Archive for June, 2014


June 30, 2014

20.11.57 42

This is the whole story of the novel and it seems that to a
certain extent it is a very instructive and moral story that
could be used at the level of what we want to demonstrate.
Here then we have our Heinrich Heine who has created this
character as a background, and this character has produced with
the signifier famillionaire, the double dimension of metaphorical
creation, and on the other hand a sort of new metonymical object,
the famillionaire, whose position you can situate here and here.


I showed you last day that to conceive of the existence of the
signifying creation called the famillionaire we can find here,
even though here of course attention is not drawn to this aspect
of things, all the debris, all the ordinary waste from the
reflection of a metaphorical creation on an object; namely, all
(13) the underlying signifiers, all the signifying packets into
which we can break the term famillionaire, the fames, the fama,
the infamy, in fact anything you like, the famulus, everything
that Hirsen-Hyacinth effectively is for his caricature of a boss,
Cristoforo Gumpelino.


And here in this place, we should
systematically search every time we are dealing with a formation
of the unconscious as such, for what I have called the debris of
the metonymical object which certainly, for reasons that are
altogether clear from experience, are shown to be naturally more
important when the metaphorical creation, one might say, has not


I mean when it has culminated in nothing, as in the
case that I have just shown you of the forgetting of a name; when
the name Signorelli is forgotten to rediscover the trace of this
hollow, of this hole that we find at the level of metaphor, the
metonymical debris take on all their importance.


The fact that at the level of the disappearance of the term
“Herr”, it is something that forms part of the whole metonymical
context within which “Herr” is isolated, namely the context of
Bosnia Herzogovina, that allows us to restore it, takes on here
all its importance.

在这个术语的消失的层次,有某件东西形成整个换喻的内容。在这个内容里,“Herr” 被孤立出来,换句话说,Bosnia Herzogovina 的内容。它让我们能够恢复它,在此具有它的一切意义。

But let us return to our famillionaire.
Our famillionaire is produced then at the level of the message. I
(13) pointed out to you that we would find ourselves at the level
of f amillionaire when we were dealing with the metonymical
correspondences of the paradoxical formation that is produced at
the level of the forgetting of a name.

但是让我们回到famillionaire。 我们的famillionaire 当时在讯息的层次被产生。我跟你们指出,我们将会发现我们自己处于famillionaire的层次,当我们正在处理悖论形成的换喻的对应。这个悖论的形成在忘记名字的层次被产生。

In the case of Signorelli
we should also find something corresponding to the concealment,
to the disappearance of Signor, in the case of the forgetting of
a name.

在Signorelli的情况,我们也应该发现某件东西,对应于这个隐藏,对应于Signor 的消失,在忘记名字的这个情况。

We should also find it at the level of the witticism.
This is where we stopped. How can we think, reflect on what
happens at the level of famillionaire, given that the witty
metaphor has succeeded in this case? There must be something
that up to a certain point corresponds, marks in some way, the
residue, the refuse of the metaphorical creation.




June 30, 2014

20.11.57 33

I showed some equivalent things that are very like it in the
order of pure and simple parapraxes – but which on the contrary
found, in the conditions that the accident occurs, to be
registered and given a value as a meaningful phenomenon;
precisely of being a generation of meaning at the level of a
Signifying neo-formation, of a sort of co-lapsing, of signifiers
that in this instance, as Freud puts it, are compressed into one
another, stuck one against the other, and that this created
meaning, and I showed you its nuances and its enigmatic
qualities. Between what and what?


Between a certain evocation of
(10) a properly metaphorical manner of being: “he treated me
quite famillionairely”; and a certain evocation of a particular
type of being, a verbal being that is ready to take on the
peculiar animation whose ghost I already brandished before you
with the famillionaire;


the famillionaire in so far as he makes
his entry into the world as the representative of something that
is very likely to take on for us a much more consistent reality
and weight than the more hidden reality and weight of the


but which I also showed you as having a certain
something in existence that is vivid enough to really represent a
personage characteristic of a certain historical epoque. And I
pointed out to you that Heine was not the only one to have
invented it, I talked to you about Gide’s Prometheus ill-bound
and his “miglionnaire”.


It would be very interesting to pause for an instant at the
Gidean creation of Prometheus ill-bound. The millionaire in
Prometheus ill-bound is the banker Zeus, and there is nothing
more surprising than the way this character is elaborated. I do
not know why in our memories of Gide’s work, it is eclipsed
perhaps by the ineffable brilliance of Palude, of which it is
nonetheless a sort of correspondent and double.


