Archive for December, 2013

庄周梦蝶 2

December 31, 2013

庄周梦蝶 2

 

The relation of the function of fantasy to the symbolic field, that the

fantasy is that which covers over the lack in the symbolic and thus functions

as a support for the symbolic insofar as the subject relates to it, indicates that

fantasy not only offers a certain (illusory) coherence for the subject in terms

of his own self-identity but it also confers an equally illusory coherence on

“reality” (as it is mediated in terms of the Other). Properly, these should not

be understood as two distinct moments.

 

幻见的功能跟象征领域的关注,幻见是,涵盖在象征界的欠缺的东西,因此,幻见充当对象征界的一种支撑,因为主体跟它息息相关。这种关系指示著,幻见不仅提供主体,某种的幻觉的一致性,使用他自己的认同,而且幻见也给予「现实界」同等的幻觉的一致性,(如同用大他者的术语所中介的)。适当来说,这些一致性不应该被理解为两个不同的时刻。

 

The subject’s identity is always

symbolically effected and the symbolic reality to which the fantasy lends

some coherence is always a subjective representation. The identity thus secured

in the mode of fantasy is indicative of the desire both to identify oneself,

to “find” or construct one’s identity, and to do so in relation to something

mediated and structured by the symbolic network.

 

主体的认同总是由象征的现实界形成的结果,幻见借助某种一致性给象征的现实界,总是一种主观的再现表象。在幻见到模式里因此被获得的认同指示著,一方面既认同自身,「找到」或建构自己身份的欲望,另一方面,又以跟某件被中介的东西这样做,某件由象征的网络所架构的东西这样做。

 

The fantasy in this sense encapsulates what it is that the subject wants,

albeit in a surrogate form. That is, the object standing in for objet petit a is

never it and thus fantasy can and will necessarily move on to another object

which will also not be it. It also provides some answer to what it is that the

Other wants, in the sense that it offers the possibility of an explanation of

what it is that the Other is lacking and why it is that the Other is lacking. Again,

this is not to suggest that the answer is found, that we can actually

solve the lack in the Other, but that this lack is obfuscated by an (impossible

and) illusory answer (Stavrakakis 47, 150-52). It is in this sense, again,

that Lacan can assert that it is fantasy which is the support of the desire, not

the object (Four Fundamental Concepts 185).

从这个意义而言,幻见涵盖主体想要的东西,虽然是以代理的形式。换句话是,代表小客体的这个客体从来就不是它。因此,幻见能够而且必然要前进到另外一个客体,而这个客体也将不会是它。幻见也提供某种的解答,对于大他者想要什么。因为幻见提供这个可能性:解释大他者欠缺什么,以及为什么大他者总是处于欠缺。而且,这并不是要建议:这个解答被找到,我们实际上能够解答大他者的欠缺。而是建议:这个欠缺被不可能而幻觉的回答所模糊。而且,从这个意义而言,拉康能够主张,欲望的支撑物是幻见,而不是客体。(精神分析的四个基本原则 185页)

 

Fantasy is thus that within the subject which attempts to shore up both

its own constitutive lack and the lack in the Other. This operation is made

possible by the objet petit a, that remainder of the Real which insists on the

subject, both indicating and serving to mask and protect against the trauma

of the Real.

 

幻见因此在主体之内,企图支撑它自己的构成的欠缺,以及在大他者的欠缺。而小客体让支撑的运作成为可能。小客体作为是实在界的残余物,坚持主体指示并且充当遮蔽与保护,对抗实在界的创伤。

 

Crucial to the logic of fantasy and desire, however, is the impossibility

inherent in its operation. Were the objet petit a, the object of fantasy,

to be attained, the subject would be faced with the very trauma which

the fantasy serves to protect it from. It is thus that desire must be understood

as a perpetual movement, not in the sense of the drive whose aim is its ultimate

goal but in the sense that the object which causes it would, if attained,

negate its very own function.

 

可是,幻见逻辑与欲望的核心,是它的运作本质上的不可能。假如小客体就是应该被获得的幻见的客体,主体将会面临这个创伤,幻见充当保护它免于的创伤。因此,欲望必须被理解,作为是永久的运动,倒不是因为冲动的目标是最后的目标,而是因为引起冲动的客体,一旦被获得,它会否定它自己的功能。

 

Perhaps the quintessential example of the fantasy would be that of

love as original unity as presented in Plato’s The Symposium. Plato has

Aristophanes tell us of how humanity once consisted of three genders,

male, female and hermaphrodite, and how each individual of whichever

gender was complete in itself through combining what we would now understand

as the attributes of two people: four hands, four legs, two faces

etc.

 

或许,幻见的认同差异的例子,将就是爱的认同差异,作为是原初的一致性。如同在柏拉图的「会饮篇」所呈现的。柏拉图要求亚里斯多芬告诉他,人类曾经有一段时间是由三种性别组成,男性,女性,于阴阳同体。以及每一种性别的每个个体,如何通过跟我们现在所理解的两个人的属性结合,而获得完成:四隻手,四隻脚,两个脸孔,等等。

 

 Due to these creatures’ ambition and power, they were considered a

threat to the Gods who decided to split each one into two halves. Because,

however, each creature had previously formed a whole with its other half,

they clung to them and, if separated, searched for them relentlessly (25-

28). The myth, as it has come to pass into popular culture, has us each in

restless pursuit of our true other half, that other person who would really

complete us.

