Archive for October, 2015

分析家作为欲望的客体

October 29, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OBJECT OF DESIRE
分析家作为欲望的客体

Lacan’s rekindling of Freud’s ‘rule of abstinence’ as a symbolic,
intersubjective relationship between the subject of the analysand and the
analyst as Other subject subsisted until the late 1950s. It gave way to an
entirely different conception of the analyst’s position when Lacan realized
that the analyst’s functioning as Other subject is not a sufficient guarantee
for excluding the occurrence of identifications between analyst and
analysand, or for preventing the deterioration of the analytic treatment
into a reciprocal working alliance. The following passage from Seminar V
betrays Lacan’s mercurial self-criticism concerning the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other:

拉康重新启示弗洛伊德的“节制的规则”,作为是象征,互为主体性的关系,处于分析者的主体,与作为大他者主体的分析家之间的关系。这个重新启示一直维持到1950年代,才被取代,由分析家的地位的具有完全不同的观念取代。当拉康体会到,分析家的充当大他者主体的功能,并不是充分的保证,作为排除认同的发生,处于分析家与分析者之间的认同的发生。或作为阻止精神分析的关系的恶化成为互惠的运作的联盟。从第四研讨班的以下的段落,显露出拉康的敏捷的自我批判,关于主体与大他者之间的象征的关系。

[T]he distinction between the Other and himself [the subject] is
initially the most difficult distinction to make…These two modes
of ambiguity, these two limits—that which is situated on the
imaginary level and the one belonging to the symbolic order,
through which desire is founded in the speech of the Other—these
two modes of crossing which imply that the subject alienates
himself, do not coincide…Yet there is always the question as to
what happens when these subjects are two of a kind, that is to say,
when the subject is supporting itself in the presence of the Other.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:357–358)

大他者与他自己(主体)之间的区别最初是最困难作的区别。这两个模糊嗳昧的模式,这两个限制—被定位在想像的层次与属于象征秩序的层次—这两个交会的模式暗示着,主体异化他自己,并没有巧合。可是,总是存在着这个问题,关于发生的事情,当这两个主体是属于相同种类的主体。换句话说,当主体正在支持它自己,在大他者的面前。

Here Lacan acknowledged that a relationship between two subjects,
despite one of them being in the position of Other, is as much open to
reciprocal solidarity as an imaginary bond between two egos. Although
the result may be a symbolic instead of an imaginary identification, it is
much the same problem.32 The issue is illustrated by a common experience
of analysts who insist that the patient comply with the rule of free
association.

在此,拉康承认,处于两个主体之间的关系,尽管其中一位处于大他者的立场。这个关系同样开发给互惠的团聚,如同想像的盟约,处于两个自我之间。虽然这个结果可能是象征,而不是想像的认同。这是相同的难体。这个问题由精神分析家的共同经验来说明。这位精神分析家坚持,病人应该同意自由联想的规则。

The more they demand that the patient comply with the
ground rule the more they encounter ‘resistance’, in the form of a
reciprocal demand of the patient that the analyst speak, or a general
unwillingness to cooperate.33 In Seminar V Lacan exemplified this by
referring to what happens when a mother (as Other subject) demands
something of her child (as subject). Before long, the child discovers that
its possession of what the Other is asking for equips it with the power to
return the question: You want me to give what I have, but I will only give
it to you if you are willing to give me what you have first. ‘On the level
of demand’, Lacan stated, ‘the subject and the Other are in a situation of
reciprocity’ (ibid.: 359). Seeking to overcome this deadlock, Lacan started
to insist on the crucial importance of the Other’s desire:

分析家越是要求病人应该同意这个基本规则,他们越是遭遇到“抗拒”,用病人的互惠的要求的形式,病人要求精神分析家言说,或病人通常不愿意合作。在第四研讨班,拉康提到一个发生的例子说明。当一位母亲(作为大者主体),要求某件属于小孩的东西(作为主体)。不久,小孩发现,它拥有大他者要求的东西,让它具有这个权力来回应这个问题:你要我给予我拥有的东西,但是我将仅是给出它,假如你愿意给予我,你首先拥有的东西。“在要求的层次”,拉康陈述,“主体与大他者处于互惠的情境”。当拉康尝试克服这个僵局时,他开始坚持大他者的欲望的这个关键的重要性。

What I would like to draw your attention to, is the function of this
desire of the Other, insofar as it makes it possible for the distinction
between the subject and the Other to establish itself once and for
all …What needs to be introduced and what is there from the start,
latent from the beginning, is that, beyond what the subject demands
and what the Other demands from the subject, there is the necessary
presence and dimension of what the Other desires.
(ibid.: 359, italics added)

我想要吸引你们注意的东西是,大他者的欲望的这个功能。因为它让这个区别成为可能,主体与大他者之间的区别,为了一劳永逸地建立它自己。所需要被介绍的东西,与从一开始就存在那里的东西,从一开始就潜在的东西是:超越主体的要求的东西,与大他者从主体要求东东西,必然存在着大他者欲望的东西的维度。

In Lacan’s theory of the late 1950s, desire originated in the human
being’s incapability to express its vital, biological needs through the
linguistic function of demand. Because human beings grow up in a
symbolic world, they are pushed to employ language as a means for
conveying their needs to others. A child does not simply act upon its
bodily processes when it is hungry, it makes its need clear to an Other by
demanding food—whether intentionally and independently, or primarily
through the Other’s reading of the child’s conduct. The same holds for
the Other, who does not merely supply the food the child is asking for,
but who demands that the child allow itself to be fed (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:238).

在拉康1950年代晚期的理论,欲望起源于人类的没有能力表达它的生命的生物的需要,凭借要求的语言的功能。因为人们成长于象征的世界里,他们被迫运用语言,作为工具,来传达他们的需要给别人。小孩并不仅根据它的身体的过程来行动,当它饥饿时。小孩让它的需要让大他者知道,凭借要求食物—无论是意图地与独立地,或是主要是经由大他者阅读小孩的行为。相同的道理适用于大他者。大他者并不仅是供应小孩正在要求的食物,而且大他者要求,小孩应该容许它自己被餵食。

Yet when a subject raises its biological need to the level of
demand, the need cannot be articulated fully in the signifiers of the
subject’s language, for language can only inappropriately represent that
which is essentially beyond it. Lacan put this discordance between need
and demand on a par with Freud’s concept of primal repression (Freud
1915d) arguing, in accordance with Freud’s idea of the dynamic
unconscious, that the repressed inarticulate part of the need will put out
a new sprout (rejeton), which ‘presents itself in man as desire’ (Lacan
1977j[1958]:286). Hence, desire is what stems from the leftover need
after it has been articulated in the signifiers of a demand.34

可是,当主体将它的生物的需要提升到要求的层次,这个需要无法充分地被表达,用主体的语言的能指。因为语言仅能够不合适地代表基本上是超越它的东西。拉康将需要与要求之间的不协调,跟弗洛伊德的原初的压抑的主张相提并论。以符合弗洛伊德的动力结构的无意识。需要的被压抑的无法表达的部分将产生一个新的奔放。这个新的奔放呈现它自己,在人的身上,作为欲望。因此,欲望就是起源于这个残存的需要,在需要已经被表达之后,在要求的能指里。

As if this explanation proved unsatisfactory, Lacan revealed yet another
source of desire.35 Probing further into the nature of human demand,
Lacan arrived at the conclusion that a vital need is not the only factor
triggering it.

好像这个解释证明并不令人满意,拉康揭露欲望的另外一个来源。当拉康更加深入地探索人类要求的特性时,他获得这个结论:生命的需要并不是触动需要的唯一的因素。

Apart from specific objects which can satisfy their primary
physiological necessities, people also demand something much more
insubstantial, which can be called ‘love’. In this case, the object becomes
less important than the Other’s act of giving it, which the subject perceives
as an indication of the Other’s affection. When demanding something, a
subject is thus not only pressing for the satisfaction of its needs, it is also
questioning the love of the Other, even to the extent that the subject will
be happy to accept anything as long as it testifies to the Other’s loving
concern. In this way the subject’s demand for what the Other possesses,
an object that is capable of satisfying the subject’s needs, is transformed
into a demand for what the Other does not possess as an exchangeable
object.36

除了能够满足他们的原初的生理的需求的明确的客体之外,人们也要求某件更加是抽象的东西,它可以被称为是”爱“。在这个情况,客体变得不像大他者的给予它的行动那么重要。主体感知大他者给予它的行动,作为是大他者的情感的指示。当主体要求大他者时,主体因此不但强迫要求它的欲望的满足,它也询问大他者的爱。甚至,主体将会快乐地接受任何东西,只有它证实是大他者的爱的关心。用这个方式,主体要求大他者所拥有的东西,能够满足这主体的需要的的客体,被转化成为是要求大他者并没有拥有的东西,作为是可以被交换的客体。

Similar to the residue produced by the transformation of a need into a
demand, Lacan believed that the transition from the demand for a material
object to the demand for love generates a rest. In the demand for love the
particularity of the object is annihilated, but the object itself does not
disappear.37 When the demand for an object becomes a demand for love
(and, in a sense, demand always already includes this dimension), the object
is no longer appreciated for its intrinsic qualities or its use value, but acquires
a higher status, incorporating a surplus value.38 The object in an exchange
governed by a demand for love might be something completely useless,
indeed it can be ‘a piece of shit’, but for the partners involved this essentially
worthless object will be invaluable as a proof of love. Whereas the demand
for love appears to relinquish the objects that feature prominently in the
demand for the satisfaction of a need, the former is not a pure negation of
the latter, but rather an obliteration (ibid.: 287). According to Lacan, the
residue of the object, after the annulment of its particularity by the demand
for love, constituted the ‘absolute condition’ for desire:

类似于这个残渣,需要转化成为要求所产生的残渣,拉康相信:从要求物质的客体,转换成为爱的要求,产生一个停顿。在对爱的要求里,客体的特殊性被毁灭。但是客体的自身并没有消失。当对于客体的要求变成熟对爱的要求(从某个意义言,要求总是已经包含这个维度)。客体不再是被欣赏,因为它的内在的品质,或是它的使用价值。客体获得更高的地位,合并一个剩余价值。在交换里被爱的要求统辖的客体,可能是某件完全没有用途的东西。的确,它可能是一件“无拥之物”,但是对于被牵涉的伴侣,这个基本上没有价值的客体,将是无价之宝,作为是爱的证明。虽然爱的要求似乎放弃这些客体,主要是作为特征的客体,在要求需求的满足。前者并不是纯粹否定后者。相反地,前者抹除后者。依照拉康,客体的残渣,经过它的特殊性的宣告无效,被爱的要求,则是组成对于欲望的“绝对的条件”。

[T]his condition indeed brings to a denouement the aversion which
the proof of love has to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is
neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but
the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the
second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung).
(ibid.: 287, translation modified)

这个绝对条件确实造成这样的结局:爱的证据厌恶需要的满足。因此,欲望既不是对于满足的欲望,也不是对于爱的要求。而是从欲望的满足,扣除爱的要求的差异,欲望的满足与爱的要求之间的分裂的现象。

The crucial point of this paragraph is that desire, unlike need and demand,
never balances towards an object, whether a concrete object of satisfaction
or the ‘anything and nothing’ of love. Contrary to need and demand, desire
derives its power from the priceless remainder of an object after it has been
accommodated within the symbolic register. In the context of Seminar V
(1998b[1957–58]), Lacan expressed the same idea when he said that desire
is born from the (object of) jouissance that is lost through symbolic
castration.39 Objects functioning in the realms of need and demand have an
assuaging, quenching effect, whilst objects in the realm of desire only serve
to sustain it. With this conceptualization of desire, as a power beyond need
and demand, Lacan revised his original schema of analytic intersubjectivity,
newly designating the relationship between patient and analyst as a ‘subjective
disparity’ which revolves around the desire of the analyst.

这个段落的关键重点是,不像需要与要求,欲望从来不是朝向客体的平衡。无论是满足的具体的客体,或是爱的任何东西与爱的空无。跟需要与要求恰恰相反,欲望获得它的力量,从客体的珍贵的残余物,在欲望欲望已经被接纳在象征的铭记内部之后。在第四研讨班,拉康表达相同的观念,当他说,欲望诞生于欢爽的这个客体,由于象征的阉割而失落的欢爽的客体。在需要与要求的领域发挥功能的那些客体,具有舒缓,止渴的效果。而在欲望的领域的那些客体,仅是充当维持欲望的功能。拉康将欲望如此构成观念,作为是超越需要与要求的力量时,他重新订正他的原先的”互为主体性“的基型。他重新指明病人与精神分析家之间的关系,作为是”主体的不一致“。这个主体的不一致环绕精神分析家的欲望旋转。

Lacan’s promotion of ‘subjective disparity’ within analytic treatment
coincided with his discussion of transference in Seminar VIII. In the
opening lesson of this Seminar he explained his decision to introduce
the notion of ‘subjective disparity’ by disclosing his eagerness to find a
proper term to describe the opposite of intersubjectivity. Although he
himself had advocated intersubjectivity time and again as the only way
forward in psychoanalysis, now he could only see the drawbacks of his
former prodigy (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:20–22, 233).

在精神分析的治疗,拉康的提倡“主体的不一致“,恰合于在第八研讨班,他对于移情的讨论。在这个研讨班的开始的几堂,拉康解释他的决定,要介绍”主体的不一致“的观念。他显露他的渴望,要找到一个合适的术语,来描述互为主体性的这个对立。虽然拉康自己经常主张互为主体性,作为是唯一前进的途径,在精神分析里。现在,拉康则仅是看出他先前的宏观的挫折。

As described on
p. 70, Lacan had already broached the pitfalls of intersubjectivity in
Seminar V within the context of a critical discussion on reciprocity. Now,
in Seminar VIII, he added that transference itself runs counter to
intersubjectivity, inasmuch as the position of those involved in a
transference relationship is by no means equivalent (ibid.: 233).40 In the
‘pseudo-situation’ of the analytic treatment—as Lacan described it in
Seminar VIII—subjective disparity reigns because the patient’s demand
(for help, advice, happiness, etc.) does not meet a reciprocal demand
(for letting oneself be cured) in the analyst. The analyst’s policy does
not hinge on a demand, but on a specific desire.

如同在第10页所描述的,拉康已经将第四研讨班时的互为主体性的陷阱粗略描绘,在批判地讨论互为主体性的内文里。现在,在第八研讨班,他补充说:移情的本身跟互为主体性并行不悖。因为牵涉到移情关系里的那些人们的立场,绝非是平等的。在精神分析治疗的“虚假-情境”—如同拉康在第八研讨班描述它—主体的不一致统辖一切,因为病人的要求(帮助,劝告,快乐,等等),并没有满足在精神分析家身上的互惠的要求(要求让自己被治疗)。精神分析家的政策并没有悬置在要求,而是悬置在明确的欲望。

The concept of the desire of the analyst appeared for the first time in
‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’
(1977i[1958]:252), one of Lacan’s most clinically informed writings from
the 1950s. Fulminating, yet again, against the deplorable clinical conduct
of his contemporaries, Lacan underscored that analysts should be
concerned with the direction of the treatment and not with the direction
of their patients (ibid.: 227).

精神分析家的欲望的观念,首次出现在“治疗的方向与治疗的力量的原则”。那是一篇最具有临床资讯的著作,从1950年代开始。拉康再次猛烈抨击他的当代的精神分析家的令人悲叹的临床行径。拉康强调,精神分析家应该关注治疗的引导,而不是关注他们的病人的引导。

Directing the treatment implied that besides
the patient, the analyst too has to pay for what is happening, notably in a
triple fashion. First of all, the analyst has to pay the analysand with words
taking the form of analytic interpretations.41 Second, analysts must tolerate
their being invested by analysands with all the strengths and weaknesses
of the significant others in the analysand’s experience. This is what Freud
described in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b) as the libidinal
cathexis of the analyst by the analysand, through which the analyst is
inscribed, qua form and contents, within one of the analysand’s psychic
series.

治疗的引导暗示着,除了病人之外,精神分析家也必须付出代价,对于正在发生的事情。特别是用三重的形式。首先,精神分析家必须付给分析者,使用精神分析的解释的形态。其次,精神分析家必须容忍他们自己被分析者投注所有的力量与弱点,在分析者的经验里,她的重要的他人的力量与弱点。这就是弗洛伊德所描述的,在“移情的动力结构”,作为是精神分析家的生命的力比多受到分析者的倾注。经有这个力比多的倾注,精神分析家被铭记,作为形式与内容,被铭记在分析者的心灵的感觉内部。

In Lacan’s terminology, it meant that an analysand’s transference
dispossesses the analyst of his identity, and that the analyst’s proper
handling of the transference entails that he is willing to pay for analysis
with his person. Finally, and most significantly, Lacan was also convinced
that analysts have to pay with a judgement on the nature of their action,
all the more so that to them the precise nature of analytic effectiveness
generally remains a mystery too. In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ he
explained that whereas the first two payments relate to what the analyst
says and does, the third corresponds to what the analyst is, i.e. to the
analyst’s being (Lacan 1977i[1958]:227–228, 250–256).

使用拉康的术语来说,这个力比多的倾注意味著,分析者的移情,替精神分析家剥除他的身份。精神分析家的合适的处理移情意味著,精神分析家愿意用他的个人生命付出精神分析的代价。最后,而且最重要地,拉康也相信,精神分析家必须付出代价,用对于他们的行动的特性的判断。更加是如此的状况,这样,对于他们,精神分析的有效性的明确的特性,通常始终也保持是神秘。在“治疗的引导”一文,拉康解释,虽然前两个付出,跟精神分析家的所说所为息息相关,第三个付出,则是对应于精神分析家的生命实存,也就是,对应于精神分析家的生命的本质。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为另一个主体 3

October 27, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OTHER SUBJECT
精神分析家作为另外一个主体

Since Lacan conceived all his contributions to psychoanalytic theory
from the early 1950s as recuperations of Freud’s legacy, against the
reigning discourse of ego-psychology, it does not come as a surprise that
his initial attempts to describe the function and position of the analyst
were strongly flavoured by his trenchant criticism of mainstream
psychoanalysis.

因为拉康构想他对于精神分析理论的所有的贡献,从1950年代开始,作为是弗洛伊德的遗产地复得,对抗自我-心理学的盛行的辞说。不足为奇的是,他最初的企图,想要描述精神分析家的功能与立场,强烈地被渲染着他对于主流精神分析的锐利的批判。

In the ‘Rome Discourse’ he defined the analyst’s task
primarily in a negative way, choosing his examples of bad practice across
the board of psychoanalytic activity. Unscrupulously, Lacan argued that
analysts whose aim is to redesign their patients’ lives, or to restore their
relationships with the outside world, betray their own profession.
Scorning the contemporary ‘analysis of resistance’, he reproached his
colleagues for disclosing personal feelings and for presenting themselves
as role models (ideal egos) within the ‘here and now’ of the clinical
setting.

在他的“罗马辞说”,他定义精神分析家的工作,最初是以负面的方式。他选择精神分析的活动的领域里恶行恶状的实践的例行。非常不谨慎地,拉康主张:精神分析家的目标,若是朝着重新设计他们的病人的生活,或是目标朝着恢复他们的病人跟外在世界的关系,这些精神分析家都是背叛他们自己的专业。拉康藐视当代的“抗拒的精神分析”,他谴责他的同事,因为他们泄漏个人的感觉,以及因为他们呈现他们自己,作为理想自我的典范,在临床背景的“此时此刻”。

To Lacan, these analysts were breaking their promise of
psychoanalytic treatment because they were simply facilitating
introspection, fostering social competence, building intellectual maturity,
and nurturing communicative abilities, whilst promoting their own lifestyle
as an image of general psychic health with which the patients were
supposed to identify. Lacan believed these therapeutic interventions to
be indicative of the analyst’s avoidance of the symbolic power of speech
and language—the prime source of psychoanalytic effectiveness—in
favour of an imaginary level of functioning.15

对于拉康,这些精神分析家正在破坏他们对精神分析的治疗的许诺。因为他们仅是内省方便行事,培养社会的胜任能力,建造知识的成熟园满,以及滋长沟通的能力。另一方面,他们又提升他们自己的生活方式,作为是通常心灵健康的意象。病人们被认为是认同通常心灵健康的这个意象。拉康相信这些治疗的介入,指示著精神分析的逃避言说与语言的象征的力量–精神分析的有效性的最初的来源—以迁就功能的想像的层次。

Although Lacan’s crusade against the mission statement of American
ego-psychology can be seen as an idiosyncratic act of recalcitrance, he was
in fact merely rewording one of Freud’s admonitions in ‘Lines of Advance
in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a[1918]). In this paper Freud criticized
the way in which the Swiss school (Jung) and some American psychoanalysts
had conceived the analyst’s task as similar to that of indomitable educators,
godlike creatures who incessantly attempt to mould the uneducated into
images of themselves. Against this view, Freud declared:

虽然拉康对于美国的自我-心理学的使命陈述的批判抨击,可以视为是一种顽强的怪癖的行为。他实际上仅是用不同词语陈述,弗洛伊德的警告,在“精神分析的治疗的前进的路线”(1919a)。在这篇论文,弗洛伊德批判瑞士学派(荣格学派)与美国的精神分析家构想精神分析家的工作的方式,作为是类同大无畏的教育家的工作。他们像是神性一般的人们,不断地企图将没有受过教育的人们塑造成为他们自己的意象。反对这样的观点,弗洛伊德宣称:

We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself
into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide
his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is
good…In my opinion, this is after all only to use violence, even
though it is overlaid with the most honourable motives.
(ibid.: 164–165)

我们非常强调地拒绝将病人转化成为我们的财产,虽然病人将他自己放置在我们手里,寻求帮助。我们拒绝代替病人决定他的命运,强迫我们的理想在他们身上,并且带着创造者的骄傲,用我们自己的意象塑造他,然后顾盼自得,情况良好、、、依我之见,这毕竟仅是使用暴力,即使这个暴力充满荣耀的动机。

As an appropriate alternative Freud suggested the ‘rule of abstinence’,
which consists in the analyst’s refusal to gratify the patient’s needs and
demands so that all substitute satisfactions are avoided and a productive
level of suffering is maintained. Freud refused to model the analytic
treatment on a mental hospital’s policy to look after patients and to make
them feel as comfortable as possible inside. He also emphasized that
whatever educational effect psychoanalysis may entail, analysts should
ensure that their patients do not come to resemble them, but are
encouraged in the liberation and realization of their own being.

