。在发展的更高阶段。在那里,灵魂的观念已经存在1,并不是所有的意象都继续被投射(在那里,这种事情发生,即使树木与石头都会说话),但是某个情结,都足够靠近意识,为了被感觉,作为不再是陌生,而是作为“归属”的东西。
Nevertheless, the feeling that it “belongs” is not at first sufficiently strong for the complex to be sensed as a subjec¬tive content of consciousness. It remains in a sort of no man’s land between conscious and unconscious, in the half-shadow, in part belonging or akin to the conscious subject, in part an au-tonomous being, and meeting consciousness as such. At all events it is not necessarily obedient to the subject’s intentions, it may even be of a higher order, more often than not a source of inspiration or warning, or of “supernatural” information.

可是,这个情结“归属”,起床并不是足够强壮,为了让情结被理解,作为是意识的主体的内容。它始终保留在某种的无人的领域,处于意识与无意识之间。处于半阴影,部分归属于,或是类似意识的主体。部分是具有自主权的存在,作为这样的存在,跟意识相会。无论如何,它未必是服从于主体的意图。它甚至可能是属于更高的层次,往往是灵感或是警告的来源,或是“超自然”的资讯的来源。

Psy¬chologically such a content could be explained as a partly auton¬omous complex that is not yet fully integrated. The archaic souls, the ba and ka of the Egyptians, are complexes of this kind. At a still higher level, and particularly among the civilized peo¬ples of the West, this complex is invariably of the feminine gen¬der-anima and a fact for which deeper and cogent rea¬sons are not lacking.

心理学而言,这样的内容能够被解释,作为是部分具有自主的情结,这个情结还没有被融合。旧时的灵魂,埃及人的bu与ka,都是属于这种的情结。在更高的层面,特别是西方的文明的人们当中,这个情结一成不变地上属于女性的性别—阿尼玛。对于这一个事实,更加深入 ,更加具有份量的理由,并不欠缺。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

爱的知识与客体

November 29, 2015

KNOWLEDGE OF LOVE AND THE OBJECT a
爱与客体的知识

Thus far I have only examined the role of the analysand as a lover within
the transference. But what about the position of the analyst as a loved
object? Elaborating Socrates’ response to Alcibiades’ declaration of love
in the Symposium, Lacan stressed in Seminar VIII (1991b[1960–61]:185)
that the analyst ought to avoid entering the metaphor of love. Like
Socrates the analyst is approached as a loved object, invested with the
supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, yet she is not meant to
return the analysand’s love if the psychoanalytic process is to continue.
Needless to say that this guideline is but a reformulation of Freud’s
warning in ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]:165–166)
that the analyst who considers entering a love relationship with the
analysand is inevitably drawn into something else than psychoanalysis.

迄今,我仅是解释分析及作为爱人的角色,在移情里面,。但是关于分析家作为被爱的客体的立场又如何?建构苏格拉底的回应阿西比底斯的宣告爱,在“会饮篇”里,在第八研讨,拉康强调,分析家应该避免进入爱的隐喻。就像苏格拉底,分析家被接近,作为是被爱的客体,被投注作为应该知道的主体,这位阿加马。可是,分析家并没有被用来回因分析者的爱,假如精神分析的过程想要继续。自不待言,这个引导仅是重新阐释弗洛伊德的警告,在“论移情与爱的观察”:分析家若是考虑跟分析者进入爱的关系,他无可避免地会被扯进并非是精神分析的其他东西。

Even more important than the analyst’s avoidance of the metaphor of
love is her refusal to identify with the supposed subject of knowing.
When handling the transference the analyst should again follow Socrates’
example inasmuch as he incessantly impressed on his acolytes that he
knew nothing at all, his only objective in life being the ongoing evaluation
of what they themselves purportedly knew.

比起避免爱的隐喻更加重要的事情,就是分析家拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。当分析家处理移情时,他应该再次遵循苏格拉底的榜样。因为他不断地给予他的侍从这个印象:他根本什么都不知道,他一生的唯一的目标,就是正在进行的评估,他们自己被认为知道的事情。

When Lacan claimed that
analysts are supposed subjects of knowing in the transference, it is
therefore crucial to understand that this may be representative of how
analysands perceive their analysts, but not of how analysts should present
themselves vis-a-vis their patients. On numerous occasions Lacan
declared that analysts should refrain from incarnating the supposed
subject of knowing.

当拉康宣称,分析家是被认为知道的主体,在移情里。因此这是很重要的,要理解,这可能的这个代表,分析者如何感知他们的分析家,但是并不是代表分析家应该如何呈现他们自己,跟病人面对时。在无数的场合,拉康宣称:分析家应该自我节制,不要具体表现作为被认为是知道的主体。

As such, he warned in Seminar IX: ‘We need to
learn how to rid ourselves of this supposed subject of knowing at every
moment. We can never have recourse to it; that is excluded’ (Lacan 1961–
62: session of 22 November 1961). Six years later, in Seminar XIV, he
contended that analysts ought to know that they are not subjects endowed
with knowledge, and that one of the analyst’s main tasks consists in the
rectification of the effects of the analysand’s supposition (Lacan 1966–
67: session of 21 June 1967).

作为一位应该知道的主体,拉康在第九研讨班提出警告:「我们需要学习如何替我们自己摆脱这个随时被认为是知道的主体。我们永远无法诉诸于它。那是被排除的。」六年以后,在第14研讨班,拉康主张,分析家应该知道,他们并不是被禀赋具有知识的主体。分析家的主要工作之余,就是矫正分析者的假设的影响。

Taking this precept one step further, one could say that the analyst’s
identification with the supposed subject of knowing is as much a recipe
for the termination of psychoanalytic treatment as engaging in the metaphor
of love, with the caveat that in this case the relation between the analyst
and the analysand will be governed by objectification, suggestion and the
therapeutic abuse of power rather than the mutual sharing of losses and
gains. Not offering themselves as reservoirs of knowledge and not satisfying
the analysand’s demands—a venture in which they engage automatically
when they identify with the supposed subject of knowing— analysts are
expected to bring about a psychic transformation from demand to desire
in the analysand (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:430; 1977i[1958]:269). In
Seminar XI Lacan put it as follows:

当我们讲这个教导更加深入探讨,我们能够说,分析的认同是应该知道的主体,同样是一个食谱,对于精神分析治疗的终止,作为是参与爱的隐喻。带着这个旦书:在这个情况,分析家与分析者之间的关系将会受到客体化,暗示,与治疗的濫用权力的统辖。而不是互相的分享损失与获益。分析家并没有提供他们自己,作为是知识的贮存所,也没有满足分析者的要求—分析者自动地参与这样的事业,当他们认同应该知道的主体。分析家被期望导致心灵的转变,从要求转变成为分析者身上的欲望。在第11研讨班,拉康表达它如下:

In so far as the analyst is supposed to know [according to the
analysand], he is also supposed [according to the ethics of
psychoanalysis] to set out in search of unconscious desire. This is
why I say …that desire is the axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer,
by which is applied the force-element to the inertia that lies behind
what is formulated at first, in the discourse of the patient, as demand,
namely the transference.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:235, translation modified)53

因为分析家应该知道,(依照分析者的想法),也被认为应该出发寻找无意识的欲望(依照精神分析伦理学)。这就是我说的东西。欲望是轴心,枢纽,手把,铁锤。凭借它们,力量的元素比运用到惯性,隐藏在起初被阐释背后的惯性,在病人的辞说里,作为要求,换句话说,作为移情。
At the end of Seminar XI he reconstructed this mandatory analytic
transition from demand to desire—the only way out of the clinical impasse
of transference—in the so-called ‘schema of the interior eight’ (ibid.:
271):

在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重新建构这个义务的精神分析的转移,从要求转移到欲望—这是唯一的方式脱离移情的临床的僵局。这个所谓的“内部的8字形的基模”。

Figure 2 The interior eight
Source: J.Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, p. 271.

In this figure the outer line symbolizes the demands (D) verbalized by the
analysand during the initial stages of the analytic process. Through these
demands the analysand inevitably arrives at a point of transference (T),
notably when he bears witness to a belief in the supposed subject of
knowing. If this moment does not prompt the analysand to withdraw from
the treatment, it constitutes a nodal point where the trajectory of demand
bifurcates, continuing either via the line of identification or via desire.
On the one hand analysts can take advantage of their analysands’
transference to present themselves as ego ideals, proving to their patients
that they honestly care about them (thus fulfilling their demands), cultivating
a mutual working alliance, and facilitating processes of social and
behavioural modelling.

在这个图形里,外面的那条线象征要求(D),由分析者文词表达的要求,在精神分析的过程的最初的阶段。通过这些要求,分析者无可避免地到达移情的点(T).特别是当他见证一个信仰:分析家作为是应该知道的主体。假如这个时刻并没有激发分析者从治疗撤退,它会形成一个节点。在那里,要求的投射分叉出去,要就是经由认同的脉络,要不就是经由欲望的脉络。一方面,分析家能够利用他们的分析者的移情,来呈现他们自己,作为自我理想,对他们的病人证明:他们诚实地关心他们(因此,实践他们的要求),培养互相的工作的联盟,并且让社会与行为的模拟过程更加方便。

This is the approach Lacan situated on the
intersecting line of identification, and which he had designated earlier as
the hallmark of suggestion and the analytic abuse of power (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:423–438; 1977i[1958]:270).54 When analysts opt for this
strategy of transference handling, analysands identify with their analysts
and enter an endless cycle of identical demands.55

拉康将这个方法定位在移情的脉络的互相交会。他早先曾经指明这个方法,作为是暗示与精神分析的滥用权力的标记。当分析家选择处理移情的策略,分析者认同他们的分析家,并且进入认同的要求的无穷尽的迴圈。

On the other hand,
however, the analyst can also halt before the pathway of identification and
direct the analysand towards the realm of desire (d), which Lacan depicted
as an interrupted line piercing the plane of demand at the point of
transference, thus circumventing the line of identification before rejoining
that of demand.56 To open this sequence, the analyst should neither satisfy
nor frustrate the analysand’s demands (Lacan 1977i[1958]:255), but use
them as launch pads for eliciting a series of questions in the analysand:
‘What do you (analyst) want (from me)?’, ‘What do others want (from
me)?’, ‘What is it that I want (others to want from me)?’, and ‘How is
what I want influenced by what others want (from me)?’.

可是,在另一方面,分析家也能够停止,在认同的途径面前,并且引导分析者朝向欲望(d)的领域。拉康描述欲望的领域,作为是被中断的线,贯穿要求的层面,在移情的点,因此绕过认同的线,在重新加入要求的线之前。为了打开这个系列,分析家既不应该满足,也不应该挫败分析者的要求。而是要使用分析者的要求,作为发达的垫板,召唤分析者的一系列的问题:「你作为分析家想要从我这里获得什么?」,「别人想要从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要别人从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要的东西,如何受到别人从我这里想要的东西的影响?」

Again the analyst
is not supposed to answer these questions, because that would only imply
his renewed identification with the supposed subject of knowing. Rather
he is expected to enable analysands to voice their own answers, which
normally leads to the (re)construction of their fantasies and, eventually, to
their realization that it is impossible to know for once and for all what it is
they want since they are human beings endowed with an unconscious. For
analysts the linchpin of this entire procedure is their constant refusal to
identify with the supposed subject of knowing.

而且,分析家并不认为应该回答这些问题。因为那将仅是暗示他的重新的认同作为应该知道的主体。相反地,分析家被期望让分析者能够表达他们自己的回答。分析者自己的回答正常来说,会导致他们的幻见的重新建构。最后,会导致他们的体会:这个不可能的,要一劳永逸地知道他们想要什么,因为他们是禀赋著无意识的人类。对于分析家,这整个过程的支撑就是他们固定地拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。

Does this mean that Lacanian analysts are entitled to ensconce
themselves in their comfortable seats without bothering too much about
the acquisition of psychoanalytic knowledge? Not at all. In his ‘Proposition
of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, Lacan proclaimed:
‘It is clear that of the supposed knowledge he [the analyst] knows nothing
…This in no way authorises the psychoanalyst to be satisfied in the
knowledge that he knows nothing, for what is at issue is what he has to
come to know’ (Lacan 1995b[1967]:6).

这难道意味著,分析家有资格牢固他自己,于他们的舒适的座位,不必太过费心于精神分析知识的获得?绝非如此。在他的1967年的“建议”,论学院派的精神分析家,拉康宣称:「显而易见,关于这个被认为的知识,分析家一无所知。这让分析家根本就没有被授权,要满意于知识。分析家一无所知。因为受到争议的东西,是分析家必须逐渐知道。」

And in a contemporaneous
intervention on the relation between psychoanalysis and reality he declared:
‘Psychoanalysts are the wiseacres of a knowledge about which they cannot
converse with each other. This is something else than the mystagogy of
non-knowledge’ (Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). But what is this functional
knowledge analysts are asked to acquire and which is seemingly powerful
enough to guarantee their ignoring what they know?

在精神分析与现实之间的关系的当代的介入,拉康宣称:「精神分析师知识的嘲讽者。关于这个知识,他们彼此无法对谈。这是某件其他的东西,并非是非-知识的神秘学。」但是,分析家被要求去获得这个功能性的知识是什么?表面上似乎拥有足够力量保证他们忽略他们所知道的东西?

During the early 1950s
Lacan believed it was sufficient for analysts to know that their knowledge
is but a symptom of their ignorance, and that the success of their
interventions crucially depends on their ability to ignore what they know
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:349, 358). Yet from Seminar VIII he underscored
that analysts succeed in ‘knowing that they have to ignore what they know’
only if they know something about love (Lacan 1991b [1960–61]:135).

