超越现实原则 05
Beyond the “Reality Principle”
雅克、拉康
Jacques Lacan
The Object of Psychology Is Defined in Essentially Relativistic Terms
心理学的对象被定义，用基本上是相对的术语
It is in the specific reality of interpersonal relations that a psychology can define
its own object and its method of investigation. The concepts implied by this
object and this method are not subjective, but relativistic. Although they are
anthropomorphic in their foundations, these concepts can develop into general
forms of psychology, assuming their abovementioned extension to animal
psychology proves valid.
雄伯译
就是在人际之间的这个明确的现实界，心理学能够定义它自己的客体及它的研究方法。
这个客体跟这个方法暗示的这些观念并不是主观性，而是相对性。
虽然这它们的基础，它们是拟人化，这些观念能够发展成为心理学的一般形式，假定它们以上提到的延伸到动物心理学证明是正确的。
雄伯说
拉康认为这些观念不是主观性subjective，而是相对性。
相对性relativistic 跟客观性objective又有什么差别？
Furthermore, the objective value of a form of research is demonstrated like
the reality of motion is demonstrated: by the efficacy of its progress. What
best confirms the excellence of the pathway that Freud defined by which to
approach the phenomenon, with a purity that distinguished him from all other
psychologists, is the prodigious advance that gave him a lead on all others in
psychological reality.
而且，研究形式的客观的价值被证明，就像动力的现实界根据它的进展的有效性来证明。
什么最能肯定弗洛伊德定义的途径的优越性？
凭借这个途径来探究这个现象，是这个巨大的进步，让他在心理学的现实界，领先所有其他的人。
弗洛伊德定义的这个途径，动机纯净，让他跟所有其他的心理学家不同。
I will demonstrate this in part two of this article. I will simultaneously show
the felicitous use he was able to make of the notion of the image. And if, with
the term “imago,” he did not fully extract it from the confused state of everyday
intuition, he nevertheless masterfully exploited its concrete importance,
preserving the entirety of its informationalfunction in intuition, memory, and
development.
雄伯译
我将在文章的第二部分证明这点。
我将同时显示弗洛伊德对于这个形象的观念，使用得恰到好处。
使用形象的这个术语，他并没有从日常的直觉的混乱的状态，充分地 抽取它。
可是，他掌控地利用它的具体的重要性，保存它在直觉，记忆，及发展的资讯功能的完整性。
雄伯说
区别形象与直觉的关系。
He demonstrated this function in discovering through analytic experience
the process of identification. The latter is quite different from the process of
imitation, which is distinguished by its partial and groping form of approximation;
identification contrasts with imitation not simply as the global assimilation
of a structure but as the virtual assimilation of development implied by
that structure in a still undifferentiated state.
雄伯译
他证明这个功能，当他凭借精神分析经验，发现认同的这个过程。
认同完全不同于模仿的过程。
模仿是根据它的部分而且是模索的近似的形态，被区别出来。
认同跟模仿对比起来，不仅是作为结果的全球性同化，而且作为发展的虚拟同化。
在那个结构尚处于没有被区别的状态，所暗示的发展。
雄伯说
Global assimilation 完全同化，全球性同化
Virtual assimilation 潜在同化，虚拟同化
认同跟同化息息相关。
模仿仅是部分形态的模仿。
We thus know that a child perceives certain affective situations—for example,
the particular bond between two individuals in a group—with far more
immediate perspicacity than an adult. An adult, despite his greater psychical
differentiation, is in fact inhibited both in human knowledge and in the conduct
of his relationships by conventional categories that censor them. But the
absence of these categories serves a child less in permitting him to better perceive
the signs than the primal structure of his psyche serves him in immediately
imbuing him with the essential meaning of the situation. But this is no
the whole of his advantage: along with the significant impression, it also brings
with it the germ, which it will develop in all its richness, of the social interaction
that is expressed in it.