作为一个合适的替代选择,弗洛伊德建议这个“节制的原则”。这个“节制的原则”主要在于精神分析家拒绝满足病人的需要与要求。这样,所有的替换的满足都被避免,这样,才能维持遭受痛苦具有创造的层次。弗洛伊德拒绝将精神分析的治疗,模拟精神病院的政策,为了照顾病人,并且让病人的内部尽可能感觉舒适。弗洛伊德也强调,精神分析可能涵盖的任何教育的效果,应该保证,他们的病人并不以逐渐类似精神分析家。而是要鼓励病人从事他们的自己的生命实存的解放与体现。

Lacan’s antagonism between the imaginary and the symbolic followed
Freud’s opposition between non-analytic image building and proper
analytic abstinence. It can be summarized as an antagonism between the
psychic register of insuperable, yet regulated difference and that of
deceptive, yet fascinating resemblance.16 Apropos of the symbolic, Lacan
recognized the paragon of the human symbolic function (the ‘original
symbolism’) in the complex rules of matrimonial alliance, the elaborate
laws of kinship and the practices of exchanging gifts that preside over
otherwise ‘pre-modern’, non-industrialized communities (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:65–66).

拉康将想像界与象征界作为互具敌意,是遵循弗洛伊德将非-精神分析的意象的建造,跟本体的精神分析的节制的互相对立。这个互具敌意能够被总结为:心灵的铭记的无法被征服,可是又被规范的差异,与欺骗,可是又是令人著迷的类似之间的互具敌意。关于象征界,拉康体认出这个典范:人类象征的功能的典范,(原初的象征主义),在婚姻联盟的复杂的规则里,亲属关系的复杂的法则里,与礼物交换的实践。这些统辖著不同的“前-现代”,非-工业化的社会。

Whilst none of these regulations is rooted in a preordained
natural order, they structure the natural living conditions in
such a way that distinct group members are continuously forced to
participate in existing agreements and to negotiate new pacts.17 By
contrast, Lacan located the source of the human imaginary in the socalled
‘mirror-stage’ (Lacan 1977c[1949]), whereby the child develops
its identity (its ego) via an identification with the twin image reflected
by the mirror or, in the absence of reflective surfaces, by a similar other.18

虽然这些规则没有一条是根源于预先注定的自然的秩序,它们架构自然的活生生的情况,用这样一种方式,以致于明显的团体成员继续不断地被迫参与现存的协定,并且协商新的盟约。对照起来,拉康将人类的想像的起源定位在社会化的“镜像阶段”。在“镜像阶段”那里,小孩发展它的自我的认同,经由镜子反映的孪生意象的认同。或者,在反映的表面欠缺的时刻,由类似的他者作为镜像反映。

In Seminar I, and in reference to Freud, Lacan defined the ego accordingly
as an agency that ‘is constructed like an onion, one could peel it and
discover the successive identifications which have constituted it’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:171).19 Consequently, the human imaginary has nothing
to do with the installation and regulation of difference; it is fundamentally
geared towards the advancement of similarity and instead of a
symbolic
truce, it induces jealousy, rivalry, competition and aggression.
在第一研讨班,提到弗洛伊德时,拉康遵循弗洛伊德,将自我定义为一位代理者,“像洋葱一样被建造的代理者。我们能够剥开洋葱,然然发现连续的认同的表层,构成这个自我”。结果,人类的想像跟差异的安置与规则,根本没有任何关系。人类的想享基本上被触动,朝向类似的前进,而非是朝向象征的休战。人类的想像引申出敌意,競争与侵凌。

At the end of Seminar II (1988c[1954–55]:243), Lacan integrated
these two discordant dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary into
a comprehensive cartography of psychoanalytic treatment, placing the
principles of ego-psychology orthogonally to a clinical practice which
he deemed more loyal to Freud’s inspiration. This schema of analytic
communication (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:14), to which Lacan also referred
as the ‘Schema L’, comprises four terms (S, o, o’ and O) and two
conflicting relations (imaginary and symbolic-unconscious).20

在第二研讨班的结束时,拉康将象征界与想像界的这两个不协调的维度,合并成为精神分析治疗的一个全面的地图制作。拉康将自我-心理学的原则,正统地放置在临床的实践里。他认为这是更加忠实于弗洛伊德的启发。精神分析的沟通的这个基模,拉康也提到,作为是“L型基模”,它包括四个术语(S,0,0‘, O),与两个冲突的关系 (想像与象征的无意识)。

In this schema the therapeutic alliance between the clinician and the
patient in an ego-psychological setting is displayed as an imaginary
relation between an ego (o) and another ego (o’).

在这个基模,治临床医生与病人的治疗的联盟,在自我-心理学的背景,被展示出来,作为是想像的关系,处于自我(o),与另外一个自我(o‘)之间。

Lacan proclaimed that
the majority of contemporary clinicians were viewing the patient as an
objectified other whose ego needs ‘to gather its strength, to realise itself,
to integrate itself (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245). In keeping with his theory
of the ego as an imaginary construction, he then argued that the patient’s
ego ‘can only re-encounter and reconstitute itself by way of the fellow
being the subject has before him—or behind him’ (ibid.: 245), which is
of course the figure of the analyst. Hence, the patient and the analyst had
become allies in an imaginary exchange of egos, leading to the
replacement of the patient’s former (pathological) identity by the new
(healthy) identity of the analyst.21

拉康宣称:大多数的当代临床医生,正将病人看待作为是一个被客体化的他者。自我需要这个他者来聚集它的力量,为了实现它自己,为了融合它自己。为了跟他的自我的理论保持一致,作文是想像的建构,拉康因此主张,病人的自我仅能够重新遭遇,重新建构它自己,凭借主体在他面前,或在他背后,拥有的这位同胞。这位同胞当然就是精神分析家的人物。因此,病人与精神分析家已经变成联盟,在想像地交换自我。导致病人的先前的(病态)的认同,被精神分析家的新的认同所取代。

Figure I Schema L
Source: J.Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, New York,

In Lacan’s purportedly Freudian alternative, patients had to be
approached as subjects with an unconscious, rather than unitary
objectified others. In Schema L, the subject (S) is identified with the
Freudian Id (Es) and the unconscious is emanating from the Other
according to a symbolic vector which crosses the imaginary axis. This
means that the intervention of the Other (the unknown dimension of the
other) is necessary for the revelation of the unconscious.

在拉康据说是作为弗洛伊德的替换里,病人必须被接近,作为是具有无意识的主体,而非是单一的被客体化的他者。在L基型,主体(S)被认同是弗洛伊德的他我id (Es)。无意识从大他者散发出来,依照象征的向量。这个象征的向量跨越想像的枢扭。这意味着,大他者的介入(大他者的未知的维度)是必要的,对于无意识的启蒙。

The idea is that
if human beings can wonder about the hidden intentions of a fellow being,
or if the latter answers their questions in a way which they had never
expected, they will also be driven to investigate the (hitherto unconscious)
mainspring of their own intentions.22 Whereas on Lacan’s account an
ego-psychologist attributed a patient’s symptom to a weakness of the
ego, or an incomplete self-realization, and remedied this problem by
increasing the patient’s self-awareness, a truly Freudian analyst defined
the symptom as a compromise between unconscious knowledge (the
repressed representations) and conscious ignorance.

这个观念是,假如人会想要知的一个同胞的隐藏的意图,或是一位同胞回答他们的问题,用他们从来没有预期的方式。他们也将会被驱使去研究他们的意图的(迄今是无意识的)泉源。虽然因为拉康的缘故,自我-心理学家将病人的症状归咎于自我的弱点。或是归咎于不完整的自我的实践,然后修补这个难题,凭借增加病人的自我-知识。一位真正的弗洛伊德的精神分析家则是定义这个症状,作为是一种妥协,处于无意识的知识(被压抑的表象)与意识的无知之间的妥协。

To open up this realm
of unconscious knowledge, Lacan posited that the analyst’s task is to be
somewhere in the place of the Other (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:161).
In various interventions from the early 1950s (1977e[1953]:88; 1988c
[1954–55]:246) Lacan specified this task of the analyst as the facilitation
of full speech (parole pleine) or true speech (parole vraie) in the patient.

为了打开无意识的这个领域,拉康假设,精神分析家的工作应该是在大他者的位置的某个地方。从1950年代早期的各种的介入开始,拉康指明精神分析家的这个工作,作为是病人身上的充分言说或真实言说的方便法门。

Full speech is opposed to empty speech (parole vide), ‘where the subject
seems to be talking in vain about someone who, even if he were his spitting
image, can never become one with the assumption of his desire’ (Lacan
1977e[1953]:45).

充分言说跟空洞言说互相对立。在空洞言说,主体似乎白费力气地谈论有关某个人。即使他是他的分裂的意象,这位某个人永远没有办法跟他的欲望的假设成为一体。

Patients producing empty speech continuously objectify
themselves in their words, for example by starting every sentence with ‘I
think I am a person who…’ or by speaking about themselves as objects in
the discourse of others, as in ‘My best friend says that I am…’ Lacan was
keen to point out that the identity a patient conjures up in her empty speech
can bear a striking resemblance to her actual self-image and the reality
perceived by others.

产生空洞言说的病人,继续地用他们的话语,让他们自己成为客体。譬如,凭借从每个句子开始,用“我认为我是这么一个人、、、”或凭借谈论关于他们自己,作为别人辞说里的客体,譬如,在“我的最好的朋友说我是、、、、”拉康渴望地指出,病人用她的空洞的言词召唤的认同,具有显著的类似,跟她的实际的自我-意象与被别人感知的现实。

Hence, empty speech is not necessarily deceitful
speech. Paradoxically, in terms of its correspondence with a factual reality,
empty speech might be more ‘true’ than true speech (Lacan
1966b[1955]:351).

因此,空洞的言说并不必然是欺骗的言说。悖论地,由于空洞的言说跟实际上的现实的对应,空洞的言说可能比起真实的言说更加地“真实”。

For the distinctive characteristic of true speech is not
that it represents matters as they really are; its core feature is that it entails
a genuine subjective commitment, with a perspective on the future. The
truth value of true speech is not related to reality, but to the subject’s
recognition of the desire which he has hitherto discarded.23 In Freudian
terms, subjective truth should be taken in its historical, rather than its
material dimension. In this sense, what ‘is at stake in analysis is the advent
in the subject of that little reality that this desire sustains in him’, whereby
the analyst ‘guides the subject’s discourse towards the realization of his
truth’ (Lacan 1977e[1953]:68, 93).

因为真实的言说的明显的特征并不是:它代表事情的本来的样子。它的核心的特征是:它意味着一个真诚的主体的奉献,具有针对未来的观点。真实言实的真理的价值,并不是跟现实联接一块,而是跟主体的体认他迄今抛弃的欲望联接一块。用弗洛伊德的术语来说,主体的真理应该被看待,根据主体的历史。而不是根据主体的材料的维度。从这个意义来说,在精神分析里岌岌可危的东西,就是在主体身上,欲望在他身上维持的那个小小的现实的来临。凭借这个小小现实的来临,精神分析家引导主体的辞说,朝向他的真理的体现。

Patients should finally arrive at the
verbalization of what they have kept away from themselves and take
responsibility for it, which tallies with Freud’s perspective on the goal of
analysis as the assumption of one’s historical truth.

病人应该最后到达这个文词表现,对于他们曾经保持距离的文词表现,并且替它担负起责任。这符合弗洛伊德的观点,将精神分析的目标,视为是担负起一个人的历史的真理。

This facilitation of full speech in the patient is only possible if the
analyst is indeed somewhere in the position of the Other. Only in the
presence of an unknown Other is the subject able and required to make
symbolic commitments, as exemplified in statements such as ‘You are
my master’ or ‘You are my husband’.24 To maintain this position analysts
are not allowed to reveal their intentions, much less to present themselves
to their patients as familiar others.

病人身上的充分言说的方便法门可能的条件是:病人确实是在大他者的位置的某个地方。仅有在一位未知的大他者的面前,主体才能够并且被要求发表象征的奉献。譬如,在这些陈述里: “你是我的主人“或”你是我的丈夫“。为了维持这个立场,精神分析家并没有被容许显示他的意图,更不用说呈现他们自己给病人,作为熟悉的别人。

Analysts are not fellow human beings
who fully understand and share their experiences with their therapeutic
neighbours.25 Neither the patient nor the analyst is thus involved in the
‘analytic dialogue’ as an imaginary object. The analyst is literally the
mouthpiece of the patient, to the extent that the analyst is the instrument
which enables the patient to make a full statement.26 In principle this
does not imply that analysts ought to remain silent throughout the session
on the condition that their interventions are not designed as the staging
of an encounter between two egos (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245).27

精神分析家并不是这样的同胞,他们充分理解并且分享他们的经验,跟他们治疗的邻居。病人与精神分析家因此没有一位牵涉到“精神分析的对谈“,作为是想像的客体。精神分析家实质上是病人的发言人。甚至,精神分析家是让病人能够从事充分陈述的工具。原则上,这并没有意味著,精神分析家应该保持沉默,在咨商期间里。条件是,他们的介入,不应该被指明,作为是展示这么一种遭遇,处于两个自我之间的遭遇。

The analyst’s interventions can only have the desired effect of eliciting full
speech in the patient if these interventions are themselves paragons of
full speech (Lacan 1966b[1955]:359). Again, this does not mean that
analysts ought to ensure that their interpretations are demonstrably true,
i.e. corresponding with a factual reality, but they must capture the patient’s
subjective historical truth.28 Since the process is directed towards the
subject of the patient (the acknowledgement of the unconscious drives
and desires beyond the ego, which Freud situated in the Id) and analysts
themselves function as subjects in the place of the Other (instead of egoobjects
for identification), Lacan qualified the entire analytic dialectics
as an intersubjective experience.29

精神分析家的介入能够获得在病人身上召唤充足言说的欲望的效果,仅有当这些介入的本身是充分言说的典范。而且,这并不意味着,精神分析家应该保证,他们的解释可证明是真实的。譬如,符合实际的现实。但是,他们必须捕捉病人的主体的历史的真理。因为这个过程被引导朝向病人的主体(承认无意识的冲动与欲望,超越自我。弗洛伊德将这个自我的超越,定位在id (主体)。精神分析家他们自己充当代替大他者的主体(而不是作为认同的自我的客体)。拉康给予完整的精神分析的辩证法,作为是互为主体性的经验。

However, he did not consider it possible for the analytic treatment to
deploy itself exclusively on the symbolic axis of the unconscious. From
his initial introduction of Schema L, Lacan clarified that no analyst manages
to avoid the interference of the imaginary axis. The imaginary interplay
between egos is at once an obstacle and a necessary passage in the symbolic
progression of psychoanalytic treatment, which is represented in Schema
L via the imaginary crossing of the symbolic vector of the unconscious. A
close reading of Lacan’s argument reveals at least four reasons, two on the
side of the analyst and two on the side of the patient, for this unavoidable
inflection of the symbolic towards the imaginary.

可是,拉康并没有认为这是可能的,让精神分析的治疗运作它自己,专门是在无意识的象征的枢纽。从他最初介绍L基型开始,拉康澄清,没有一位精神分析成功地避免想像的轴心的干涉。在两个自我之间的想享的互相作用,既是一种阻碍,同时又是一个必要的经过,在精神分析的治疗的象征的进展。这个象征的进展被代表作L基型里,经有想像的跨越无意识的象征的向量。假如我们仔细阅读拉康的主张,我们会发现至少有四个理由。在精神分析家这边有两个,在病人那边也有两个理由。因为象征会无可避免地内射,朝向想像界。

First, and perhaps most significantly, analysts are not equal to their
jobs as subjects in the position of the Other. According to their job
description, analysts should be capable of relinquishing their ego, or at
least be sufficiently aware of its manifestations to recognize and neutralize
them whenever they threaten to intervene—a manoeuvre for which their
own training analysis should have prepared them. In Seminar II Lacan
described analysts as ‘subjects in whom the ego is absent’ (Lacan 1988c
[1954–55]:246). In Seminar III he argued even more strongly that analysts
‘must be dead enough not to be caught up in the imaginary relation’
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:162).

首先,或者最重要地,精神分析家并没有胜任他们的工作,作为大他者的位置的主体。依照他们的工作的描述,精神分析家应该能够放弃他们的自我。或者,至少精神分析家应该能够充分地知道精神分析的展示,要体认并且让他们保持中立,每当他们威胁要介入的时刻。这一个策略,他们的精神分析的训练本来就应该替他们准备好。在第二研讨班,拉康描述精神分析,作为是“自我缺席的主体“。在第三研讨班,拉康甚至更加强烈地主张,精神分析必须完全死掉,这样他才能够被套陷在想像的关系。

And in ‘Variations of the Standard
Treatment’ he asserted that analysts can only be attentive to the full speech
of their patients if the mirages of their own narcissism have become
transparent (Lacan 1966b[1955]:352). Yet Lacan himself realized that
these are theoretical accounts of an ideal situation, since there is ‘never
a subject without an ego’ (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:246) and since ‘the
analyst is never fully an analyst, for the simple reason that he is a human
being, and that he, too, partakes of the imaginary mechanisms that are
obstacles to the passage of speech’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:162).

在“各式各样的标准治疗“,拉康主张,精神分析家只有在他们自己的自恋的幻景已经变得透明时,他们才会专注病人的充足的言说。可是,拉康他自己体会到,这些都是理想情况的理论的描述。因为主体存在,自我也跟着存在。因为精神分析家永远不是充分地作为精神分析家。理由很简单:精神分析家是个凡人。他也参与想像的心理机制,而这些想像的心理机制构成言说的过程的阻碍。”

This difficulty is represented in Schema L on the vector that runs from O to o.
The second reason on the side of the analyst has to do with what Lacan
called ‘the paradox of the analyst’s position’ (Lacan 1988b[195 3–54]:51).
If analysts are supposed to elicit full speech in their patients, they can
decide to curb their patients’ empty speech by launching interpretations
that probe into its hidden aspects.

这个困难在L基型里被代表,在从O到 o前进的向量。第二个理由,在精神分析家这一边,跟拉康所谓的“精神分析家的立场的悖论息息相关”。假如精神分析家被认为是召唤病人身上的充足的言说,他们能够决的要控制他们的病人的空洞的言说,凭借发动探索这个空洞言说的解释。

Yet they can hardly do this without relying
on their own projections of what is going on in their patients’ minds. Hence,
when the patients’ speech is empty analysts can only intervene effectively
by reducing the influence of their own ego to the lowest possible level,
that is to say by being ‘dead enough’, an operation which drives them to
silence rather than speech.

可是,每当精神分析家这样做,他们必然依靠他们自己的投射,对于他们的病人的心灵正在进行的东西。因此,当病人的言说是空洞的,精神分析家能够有效地介入,凭借减少他们的自己的自我的影响,到尽可能低的程度。换句话说,凭借成为“充分死掉”,这一个运作,驱使他们保持沉默,而不是言说。

But when the patients’ speech does present an
appropriate level of fullness, analysts should keep their interventions at
bay in order to avoid disturbing the advancement of this full speech. So,
on the one hand analysts cannot really intervene without taking their own
ego as measure, whilst on the other hand their full speech is not required!
Indeed, if the analysts’ task consists in eliciting full speech, it appears that
they can only perform it by absenting themselves and remaining silent,
every utterance encompassing the danger of a new imaginary alienation.
In ‘The Freudian Thing’, Lacan put it as follows:

但是,当病人的言说确实呈现一个合适的充实的层面,精神分析应该节制地保持他们的介入,为了避免扰乱这个充实言说的前进。所以,一分没,精神分析家无法确实介入,而不僵他们自己的自我作为策略。另一方面,他们的充实的言说的确并没有被要求。假如精神分析家的工作,在于召唤充实言说,似乎是,他们能够完成它,仅是凭借让他们自己缺席,并且保持沉默。每个表达涵盖新的想像的异化的这个危险。在“弗洛伊德的物”,拉康表达它如下:

[T]he analyst intervenes concretely in the dialectic of analysis by
pretending he is dead, by cadaverizing his position as the Chinese
say, either by his silence when he is the Other with a capital O, or
by annulling his own resistance when he is the other with a small
o. In either case, and under the respective effects of the symbolic
and the imaginary, he makes death present.
(Lacan 1977f[1955]:140)

精神分析具体地介入精神分析的辩证法,凭借假装他是死人,凭借将他的立场形同行尸走肉,如同中文的成语。要就是凭借他的沉默,当他与具有大写字母O的大他者同在。要不然就是将他自己的抗拒成为无效,当他与具有小写字母o的小他者同位。不论是哪个情况,在象征界与想像界的各别的影响之下,他让死亡呈现。

Third, if analysts too remain subjects endowed with an ego, even after
a prolonged analytical training, it is evident that patients undertaking
analytical work will not be able to associate freely without objectifying
themselves in imaginary identifications with unitary objects. Lacan
conceded that even at the end of analysis the subject ‘refers to this
imaginary unity that is the ego…where he knows himself and
misrecognizes himself, and which is what he speaks about’ (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:161). This ongoing entanglement of the subject with the
ego is represented within Schema L in the vector from S to o’ (the
identifications with the imaginary counterparts on which the ego is based).