 

由于这些动物的企图心与权力,他们被认为是众神的威胁,众神诀的将每一个个体分裂成为两半。可是,因为每个动物原先已经形成整体,拥有它的另外一半。他们紧捉著另外一半。假如被分开的话,他们会不断地寻找他们。如同发生在通俗文化里,这个神话让我们每一个人从事不断地追寻我们真实的另外一半,另外一位真正会跟我们成为整体的人。

 

This example illustrates the different functions performed in fantasy.

Firstly, it proffers an identity, the answer to the question of who I really am;

I am really the other half of my lost other half. Secondly, it does so with reference

to the promise of a wholeness to come; when I find my lost other

half, I will again be complete and everything will be perfect. Lastly, it offers

an excuse as to why things are not (yet) perfect, why it is that both I and the

world are lacking.

 

这个例子说明在幻见表现的不同功能。首先,它提供一种认同,对于我确实是什么的问题的解答。我确实就是我丧失的另外一半的另外一半。其次,我虽然成为这样,却是带有未来获得完整的这个许诺。当我找到我丧失的另外一半时,我将再次成为完整,每样事情将成为完美。最后一点,它提供一种藉口,关于为什么事情尚未是完美,为什么我与这个世界总是欠缺。

 

Through each of these complementary functions, the fantasy

serves to forestall any final resolution. When we do find or think we

have found our lost other half, the girl or boy of our dreams, it inevitably

turns out that they are not quite the magical thing we had hoped for, the

world is not suddenly put to rights, nothing is really perfect and thus they

cannot be it and the hope can continue that the real Platonic other half is still

“out there.”

 

通过每个这些辅助的功能,幻见充当阻挡任何最后的解决。当我们确实发现或认为,我们已经找到我们丧失的另外一半,我们梦中的女孩或男孩,它无可避免地结果会是:他们并不完全是我们曾经希望的魔术般的东西。这个世界并没有突然地被矫正过来。没有一样东西确实是完美的,因此,他们无法就是「它」,我们会继续怀着希望:真实的柏拉图的另外一半依据「还在外面那里」。

 

Crucial in understanding this function of the fantasy is the appreciation

that the fantasy works to situate the subject. The fantasy is not experienced

as a passive scene, the straightforward construct of the subject. As evident

in the example of Choang-tsu’s butterfly, the fantasy always looks back or,

properly speaking, the fantasy embodies the gaze. This can be seen equally

in the example from The Symposium where the gaze returned from the fantasized

conjoining of lost pairs can be understood to situate the subject as notone.

 

理解幻见到这个功能的核心就是要认识到,幻见运作是为了定位主体。幻见并没有被经验,作为是被动的场景,主体的立即建构。如同在庄子梦蝶的例子显见的,幻见总是往后回顾,恰当地说,幻见具体代表凝视。从「会饮篇」的例子,同样能够看出这一点。在那里,凝视从丧失的配对的幻见到结合回转,能够被理解为:将主体定位为「并非一个」。

 

That is to say, the element of self-perception evident in fantasy demonstrates

something of the distance between the subject and the objet petit a.

This points to one of the fundamental operations of, and thus lessons to

be learnt from, psychoanalysis, that of “traversing the fantasy.” If, as we have

seen, the formula of fantasy (∃&a) describes the subject in relation to objet

petit a, this indicates that the fantasy presents the subject in relation to what

it would take to be the object cause of its desire.

 

换句话说,在幻见里显而易见的自我感觉的元素证明某件距离的东西,处于主体与小客体之间的距离。这指向精神分析的一个基本运作,从它获得一个教导:穿越幻见。如同我们曾经看见的,假如幻见的这个公式($‹›a)描述主体,作为是跟小客体的关系,这指示著,幻见呈现主体,作为是跟它的关系,为了成为它的欲望的客体的原因所需要的东西。

 

Traversing, crossing over the

fantasy, would thus involve the assumption of responsibility for the cause of

one’s own desire and thus of one’s own cause as subject, as without desire

the subject cannot come to be.

 

穿越幻见,横超幻见,因此将会牵涉到要担负这个责任,成为自己的欲望的原因,以及因此而成为自己的原因,作为主体的责任,因此,作为假如没有欲望,主体无法获得生命实存。

 

Traversing the fantasy would thus involve assuming

a position of responsibility towards (the function of) one’s fantasy –

that is to say, assuming the role of the cause of desire and thus accepting the

perpetual sliding of the objet petit a. Put simply, traversing the fantasy entails

accepting one’s desire for what it is, accepting one’s desire as interminably

bound to the desire of the Other, and not attaching oneself to the

illusory dream of attaining impossible lost jouissance “elsewhere.” It entails

confronting that which the gaze would show, “the essence of the gaze,” that

we paint ourselves in our own colours (Lacan, Four Fundamental Concepts

76).

穿越幻见因此将会牵涉到担任起一个责任的立场,朝向自己的幻见的这个功能。换句话说,担任起欲望的原因的角色,因此接受这个小客体的永久的滑动。简言之,穿越幻见涵盖接纳自己的欲望,依照它本来的样子。接纳自己的欲望,作为是跟大他者的欲望永无终了地息息相关。并且并不将自己连繫于那个幻觉的梦:在别的地方,获得不可能的丧失的欢爽。它涵盖面对凝视所显现的东西,「凝视的本质」,我们用我们自己的颜色,描绘我们自己的东西。(拉康:精神分析四个基本原则,第 76页)

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

 

拉康论庄周梦蝶 Choang-tsu’s Butterfly:

December 30, 2013

Choang-tsu’s Butterfly:

Objects and the Subjective Function of Fantasy

庄子的蝴蝶

幻见的各种客体与主体性功能

 

Calum Neill

凯拉姆、内尔

 

In the sixth chapter of The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,

Lacan refers to the Taoist Choang-tsu’s well known parable of the

dream butterfly. Choang-tsu poses the question of how, after waking

from a dream of being a butterfly, he can tell whether he is Choang-tsu

who has woken from the dream of being a butterfly or whether he is the

butterfly now dreaming he is Choang-tsu. This article argues that Lacan’s

treatment of the parable allows us to discern two instances of fantasy;

the fantasy of being the butterfly and the fantasy of being Choangtsu.