在1950年代的早期,拉康相信,这样是足够的,精神分析家只要知道,他们的知识仅是他们的无知的症状。他们的介入的成功主要依靠他们的能力,忽略他们所知道的东西。可是,从第八研讨班,拉康强调,精神分析家成功于“知道他们必须忽略他们所知道的东西”。只要他们知道有关爱的某件东西。

In
other words, knowing something about transference is a prerequisite for
suspending the knowledge one has accumulated from training sessions,
books and previous experience.

换句话说,知道关于移情的某件东西,是悬置这个知识的先决条件。我们曾开;累积这个知识,从训练的节数,书籍与先前的经验。

Once again Lacan referred to Socrates who, in spite of his incessant
confession of ignorance, did admit that he knew something about love.
Of course, when Socrates transmitted his knowledge about love he did
not speak in his own name, but through the mouth of a mysterious woman
named Diotima. Lacan interpreted this singularity of the Socratic
discourse as a move necessitated by the antagonism between Socrates’
dialectical method of inquiry and the epistemological status of the
knowledge in question.

再一次,拉康提到苏格拉底。尽管苏格拉底经常坦诚他的无知,他确实承认,他知道某件东西,关于爱。当然,当苏格拉底将他的关于爱的知识传递时,他并没有用他自己的名字谈论。而是通过一位名叫狄奥提玛的神秘的女人。拉康解释苏格拉底的辞说的独异性,作为是这个敌意必然需要的动作,苏格拉底的研究的辩证法,与受到置疑的知识的认识论的地位之间的敌意。

To Lacan knowledge of love escaped Socrates’
dialectical method, forcing him to rely on what he had learnt from the
common-sense opinions of Diotima (ibid.: 142–148). Socrates’
knowledge of love did not belong to the established realm of episteme, a
series of hard and fast scientific facts, but merely to the ethereal sphere
of doxa, the shared ideas of popular wisdom.

对于拉康,爱的知识是苏格拉底的辩证方法无法理解的。爱的这个知识强迫苏格拉底依靠他从狄奥提玛的常识的意见里学习来的东西。苏格拉底的爱的知识并没有属于认识论的已经建立的领域,那一系列的艰涩与快速的科学的事实。代替地,爱的知识仅是属于“共享观念”的空中的领域,那是通俗智慧的共享观念。

Analysts need to possess knowledge of love to be capable of ignoring
what they know and to ensure the maintenance of analytic standards, but
the knowledge of love itself constitutes a limit. This is the problem Lacan
set out to investigate in Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]), not so much
with the brief of enhancing our understanding of love, but more with the
aim of clarifying the rationale behind this limit of love and knowledge.
From the start of the seminar he informed his audience: ‘[W]hat I say of
love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it…I spoke of the love
letter, of the declaration of love—not the same thing as the word of love’
(ibid.: 12). Operating beyond the signifier, Lacan defined love as a sign,
and more specifically as a sign that one changes reason or discourse.

分析家需要拥有爱的知识,这样他才能够忽略他们所知道的东西,并且保证维持精神分析的标准。但是爱的这个知识本身形成一个限制。这就是拉康出发要研究的难题,在第20研讨班。他并没有带著强化我们对爱的理解的主题,而是目的在于澄清爱与知识的这个限制的背后的理性。从研讨班一开始,他告诉他的听众:「我所谈论的关于爱,确实就是,我们无法谈论它的东西。我谈论爱的信息,爱的宣告—这跟爱的话语,并不相同。拉康超越这个能指运作,他定义爱作为是一个讯息。更加明确底,作为我们改变理性或辞说的信息。

Unlike the signifier, love is unequivocal to the extent that it can always
be taken as indicating a transition from one discourse to another (ibid.:
16). However, love is at once the most awkward sign to recognize: neither
the jouissance of the Other, the sexual characters appearing on the surface
of the partner’s body, nor the receipt of love letters, nor the awareness
that the Other knows you so well that he can predict your whereabouts
offer reliable criteria for ascertaining the Other’s love.57 Lacan’s entire
Seminar XX hovered around an amazing paradox: love always constitutes
a sign, but nothing ever constitutes a sign of love. When love takes over,
it inevitably alters the course of human action, yet testimonies of love
are impossible to confirm by established facts.

不像能指,爱并非模棱两可,甚至爱总是能够被认为啥指示一个传递,从一个辞说传递到另一个辞说。可是,爱既是最笨拙的信息,要体认出来:爱既非是大他者的欢爽,性爱的人物出现在伴侣的身体的表面,也非是爱的信息的接收者,也非是这个知道:大他者对你甚为熟稔,以致他能够预测你的下落,提供可靠的标准,作为确的大他者的爱。拉康的整个的第20研讨班,萦绕一个令人惊奇的悖论:爱总是形成一个信息,但是没有任何东西,形成爱的一个信息。当爱接管时,爱一成不变地改变人类行动的途径,可1,爱的测试基石是不可能证实,凭借已经建立的事实。

A woman might be
convinced of her own love and the ravages it provokes, without ever
being able to prove her love to her partner and without ever being
successful in ratifying his own love for her. The crucial implication for
the analyst is that she must never take ostensible signs of love
(transference) in the analysand at face value, whilst acknowledging that
love dramatically changes the analytic picture. In addition, analysts ought
to realize that knowing everything about love is an illusion, and that
what knowledge they have must be subject to continuous revision.

女人可能相信她自己的爱与爱引起的破坏,但是女人从来就不能够证明她的爱,对她的伴侣,女人从来没没有成功地批准他对于她的爱。对于分析家的重要的暗示是,女人一定不要按照分析者身上的表面价值,接受爱的夸张的信息时。另一方面,女人必须承认,爱戏剧性地改变精神分析的画面。除外,分析家应该体会:知道有关爱的一切是一种幻觉。分析家所拥有的知识必须隶属于继续的修正。

Not complying with the metaphor of love and ignoring what he knows
on the basis of a (necessarily limited) knowledge of love, the analyst’s
task also consists in dismantling the ideals which the analysand has
conferred onto him. Whilst supporting the functions of the supposed subject
of knowing and the agalma in order to elicit the analysand’s fantasy, the
analyst needs to ensure that the transference can be analysed. Indeed, for
all his scepticism about the so-called ‘liquidation’ of the transference—
one of the pillars of mainstream French psychoanalysis during the 1950s—
Lacan never disputed the analyst’s duty of bringing about the fall (chute)
or the reduction (reduction) of the analysand’s transference (Lacan 1967–
68: session of 10 January 1968).58

分析家的工作并不是同意爱的隐喻,然后忽略他知道的东西,以爱的必然是有限的知识作基础。分析家的工作也是在于拆解这些理想,分析者给予他的这些理想。分析家一方面支持被认为是应该知道的主体与阿加马的功能,为了召唤分析者的幻见。另一方面,分析家也需要保证,这个移情能够被分析。的确,尽管分析家的怀疑主义,关于移情的所谓的“终止”–在1950年代期间,主流的法国精神分析的支柱之一。拉康从来没有争议分析家的责任,关于分析者的移情的化简的掉落。

Inducing the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing means that the analyst ought to lay bare its illusory character
after having exploited (but not identified with) its value for the construction
of the analysand’s fantasy. An elimination of the deceptive aspect of the
transference is the only meaning Lacan was willing to grant to the practice
of transference-liquidation (Lacan 1977b[1964]: 267). As such, the
Lacanian clinic does not dislodge the transference, the analyst cannot
prevent the unconscious from being re-enacted or closing up, yet the
analytic process does contribute to dissolving the dissimulation which the
supposed subject of knowing sustains.

化简被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,意味着,分析家应该揭露这种化简具有幻见的特性,当它已经利用(但并不是认同)它的价值,对于建设分析者的幻见。移情的欺骗的层面的减少,是拉康愿意给予的唯一的意义,给移情-终止的实践。作为这样的实践,拉康派的琳床并没有移除移情,分析家无法阻止无意识,不要被重新扮演,或封闭。可是,精神分析的过程确实促成这个欺骗,被认为应该知道的主体维持的欺骗。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, working towards the destabilization
of deceit equalled progressing towards the realization of truth. By contrast
with the established schools of psychoanalysis he did not flaunt the essential
replacement of (the analysand’s) transference with (the analyst’s) reality, even
less the slow maturation of the transference to the level of genital objectrelations,
defending instead the gradual substitution of truth for knowledge.59

用拉康的治疗的观念,朝向将欺骗的除掉稳定的工作,相等于是朝向体现真理的进展。跟精神分析的现存的学派对照起来,拉康并没有炫耀用基本上是分析家的现实,取代分析者的移情。甚至没有炫耀移情的缓慢地成熟到性器官的客体化的层次。代替的,拉康防卫真理逐渐被知识替换。

Saying that the analyst should act in the name of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session
of 21 June 1967) or that his feigning the position of supposed subject of knowing
is the only access to truth (Lacan 1967–68: session of 22 November 1967)
seemed even more conceited and presumptuous than proposing a
transformation of the ‘hysterical misery into common unhappiness’ (Freud
and Breuer 1895d:305) or staging a confrontation between the analysands’
pleasurable fantasies and the standard requirements of reality. Although
supported by Freud’s professed love of truth (Wahrhaftigkeit, Wahrheitsliebe)
(1915a[1914]:164; 1937c: 248), Lacan was vilified for his uncompromising
espousal of veracity as the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis, the more so after
launching statements such as ‘I, the truth, am speaking’ (Lacan
1977f[1955]:120–123; 1989b[1965]:15) and ‘I always speak the truth’ (Lacan
1990d[1973]:3).

说分析家应该行动,以真理之名,或是说,分析家伪装具有被认为是应该知道的主体,是接近真理的唯一的途径。这种说法是更加地自负与冒昧,比起建议将癔症的悲惨,转化成为共同的不快乐。或是展示一种冲突,在分析者的令人快乐的幻想,与现实的标准的要求之间。虽然受到弗洛伊德的宣称的真理之爱的支持,拉康被抨击,因为他毫不妥协地主张真理,作为是精神分析的最终的目标。他更加受的抨击,当他发动这些陈述,诸如,“我,作为真理,正在言说”,“我总是言说真理”。

But against the expectations Lacan’s notion of truth did not
signal the perfect match between reason and reality, the scientific
‘correspondence criterion’ of truth embedded in the medieval adage of
adaequatio rei et intellectus (an intellect that is in line with the thing).60 Neither
did it advance the traditional psychoanalytic goal of the analysand’s discovery
of a repressed unconscious representation, and its reintegration into a conscious
series of thoughts. The Lacanian truth emblematized no more no less than the
very absence of definitive truths within human existence, owing to the fact
that not all knowledge can be subjectified, that the enjoyment of fullness is
forever excluded, that the symbolic law of castration compels (neurotic) subjects
to desire until the end of their days.

但是对抗这些期望,拉康的真理的观念并没有指示理性与现实的完美的匹配。真理的科学的对应的标准,被镶嵌于中世纪的箴言:跟物象若合一契的知识。拉康的真理的观念也没有提升传统的精神分析的目标:分析者的发现被压抑的无意识的再现表象,以及这个被压抑的无意识的再现表象,被融化进入意识的思想的系列。拉康派的真理的具体标志,实实在在就是在人类的存在内部,明确的真理的欠缺。由于这个事实:并非所有的知识都能够被成为主体,充实的享受,。永远地被排除。阉割的象征的法则逼迫神经症的主体去欲望,直到他们的有生之年的结束。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ Lacan
decanted this truth (of an irreducible absence or lack) into the aphorism
‘There is no Other of the Other’, and its algebraical equivalent S(O),
carefully delineating its implications for analytic practice:
The lack referred to here is indeed that which I have already
formulated: that there is no Other of the Other.

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法1”,拉康倾注“无可化简的缺席或欠缺”的这个真理,成为这个警语:“没有大他者的大他者“。这句警语用代数公式等于:S(O) 。拉康仔细地描述这个警语对于精神分析的实践的重要性。在此被提到的欠缺确实就是我已经阐释的东西:大他者没有大他者。

But is this mark
made by the Unbeliever of the truth really the last word that is
worth giving in reply to the question, ‘What does the Other want
of me?’, when we, the analysts, are its mouthpiece? Surely not,
and precisely because there is nothing doctrinal about our office.
We are answerable to no ultimate truth; we are neither for nor
against any particular religion.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:316)

但是真理的不信仰者发表的这句谈论,难道确实就是最后的断言,它值得给予这个回答吗?针对这个问题:“大他者想要我什么?”。当我们作为分析家,就是真理的代言人?当然不是,确实是因为关于我们提供的服务,并没有任何信条的东西。我们并不对任何最终的真理负责。我们既不赞同,也不反对任何特殊的宗教。

The impossibility to unearth the final truth about oneself should not
embolden the analyst to answer the analysand’s question—once the
fantasy has been constructed—of ‘What does the Other want from me?’
with stock expressions such as ‘You will never know’ or ‘This is
impossible to find out’. For these statements are as much tributary to a
definitive truth as their vexed counterparts (‘This is what the Other wants’,
‘I possess the solution to your problem’). Pontificating that it is impossible
to know for once and for all what the Other wants becomes a definitive
truth in its own right, which contradicts the principle that there is no
such thing as a final truth. It is therefore sufficient for analysands to
relativize their own time-honoured answers to what the Other wants from
them, that is to say to question the trust they had put in their fantasies.

不可能挖掘关于自己的最后的真理, 不应该因此让分析家大胆地回答分析者的问题: “大他者想要从我这里获得什么?”,一旦这个幻见已经被建构, 带着现存的表达,譬如, “你永远不会知道”, 或”这是不可能发现的” . 因为这些陈述同样都是归属于明确的真理,作为他们的感到懊恼的类同之物.(“这就是大他者所想要的是东西”, “ 我拥有你的难题的解答”) .武断地说, 我们不可能一劳永逸地知道大他者想要的东西, 这句话本身就形成一个明确的真理 .这句话抵触这个原则: 没有最后的真理的这样的东西存在 . 因此,分析者有充分理由将他们自己的自古以来的回答, 作为相对的价值, 回答大他者想要从他们获得什么.换句话说, 要质疑他们给予他们的幻见的信任.