第三,假如精神分析家也始终是禀赋的自我的主体,即使经过漫长的精神分析训练之后,显而易见地,从事精神分析工作的病人,将无法自由地联想,而没有让他们自己成为客体,在想像地认同具有独异性的那些客体。拉康承认,即使在精神分析的结束,主体“提到这个想像的一致性,那就是自我、、、在那里,他认识他自己,并且错误地体认他自己。那就是他谈论的事情。主体正在跟自进行的这个纠缠,被代表在L基型,从S 到 o’ 的向量(跟自我作为基础的想象的对应物认同。)

The emergence of the patient’s ego will also reawaken the ego of the
analyst, on whose presence it depends during the analytic session. In
Seminar I, before the actual construction of Schema L, Lacan averred:
Just when he seems ready to come out with something more
authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up
with to then, the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a
statement, which might be the following—I am aware all of a
sudden of the fact of your presence…the subject himself then feels
something like a sharp bend, a sudden turn which causes him to
pass from one slope of the discourse to the other, from one aspect
of the function of speech to another.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:40)

病人的自我的出现将也会重新唤醒精神分析家的自我。病人的自我就是依靠分析家的存在,在精神分析的咨商时刻。在第一研讨班,就在L基型的实际建构之前,拉康主张:

正当主体似乎准备要出来,带着某件更加真诚,更加中肯,比起在那个时候之前已经获得的东西。在这些情况,主体中断,并且表达一个陈述, 这个内容的陈述如下:「我突然知道你存在的这个事实、、主体自己因此感觉某件东西像是锐利的弯曲,突然的转弯,引起他从辞说的一个斜坡,到另外一个斜坡,从言实的功能的一个层面,到另外一个层面。

The experience which Lacan invoked in this passage had already been
described by Freud in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b), as an
example of how the patient’s resistance makes use of the transference,
or of how the transference serves resistance. Lacan reinterpreted it as the
turn of symbolic transference towards its imaginary avatar, which equals
resistance.30

拉康在这个段落召唤的经验,弗洛伊德在“移情的动力结构”已经描述过,作为是病人如何利用移情作为抗拒的典范。或是移情如何替抗拒服务。拉康重新解释它,作为是象征的移情的转移,朝向它的想像的天使下凡。这相当等于是抗拒。
Finally, analysts are continuously solicited by their patients to leave
their position as an (unknown) Other and to intervene as an ego. In the
case of psychotic patients, who are only capable of imaginary
transference, the analyst is automatically allocated the place of a
transparent, imaginary counterpart.31 By contrast, neurotic patients are
extremely apt at seducing analysts to formulate a judgement, to express
an opinion, or to profess a piece of knowledge, which is exactly what the
above model (and the mental economy of neurosis) demands them to
avoid if they want to be successful.

最后,精神分析家继续受到病人的召唤,要离开他们的立场,作为(未知的)的大他者,并且介入作为自我。在精神病人的个案,他仅是能够想像的移情,精神分析家自动地被分配给与透明的,想像的对应物的位置。对照起来,神经症的病人极端容易诱拐精神分析家解释一个判断,表达一个意见,或是宣称某件知识。这确实就是以上的模式(神经症者的精神的活力)要求他们避免的东西,假如他们想要成功。

For example, a hysterical patient (or
a hystericized patient, for that matter) may engage in lengthy complaints
about how he had expected something altogether different from his
analyst: answers to his questions, advice on how and what to decide in
the usual dilemmas of work and love, concrete recommendations on how
to design his future, etc. He may even try to provoke a reaction by stating
that he will inevitably be driven to another practitioner if the situation
does not change rapidly.

譬如,癔症的病人(或成为癔症的病人,就那件事情而言),可能从事冗长的抱怨,关于他如何曾经预期某件跟精神分析家完全不同的东西: 对于他的问题的回答,劝告他应该如何决定,与决定什么,当面临工作与爱的通常的困境。以及具体的推荐,应该如何设计他的未来,等等。他甚至可能挑激一个反应,凭借陈述说:他无可避免地回被驱使到另外一位精神分析家,假如情况没有迅速改善的话。

Sometimes the challenge is more straightforward,
as in the case of a patient who says ‘My mother thinks I am a genius and
my father is convinced I am a fool. What do you think? Why aren’t you
saying anything? Since you seem to be unable to make up your mind,
you must be a fool yourself.’ Depending on the analyst’s own narcissism,
she will be poised to intervene, in which case the analyst’s ego will eclipse
her position as a subject. And, of course, if analysts do give their patients
concrete advice (‘I think you should leave your lover and stay with your
husband’), they are bound to discover that the patients will either use it
against them, or use it to do exactly the opposite.

有时,这种挑战赛更加直接,如同在这个个案,病人说:「我的母亲认为我是一位天才,而我的父亲则是相信我是白痴。你的看法是什么?为什么你不说任何事情?因为你似乎不能够下定你的决心,你自己一定是一位傻瓜。」依靠精神分析家的自己的自恋,她将会很镇定地介入。在那个情况,精神分析家的自我将会模糊她作为主体的立场。当然,假如确实给予他们的病人具体的劝告,(“ 我认为你应该离开你的情人,跟你的丈夫住在一块。“)他们一定会发现,病人要就是用这句话来反对他们,要不然就是确实做相反的事情。

Summarizing, it may be said that the main difference between ego psychology
and classical Freudian analysis, as Lacan conceived it during
the early 1950s, is not that the former is strengthening the imaginary
relationship between ego and (alter) ego, whereas the latter strictly
operates within the symbolic framework of subject and Other. The
difference is rather that ego-psychologists place their money on ego building
techniques to the detriment of a questioning of the patient’s
history, whereas Lacan’s model aimed to install and explore the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other, despite the relentless
interference of imaginary identifications, both in the patient and the
analyst.

总结一下,我们可以说,自我心理学与古典弗洛伊德学派的精神分析之间的主要差异,依照拉康在1950年构想它。主要的差异并不是,自我-心理学正在强化自我与(他)我之间的想像的关系。古典的弗洛伊德学派精神分析则是严格地运作,在主体与大他者之间的象征的架构。相反地,差异的地方是,自我-心理学家将他们的重点放置在建造自我的技术,结果伤害到对于病人的历史的询问。而拉康的模式则是目标朝着安置,并且探索在病人与精神分析家两人身上,主体与大他者之间的象征的关系,尽管想像的认同的无情的干涉。

Not taking the patient’s words at face value, much less employing
them as building blocks for the construction of a new identity, the analyst’s
task consisted in bringing the patient to the point where he questions the
accepted meaning of words, beliefs and values. In the ‘Rome Discourse’
Lacan stated that ‘the art of the analyst must be to suspend the subject’s
certainties until their last mirages have been consumed’ (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:43), so that the subject can make a commitment that is more in
accordance with the true nature of her desire.

精神分析家的工作并不是将病人的话语表面看待,更不是运用这些话语,当著是新的身份的建造的建筑材料。精神分析家的工作在于将病人带到这个点。在那里,他质疑话语,信仰,与价值的被接纳的意义。在“罗马辞说“,拉康陈述:「精神分析家的艺术一定就是悬置主体的确定性,直到最后的幻景已经被消耗。」这样,主体才能够作出奉献,跟她的欲望的真实的天性更加符合的奉献。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为另一个主体 2

October 27, 2015

The emergence of the patient’s ego will also reawaken the ego of the
analyst, on whose presence it depends during the analytic session. In
Seminar I, before the actual construction of Schema L, Lacan averred:
Just when he seems ready to come out with something more
authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up
with to then, the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a
statement, which might be the following—I am aware all of a
sudden of the fact of your presence…the subject himself then feels
something like a sharp bend, a sudden turn which causes him to
pass from one slope of the discourse to the other, from one aspect
of the function of speech to another.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:40)

病人的自我的出现将也会重新唤醒精神分析家的自我。病人的自我就是依靠分析家的存在,在精神分析的咨商时刻。在第一研讨班,就在L基型的实际建构之前,拉康主张:

正当主体似乎准备要出来,带着某件更加真诚,更加中肯,比起在那个时候之前已经获得的东西。在这些情况,主体中断,并且表达一个陈述, 这个内容的陈述如下:「我突然知道你存在的这个事实、、主体自己因此感觉某件东西像是锐利的弯曲,突然的转弯,引起他从辞说的一个斜坡,到另外一个斜坡,从言实的功能的一个层面,到另外一个层面。

The experience which Lacan invoked in this passage had already been
described by Freud in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b), as an
example of how the patient’s resistance makes use of the transference,
or of how the transference serves resistance. Lacan reinterpreted it as the
turn of symbolic transference towards its imaginary avatar, which equals
resistance.30

拉康在这个段落召唤的经验,弗洛伊德在“移情的动力结构”已经描述过,作为是病人如何利用移情作为抗拒的典范。或是移情如何替抗拒服务。拉康重新解释它,作为是象征的移情的转移,朝向它的想像的天使下凡。这相当等于是抗拒。
Finally, analysts are continuously solicited by their patients to leave
their position as an (unknown) Other and to intervene as an ego. In the
case of psychotic patients, who are only capable of imaginary
transference, the analyst is automatically allocated the place of a
transparent, imaginary counterpart.31 By contrast, neurotic patients are
extremely apt at seducing analysts to formulate a judgement, to express
an opinion, or to profess a piece of knowledge, which is exactly what the
above model (and the mental economy of neurosis) demands them to
avoid if they want to be successful.

最后,精神分析家继续受到病人的召唤,要离开他们的立场,作为(未知的)的大他者,并且介入作为自我。在精神病人的个案,他仅是能够想像的移情,精神分析家自动地被分配给与透明的,想像的对应物的位置。对照起来,神经症的病人极端容易诱拐精神分析家解释一个判断,表达一个意见,或是宣称某件知识。这确实就是以上的模式(神经症者的精神的活力)要求他们避免的东西,假如他们想要成功。

For example, a hysterical patient (or
a hystericized patient, for that matter) may engage in lengthy complaints
about how he had expected something altogether different from his
analyst: answers to his questions, advice on how and what to decide in
the usual dilemmas of work and love, concrete recommendations on how
to design his future, etc. He may even try to provoke a reaction by stating
that he will inevitably be driven to another practitioner if the situation
does not change rapidly.

譬如,癔症的病人(或成为癔症的病人,就那件事情而言),可能从事冗长的抱怨,关于他如何曾经预期某件跟精神分析家完全不同的东西: 对于他的问题的回答,劝告他应该如何决定,与决定什么,当面临工作与爱的通常的困境。以及具体的推荐,应该如何设计他的未来,等等。他甚至可能挑激一个反应,凭借陈述说:他无可避免地回被驱使到另外一位精神分析家,假如情况没有迅速改善的话。

Sometimes the challenge is more straightforward,
as in the case of a patient who says ‘My mother thinks I am a genius and
my father is convinced I am a fool. What do you think? Why aren’t you
saying anything? Since you seem to be unable to make up your mind,
you must be a fool yourself.’ Depending on the analyst’s own narcissism,
she will be poised to intervene, in which case the analyst’s ego will eclipse
her position as a subject. And, of course, if analysts do give their patients
concrete advice (‘I think you should leave your lover and stay with your
husband’), they are bound to discover that the patients will either use it
against them, or use it to do exactly the opposite.

有时,这种挑战赛更加直接,如同在这个个案,病人说:「我的母亲认为我是一位天才,而我的父亲则是相信我是白痴。你的看法是什么?为什么你不说任何事情?因为你似乎不能够下定你的决心,你自己一定是一位傻瓜。」依靠精神分析家的自己的自恋,她将会很镇定地介入。在那个情况,精神分析家的自我将会模糊她作为主体的立场。当然,假如确实给予他们的病人具体的劝告,(“ 我认为你应该离开你的情人,跟你的丈夫住在一块。“)他们一定会发现,病人要就是用这句话来反对他们,要不然就是确实做相反的事情。

Summarizing, it may be said that the main difference between ego psychology
and classical Freudian analysis, as Lacan conceived it during
the early 1950s, is not that the former is strengthening the imaginary
relationship between ego and (alter) ego, whereas the latter strictly
operates within the symbolic framework of subject and Other. The
difference is rather that ego-psychologists place their money on ego building
techniques to the detriment of a questioning of the patient’s
history, whereas Lacan’s model aimed to install and explore the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other, despite the relentless
interference of imaginary identifications, both in the patient and the
analyst.

总结一下,我们可以说,自我心理学与古典弗洛伊德学派的精神分析之间的主要差异,依照拉康在1950年构想它。主要的差异并不是,自我-心理学正在强化自我与(他)我之间的想像的关系。古典的弗洛伊德学派精神分析则是严格地运作,在主体与大他者之间的象征的架构。相反地,差异的地方是,自我-心理学家将他们的重点放置在建造自我的技术,结果伤害到对于病人的历史的询问。而拉康的模式则是目标朝着安置,并且探索在病人与精神分析家两人身上,主体与大他者之间的象征的关系,尽管想像的认同的无情的干涉。

Not taking the patient’s words at face value, much less employing
them as building blocks for the construction of a new identity, the analyst’s
task consisted in bringing the patient to the point where he questions the
accepted meaning of words, beliefs and values. In the ‘Rome Discourse’
Lacan stated that ‘the art of the analyst must be to suspend the subject’s
certainties until their last mirages have been consumed’ (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:43), so that the subject can make a commitment that is more in
accordance with the true nature of her desire.

精神分析家的工作并不是将病人的话语表面看待,更不是运用这些话语,当著是新的身份的建造的建筑材料。精神分析家的工作在于将病人带到这个点。在那里,他质疑话语,信仰,与价值的被接纳的意义。在“罗马辞说“,拉康陈述:「精神分析家的艺术一定就是悬置主体的确定性,直到最后的幻景已经被消耗。」这样,主体才能够作出奉献,跟她的欲望的真实的天性更加符合的奉献。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为另外一个主体

October 25, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OTHER SUBJECT
精神分析家作为另外一个主体

Since Lacan conceived all his contributions to psychoanalytic theory
from the early 1950s as recuperations of Freud’s legacy, against the
reigning discourse of ego-psychology, it does not come as a surprise that
his initial attempts to describe the function and position of the analyst
were strongly flavoured by his trenchant criticism of mainstream
psychoanalysis.

因为拉康构想他对于精神分析理论的所有的贡献,从1950年代开始,作为是弗洛伊德的遗产地复得,对抗自我-心理学的盛行的辞说。不足为奇的是,他最初的企图,想要描述精神分析家的功能与立场,强烈地被渲染着他对于主流精神分析的锐利的批判。

In the ‘Rome Discourse’ he defined the analyst’s task
primarily in a negative way, choosing his examples of bad practice across
the board of psychoanalytic activity. Unscrupulously, Lacan argued that
analysts whose aim is to redesign their patients’ lives, or to restore their
relationships with the outside world, betray their own profession.
Scorning the contemporary ‘analysis of resistance’, he reproached his
colleagues for disclosing personal feelings and for presenting themselves
as role models (ideal egos) within the ‘here and now’ of the clinical
setting.

在他的“罗马辞说”,他定义精神分析家的工作,最初是以负面的方式。他选择精神分析的活动的领域里恶行恶状的实践的例行。非常不谨慎地,拉康主张:精神分析家的目标,若是朝着重新设计他们的病人的生活,或是目标朝着恢复他们的病人跟外在世界的关系,这些精神分析家都是背叛他们自己的专业。拉康藐视当代的“抗拒的精神分析”,他谴责他的同事,因为他们泄漏个人的感觉,以及因为他们呈现他们自己,作为理想自我的典范,在临床背景的“此时此刻”。

To Lacan, these analysts were breaking their promise of
psychoanalytic treatment because they were simply facilitating
introspection, fostering social competence, building intellectual maturity,
and nurturing communicative abilities, whilst promoting their own lifestyle
as an image of general psychic health with which the patients were
supposed to identify. Lacan believed these therapeutic interventions to
be indicative of the analyst’s avoidance of the symbolic power of speech
and language—the prime source of psychoanalytic effectiveness—in
favour of an imaginary level of functioning.15

对于拉康,这些精神分析家正在破坏他们对精神分析的治疗的许诺。因为他们仅是内省方便行事,培养社会的胜任能力,建造知识的成熟园满,以及滋长沟通的能力。另一方面,他们又提升他们自己的生活方式,作为是通常心灵健康的意象。病人们被认为是认同通常心灵健康的这个意象。拉康相信这些治疗的介入,指示著精神分析的逃避言说与语言的象征的力量–精神分析的有效性的最初的来源—以迁就功能的想像的层次。

Although Lacan’s crusade against the mission statement of American
ego-psychology can be seen as an idiosyncratic act of recalcitrance, he was
in fact merely rewording one of Freud’s admonitions in ‘Lines of Advance
in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a[1918]). In this paper Freud criticized
the way in which the Swiss school (Jung) and some American psychoanalysts
had conceived the analyst’s task as similar to that of indomitable educators,
godlike creatures who incessantly attempt to mould the uneducated into
images of themselves. Against this view, Freud declared:

虽然拉康对于美国的自我-心理学的使命陈述的批判抨击,可以视为是一种顽强的怪癖的行为。他实际上仅是用不同词语陈述,弗洛伊德的警告,在“精神分析的治疗的前进的路线”(1919a)。在这篇论文,弗洛伊德批判瑞士学派(荣格学派)与美国的精神分析家构想精神分析家的工作的方式,作为是类同大无畏的教育家的工作。他们像是神性一般的人们,不断地企图将没有受过教育的人们塑造成为他们自己的意象。反对这样的观点,弗洛伊德宣称:

We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself
into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide
his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is
good…In my opinion, this is after all only to use violence, even
though it is overlaid with the most honourable motives.
(ibid.: 164–165)

我们非常强调地拒绝将病人转化成为我们的财产,虽然病人将他自己放置在我们手里,寻求帮助。我们拒绝代替病人决定他的命运,强迫我们的理想在他们身上,并且带着创造者的骄傲,用我们自己的意象塑造他,然后顾盼自得,情况良好、、、依我之见,这毕竟仅是使用暴力,即使这个暴力充满荣耀的动机。

As an appropriate alternative Freud suggested the ‘rule of abstinence’,
which consists in the analyst’s refusal to gratify the patient’s needs and
demands so that all substitute satisfactions are avoided and a productive
level of suffering is maintained. Freud refused to model the analytic
treatment on a mental hospital’s policy to look after patients and to make
them feel as comfortable as possible inside. He also emphasized that
whatever educational effect psychoanalysis may entail, analysts should
ensure that their patients do not come to resemble them, but are
encouraged in the liberation and realization of their own being.

作为一个合适的替代选择,弗洛伊德建议这个“节制的原则”。这个“节制的原则”主要在于精神分析家拒绝满足病人的需要与要求。这样,所有的替换的满足都被避免,这样,才能维持遭受痛苦具有创造的层次。弗洛伊德拒绝将精神分析的治疗,模拟精神病院的政策,为了照顾病人,并且让病人的内部尽可能感觉舒适。弗洛伊德也强调,精神分析可能涵盖的任何教育的效果,应该保证,他们的病人并不以逐渐类似精神分析家。而是要鼓励病人从事他们的自己的生命实存的解放与体现。

Lacan’s antagonism between the imaginary and the symbolic followed
Freud’s opposition between non-analytic image building and proper
analytic abstinence. It can be summarized as an antagonism between the
psychic register of insuperable, yet regulated difference and that of
deceptive, yet fascinating resemblance.16 Apropos of the symbolic, Lacan
recognized the paragon of the human symbolic function (the ‘original
symbolism’) in the complex rules of matrimonial alliance, the elaborate
laws of kinship and the practices of exchanging gifts that preside over
otherwise ‘pre-modern’, non-industrialized communities (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:65–66).

拉康将想像界与象征界作为互具敌意,是遵循弗洛伊德将非-精神分析的意象的建造,跟本体的精神分析的节制的互相对立。这个互具敌意能够被总结为:心灵的铭记的无法被征服,可是又被规范的差异,与欺骗,可是又是令人著迷的类似之间的互具敌意。关于象征界,拉康体认出这个典范:人类象征的功能的典范,(原初的象征主义),在婚姻联盟的复杂的规则里,亲属关系的复杂的法则里,与礼物交换的实践。这些统辖著不同的“前-现代”,非-工业化的社会。

Whilst none of these regulations is rooted in a preordained
natural order, they structure the natural living conditions in
such a way that distinct group members are continuously forced to
participate in existing agreements and to negotiate new pacts.17 By
contrast, Lacan located the source of the human imaginary in the socalled
‘mirror-stage’ (Lacan 1977c[1949]), whereby the child develops
its identity (its ego) via an identification with the twin image reflected
by the mirror or, in the absence of reflective surfaces, by a similar other.18

虽然这些规则没有一条是根源于预先注定的自然的秩序,它们架构自然的活生生的情况,用这样一种方式,以致于明显的团体成员继续不断地被迫参与现存的协定,并且协商新的盟约。对照起来,拉康将人类的想像的起源定位在社会化的“镜像阶段”。在“镜像阶段”那里,小孩发展它的自我的认同,经由镜子反映的孪生意象的认同。或者,在反映的表面欠缺的时刻,由类似的他者作为镜像反映。

In Seminar I, and in reference to Freud, Lacan defined the ego accordingly
as an agency that ‘is constructed like an onion, one could peel it and
discover the successive identifications which have constituted it’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:171).19 Consequently, the human imaginary has nothing
to do with the installation and regulation of difference; it is fundamentally
geared towards the advancement of similarity and instead of a
symbolic
truce, it induces jealousy, rivalry, competition and aggression.
在第一研讨班,提到弗洛伊德时,拉康遵循弗洛伊德,将自我定义为一位代理者,“像洋葱一样被建造的代理者。我们能够剥开洋葱,然然发现连续的认同的表层,构成这个自我”。结果,人类的想像跟差异的安置与规则,根本没有任何关系。人类的想享基本上被触动,朝向类似的前进,而非是朝向象征的休战。人类的想像引申出敌意,競争与侵凌。

At the end of Seminar II (1988c[1954–55]:243), Lacan integrated
these two discordant dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary into
a comprehensive cartography of psychoanalytic treatment, placing the
principles of ego-psychology orthogonally to a clinical practice which
he deemed more loyal to Freud’s inspiration. This schema of analytic
communication (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:14), to which Lacan also referred
as the ‘Schema L’, comprises four terms (S, o, o’ and O) and two
conflicting relations (imaginary and symbolic-unconscious).20

在第二研讨班的结束时,拉康将象征界与想像界的这两个不协调的维度,合并成为精神分析治疗的一个全面的地图制作。拉康将自我-心理学的原则,正统地放置在临床的实践里。他认为这是更加忠实于弗洛伊德的启发。精神分析的沟通的这个基模,拉康也提到,作为是“L型基模”,它包括四个术语(S,0,0‘, O),与两个冲突的关系 (想像与象征的无意识)。

In this schema the therapeutic alliance between the clinician and the
patient in an ego-psychological setting is displayed as an imaginary
relation between an ego (o) and another ego (o’).