It is the same character who is involved in both. There are many features here
(11) that overlap: the millionaire, in any case, is someone who
is found to have rather peculiar relationships with his fellows,
because it is here that we see emerge the idea of the gratuitous
act. Zeus, the banker, who is incapable of having with any other
person a true and authentic interchange, since he is identified
one might say with absolute power, with this aspect of the pure
signifier that there is in money, that questions one might say
the existence of every possible kind of significant exchange, can
find no other way of escaping from his solitude than to proceed
in the following way:


as Gide puts it, to go out on the street
with in one hand an envelope containing what at the time was
something of value, a five hundred franc note, and in the other
hand a box in the ear, if one can put it like that; he lets the
envelope fall and, when someone obligingly picks it up, asks him
to write a name on the envelope, in return for which he gives him
a blow in the face.


And it it is not for nothing that he is Zeus.
It is a tremendous blow that leaves him dazed and hurt; then he
goes off and sends the contents of the envelope to the person
whose name had been written by the person whom he had just
treated so roughly.


In this way he finds himself in the position of not having to
make a choice, of having compensated, one might say for a
gratuitous piece of badness by a gift that owes absolutely
(12) nothing to him.


His choice is to restore by his action the
circuit of exchange into which he cannot introduce himself in any
way or from any angle, to participate in it in this way by
attraction, as it were, to engender a sort of debt in which he
does not participate, and all of whose consequences, which will
develop in the rest of the novel through the fact that the two
characters themselves never succeed in connecting what they owe
to one another; one will become almost blind and the other will
die of it.


无意识的形成 29

June 29, 2014

无意识的形成 29
20.11.57 40
This had of course already made its appearance, but only up to a
certain point and masked in some way; masked in so far as what is
graspable at the level of discourse, of the concrete discourse,
always presents itself with respect to this generation of meaning
in an ambiguous position;

this language, in effect, being already
turned towards objects that include in themselves something of
the creation that they have received from language itself and
(8) something that had already been the object precisely of a
whole tradition, even of a whole philosophical rhetoric, that
which asks the question in the most general sense of the critique
of judgement:


what is the value of language? What do these
connections represent in relation to the connections at which
they appear to culminate? That they should even put themselves
forward as representing the connections that exist in the real


It is at all of this, in fact, that there culminates a critical
tradition, a philosophical tradition, whose high point and summit
we can define by Kant, and already we can in a certain way
interpret, think of Kant’s critique as the most profound
questionning of every kind of reality, in so far as it is submitted
to a priori categories not only of aesthetics but also of logic.


Here indeed is something that represents a pivotal point from
which human meditation can begin again to rediscover that
something that was not at all perceived in the way of asking the
question at the level of discourse, at the level of logical
discourse, at the level of the correspondence between a certain
syntax of the intentional circle


in so far as it is closed in each sentence, to take it up again right through this book on the critique of logical discourse, to reconsider again the action of
the word in this creative chain in which it is always capable of
engendering new meanings, most obviously by means of metaphor;
(9) and by way of metonymy in a fashion that – I will explain why
in due course – has up to recent times always remained profoundly


This introduction is already difficult enough to make me return
to my example of famillionaire and to make us try here to
complete it.


We only arrived at this notion in the course of an intentional
discourse in which, while the subject presents himself as wishing
to say something, something else is produced that goes beyond his
wish, something that presents itself as an accident, as a
paradox, as a scandal, a neo-formation, that appears with certain
features that are not at all the negative ones of a sort of
stumbling like in a parapraxis which is what it might have been –



无意识的形成 28

June 28, 2014

无意识的形成 28
20.11.57 39
But naming them is not what is important. The core of what he
puts forward, the key to his analysis is this recognition of
common structural laws. This, as he says, is how you recognize
that a process has been drawn into the unconscious. It is what
is structured according to the laws, structured according to
their types. This is what is in question when the unconscious is
in question.


What happens then? What happens at the level of what I am
teaching you, is that we are now able, that is after Freud, to
recognize this event that is all the more demonstrative because
it is really extremely surprising.


That these laws, this
structure of the unconscious, that by which a phenomenon can be
recognized as belonging to the formations of the unconscious is
strictly identifiable with, overlaps, and I would even say
further, overlaps in an exhaustive fashion what linguistic
analysis allows us to detect as being the essential modes of the
(6) formation of meaning, in so far as this meaning is engendered
by combinations of signifiers.