我们因此知道，小孩感觉某些情感的情境—譬如，在团体，两个个人之间的特别默契，比起成年人，他们具有更加当下的敏锐性。
成年人，尽管拥有较大的心理的差异，事实上是被潜抑，不论是在人类的知识，或是在他的关系的行为，凭借审查它们的传统的范畴。
但是这些范畴的欠缺，对于小孩功用不大，因而让他能够更佳地感觉这些符号，比起他的心理的原初的结构，提供的功能，用这个情境的基本意义充满他。
但是这还不是他的全部利益，它也带给他在里面被表达的社会互动的这个种子。这个种子将会丰富地发展，
雄伯说
这个社会互动的种子the germ of the social interaction，以后会形成社会契约social bond。使精神分析辞说不会永远朝着实在界的空洞倾斜，而回转到符号界。
This is why a man’s character can include an identification with a parental
feature that disappeared before the time of his earliest memories.
What is transmittedby the psychical pathway are traits that give the individual the particular
form of his human relations, in other words, his personality. But what man’s
behavior thus reflects are not simply these traits, which nevertheless are often
among the most hidden, but the current situation in which the parent, who
was the object of the identification, found himself when the identification
occurred—for example, in a situation of conflict or of inferiority in the married
couple.
这就是为什么人的人格会包括认同于父母的特征。
这个特征在他的最早的记忆的时代消失。
这个心理途径所传递的东西是这些特征。
这些特征给予个人属于他的人际关系的这个特别的形式，换句话说，他的人格。
但是人的行为因此反映的东西，并不仅是这些特征，而是这目前的这个情境。。
这些特征往往是最被隐藏的特征之一。
在这个情境里，父母是认同的目标。
可是，当认同发生时，父母发现他们自己，譬如，会处于冲突或自卑的状态，在婚姻的关系里。
雄伯说
在婚姻关系里，父母本身处于冲突状态，经济，权力，能力处于劣势者必然产生自卑心理，必然也会影响到小孩的人格的认同与成长。
The result of this process is that man’s individual behavior bears the mark
of a certain number of typical psychical relations in which a certain social structure
is expressed, at the very least the constellation within that structure that
especially dominates the first years of his childhood.
雄伯译
这种过程的结果是，人的个人的行为带有某些典型的心理关系的标记。
在这些标记里，某个社会的结果被表达。
至少，在那个结构里面的这个背被被表达。
这个结构里的背景特别支配着他的童年的前几年。
雄伯说
Constellation 可指天空的星座，这里指的是社会结构里，小孩的成长背景。
拉康常用这个constellation术语，强调小孩的心理关系，跟成长背景息息相关。
These fundamental psychical relations have been revealed in analytic experience
and defined by analytic theory with the term “complexes.” We should
see in this term the most concrete, fruitful concept that has been contributed
to the study of human behavior, as opposed to the concept of instinct which,
up until the former’s introduction, had proven to be as inadequate in this field
as it was sterile. Although analytic doctrine has, in fact, related complexes to
instincts, it seems that the theory is better clarified by the former than it is supported
by the latter.
雄伯说
这些基本的心理关系，在精神分析经验里，曾经被揭露出来。
它们被精神分析理论用「情结」的术语定义。
我们应该在这些术语里看出，最具体而有成果的观念。
这个观念曾经被贡献给人类行为的研究，作为跟本能的观念相提并论。
在精神分析领域，「情结」这个观念被介绍之前，本能的这个观念证明不够充分，因为它的贫瘠的。
虽然精神分析信条实际上，将情结与本能相提并论，精神分析理论似乎更加凭借前者澄清，胜过于它受到后者支持。
雄伯说
情结与本能都是弗洛伊德的术语。如何区别？
伊狄浦斯是情结，而死亡却是本能。
拉康则是将死亡本能death instinct改成死亡冲动death drive。
90
It is through the pathway of the complex that the images that inform the
broadest units of behavior are instated in the psyche, images with which the
subject identifies one after the other in order to act out, as sole actor, the drama
of their conflicts. This comedy, which is situated by the genius of the species
under the sign of laughter and tears, is a commedia dell’arte in that each individual
improvises it and makes it mediocre or highly expressive depending on
his gifts, of course, but also depending on a paradoxical law that seems to show
the psychical fecundity 丰饶of all vital insufficiency.