在这个基模,治临床医生与病人的治疗的联盟,在自我-心理学的背景,被展示出来,作为是想像的关系,处于自我(o),与另外一个自我(o‘)之间。

Lacan proclaimed that
the majority of contemporary clinicians were viewing the patient as an
objectified other whose ego needs ‘to gather its strength, to realise itself,
to integrate itself (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245). In keeping with his theory
of the ego as an imaginary construction, he then argued that the patient’s
ego ‘can only re-encounter and reconstitute itself by way of the fellow
being the subject has before him—or behind him’ (ibid.: 245), which is
of course the figure of the analyst. Hence, the patient and the analyst had
become allies in an imaginary exchange of egos, leading to the
replacement of the patient’s former (pathological) identity by the new
(healthy) identity of the analyst.21

拉康宣称:大多数的当代临床医生,正将病人看待作为是一个被客体化的他者。自我需要这个他者来聚集它的力量,为了实现它自己,为了融合它自己。为了跟他的自我的理论保持一致,作文是想像的建构,拉康因此主张,病人的自我仅能够重新遭遇,重新建构它自己,凭借主体在他面前,或在他背后,拥有的这位同胞。这位同胞当然就是精神分析家的人物。因此,病人与精神分析家已经变成联盟,在想像地交换自我。导致病人的先前的(病态)的认同,被精神分析家的新的认同所取代。

Figure I Schema L
Source: J.Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, New York,
W.W.Norton, 1993, p. 14.
What does the analyst want? 65

From the other to the Other 72

October 24, 2015

From the other to the Other
从他者到大他者

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

12.2 69 XI4
I think that I have sufficiently made you sense that by reason of the
(133) function,of the zeros that do not really form part of the results of
a wager that might be made against a partner, because it is precisely
the existence of the partner that is in question and that it is what you
have to wager on. In these conditions the two lines of possibility that
are offered to the gambler do not intersect with any line of possibility
that might belong to the Other, since one can not even be sure of the
existence of the Other. It is then at the same time on the existence or
non-existence of the Other, on what promises his existence and what
allows his inexistence, it is on this that the choice is brought to bear,
and in this case it is plausible – 1 am saying, it is plausible, of course if
one has a mathematical mind – to wager, and to wager in the sense that
Pascal proposes.

我认为我已经充分地让你们理解。凭借这些零的功能,这些零并没有形成赌注的结果的部分。这个赌注可能被用来对康伴侣。因为确实就是因为伴侣的存在受到质疑。这就是你们必须下赌注的地方。在这些情况里,被提供给赌徒的这两行的可能性,并没有互相交会,跟可能属于大他者的可能性的任何一行。因为我们甚至无法确的大他者的存在。因此跟这个被迫的选择息息相关的是跟大他者的存在或非存在同时息息相关,跟许诺大他者的存在与容许大他者的存在息息相关。在这个情况,这似乎是合理的—我正在说,这是合理的。当然,假如我们具有数学头脑—下赌注,下巴斯卡建议的赌注。

Only, you will not forget that I introduced at this state of the affair, in
order of course not to give rise to misunderstanding and the belief that
here I am lending myself to something which would be the indication
of the advantage of this solution, I effectively remarked the following.

只是,你们将不会忘记,在事情的这个状态,我介绍,当然是为了不要产生误解。在此,我正在帮助某件事情的信念,这个事情将会指示这个解答的利益。我有效地陈述如下:

7 . . . And in the very introduction to the reminder of the wager as it is
presented, much less than it is through the grid of the discussions that
have become classic, I pointed out that at this level one could
substitute for the choice to be made on the subject of the existence of
God, the remark that one would fulfil the function – which would
completely change its sense – this remark that what is at stake, that
what could be at stake, is this radical formulation which is that of the
real, in so far as we can conceive of it and as moreover we sometimes
put our finger on it, that it is not conceivable to imagine any other limit
of knowledge than this stopping point at which one has only to deal
with this, something unsayable and which either is or is not. In other
words something that is related to heads or tails.

当我介绍提醒赌注,当它被呈现,不是经由已经变成经典的讨论的框架。我指出,在这个层次,我们能够用这个谈论来替换应该被做的选择,针对上帝的存在的主体。我们将会实践这个功能—将会完全改变它的意义的功能—这个谈论是:岌岌可危的东西,可能岌岌可危的东西,就是这个强烈的说明,实在界的说明。因为我们能够构型它。而且,我们有时候会掌握它。这并非是匪夷所思的,假如我们想像知识的任何其他限制,除了这个停顿点。在那里,我们必须处理这个某件无法说出的东西。它要,就是存在,要不,就是不存在。换句话说,某件跟头或尾巴息息相关的东西。

This was of course to put you in tune with what is invo lved in not
losing the plot. Namely, that we are not amusing ourselves. We are in
the process of trying to give articulations of such a kind that there can
be played out for us the most important decisions that are to be taken.

这当然是要让你们跟不要丧失计谋所牵涉到东西调合一致。换句话说,我们并不是自娱娱人。我们正在尝试要给予表的,对于这种事情。应该被採取的最重要的决的,能够被扮演出来。

As it happens our times mark more and more that these most important
decisions, in so far as they may be those of the psychoanalyst, may
(134) also coincide with those required at a key point in the social
body, namely, the administration of knowledge, for example.

偶然地,我们的时代越来越标示,这些最重要的决的,因为是精神分析家的重要的决定,可能也巧合于被要求的那些重要的决定,在社会的团体的关键的时刻,譬如,知识的行政体制。

But then, even though on this point it is well understood that I cleared
the board, that I am not doing history and that I do not see why such a
precise system, especially if we correctly conceive the joint at which it
is situated, that Pascal’s wager would have less resources for us than it
had for its author.

但是,即使在这一点,我们清楚地理解,我清理赌盘,我并不正在从事历史,我并不明白,为什么这样一个明确的系统。特别是假如我们正确地构想这个联接,在那里,它被定位。对于我们,巴斯卡的赌注拥有的资源将少于对于它的作者。

And we will indeed come back to this question of
the situation, all the better because we are going to illuminate it now. It
is therefore not, as you are going to see right away, doing history, to
remind you, as I recalled the last time to remind you that in Pascal’s
time, Revelation existed.

我们的确将会回到情境的这个问题。尤其是因为我们现在将要启蒙它。如同你们将立即看出,提醒你们,并不是要从事历史,如同我上次提醒你们,在巴斯卡的时代,启蒙运动存在。

And I even stressed what was at stake with
these two levels, the word of the Church, and then Sacred Scripture,
and the function that Sacred Scripture played for Pascal. And it is
obviously not to remind you that Newton also, who had other things on
his mind, produced a big book — my hobby being bibliophilic, it
happens that I have it, it is superb – which is a commentary on the
Apocalypse and of Daniel’s prophecy. He gave just as much care – 1
mean in the calculation, in the manipulation of numbers that are
nevertheless extremely problematic as those that are at stake when it is
a matter of situating the reign of Nebuchadnezzar for example – as in
his study on the laws of gravity. This should be remembered then in
the margin, but it does nothing for us.

我甚至强调,对于这两个层次,岌岌可危的东西,教堂的真理与圣经的真理。圣经替巴斯卡扮演的功能。显而易见地,我并不是要提醒你们,牛顿也产生一大本书,尽管他想的是其他事情。因为我习惯编排目录,我恰好拥有一本目录,非常优秀的目录—针对启示录与丹尼尔的预言的评论。他给予同样的关心—我指的是计算,在数目字的操控。这些数字仍然是极端问题重重,如同那些岌岌可危的数字,当问题是要定位尼布甲尼撤的统治时期—如同他研究地心引力的法则。这应该顺便被记住。但是它对于我们并没有任何帮助。

What is at stake at this stage, is to remark that at the level that Pascal
then proposes his wager to us, whatever may be the relevance of our
remarks about what is involved in it in the final term, namely, that such
a proposition can only be conceived of when the knowledge of science
is bom, it nevertheless remains that, for him, the wager reposes on
what we can call the word of the Other, and the word of the Other
naturally conceived of as truth.

在这个阶段,岌岌可危的东西是要谈论,在巴斯卡跟我们建议他的赌注的层次,可能跟我们的谈论息息相关的东西,关于用最后的术语所牵涉的东西。换句话说,这样一个命题能够被构想,仅有当科学的知识诞生。问题仍然是,对于巴斯卡,这个赌注依靠我们所谓的大他者的话语。大他者的话语当然被构想作为是真理。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家想要什么?

October 23, 2015

Chapter 2
第二章
What does the analyst want?
精神分析家想要什么?

FREUD’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL SLEUTHING
弗洛伊的的考古学的调查

In order to explain the general attitude of the psychoanalyst during
the treatment, Freud often appealed to highly imaginative metaphors.
For example, in his 1914 essay on transference-love
(1915a[1914]:170) he defined analysts as warriors who are incessantly
waging a threefold battle with their recalcitrant patients, their own
oppressive mental forces and their political opponents outside the
clinical setting.

为了解释精神分析家在治疗时刻的一般态度,弗洛伊德经常诉诸于高度想像的隐喻。譬如,在他的1914年探讨移情与爱的论文,他定义精神分析家作战士,不断地从事三重的战役,跟他们的顽抗的病人,他们自己的压迫的心理的力量,与他们在临床背景之外的政治的对手。

Years later, in Lecture 34 of the ‘New Introductory
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’, he argued that analysts are principally
in the same position as the medieval woman who is suspected of
witchcraft and therefore sentenced to being ‘stewed in a cauldron of
boiling water’ (Freud 1933a[1932]:155), a judgement epitomizing a
surreptitious, yet inescapable death penalty.1

几年之后,在“精神分析的新导论讲演“的34讲里,弗洛伊德主张,精神分析家原则上处于相同的立场,跟中世纪被怀疑具有巫术的女巫。这些女巫因此被判在”滚热的水的大锅里煮泡”。这个判断词描绘秘密而又无可逃避的死刑的轮廓。

Freud’s most insistent and compelling metaphor of the analyst is
definitely that of the archaeologist, a representation which he not only
applied to the abstract practitioner in his writings, but which he himself
embraced wholeheartedly, from the dawn of his analytic itinerary to his
years of forced exile.2 In his preface to the famous Dora case, Freud’s
first extensive report of a psychoanalytic treatment, he divulged that he
had proceeded like a ‘conscientious archaeologist’, bringing ‘to the light
of day after long burial the priceless though mutilated remnants of
antiquity’ and reassembling the shattered pieces without concealing where
‘reconstruction supplements the authentic’ (Freud 1905e[1901]:12–13).

弗洛伊德最持续而强烈的隐喻精神分析家,很明确地说考古学家的隐喻。这一个表象,他不但运用到他的著作里的那些抽象的执业者,而且他自己全心全意地接受这个表象。从精神分析的探索的开始,到他强迫退休的几年。在著名的“朵拉”的个案的序言,弗洛伊德最初广泛地报导精神分析的治疗,他详细说明,他曾经前进,就像一位“孜孜不倦的考古学家”,将“古代的珍贵而切割的残余物,经过长久埋藏之后,重新见到光明“,并且重新组合这些被破坏的碎片。但是没有隐藏“重新建造补足真诚之物”的地方。

In his recollections of Freud, the ‘Wolf Man’ conceded that the Berggasse
consultation rooms ‘must have been a surprise to any patient, for they in
no way reminded one of a doctor’s office, but rather of an archaeologist’s
study’, a feature which Freud explained to his patient by stating that ‘the
psychoanalyst, like the archaeologist in his excavations, must uncover
layer after layer of the patient’s psyche, before coming to the deepest,
most valuable treasures’ (Gardiner 1972:139).3

在弗洛伊德的回忆里,“狼人”承认,博加瑟咨商室“当时一定让任何病人大吃一惊,因为咨商室根本就不会让人想起医生的诊疗室。相反地,它让人想起考古学家的研究室”。弗洛伊德对他的病人解释这个特征时,他陈述说:“精神分析家,就像考古学家在挖掘考古。他必须揭露病人的心灵的每个层面,这样,他才能够来到最深层,最宝贵的宝藏那里。”

The metaphor reappeared
in ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ (1930a[1929]:69–72) and in
‘Constructions in Analysis’ (1937d:259–260), Freud’s testament of
analytic technique, although he now assured that analysts are in a sense
more fortunate than archaeologists, since they have the opportunity to
operate on living materials whose structures have not been eroded by
the accumulated covers.4

在“文明与其不满”,这个隐喻重新出现。在“精神分析的建构”,弗洛伊德处理精神分析的技术。虽然他现在确定,精神分析在某个意义来说,比起考古学家更加幸运。因为他们拥有这个机会来探索活生生的材料。这些材料的结构还没有被腐蚀,被累积的表层。

In his designation of the analyst, including himself, as an archaeologist,
Freud was fascinated by the nineteenth-century German explorer Heinrich
Schliemann, who managed to unearth the remains of Troy and a score of
Mycenaean treasures with Homer’s poetry as his main guide. After the
example of Schliemann, Freud aspired to be a tireless digger and proud
discoverer, not of the sociocultural heritage of humanity, but of the
familial antecedents of the neurotic individual, taking the patient’s
contrived associations, a series of apparently meaningless words, as his
principal lead.5

当弗洛伊德指明精神分析家,包括他自己,作为是考古学家。他著迷于十九世纪的探险家希乐曼。希乐曼成功地挖掘出特洛城的遗迹,以及二十多个迈锡尼文明的财宝。他用荷马的史诗作为他的主要的引导。经过希乐曼的榜样后,弗洛伊德渴望成为一位永不疲倦的挖掘者与自负的发现者,不是发现人类的社会与文化的遗产,而是发现神经症的个人的家庭的先辈。弗洛伊德将病人的计谋的联想,一系列显然没有意义的词语,当作是他的主要的引导。

Also in the wake of Schliemann, Freud was less concerned
with the correct reconstruction of the retrieved fragments than with the
historical value of the relics themselves. Historical truth, predicated upon
the legitimate connection between a current state of affairs and a historical
event, mattered more to Freud than material truth, presupposing a strict
congruence between the past and its representation in the present.6

而且,跟随着希乐曼之后,弗洛伊德所关注的东西并不是这些复得的碎片的正确的重新的建构。他关注的是这个残余物本身的历史的价值。历史的真理,根据合法联机来描述,在目前的事物的状态与历史的事件之间。对于弗洛伊德,历史的真理更加重要,胜过于材料的真实。因为它预先假设,过去与它的现在的表象之间,有严格的一致性。

However elliptic or distorted the patients’ accounts and however fantastic
their symptoms, Freud maintained that these neurotic phenomena are
supported by an unconscious scaffolding, elements which had once been
part and parcel of the patients’ conscious daily reality.

病人的描述无论多么地失漏与被扭曲,他们症状无论多么的匪夷所思,弗洛伊德主张,这些神经症的现象,受的无意识的框架的支持。这些元素曾经是病人的意识的日常的现实的部分与包裹。

Consequently, the Freudian clinician was held to gather as many clues
as possible from the patients’ psychopathology of everyday life, building
hypotheses and drawing maps of the original constellation, and
penetrating into the submerged psychic architecture in order to reveal
the foundations of the symptoms. Whereas the analyst’s theoretical
framework was profoundly archaeological, his methods were deemed
investigative, drawing upon Ovid’s formula Causa latet, vis est notissima
—the cause is hidden but its effect is conspicuous. Yet instead of relying
on the most salient features of his patients’ clinical condition when
venturing this work of reconstruction, Freud put all his trust in apparently
meaningless trifles: slips of the tongue, dreams, parapraxes, lapses of
memory, etc.

结果,弗洛伊德学派的临床医生被认为尽可能收集,从病人的日常生活的心理治疗,建造一些假设,并且绘制原初的心理情意丛的地图,然后贯穿进入潜藏的心灵的建筑结构,为了显示症状的基础。精神分析家的理论的架构虽然是深刻的考古学,他的方法却被认为是研究的方法,依靠奥维德的公式:“原因隐藏,但是结果显露。可是,弗洛伊德并没有依靠他的病人的临床的情况的最有趣的特征,当他冒险从事重建的这个工作。代替的,弗洛伊德将他所有的信任,放在明显没有意义的琐碎的事情:口误,梦,遗忘,记忆失误,等等。

This Freudian analytic procedure of inferring causes from the careful
observation of ostensibly insignificant details mirrored the so-called
‘method of Zadig’, a technique immortalized by Voltaire in a short story
from the mid-eighteenth century and subsequently designated by the
agnosticist Thomas Huxley as the method of ‘retrospective prophecy’.7

这个弗洛伊德的精神分析的程序,根据仔细地观察不重要的细节,反映出这个所谓的“启蒙大师的方法“,这一个技术,由于伏尔泰的短篇小说变得不朽,从十八世纪开始。随后被不可知论者赫胥黎指明是”内省的预言“。

By scrutinizing the trees lining a narrow road and the marks on the ground,
Voltaire’s Zadig succeeded in describing all the essential characteristics
of the horse that had recently passed by, including the length of its tail
and the quality of its bit. Yet, apart from Zadig’s method, Freud’s modus
operandi was also reminiscent of a widely acclaimed procedure for
determining the authorship of works of art which had been developed by
the Italian physician Giovanni Morelli during the nineteenth century.

凭借审查这些树,排列在狭窄的路上,与地上的标记,伏尔泰的启蒙大师成功地描述最近刚刚经过的马的所有的基本的特征。包括尾巴的长度,与马的脚链的品质。可是,除了启蒙大师的方法,弗洛伊德的“动作模式”也让人想起广泛被宣称的程序,用来决的艺术作品的作者归属。这个方法曾经由义大利的医生摩瑞利发展,在十九世纪。

Morelli argued that the tiny details of a painting, such as a character’s
earlobes, reveal more about the identity of the artist than the style of its
central depiction. In ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ Freud admitted to his
long familiarity with Morelli’s procedure, and put it on a par with the
central research method in psychoanalysis:

摩瑞利主张,图画的小小的细节,譬如一个人物的耳叶,更加显示出艺术家的身份,远超过它的中心的描述。在“米开兰吉罗的摩西”,弗洛伊德承认他对于摩瑞利的程序耳熟能详很久了。他并且将它与精神分析的中央的研究方法相提并论。

It seems to me that his [Morelli’s] method of inquiry is closely
related to the technique of psychoanalysis. It, too, is accustomed
to divine secret concealed things from despised or unnoticed
features, from the rubbish-heap, as it were, of our observations.
(Freud 1914b:222)

我觉得,他的摩瑞利的研究的方法,跟精神分析的技术息息相关。这个方法也习惯于被用来猜测秘密被隐藏的东西,从被轻视或没有被注意到的特征,也就是,从我们的观察的垃圾堆里。

To the extent that psychoanalysts, on Freud’s account, study their patients’
clinical pictures with the Zadig-Morelli method, their mode of operation
also resembles that of a host of fictional detectives, the most prominent
being Poe’s C.Auguste Dupin and Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes. To many a
reader’s delight these characters have been portrayed as expert Zadigs,
whose capacities for ‘looking awry’, coupled with an exceptional acumen,
enable them time and again to solve even the most persistent of mysteries.
Likewise, and although the metaphor never appeared in his writings,
Freud intimated that the analyst is some sort of professional clinical
gumshoe, a mental health sleuth whose task consists in dissolving present
psychic crises by retrieving their historical causes via the analysis of
apparently meaningless details.8

因为弗洛伊德的缘故,精神分析研究他们的病人的临床的画面,用摩瑞利-启蒙大师的方法,它们的运作模式也类似许多的幻奇侦探的运作模式一样。最具名声的莫过于爱伦坡的奥古斯特 杜品与道尔的夏洛克 福尔摩斯。令许多读者感的快乐的事,这些人物曾经被描绘成为启蒙大师的专家。他们的“冷眼看世间”能力,再加上特殊的洞察力,让他们有时能够解答即使是顽抗难解的神秘。同样地,在弗洛伊德的著作里,隐喻从来没有出现,他宣告,精神分析家是某种专业的临床侦探,心灵健康的警探,他们的工作就是在于解决目前的心灵的危机。他们获得这些心灵危机的原因,经由表面上没有意义的细节。

Inspired by this contiguity, film directors have often modelled their
detectives—from Hitchcock’s characters for Ingrid Bergman and Scan
Connery in Spellbound and Marnie, to Peter Falk in the role of the
inimitable inspector Columbo—on the image of the Freudian analyst.9
The setting of the Columbo series is particularly relevant here, because
as Slavoj •i•ek has noted in The Plague of Fantasies:

受到这种靠近的启发,电影的导演经常模仿他们的侦探—从希区考克的人物模仿英格丽 柏格曼与史康 科尼立,在“Spellbound and Mamie”,到皮特 法尔克,在大无畏的警探科伦坡—他们模仿弗洛伊德学派的精神分析家。科伦坡警探的系列的背景在此具有特殊关了,因为如同齐泽克在“幻见的瘟疫”里注意到的:

[T]he enigma to be resolved is not that of ‘whodunit?’, but of how the
detective will establish the link between the deceptive surface (the
‘manifest content’ of the crime scene) and the truth about the crime
(its ‘latent thought’)—how he will prove his or her guilt to the culprit.
(•i•ek 1997:106)

应该被解答的谜团并不是“谁幹这件事”,而是侦探如何建立这个关联,处于欺骗的表面与真相之间的关联。表面上犯罪的场景的“表面内容”,真相则是关于犯罪(潜在的思想)–他如何整面他或她的罪行,对于犯罪者。

However, the viewer is not the only person who knows the identity of
the murderer in advance for, as •i•ek has emphasized, the other
distinguishing feature of the Columbo series is that the detective also
seems to know the ins and outs of the matter, including the identity of
the criminal, from the moment he arrives at the scene (ibid.: 107).