The term signifier takes on its full meaning from a certain
moment in the evolution of linguistics, that at which there is
isolated the notion of the signifying element, a notion very
closely linked in the actual history to the separating out of the
notion of the phoneme.


Since it is uniquely localized by its
associations with this notion, the notion of signifier, in so far
as it allows us to take language at the level of a certain
elementary register, can be doubly defined, on the one hand as a
diachronic chain, and, as a possibility within this chain, of a
permanent possibility of substitution in the synchronic sense.


This grasp at an elementary level of the functions of the
signifier is a recognition at the level of this function of an
original power which is precisely that in which we can localize a
certain generation of something called meaning, and something
that in itself is very rich in psychological implications, and
that receives a kind of complement, without even needing to push
any further its own way, its research, to plough any further its
own furrow, in what Freud himself had already prepared for us at
this point of conjunction between the field of linguistics and
the proper field of psychoanalysis.


It is to show us that these
psychological effects, that these effects of the generation of
(7) meaning are nothing other than this, and overlap exactly what
Freud show us as being the formations of the unconscious.


In other words, we are able to grasp something that remained
elided up to then in what can be called the place of man, and it
is precisely this: the relationship that there is between the
fact that for him there exist objects of a heterogeneity, of a
diversity, of a variability that is truly surprising compared to
the biological objects that we could expect as corresponding to
his existence as a living organism, namely something particular
that presents a certain style, a certain superabundant and
luxuriant diversity, and at the same time something impossible to
grasp as such as a biological object, something that comes from
the world of human objects, something that is found in this
instance to be closely and indissolubly related to the
submission, to the subduction, of the human being by the
phenomenon of language.



无意识的形成 27

June 27, 2014

无意识的形成 27
20.11.57 38

There is no need to refer to it since a simple, sincere inspection of the life of any one of us helps us to see that this so-called power of synthesis is more than held in check; and that really, unless we are dealing in fiction, there
is nothing more common in experience than what we can call not
just the incoherence of our motives, but even more, I would say
the sentiment of their profound lack of motivation, of their
fundamental alienation.


So that if Freud puts forward a notion of
the subject that operates beyond this, this subject that is so
difficult to grasp in ourselves, if he shows us its sources and
its action, there is something that should always have given us
pause, namely that this subject – in so far as it introduces a
hidden unity, a secret unity into what is apparent to us at the
most banal level of experience, our profound division, our
profound fragmentation, our profound alienation with respect to
(4) our own motives – that this subject is other.


Is it simply a kind of double, a subject that is perhaps a bad
ego, as some have said, since in fact it conceals some rather
surprising tendencies, or simply another ego, or as you might
rather think I am saying, the true ego? Is that really what is in
question? Is it simply an understudy, purely and simply an other
whom we can conceive of as being structured like the ego of our


That is the question, and that is also why we approach it this
year at the level and under the title of formations of the


The question is of course already present, and offers a response.
It is not structured in the same way: in this experiential I
(moi) something is presented that has its own laws. It has in
fact an organization of its formations, and has not only a style
but also a particular structure.


Freud approaches this structure
and deconstructs it at the level of neuroses, at the level of
symptoms, at the level of dreams, at the level of parapraxes, at
the level of the witticism. He recognizes it as being unique and


The whole core of what he exposes to us at the
level of the witticism, and this is the reason why I chose it as
a point of entry, rests on this; it is his fundamental argument
for making of the witticism a manifestation of the unconscious.


This means that it is structured, that it is organized according
(5) to the same laws as those we find in the dream. He recalls
these laws to us, he enumerates them, he articulates them, he
recognizes them in the structure of the witticism.


They are the
laws of condensation; the laws of displacement; essentially and
above all something of the other adheres to them; he also
recognizes in them what I translated at the end of my article as
égards aux nécessités de la mise en scene (tr: considerations of
representability). He introduces this also as a third element.




June 26, 2014




Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller




The Object Relation 1956-1957

客体关系 1956-1957












I Introduction导论

II The three forms of object lack客体欠缺的三种形式

III The signifier and the Holy Spirit能指与神圣精神

IV The dialectic of frustration挫折的辩证法

V  On bundling as analysis, and its consequences






VI  The primacy of the phallus and the young homosexual girl


VII 1.:, A Child is Being Beaten and the young homosexual girl


VIII WS Dora and the young homosexual girl






DC The function of the veil


X Identification with the phallus


XI  The phallus and the unsatiated mother









The Z-shaped schema.