Analysts should not (and cannot) prevent analysands from formulating
new answers and creating new fantasies, their only hope being that the
distrust they have developed towards the old ones affects their attitudes
towards the new versions. In his 1967 ‘Proposition’ Lacan described
this process, which coincides with the end of the transference relation,
as a subjective destitution (destitution subjective), issuing it as the
analysand’s entry ticket to the analytic profession (Lacan 1995b[1967]:8).

分析不应该(与不能够)阻止分析者不宜阐释新的回答与创造新的幻见。他们仅有希望,他们发展的不信任,朝向旧的答案的不信任,会影响他们朝向新的版本的态度。在他的1957年的“建议”,拉康描述这个过程,巧合于移情的关系的结束。作为是主体的匮乏,发表它,作为是分析者进入精神分析的专业的入场门票。

Lacan was adamant that the fall of the supposed subject of knowing
and its concurrent effect of subjective destitution on the side of the analysand
cannot be realized through an array of transference-interpretations, that is
to say interpretations whose object is the nature of transference itself. As
he had explained in Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:428) and ‘The Direction
of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:231), the analyst cannot construct a ‘neutral’
platform outside the analysand’s transference from which to operate on
this transference. If the analysand accepts the analyst’s interpretation of
the transference, this acceptance needs to be interpreted in its own right
because the analysand is bound to hear the interpretation as coming from
the supposed subject of knowing and thus from within the transference.
Giving meta-interpretations after the transference has been interpreted does
not make a difference, since these metainterpretations would also require
interpretation, ad infinitum. As Lacan put it in his 1969 summary of Seminar
XV: ‘

拉康坚决主张,被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,与分析者这边的主体的匮乏的同时对影响,无法通过移情与独立的安排来体会。换句话说,解释的目标就是移情的特性本身。依照他在第四研讨班解释的,分析家无法建构一个“中立”的平台,。在分析者的移情的外面,来运转这个移情。假如分析者接受分析家的解释移情,这个接受需要在它自身之内被解释。因为分析者一定会听见这个解释,作为来自被认为是应该知道的主体。因此是来自移情。在移情被解释之后,给予形上的解释,并没有什么差别。因为这些形上的解释也要求解释,直到永远。如同拉康在他的1969年的“第14研讨班”的总结这样表达;

There is no transference of the transference’ (Lacan 1984[1969]:25).
Lacan’s solution to this deadlock lay in the deployment of a tactics of
interpretation which points towards the analysand’s desire rather than
the demands (for love) within the transference. The analyst makes clear
that she knows nothing about the analysand, that whatever knowledge
the analysand has assembled is futile, and that additional knowledge
(whether practical know-how or deep wisdom) is not what the analysand
can expect from the experience. On the contrary, if knowledge is at all
involved at the end of the psychoanalytic process it will appear as an
acknowledgement of the limit of the imperative to ‘Know Thyself!’
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 13 March 1968).

拉康对于这个僵局的解答在于运用解释的策略。这个解释的策略指向分析者的欲望,而不是移情之内的对爱的要求。分析家澄清,她对于分析者一无所知。无论分析者装配怎样的知识,都是徒劳的。那个额外的知识(无论是实践的技术手册,或深刻的智慧),都不是分析者能够从精神分析所期望的。相反地,假如知识在精神分析过程的结束时被牵涉进入,它将看起来像是承认“认识你自己”的命令的极限。

This tactics of interpretation
evidently challenges the meaning of analytic interpretation as such,
because the analyst neither explains the analysand’ s symptoms, nor
makes sense of what the analysand says, nor translates the analysand’s
actions into new significant units, etc. Vacillating between silence, the
punctuation of the analysand’s discourse and the formulation of oracular
sentences, the analyst cultivates the atopia of the Socratic position (Lacan
1991b [1960–61]:126–127). I will discuss the underlying principles of
these Lacanian tactics of interpretation at length in the following chapter
of this book.

解释的策略明显地挑战精神分析解释作为这种极限的意义。因为分析家既不解释分析者的症状,也没有理解分析者说的内容,也不是翻译分析者的行动,成为新的重要的单位,等等。分析家摇摆于沉默,分析者的辞说的标点,与侃侃而谈的阐述之间,分析家培养苏格拉底的立场的无边界国土。我将在这本书的下一个章节,详细讨论这些拉康学派的解释的策略的基本原则。

From the mid-1960s Lacan associated the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing with the analyst’s functioning as an object a, his disbeing
(desetre) the analysand’s cause of desire. For example, in Seminar XV
he stated:

从1969年代代中业,拉康将被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,跟分析家作为小客体a的功能,这个“非存在物”是分析者的欲望的原因。譬如,在第14研讨班,拉康陈述:

The end of analysis consists in the fall of the supposed subject of
knowing and its reduction to the accession of this object a, the
cause of the division of the subject, which replaces it. The only
thing the analyst, who fantasmatically plays the game with the
analysand as regards the supposed subject of knowing, supports at
the end of analysis is this rest of the known thing which is called
the object a.
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January 1967)

精神分析的目的,在于被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,以及它被化减到这个小客体a的让位,主体的分裂的原因。这个小客体a取代了主体。分析家幻见地跟分析者扮演这个游戏,关于被认为是应该知道的主体,分析家支持的唯一的东西,在精神分析的结束,就是这个已知之物的其余部分,被称为小客体a。

To understand the meaning of this proposition it suffices to look back at
what Lacan concluded at the end of Seminar VIII:

为了理解这个建议的意义,我们回顾一下,就足够理解拉康作为结论的东西,在第八研讨班的结束:

What Socrates knows, and what the analyst at least has to see, is
that on the level of the small a [the object a], the issue is completely
different from that of the access to an ideal. Love can only grasp
the field of being. And the analyst can only think that any object
can fulfil it. This is where we analysts are brought to balance, on
this limit where the question is raised of the value of any object
that enters the field of desire.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:459–460)

苏格拉底知道的东西,分析家至少必须看见的东西,就是,在小客体a的层次,这个问题并没有完全不同于接近理想的问题。爱仅能理解生命实存的领域。分析家仅能够认为,任何客体都能够满足它。这就是我们作为分析家被迫要平衡的东西,在这个限制。在那里,问题被提出,针对任何客体的价值,在进入欲望的领域时。

Disbeing the object a involves encouraging analysands to realize that
the supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, whose brilliance once
reassured them in their love, are but replaceable objects a, semblances
of being whose power does not outmatch that of other potential objects
and whose promise of enjoyment is doomed to remain inadequate.61 The
result of this operation, which the analyst effectuates by reducing himself
to nothing but a gaze or a voice (Lacan 1995b[1967]:10; 1967–68: session
of 7 February 1968), is that the analysand can undertake a ‘crossing’
(traversee) (Lacan 1977b[1964]:273) or succeeds in dropping out (decoir)
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:8) of his fantasy.62 Again, this result correlates with
a moment of subjective destitution which, as mentioned on p. 136, Lacan
promoted as the precondition for entering the practice of psychoanalysis.

“非存在”这个小客体a,牵涉到鼓楼分析者体会到,被认为应该知道的主体与阿加马,他们的辉煌曾有一度让他们相信他们的爱。现在仅剩可被替换的小客体a,生命实存的类似物。它的力量并没有击败其他的潜在的客体的力量。它对于欢爽的许诺,注定始终不足够。这个运作的结果,分析家让它实现,凭借将他自己化减成为仅是凝视或声音。这个运作的结果是,分析者能够理解一个“跨越”,或是成功地抛掉他的幻见。而且,这个结果跟主体的匮乏的时刻息息相关。拉康
将它提升为进入精神分析的先决条件。

As I have indicated at the end of the previous chapter, during the early
1970s Lacan opened yet another new perspective on the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, combining Freud’s idea that psychoanalysis
operates via the pathways of love (McGuire 1974:12–13) and his own
assertion that love is always a sign of changing discourses (Lacan
1998a[1972–73]: 16).

如同我曾经指示,在早先的章节的结束,在1970年代,拉康打开另外一个观点,针对精神分析治疗的目标。他将弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析经由爱的途径运作,跟他自己的主张:爱总是正在改变的辞说的讯号。

The theoretical framework for this new perspective
can be derived from a juxtaposition of two of Lacan’s numerous aphorisms
in Seminar XX and Television, statements produced in 1973 with an interval
of a mere six months. In the final pages of Seminar XX Lacan posited:
I incarnated contingency in the expression ‘stops not being written.’
For here there is nothing but encounter…

对于这个新观点的理论的架构,能够被获得,从拉康的无数的警语的其中两个警语的并列,在第20研讨班与“电视访谈“,在1973年产生的陈述,中间区隔仅六个月,在第20研讨班的最后几页,拉康提出:「我具体表现偶然性,在这个表达”停止不被书写“。因为在此,仅是存在着遭遇。

The displacement of the
negation from the ‘stops not being written’ to the ‘doesn’t stop
being written’, in other words, from contingency to necessity—
there lies the point of suspension to which all love is attached. All
love, subsisting only on the basis of the ‘stops not being written’,
tends to make the negation shift to the ‘doesn’t stop being
written’…Such is the substitute that…constitutes the destiny as
well as the drama of love.
(ibid.: 145)

从“听止不被书写“的否定,更换到”不要停止被书写“,换句话说,从偶然性替换到必然性—那里存在着悬置的点,所有的爱被连系到那个悬置的点。所有的爱,维持的基础仅是”停止不被书写“,它倾向于让这个否定转移到”不要停止被书写“。形成命运与爱的戏剧的替换就是如此。

This fragment loses much of its mysterious character if one exchanges
the notion of love for that of transference. For then it becomes clear that
Lacan hinted at the inauspicious transference situation Freud had held
responsible, in the letter to Flies from April 1900 quoted on p. 107, for
‘the apparent endlessness’ and the ‘asymptotic conclusion of the
treatment’ (Masson 1985:409): an accidental encounter (contingency)
which develops into an indispensable compulsive relationship (necessity).
The tenor of Lacan’s words at the end of Seminar XX chimed with his
oration on love in Television, although the latter concerned itself more
explicitly with the analyst’s coordination of its labours.

这个碎片丧失许多它的神秘的特性,假如我们交换爱的观念,跟移情的观念。因为那时,显而易见地,拉康暗示这个不吉祥的移情的情境,弗洛伊德要负责的移情的情境。在他写给弗利斯的信件,从1900年四月,“因为明显的没有终止“与”治疗的非症状的结论“:一个意外的遭遇(偶然性)发展成为无可免除的强迫的关系(必然性)。拉康的话语的主调,在第20研讨班的结束,跟他在”电视访谈“的侃侃而谈爱,互相共鸣。虽然后者更加明确地关注到分析家对于爱的劳苦的调和。

After having
expounded that the analytic discourse promises to introduce something
new within the field of love (Lacan 1990d[1973]:28), an arena marked
by the impasse (closure) of the unconscious, he contended that this novelty
requires only that somewhere the sexual relation stops not being
written, that contingency be established (what it comes down to),
so as to make headway on that which will later be completed by
demonstrating such a relation to be impossible, that is by instituting
it in the real.
(ibid.: 39, translation modified)

拉康解释,精神分析辞说承诺要介绍某件新的东西,在爱的领域里面。这一个斗技场被标识是无意识的僵局(封闭)。拉康主张,这个新奇仅是要求,某个地方,性的关系停止不被书写,偶然性应该被建立(它的总结),为了向前推进,后来将会被完成对东西,凭借证明这样的关系是不可能。也就是,凭借在实在界建立它。

This sentence contains first of all an argument to bring the necessity of the
analysand’s transference back to its underlying contingency. Chosen in an
unexpected, yet fortunate encounter and gradually transformed into a
standard feature of the analysand’ s life, the analyst tries to re-establish
her original position as an accidental, replaceable find. This restoration of
contingency is a prerequisite for the analysand’s discovery that everything
will fall short of the ‘perfect match’ or, to use Lacan’s words in the second
part of the above sentence, that the sexual relation is impossible.

这个句子首先包含一个论点:要将分析者的移情的必要性,带回到它作为基础的偶然性。当分析家被选中,在出乎意外,可是有幸运的遭遇里,然后逐渐被转化成为分析者的生活的标准的特征,分析家尝试重新建立她的原初的立场,作为是偶然,可被替换的发现。偶然性的恢复是分析者的发现的先决条件:每件事情都无法符合“完美的匹配“,或是,用拉康的话语说,在以上的句子的第二部分:性的关系是不可能的。

If the analyst moves from contingency to necessity and back, then the
same could be said of the entire analytic process. Lacan’s words in
Television could indeed be read as also comprising an argument for
calibrating psychoanalytic practice around surprise, revelation, sudden
discovery, etc. Conceiving psychoanalytic treatment as a discipline of
contingencies could also solve the question as to how the discourse of
the analyst can subsist if it is predicated upon love and if love is the sign
of changing discourses.

假如分析家从偶然性移动到必然性,然后回转,然后相同的道路,对于完整的精神分析的过程而言,也是真实的。拉康在“电视访谈“的话语,确实能够被阅读为,也是包含一个论点,作为订定精神分析实践的标准,环绕着惊奇,启示,突然发现,等等。将精神分析的治疗构想为偶然性的专业,也能够解决这个问题,关于分析家的辞说如何能够存在,假如它是以爱作为陈述,假如爱是正在改变的辞说的讯息。

As I have mentioned before (see p. 134), Lacan
stipulated at the beginning of Seminar XX that the sign of love strikes
whenever a subject is moving from one discourse to another. But if
psychoanalysis is indeed effected by love, how is it possible to
institutionalize a discourse that is no more no less than the transition
from one discourse to another? One answer could be that the entire period
between the analysand’s entry into and departure from analysis represents
a transition from one discourse, say a deeply ingrained life-style, to
another. A second answer could be that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place every time an analysand has a session with the
analyst.