可是,观众并不是唯一的人,预先知的谋杀者的身份。如同齐泽克所说的,科伦伯警探系列的区别特征是,侦探也似乎知道事情的内外原委。包括犯罪者的身份,从他到达现场开始。

In a similar vein, Freud worked from a mysterious yet singularly
adequate universal knowledge base, which can deservedly be called
‘mythical’ since it was anchored in Sophocles’ poetic account of the rise
and fall of Thebe. Epistemologically, Freud employed an Oedipal
template, which allowed him to ‘guess’ the pivotal elements of his
patients’ lives even before they had presented them(selves) to him.

同样地,弗洛伊德根据神马可是又独异地充分的普世的知识作为基础开始研究。这个充分的普世知识应该值得被称为“神秘”,因为它能够被追溯到索弗克利斯的史诗的描述西伯家族的興起与衰亡。这让他能够“猜测”病人的生活的关键的因素,即使在这些因素呈现给他之前。

Which
infantile constellation presided over his patients’ adult experiences and
which relationships determined their mental crises were questions Freud
did not need to answer. The only mystery the patients had in store
concerned the way in which the historical truth pervaded the intricate
cobweb of their present symptoms, a mystery which, for its known
Oedipal context, was no less difficult to resolve. Freud’s pre-eminent
challenge was how to dissolve the patients’ smokescreens and confront
them with the naked truth of what they had hitherto been hiding from
their environment and, of course, from themselves.10

哪一个婴孩时代的情结主宰病人的成年的经验?哪一个关系决定他们的精神的危机?这些并不是弗洛伊德需要回答的问题。病人拥有的唯一的等待回答的神秘,跟这个方式息息相关,跟历史的真相弥漫目前的症状的复杂的蜘蛛网的方式息息相关。这一个神秘,因为它已经被知道的伊狄浦斯的内文,同样困难解决。弗洛伊德的杰出的挑战是要如何解的病人的烟幕窗帘,并且让它们面对赤裸裸的真相,他们迄今隐藏的真相,不让环境知道,当然,也不让他们自己知道。

Technically, Freud’s analytical method of ‘retrospective prophecy’,
or, if one prefers, of ‘archaeological sleuthing’ followed the same route
as that which had led to the formation of the patient’s symptoms, albeit
in the opposite direction. For the patients this implied that they had to
recognize the historical (infantile) causes of their symptoms, after the
analyst had succeeded in reconstructing these causes out of the traces
they had left behind.

技术方面来说,弗洛伊德的精神分析的方法“回顾的预测”,或者,我们不妨说是“考古学的技术”,遵循相同的途径,如同曾经导致病人的症状的形成的途径。虽然是朝著相反的方向。对于病人,这暗示着,他们必须体认他们的症状在历史(婴孩)的原有。当精神分析家曾经成功地重新建造这些原因,根据他们留下来的痕迹。

As such, Freudian analysis strictly relied on the
present perfect tense: events starting in the past were expected to have a
lasting, yet unconscious impact on the present and the patients were urged
to come to terms with their contemporary condition by acknowledging
‘what has been’. This idea corresponds to the classical medical maxim
of Ablata causa, tollitur effectus (if the cause is taken away, its effect
will disappear), and it has contributed enormously to the common
designation of Freudian psychoanalysis as a paragon of causal therapy.

作为这样的途径,弗洛伊德学派的精神分析严格遵循“现在完成式”:从过去开始的事件被预期会具有永久,可是无意识的影响目前。病人被建议要跟他们的当时的情境互相妥协,凭借承认“曾经发生过的事情”。这个观念对应于古典的医学的公理:“假如原因被拿走,它的结果将会消失)。它相当程度促成弗洛伊德学派的精神分析的共同指明,作为是因果律治疗的典范。

Once the (infantile) causes had been liberated from the psychic
dungeon to which repression had relegated them, Freud expected these
causes to lose their pathogenic effect automatically. In another extensive
archaeological metaphor, he underscored that ‘in mental life nothing
which has once been formed can perish’, just like the burial of precious
objects under myriad layers of sand contributes to their survival (Freud
1930a[1929]:69–70). But he was keen to add that when these objects are
excavated they are so vulnerable that they can rapidly disintegrate into
insignificant grains of dust, thus returning to their proper place as objects
belonging to a remote past.

一旦(婴孩的)原因已经被解放,从心灵的地牢,压抑曾经将这些原因打到地牢里。弗洛伊德期望这些原因自动地丧失它们的病因的影响。在另外一个广泛的考古学的隐喻,他理解到,在心灵生活里,曾经被形成的东西,没有一样会消灭。就像是珍贵东西的被埋藏在无数层的沙堆里,这个埋藏促成它们的存活。但是弗洛伊德很渴望补充说:当这些东西被挖掘出来,他们是如此容易受到伤害,以致他们迅速地瓦解成为无足轻重的灰尘,因此回到它们本来的位置,作为属于遥远的过去的东西。

‘[T]he destruction of Pompeii was only
beginning now that it had been dug up’, he told the Rat Man (Freud
1909d:176). This is precisely what Freud expected to happen with the
retrieved historical causes of his patients’ symptoms. He anticipated
symptomatic effects to disappear spontaneously following the liberation
of their historical causes from their secret unconscious shelters.

庞贝城的毁灭才刚刚开始,一旦它已经被挖掘出土。弗洛伊德告诉鼠人。这确实是弗洛伊德期望发生的事情,对于他的病人的症状的复得到历史的原因。他预期症状的结果的自动自发地消失,跟随在他们的历史的原因的解放,从他们的秘密的无意识的庇护所。

He believed that a patient’s assumption of his historical truth (as cause) would
have a benign effect on his symptoms, because the patient’s
acknowledgement would grant these causes a new, conscious and
innocuous guise. In the process, the temporal status of psychic events
gradually transformed itself from the present perfect into the past tense.11
Despite its compelling outlook, Freud noticed that something in the
nature of the unconscious itself hindered the full realization of this
analytical project.

弗洛伊德相信,病人的假设他的历史真相(作为原因),将会有良性的影响,对于他的症状。因为病人的承认将会给予他们的原因,重新有意识地伪装成为无害。在这个过程,心灵事件的暂时的状态逐渐转化它自己,从现在完成式,转化成为过去式。尽管它的诱人的外观,弗洛伊德注意到,某件具有无意识本身的特性,阻碍这个精神分析的计划的充分实现。

Already in the final paragraphs of ‘The Dynamics of
Transference’ he observed that the patient’s unwillingness or inability
to subscribe to the rule of free association cannot be attributed entirely
to the psychic power of resistance. Freud had to admit that unconscious
impulses ‘refuse to be remembered’ (wollen nicht erinnert werden) and
are strictly aimed at reproducing themselves (Freud 1912b:107–108).

在“移情的动力结构“的最后一段,弗洛伊德观察到:病人不愿意或是不能够同意自由联想到规则,并无法完全被归咎于抗拒的心灵的力量。弗洛伊德必须承认,无意识的冲动”拒绝被记住“,并且目标严格地朝向复制它们自己。

In
subsequent texts, he conceptualized this unconscious force alternatively
as a not wanting to know (Freud 1913c:141–142), negative therapeutic
reactions (Freud 1923b:49) and the compulsion to repeat (Freud 1920g:
18–20), mental derivatives of the death drive which operates beyond the
pleasure principle. But naming the force and its engine was not sufficient
to eradicate the problem, neither theoretically nor clinically. In Lecture
31 of the ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’, Freud
summarized the work of analysis as follows:

在随后的文本,弗洛伊德替换地建构这个无意识的力量的观念,作为是不想要知道,负面的治疗的反应。与重复的冲动,死亡冲动的精神衍生物,死亡冲动的运作超越快乐原则。但是,光是命名这个力量与力量的引擎,并不足够抹除这个难题,无论是理论上,或是临床方面。在“精神分析新导论的第31演讲班“,弗洛伊德总结精神分析的工作如下:

[Impressions] which have been sunk into the id by repression, are
virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as
though they had just occurred. They can only be recognized as
belonging to the past, can only lose their importance…when they
have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and it is on this
that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small
extent. Again and again I have had the impression that we have
made too little theoretical use of this fact…of the unalterability by
time of the repressed.
(Freud 1933a[1932]:73–74)

被压抑沉入到本我的那些印象,几乎的永久不灭的。经过几十年的过程,它们行为好像它们才刚刚发生。它们仅能够被体认,作为是属于过去,仅能够丧失它们的重要性。当它们被精神分析的工作挖掘到意识层面。精神分析治疗的疗愈的效果,有相当程度就是依靠这一点。经常地,我曾经有这个印象:我们理论上太少运用这个事实:被压抑的事情并没有被时间改变!

Returning to this issue in the third chapter of ‘Analysis Terminable and
Interminable’, Freud ultimately concluded that an analysis may have a
practical end (when the patient and the analyst stop seeing each other)
but not a definitive end, since the treatment procedure is incapable of
neutralizing deleterious unconscious impulses for once and for all.

当弗洛伊德回到“精神分析的终止与没有终止“的第三章节的这个议题,他最后下结论说:精神分析可能拥有一个实际的结束(当病人与精神分析家停止互相再见面)。但是,这并不是明确的结束。因为治疗的程序并不能够让有害的无意识的冲动一劳永逸地保持中立。

Faced with this theoretical and clinical impasse of the Freudian model,
post-Freudian authors have constructed a variety of escape routes. For
instance, ego-psychologists have argued that Freud overestimated the
clinical impact of the death drive or, conversely, that he underestimated
the power of analytic treatment to master its most pervasive outlets, the
manifestations of aggression and destruction.12

面对弗洛伊德的模式的理论与临床的僵局,后-弗洛伊德学派的作者们已经建造各式各样的逃离的路线。譬如,自我-心理学家曾经主张:弗洛伊德过分高估死亡冲动对于临床的影响。或者,反过来说,弗洛伊德过分低估精神分析治疗可以掌控即使到处弥漫的出口的力量,掌控侵凌性与毁灭性的展示。

From a different angle,
psychodynamic therapists have exchanged Freud’s paradigm of
archaeological sleuthing for an alternative treatment model in which the
retrieval of unconscious memories into consciousness is replaced by less
demanding, more superficial procedures, such as the creation and
maintenance of adequate coping strategies and ‘corrective emotional
experiences’.13

从不同角度来看,精神分析动力结构的治疗师,曾经将弗洛伊德的考古学的技术的典范,交换成为替换的治疗的模式。在那里,无意识的记忆的重新进入意识被取代,被比较不那么严格要求,更加表面的程序取代。譬如,充分的应付策略与改进的情感的经验的创造与维持。

In yet another branch of psychoanalysis, object-relations
therapists have sustained Freud’s general conception of analytic treatment,
whilst shifting its focus to the reparation of the patients’ early childhood
relationships, with the analyst functioning as a ‘good enough mother’.14
Each of these developments could be canvassed in its historical origins
and its clinical-theoretical premises, yet within the scope of this book I
will merely focus on Lacan’s answer to the apparent deadlock of Freudian
psychoanalysis.

在另一个精神分析的部门,客体关系的治疗师曾经维持弗洛伊德的精神分析治疗的观念。虽然他们转换它的焦点,到病人的早期的童年的关系的恢复。由精神分析家充当“足够良善的母亲“。每一个发展都能够被细查,在它的历史的起源里与它的临床与理论的假设里被细查。可是,在这本书的范围里面,我将仅是专注于拉康的回答,对于弗洛伊德学派的精神分析的明显的僵局。
During the first years of his seminars, Lacan generally
espoused Freud’s views on the end of analysis—interpreted in terms of
its termination, its goal and its results. For example, in the final session
of Seminar I (1988b[1953–54]:273–287), he argued that the analyst’s
task consists in encouraging patients to embark on a progressive
verbalization of those elements which they have never integrated into
their life history, in view of the full realization of their subjective truth.

在拉康的研讨班的前几年,拉康通常说明弗洛伊德对于精神分析终止的观点—他用精神分析的终止,它的目标与它的结果的术语来解释。譬如,在第一研讨班的最后一节,拉康主张,精神分析家的工作就在于鼓励病人从事逐渐进步的文词表达这些因素,他们从来没有将这些因素融合到他们的生命的历史,因为他们的主体的真理的充分的实现。

During the late 1950s, this Freudian goal was gradually reformulated as
‘the subject’s avowal of his desire’ in its indebtedness to the desire of
the Other (Lacan 1977i[1958]:275; 1991b[1960–61]:234). From the mid-
1960s, and especially with Seminar XI, Lacan then explored the psychic
backdrop of this subjective avowal of desire, which cleared the way for
his conceptualization of ‘traversing the fantasy’ (Lacan
1977b[1964]:273–274) and ‘subjective destitution’ (Lacan
1995b[1967]:8) as the most advanced analytic goals, to be reserved for
those clinical experiences which have training effects on the analysand.

在1950年晚期,这个弗洛德的目标逐渐被重新说明,作为是主体的承认他的欲望,由于主体感谢大他者的欲望。从1960年开始,特别是第11研讨班,拉康当时探索主体的承认欲望的心灵的背景。这清除这个途径,让他能够建构这两个观念:“亲厉幻见“与”主体的匮乏“。作为是最进步的精神分析的目标,应该被保留给那些临床的经验,这些经验对于分析者具有训练的效果。

This gradual shift from fullness (the reintegration of one’s personal
history) to emptiness (the acknowledgement of an irrecuperable loss in
the avowal of desire) as the appropriate terminus of analytic treatment
correlated with Lacan’s ongoing reflection upon the analyst’s clinical
position and his theoretical re-evaluation of the Freudian unconscious.
Eventually, it opened up entirely new perspectives on the clinical politics
of the analyst, which he formalized in the so-called ‘discourse of the
analyst’ (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:31–42).

逐渐的转变,从充实(一个人的个人的历史的融合),到空虚(承认欲望时,承认丧失的无法复得),作为是精神分析治疗的的合适的终止。这个拉康正在进行的反思息息相关,反思精神分析家的临床的立场,与其理论的重新评估弗洛伊德的无意识。最后,它展开完全崭新的观点,对于精神分析家的临床的活动。他在所谓的“精神分析家的辞说“里,说明这个活动。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从他者到大他者 71

October 22, 2015

From an other to the Other
从他者到大他者

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

12.2 69
Seminar 11: Wednesday 12 February 1969
(131) Very bored with everything that is happening, huh! You too I
think. One cannot all the same not notice it, because I am in the
process of asking myself whether I am here to do my usual thing or
whether I am occupying the place! Anyway! Some benevolent ears
were prepared to understand that some of the things that I put forward,
specifically during my second last seminar, had some relationship with
a science — who knows? With perhaps not a new science, but with a
bringing up to date of what is involved for the conditions of science.

他们对每件正在发生的事情感到无聊,呵呵!我想,你们也是。我们无法被仍然注意它,因为我正在询问自己,我在这里,是否是为了做我通常的事情,或是为正在占有这个位置!无论如何!有些好心的耳朵正准备好理解,我提出的某些的事情,明确地在我前两次的研讨,它跟某个科学具有关系—天晓得!或许并不是跟一门新科学,而是跟对于科学的情况所牵涉的东西的新潮流行有关系。
/ ‘
Today I sense, for all sorts of reasons, even if it is only because we are
getting close to Mardi-Gras, so then it is appropriate, that I should
gently change the direction of things. I sense it, like that, after
balancing what I thought out this morning before seeing you. I am
going to bend myself a little bit towards something that you can call
whatever you want, but which is rather a moral note. How could one
moreover escape it, in the aura, in the margin, in the limits of that
through which I tackled something which is Pascal’s wager.

今天,我感觉到,因为各种理由,即使这仅是因为我们正在靠近圣灰狂欢节,所以那时合适的,我应该温和地改变事情的方向。我感觉它,像那样,当我平衡我今天早晨思维出的东西,在跟你们会面之前。我正要稍微倾身朝向你们能够称为你们喜欢的东西。但是,这是道德的语调。而且,我们如何能够逃避它,在这个氛围,在这个边缘,在我克服某件属于巴斯卡的赌注的东西的限制。

It is
certain that we cannot fail to recognise this incidence, even though, of
course, what inspired me to speak to you about it, is that Pascal’s
wager is at a certain joint, and this, all the same, I am going to recall,
But, like that, as a way of introducing things a little and of relaxing,
however little, the atmosphere – 1 told you that we were getting close
to Mardi-Gras — I am going to read you a letter that I received. I am
not going to tell you who sent it to me, nor even from what town it
came.

的确,我们一定会体认出这件意外,当然,即使启发我跟你们言谈它的理由是,巴斯卡的赌注处于某个关节。这仍然是我将要提醒的东西。但是,像那样,作为稍微介绍事情的方式,并且让气氛稍微轻松一点。我告诉你们,我们正要靠近圣灰狂欢节—我将用跟你们阅读我收到的一封信。我将不告诉你们谁寄给我这封信,也不告诉你们信从哪个城镇来。

“Dear Mr Lacan. We are students and we have read almost all o f your
Ecrits. We find a lot o f things in it. Obviously it is not always easy to
approach but this all the same deserves our congratulations….. ” I
don’t get those every day! “We would really like to know how one sets
about writing such difficult things…”

「亲爱的拉康先生。我们是学生,我们都已经阅读你的精神分析论文全集。我们在它里面发现许多东西。显而易见地,要理解并不是那么容易。但是这仍然值得我们恭喜你。」我并不是每天都得到这些恭喜!「我们确实想要知道,你是如何开始书写这些艰涩的东西、、、」

I am not sending anyone up,
and certainly not these chaps that I find really.. .anyway I will tell you
what I think about it; there must have been two of them to write that!

我并不是让任何人都感興趣,的确,并不是这些人们,我发现确实、、、!我将告诉你们我对它的看法。当时一定有两个人书写它!

“… it would be useful to us in our examinations. We may well have a
degree in philosophy, but it is getting more and more complicated to
get through the selection. We think that it would be better to use
trickery and astonish the teachers rather than persisting in a style o f
banal down-to-earth discourse”. And they add “make no mistake.
Could you point us to some little fiddles in this direction?“’ That strikes
(132) me, because all I am saying is that, fundamentally, that is what I
am in the process of doing! “On the other hand, we would like again
to ask you something if it’s not too daring: Do you think you could
send us as a souvenir one o f your lovely bow ties? We would really
like that. Thanking you in advance, we say farewell, Mr Lacan, and
please receive our most respectful h o m a g e I am not going to leave
that lying around because .. .they are not really up to date. They do not
know that I have been wearing a polo neck for some time!

「在我们参加考试时,那是相同有用途。我们很有理由拥有哲学的学位。但是,要通过这些筛选是越来越复杂。我们认为我们最后使用诡计,并且让老师们惊奇,而不是持续陈腔滥调的务实辞说的风格。」然后,他们补充说:「请不要误解,朝这个方向,你能够跟我们指出某些小谜团吗?」那让我感到印象深刻。因为我正在言说的一切,基本上,那是我正处于做的过程!「在另一方面,我们想要再次要求你某件东西,假如这不太冒昧的话:你认为你能够送给我们一个纪念品,你的可爱的胡蝶领结?我们确实喜欢它。预先感谢你,我们说再见。拉康先生,请你接受我们的敬意。」我将不要让那个领结到处流通,它们确实没有消息灵通。他们并不知道,我一直是穿着长领羊毛衫。

For me, that gives an echo, confirmation, a resonance to something that
moves me when I hear right minded people going on, like that, since
the month of May: ‘Things are no long the way they were”. I think
that where we are at, it is more than ever like it was before. And after
all, I am very far of course from limiting the phenomenon to this little
report that this letter gives of what is a comer of the affair. Obviously
there are many other things at stake.

对于我,那给予一个回响,肯定,对于感动我的某件事情的回响。当我听见心灵正直的人们正在进行的事情,像那样。自从五月份以来“事情不再是以前的样子、、、“我认为,我们正处于的地方,不再像是以前的样子。毕竟,我当然是根本没有将这个现象,限制与这个小小的报导,这封信给予的报导,关于事情的某个角落的东西。显而易见地,还有许多其他的事情岌岌可危。

Only what is striking, is that from a certain point of view, this letter in
my eyes may very well sum up the way people have listened to me, but
in a zone that is not at all as distant from me as this town which is all
the same a good distance away. As you see, they are not very up to
date! But in any case, it is an aspect of the way that teaching is
received.