These two instances help to demonstrate the centrality of the

process of identification to the function of fantasy and allow us to grasp

an ethical dimension entailed in one’s subjective relation to the object(s)

of fantasy.

 

在「精神分析的四个基本原则」的第六章,拉康提到道家庄子著名的蝴蝶梦的寓言。庄子提出这个问题:从作为蝴蝶的梦中醒来之后,他如何能够辨明,是否他就是从作为蝴蝶的梦中醒来的庄周,或是他是蝴蝶现在正梦见他是庄周。我的论文主张,拉康对于这个寓言的处理,让我们能够觉察两种幻见的例子:作为蝴蝶的幻见,与作为庄周的幻见。这两个例子有助于证明,认同幻见的功能的过程的中心思想,并且让我们能够理解,我们跟幻见到各种客体的主体性的关系的伦理学的维度。

From the mirror stage, we can understand the seeds of fantasy in the

subject’s self-relating as meconnaissance. That is to say, in mistaking

the wholeness perceived in the mirror as a wholeness attributable

to itself, the subject establishes the fantasy of itself as an image, or

what Lacan terms the ideal-ego. Central to this process of (mis)identification

is the mechanism of seeing and, inseparable from this, being seen. In

the terminology of later Lacan, this is elaborated under the concept of the

gaze. Through his discussion of the gaze as objet petit a in Seminar XI and,

in particular, through his treatment of Choang-tsu’s famous paradox of the

dream of the butterfly, Lacan allows us to apprehend what we might call the

properly subjective function of the fantasy.

 

从镜像阶段,我们能够理解幻见的各种种因,在主体的自我指涉,作为是误识。换句话说,当他误认在镜中感受到的整体,作为是归属于镜子本身的整体时,主体建立属于它自身的幻见,作为一种形象,或是拉康术语所谓的理想自我。作为认同(或误认)的这个过程的核心,是看见与被看见的心理机制。看见与被看见是不可分割的。用晚期拉康的术语来说,这个心理机制被建构在凝视的观念之下。通过在第11研讨班,凝视作为小客体的讨论,特别是,通过他处理庄子的著名的蝴蝶梦的悖论,拉康让我们理解,我们所谓的幻见的合适的主体性的功能是什么。

61

 

Waking from a dream in which he experienced himself as a butterfly,

Choang-tsu poses himself the question of how he can be certain that he is

now himself, Choang-tsu, and not the butterfly dreaming that he is Choangtsu.

 

当庄子从梦中醒来,他在梦里经验到自己作为蝴蝶,庄子跟自己提出这个问题:他如何能够确定,他现在是他自己,庄周,而不是蝴蝶正在梦见他是庄周。

 

Put simply, Choang-tsu’s dilemma can be phrased as that of how we can

know which self is the “real” or authentic self and which self is an illusory,

“invented,” dream version.

 

简言之,庄子的困境能够被诠释为这样的困境:我们如何能够知道哪一个自性是「实在的」或真诚的自性,那一个自性的幻觉的自性,是「被杜撰的」的梦的版本。

 

This should also, perhaps, remind us of the classical

Cartesian quandary as to how he, Descartes, can know he is not dreaming

when he is “in fact” awake (14). Where Descartes, to an extent, circumvents

this problem, leading to the conclusion that, even if he is the dream

version, this in itself is indicative of a real Descartes beyond the dream insofar

as the dream “copy” necessitates an original from which it is abstracted

(15), Lacan’s treatment is a little more involved. For Lacan, Choang-tsu

is correct to pose himself this question for two reasons.

 

或许,这应该让我们想起这个经典的笛卡尔的困境,关于笛卡尔,他如何知道,他并不是在作梦,当他「实际上」是清醒的时刻。笛卡尔有几分程度是规避这个难题,而导致这个结论:即使他是梦的版本,这本身也指示著一位超越梦之外的实在的笛卡尔。因为梦的「抄本」必须先要有原版。从原版那里,梦的抄本才能被抽离出来。拉康的处理则是稍微更加深入。就拉康而言,庄子是正确的,当他替自己提出这个问题。理由有两个:

 

First, taking such a

question seriously indicates that one has not fallen so under the sway of the

master signifier as to have foreclosed one’s own division; that is, one does

not assume that one is adequate to one’s perceptions of oneself. In fact, one

does not assume one is one: “When Choang-tsu wakes up, he may ask himself

whether it is not the butterfly who dreams that he is Choang-tsu. Indeed

he is right, and doubly so, first because it proves he is not mad, he does not

regard himself as absolutely identical with Choang-tsu” (Lacan, Four Fundamental

Concepts 76).

首先,将这个问题认真看待指示著:我们并没有完全受到主人能指的影响,以致于将自己的分裂除权弃绝。换句话说,我们并没有假设,我们对自己的各种感觉充分满意。事实上,我们并没有假设一就是一:「当庄周醒来时,他可能询问他自己,是否是蝴蝶梦见他是庄周。的确,有两个理由,他是正确的。首先是因为它证明:他没有疯狂,他没有认为他自己是绝对地认同庄周(拉康:精神分析的四个基本原则 第76页)

 

In addition to this, the question Choang-tsu poses to himself holds within

it a certain truth of Choang-tsu. In a sense, he is the butterfly. The butterfly,

in Lacan’s reading, cannot be reduced to some mere chimera, an arbitrary

construct of Choang-tsu’s dream-state. On the contrary, it is as dream

butterfly that Choang-tsu was able to grasp something of his own identity,

namely “that he was, and is, in his essence, that butterfly who paints himself

with his own colours” (76).