如同我以前曾经提到,拉康在第20研讨班的开始提出但书:爱的讯息打击,每当主体正在移动,从一个辞说到另外一个辞说。但是,假如精神分析确实是由爱造成结果,这如何是可能的?要将辞说形成体制?这个辞说实实在在就是从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说?其中一个答案可能是:整个时期,在分析家的进入,与从精神分析的出发之间的整个的时期,代表从一个辞说的转移,譬如,根深蒂固的生活-形态,转移到另外一个辞说。第二个答案可能是:从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说会发生,每当分析者跟分析家进行咨商时。

Each of these answers is valid only if one forgets that analysands do
not immediately change their ways when entering psychoanalysis, neither
during individual nor over consecutive sessions. Despite the rule of free
association, analysands commonly fall back on their usual, current
discourse. Some analysands even believe that the day they will be able
to engage in free association will also constitute the end of their analysis.

这些回答的每一个都是正确的,只要我们忘记,分析者并没有立即改变他们的方式,当他们进入精神分析时,既不是在个人的咨商,也不是在连续性的咨商。尽管自由联想到规则,分析者通常依靠他们的寻常的目前的辞说。有些分析者甚至相信,他们将会从事自由联想到那一天,将也是形成精神分析结束。

My answer to the above problem is that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place at irregular moments, both during the course of
psychoanalytic treatment and outside a psychoanalytic setting. The only
difference between the emergence of these transitions is that within the
treatment they are consciously provoked by the analyst, whereas outside
they occur more or less haphazardly. When Lacan stated in Television
that conceiving something new requires contingency (what stops not
being written), this applies directly to how the analytic discourse affects
the analysand who is subjugated to the necessities of other discourses:
not the regular pattern of analytic sessions, but the unexpected appearance
of a new signifier governs the process of change.

针对以上的难题,我的回答是:从一个辞说转换到另外一个辞说发生在不规律的时刻。两者都在精神分析的治疗的过程,与外在于精神分析的背景。唯一的差异,在这些转换的出现之间的唯一的差异是,在治疗内部,他们意识方面受到分析家的激发。而在外面,他们相当偶然地发生。 当拉康在“电视访谈”陈述:构想某件新的东西,要求偶然性(停止不被书写的东西),这直接运用到精神分析的辞说如何影响分析者,隶属于其他的辞说的必然性的分析者:这并不是精神分析咨商的规律模式,而是新的能指的意外的出现,统辖改变的过程。

Since the destiny and drama of love hinges on a shift from contingency
to necessity, as Lacan put it in Seminar XX, the ultimate psychoanalytic
effect can only involve a reduction of the established necessity of the
analytic effects themselves to the status of simple contingency. This
process requires an analysis of the analytic experience, in which the
analysand can come to realize that it was no more than an accident on
his particular journey through life. The ultimate analytic effect thus
coincides with the termination of psychoanalysis, after which the
analysand will hopefully understand, at least if the treatment was
Lacanian, not the true signification but the nonsensicality of the entire
experience, not the necessity but the impossibility of finding definitive
answers to the questions of life.

既然命运与爱的戏剧都依附从偶然性的转变成为必然性。如同拉康在第20研讨班表达它。最后的精神分析的影响仅会牵涉到将精神分析的影响本身的已经建立的必要性,化减成为单纯的偶然性的地位。在那里,分析者能够逐渐体会到,那仅是一件意外,在他经历的人生的特殊的旅途。最后的精神分析的影响,因此巧合于精神分析的终止。在精神分析终止之后,分析家将会希望地了解,至少假如治疗是拉康学派的话,不是了解这个必然性,而是了解这个不可能:提人生的问题找到明确的答案的不可能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:超验的功能

November 27, 2015

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION 1
超验的功能
Prefatory Note
This essay was written in 1916. Recently it was discovered by stu¬dents of the C. G . .lung Institute, Zurich, and was brought out in a private edition in its first, provisional form, in an ‘English transla¬tion. In order to prepare it for publication, I have worked over the manuscript, while preserving the main trend of thought and the un¬avoidable limitedness of its horizon. After forty-two years, the prob¬lem has lost nothing of its topicality, though its presentation is still in need of extensive improvement, as anyone can see who knows the material.
这篇论文在1916年被写成。最近,苏黎世,荣格研究所的学生发现它。以私人的版本被出版,照它的第一次的暂时的形式,作为英译本。为了准备让它出版。我曾经修正原稿。虽然我保存它思想的倾向与它的视阔的无法避免的有限性。经过42年,这个难题并没有丧失它的主题。虽然它的呈现依旧还需要广泛的修正。如同任何人都会看出,是谁知道这个材料。

The essay may therefore stand, with all its imperfections, as an historical document. It may give the reader some idea of the efforts of understanding which were needed for the first attempts at a syn¬thetic view of the psychic process in analytical treatment. As its basic argument is still valid today, it may stimulate the reader to a broader and deeper understanding of the problem. This problem is identical with the universal question: How does one come to terms in practice with the unconscious?

尽管它的不完美,这篇论文因此充当是历史的文件。它可能给予读者努力要理解的观念。这些理解的努力是需要的,因为这是首次的企图,要综合地理解心灵的过程,在精神分析的治疗里。因为它的基本的论点今天依旧有效。它可能激发读者更加广泛,更加深入地理解这个难题。这个难题认同普世的问题:我们如何跟无意识达成妥协?

1 [Written in 1916 under the title “Die Transzendente Funktion,” the ms. lay in Professor Jung’s files until 1953. First published in 1957 by the Students Associa¬tion, C. G. Jung Institute, Zurich, in an English translation by A. R. Pope. The German original. considerably revised by the author. was published in Geist lJnd Werk … %Urn 75. Geburtstag van Dr. Daniel Brady (Zurich, 1958), together with a prefatory note of more general import specially written for that volume. The author has partially rewritten the note for publication here. The present transla¬tion is based on the revised German version, and Mr. Pope’s translation has been consulted.-EDlTORS.]
67

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE
This is the question posed by the philosophy of India, and par¬ticularly by Buddhism and Zen. Indirectly, it is the fundamental question, in practice, of all religions and all philosophies. For the unconscious is not this thing or that; it is the Unknown as it immedi¬ately affects us.

这是印度哲学提出的这个问题,特别是佛教与禅宗。间接地,这是所有的宗教与所有的哲学,实践时的基本的问题。因为无意识并不是这个东西,或那个东西。无意识是未知者,因为它立即影响我们。

The method of “active imagination,” hereinafter described, is the most important auxiliary for the production of those contents of the unconscious which lie, as it were, immediately below the thres¬hold of consciousness and, when intensified, are the most likely to irrupt spontaneously into the conscious mind. The method, there¬fore, is not without its dangers and should, if possible, not be em¬ployed except under expert supervision.

因此而被描述的“积极想像”的方法,是最重要的辅助,对于无意识的那些内容的产生。也就是说,立即隐藏在意识的门槛底下的的无意识。当它被强化时,是最有可能自动自发地爆发进入意识的心灵。因此,这个方法,并不是没有它的危险。假如可能的话,这个方法不应该被使用,除了在专家的监督之下。

One of the lesser dangers is that the procedure may not lead to any positive result, since it easily passes over into the so-called “free association” of Freud, whereupon the patient gets caught in the sterile circle of his own complexes, from which he is .in any case unable to escape. A further danger, in itself harmless, is that, though authentic contents may be produced, the patient evinces an exclusively aesthetic interest in them and con¬sequently remains stuck in an all-enveloping phantasmagoria, so that once more nothing is gained. The meaning and value of these fan¬tasies are revealed only through their integration into the personality as a whole-that is to say, at the moment when one is confronted not only with what they mean but also with their moral demands.

其中一个次要的危险是,这个程序可能不会导致任何的积极的结果。因为它很容易被传递成为弗洛伊德的所谓的“自由联想”。在“自由联想”里,病人被套陷于他自己的各种情结的贫瘠的圈子里。更加深入的危险,本身是无害的。虽然它的真诚的内容可能被产生,病人逃避对于它们的专属美学的興趣,并且结果,始终被卡陷在涵盖一切的巨大幻影里。所以,再一次,并没有任何东西被获得。这些幻见的意义与价值,被显示出来,仅是凭借体它们的融合进入整体的人格里。换句话说,就在当我们不但面临它们的意义,而且面临它们的道德的要求。

Finally, a third danger-and this may in certain circumstances be a very serious matter-is that the subliminal contents already possess such a high energy charge that, when afforded an outlet by active imagination, they may overpower the conscious mind and take pos¬session of the personality. This. gives rise to a condition which¬temporarily, at least-cannot easily be distinguished from schizo¬phrenia, and may even lead to a genuine “psychotic interval.” The method of active imagination, therefore, is not a plaything for chil¬dren. The prevailing undervaluation of the unconscious adds con¬siderably to the dangers of this method. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that it is an invaluable auxiliary for the psycho¬therapist.

最后,第三个危险。在某些的情况,这可能是一个非常严肃的事情。第三个危险是,升华的内容已经形成如此高的能源负荷量。当它被积极想像给予一个出口,它们可能压倒意识的心灵,并且拥有人格。这会产生一个情况。这个情况暂时,至少不容易跟精神分裂症区别出来。甚至可能导致真诚的“精神病的间隔期间”。因此,积极想像的方法,并不是儿戏之物。目前流行对于无意识的低估,对这个方法的危险,更是雪上加霜。在另一方面,无可置疑地,对于精神病的治疗师,这是个宝贵的辅助之物。

C. G. J.
KiisnachtJ July I958 / September I959
68

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
1111 There is nothing mysterious or metaphysical about the term
“transcendent function.” It means a psychological function com-parable in its way to a mathematical function of the same name, which is a function of real and imaginary numbers. The psy-chological “transcendent function” arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents.

关于“超验的功能”,没有什么神秘或形上学之处。“超验的功能”意味著心理的功能,它的方式可类比相同名称的数学的功能。这个数学的功能是实在而想像的数字的功能。心理学的“超验的功能”起源于意识与无意识的内容的统合。

132 Experience in analytical psychology has amply shown that
the conscious and the unconscious seldom agree as to their con¬tents and their tendencies. This lack of parallelism is not just accidental or purposeless, but is due to the fact that the uncon¬scious behaves in a compensatory or complementary manner towards the conscious. We can also put it the other way round and say that the conscious behaves in a complementary manner towards the unconscious. The reasons for this relationship are:

分析心理学的经验充分显示,意识与无意识很少同意一致,关于他们的内容与它们的倾向。相提并论的这个欠缺并不仅是偶然,或没有目的。而是由于这个事实:无意识的行为,是以补偿或辅助的方式,朝向意识。我们也能够将它倒转过来,并且说,意识的行为,是以辅助的方式,朝向无意识。这个关系的理由是:

(1) Consciousness possesses a threshold intensity which its contents must have attained, so that all elements that are too weak remain in the unconscious.

意识拥有一个门槛的张力,意识的内容一定已经获得这个门槛的张力。这样,所有太过于微弱的元素,始终留在无意识里。

(2) Consciousness, because of its directed functions, exercises an inhibition (which Freud calls censorship) on all incompatible material, with the result that it sinks into the unconscious.

因为它的被引导的功能,意识运用一种压抑(弗洛伊德称之为审查),施加在所有不和谐的材料。结果是:意识沉落进入无意识。

(3) Consciousness constitutes the momentary,process of ad-aptation; .•. •whereas the unconscious contains not only all the forgotten material of the individual’s own past, but all the in¬herited behaviour traces constituting the structure of the mind.

意识构成适应的暂时的过程。而无意识包含不但是所有被个人自己的过去遗忘的材料,而且包含所有的被遗传的行为的痕迹,它们组成心灵的结构。

(4) The unconscious contains all the fantasy combinations which have not yet attained the threshold intensity, but which in the course of time and under suitable conditions will enter the light of consciousness.

无意识包含所有的幻见的组合,这些组合还没有获得门槛的张力。但是随著时间过去,在合适的情况之下。所有的幻想的组合将会进入意识的光辉里。

133 This readily explains the complementary attitude of the
unconscious towards the conscious.

这迅速地解释无意识朝向意识的辅助的态度。

134 The definiteness and directedness of the conscious mind are
qualities that have been acquired relatively late in the history of the human race, and are for instance largely lacking among primitives today. These qualities are often impaired in the neurotic patient, who differs from the normal person in that his threshold of consciousness gets shifted more easily; in other words, the partition between conscious and unconscious is much more permeable. The psychotic, on the other hand; is under the direct influence of the unconscious.

意识心灵的明确性与方向感,是已经被获得的特质,在人类种族的历史的比较晚晴。譬如,在今天的原始种族,主要是欠缺明确性与方向感。这些特质经常受到伤害,在神经症的病人身上。神经症病人遭受正常人的痛苦,因为他的意识的门槛更加容易被转移。换句话说,在意识与无意识之间的间隔,更加被渗透。另一方面,精神病者则是在无意识的直接的影响之下。

135
69

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE

The definiteness and directedness of the conscious mind are extremely important acquisitions which humanity has bought at a very heavy sacrifice, and which in turn have rendered hu¬manity the highest service. Without them science, technology, and civilization would be impossible, for they all presuppose the reliable continuity and directedness of the conscious process. For the statesman, doctor, and engineer as well as for the simplest labourer, these qualities are absolutely indispensable. We may say in general that social worthlessness increases to the degree that these qualities are impaired by the unconscious. Great artists and others distinguished by creative gifts are, of course, exceptions to this rule. The very advantage that such individuals enjoy consists precisely in the permeability of the partition separating the conscious and the unconscious. But, for those professions and social activities which require just this continuity and reliability, these exceptional human beings are as a rule of little value.