只是,耐人寻味的事情是,从某个观点而言,这封信在我的眼里很有理由总结人们曾经倾听我的情况。但是这个领域距离我丝毫并不遥远,比起这个有一段距离的这个小镇。如同你们看见,他们消息并不灵通!但是,无论如何,这是教学被接纳的方式的层面。

And then I do not see why one would blame them for the
bow tie. Because there is someone who played a pivotal role in a
certain examining board, like that, that a certain British Society sent us
a long time ago, who put that down as a point that was quite worthy of
putting in the scales with the rest of my teaching. I mean that that was
how it was, this was on one pan and on the other, my bow tie.

因此,我并不明白为什么我们要责怪他们因为这个胡蝶领结。因为有某个人扮演关键的角色,在某个考试委员会,像那样,某个英国社团很久以前送给我们,他将那个考试委员会归属于某个时刻,相当值得用我的教学平衡的时刻。我指的是,那就是它的当时的情况。这就是某个双关语,我的胡蝶领结。

Namely,
with the help of this accessory the identification of those who
presented themselves at that time as my pupils was supposed to be
possible. So then you see that this is not limited to the level of these
little dears, nice naive people. They are perhaps not so naive as that
because, as they told you, you have to be a little tricky. We will come
back to it.
/
换句话说,凭借当时出现的那些人们的认同的这个附属品,我们的学生当时被认为可能认同的附属品。所以,你们看见,这并不是限制与这些小小的亲爱的,天真可爱的人们。他们或许并没有像那样天真,因为如同他们告诉你们,你们必须稍微具有诡计。我们将回头谈论它。

So then we will take things up where we had dismantled them a little,
namely, in the table of the wager. On the left – the blue lines are made
to show where the limits of each one of these schemas stop, so that,
they do not overlap one another, either really or in your minds – so.
then the one on the left is the one with which I believed I should
complete the matrix in which, in imitation of what is practised in
games theory, one could schematise what was effectively discussed
throughout the whole of the nineteenth and even during a good part of
the beginning of our century around Pascal’s wager. Namely, the way
of demonstrating how, in a way, Pascal was trying to swindle us.

所以,我们将探讨事情,在我们曾经稍微拆解它们的地方。换句话说,在赌注的这个表格。在左边—蓝色线条被用来显示,这些基模的每一个的限制在哪里停止。这样,它们才不会互相重叠,不论是实际上,或是在你们的心理互相重叠。因此,左边的这个表格,就是我相信我应该完成的基模。在那里,当我们模仿游戏理论被实践的东西,我们能够建立基模,将实际上被讨论的东西,在整个的十九世纪,与我们这个世纪的开始的一大部分,环绕巴斯卡的赌注。换句话说,这个方式证明,巴斯卡如何尝试欺骗我们。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 10

October 21, 2015

WHITHER PERVERSION?
是否倒错

When discerning the three clinical paradoxes between speech and
language in his 1953 ‘Rome Discourse’, Lacan did not venture upon an
alternative definition of the nosological category of perversion. Instead,
he described the third paradox as ‘the subject who loses his meaning in
the objectifications of discourse’, which opened a more metaphysical
perspective on the antagonistic relationship between the subject (sujet)
and the ego (moi). Lacan put the ‘disguises of perversion’ in the neurotic
compartment—alongside the ‘talking arms of character’ and the ‘seals
of self-punishment’—as ‘hermetic elements’ which the psychoanalytic
exegesis can resolve (Lacan 1977e[1953]:70).

当拉康辨别处于言说与语言之间的这三种悖论时,他于他的1953年的“罗马辞说”,他并没有探测一个替代的定义,对于倒错的分类的范畴。代替的,他描述这第三个悖论,作为是“丧失他的意义于辞说的客体化的主体”,这个辞说展开一个更加形上学的观点,探讨主体与自我之间的敌意的关系。拉康将“倒错的伪装”,放置在神经症的分类。伴随着“人格的谈话的手臂”与“自我-惩罚的封印”—作为是“解释的元素”,精神分析的存在能够解决的“解释的元素”。

Lacan’s hesitation to qualify perversion as a discrete clinical structure
permeated much of his work from the 1950s, and is rooted in the
theoretical inconsistencies which troubled Freud in his pioneering
psychoanalytic explorations of the topic. Using the concept of perversion
in its then accepted medico-legal meaning of sexual phenomena
precluding genital union and/or the involvement of two consenting adult
human beings belonging to the opposite sex, Freud averred in his casestudy
of Dora and in his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ that
all psychoneurotics possess forceful, albeit repressed perverse tendencies,
and that the sexual constitution of the child, owing to its being ruled by
disorganized partial drives, is polymorphously perverse (Freud
1905d:231–232; 1905e [1901]:50).

拉康的犹豫,不愿将倒错的品质定为是混杂的临床结构。他的犹豫弥漫于他的许的著作里,从1950年代开始,并且根源于让弗洛伊德感到困扰的理论的不一致,在他开前锋的精神分析对这个议题的探索。弗洛伊德使用倒错的观念,在它当时被接受的医学与法律的意义,对于这些性的现象,预先包含性器官的结合与(或)两位同意的成年人的牵涉,他们属于不同的性别。弗洛伊德在他的个案研究“朵拉”,与“性学三论”,主张,所有的心理的神经症者拥有强迫性,虽然是压迫的倒错的倾向。小孩的性的体质,由于受的瓦解的部分冲动的统辖,呈现多种样体的倒错。

Consequently, the category of
perversion was expanded to include children as well as adults,
psychoneurotics as well as ‘genuine’ perverts, and Freud saw himself
faced with the question as to what distinguishes true ‘positive perversion’
(perversion proper) from its false, ‘negative’ avatars.
After having discarded the nature of the sexual behaviours and the
contents of the fantasies, Freud eventually confided in the genuine pervert’s
fixation on the sexual object and the perverse exclusiveness with regard to
the sexual aim, processes which he attributed to an interaction of
constitutional and accidental factors (Freud 1905d:162, 235–240). Of
course, both fixation and exclusiveness are quantitative rather than
qualitative criteria, which probably explains why Freud continued to look
for more reliable distinctions between perversion and neurosis.

结果,倒错的范畴被扩大到包含小孩与成年人,心理神经症者与“真正”的倒错症者。弗洛伊德自己看见,当他面对这个问题:如何区别真正的“正面倒错者”(本体的倒错者)与虚假的“负面的”倒错者的天使下凡之间的差异。弗洛伊德抛弃性的行为的特性与幻见的内容之后,他最后坦白承认,在他论述真正的倒错者的固著于性的客体,与倒错者的排除,关于行的目的。他将这些过程归属于体质与意外的因素的互相作用。当然,两种固著与排除都是数量方面,而非是品质方面的标准。这可能解释为什么弗洛伊德继续寻找更可靠的区别,在倒错者与神经症者之间。

In ‘Fetishism’ (1927e), he launched the criterion of disavowal
(Verleugnung) to explain how a male child develops into a fetishist. When
confronted with the reality of sexual difference, the child disavows
castration (the mother’s lack of a penis) by convincing himself that the
mother does possess a penis. As a substitute for the painfully missed
penis of the mother, the fetish serves to sustain this psychic reaction of
disavowal and produces a split in the child’s ego, because it symbolizes
both mental triumph and the inherent threat of castration. According to
Freud (ibid.: 156–157), this split could also account for the fetishist’s
ambiguous attitude vis-a-vis his objects.

在“论恋物癖”,弗洛伊德竖立起这个标准:不承认。为了解释一位男性的小孩为什么发展成为恋物癖者。当小孩面临性的差异的现实,小孩不承认被阉割(母亲的欠缺阴茎)。他说服自己:母亲并没有拥有阴茎。作为母亲的这个令人痛苦的丧失的阴茎,恋物癖被用来维持这个心灵的反应,并且产生小孩的自我的分裂。因为它象征精神的胜利与阉割的本质的威胁。依照弗洛伊德,这个分裂的小孩也能够解释恋物癖的模糊嗳昧的态度,当他面临他的客体时。

Although a proper qualitative criterion for (fetishistic) perversion,
similar to that of repression in neurosis, Freud’s mechanism of
disavowal proved as indiscriminate as the nature of the sexual
behaviours and the contents of the fantasies. For shortly before his
death, in ‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’ (1940a[1938]:204), he
emphasized the possibility of a disavowal of castration in non-fetishistic
subjects, that not only put the specificity of fetishism, but that of the
entire category of perversion at risk.

虽然有关“恋物癖”的倒错症者的合适的品质的标准,类似神经症者的压抑的标准。弗洛伊德对于“不承认”的心理机制,作为是区别性行为的特性与幻见的内容。因为在他死亡之前不久,在“论精神分析的钢要”,他强调“不承认被阉割”的可能,在非-恋物癖的主体。那不但让恋物癖的特殊性,而且让倒错的整个的范畴的特殊性,陷于危险。

During the early 1950s, Lacan embraced the same definition of
perversion as Freud, and embarked on an analogous project of
differentiating between the polymorphous perversity of the child, the
perverse sexuality of neurotics (and psychotics) and the psychic structure
of genuine perverts.48 In Seminar I, he posited that the structure of
perversion is characterized by the reduction of the (symbolic) register of
intersubjective recognition to an imaginary relationship (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:221).

在1950年代早期,拉康接受跟弗洛伊德相同的对应倒错者的定义。他开始从事一个类似的计划,区别小孩的多重样态的倒错行为,神经症这(精神病者)的倒错的性行为,与真正的倒错症者的心理的结构。在第一研讨班,他提出假设:倒错症者的结构的特色,是减少互为主体性的体认的“象征”的铭记,减少成为想像的关系。

By this he meant that perverts try to reduce their
partners to mere objects, to instruments or idols—short of seeking solace
in idealized inanimate objects—whose only function is to satisfy their
own desires, with the caveat that the positions within this relationship of
submission/dominance can suddenly be reversed so that the original
master becomes the slave and vice versa. To the degree that this
observation ostensibly enabled Lacan to separate authentic perversion
from sexual ‘phenomena which one calls perverted’ on the ‘plane of an
exclusively playful execution’ (ibid.: 215), it did not stand the test of
infantile sexuality.

他这样假设的意义是,倒错症者尝试减少他们的伴侣,甚至成为仅是客体,仅是工具与木偶。他并不是要被理念化的没有生物的客体里寻找安慰。这些客体的唯一的功能是满足他们自己的欲望。他们主张,这顺服与支配的这个关系之内的这些立场,能够突然地被倒转。这样,原初的主人变成奴隶,原初的奴隶变成主人。甚至,这个观察夸张地让拉康分开真正的倒错症者与我们所谓的倒错症者的性的“现象”,根据“专注的运作的执行的层面“。它并没有经得起婴孩的性的考验。

For in the same seminar Lacan admitted that ‘[I]f
analytic theory has qualified as polymorphously perverse this or that
mode or symptom in the child’s behaviour, it is in so far as perversion
implies the dimension of imaginary intersubjectivity’ (ibid.: 217–218).
Lacan returned to this issue in Seminar IV, in which he undertook a
year-long theoretical analysis of the child’s pre-Oedipal, pre-genital
object-relations, notably those that were being held to support its status
of polymorphous perversity as an imaginary intersubjectivity. Here he
defended the innovative idea that the pre-Oedipal relations between a
child and its mother are not governed by imaginary intersubjectivity at
all, because they are always already inhabited by the symbolic universe
in which human beings function.

因为在相同的研讨班,拉康承认,假如精神分析理论已经给予特质,作为是多重样态的倒错症,小孩的行为的这种或那种模式,或症状,那是因为倒错症暗示着想像的互为主体性的维度。拉康回到这个议题,在第四研讨班。在那里,他从事一年之久的理论的分析小孩的前-伊狄浦斯,前-性器官的客体的关系。特别是那些人们,被认为是支持小孩的多重样态的倒错的地位,作为是想像的互为主体性。在此,他辩护这个创新的观念:小孩与母亲的前-伊狄浦斯的关系,根本就没有受到互为想像的互为主体性所统辖。因为他们总是准备已经被象征的宇宙所驻居。在那里,人能发挥功能。

To Lacan the primary mother-child
relationship is not a pre-established, symbiotic bond, but an essentially
heterogeneous sphere reigned by tension, conflict and misunderstanding
on both sides.

对于拉康,这个原初的母亲与小孩的关系,并不是一个预先建立的象征的关系,而是基本上异质性的领域,受到两边的紧张,冲突,与误解的统辖。

Criticizing Balint’s conception of the primary motherchild
interaction as a perfectly tuned, reciprocal exchange, Lacan claimed
that mothers do not love (nurture, nurse and nourish) their children simply
for the fact that they constitute their precious and vulnerable offspring,
but also because the children present them with an additional source of
satisfaction.49 Put differently, a mother loves her child not so much
because she is acting upon a natural mother instinct, but because she
unconsciously uses the child to cover up her symbolic lack of enjoyment
and to obtain supplementary satisfaction in a carefree and selfish way. In
Lacan’s terminology, there ‘is always in the mother, on the side of the
child, the requirement of the phallus, which the child more or less
symbolizes or realizes’ (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:56).

当拉康批评巴林特的观念:将原初的母亲与小孩的互动,作为是一个完美调适,互惠的交换。拉康宣称,母亲爱(滋养,看护,与养育)她们的小孩,并不仅是因为这个事实:他们形成他们珍贵而易受伤害的后代。而是因为小孩呈现给与她们额外的满足的来源。换句话说,母亲爱她的小孩,并不是因为她根据自然的母亲的本能採取行动,而是因为她无意识地使用小孩掩盖她的象征的欠缺快乐,并且为了获得补充的满足,用任意与自私的方式。用拉康的术语,在母亲身上,在小孩这边,总是有阳具的要求。小孩相当程度象征或体现阳具。

As far as the child
itself is concerned, Lacan argued that it experiences a psychic crisis when
it discovers that in order to secure the love of the mother more is required
than simply ‘being there’, that in order to sustain her love it is not enough
to offer oneself. The fact that the child is also ‘the phallus, as object of
the desire of the mother …constitutes an insurmountable barrier for the
satisfaction of the desire of the child, which is to be the exclusive object
of the desire of the mother’ (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:285–286).

就小孩自身而言,拉康主张,它经验到心灵的危机,当它发现,为了获得母亲的爱,它所需要的东西,不仅是“在那里”。为了维持她的爱,光是提供它自己是不足够的。小孩也是“阳具”,作为母亲的欲望的客体的这个事实,形成一个无法被克服的阻碍,对于小孩的欲望的满足。那就是要成为母亲的欲望的专注的客体。

The child can alleviate this conflict in two different ways (Lacan 1994
[1956–57]:81–86). On the one hand, it can try to maintain the satisfaction
of its own desire (to be the exclusive object of the mother) by identifying
with the phallus (the object of the desire of the mother), whereas on the
other hand it can acknowledge the sociocultural exclusion of a fully
satisfying relationship with the mother and its concurrent promise of a
different, future fulfilment. In the former case the child endeavours to
satisfy all of the mother’s desires, thus putting its relationship with the
mother under the aegis of the imaginary, which entails unselfish
interdependence and strict reciprocity; in the latter case, the child
assimilates the symbolic convention of the prohibited relationship with
the mother, accepts its desire to remain fundamentally unsatisfied and
engages in a quest for substitute satisfactions.

小孩能够减轻这个冲突,用两个不同的方式。一方面,小孩能够尝试维持它自己的欲望的满足,(成为母亲的专注的客体),小孩认同阳具(母亲的欲望的客体)。另一方面,小孩能够承认社会与文化的排除,对于充分令人满意的关系,跟母亲与小孩同时的承诺给予不同的,未来的满足。在前者的情况,小孩努力满足所有的母亲的欲望,因此将它跟母亲的关系,放置在想像结的枢纽。这意味着,没有私心地互相依靠与严格的互惠。在后者的情况,小孩接受象征的传统:跟母亲具有禁止的关系。小孩接受它的欲望基本上始终不被满足,并且尝与追寻替换的满足。

Lacan argued that the
former solution leads to fetishism, the ‘perversion of perversions’ (ibid.:
194), whereas the latter introduces the child into the structure of neurosis.50
Despite its appeal, this elaborate explanation of perversion proved as
unsatisfactory as the previous one (of the reduction of the symbolic to
an imaginary intersubjectivity), since it begged the question as to how
perverts differ from psychotics, whom Lacan had also located outside
the symbolic pact.

拉康主张,先前的关系导致恋物癖,“倒错症中的倒错”。后者则是介绍小孩进入神经症的结构。尽管它的诉求,这个复杂的倒错症的解释,证明同样不令人满意,跟先前的解释(将象征化简成为想像的互为主体性)。因为它闪躲这个问题, 关于倒错症者如何不同于精神病者。拉康也将精神病定位在象征的盟约的外面。

Neither did Lacan’s solution answer the question
whether true perverts are any different from the multitude of neurotics
and psychotics who display ‘perverse’ behaviours.51 Accounting for these
neurotic and psychotic ‘perverse’ behaviours, Lacan often talked about
‘paradoxical perverse reactions’, perverse ‘paroxysms’, and passage a
l’acte, conceding that they too rest upon a shortening of the symbolically
regulated distance between the subject and his object of satisfaction, and
that ill-advised analysts can easily induce these reductions unknowingly
during the course of analytic treatment (ibid.: 81).52

拉康的解决也没有回答这个问题:真正的倒错症者是否不同于显示“倒错行为”的多数的神经症者与精神病者。当拉康解释这些神经症与精神病的“倒错”的行为时,他经常谈论关于“悖论的倒错症的反应,倒错症者的“麻痹”,与”行动的过程“。他承认,它们也依靠缩短被象征规范的距离,在主体与他的满足的客体之间的距离。那个并不恰当被劝告的精神分析家能够容易地引导出这些化简,不知不觉地,在精神分析的治疗的过程。

To resolve the issue of the separation between perversion and
psychosis, Lacan returned to Freud’s 1919 essay ‘A Child is Being
Beaten’, in order to proclaim that perversion, unlike psychosis, follows
the fundamental pattern of the Oedipus complex:

为了解的倒错症者与精神病这之间分开的这个问题,拉康回到弗洛伊德1919年的论文“论小孩正在被打“,为了宣称:倒错症者,并不像精神病者,他们遵循伊狄浦斯情结的基本模式。

Perversion is usually considered to be a drive which has not been
elaborated by the Oedipal, neurotic mechanism—a pure and simple
survival, the persistence of an irreducible partial drive. Freud, on
the contrary, in this primordial paper [‘A Child is Being Beaten’]
and also in many other places, indicates sufficiently that no perverse
structuring, no matter how primitive we suppose it to be…can be
articulated without…the process, the organisation, the articulation
of the Oedipus complex.
(ibid.: 120–121)

倒错症通常被认为是一种还没有被伊狄浦斯,神经症的心理机制建构的冲动—一个纯粹而单纯的存活,无法被化简的部分的冲的的持续。相反地,在这篇原初的论文”小孩正在被打“,也在许多其他的场合,弗洛伊德充分地指示:每个倒错症的结构被表达时,无论我们认为它是多么的原始,总是会有伊狄浦斯情结的这个过程,这个组织,这个表达。

One year later, Lacan used almost exactly the same words to describe
the Oedipal character of perversion, yet now also broaching the ensuing
congruence of perversion and neurosis:

一年以后,拉康使用几乎完全相同的字词,来描述倒错症的伊狄浦斯的特性。可是,现在,他也转过倒错症与神经症的随后的协调。

In order to abandon the notion that perversion is purely and simply
the emerging drive, that is to say the contrary of neurosis, one had
to wait for the signal of the conductor, that is to say the moment
when Freud wrote Ein Kind wird geschlagen…Perversion does
not appear as the pure and simple manifestation of a drive, but it
turns out to be related to a dialectical context which is as subtle, as
composite, as rich in compromise, as ambiguous as a neurosis.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:230–231)

为了放弃这个观念:倒错症纯粹而单纯地是出现的冲动。换句话说,神经症的相反。我们必须等待行为者的讯息,也就是说,当弗洛伊德书写“性学三论”时,倒错症并没有出现,作为是冲动的纯粹而简单的证明。但是,倒错症结果证明跟辩证的内容息息相关。这个辩证内容跟神经症一样的微妙,一样组成,一样富有妥协,一样模糊嗳昧。

Later in the same seminar Lacan deployed the structural analogy between
perversion and neurosis further by claiming that the neurotic mechanism
of repression equally applies to perversion, ‘inasmuch as it presents itself
also as a symptom and not as the pure and simple manifestation of an
unconscious desire’ (ibid.: 336).53

后来,在相同的研讨班,拉康运用倒错症与神经症之间结构的类似。他宣称,压抑的神经症的心理机制,同样运用到倒错。因为它也呈现它自己,作为症状,而不是作为纯粹而单纯的展示无意识的欲望。

Having postulated this constitutive link between the structures of
neurosis and perversion, Lacan’s subsequent move was to situate
perversion with regard to the neurotic dynamics of jouissance, desire,
object a and the fantasy.54 The groundwork for this new differentiation
was done in Seminar VI, in which Lacan contended that ‘the fantasy [?
a] marks every human passion with those traits which we call perverse’,
although ‘in the perversion, the accent is on the object a, [whereas] the
neurosis can be situated as having its accent on the other term of the
fantasy, the ’ (1977a[1959]:14, 16).

当拉康提出这个结构性的关联,处于神经症与倒错症之间的结构之间。拉康的随后的行动就是定位倒错症,关于神经症的动力结构:欢爽,欲望,小客体,与幻见。作为这个新的差异的基础被完成,在第六研讨班。在那里,拉康主张,这个幻见标示每个人的激情,具有我们所谓的“倒错症”的特征。虽然在“倒错症,强调的是小客体。而神经症者则是被定位在将它的强调放在幻见的另外一个术语”。

Throughout the remainder of his
career, Lacan employed this criterion of the fantasy as a tool to separate
neurosis from perversion. In Seminar XI, for example, he stated that the
structure of perversion is strictly speaking an inverted effect of the fantasy,
because it ‘is the subject who determines himself as object, in his
encounter with the division of subjectivity’ (Lacan 1977b[1964]:185).