 

除此之外,庄子对自己提出的这个问题,在问题之内,包含着庄子的某种真理。从某个意义来说,他就是蝴蝶。拉康的阅读是,蝴蝶无法被还原成为是某种神话中的狮头,羊身,蛇尾的吐火女怪物,由庄子的梦中的状态的任意建造。相反地,作为梦中的蝴蝶,庄子才能够理解某件属于他自己身份的东西。也就是说,他以前是那只蝴蝶,现在的本质也是那只蝴蝶,用他自己的各种颜色彩绘他自己的那只蝴碟。

 

For Lacan, it is through this penetration of

the unconscious that something of Choang-tsu can emerge, as opposed to

some social construct or status known as Choang-tsu. This can be reformulated

in terms of the relation of the subject to the signifier. What we have in

the parable of Choang-tsu are two signifiers, “Choang-tsu” and “butterfly.”

 

对于拉康,就是通过这种无意识的贯穿,庄子的某件东西才会出现。作为相对于某种大名鼎鼎的庄子社会的建构,或 社会地位。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

The subject, in the proper Lacanian sense, of the parable is that which is represented

between these two signifiers. Phrased otherwise, the subject of the

parable is placed under these two signifiers:

Choang-tsu butterfly

 

从恰当的拉康的意义而言,这个寓言的主体是有这两个能指之间所代表的东西。用不同方式来诠释,这个寓言的主体被放置在这两个能指之下:庄周-蝴蝶。

 

 

It is, however, actually only in the movement between them that the subject

proper emerges.

 

可是,主体的本体的出现,确实并不是仅是在这两个能指之间。

 

The difference here, for Lacan, between the dream and “reality” is attested to by the mechanism of representation. In the dream the subject is represented

as a butterfly, thus confirming something of his subjective apperception.

 

对于拉康而言,在此,梦与现实界之间的差异,由再现表象的机制来测试。在梦中,主体再现作为蝴蝶,因此证实他的主体的过去经验感觉的某件东西。

 

Outside the dream, the subject is represented as Choang-tsu but

feels it necessary to question this representation. This logic of uncertainty is

in itself what points towards the subjective truth of the situation. As a butterfly,

the subject does not pose the same question as when he is awake:

“when I am not this dream butterfly, when I am awake, am I actually this

dream butterfly?”

 

在梦的外贸,主体由庄周来再现,但是感觉到有必要质疑这个再现。不确定的这个逻辑的本身就是指向情境的主体性。作为蝴蝶,主体并没有像他在清醒时提出这个问题:「当我不是这个梦的蝴蝶,当我清醒时,我是否确实就是这只蝴蝶?」

 

Lacan’s explanation here and thus his conclusion is that,

as dream butterfly, the subject is but his own representation whereas as

Choang-tsu, he is a social representation:

 

拉康在此的解释,因此他的结论是:作为梦中蝴蝶,主体仅是他的再现表象,而作为庄周,他的社会的再现表象。

 

when he is the butterfly, the idea does not occur to him to wonder

whether, when he is Choang-tsu awake, he is not the butterfly that he

is dreaming of being. This is because, when dreaming of being the

butterfly, he will no doubt have to bear witness later that he represented

himself as a butterfly. But this does not mean that he is captivated

by the butterfly – he is a captive butterfly, but captured by nothing,

for, in the dream, he is a butterfly for nobody. It is when he is

awake that he is Choang-tsu for others, and is caught in their butterfly

net. (76)

 

当他是蝴蝶时,他并没有想到这个观念,想要知道,当他是清醒时的庄周,他是否并不是他梦见生命实存的蝴蝶。这是因为,当他梦见成为蝴蝶时,他无可置疑地后来必须见证,他再现他自己的表象,作为蝴蝶。但是,这并不意味着,他被蝴蝶著迷—他成为蝴蝶的俘虏,而是他被空无补获,因为他在梦中,他是针对无人的蝴蝶。当他清醒时,他是庄周,那是针对其他人而言,而且他被他们的蝴蝶的网网住。

 

The point we can extract from Lacan’s reading of this parable is that the subject,

∃, cannot be reduced to either instance; neither butterfly nor Choangtsu.

Neither, however, is the subject properly some entity outwith the two

instances. The subject is not the property of, a pure effect of, the symbolic

order – here that which is fixed under the signifier Choang-tsu – nor can

the subject be reduced to a pure effect of itself (beyond or outwith the

signifying realm).

 

我们能够从拉康对于这个寓言的阅读抽离出这一点是,主体无法被简化成为任何一个例子,他既不是蝴蝶,也不是庄周。可是,在这两个例子之外,主体既不是恰当的某个实体。主体并不是象征界秩序的的特性,纯粹的结果—在此,被固定在庄子这个能指之下的东西。主体也不会被化简成为它的本身的纯粹的结果(超越或外在于能指的领域之外。)

雄伯译

 

In this sense, following IiIek (46), we could understand the dream (and

its content) as the fantasy of the subject wherein the butterfly constitutes the

(representative of the) object: (∃& butterfly). IiIek writes, “In the symbolic

reality he was Zhuang Zi [Choang-tsu], but in the real of his desire he was

a butterfly. Being a butterfly was the whole of his positive being outside the

symbolic network” (46).