意识心灵的明确性与方向感是极端重要的获得之物。人类曾经耗费重大的牺性,才买到的重要的获得之物。然后轮到它们提供人类最崇高的服务。假如没有它们,科学,科技,与文明将是不可能的。因为它们都预先假设意识的过程,具有这个可靠的连续性与方向感。对于政治家,医生,与工程师,以及对于纯朴的劳工,这些特质绝对是无可避免的。我们通常说,社会的没有价值感,随着这些特质的受到无意识的伤害而增加。伟大的艺术家与其他凭借创造的天赋而显著的人们,当然是这个常规的例外。这些个人享受的利益,确实主要是在于分开意识与无意识的间隔的可渗透性。但是,对于那些专业与社会的活动,它们仅是要求这个连续性与可靠性。这些特别的人类,通常并没有多大的价值。

136 It is therefore understandable, and even necessary, that in
each individual the psychic process should be as stable and definite as possible, since the exigencies of life demand it. But this im’olves a certain disadvantage: the quality of directedness makes for the inhibition or exclusion of all those psychic ele¬ments which appear to be, or really are, incompatible with it, ie., likely to bias the intended direction to suit their purpose and so lead to an undesired goal. But how do we know that the concurrent psychic material is “incompatible”? We know it by an act of judgment which determines the direction of the path that is chosen and desired.
因此,这是可以理解的,甚至是必要的。在每个个人身上,心灵的过程应该尽可能地稳的与明确。因为生命的迫切性要求它。但是这牵涉到某个不利:方向感的品质朝向压抑或排除所有那些心灵的元素。表面上,或实际上跟它格格不入的心灵的元素。譬如,很可能让这个意图的方向产生偏见,以适应他们的目的,因此,导致一个并不被欲望的目标。但是,我们如何知道,这个同时发生的心灵的材料是“不相和谐”?我们知道它,凭借判断的行动。这个判断的行动决定被选择,被欲望的途径的方向。

This judgment is partial and preju¬diced, since it chooses one particular possibility at the cost of all the others. The judgment in its turn is always based on experience, i.e., on what is already known. As a rule it is never based on what is new, what is still unknown, and what under certain conditions might considerably enrich the directed proc¬ess. It is evident that it cannot be, for the very reason that the unconscious contents are excluded from consciousness.

这个判断是部分,而且具有偏见。因为它选择一个特殊的可能,牺牲所有其他的可能。然后轮到这个判断总是以经验作为基础。譬如,以已经被知道的东西作为基础。通常,它从来没有以新的东西作为基础,以依旧未被知道的东西,以在某些的情况里,可能会丰富被引导方向的过程作为基础。显而易见地,它不可能是这样。理由是,无意识的内容从意识里被排除出来。

137 Through such acts of judgment the directed process neces-
sarily becomes one-sided, even though the rational judgment may appear many-sided and unprejudiced. The very rationality of the judgment may even be the worst prejudice, since we call reasonable what appears reasonable to us. What appears to us unreasonable is therefore doomed to be excluded because of its
70

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
irrational character. It may really be irrational, but may equally well merely appear irrational without actually being so when seen from another standpoint.

凭借判断的这些行动,被引导方向的过程必然会成为是单边,即使理性的判断可能看起来是许多边与没有偏见。判断的理性化甚至可能是最糟糕的偏见。因为我们称我们看起来是合理的东西,为合理。我们看起来是不合理的东西,因此注定会被排除,因为它的非理性的特性。它可能确实是非理性的,但是它同样很有理由仅是外表是非理性。但是实际上,从另外一个观点来看,它实际上并没有非理性。

138 One-sidedness is an unavoidable and necessary characteristic
of the directed process, for direction implies one-sidedness. It is an advantage and a drawback at the same time. Even when no outwardly visible drawback seems to be present, there is always an equally pronounced counter-position in the unconscious, unless it happens to be the ideal case where all the psychic components are tending in one and the same direction. This possibility cannot be disputed in theory, but in practice it very rarely happens. The counter-position in the unconscious is not dangerous so long as it .does not possess any high energy-value. But if the tension increases as a result of too great one-sidedness, the counter-tendency breaks through into consciousness, usually just at the moment when it is most important to maintain the conscious direction. Thus the speaker makes a slip of the tongue just when he particularly wishes not to say anything stupid. This moment is critical because it possesses a high energy ten¬sion which, when the unconscious is already charged, may easily “spark” and release the unconscious content.

单边性是被引导的过程的一个无可避免而且必要的特性。因为方向感暗示单边性。它既是利用,又是挫折。甚至,当没有外在的可看见的挫折似乎存在时,还是总是有一个同被宣告的反对-立场,在无意识里。除非,它恰好就是理想的情况。当所有的心灵的成分倾向于朝相同的方向。这个可能性无法用理论来争辩。但是实际上,它很少发生。无意识的反对-立场并不危险,只要它没有拥有高度的能源的价值。但是,假如这个紧张增加,由于太过强烈的单边性的结果。反对的倾向会突破进入意识,通常就是这个时刻,要维持意识的方向是非常重要的时刻。因此,言说者会有口误,正当他特别愿望不要说出任何愚蠢的事情。这个时刻是非常重要的,因为它拥有高度能源的紧张。当无意识已经被负荷,它可能“触发”并且释放无意识的内容。

139 Civilized life today demands concentrated, directed con-
scious functioning, and this entails the risk of a considerable dissociation from the unconscious. The further we are able to remove ourselves from the unconscious through directed func¬tioning, the more readily a powerful counter-position can build up in the unconscious, and when this breaks out it may have disagreeable consequences.

今天的文明生活要求专注的被引导的意识的功能。这涵盖这个冒险:跟无意识解离的冒险。我们越是能够将自己从无意识移除越远,通过被引导的功能,一个反动的离场越是迅速地累积起来。当发生这样的状况时,那可能拥有不和谐的结果。

14° Analysis has given us a profound insight into the importance
of unconscious influences, and we have learnt so much from this for our practical life that we deem it unwise to expect an elimination or standstill of the unconscious after the so-called completion of the treatment. Many patients, obscurely recogniz¬ing this state of affairs, have great difficulty in deciding to give up the analysis, although both they and the analyst find the feeling of dependency irksome. Often they are afraid to risk standing on their own feet, because they know from experience that the unconscious can intervene again and again in their lives in a disturbing and apparently unpredictable manner.

精神分析给予我们深刻的内省,洞察到无意识的影响的重要性。我们从这里学习众多,作为我们的生活,以致我们认人这是不明智的,期望无意识的减少或停滞,经过所谓的知疗的完成。许多病人,模糊地体认事情的这个状态,他们遭遇许多困难,当他们要决的放弃精神分析。虽然他们与分析家发现依靠的感觉是乏味的。经常,他们是害怕独立行事的冒险。因为他们根据经验知道,无意识能够一再地介入他们的生活,用一个令人困扰与明显无法被预测的方式。

141
71

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE

It was formerly assumed that patients were ready to copewith normal life as soon as they had acquired enough practical self-knowledge to understand their own dreams. Experience has shown, however, that even professional analysts, who might be expected to have mastered the art of dream interpretation, often capitulate before their own dreams and have to call in the help of a colleague. If even one who purports to be an expert in the method proves unable to interpret his own dre~ms satis-factorily, how much less can this be expected of the patient. Freud’s hope that the unconscious could be “exhausted” has not be’en fulfilled. Dream-life and intrusions from the unconscious continue-m utatis m utan dis-unim peded.

先前,我们假定,病人准备要处理正常的生活,当他们已经获得足够的实践的自性-知识,为了理解他们自己的梦想。可是,我们根据经验知道,即使是专业的精神分析家,他们被期望已经掌控梦的解释的技艺,他们经常束手无策于他们自己的梦,并且必须召唤同事的帮忙。假如被认为是这个方法的专家,都没有能力令人满意地解释他自己的梦,对于病人,那就更没有什么奢望。 弗洛伊德的希望,无意识能够被“穷尽理解”,并没有被实现。梦与无意识的闯入继续排山倒海而来。

142 There is a widespread prejudice that analysis is something
like a “cure,” to which one submits for a time and is then dis¬charged healed. That is a layman’s error left over from the early days of psychoanalysis. Analytical treatment could be described as a readjustment of psychological attitude achieved with the help of the doctor. Naturally this newly won attitude, which is better suited to the inner and outer conditions, can last a con¬siderable time, but there are very few cases where a single “cure” is permanently successful

有一个广泛的偏见;精神分析是某件像是治疗的东西。我们有一阵子,接受这种治疗,因此被疗愈出院。那是外行人的错误,从精神分析的早期遗留下来。精神分析的治疗能够被描述,作为重新调整心理的态度,凭借医生而获得。当然,这个刚刚被赢得的态度,比较能够适合内在与外在的情况。能够维持相当长久的时间。但是,单一的“治疗”是永久的成功,这样的个案是很少的。

It is true that medical optimism has never stinted itself of publicity and has always been able to report definitive cures. We must, however, not let ourselves be deceived by the all-t0
o-human attitude of the practitioner. but should always remember that the life of the unconscious goes on and continually produces problematical situations. There is no need for pessimism; we have seen too many excellent results achieved with good luck and honest work for that. But this need not prevent us from recognizing that analysis is no once¬and-for-all “cure”; it is no more, at first, than a more or less thorough readjustment. There is no change that is uncondi¬tionally valid over a long period of time. Life has always to be tackled anew.

的确,医学的乐观主义从来没有不引起大众注意,并且总是能够报导明确的治疗。可是,我们一定不要让自己被欺骗,被执业医师的太过于人性的态度欺骗。相反地,我们应该总是记住:无意识的生活继续下去,并且继续产生问题重重的情况。没有悲观主义的需要。我们曾经看见太多的优秀的结果,非常幸运地,而且诚实工作地被获得。但是,这并不需要阻止我们不去体会出,精神分析并没有一劳永逸地被“治疗”。起初,它仅是相当彻地被调整。没有任何改变是无条件地有效漫长的时间。生命总是必须重新被克服。

There are, of course, extremely durable collec¬tive attitudes which permit the solution of typical conflicts. A collective attitude enables the individual to fit into society without friction, since it acts upon him like any other condition of life. But the patient’s difficulty consists precisely in the fact that his individual problem cannot be fitted without friction into a collective norm; it requires the solution of an individual conflict if the whole of his personality is to remain viable. No rational solution can do justice to this task, and there is abso-
72

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
lutelyno collective norm that could replace an individual solu¬tion without loss.
当然,会有极端耐久度集体的态度容许典型的冲突的解决。集体的态度让个人能够适应进入社会,而没有冲突。因为它依靠他来行动,就像任何其他的生活的情况。但是,病人的困难确实是在于这个事实:个人的难题无法没有冲突地被调适成为集体的名称。它要求个人的冲突的解决,假如他的人格的整体想要保持行得通。对于这项工作,任何理性的解决都无法彻底。绝对没有一个集体名称能够取代个人的解决,而没有丧失。

143 The new attitude gained in the course of analysis tends
sooner or later to become inadequate in one way or another, and necessarily so, because the constant flow of life again and again demands fresh adaptation. Adaptation is never achieved once and for all. One might certainly demand of analysis that it should enable the patient to gain new orientations in later life, too, without undue difficulty. And expe’rience shows that this is true up to a point. We often find that patients who have gone through a thorough analysis have considerably less difficulty with new adjustments later on.

在精神分析的过程被获得的这个新的态度,倾向于迟早会变成不足够,用某种的方式,而且必然是不足够。因为生命的经常的流动一再地要求新鲜的调适。 调适从来没有一劳永逸地被获得。我们确实可能要求精神分析应该让病人能够获得新的方向,在以后的生活,而没有过分的困难。经验告诉我们,这到达某个时刻是真实的。我们经常发现,曾经经历彻底的精神分析的病人,遭遇较少的困难,对于后来的调适。

Nevertheless, these difficulties prove to be fairly frequent and may at times be really trouble¬some. That is why even patients who have had a thorough analy¬sis often turn to their old analyst for help at some later period. In the light of medical practice in general there is nothing very unusual about this, but it does contradict a certain misplaced enthusiasm on the part of the therapist as well as the view that analysis constitutes a unique “cure.” In the last resort it is highly improbable that there could ever be a therapy that got rid of all difficulties. Man needs difficulties; they are necessary for health. What concerns us here is only an excessive amount of them.

可是,这些困难证明是相当频繁,有时,可能确实引起麻烦。那就是为什么即使是曾经做过彻底的精神分析的病人,经常求助于他们的有经验的分析家帮忙,在某个后来的时期。从一般的医学实践的观点,关于这点,并没有任何不寻常之处。但是,它确实抵触某个误置位置的热忱,在治疗师方面,以及这个观念:精神分析组成一个独特的“治疗”。最后,这会变得非常不可能,要找到一个排除一切困难的治疗方法。人需要困难,困难对于健康是必要的。我们在此关心的事情是,仅是困难的数量过于庞大。

144 The basic question for the therapist is not how to get rid of
the momentary difficulty, but how future difficulties may be successfully countered. The question is: what kind of menta] and moral attitude is it necessary to have towards the disturbing influences of the unconscious, and how can it be conveyed to the patient?

对于治疗师,基本的问题并不是如何排除暂时的困难,而是未来的困难可能如何成功地被应付。这个问题是:必须要拥有什么种类的精神与道德的态度,对待无意识的这个令人困扰的影响?以及它如何被传达给病人?

拉康:知识之爱与爱的标记

November 21, 2015

LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE AGALMA
知识之爱与爱的标记

The intersubjective relationship between the analysand and the analyst,
and the analyst’s ineluctable involvement in the analysand’s transference
indicate that Lacan’s original outlook of transference singled out the
analytic situation as a constructive dialogue on the symbolic plane of
full speech or, better still, as an interaction between two subjective desires.