在拉康事业的晚年,拉康运用幻见的这个标准,作为是分开神经症与倒错症的工具。譬如,在第十研讨班,他陈述:倒错症的结构严格来说,是这个幻见到倒转的影响。因为它是“决定他自己作为客体的主体,在他遭遇到主体的分裂时“。

Unfortunately, it is easier to pinpoint these references than to explain
what they mean. The gist of Lacan’s argument seems to be contained in
a passage from the 1960 text ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, in which he wrote:
Perversion adds [to the privileged place of jouissance] a
recuperation of the f that would scarcely appear as original, if it
did not interest the Other as such in a very particular way. Only my
formulation of the fantasy enables us to reveal that the subject
here makes himself the instrument of the Other’s jouissance. It is
all the more important …to grasp the relevance of this formula in
the case of the neurotic, precisely because the neurotic falsifies it.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:320, translation modified)

不幸地,我们更加容易强调这些指称,胜过解释它们是什么意思。拉康的论点的要旨似乎能够被包括在1960年的文本的段落,“弗洛伊德的无意识,作为主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”。在那里,拉康写到:倒错症增添原先并没有出现的这个阳具的恢复,作为欢爽的具有特权的位置。假日它对大他者的本身,以一个特殊的方式。只有我对于幻见的说明让我们能够揭示,在此的主体让他自己成为是大他者的欢爽的工具。这是更加重要的,要理解这个公式的相关性,在神经症的个案,确实是因为神经症让它成为虚假。

If perverts pass through the Oedipus complex, as Lacan had learnt from
Freud, then they must experience a loss of enjoyment (-f) in the same
way as neurotics (obsessionals and hysterics) do. Like neurotics they
must also set out to retrieve that lost jouissance, a project whose end
result would comprise the restoration of subjective fullness. Therefore,
the perverse recuperation of the f scarcely appears as original, because
the same mechanism is valid for neurosis.

假如倒错症者通过伊狄浦斯情结,如同拉康从弗洛伊德学习到,那么他们必须经验阳具享乐的丧失,如同神经症者(妄想症者与癔症者)一样。就像神经症者,倒错症者也必须出发去重新复得那个丧失的享乐。这个计划的结果将会组成主体的充实的恢复。因此,倒错症者的恢复这个阳具的享乐,原先并没有出现。因为相同的心理机制,对于神经症者是有效的。

What does distinguish a pervert
from a neurotic though, is the former’s peculiar involvement of the Other
in the subjective process of the recuperation of the lost enjoyment.
I have already explained that in Lacan’s idiom hysterical subjects
try to come to terms with symbolic castration (the loss of enjoyment)
by arousing and sustaining the desire of the Other. In a sense, hysterics
derive satisfaction from making themselves desirable, but not enjoyable.

区别倒错症者与神经症者的东西,就是倒错症者的大他者特殊地牵涉到,这个丧失的享乐的这个恢复的主体的过程。我已经解释过,在拉康的术语,癔症的主体尝试要达成妥协,跟象征的阉割(享乐的丧失)。他召唤并且维持大他者的欲望。就某个意义言,癔症者获得满足,从让他们自己被欲望,但是不是被享乐。

When dealing with hysterics one often finds that they are extremely
attractive but utterly unpalatable, which is exactly what they intend to
achieve. For the hysteric, the enjoyment of the Other is what needs to
be avoided at all costs. In a slightly different way, obsessionals try to
overcome symbolic castration by neutralizing the desire of the Other.

当一个人处理癔症这时,我们经常发现,他们极端地迷人,但是完全令人乏味。这确实是他们想要获得的。对于癔症者,大他者的享乐就是需要被避免的东西,不计任何代价地。用稍微不同的方式,妄想症者尝试克服象征的阉割,凭借将大他者的欲望保持中立。

Obsessional neurotics derive satisfaction from an estrangement of/from
the Other and perceive complete isolation as the most splendid of life
achievements. However palatable obsessional neurotics may be, they
do not really want to be desired, let alone enjoyed by others. Hence,
despite their divergent strategies vis-a-vis the desire of the Other, both
hysterics and obsessionals shun the Other’s jouissance. The worst thing
that can happen to them is to become an object for the enjoyment of
the Other.

妄想症的神经症者获得满足,从大他者的纠缠,并且感知完全的孤立,作为是最辉煌的成就。妄想症的神经症者无论多么讨人喜欢,他们并没有确实想要被欲望。更不用说想要被别人享乐。因此,尽管各式各样的策略,面临大他者的欲望时,癔症者与妄想症者逃避大他者的欢爽。他们身上发生的最糟糕的事情,是成为大他者的享乐的客体。

This is precisely where the perverse structure branches off.55 In Lacan’s
view, perverts obtain satisfaction by ensuring the enjoyment of the Other,
thereby transforming themselves into an ‘instrument of the Other’s
jouissance’. Deriving satisfaction from conjuring up jouissance in the
Other, the pervert’s strategy to annihilate the effect of castration involves
neither taking things back from the Other (hysteria), nor minimizing the
loss (obsessional neurosis), but creating an alternative symbolic order in
which jouissance holds pride of place.

这确实就是倒错症者的结构分叉出来的地方。从拉康的观点,倒错症者获得满足,凭借遵循大他者的享乐,因此转化他们自己,成为“大他者的欢爽的工具”。当倒错症者获的满足,从召唤大他者身上的欢爽,倒错症者想要毁灭阉割的效果的策略,既没有牵涉到把东西从大他者那里要回来(癔症者),也没有忽视这个丧尸(妄想症神经症者)。代替地,倒错症者创造一个象征的秩序,让欢爽在那里拥有骄傲的地位。

The pervert transcends the neurotic
opposition between jouissance and desire which results from the curtailing
impact of the symbolic law, and builds jouissance into the very heart of
the Other. In this way, the pervert literally perverts the neurotic law
according to which ‘jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks as such’
(ibid.: 319), advocating instead a ‘discourse of the right to jouissance’
(Lacan 1989a[1962]:60). From an excluded, prohibited privilege in the
neurotic’s economy, jouissance thus gains ascendancy in the pervert’s
ideology as a formal universal principle which is applicable to everyone
in every situation.56

倒错症者超越神经症者的对立于欢爽与欲望之间。这个欲望是因为缩短象征法则的影响所形成。倒错症者将欢爽建造进入大他者的核心。用这个方式,倒错症者实质上倒错神经症的法则。依照这个法则,欢爽被拒绝给予那些言说作为神经症者的人。代替地,倒错症者主张获得欢爽的权利的辞说。从一个在神经症者的生命活力,欢爽作为被排除,被禁止的特权。在倒错症者的意识形态,作为是正式的普世的原则,欢爽获得提升。这可运用到日常生活情况的每个人。

In Seminar XI Lacan designated this perverse solution as an inverted
effect of the fantasy (Lacan 1977b[1964]:185). Normally, in neurosis,
the fantasy contains images of utter bliss in the presence of perfectly
adequate, obliging objects. The neurotic fantasy glorifies every
imaginable, prohibited sexual activity (and much more), which is why it
can be called ‘perverse’ in line with the aforementioned, classic definition
of perversion.

在第11研讨班,拉康指明这个倒错的解决,作为是幻见的倒错的影响。正常来说,在神经症者,幻见包含完全幸福的各种意象,就在完全充足的讨人喜欢的客体的面前。神经症者的幻想推崇每个可以想像的,被禁止的性的活动,(不仅如此)。这就是为什么它会被称为是“倒错”,以符合前面提到的古典对于倒错症者的定义。

By contrast, the fantasy of the pervert is oriented towards
pure and unblemished, yet deficient and disconcerted objects that are
desperately in need of satisfaction. On the level of the fantasy, the pervert
does not desire lascivious and voluptuous studs (or vixens), but ostensibly
innocent, sexually deprived angels. The pervert’s fantasy is therefore
paradoxically less ‘perverse’ than that of the neurotic, with the proviso
that the pervert is keen to corrupt the cherished morality of the fantasized
objects.

比较起来,倒错症者的幻见被定向,朝向纯粹而没有被污染,可是不足而且令人狼狈的客体。这些客体绝望地需要被满足。在幻见的层次,倒错症者并没有欲望那些猛男或浪女,而是夸张地于欲望纯真,性纯洁的天使。倒错症者的幻想因此悖论地并没有那么“倒错”,比起神经症者的倒错。但书是,倒错症者非常渴望败坏被幻见的客体的被怀抱的道德。

During the first decade of Lacan’s teachings, the original confusion
between the polymorphous perversity of the child, the perverse activities
of the neurotic and genuine perversion gradually evaporated, giving rise
to the delineation of a separate perverse structure. The latter appeared
less as a particular type of sexual behaviours, notably all those
transcending the adult genital heterosexual standard, but more as a specific
relationship between the subject, the object and the symbolic order.

在拉康的教学的前十年,这个原先的混淆,处于多重样态的小孩的倒错,神经症者与真正的倒错之间的原先的混淆逐渐消失,产生分开的倒错症的结构的描述。后者比较罕见出现,作为是特殊的性的行为,特别是那些超越成年人的性器官的异性的标准的性行为。代替地,它作为一个明确的关系,处于主体,客体与象征秩序之间。

None
the less, it would also appear that the perverts’ construction of an
alternative ‘law of enjoyment’ makes them especially prone to indulge
in those sexual behaviours that are culturally prohibited. In other words,
Lacan’s theory implies that perverse behaviours—defined as above—do
not discriminate between neurotics, psychotics and perverts, although
perverts are likely to find great comfort in those sexual behaviours that
are forbidden by religious, moral or legal standards.57

表面看来,倒错症者的建构一个替换的“享乐的法则”,仍然让他们特别容易耽溺于那些性的行为,在文化方面被禁止的性的行为。换句话说,拉康的理论暗示着,倒错的行为—被定义如上—并没有区别神经症者,精神病者与倒错症者。虽然倒错症者很可能找到强烈的安慰,在那些性的行为,被宗教,道的,或法律的标准禁止的行为。

Compared to his numerous reflections on the analytic treatment of
neurotics and psychotics, Lacan’s suggestions about how to work
analytically with structurally perverse patients are extremely limited. Is
it possible to diagnose perversion on the basis of the patient’s speech
and transference? How do perverts relate to knowledge and truth? Are
they affected by symptoms and if so, how do they experience them?
What, if anything, drives a pervert towards an analyst and would he be
approached as a supposed subject of knowing?

跟无数的反思比较起来,反思神经症者与精神病者的精神分析的治疗。拉康的建议是极端有限制的,关于如何在精神分析方面处理结构上说倒错的病人。这是可能的吗?我们诊断倒错症,根据病人的言说与移情的基础?倒错症者如何跟知识与真理扯上关联?他们受到症状的影响吗?假如是受到症状的影响,他们如何经验到这些症状?是什么驱使一位倒错症者朝向精神分析家?他愿意被接近,作为是被认为是知道的主体吗?

Can the analyst who is
working with a pervert use the same techniques of interpretation and the
same procedures for transference handling as those applicable with
neurotics? These and other technical questions are largely left in abeyance.
Some authors have insinuated that Lacan’s silence concerning the
analytic treatment of perverse patients should not bother analysts too
much, since perverts hardly ever come to see an analyst, either because
they are perfectly happy with their objects and methods of sexual
gratification, or because they are afraid that therapy will force them to
relinquish parts of their enjoyment (Miller 1996a[1989]:309–310).

正在处理倒错症者的精神分析家,使用相同的解释的技术与相同处理移情的程序吗?跟运用到神经症者的处理移情的程序相同吗?这些以及其他的技术的问题主要都留置于欠缺当中。有些作者曾经嘲讽:拉康的沉默,关于精神分析的治疗倒错症者的病人,不应该让精神分析家太过于懊脑。因为倒错症者很少会前来跟精神分析家就诊。要就是因为他们对于他们的性的满足的客体与方法,非常快乐。要不就是因为他们害怕,治疗会强迫他们放弃部分他们的享乐。

It has also been advanced that those who do come are seldom interested in
a proper analysis; they are rather looking for technical advice on how to
carry on with some of their unlawful practices whilst keeping on the
‘right side’ of the law, which is but a surreptitious demand for extra
enjoyment. In the light of these observations, the attention of Lacanian
analysts has frequently shifted from the principles governing the analytic
treatment of perverts towards the clinical management of so-called
‘perverse traits’ (fetishistic practices, homosexual object-choice, sadistic
fantasies) in neurotic and psychotic patients.58

也曾经有人主张,那些前来精神分析家就诊的倒错症者,很少对于一个精神分析的本体感到興趣。相反地,他们正在寻求技术性的劝告,关于如何继续某些他们不合法的做法。另一方面,他们又继续遵守法律的“正确的这一边”。这仅是一种秘密的要求额外的享乐。从这些观察的观点,拉康派的精神分析家的注意力,经常地转换,从统辖倒错症者的精神分析的治疗,转换朝向临床的管理所谓的“倒错症的特征“(恋物癖的做法,同性恋的客体-选择,自虐狂的幻想),在神经症与精神病的病人身上。

However small the structurally perverse clientele of the analyst may
be, it is definitely worth the effort to reopen the issue of how to direct the
treatment and, perhaps more significantly, of how to diagnose perversion
on the basis of speech and transference. Indeed, one can reasonably
assume that some perverts, irrespective of their access to gratifying sexual
objects within a self-styled symbolic order, may experience recurrent
bouts of anxiety or depression that propel them into psychoanalytic
treatment.59

虽然精神分析家的结构上属于倒错症的病人人数很少,这确实是值得这个努力,要重新展开这个议题:如何引导治疗,或是更加重要地,如何诊断倒错症,根据言说与移情的基础。的确,我们能合理地假设:某些的倒错症者,尽管他们接近令人满足的性的客体,在自己承认的象征的秩序里,他们可能经验到焦虑或沮丧的重复发作。因为焦虑与沮丧的重复发作驱使他们接受精神分析的治疗。

Examples of how perverse patients enter analysis, including technical
and diagnostic guidelines for the practitioner, have been described in an
illuminating fashion by Andre (1993). Zeroing in on the extraordinary
nature of the pervert’s speech and transference, this Lacanian analyst
contended:

倒错症的病人如何进入精神分析的例子,包括技术性与诊断的指导方针,对于执业分析家。这些例子被安德鲁描述,用启蒙的方式。当这位拉康派的精神分析家目标朝着探索倒错症者的言说与移情的特殊性质,他主张说:

Perversion is traceable as such within the transference. It manifests
itself through a reversal of the relation with the Other and through
a radical subversion of the position of the supposed subject of
knowing …Hearing the pervert speak, it is impossible not to
experience an impression of indecency; one always feels a bit
violated by the pervert’s discourse…There is a perverse way of
pronouncing the fantasy…[Perverts have] a tendency to display
their fantasies, often by means of a provocation.
(Andre 1993:53–54)

倒错症的本身能够被追踪到移情内部。倒错症展示它自己,通过跟大他者的关系的倒转,并且通过强烈的颠覆被认为知道的主体的位置。当我们听见倒错症者言说时,我们不可能经验不正当行为的表达。我们总是觉得倒错症者的辞说有点令人反感、、、有一种倒错的方式来宣告幻见。倒错症者拥有一个倾向,要展示他们的幻见,经常是凭借挑衅。

This fragment contains all the elements an analyst needs to diagnose a
pervert. Unlike neurotics, perverts have no difficulty charting their sexual
fantasies and seem to derive enjoyment from embarrassing, shocking or
exciting the analyst with their kinky and sleazy details. This is what
distinguishes them from the patients on whose stories Freud based his
account of the fantasy in ‘A Child is Being Beaten’, because Freud’s
patients expressed their masturbatory fantasies with hesitation, uncertainty,
resistance, shame and guilt (Freud 1919e:179).

这个片段包含所有的元素,精神分析家需要这些元素来诊断倒错症者。不像神经症者,倒错症者并没有任何可困难,来描绘出性的幻想,并且似乎获得快乐,从让精神分析家感到尴尬,惊吓或興奋,用他们的古怪而卑下的细节。这就是区别他们跟那些病人不同的地方。那些病人的故事,弗洛伊德将它们的基础定制幻见的描述里,在“小孩正在被打”。因为弗洛伊德的病人表的他们的手淫式的幻想,用犹豫,不确定,抗拒,羞愧,与罪恶感。

In addition, perverts do
not consult the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, but as a supposed
subject of enjoying, which means that they assume her to be infatuated
with the same things as they themselves are, or desperately seeking the
satisfaction which the analytic profession does not allow and which they
themselves have on offer. As with everybody else, the pervert prompts the
analyst to let go of her restrictive code and to become an ally, or at least to
endorse the attractiveness of a life and law of enjoyment. Instead of
addressing the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, perverts present
themselves as supposed subjects of knowing.

除外,倒错症者并没有就诊于精神分析家,作为是被认为是知道的主体。而是作为被认为是享乐的主体。这意味着,他们认为她是著迷于相同的事情,当他们自身正在或併命地寻求这个满足,精神分析的专业病没有容许的满足,他们自己必须提供追寻的满足。如何对应每一位其他的人,倒错症者激励精神分析家放开她的限制的符码,并且为了成为盟友,或至少认可享乐的生活与法则的吸引人。倒错症者并没有对著精神分析家谈论,作为是被认为的知道的主体。倒错症者呈现他们自己,作为被认为是知道的主体。

This perverse knowledge
concerns the pathways to enjoyment and they will try to convince the
analyst, whom they expect to be suffering from an obstinate reluctance to
follow these pathways, of their universal value as royal roads to happiness.60

这个倒错症的知识关系到通往享乐的这些途径。这些途径将会说服精神分析家。他们期望精神分析家遭受痛苦,因为他们顽固地不愿意遵循这些途径,他们让精神分析家相信他们的普世的价值,作为是通往快乐的捷径。

Still, these diagnostic indications provide analysts with little guidance as
to how they should conduct their clinical vehicle when the passenger happens
to be a pervert. In one of his scarce outpourings on the analysis of perverts,
and in sharp contrast to the patent complexity of the situation, Lacan
maintained that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate, interpretable,
analyzable, and on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16). Here he reiterated Freud’s conviction that ‘the positive
perversions [perversion proper] are also accessible to psychoanalytic therapy’
(Freud 1905d:232).

可是,这些诊断的暗示并没有供应精神分析家多少的引导,关于他们应该如何运用他们的临床的工具,当来客恰好是一位倒错症者。拉康在一次颇为罕见地发现对于倒错症者的精神分析,并且跟这个情境的专业的复杂性,成强烈对比。拉康主张,倒错症者确实是某件表达清楚,可以解释,可以分析,跟神经症者确实处于相同的层面。在此,拉康重复弗洛伊德的信念:正面的倒错症者(倒错症本体),也可以接受精神分析的治疗。

Freud based his assertion on the idea that the fixation
and regression to an infantile sexual tendency in the ‘positive perversions’
must also originate in a repression of mainstream sexual development,
consistent with the central psychic mechanism in the neuroses. In Lacan’s
reading of Freud this meant that perversion is rooted in the Oedipus complex
or, in his own terminology, that the perverse individual succumbs to symbolic
castration as much as the neurotic does, leading to the installation of divided
subjectivity (), desire, fantasy and (lost) jouissance. Such being the case,
Lacan’s point seemed to be that neurosis and perversion can indeed be
analysed on the same (Oedipal) level.61

弗洛伊德将他的主张,以这个观念为基础:在“正面的倒错症者”的婴孩的性的倾向的固著与退行,也必须起源于主流的性的发展的退行。这个主流的性的发展,跟神经症者的中心的心灵的心理机制互相一致。当拉康阅读弗洛伊德时,这意味着,倒错症根源于伊狄浦斯情结。或者,用他自己的术语来说,倒错症的个人屈从于象征的阉割,跟神经症者一样。这导致的安置是:分裂的主体,0,欲望,幻想,与丧失的欢爽。情况既然是这样,拉康的重点似乎是,神经症与倒错症确实能够被分析,在相同的伊狄浦斯情结。

Nonetheless, the inverted effect of the fantasy in perversion, formalized
as a ? , constitutes yet another major challenge for the analyst, because it
somehow mirrors the analyst’s own position as Lacan conceived it at the
end of the 1960s. For the discourse of the analyst which Lacan constructed
in Seminar XVII (1991a[1969–70]) also has the analyst operating as an
object a and the analysand functioning as a divided subject (, the analytic
effect of hysterisation), which implies that there is a remarkable ‘structural
analogy between the desire of the analyst and the desire of the pervert’
(Andre 1993:17).

可是,在倒错症的幻想的颠倒的影响,被成为正式,作为小客体a,它组成另外一个主要的挑战,对于精神分析家。因为它以某种方式反映出精神分析家自己的位置,依照拉康所构想它,在1960年代的末期。拉康在第17研讨班建构的精神分析家的辞说,也让精神分析家运作,作为一个小客体,而分析者则是充当分裂的主体的功能(让精神分析成为癔症的结果)。这暗示着,有一个明显的结构主义的类比,处于精神分析家的欲望与倒错症者的欲望之间的类比。

This formal congruence elicits at least two cardinal
questions. First, what prevents the analyst from being an institutionalized
pervert? How can we distinguish between the enduring dedication of the
analyst and the quintessential commitment of the pervert? And second,
assuming that there is a crucial difference between analysts and perverts,
how can analysts intervene effectively when their patients represent an
image of themselves? How can the non-perverse analyst work with a
singularly analytic pervert?