The object, lost and refound.




The object, anxiety, the hole.



The fetish and the phobic object.



This year we shall speak on a topic to which the historical evolution of

psychoanalysis, or what is thus named, might give a central position in

theory and in practice, whether in a way that is explicit or not.




This topic is the object relation.




Why did I not choose that when we began these seminars, since it was

already current, primary, critical? Precisely for the reason which motivates

the second part of my title — and Freudian structures.




This topic could be treated, in effect, only after a certain distance had

been taken on the question. We had first to consider the structures in

which Freud has shown us that analysis takes place and operates,

especially the .complex structure of the relation between the two subjects

present in analysis, the analysand, and the analyst. It is to this that our

three years of commentary and criticism of Freud’s texts have been

dedicated, as I shall recall for you briefly.





The first year dealt with the very elements of the technical management

of the cure, that is, with the ideas of transference and resistance. The

second year was concerned with the foundation of the Freudian experience

and discovery, namely, the idea of the unconscious, which I believe I have

sufficiently shown to be what obliged Freud to introduce the principles,

literally paradoxical on the dialectical plane, which figure in Beyond thePleasure Principle. Finally, during the course of the third year, I gave you aclear example of the absolute necessity of isolating that essential

articulation of symbolism which is called the signifier, in order to

understand anything at all, analytically speaking, of the strictly paranoiacfield of the psychoses.






At the end of these three years of criticism, we are thus armed with a

certain number of terms and schemas. The spatiality of the latter is not to

be taken in the intuitive sense of the term schema, but in another perfectlylegitimate, sense, which is topological — it is not a matter of

localizations, but of the relations between places, interposition,

for example, or succession, sequence. Our elaboration culminates in a

schema that we can call the schema, which is the following –





[Diagram, p. 12.]

(Es) S . . o’ other

(Ego) o . . 0 Other





This schema initially provides a notation of the relation of the subject

to the Other. As it is constituted at the beginning of analysis, it is a

relation, of virtual speech by  which he subject receives his own message

from the Other, in the form of speech which is unconscious.






message is, forbidden him, it is profoundly misconstrued [

meconnu] it is deformed, arrested, intercepted, because of the

interception of the imaginary relation


between o and o’, between the ego and the other, which is its typical

object. The imaginary relation, which is essentially an alienated relation,

interrupts, slows down, inhibits, usually inverts, and profoundly

misconstrues the speech relation between the subject and the Other, the

great Other, in so far as this is another subject, a subject par excellence

capable of deceiving.


这个讯息,由于被禁止给他,深深地被错误解释。这个讯息受到扭曲,组碍,拦截,因为在o o’之间,在自我与他者之间的想像的关系受到拦截,因为他者是自我的客体。想像的关系基本上是异化的关系。这个关系会干涉,缓慢,潜抑,通常还会逆转,深深地错误解释主体与大他者,这位伟大的大他者之间的言说关系。因为这是另外一个主体,能够欺骗的无与伦比的主体。





It is not in vain to have introduced this schema into analytic experience,

seeing how that is formulated today by an ever increasing number of

analysts, who give prevalence in analytic theory to the object

without, however, sufficiently commenting on it.




They recenter the

dialectic of the pleasure principle and the reality principle upon it, and

they found analytic progress upon a rectification of the subject’s relation to

the object, considered as a dual relation, which is, they then say, in

speaking of the analytic situation, extremely simple. This relation of

subject to object, which tends more and more to occupy the center of

analytic theory, is precisely what we shall put to test.





Once the object relation considered as dual is seen to correspond

precisely to line o-o’ of our schema, can one thus construct a

satisfactory whole from the phenomena offered to observation in analytic

experience? Does this instrument all by itself allow us to reply to the

facts? Can the more complex schema that we have suggested be put aside,

indeed, must it be discarded?




That the object relation has become, at least in appearance, the principal

theoretical element in analytical explanation, is something that I can

demonstrate to you from a recently published Collective work, to which, infact, the term collective applies particularly well.’ I cannot say that I am

inviting you to delve into it. You will see object relations overvalued and

promoted from one end to the other in a way that is not always very

satisfying in its articulation, but whose monotony and uniformity are

surely striking. You will see the object relation promoted in art article

entitled Evolution de la psychanalyse, and, as the final term in this

evolution, you will see in the article, La Clinique psychanalytique, a

presentation of clinical work which centers it entirely upon the object

relation. Perhaps I might give you some idea of where such a presentation

can lead.