 

从这个意义言,跟随着李列克,我们能够理解这个梦及其内容,作为是主体的幻见。在那里,蝴蝶形成客体的再现表象:李列克写的,「在象征的现实界,他说庄周,但是在他的欲望的实在界,他是蝴蝶。成为蝴蝶是在象征的网络之外的他的强烈生命实存的整体。」

 

What IiIek’s interpretation occludes is the fact

that, despite the impossibility of inverting the terms of the dream/fantasy to

which IiIek correctly attests, the parable does contain two instances of fantasy.

 

李列克的诠释阻塞的东西是这个事实:尽管不可能倒转李列克正确地测试的梦与幻见的这些术语,这个寓言确实包含两个幻见的例子。

 

While only one instance can, as Lacan confirms, be understood as a

dream, fantasy is not reducible to dream states – we fantasize when awake

and the unconscious continues to pulsate when awake.

 

依照拉康的证实,虽然仅有一个例子能够被理解,作为梦。幻见并没有被化简成为就是梦的状态。我们清醒时,会有幻见。当我们清醒时,无意识继续悸动。

 

While clearly, in accordance

with IiIek’s reading, the butterfly is a fantasized representation of

the subject such that it can be represented as ∃& butterfly, the parable also

contains the fantasy of being Choang-tsu; ∃& Choang-tsu.

 

遵照李列克的阅读,蝴蝶显而易见是主体的幻见的再现表象,以致于它能够被再现作为庄周与蝴蝶,这个寓言也包含成为庄周的幻见。

 

 

What is significant

in the parable in terms of the light it casts on the notion of fantasy is

that by raising and posing the question of his own identity and, in Lacan’s

words, in “not fully understand[ing] how right he is” (Four Fundamental

Concepts 76), Choang-tsu points us towards the impossibility of the subject

in either position. The subject is that aphanisic point of its own departure;

the subject is nothing but its own division.

 

用它投射在幻见的光的术语来说,寓言的重要的内容是,凭据提出他自己的认同的这个问题,用拉康的术语说,凭借并没有充分理解他正确的什么程度,庄子跟我们指向主体不可能处于任何的一个立场。主体是它自己离开的主体消失的点;主体仅是它自己的分裂。

 

In this sense the fantasy embodies a relation to some thing or image

which functions as the objet petit a and thus protects the subject from the

(im)possibility of the traumatic encounter with the Real by masking or obfuscating

the site of the lack in the symbolic order. At the same time, and in

a sense it is but a different perspective on the same function, the fantasy

serves to protect the subject from the jouissance of the Real by providing a

surrogate, fantasized, sense of unity.

 

从这个意义言,幻见具体表现跟某个物象或意象的关系。它们充当这个小客体,因此保护主体免于跟实在界遭遇的这个可能或不可能。因为它们遮蔽或阻碍在象征的秩序的欠缺的这个地点。同时,幻见充当保护主体免于实在界的这种欢爽,凭借提供一种代理,幻见的一致性的意义。

 

Through the mode of fantasy we can perceive the mechanism of desire

at work. The objet petit a, as that which causes desire, can be understood to

stand in for the unity we would wish to achieve. In both scenarios posed in

the parable, as we have seen, there is something of an imagined sense of unity

at work; I am the butterfly or I am Choang-tsu. In a sense, the psychoanalytic

“reality” is both attested to and negated in both versions – I am neither

the butterfly nor Choang-tsu but I am positioned in response to my conceptualization

of myself as the butterfly and Choang-tsu.

 

经由幻见的模式,我们感觉欲望运作的机制。小客体,作为是引起欲望的东西,能够被理解是代表我们希望获得的一致性。在这个寓言提出的两个剧本,如同我们曾经看见的,有某件被想象的一致性在运作的意义。我「是」蝴蝶,或我「是」庄子。从某个意义来说,精神分析的「现实界」在这两个版本里,既被测试,也被否定。我既不是蝴蝶,也不是庄周。但是我的立场是要回应我对我自己的概念化,作为是蝴蝶与庄周。

 

The truth of the

subject is the mark of desire inscribed in both fantasies. The Lacanian point

here would thus not be that the dream can be equated to fantasy and the waking

state could not, but rather that both dream and waking state attest to the

same fundamental fantasy, albeit in necessarily different modes.

 

主体的真理是,欲望被铭记在两种幻见的标记。拉康在此的观点,因此将不会是:梦有时相等于是幻见,而清醒的状态不能够等于是幻见。相反地,拉康的观点是:梦与清醒的时刻都测试相同的基本的幻见,虽然用必须是不同的方式。

 

As noted above, the fact that the Other is lacking points to the necessary

or constitutive lack in the subject. In encountering the Other as lacking,

the subject should be seen as not so much encountering the void of the Real,

but rather that point on the signifying chain which is indicative of the existence

of this void.

 

如上面注意到的,大他者欠缺的这个事实,指向主体的必然欠缺或构成本质的欠缺。当主体遭遇作为欠缺的大他者时,主体应该被看待,作为并不是遭遇到实在界的空无,相反地,而是遭遇到能指化锁链的那个点,能指化的锁链指示著这个空无的存在。

 

This allows us to understand the subject as resorting to

or finding support in fantasy as a veil for this lacking both in the Other, the

symbolic field, and in the subject itself. It is as such that the object of fantasy,

that in relation to which the subject places itself in fantasy, constitutes

the cause of subjective desire and thus constitutes the subject proper as subject

of desire. Without the function of fantasy the subject would fail to mobilize

itself.