分析者与分析家之间的互为主体性关系,以及分析家的难以避免的牵涉分析者的移情,指示著,拉康对于移情的原初的观点,突显出精神分析的情境,作为是建设性的对话,在充分言说的象征的层面。或者,更好的是,作为两个主体的欲望之间的互动。

Many of Lacan’s glosses on transference from the 1950s could be
mustered to corroborate this picture and many of Lacan’s attacks on the
techniques of transference handling within ego-psychology could be read
as implicit arguments for the revival of psychoanalytic treatment as a
symbolic interaction between two subjects.36

从1950年开始,拉康对于移情的许多铨释能够被聚集来形成这个画面。拉康对于自我-心理学之内,处理移情的技术的许多攻击,能够被阅读作为是暗示的论点,赞同精神分析的治疗的复興,作为是象征的互动,处于两个主体之间。

Lacan’s post-1960 contributions cleared the way for a completely
different view. To see how radically his ideas on transference changed
over the course of a decade, it suffices to contrast a statement from his
1957 ‘The Agency of the Letter’ (1977g[1957]) with a passage from his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
(1995b[1967]).

拉康在1960后的贡献,替一个完全不同的观点,清理途径。假如我们看见,拉康在十年的过程当中,他对于移情的观念如何强烈地改变。这就足够将一个陈述,从1957年的“信息的代理者”,跟1967年10月的建议,针对学院派的精神分析家的一个段落,作为对照。

Referring again to Freud’s explanation of transference
in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Lacan reported in the former
text that ‘transference…gave its name to the mainspring of the
intersubjective link between analyst and analysand’ (Lacan
1977g[1957]:170). Ten years later he shattered any remaining faith in
the value of this name, stating with undisguised disdain:
I am astounded that no-one has ever thought of objecting to me,
given certain of the terms of my doctrine, that the transference
alone is an objection to intersubjectivity. I even regret it, seeing
that nothing is more true: it refutes it, it is its stumbling block.
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:4)

拉康再次提的弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在“梦的解析”里。拉康在先前的文本报导,移情给予它的名字,给分析家与分析者之间的互为主体的联接的动力。十年以后,他粉碎任何剩余的信仰,对于移情这个名字的价值。他带着毫不伪装的藐视陈述:「我大为吃惊,竟然从来没有人反对我。假如考虑到,我的信条的某些术语。光是移情就是互为主体间性的反对。我深知对它感到遗憾。因为没有一样东西比它更加真实,移情反驳互为主体间隙。移情是互为主体间性的绊脚石。」

Prepared in the course of his Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:357–358) and
advanced more emphatically in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i
[1958]:229–230) and the ‘Remark on the Report by Daniel Lagache’
(1966e[1960]:655–656), Lacan’s self-criticism of intersubjectivity had
reached a first peak in Seminar VIII, On Transference (1991b[1960–
61]), which initiated a less homogeneous, more conflict-ridden version
of the analytic relationship.37

拉康对于互为主体间性的批评,在第四研讨班的过程已经准备。然后在“治疗的方向”,以及“拉噶奇的报告的谈论”,更加强调地提出。在第八研讨班,“论移情”,拉康对于互为主体间性的自我批评首次达到颠峰。第八研讨班,“论移情”开启一个比较没有那么同质性,更加充满冲突的说法,对于精神分析的关系。

Seminar VIII was strewn with references to the insuperable inequity
which the transference instates between the analysand and the analyst.
Sometimes Lacan designated this inequity as a ‘subjective disparity’
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233), at other times he qualified it as a
fundamental discordance or dissymmetry (ibid.: 53, 68). As I have pointed
out in the previous chapter (pp. 72–73), Lacan’s self-criticism had grown
out of the observation that intersubjectivity does not exclude the perils
of a reciprocal, imaginary ‘therapeutic alliance’ between the analysand
and the analyst.38

第八研讨班的内容散布著无法克服的不平等,移情安置的不平等,在分析者与分析家之间。有时,拉康指明这个不平等,作为是“主体性的差异”。还有些时刻,他将这个不平等赋予基本的不协调或不均称的特质。如同我曾经指出,在先前的章节,拉康的自我-批评是产生于这个观察:互为主体性并没有排除互惠的,想像的联盟的危险,在分析者与分析家之间。

In Seminar VIII he argued that intersubjectivity is an
altogether erroneous description of what takes place within the analytic
setting, quite simply because this setting is governed by transference,
which is in turn pervaded by love. To demonstrate that transference runs
counter to intersubjectivity Lacan thus rejuvenated his Freudian
equivalence of transference and love, initially adumbrated in Seminar I
(1988b[1953–54]:90), now showing that love entails everything but a
harmonious interaction between two complementary subjects.

在第八研讨班,拉康主张,互为主体性是一个完全错误的描述,对于发生在分析家的背景内部。这完全是因为这个背景受到移情的统辖,然后移情被爱所弥漫。为了证明,移情跟互为主体性并行不悖,拉康因此重新提醒他对弗洛伊德将移情与爱相提并论。在第一研讨班,首次被描绘轮廓。他现在则是显示,爱涵盖每样东西,除了在两个互补的主体之间的和谐的互动。

The conflict-ridden undertow of the psychoanalytic process also emboldened
him to criticize mainstream descriptions of the treatment as an analytic
‘situation’, a term which he preferred to replace by ‘pseudo-situation’
because ‘the position of the two subjects present is by no means
equivalent’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233).39

精神分析过程的充满冲突的暗流,也让拉康大胆地批评治疗的主流的描述,作为是精神分析的“情境”。他比较喜欢用“人为-情境”来取代“情境”这个术语。因为“两个主体的立场绝非是相等的。”

Taking his lead from the Symposium (Plato 1951), which he presented
as the minutes of a series of psychoanalytic sessions (Lacan 1991b [1960–
61]:38), Lacan identified the analysand with the lover, the analyst with
the beloved, and the resulting strategies of transference with the dynamics
of love. What characterizes the lover is an immanent feeling of lack.40
Although the lover is hardly aware of this lack, much less of its exact
nature, he none the less believes that the loved object possesses the means
to neutralize it, thus restoring a sense of completeness.41

拉康从探讨柏拉图的“会饮篇”作为开始,他呈现“会饮篇”的探讨,作为精神分析节数的系列的细节。拉康将分析者认同为情人,分析家认同是被爱者。移情的造成结果的策略,具有爱的动力结构。表现情人的特征的东西是欠缺的内在感觉。虽然情人自己几乎不知道这个欠缺,更不用说是欠缺的确实的特性。他仍然相信,这个爱的客体拥有这个工具,让这个欠缺保持中立,因此恢复一种完整的感觉。

To Lacan, the
fact that the lover lacks knowledge about the existence and the status of
this lack was sufficient proof to claim that the lack is unconscious.42
When the beloved recognizes the other’s love, the beloved reckons that
she must have something which provokes the other’s interest, yet she
does not have a clue as to what it is (ibid.: 52–53). Hence both the lover
and the beloved are in a position of partial ignorance, but their ignorance
is not the same.

对于拉康,情人欠缺这个知识,关于这个欠缺的存在与地位,就是充分的证据用来宣称,这个欠缺是无意识的欠缺。当被爱的人体认筹他者的爱,被爱的人认为,她一定拥有某件东西,引起他者的興趣。可是,她并没有线索,关于那是什么。因此,情人与被爱的人都处于部分无知的立场。但是他们的无知并不相等。

The lover does not know much about the immanent lack,
but does know the beloved can annihilate it; the beloved does not know
what he has, yet does know the lover wants it. The lover’s ignorance is
more related to an absence (what the lover misses), whereas the beloved’s
ignorance is more associated with a presence (what the beloved owns).
Relying on Ancient Greek mythology, Lacan stated that love reaches
its highest degree of expression when the beloved becomes a lover in
turn and starts returning the lover’s love. When this occurs the positions
within the relationship are no longer distributed according to who lacks
(the lover) and who possesses something (the beloved), since each partner
wants something from the other and also has something to offer.

情人对于这个内在性的欠缺,所知不多。但是,她确实知道这位被爱的人能够毁灭这个欠缺。被爱的人并不知道他拥有什么。可是他确实知道情人想要它。情人的无知,跟一个缺席(情人所错过的东西)更加息息相关。而被爱的人的无知则是跟一个存在(被爱的人拥有的东西),更加地联想一块。依靠古代的希腊文化,拉康陈述:爱到达它的最高的表达,当轮到被爱的人成为情人,然后开始回报情人的爱。当这样的事情发生,在关系之内的立场不再被分配,依照谁欠钱(情人),与谁拥有某件东西(被爱的人)。因为每一个伴侣都想要某件东西,从他者那里,并且也拥有某件给予东西。

Lacan designated the moment when the beloved becomes a lover as ‘the
metaphor of love’, and in accordance with his own definition of metaphor
he drew attention to its potential for revealing a new signification, notably
the genuine, true signification of love (ibid.: 49–64).43

拉康指明这个时刻,被爱的人成为爱人的时刻,作为是“爱的隐喻”。为了符合他自己对隐喻的定义,他提醒注意隐喻的潜力,作为显示新的意义。特别是真诚,真实的爱的意义。

For all its ostensible rosiness, the portrait of love Lacan painted in Seminar
VIII was of course predicated upon a tragic misunderstanding between the
partners. What the lover discovers in the beloved is no more no less than the
object of the lover’s own fantasy, and has nothing to do with what the beloved
really has to offer. Conversely, what the beloved believes she possesses as an
object for the lover, without knowing for sure what it is, equally relates to
the beloved’s fantasy and has no bearing whatsoever on what the lover really
lacks. Each of the partners mistakes fantasy for reality, adding error to error
when entering the metaphor of love.

拉康在第八研讨班描绘的爱的肖像,尽管过于绚丽灿烂,当然对于它的描绘是依靠一个悲剧的误解,在伴侣之间。爱人在被爱的人身上发现的东西,实实在在就是爱人自己的幻想的客体。跟被爱的人确实必须提供的东西,没有丝毫关系。相反地,被爱的人相信她拥有的东西,作为是爱的的客体,而没有确实知道那是什么东西,那同样是跟被爱的人的幻想息息相关。跟爱人确实欠缺的东西,根本没有丝毫关系。每一位伴侣都将幻见误认为是现实,将错误增加到错误,当他进入爱的隐喻。

Applying this picture to the analytic ‘pseudo-situation’, Lacan
compared the analysand to a lover because analysands generally expect
their analysts to possess the key to their difficulties—inhibitions,
symptoms and anxieties which they cannot understand, let alone solve.

拉康将这个画面运用到精神分析的”人为的情境“,并将分析者比喻为分析家,因为分析者通透期望她们的分析家拥有解决他们的困难的解答—压抑,症状,与焦虑的的困难的解答。那是分析者无法理解的,遑论解答。

In Seminar VIII Lacan described this key, as seen through the eyes of the
analysand, in two different ways. In the opening stages of the Seminar,
he cut the analyst’s key from the substance of knowledge:
The psychoanalyst is a human being one comes to see in order to
find the knowledge [science] of what is most intimate to oneself—
this is the state of mind in which one usually approaches him—
and thus of what we must assume to be initially most alien to him.
None-the-less, this is what we encounter at the start of
psychoanalysis; this knowledge [science] is what he is supposed
to have.
(ibid.: 81–82)

在第八研讨班,拉康描述这个解答,通过分析者的眼光可以看出,用两个不同的方式。在研讨班的开始的阶段,,拉康将分析家的解答,从知识的物质切割下来。我们逐渐将精神分析家看着是一个人,为了找到这个知识,跟我们自己最亲密的东西的知识。那就是心灵的状态,我们通常接近他的心灵的状态。因此,也是我们必须假定是对于他是最异化的的东西的状态。尽管如此,这就是我们遭遇的东西,在精神分析的开始。这个知识就是他被认为拥有的东西。

Lacan’s observation that analysands commonly regard their analysts as
experts of the human psyche whose specialized knowledge will dissolve
the symptoms ultimately crystallized into his concept of the ‘supposed
subject of knowing’, which continued to undergird his ideas on
transference until the end of his career.44

拉康观察到,分析者通常将他的分析家视为是人类心灵的专家。这位心灵的专家精通的知识将会化解症状。拉康的观察最后具体成为他的观念:“被认为是知道的主体“。这个观念继续作为他探讨移情的观念的的支撑,直到拉康的事业的结束。

Yet as his work progressed he underscored that this function of the
‘supposed subject of knowing’, the constitutive element of the
transference, does not imply that the analysand automatically perceives
the analyst as somebody who knows (Lacan 1977b[1964]:233; 1967–
68: session of 22 November 1967; 1971–72: session of 2 December 1971).
In his ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
he even went so far as to state:

可是,随着他的研究的进展,拉康强调,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个功能,移情的形成的元素,并没有暗示,分析者自动地感知这位分析家,作为是知道的某个人。在他的”1967年11月的建议“,针对学院派的精神分析家,拉康甚至过分地陈述:

We shall have to see what qualifies the psychoanalyst to respond
to this situation [of the supposed subject of knowing] which one
can see does not envelop his person. Not only is the supposed
subject of knowing not real in effect, but it is in no way necessary
that the subject who is active in the conjuncture, the
psychoanalysand (the only one who speaks initially), impose it
upon him. Not only is it not necessary, it is not usually true: which
is demonstrated in the initial stages of the discourse by a way of
assuring oneself that the suit does not fit the psychoanalyst—an
assurance against the fear that he will put, if I may say so, his
creases in it too soon.