这个正式的协调,至少引来两个主要的问题:首先,是什么阻止精神分析家不要成为一个被体制制约的倒错症者?我们如何区别精神分析家持久的奉献,与倒错症者的本质的奉献?其次,当精神分析家假设,在精神分析家与倒错症者之间存在着重大的差异,精神分析家如何有效地介入,当他们的病人代表他们自己的一个意象?这位非-倒错症的精神分析家,如何能够处理一位具有独异性精神分析的倒错症者?

These clinical issues, alongside those emerging from the analysis of
neurotics and psychotics, will be elaborated in the following chapters of
this book, dealing respectively with the position of the Lacanian analyst
within the treatment, the strategies of transference handling and the tactics
of analytic interpretation.

这些临床的问题,伴随着从神经症者与精神病者的精神分析一块出现的问题,将会被建构,在本书的以下的章节。它们各别地处理拉康学派的精神分析家的立场,在治疗的内部,处理移情的策略,以及精神分析解释的技巧。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践9

October 21, 2015

This fragment contains all the elements an analyst needs to diagnose a
pervert. Unlike neurotics, perverts have no difficulty charting their sexual
fantasies and seem to derive enjoyment from embarrassing, shocking or
exciting the analyst with their kinky and sleazy details. This is what
distinguishes them from the patients on whose stories Freud based his
account of the fantasy in ‘A Child is Being Beaten’, because Freud’s
patients expressed their masturbatory fantasies with hesitation, uncertainty,
resistance, shame and guilt (Freud 1919e:179).

这个片段包含所有的元素,精神分析家需要这些元素来诊断倒错症者。不像神经症者,倒错症者并没有任何可困难,来描绘出性的幻想,并且似乎获得快乐,从让精神分析家感到尴尬,惊吓或興奋,用他们的古怪而卑下的细节。这就是区别他们跟那些病人不同的地方。那些病人的故事,弗洛伊德将它们的基础定制幻见的描述里,在“小孩正在被打”。因为弗洛伊德的病人表的他们的手淫式的幻想,用犹豫,不确定,抗拒,羞愧,与罪恶感。

In addition, perverts do
not consult the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, but as a supposed
subject of enjoying, which means that they assume her to be infatuated
with the same things as they themselves are, or desperately seeking the
satisfaction which the analytic profession does not allow and which they
themselves have on offer. As with everybody else, the pervert prompts the
analyst to let go of her restrictive code and to become an ally, or at least to
endorse the attractiveness of a life and law of enjoyment. Instead of
addressing the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, perverts present
themselves as supposed subjects of knowing.

除外,倒错症者并没有就诊于精神分析家,作为是被认为是知道的主体。而是作为被认为是享乐的主体。这意味着,他们认为她是著迷于相同的事情,当他们自身正在或併命地寻求这个满足,精神分析的专业病没有容许的满足,他们自己必须提供追寻的满足。如何对应每一位其他的人,倒错症者激励精神分析家放开她的限制的符码,并且为了成为盟友,或至少认可享乐的生活与法则的吸引人。倒错症者并没有对著精神分析家谈论,作为是被认为的知道的主体。倒错症者呈现他们自己,作为被认为是知道的主体。

This perverse knowledge
concerns the pathways to enjoyment and they will try to convince the
analyst, whom they expect to be suffering from an obstinate reluctance to
follow these pathways, of their universal value as royal roads to happiness.60

这个倒错症的知识关系到通往享乐的这些途径。这些途径将会说服精神分析家。他们期望精神分析家遭受痛苦,因为他们顽固地不愿意遵循这些途径,他们让精神分析家相信他们的普世的价值,作为是通往快乐的捷径。

Still, these diagnostic indications provide analysts with little guidance as
to how they should conduct their clinical vehicle when the passenger happens
to be a pervert. In one of his scarce outpourings on the analysis of perverts,
and in sharp contrast to the patent complexity of the situation, Lacan
maintained that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate, interpretable,
analyzable, and on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16). Here he reiterated Freud’s conviction that ‘the positive
perversions [perversion proper] are also accessible to psychoanalytic therapy’
(Freud 1905d:232).

可是,这些诊断的暗示并没有供应精神分析家多少的引导,关于他们应该如何运用他们的临床的工具,当来客恰好是一位倒错症者。拉康在一次颇为罕见地发现对于倒错症者的精神分析,并且跟这个情境的专业的复杂性,成强烈对比。拉康主张,倒错症者确实是某件表达清楚,可以解释,可以分析,跟神经症者确实处于相同的层面。在此,拉康重复弗洛伊德的信念:正面的倒错症者(倒错症本体),也可以接受精神分析的治疗。

Freud based his assertion on the idea that the fixation
and regression to an infantile sexual tendency in the ‘positive perversions’
must also originate in a repression of mainstream sexual development,
consistent with the central psychic mechanism in the neuroses. In Lacan’s
reading of Freud this meant that perversion is rooted in the Oedipus complex
or, in his own terminology, that the perverse individual succumbs to symbolic
castration as much as the neurotic does, leading to the installation of divided
subjectivity (), desire, fantasy and (lost) jouissance. Such being the case,
Lacan’s point seemed to be that neurosis and perversion can indeed be
analysed on the same (Oedipal) level.61

弗洛伊德将他的主张,以这个观念为基础:在“正面的倒错症者”的婴孩的性的倾向的固著与退行,也必须起源于主流的性的发展的退行。这个主流的性的发展,跟神经症者的中心的心灵的心理机制互相一致。当拉康阅读弗洛伊德时,这意味着,倒错症根源于伊狄浦斯情结。或者,用他自己的术语来说,倒错症的个人屈从于象征的阉割,跟神经症者一样。这导致的安置是:分裂的主体,0,欲望,幻想,与丧失的欢爽。情况既然是这样,拉康的重点似乎是,神经症与倒错症确实能够被分析,在相同的伊狄浦斯情结。

Nonetheless, the inverted effect of the fantasy in perversion, formalized
as a ? , constitutes yet another major challenge for the analyst, because it
somehow mirrors the analyst’s own position as Lacan conceived it at the
end of the 1960s. For the discourse of the analyst which Lacan constructed
in Seminar XVII (1991a[1969–70]) also has the analyst operating as an
object a and the analysand functioning as a divided subject (, the analytic
effect of hysterisation), which implies that there is a remarkable ‘structural
analogy between the desire of the analyst and the desire of the pervert’
(Andre 1993:17).

可是,在倒错症的幻想的颠倒的影响,被成为正式,作为小客体a,它组成另外一个主要的挑战,对于精神分析家。因为它以某种方式反映出精神分析家自己的位置,依照拉康所构想它,在1960年代的末期。拉康在第17研讨班建构的精神分析家的辞说,也让精神分析家运作,作为一个小客体,而分析者则是充当分裂的主体的功能(让精神分析成为癔症的结果)。这暗示着,有一个明显的结构主义的类比,处于精神分析家的欲望与倒错症者的欲望之间的类比。

This formal congruence elicits at least two cardinal
questions. First, what prevents the analyst from being an institutionalized
pervert? How can we distinguish between the enduring dedication of the
analyst and the quintessential commitment of the pervert? And second,
assuming that there is a crucial difference between analysts and perverts,
how can analysts intervene effectively when their patients represent an
image of themselves? How can the non-perverse analyst work with a
singularly analytic pervert?

这个正式的协调,至少引来两个主要的问题:首先,是什么阻止精神分析家不要成为一个被体制制约的倒错症者?我们如何区别精神分析家持久的奉献,与倒错症者的本质的奉献?其次,当精神分析家假设,在精神分析家与倒错症者之间存在着重大的差异,精神分析家如何有效地介入,当他们的病人代表他们自己的一个意象?这位非-倒错症的精神分析家,如何能够处理一位具有独异性精神分析的倒错症者?

These clinical issues, alongside those emerging from the analysis of
neurotics and psychotics, will be elaborated in the following chapters of
this book, dealing respectively with the position of the Lacanian analyst
within the treatment, the strategies of transference handling and the tactics
of analytic interpretation.

这些临床的问题,伴随着从神经症者与精神病者的精神分析一块出现的问题,将会被建构,在本书的以下的章节。它们各别地处理拉康学派的精神分析家的立场,在治疗的内部,处理移情的策略,以及精神分析解释的技巧。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从他者到大他者 70

October 20, 2015

From the other to the Other 70
从他者到大他者

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

http://www.lacaninireland.com
5.2.69 X 11

You make a list of fifteen quotations. And I must say that here I am being humorous. But he is reaching out to help me. Because of course Bergler has read Freud, anyway I
like to imagine it! But all the same he admits that in order to write this chapter, he
wrote to H H Heart to give him quotations about the superego. The result is that he
can obviously clearly mark, exactly at the same level that all the existing
psychoanalytic reviews are at, except mine, of course, the degree to which it is
incoherent. It begins with the censor at the level of dreams; people believe that the
censor is an innocent, as if it were nothing precisely to have the pair of scissors with
which one subsequently constructs the theory.

你们列举十五个引文的名单。我必须说,在此我正在表现幽默。因为他正伸手出来帮忙我。因为当然,博格勒曾经阅读弗洛伊德。无论如何,我喜欢这样想像!但是他仍然承认,为了书写这个章节,他写信给哈特,为了给予他这些关于超我的引文。结果是,他能够显而易见地标记,在确实相同的层面。所有的现存的精神分析的评论,除了我的评论之外,当然甚至会呈现不一贯。它先以梦的层次的审查者开始。那些人们相信:审查者是一位无辜者,好像拥有一把剪刀,我们随后可以用来建构理论,确实没有什么了不起。

And after all, this becomes something
that titillates you. And then afterwards it becomes a big bad wolf. And then after
that, there is nothing more. And after that, Eros is evoked, Thanatos and the whole
caboodle! Thanatos is going to have to find its place there. And then, I make
arrangements with this superego; I bow and scrape to it.

毕竟,所有这些都变成是挑逗你的东西。后来,它变成一只大野狼。然后,再没有别的东西。之后,性欲被召唤出来。死亡冲动与一整套东西!死亡冲动将必须在那里找到位置。然后,为安排这个超我!我对著超我躬身,装模作样。

Ah! Dear little superego!
Good. Thanks to this presentation, of course, you get something it must be said that is
rather laughable. You really have to be in our epoch for no one to laugh. No one
laughs. Even a professor of philosophy. It must be said that they have got to a point,
(128) in our generation! Even a professor of philosophy can read this stuff without
laughing.

啊!亲爱的小超我!
不错。当然由于这个呈现,你们获得某件东西。我们必须说,这个东西是相当可笑的。你们确实必须在外面的时代,才有人忍住不笑。没有笑。即使是哲学教授。我们必须说,他们已经到达某个点,在我们的世代! 甚至连哲学教授阅读这个材料,也没有笑!

They have been checkmated! There was all the same a time when there
were people who were not especially intelligent, a chap called Charles Blondel, who
shouted and roared about Freud. At least it was something. Nowadays even the
people least in a position to imagine what is involved in a psychoanalysis read these
absolutely astounding things without complaint. No. Everything is possible |
everything is accepted. We are — moreover things are showing their lineaments
elsewhere than in the real before descending into it — really in a regime of intellectual segregation.

他们都遭受围攻!仍然有一段时间,当有些人们并没有特别聪明,有一位名叫布兰德尔,他大力抨击与咆哮弗洛伊德。至少当时是个事件。现在,即使是那些根本就没有资格想像精神分析牵涉什么的人们,当他们阅读这些令人惊奇的事情,他们也没有抱怨。没有。每样事情都是可能的!每样事情都被接受。我们确实处于知识隔离的体制—而且,事情正在显示它们的发展,在别的地方,而不是在实在界, 在他们前来探讨它之前。

Well then, this chap has noticed a whole lot of things. When something is there,
under his nose, he understands it. And I would say that this is what is sad because he
understands it at the level of his nose, which cannot of course be absolutely like that;
it is necessarily pointy. But he sees a tiny little thing. He notices that what is
explained to him, like that, in the quotations from Freud, as being the superego, he
notices, that this ought to have a relationship with what he sees all the time. So then
he begins by noticing, but like that in an intuitive way, at the level of sensation, that
what is called Durcharbeitung, I ‘elaboration as it is translated in French – people
spend their time noticing that it is untranslatable. Durcharbeitung, is not elaboration,
we can do nothing about it; since there is not in French a word to say “work through”,
drilling, it is translated as elaboration; everyone knows that in France, people
elaborate; it is something like smoke.

呵呵,这个人已经注意到整堆事情。当某件东西在那里,在他面前,他理解它。我不妨说,这是悲哀的事情,因为他理解它,在他的面前的层次。当然,事情根本就不是那个样子。事情必然是很锐利的。但是他看见一件小小的事情。他注意到,,对他被解释的东西。像那样,从弗洛伊德的引文,作为是超我。他注意到,这应该拥有一个关系,跟他始终看见的东西。所以,他开始注意到,但是像那样,用直觉的方式,在感官的层次。所谓的Durcharbeitung, ,如同法文的翻译I ‘elaboration。人们花费时间注意到,Durcharbeitung 并不是I ‘elaboration。 我们无法翻译它,因为在法文,没有一个字词说“工作彻底”的錾孔。它被翻译成为elaboration;(建构)。众所周知,在法国,人们建构,那是某件像是抽烟的东西。

Analytic elaboration is not at all like that. People on the couch see that it consists in
coming back the whole time to the same thing. At every turn one is brought back to
the same thing. And it is necessary for that to last in order to get precisely to what I
have explained to you, to the limit, to the end, naturally when one is going in the right
direction, when one encounters a limit. He says ‘That’s an effect of the superego”.

精神分析的建构根本就不是那样。躺在躺椅上的人们看见,它从头到尾都必须回到相同的事情。有时,我们被带回到相同的事情。让那件事情持续下去是必要的,为了要确实到达我已经跟你们解释的东西,到达极限,到达结束。当然,我们将会朝右边的方向前进。当我们遭遇限制。他说:「那就是超我的影响。」

Namely, he notices that this kind of big wicked thing that nevertheless is supposedly
extracted from the Oedipus complex, or again from the devouring mother, or from
anyone of these see-saws. He notices that this has a relationship with this exhausting,
boring, necessary, especially repeated aspect by which one arrives at something that,
in effect, sometimes, has an end. How does he not see that this has nothing in
common with this kind of picture of a scenario where the superego is, as people say,
an agency, which would be nothing, but where people make it live like a person.
Because, people have not well understood what an agency is, we attach the idea to the
superego.

换句话说,他注意到,这种的大的邪恶的事情。这个事情仍然被认为从伊狄浦斯情结抽离出来。或者,从吞噬的母亲,或许从这些摇摆的人们,抽离出来。他注意到,这具有一层关系,跟这个令人疲倦,沉闷,必然,而且特别重复的层面。我们获得某件事情,实际上,这件事情有时具有目的。他如何会没有看见,这根本就没有关系,跟超我作为代理者的戏码的这种画面。这种代理根本不算什么,但是人们让超我生活像个人。因为人们并没有清楚理解代理是什么,我们将这个观念跟超我联接一块。

All of this must happen not on the other stage, the one that Freud spoke about, the one
that functions in dreams, but in a kind of little play, where what is called analytic
(129) teaching makes you play with puppets. The superego is the police
superintendent and he hits the Guignol, which is the ego, on the head. Why, by
simply seeing this rapprochement that he senses so well from the clinical point of
view, with elaboration, Durcharbeitung, does this not suggest to him that the
superego may well be found in something that would not require, like that, the
multiplication of agencies in the personality. And then at every instant he lets it slip,
he admits it, namely, that people have clearly mapped out, he says, that this has a
relation with the ego ideal. But it must be admitted that absolutely nothing is known
about it; no one has yet put things together.

所有这一切都一定发生在另外一个阶段。弗洛伊德谈论到的这个阶段,在梦里发挥功能的这个阶段。但是用一种小游戏。在游戏里,所谓的精神分析的教学让你跟木偶游戏。超我就是警察的督察,他打击“自我”的头。凭借仅是看出这个关系,他如此清楚地从临床的观点理解的关系,用elaboration(建构),这难道不是对他暗示着:超我很有理由被找到,在某件东西?像那样,这个东西并不要求在人格身上各种代理者的多重性。因此在每个时刻,他让它滑溜走。他承认它,换句话说,人们清楚地描绘出,这跟自我理想有关系。但是,我们必须承认,关于自我理想,我们根本什么都不知的。还没有人将事情完全聚拢一块。

All the same, in order that these discourses should be something other than memoirs
of the psychoanalyst, namely, evoking the case of a young woman who, in this
connection, one sees clearly that it was a guilt feeling that made her come into
psychoanalysis. Let us hope that it was the same thing that made her get out of it!
You can perhaps all the same note that, for example, this kind of little manoeuvre of a
measure that is precisely the measure of what cannot be measured because it is the
starting bet.

同时,为了这些辞说应该是某件东西,除了精神分析的记忆。换句话说,引用年轻女人的个案。关于这一点,我们清楚看见,那是罪恶感的感觉,让他进入精神分析。让我们希望,这是相同的事情让他逃避它。你们或许仍然注意到,譬如,这种的策略,所无法被测量的东西的测量的策略,因为那是开始的赌注。

This can in effect in some cases be represented with the greatest
precision and be written on the board. It is in the manner of a certain way of regularly
balancing that one manages to fill up this something that can in certain cases be
represented as the One. You can all the same see that there is some interest in
articulating in a way that is really precise something that allows it to be conceived that
it is not at all in effect an abuse of terms to bring together, even in the name of a
minimal intuition like that, the elaboration, the Durcharbeitung in the treatment, with
the superego.

实际上,在某些的个案,这能够被代表,非常准确地,并且能够被书写在黑板上。用某种的规律地平衡的方式,我们能够成功地填补这个某件东西。在某些的情况,这个东西能够被代表作为这个“一”。你们仍然看出,有某些的興趣要来确地表达某件东西。这个东西让它能够被构想。实际上,这并非是术语的滥用,将治疗中的这个建构跟超我聚集一块,以最小量的直觉的名义。

So then you have to choose. You cannot tell us that the superego is the big bad wolf
and rack your brain to see whether it is not in the identification that I have with some
person that this severe superego is bom. That is not how questions should be put. It
is like the people who tell you that if so-and-so is religious, it is because his
grandfather was. That is not enough for me, because even if you had a religious
grandfather you may also perhaps see that it is stupidity, is that not so?

所以,你们必须选择。你们无法告诉我们,这个超我就是这只大坏野狼。然后你们绞尽脑筋要看出,我是否认同这个严厉超我从他诞生的某个人。那并不是问题应该被提出的方式。就像是有些人们告诉你们,假如某某人是信仰宗教,那是因为他的祖父信仰宗教。对我而言,那是不足够的。因为即使你有一位信仰宗教的祖父,你可能也看出,那是愚蠢的。那难道不是这样吗?

It is necessary all the same to distinguish the direction of identification as compared to
other things It is necessary to know whether identification in analysis is the goal or is
the obstacle. But this might well perhaps be the means by which one engages people
precisely no doubt to do it, but by the same fact, it is abolished. And it is in the fact
that it is abolished precisely because one has done it that they can appear something
else that we can call the hole on this occasion.

这仍然是必要的,要区别认同的方向,跟其他事情比较起来。这是必要的,我们要知道,精神分析里的认同是否就是目标,或是阻碍。但是这很有理由,就是这些工具,我们凭借来让人们无可置疑地参与它。但是根据同样的事实,它被废除掉。就在它被废除掉的这个事实里,确实是因为我们已经做它,它们才能够出现,这是我们在这个场合所谓的空洞的某件其他东西。

I am going to leave you there today. I tried at the end of this discourse, to show you
that it is a discourse that is of direct importance to bring some fresh air into our
(130) practice. By that I mean that by using what were certainly not experiments in
smell, it was not by following his nose that Freud advanced, one can in effect see in it,
in the development of a function through his thinking, the framework that allows its
consistency to be given. But it is indispensable if one wants to advance with
something other than little stories, to assemble this coherence and to give it
consistency and solidity. This would perhaps allow there to be seen quite different
facts than simply analogical facts.

今天,我将要跟你告一段落。我尝试在这篇辞说结束时,跟你们显示:这是一个非常重要的辞说,替我们的精神分析实践,带进某些新鲜的空气。我指的是,凭借使用性质上并非是嗅觉试验的东西。弗洛伊德的前进,并非是遵循他的鼻子的嗅觉。实际上,我们能够在它里面看见这个架构,经由他的思想,一个功能的发展。这个架构让他的辞说产生一贯性。但是,这是不可免除的,假如我们想要前进,带着某件并非是小故事的东西。要将这个一贯性装配起来,并且给予它一贯性与正确性。这或许让完全不同的事实能够被看见,跟仅是类推的事实完全不同。

What I am saying does not take anything away from the importance of detail,
precisely as Bergler insists. But read this chapter to see that even something that is
relevant, well oriented, but oriented like particles of iron filings when you tap into a
field already magnetised, contains no kind of true motivation for the power and the
importance of detail. And why in effect it is only the details, it is quite true, that
interest us. Again it is necessary to see in every case what is interesting. Because if
one does not know it, one brings together disparate details in the name of pure and
simple resemblance, while this is not what is important. We will take it up the next
time at the level of the third figure.

我正在说的东西,并没有将任何东西脱离细节的重要性,确实是依照博格勒所坚持的。但是请你们阅的这个章节,你们就会看出,即使是某件相关的东西,清楚定向的东西,但是像铁条的分子那样的定向,当你将它钉入已经是磁场的领域。它并没有包含任何种类想获取权力的动机。的确,这些细节让我们感到興趣。而且,这是必要的,在每个情况里看见,令人感到興趣的东西。因为假如我们并不知道它,我们将各式各样的细节聚拢一块,以纯粹而单纯是类似的名义。这并非是重要的事情。下一次,我们将要从事探讨,从这第三个人物的层次。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com