 

这让我们能够理解主体,作为是诉诸于,或找到幻见的支撑,作为是遮蔽在大他者,象征界,与主体自身的这个欠缺。作为这样的欠缺,幻见的客体,就形成主体欲望的原因,因此形成主体的本体,作为是欲望的主体。主体将自己放置于幻见,作为是跟客体的幻见相关。假如没有幻见到这个功能,主体将没有办法动员自己。

 

That is to say, it would not properly be (a) subject: “in its fundamental

use, the fantasy is the means by which the subject maintains him-

self at the level of his vanishing desire, vanishing inasmuch as the very satisfaction

of demand deprives him of his object” (Lacan, “Direction of the

Treatment” 532).

 

换句话说,合宜地说,这并不是一个主体:「在体基本地使用,幻见是这个工具,主体凭借用来维持他自己,处于逐渐消失的欲望的层次,逐渐消失,因为要求的这个满意,让他丧失他的客体。」(拉康:治疗的方向,532页)

 

The castration of the subject, the dividing and alienating

effect of the symbolic order as it functions at one and the same time to allow

the possibility of the subject and to deny the subject the coherence it

might (impossibly) have otherwise enjoyed, is attested to in the intercession

of Demand. The desire which then arises as one effect of this intercession is

caused, set in motion, by the object of fantasy.

 

主体的阉割,象征秩序的区分与异化的结果,当它同时地发挥功能,让主体有存在的可能,并且拒绝给予主体,它否则可能(或不可能)享受到的一致性。主体的阉割被证实,

在「要求界」的介入时。因此而产生的欲望,作为是这个介入的一个结果,被幻见到客体所引起,所触动。

 

But this object, attesting as it

does to the state before castration, before the intercession of demand, is

never actually available to be attained. Fantasy is thus the mode whereby the

subject can “flirt” with the (semblance of the) object in a relatively secure

manner. In this sense, fantasy can be understood as the provision of a surrogate

jouissance which, as surrogate, serves to guard the subject against Real

jouissance by masking the lacking point in the symbolic network which is

indicative of the (possibility) of the emergence of the Real.

 

但是这个客体,因为它证实阉割之前的状态,在要求界的介入之前的状态,这个客体从来没有确实地可利用来获得。幻见因此是这个模式,主体凭借幻见,来跟客体的类似无「调情」,用比较安全的方式。幻见能够被理解,作为是提供一个代理欢爽。作为代理欢爽,它充当用来防护主体,对抗实在界的欢爽,凭借遮蔽在象征网络的这个欠缺点,。它指示著实在界的出现的这个可能性。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神病 170

December 28, 2013

精神病 170

The psychoses

My thesis, and perhaps it will give the answer to the enigma that for some
of you my purple passage of last time on the peace of the evening seems to
have consisted in, is as follows – reality is at the outset marked by symbolic
nihilation [neantisalion].

我的主题如下:现实界从一开始就被象征的虚无主义所标示。或许这会回答这个谜团,对于你们有些人,上次我那个眩丽的段落,讨论「黄昏的宁静」似乎引起的谜团
169

Although all of last year’s work prepared us for it, I’m nevertheless going
to iUustrate it once again, even if only so as to come back to this peace of the
evening that got such a mixed reception.

虽然我们去年所有的探索就是为了这个主题而准备,我仍然将再次地说明,即使仅是为了回到这个受到毁誉交交的「黄昏的宁静」。

This is not a detour that, as Plato says, is discordant or lacking in analytic
tone. I don’t think I’m being at all innovative. If you read Freud’s text on
President Schreber you will see that, as a clinical argument for understanding
the said President, he explores the function that Nietzsche’s saga in his Zarathusira,
called Before the dawn, played for another patient of his.4 If you
refer to this moment – it was precisely so as not to read it out to you that I
indulged in this invocation of the peace of the evening – you will see the same
thing represented I wanted to bring to your attention a week ago, which I’m
going to put to you again now in speaking to you about daytime.
The day is a being distinct from all the objects it contains and manifests,
it’s probably even more weighty and more present than any of them, and it’s
impossible to think of it, even in the most primitive human experience, as
the simple return of an experience.

用精神分析的语调来说,这并不是一种不协调或欠缺的迂回,如同柏拉图所说的。我不认为我在标新立异。假如你们阅读弗洛依德讨论许瑞伯庭长的文本,你们将会看见,作为临床的主张,理解所提到的许瑞伯庭长,弗洛依德探索这个功能,尼采在他的「扎拉特拉如是说」的那段奇遇,标题是「黎明之前」,替他的一位病人扮演的功能。假如你们提到这个时刻—那确实是为了跟你们朗读出来,我陶醉于这个黄昏的宁静的召唤。你们将会看出这个相同的事情被再现,一周前,我想要提醒你们注意的这个再现的事情。当晚们跟你们谈论有关白天时,我想要再次跟你们提及。这个白天跟它所包含与证明的所有的东西并不相同,比起这些东西的任何一个,白天可能更加沉重,更加出现。我们不可能思想到它,即使是在最原始的人类的经验,作为是一种经验的单纯回归。

It suffices to mention the prevalence of a rhythm of sleep in the first few
months of human life for us to have all sorts of reasons to believe that it isn’t
due to any empirical apprehension that at a given moment – this is how I
illustrate the initial symbolic nihilations – the human being detaches itself
from the day. The human being is not, as everything leads us to think is the
case for the animal, simply immersed in a phenomenon such as that of the
alternation of day and night. The human being poses the day as such, and
the day thereby becomes presence of the day – against a background that is
not a background of concrete nighttime, but of possible absence of daytime,
where the night dwells, and vice versa moreover. Very early on, day and night
are signifying codes, not experiences. They are connotations, and the empirical
and concrete day only comes forth as an imaginary correlative, originally,
very early on.