雄伯译
通过这个情结的途径，告知行为的最广泛单位的这些形象，被安置在心理。
主体陆续地认同这些形象，为了要演出它们冲突的这个戏剧，作为单一的演员。
这种喜剧被剧作家的天才定位在欢笑与泪水的迹象之下。
这种喜剧是即兴喜剧，因为每个人即兴创作，平铺直叙或是高潮迭起，不仅是当然端赖个人天份，而是端赖一个矛盾的法则。
这个矛盾的法则似乎显示：所有的生命力虽有不足，在心理的层面却是丰饶。
雄伯说
commedia dell’arte 即兴喜剧是十六世纪，流行于义大利的一种野台喜剧，演员戴着面具，根据剧本即兴演出。
拉康强调的却是它的矛盾法则：所有的生命力虽有不足，在心理的层面却是丰饶。
这用来形容实际人生真是再贴切不过：戴着面具演出，尽管每个人的生命，都力有不贷，但是心理层面的欢笑与泪水，却个个丰饶。
It is a commedia dell’arte in the sense that it is performed in accordance with a typical framework and traditional roles. One can recognize in it the very characters that have typified
folklore, stories, and theater for children and adults—the ogre, the bogeyman,
the miser, and the noble father—that complexes express in more scholarly
terms. We will see the figure of harlequin in an image to which the second
part of this article will lead us.
雄伯译
这个即兴喜剧的意义，在于它依照一个典型的架构及传统的角色演出。
我们能够在里面体认出这些人物。他们将民间传说，故事，及小孩与成年人的戏剧典型化：
吃人女魔，毒鞭老头，守财奴，好爸爸。
我们也能够在里面体认出：情结以更加卖弄学问的术语表达。
我将会在一种形象里，看出小丑的这个人物。
这篇文章的第二部分将会引导我们到达这个形象。
雄伯说
人生如即兴喜剧，里面的人物各有其情结要演出，守财奴，好爸爸，或小丑。
Beyond the “Reality Principle” 73
After having highlighted Freud’s phenomenologically acquired knowledge, I
now turn to a critique of his metapsychology. It begins, precisely, with the
introduction of the notion of “libido.” Freudian psychology, propelling its
induction with an audacity that verges on recklessness, claims to move from
interpersonal relations, isolating them as determined by our culture, to the
biological function that is taken to be their substratum; it locates this function
in sexual desire.
雄伯译
在强调弗洛伊德根据现象学所获得的知识之后，我现在转向他对于元心理学的批判。
他对于元心理学的批判确实开始于对力比多的观念的介绍。
弗洛伊德的心理学，推动力比多的推论，大胆到近乎不顾一切。
它宣称从人际之间的各种关系前进，将这些关系孤立出来，作为是受到我们文化的决定。
然后，它进展到这个生物的功能。这个生物的功能被认为是它们的次级层次。
它定位这个功能在性的欲望。
雄伯说
现象学与元心理学有什么差别？
现象学强调情结与本能，而元心理学强调力比多。
人际之间的各种关系受到文化的决定。
但是力比多是属于生物的功能，譬如性的欲望。
性的欲望要受文化的决定吗？
We must nevertheless distinguish between two different uses of the term
“libido,” which are constantly confounded in analytic theory: libido as an energetic
concept, regulating the equivalence of phenomena, and libido as a substantialist
hypothesis, relating the phenomena to matter.