Taken as a whole, the collection is quite striking. One sees analytic

practitioners try to organize their thinking and the understanding they

might have of their own experience around the object relation, without its

seeming to give them full and complete satisfaction, but, on the other

hand, not without its orienting their practice and penetrating it most

profoundly. One cannot say that the fact that they conceive their

experience in these terms is without consequence in their modes of

intervention, in the orientation given to the analysis, and also its results.




That is what one cannot possibly fail to recognize [meconnaitre], in simply

reading them. Analytic theory and practice, it has always been said, cannot

be dissociated, and from the moment that one conceptualizes the

experience in a particular way, it is inevitable that it will also be directed in

that way. Certainly, the practical results can only be partially glimpsed.





To introduce the question of the object relation, and more precisely the

question whether or not it is legitimate and sound to give it a central place

in analytic theory, I shall remind you at least briefly of what this concept

owes, or does not owe, to Freud himself. I shall do so because for us

starting with a commentary on Freud is a sort of guide, and almost a

technical limitation that we have imposed upon ourselves.




Moreover, this year I have sensed in you some questions, if not

disquiet, as to whether I would or would not start off with Freudian texts.

And no doubt it is very difficult, with regard to the object relation, to start

from Freud’s texts themselves, because the object relation is not in them. I

am of course speaking of what is here very strictly taken to be a deviation

in analytic theory. I must therefore start with recent texts and at the same

time, with a critique of their positions. On the other hand, there is no

doubt that we must ultimately refer to the Freudian position, and, at the

same time, we cannot avoid dealing, even if very rapidly, with what

revolves around the very notion of the object in the fundamental themes

that are strictly Freudian.






We cannot do that at the beginning in a way that is fully spelled out. It

is precisely at the end that we shall come back to it, and that we shall be

able to articulate it.




I want, therefore, simply to make a brief reminder that this would not

even be conceivable if there were not behind us three years of

collaboration in textual analysis, and if we had not already encountered

the theme of the object in its various forms.





Freud, of course, speaks of the object. The final part of Three Essays on

the Theory of Sexuality is called precisely “The Finding of an Object”, “Die

Objektfindung”. One is implicitly speaking of the object each time that the

notion of reality comes into play.






One speaks of it in yet a third waywhenever the ambivalence of certain fundamental relations is brought

into play — namely, the fact that the subject makes himself an object for the

other, the fact that there is a particular type of relation in which reciprocity

with regard to an object is patent, and is even a constituent fact.






I would like to put the strongest emphasis on the three modes in which

notions relative to the object before us appear. If you look at Chapter Three

of the Three Essays, you will see something which was already there at the

time that Freud wrote the Entwurf, a text which, I remind you, was only

published by a sort of historical accident, for not only did Freud prefer not

to publish it, but one might say that it was published against his will. Still,

in looking at this first sketch of his psychology, we find the same formula

with regard to the object.






Freud insists that for man, every means to

finding the object is, and is ever, only the pursuit of a drive [tendance] in

which what is at stake is a lost object, an object to be refound.




It is not at all a matter of the object considered in modern theory as

being the fully satisfying object, the typical object, the object par excellence,

the harmonious object, the object that founds man in an adequate reality,

in the reality which gives proof of maturity — the famous genital object.






is striking to see that at the moment when he fabricates the theory of

instinctual development as it was revealed in the earliest analytic

experiences, Freud indicates that the object is grasped by means of a search

for the lost object. The object that corresponds to an advanced state of

instinctual maturation is an object found again, the refound object of early

weaning, the object that first formed the point of attachment in the child’s

earliest satisfactions.




It is clear that a discordance is established by the mere fact of this

repetition. A nostalgia binds the subject to a lost object, and directs the

entire effort of the search. It marks the newly found object

with the sign of

an impossible repitition since this is precisely not the same object — it could

never be.







The primacy of this dialectic puts a fundamental tension at the

center of the subject-object relation, which means that what is sought is

not sought in the same way as what will be found.




It isthe search for a satisfaction past and outgrown that the new object is

sought and it is found and embraced elsewhere it was sought.