我们只要提到,在人类生命的前几个月,睡眠的节奏的盛行,就足够让我们拥有各种的理由相信,这并不是由于任何实验性的理解,在某个特定时刻—这是我说明这个最初的象征的虚无主义。人类的生命实存将它自己跟白天隔开。依照每样东西引导我们认为的,人类的生命实存并不是动物的情况。动物仅是沉湎于一种现象,譬如白天与夜晚的轮替。人类提出白天,作为就是白天的样子,白天因此就成为白天的存在。白天衬托的背景,并不是具体的夜间时间的背景,而是白天时间的可能欠缺。夜晚就驻居在那里。而且,反过来说,白天就驻居在夜晚时间的可能欠缺那里。在早期,白天与夜晚都是能指化的符码,而不是经验。它们具有外延意义,这个经验到的具体的白天的来临,仅是作为想象的相关因素,原先,在最早期时。

4 SE 12:54-55.
On the refection of a primordial signifier 149

That’s my supposition, and seeing that I speak from the genetic point of
view, I don’t otherwise have to justify it in experience. It’s structurally necessary
to admit a primitive stage in which the world of signifiers as such appears.

那是我的假设,既然我是从起源的观点来谈论,我就没有这个必要在经验里自园其说。但是承认一个原初的阶段,在结构上是有必要的。在这个阶段,各种能指本身的世界会出现。

Since this level leaves you somewhat confused, I will put things to you
dogmatically, which I detest doing – you know my style is dialectical.
Before a child can learn to articulate language, we have to assume that
signifiers, which are already of the symbolic order, have appeared. When I
speak of a primitive appearance of the signifier, this is something that already implies language. All this does is link up with the emergence of this being
that is nowhere, the day. The day qua day is not a phenomenon, the day qua
day implies symbolic connotation, the fundamental alternation of the vocal
connoting presence and absence, on which Freud hinges his whole notion of
beyond the pleasure principle.

因为这个层次让你们相当感到困惑,我将武断地跟你们说明,虽然我并不喜欢这样做—你们知道,我的风格是辩证方式。在小孩能够学习表达语言之前,我们必须假定,各种能指已经出现,已经是属于象征界的秩序。当我谈了能指的原初的出现,这是某件已经暗示是语言的东西。所以的这一切作为,跟这个白天的生命实存的出现息息相关,白天作为是乌何有之地。白天作为白天,并不是一种现象。白天作为白天暗示着象征的外延意义,指明是存在与不存在的声音的基本的轮替。弗洛依的将他的「超越快乐原则」的整个观念,就是凭借这个轮替。

170

It’s exactly this field of symbolic articulation that I’m currently aiming at
in my discourse, and it’s here that Verwerfung occurs.

我目前在我的辞说所要到达的目标,确实就是象征表达的这个领域。就在这里,除权弃绝Verwerflung出现。

I’m delighted by the fact that some of you are bothered by this subject of
Verwerfung. After all, Freud doesn’t mention it very often, and I have gone
and dug it out of the two or three crannies where the tip of an ear is showing,
and even sometimes those where nothing at all is showing, but where the
comprehension of the text demands that one assume it is there.

我对这个事实感到欣悦。你们有些人们对于除权弃绝的这个主体感到困扰。毕竟,弗洛依德并没有经常提到它。我曾经从两三个犁沟里将它挖掘出来。在那里,有个耳朵的尖端显现,甚至有时候,根本就没有东西显现。但是在那里,对于文本的理解要求,我们应该认为这种除权弃绝存在那里。

On the subject of Verwerfung, Freud says that the subject did not want to
know anything about castration, even in the sense of repression.5 As a matter of
fact, in the sense of repression one still knows something about the very thing
one doesn’t want, in some sense, to know anything about, and the whole of
analysis consists in showing us that one knows it very well indeed. If there
are things the patient wants to know nothing about, even in the sense of
repression, another mechanism is implied. And as the word Verwerfung appears
in direct connection with this sentence as well as several pages before, I grab
it. I set no great store by the term, I set store by what it means, and this is
what I believe Freud meant.

探讨除权弃绝的这个主体时,弗洛依德说,主体并不想要知道任何有关阉割的事情,即使它的意义仅是潜抑。事实上,从潜抑的观点,我们仍然知道关于这个我们并不想要知道的东西的某件事情。整个的精神分析就在于跟我们显示,我们确实清楚地知道它。假如有些事情,病人根本不想要知道,即使仅是潜抑的意义,这暗示着另外一种机制。当「除权弃绝」这个字出现时,直接跟这个句子及前面几页有关,我理解它。我并没有刻意保留这个术语,我仅是保留它的意涵。这是我相信是弗洛依德的意思。

It has been objected to me, most pertinently I must say, that the closer one
gets to the text the less one manages to understand it. This is indeed why a
text has to be brought to life by what follows and by what precedes. It’s
always by means of what follows that a text has to be understood.

有人对我提出反对意见,非常中肯地,我必须承认。我们越是靠近这个文本,我们就越是无法成功地理解它。这确实是为什么文本必须凭借前面以及后续发生的东西,来给予生命力。总是凭借后续发生的事情,文本必须被理解。

Those who make the most objections to me suggest, incidentally, that I
look in some of Freud’s other texts at something that might not be Verwerfimg
but, for instance, Verleignung – it’s strange to see the proliferation of
this Ver in Freud. I have never given you any purely semantic lesson on
Freud’s vocabulary, but I assure you that I could serve up a good dozen of
them straightaway.