(Lacan 1995b[1967]:5, translation modified)
我们将必须看出,为了回应这个情境,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个情境,我们能够看出,这个情境并没有涵盖精神分析家这个人的人格,他的特质。被认为是知道的主体不但实际上并非真实,而且活跃于这个关键联接的主体,也就是最初作为言说的唯一的人,分析者,根本也没有这个必要,将它赋加在他身上。这非但并非必要,它通常也并非是真实:在辞说的最初的阶段,被证明的东西,凭借让自己确信,这套西装并不适合精神分析家。他用这种确实来对抗这个恐惧:很快地,他将会让这套西装起皱纹,容我这样说。

Without devaluing the importance of the supposed subject of knowing
for the transference, Lacan relativized its impact as a truthful and honest
expectation with which most analysands approach their analysts, considering
the spurious relationship they have with knowledge professed by somebody
else. As I have explained in Chapter 1, it is not because people do not know
what is wrong with them, and, following their wish to know the truth, urge
professionals to tell them what they know, that they will be willing to accept
the professionals’ knowledge.

拉康并没有贬低被认为是知道的主体对于移情的重要性,他将它的影响相对化,作为忠实而诚实的期望。大部分的分析者都带着这个期望,接近他们的分析家,认为分析家具有跟某个人其他的人宣称的知识的似是而非的关系。如同我在第一章解释过程,这并不是因为人们不知道他们的问题出在哪里,当他们遵循他们的愿望要知道真理时,他们要求专业人员告诉他们他们所知道的事情,他们将会愿意接受专业人员的知识。

An analysand’s investment of her analyst with
the supposed subject of knowing is always relative: on the one hand she
wants her analyst to be wildly knowledgeable, whereas on the other she
already knows in advance that from the moment he will start professing his
knowledge, it will prove fatally flawed. Or, if the analysand has been
sufficiently hystericized, he will simultaneously expect his analyst to be
knowledgeable, to convey this knowledge, to admit it is inadequate, to seek
more knowledge, to allow him to find knowledge elsewhere, etc.45
None the less Lacan remained convinced that the supposed subject of
knowing constitutes ‘the pivot on which everything to do with the
transference is hinged’ (ibid.: 5).

分析者对于她的分析家投注被认为是知道的主体。这种投注总是相对的:一方面,她想要她的分析家成为知识广博。另一方面,她已经事先知道,从那个时刻开始,他将会开始宣称他的知识。那个知识将会证明致命地具有瑕疵。或者,假如分析者已经充分地成为癔症者,他将会同时期望他的分析家成为知识广博。传达这个知识,承认这个知识是不足够的,寻求更多的知识,让他能够在别的地方找到知识,等等。尽管如此,拉康始终相信,被认为是知道的主体形成“ 这个枢纽,依靠这个枢纽里,每件事情都跟移情有关联。

Even when analysands refuse to accept
their analysts as paragons of absolute knowledge, the supposed subject
of knowing (and transference) will continue to operate if only the
analysands believe that one day they will become masters in their own
house. In this sense Lacan’s supposed subject of knowing conveys nothing
more than the analysand’s opinion that all knowledge can be endowed
with a subject, i.e. that there is no such thing as a knowledge which has
to remain fundamentally subject-less. In more psychological terms, the
supposed subject of knowing refers to the individual’s belief that it is
possible to attain the climax of full self-realization, a status characterized
by the definitive cancellation of all nonsense, the complete understanding
of oneself and the discovery of the true signification of life.46

即使当分析者拒绝接受他们的分析家,作为是绝对知识的典范,被认为是知道的主体(与移情),将继续运转,只要分析者相信,有一天,他们将会成为大师,在他们自己的房屋里。从这个意义而言,拉康的被认为的知道的主体,传达的东西,仅仅是分析者的意见:所有的知识都能够被禀赋一个主体。譬如,并不存在着这种知识的东西,必须始终基本上是没有主体的知识。用更加是心理学的术语,被认为是知道的主体,提到个人的信仰:获得充分的自性的实现的高潮是可能的。这一种状态的特征是明确地取消一切的无稽之谈,完全理解自己,并且发现生命的真实的意义。

The supposed subject of knowing is evidently at odds with the divided subject
() of the unconscious, because it glorifies the transparency of all
knowledge and aims for the restoration of a psychic economy without
loss. The supposed subject of knowing ‘is the postulate of which it is the
case that it abolishes the unconscious’ (Lacan 1968c[1967]:46).
In his 1967 ‘Proposition’, Lacan formalized the installation of the
supposed subject of knowing in a new algorithm of transference (Lacan

1995b[1967]:5):被认为是知道的主体,跟无意识的分裂的主体,显而易见是互相抵触。因为它推崇所有的知识的透明化,并且目标朝着恢复心灵的活力,没有任何损失。被认为是知道的主体,就是这个假设,就在这个假设的情况里,它废除无意识。在他的1967年的“建议”,拉康正式将被认为是知道的主体,安置在移情的新的轨迹里。

The sequence under the bar represents the analysand’s assumption of an
agency controlling the signification of all knowledge (the undivided
subject of the unconscious, the thinker behind the unconscious thoughts),
whereby 5 stands for (undivided, present) subject and (S1, S2,…Sn) for
the unconscious thoughts (the symbolic network of signifiers). The S
above the bar is the so-called ‘transference-signifier’ (signifiant du
transfert) which, in its relation to any old signifier (Sa), makes the
supposition possible. The link between S and Sa is the connection between
two signifiers without which the supposed subject of knowing would
remain without signification for the analysand.47 Indeed the assumption
that all knowledge can be subjectified only becomes significant for the
analysand because he has ‘transferred’ one of the signifiers (ideas,
representations) in his psyche to a particular signifier belonging to another
subject, the analyst for that matter.48

在这个横杠底下的系列代表分析者的假设一个代理,控制一切知识的意义的代理(无意识的没有被分裂的主体,无意识的思想背后的思想家),S代表(没有被分裂,存在的)主体。(S1,、、、Sn)代表无意识的思想 (能指的象征的网络)。横杠以上的这个S 就是所谓的“移情-能指”。由于它跟任何旧的能指(Sa)的关系,这个“移情-能指”让这个假设成为可能。在S与Sa 之间的联接,就是两个能指之间的联接。假如没有这两个能指,被认为是知道的主体将始终保持是咩有意义,对于分析者。的确,所有的知识能够被形成主体,这个假设变得重要,对于分析者。因为他已经转移他的心灵里的其中一个能指(观念,再现表象),转移到一个特殊的能指,属于另外一个主体的能指,就这件事情而言,那就是分析家。

In Seminar XX Lacan translated this craving for complete knowledge
within the transference in the terminology of love, proclaiming that ‘love
is the desire to be One’, and that love proceeds from the belief ‘we are
but One’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:6, 47).49 Love (and transference) equals
believing that the other is not an Other affected by an irreducible lack,
but the incarnation of the perfect One, and it cherishes the hope that this
One will spill over onto one-self. Since the entrapment of love is part
and parcel of the neurotic’s psychic economy, it is by no means restricted
to the psychoanalytic setting, which again explains why transference
can easily exist outside the walls of the psychoanalytic cabinet.

在第20研讨班,拉康翻译对于完整知识的渴望,在移情之内,用爱的术语。拉康宣称,“爱是想要成为”一“的欲望。爱继续前进,凭借这个信仰:我们仅是“一”。爱(与移情)等于是相信:他者并不是受的无法还原的欠缺的影响的大他者,而是完美的“一”的具体化身。爱怀抱这个希望:这个“一”将会分撒在“作为自性的一”。因为爱的陷阱是神经症的心灵的活力的部分与包裹。爱绝非是被限制在精神分析的背景里。这再次解释为什么移情很容易存在于精神分析的咨商室的墙壁之外。

If the unconscious is a knowledge without a knowing agency (a
headless body so to speak) and the supposed subject of knowing correlates
with the complete mastery over knowledge, it is clear why Lacan
contended in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:130–133) that transference
involves a closure of the unconscious. In its striving for unity love favours
the redemption of the absent subject of the unconscious or, to use Lacan’s
terms in Encore, it aims at being, to be understood here as self-fulfilment
(Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:40). Once again this point repeated a feature
Freud had noted in his paper on transference-love and which he had
attributed to the influence of resistance:

假如无意识是没有知道的代理者的知识(也就是,没有头的身体),被认为是知道的主体,跟完整的掌控知识息息相关。显而易见地,拉康为什么在第11研讨班主张,移情牵涉到无意识的封闭。当无意识奋斗获得统一时,爱偏爱无意识的欠缺的主体的救赎。或者,用拉康在“再来”研讨班的术语说,爱的目标是生命实存,在此应该被理解为实践-自性。再次,这一点重复弗洛伊德没有注意到的一个特征,当他探讨移情与爱。弗洛伊德将这个特征归属于坚持的影响。

At a first glance it certainly does not look as if the patient’s falling
in love in the transference could result in any advantage to the
treatment. No matter how amenable she has been up till then, she
suddenly loses all understanding of the treatment and all interest
in it, and will not speak or hear about anything but her love, which
she demands to have returned. She gives up her symptoms or pays
no attention to them; indeed, she declares that she is well.
(Freud 1915a[1914]:162)

乍然一瞥,移情与爱看起来确实不像是:在移情里恋爱的病人能够造成任何的利益,对于治疗。无论她直到那时是多么的可被修正,她突然丧失所有的理解,对于治疗与治疗里的所有的興趣。她所言说,或所停到的事情,无非就是她的爱。她要求回到她的爱。她放弃她的症状,或并没有注意那些症状。的确,她宣称,她是健康的。

Alienated to the transference-signifier, analysands deceive themselves and
their analysts when supposing the subject of knowing, not only in their
sudden extirpation of the debilitating effects of the symptoms, but also in
the special demands they put upon their analysts. In the former case the
analyst runs the risk of losing his patient because she declares herself healthy
and cannot think of any good reason to continue the treatment.

当分析者针对移情的能指,表现异化时,分析者欺骗他们自己与分析家。当他们认为知道的主体,不但在他们的突然的移除症状的令人衰弱的影响,而且在他们对于分析家提出的特别的要求。在前者的情况,分析家冒着丧失他的分析者的危险。因为她宣称她自己是健康,并且无法想出任何好的理由,来继续这个治疗。

In the latter
case, a patient may consider breaking off the treatment because he feels
that the analyst is not paying enough attention to him, does not give enough
of her time, tends to run shorter sessions with him than with other
analysands, does not appreciate the (financial) effort he has put into the
whole enterprise, in short does not love him enough. Of course, the analyst
needs to ensure that the analysis does not come to a halt because the
analysand’s transference makes him feel ‘cured by magic’ or ‘just treated
like everybody else’. To solve this clinical problem, Lacan advised that
the analyst overturn the dead weight of the analysand’s demands within
the transference with the lever of desire, a recommendation to which I will
return in the following section of this chapter.

在后者的情况,病人可能考虑中断治疗,因为他觉得,分析家并没有给予他充分的注意,没有给予她充分的时间。分析家倾向于将她的咨商时数减短,比起他给予其他的分析者。分析家并没有赏识他付出的财政的努力,付给整个的企业。总之,分析家并没有充分地爱他。当然,分析家需要保证,精神分析并没有中止,因为分析者的移情让他感觉“被魔法治疗”。或“仅是像每一位其他的人一样被治疗”。为了解决这个临床的难题,拉康劝告,分析家应该推翻分析者的要求的僵化的重量,在移情之内,用欲望的杠杆。在这个章节的以下部分,我将回头谈论这一个建议。

As mentioned earlier, the analysand’s perception of the analyst as a
character equipped with knowledge of his most intimate experiences is
not the only factor Lacan distinguished in Seminar VIII to explain the
eruption of love. After having cut the analyst’s key to the analysand’s
problems, as seen through the latter’s own eyes, from the material of
knowledge, Lacan used the sparring match between Socrates and
Alcibiades at the end of the Symposium to delineate the function of the
agalma within the transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:163–195).

如同早先提到,分析者对于分析家的感觉,作为是装备他最亲近的经验的知识的人物。分析家的感觉并不是唯一的因素,拉康在第八研讨班区别出来。为了解释爱的发作。当拉康将分析家对于分析者的解答,跟知识的材料切割开始,依照从分析家自己的眼光来观看。拉康使用苏格拉底与阿西比底斯之间的拳击表演赛,在“会饮篇”的结尾,为了描述阿加马的功能,在移情之内。

Agalma is the term Alcibiades used to grasp the hidden, yet fascinating
object he believed to be enclosed in the depths of Socrates’ hideous body.
A mysterious gem whose preciousness he had savoured as a young man
during a privileged moment of revelation, the agalma had sparked
Alcibiades’ infatuation with Socrates and served to justify his eulogy of
Socrates’ attractiveness.

阿加马是阿西比底斯使用的术语,用来理解这个隐藏,可是令人著迷的客体。他相信这个客体被封闭在苏格拉底的令人厌憎的身体的深处。阿加马是一个神秘的珍宝,他年轻时曾经喜爱的珍宝的珍贵。当他处于接受启蒙的特权的时期,这个阿加马珍宝激发阿西底比斯对于苏格拉底的著迷。阿加马珍宝充当是对于苏格拉底的迷人的颂扬的理由。

In Seminar VIII Lacan surmised that the part played by the agalma in
the emergence of transference must be at least as important as that of the
supposed knowledge, yet his subsequent invocations of the topic were
rather disappointing. Apart from a small, yet valuable gloss in his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’ (1995b
[1967]:7), references were often limited to simple mentions of the term. It
is tempting to argue that Lacan gradually replaced the agalma with his
own concept of the object a, so that each passage on the function of the
object a in the transference would contain an implicit reference to the
agalma.