可是，我们必须区别力比多这个术语的两种不同的用途。
这两种用途在精神分析理论经常让人感到混淆。
一个是力比多作为精力的观念，规范著各种现象的平衡。
另一种力比多作为实体主义的假设，将现象与物质连接起来。
I refer to the hypothesis as substantialist, and not as materialist, because
recourse to the idea of matter is but a naive, outmoded form of authentic materialism.
In any case, it is the metabolism of the sexual function in man that
Freud designates as the basis of the infinitely varied “sublimations” manifested
in his behavior.
我将这个假设认为是实体主义，而不是作为唯物论，因为诉诸于物质的观念仅是真诚唯物论的一种天真而过时的形式。
无论如何，在人身上的性的功能的新陈代谢，弗洛伊德指明，作为在人的行为被展示的变化无穷的「昇华」。
雄伯说
实体主义与唯物论的差别是：唯物论诉诸于物质，而实体主体诉诸于各种变化无穷的昇华。
问题是：各种变化无穷的昇化，是属于文化决定？还是生物精力层次？
I will not debate this hypothesis here, because it seems to me to lie outside
of psychology’s proper field. I will nevertheless emphasize that it is based on
a clinical discovery of essential value: a correlation that constantly manifests
itself between the exercise, type, and anomalies of the sexual function, on the
one hand, and a large number of psychical forms and “symptoms,” on the other
hand. Let me add here that the mechanisms by which the hypothesis is developed,
which are very different from those of associationism, lead to facts that
can be observationally verified.
雄伯说
我在此并不争辩这个假设，因为我觉得它位于心理学的的本土的外面。
可是，我将强调，它的基础是临床对于基本价值的发现：一种相互关系不断地展示它自己，一方面，处于性的功能的运作，类型，及异常，另一方面，处于许多的心理的形式与各种病征之间。
容我在此补充：这些机械结构导致这些能够观察验证的事实。
凭借这些机械结构，这个假设被发展。
这些机械结构跟联想主义associationism大不相同。
雄伯说
拉康在前面就批判过联想主义。他现在要开展的这些机械结构，必然是跟它划清界限。
In effect, if the libido theory posits, for example, that childhood sexuality
goes through an anal stage of organization and grants erotic value to the excretory
function and the excremental object alike, this interest can be observed
in the child exactly where the theory says it should be.
事实上，假如力比多理论提出，譬如，童年的性通过有机组织的肛门阶段，将性爱的价值给予排粪的功能，同时给粪便的客体。这个興趣能够在小孩身上被观察出来，确实就在理论说它应该所在的地方。
As an energetic concept, on the contrary, libido is merely the symbolic notation
for the equivalence between the dynamisms invested by images in behavior.
It is the very condition of symbolic identification and the essential entity of
the rational order, without which no science could be constituted. With this
notation, the efficacy of images—although it cannot yet be tied to a unit of
measurement, but is already provided with a positive or negative sign—can
be expressed through the equilibrium that the images establish and, in some
sense, by balancing a pair of scales.
相反地，作为一个能量的观念，力比多仅是符号象征的标记，作为形象在行为投注的动力结构之间的平衡。
这是符号象征的认同的情境，理性秩序的基本实体。
假如没有这个理性秩序，没有科学能够被构成。
拥有这个标记，形象的有效性，能够被表达，通过形象所建立的这个平衡。
在某种意义，它凭借一种双边的天平。
虽然这种标记尚无法跟测量的单位连成一块，但是它已经被供应一种正面或负面的符号。
The notion of libido in this usage is no longer metapsychological: it is the
instrument of psychology’s progress toward positive knowledge. The combination,
for example, of the notion of libidinal cathexis with a structure as concretely defined as that of the “superego,” represents—regarding both the ideal definition of moral conscience and the functional abstraction of so-called reactions of opposition and imitation—progress that can only be compared to
that provided in the physical sciences by the relationship “weight divided by
volume” when it replaced the quantitative categories heavy and light.