There is a fundamental distance introduced by the essentially conflictual

element which all search for the object entails. This is the first form in

which the relation to the object appears in Freud.





精神分析的侵凌性 3/4

June 3, 2014

A point, let it be said in passing, whose anthropological
implications cannot be too highly stressed. What concerns us here is the function that I shall call the pacifying function of the ego ideal, the connexion between its libidinal
normativity and a cultural normativity bound up from the dawn of history with the imago
of the father. Here, obviously, lies the import that Freud’s work, Totem and Taboo, still
retains, despite the mythical circularity that vitiates it, in so far as it derives from the
mythological event, the murder of the father, the subjective dimension that gives this
event meaning, namely, guilt.

让我们顺便提到,有一点,它具有人类学的暗示,无论如何强调也不过分。我们在此所关心的事情,是我所谓的自我理想具有安抚的功能,它的生命力比多的规范,与文化的规范之间的联结,自古以来,它就跟父亲的意象息息相关。在此,显而易见地,弗洛依德的著作「图腾与禁忌」的意义就在那里。尽管神秘的流通让它无效,因为它从神话事件得来,它依旧保留弑父 ,给予这个事件的意义的主体性维度,那就是罪恶感。

Freud shows us, in fact, that the need to participate, which neutralizes the conflict
inscribed after the murder in the situation of rivalry between the brothers, is the basis of
the identification with the paternal Totem. Thus the Oedipal identification is that by
which the subject transcends the aggressivity that is constitutive of the primary subjective
individuation. I have stressed elsewhere how it constitutes a step in the establishment of
that distance by which, with feelings like respect, is realized a whole affective
assumption of one’s neighbour.


Only the anti-dialectical mentality of a culture which, in order to be dominated by
objectifying ends, tends to reduce all subjective activity to the being of the ego, can
justify the astonishment of a Van den Steinen when confronted by a Bororo who says:
‘I’m an ara.’


And all the sociologists of ‘the primitive mind’ busy themselves around this
profession of identity, which, on reflexion, is no more surprising than declaring, ‘I’m a
doctor’ or ‘I’m a citizen of the French Republic’, and which certainly presents fewer
logical difficulties than the statement, ‘I’m a man’, which at most can mean no more
than, ‘I’m like he whom I recognize to be a man, and so recognize myself as being such.’
In the last resort, these various formulas are to be understood only in reference to the
truth of ‘I is an other’, an observation that is less astonishing to the intuition of the poet
than obvious to the gaze of the psychoanalyst.


Who, if not us, will question once more the objective status of this ‘I’, which a
historical evolution peculiar to our culture tends to confuse with the subject? This
anomaly should be manifested in its particular effects on every level of language, and
first and foremost in the grammatical subject of the first person in our languages, in the ‘I
love’ that hypostatizes the tendency of a subject who denies it. An impossible mirage in
linguistic forms among which the most ancient are to be found, and in which the subject
appears fundamentally in the position of being determinant or instrumental of action.


Let us leave aside the critique of all the abuses of the cogito ergo sum, and recall that,
in my experience, the ego represents the centre of all the resistances to the treatment of


It was inevitable that analysis, after stressing the reintegration of the tendencies
excluded by the ego, in so far as they are subjacent to the symptoms that it tackled in the
first instance, and which were bound up for the most part with the failures of Oedipal
identification, should eventually discover the ‘moral’ dimension of the problem.


And, in a parallel fashion, there came to the forefront the role played by the aggressive
tendencies in the structure of the symptoms and of the personality, on the one hand, and,
on the other, all sorts of conceptions that stressed the value of the liberated libido, one of
the first of which can be attributed to French psychoanalysts under the register of


It is clear, in effect, that genital libido operates as a supersession, indeed a blind
supersession, of the individual in favour of the species, and that its sublimating effects in
the Oedipal crisis lie at the origin of the whole process of the cultural subordination of man.


Nevertheless, one cannot stress too strongly the irreducible character of the
narcissistic structure, and the ambiguity of a notion that tends to ignore the constancy of
aggressive tension in all moral life that involves subjection to this structure: in fact no
notion of oblativity could produce altruism from that structure.


And that is why La
Rochefoucauld could formulate his maxim, in which his rigour matches the fundamental
theme of this thought, on the incompatibility of marriage and sexual pleasure (délices).