在第八研讨班,拉康推测,在移情出现时,阿加马的珍宝扮演的角色,至少是同样地重要,跟被认为的知识的出现扮演的角色。可是,拉康随后召唤的议题相当令人失望。除了将他在1967年,针对学院派的精神分析家的“建议”,稍作修改装饰外,拉康的指称经常被限制在简单地提到那个术语。我们忍不住地要争辩:拉康逐渐用他自己的小客体a的观念,取代阿加马。所以,在移情里的小客体a的功能的每个段落,都包含含暗示地提到阿加马。


I wish to challenge this idea, not so much because it is difficult to
entertain on the basis of Lacan’s own works, but mainly because the
equation of the agalma and the object a makes it extremely difficult to
comprehend some of Lacan’s later statements on the position of the analyst
in the treatment.50 For example, when Lacan argued in Encore that analysts
are ‘in the best position to do what should rightfully be done, namely to
investigate the status of the truth as knowledge’, when they put the object
a in the place of semblance, does this mean that the analyst is supposed to
sustain the analysand’s love in order to realize the analytic goals? For if
agalma (as the mysterious object triggering love) equals the object a and
the analyst is held to occupy the position of object a in the analytic discourse,
how can the transference ever be analysed?

我希望交换这个观念,倒不是因为很困难根据拉康自己的著作来怀抱这个观念。而是因为将阿加马跟小客体a相等,让某些拉康晚期的陈述的理解成为极端困难,当他探讨治疗时的分析家的立场。譬如,当拉康在“再来”研讨班主张,分析家“处于最佳立场,去做有权利应该被做的事情,也就是说,去研究真理作为知识的位置”,当他将小客体a 取代类似物。这难道是意味著:分析家应该维持分析者的爱,为了实践精神分析的目标?因为假如阿加马(作为触动爱的神秘的客体),相等于是小客体a,而分析家被认为是占据小客体a的位置,在精神分析的辞说里,移情如何能够被分析?

The conflation of the agalma and the object a also gives rise to a
confusion of love and desire in Lacan’s work, since the object a is
traditionally defined as the object cause of desire. Lacan himself to some
degree contributed to this confusion by using love and desire as
interchangeable terms in Seminar VIII, and by elucidating the metaphor
of love in his two subsequent Seminars as a substitution of the desiring
(le desirant) for the desirable (le desire).51 However, from the mid-1960s
he charted love and desire as two separate experiences on whose
distinction the entire progress of psychoanalytic treatment depends.

阿加马与小客体a的混合,也产生爱与欲望的混淆,在拉康的著作里。因为小客体a传统上被定义为欲望的客体的原因。拉康他自己有某个程度促成这种混淆。在第八研讨班,拉康使用爱与欲望,作为是可以交换的术语。他阐述爱的隐喻,在他随后的研讨班,作为是欲望者的替换被欲望者。可是,从1960的中叶开始,他描绘爱与欲望,作为两个分开的经验。精神分析的治疗的整个的进展,就依靠这个区别。

The
promotion of desire as the analyst’s lever to overturn the analysand’s
love in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:235) can exemplify this. Hence the
agalma of love does not equal the object a of desire, because like the
supposed subject of knowing the agalma relates to the analysand’s
perception of the Other as a perfect being, containing the precious jewels
of happiness and salvation, whereas the object a is strictly situated within
the dimension of semblance. Whereas the agalma represents the ideal
stone of wisdom, the object a is but a partial, replaceable commodity.52

欲望的提倡,作为分析家的杠杆,推翻分析者的爱,在第11研讨班,能够作为这个的典范。 因此,爱的阿加马并没有相等于欲望的小客体a,因为就像被认为是知道的主体,这个阿加马跟分析者对于大他者作为是完美的人的感觉息息相关。它包含快乐与救赎的这个珍贵的珠宝。而小客体a 则是严格地被定位在类似物的维度里面。虽然阿加马代表理想的智慧的宝石,小客体a 仅是部分,无法取代的货物。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

人格面具3

November 17, 2015

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
b. Identification with the Collective Psyche
认同集体无意识
The second way leads to identification with the collective
psyche. This would amount to an acceptance of inflation, but now exalted into a system. That is to say, one would be the for¬tunate possessor of the great truth which was only waiting to be discovered, of the eschatological knowledge which spells the healing of the nations. This attitude is not necessarily megalo¬mania in direct form, but in the milder and more familiar form of prophetic inspiration and desire for martyrdom. For weak¬minded persons, who as often as not possess more than their fair share of ambition, vanity, and misplaced naivete, the danger of yielding to this temptation is very great.

第二个方法导致认同集体心灵。这将是等于接受自我膨胀。但是现在,被提升成为系统。换句话说,我们将是这个伟大真理的拥有者,仅是等待被发现的伟大的真理,属于天启的知识,暗示着各个国家的治疗。这个态度并未必是自大狂的直接的形式。而是以温和,而且更加熟悉的预言的启发以及作为烈士的欲望的形式。对人心灵软弱的人们,他们经常拥有的仅是份内的企图心,虚荣心,与摆错位置的天真,屈服于这个诱惑的危险非常大。

Access to the collective psyche means a renewal of life for the individual, no matter whether this renewal is felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Everybody would like to hold fast to this renewal: one man because it en¬hances his life-feeling, another because it promises a rich harvest of knowledge, a third because he has discovered the key that will transform his whole life. Therefore all those who do not wish to deprive themselves of the great treasures that lie buried in the collective psyche will strive by every means possible to maintain their newly won connection with the primal source of life.7 Identification would seem to be the shortest road to this, for the dissolution of the persona in the collective psyche positively in¬vites one to wed oneself with the abyss and blot out all memory in its embrace. This piece of mysticism is innate in all better men as the “longing for the mother,” the nostalgia for the Source from which we came.

接近集体心灵意味著生命的新生,对于个人而言。无论这个新生被感觉是愉快或是不愉快。每个人都想要紧紧掌握这个新生:某个人是因为新生强化他的生命的感觉,另外一个人是因为它承诺给予丰富的知识的收获,第三者则是因为他发现将会转化他的整个的生命的钥匙。因此,所有那些并没有希望剥夺自己的伟大的财宝的人们,那些财宝被埋藏在集体心灵里。他们将会奋斗,凭借一切可能的方法,为了维持他们刚刚获得的关联,跟生命的原初的来源。认同似乎就是最短的捷径,到达这里。因为人格面具的瓦解,在集体心灵里,正面地邀请我们跟这个深渊结合,然后抹除掉深渊所掌握的一切记忆。这个神秘主义与生俱有地存在于所有较佳的人们,作为是“对母亲的渴望”,对于他们来自的来源的怀旧。

261 As I have shown in my book on libido, there lie at the root of
the regressive longing, which Freud conceives as “infantile fixa¬tion” or the “incest wish,” a specific value and a specific need which are made explicit in myths. It is precisely the strongest and best among men, the heroes, who give way to their regressive longing and purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the maternal abyss.

如同我在探讨力比多的书里所显示,在退行的渴望的根源里隐藏著力比多。弗洛伊德构想这个退行的渴望,作为是“婴孩的固著”,或是“乱伦的愿望”。这一个明确的价值与明确的需要,在神话里明确被表达。确实就是这个最强壮,最优秀的人们,英雄人物,他们屈服于他们的退行的渴望。然后刻意地暴露他们自己,于被吞没的危险当中,被母亲深夜的怪物吞没。

169

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
But if a man is a hero, he is a hero because, in the final reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it, not once but many times. Victory over the collective psyche alone yields the true value-the capture of the hoard, the invincible weapon, the magic talisman, or whatever it be that the myth deems most de¬sirable. Anyone who identifies with the collective psyche-or, in mythological terms, lets himself be devoured by the monster-and vanishes in it, attains the treasure that the dragon guards, but he does so in spite of himself and to his own greatest harm.
但是假如一个人是位英雄,他是一位英雄,因为在他最后的估算,他并没有让他的怪物吞没他,而是征服他的怪物。不仅一次,而且是好几次。光是战胜集体心灵的胜利,就产生真实的价值。或是任何神话认为是最被欲望的东西。任何认同于集体心灵的人,用神话的术语来说,他会让他自己被怪物吞没,然后消失在怪物里面。获得这个财宝,龙守卫著的财宝。但是,他这样做,奋不顾身,结果造成自己受伤惨重。

262 Probably no one who was conscious of the absurdity of this
identification would have the courage to make a principle of it. But the danger is that very many people lack the necessary hu¬mour, or else it fails them at this particular juncture; they are seized by a sort of pathos, everything seems pregnant with mean¬ing, and all effective self-criticism is checked. I would not deny in general the existence of genuine prophets, but in the name of caution I would begin by doubting each individual case; for it is far too serious a matter for us lightly to accept a man as a genu¬ine prophet. Every respectable prophet strives manfully against the unconscious pretensions of his role. When therefore a prophet” appears at a moment’s notice, we would be better ad¬vised to contemplate a possible psychic disequilibrium.

可能,知道这种认同的人们,没有一位会有勇气将它定为原则。但是危险是,很多的人们欠缺这个必要的性情,或者,这个性情在这个特殊的时刻,让他们功败垂成。他们被笼罩于一股哀怜之情。每一样东西都孕育着意义,所有的有效的自我-批评都被审查。我将不否认,通常会有真诚的预言家的存在。但是以谨慎的名义,我将开始,凭借怀疑每一个个人的案例。因为这是太过严肃的一件事,我们无法轻易地接受一个人,作为是真诚的预言家。每一位可尊敬的预言家,勇敢地奋斗,反抗他的角色,作为无意识的伪装。假如我们沉思可能的心灵的不平衡,可能较为明智之举。

263 But besides the possibility of becoming a prophet, there is
another alluring joy, subtler and apparently more legitimate: the joy of becoming a prophet’s disciple. This, for the vast ma¬jority of people, is an altogether ideal technique. Its advantages are: the odium dignitatis) the superhuman responsibility of the prophet, turns into the so much sweeter otium indignitatis. The disciple is unworthy; modestly he sits at the Master’s feet and guards against having ideas of his own. Mental laziness becomes a virtue; one can at least bask in the sun of a semidivine being. He can enjoy the archaism and infantilism of his unconscious fantasies without loss to himself, for all responsibility is laid at the Master’s door. Through his deification of the Master, the disciple, apparently without noticing it, waxes in stature; more¬over, does he not possess the great truth-not his own discovery, of course, but received straight from the Master’s hands? Natu¬rally the disciples always stick together, not out of love, but for the very understandable purpose of effortlessly confirming their own convictions by engendering an air of collective agreement.

但是,除了成为预言家的可能性之外,还有另外一个诱人的享乐,比较微妙,但是明显地更加合理:成为预言家的门徒。对于大多数的人们而言,这是一个完全理性的技术。它的利益是:预言家的超人的责任,转变成为如此更加甜蜜的退休的休闲。门徒是无足轻重,谦虚地,他端坐在大师的脚边,并且警卫著不要有属于自己的观念。精神的懒散成为是一种品德。我们至少能够沐浴于半神性的阳光里。他能够享受属于他的无意识的幻想的旧时回忆与婴孩主义。但是他并没有迷失自己。因为所有的责任都被放置在大师的门边。凭借将大师奉为神性,门徒很明显并没有注意到这件事,他的身形消隐。而且,他难道没有拥有他自己的伟大的真理吗?当然,并不是他自己发现的真理,而是直接从大师的手中获得的真理?当然,门徒总是聚集一块,不是由于爱,而是为了这个可以理解的目的,不费力气地证实他们自己的信念,凭借产生集体一致1气氛。

17°

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
264 Now this is an identification with the collective psyche that
seems altogether more commendable: somebody else has the honour of being a prophet, but also the dangerous responsibil¬ity. For one’s own part, one is a mere disciple, but nonetheless a joint guardian of the great treasure which the Master has found. One feels the full dignity and burden of such a position, deem¬ing it a solemn duty and a moral necessity to revile others not of a like mind, to enrol proselytes and to hold up a light to the Gentiles, exactly as though one were the prophet oneself. And these people, who creep about behind an apparently modest persona, are the very ones who, when inflated by identification with the collective psyche, suddenly burst upon the world scene. For, just as the prophet is a primordial image from the collective psyche, so also is the disciple of the prophet.

现在,这个认同于集体心灵,似乎完全更加可被赞赏:某个其他的人拥有这个荣幸,成为预言家。但是也有危险的责任。就我们自己而言,我们仅是一位门徒,但是仍然是大师发现的伟大的财宝的共同守护者。我们感觉这个充分的尊严,与如此的地位的负担。他认为这是一个严肃的责任与道德的必要性,要抨击没有具有相同心灵的别人,登记为改变信仰者,然后举起灯光,照亮非犹太人。确实好像我们自己就是预言家。这些人们,在谦虚的人格面具背后鬼鬼祟祟。当他们由于认同集体心灵而自我膨胀,他们突然闯进世界的场景。因为,正如预言家是从集体心灵的原初的意象,预言家的门徒,也是心灵的原初的意象。

265 In both cases inflation is brought about by the collective un-
conscious, and the independence of the individuality suffers in¬jury. But since by no means all individualities have the strength to be independent, the disciple-fantasy is perhaps the best they can accomplish. The gratifications of the accompanying infla¬tion at least do something to make up for the loss of spiritual freedom. Nor should we underestimate the fact that the life of a real or imagined prophet is full of sorrows, disappointments, and privations, so that the hosanna-shouting band of disciples has the value of a compensation. All this is so humanly under¬standable that it would be a matter for astonishment if it led to any further destination whatever.

在这两个情况,自我膨胀被集体无意识导致。个体性的独立遭受伤害的痛苦。但是,因为所有的个体性决非拥有独立的力量,门徒-幻想或许就是他能够完成的最佳表现。伴随而来的自我膨胀的满足,至少有助于补偿精神自由的丧失。我们也不应该低估这个事实:一位真实或被想像的预言家的生活,充满了悲伤,失望,与被剥夺。所以,门徒的欢呼崇拜具有补偿的价值。所有这一切,在人性方面是可以理解的。假如它导致任何更进一步的目标,那将会令人大吃一惊。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com