在这种用法，力比多的观念不再是元心理学。
这是心理学朝向实证知识的进步的工具。
譬如，力比多的渲泄的观念，跟一种结构的联合，作为具体被定义为「超我」的观念，代表一种进展。
这种进展仅能够被比喻为在物理的各种科学提供的进展。
根据重量被能量区分的这个关系。
当它取代重量与光的数量范畴。
关于道德良心的理想定义，及对立与模仿的所谓反应的功能性抽离。
雄伯说
力比多—实体主义的假设—能量主义
渲泄–肛门排粪
昇华—超我—道德良心
The elements of positive determination were thus introduced between psychical
realities that a relativistic definition has allowed us to objectify. This
determination is dynamic or relative to the facts regarding desire.
It was possible in this way to establish a scale for the constitution of man’s
objects of interest, and especially for those, which are prodigiously diverse,
that remain an enigma, if psychology in theory posits reality such as knowledge
constitutes it: anomalies of emotion and drive, idiosyncrasies of attraction
and repulsion, phobias and panic attacks, nostalgias and irrational wills;
personal curiosities, selective collecting, inventions of knowledge, and job
vocations.
实证主义的决定的因素因此被介绍，处于心理的现实界之间。
一个相对主义的定义已经让我们能够将这些心理的现实界客观化。
这个决定论是动力的，或是跟关于欲望的事实相对。
以这种方式，一种天平得以建立，来形成人的興趣的客体。
特别是那些具有巨大差异的客体，它们始终是个谜团。
假如理论的心理学提出诸如组成它的知识的现实：情感与冲动的异常，吸引与排斥的各种怪癖，恐惧与惊慌的侵袭，怀旧与非理性的意志，个人的好奇心，选择性的收集，知识的发明，及工作的职业。
雄伯说
实证主义—相对主义—客观化
决定论的现实与欲望的事实相对。
人的興趣的客体是一种平衡的天平。
这些客体始终是个谜团。
On the other hand, a classification of what one might call the “imaginary
posts” that constitute the personality was defined, posts which are distributed
and in which the images mentioned above as informing development—the id,
the ego, and the archaic and secondary instances of the superego—are composed
according to their types.
在另一方面，我们所谓的「想象界的立场」的分类被定义。
想象界的立场构成人格。
这些立场被分配。
在这些立场，以上被提到的这些形象，作为告知的发展。
这些形象被组成，依照它们的类型。
这些形象是指本我id，自我ego，以及超我这个过时而且次要的例子。
雄伯说
现实界有唯物论现实界，符号象征现实，心理现实界，知识现实界。
超越这些现实界，要凭借想象界的各种立场。
Two questions arise here: how is the reality to which man’s knowledge is
universally attuned constituted by these images, these objects of interest? And
how is the /constituted, in which the subject recognizes himself, by his typical
identifications?
在此产生两个问题：当人类的知识普遍性地调适于这个现实结，这个现实界如何由这些形象，興趣的这些客体构成？这个「我」如何被构成，在那里，主体体认出他自己，根据他的典型的各种认同？
Freud answers these two questions by again moving onto metapsychological
ground. He posits a “reality principle” whose role in his theory I propose
to critique. But before doing so, I must first examine what has been provided
by the studies that have been contributing to the new psychological science,
alongside Freud’s discipline, regarding the reality of the image and forms of
knowledge. These will constitute the two parts of my second article.
弗洛伊德回答这两个问题。
他再次凭借进入元心理学的场域。
他提出一个现实原则。
这个原则在他的理论扮演的角色，我建议予以批判。
但是在这样做之前，我首先必须检查这些研究已经供应什么。
这些研究一直提供贡献，对于这个新的心理科学，跟弗洛伊德的学说，关于「形象的现实与知识的形式」。
这将构成我的第二篇文章的两个部分。
Marienbad and Noirmoutier, August—October 1936
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