We would allow the sharpness of our experience to become blunted if we deluded
ourselves, if not our patients, into believing in some kind of pre-established harmony that
would free of all aggressive induction in the subject the social conformisms made
possible by the reduction of symptoms.


And the theoreticians of the Middle Ages showed another kind of penetration, by
which the problem of love was discussed in terms of the two poles of a ‘physical’ theory
and an ‘ecstatic’ theory, each involving the re-absorption of man’s ego, whether by reintegration
into a universal good, or by the effusion of the subject towards an object
without alterity.


This narcissistic moment in the subject is to be found in all the genetic phases of the
individual, in all the degrees of human accomplishment in the person, in an earlier stage
in which it must assume a libidinal frustration and a later stage in which it is transcended
in a normative sublimation.


This conception allows us to understand the aggressivity involved in the effects of all
regression, all arrested development, all rejection of typical development in the subject,
especially on the plane of sexual realization, and more specifically with each of the great
phases that the libidinal transformations determine in human life, the crucial function of
which has been demonstrated by analysis: weaning, the Oedipal stage, puberty, maturity,
or motherhood, even the climacteric.


And I have often said that the emphasis that was
placed at first in psychoanalytic theory on the aggressive turning round of the Oedipal
conflict upon the subject’s own self was due to the fact that the effects of the complex
were first perceived in failures to resolve it.


There is no need to emphasize that a coherent theory of the narcissistic phase clarifies
the fact of the ambivalence proper to the ‘partial drives’ of scoptophilia, sadomasochism,
and homosexuality, as well as the stereotyped, ceremonial formalism of the aggressivity
that is manifested in them: we are dealing here with the often very little ‘realized’ aspect
of the apprehension of others in the practice of certain of these perversions, their
subjective value, in actual fact very different from that given to them in the existential
reconstructions, striking though they be, of a Sartre.


I should also like to mention in passing that the decisive function that we attribute to
the imago of one’s own body in the determination of the narcissistic phase enables us to
understand the clinical relation between the congenital anomalies of functional
lateralization (left-handedness) and all forms of inversion of sexual and cultural
normalization. This reminds one of the role attributed to gymnastics in the ‘beautiful and
good’ ideal of education among the Ancient Greeks and leads us to the social thesis with
which I will conclude.


无意识的形成 26

June 1, 2014

无意识的形成 26

37.11.57 1
Seminar 3: 20 november ,1957

We have approached our task then by way of the witticism, the
first example of which we began to analyse the last day, the one
that Freud made his own in the famillionaire joke, while at the
same time attributing it to Hirsch-Hyacinth, himself a very
significant poetic creation.


It is not by chance that it is
against this background of poetic creation that Freud chose his
first example, and that we ourselves have found, as is usually
the case, that this original example turned out to be
particularly suitable to portray, to demonstrate, what we want to
demonstrate here.


You have no doubt perceived that this brings us to the analysis
of the psychological phenomenon that is in question in the
witticism, at the level of a signifying articulation which, no
doubt, even though it may interest you, at least I hope a good
number of you, is nonetheless the object, as you can well
(2) imagine, of something that might easily appear disturbing. I
mean that without doubt this something that surprises, upsets
your way of thinking is also at the very core of the renewal of
the analytic experience that I am carrying on here with you, and
concerns the place, I would say up to a certain point the
existence, of the subject. Someone asked me about this, someone
who is certainly far from being badly informed, nor indeed badly
informed about the question itself, nor badly informed about what
I am trying to contribute to it.


Someone asked me the question: “But what then becomes of the
subject? Where is it?”


The reply is easy when you are dealing with philosophers, because
it was a philosopher who asked me the question at the
Philosophical Society where I was speaking. I was tempted to
reply: “But on this point I could easily ask you to answer your
own question, and say that I leave it to philosophers to speak
about it. After all, I do not see why I should do all the work.”


This question of the elaboration of the notion of the subject
certainly needs to be revised as a result of the Freudian
experience. If there is something that has to be modified in it,
this is hardly a cause for surprise.


In other words, if Freud
has introduced something essential, should we still really expect
to see intelligent people, particularly psychoanalysts, all the
(3) more completely overwhelmed by a particular notion of the
subject, embodied in a certain style of thinking, as being simply
the ego – which is nothing but a return to what we can call the
grammatical confusions of the problem of the subject, the
identification of the ego with a power of synthesis that
certainly no data of experience can allow us to sustain. You
could even say that there is no need to draw on the Freudian