那些对我提出最强烈反对意见的人们,偶然地建议:我应该在弗洛依德的其他文本,观看某件可能并不是除权弃绝的东西。譬如,否认 Verleugnung。耐人寻味地,我们看见这个「除去」ver 在弗洛依德,如此频繁地出现。我从来没有跟你们谈论弗洛依德的辞汇的纯粹语意的教导。但是我告诉你们,我马上就能够累计好几十个。
150 The psychoses

I would begin by talking about the banking connotations
of all these terms, conversion, displacement,6 etc., and this would take us a
long way, right into the major implications of this direct approach Freud had
to the phenomena of neurosis. But we can’t spend forever on these different
approaches. Trust me a bit concerning this work on the sense. I have chosen
Verwerfimg to make myself understood because it’s the fruit of long reflection,
my work leads me to it. At least for a while, take my honey such as I
offer it to you and try to put it to some use.

我开始谈论有关其他这些术语的累积的外延意义,诸如转换conversion,替换displacement 等等。这将让我们进行很久,直接进入这个直接方法的主要的暗示,弗洛依德拥有探讨神经症的现象的方法。但是我们不能老是花时间探讨不同的方法。关于这个现场的这个研究,请你们信任我。我曾经选择除权弃绝Veerwerflung这个术语,来让你们理解,因为在是经过长久反思的成果。我们研究引导我获得它。至少,有一阵子,请你们接纳为提供它给予你们的这个蜂蜜,应用它一下。

171

This Verwerfimg is implicated in the text the Verneinung, which At. Jean
Hyppolite presented here two years ago, and this is why I have chosen to
publish his presentation in the first number of the review La Psychanalyse.7
There you will be able to see, with text in hand, whether or not we were
right, Hyppolite and I, to set off down the path of Verneinung.
Freud’s text, undeniably brilliant, is far from being satisfactory. It mixes
everything up. This has nothing to do with a Verdrangung.

在否认Verneinung的文本里,这个除权弃绝Verwerfung被暗示。两年前,海普来特在此发表这个文本。这就是为什么我选择发表他的文章,在「精神分析」评论的第一期。在那里,你们将能够看出,手里拿着文本。无论我们是否正确,海普来特与我,为了从(否认Verneinung)的途径出发探究下去。无可否认地,弗洛依的的文本非常杰出,但是根本不令人满意。因为它混淆一切东西。这跟(潜抑Verdrangung)没有丝毫关系。

What is at issue when I speak of Verwerfimg? At issue is the rejection of a
primordial signifier into the outer shadows, a signifier that will henceforth be
missing at this level. Here you have the fundamental mechanism that I posit
as being at the basis of paranoia. It’s a matter of a primordial process of
exclusion of an original within, which is not a bodily within but that of an
initial body of signifiers.

当我谈论到除权弃绝时Verwerflung,受到争议的是什么?受到争议的是拒绝原初的能指进入这些外在的阴影。在这个层次,这个能指因此将是失落。在此,你们拥有这个基本的机制,我提出作为是偏执狂的基础的机制。问题是,一个原先的内部的排除的原初的过程,这并不是身体的内部,而是能指的最初的身体的内部。

It’s inside this primordial body that Freud posits the constitution of a world
of reality, which is already punctuated, already structured, in terms of signifiers.
Freud then describes the entire operation by which representation
and these already constituted objects are brought together. The subject’s initial
apprehension of reality is the judgment of existence, which consists in
saying – This is not my dream or my hallucination or my representation but an
object.

就在这个原初的身体的内部,弗洛依德提出现实的世界的构成,它已经是被插入,已经是被结构,用能指的术语而言。弗洛依德因此描述整个的运作,凭借这个运作,再现表象,以及这些已经是被构成的客体被汇集一块。主体的最初的对现实的理解,就是生命实存的判断。这种生命实存的判断说:「这并不是我的梦,或我的幻觉,或我的再现表象,而是一个客体。」

It’s a matter of testing the external by the internal – it’s Freud saying this,
not me-, a matter of the constitution of the subject’s reality in a refinding of
the object. The object is refound in a quest, and moreover the object one
refinds is never the same. This constitution of reality, essential to the explanation
of all mechanisms of repetition is registered on the basis of an initial
bipartition, one that curiously coincides with certain primitive myths that
evoke something primordially crippled that has been introduced into the sub-
ject’s access to human reality. Here you have what is presupposed by this
unusual priority that in th Verneinung Freud attributes to what he explains
analogically as a judgment of attribution, as distinct from a judgment of existence.
There is in Freud’s dialectic an initial division into the good and the
bad that can only be understood if we interpret it as the rejection of a primordial
signifier.

问题是要凭借内部测试外部—这是弗洛依德这样说,不是我说的—问题是,主体的现实界的构成,在对于客体的重新发现上。在追寻当中,这个客体被重新发现。而且,我们重新发现的这个客体,从来就不是相同的客体。现实界的这个构成,对于重复的所有的机制的解释,是非常重要的,它被铭记,根据最初的两份区隔。一份耐人寻味地巧合于某种原始的神话。这个原始神话召唤某件原初就剥夺的东西,当它被介绍进入主体的接近人类的现实界。在此,你们拥有这个预先被假设的不寻常的优先性。在(否认Verneinung)一文,弗洛依德将它归属于他类比解释的东西,作为是归属地判断,作为是跟生命实存的判断不同的东西。在弗洛依德的辩证法,有一个最初的区分善与恶。仅有当我们理解将它诠释为原初的能指的拒绝时,我们才能理解善与恶的这种区别。

What does primordial signifier mean? It’s clear that it quite precisely means
nothing.

这个原初的能指意味着什么?显而易见地,它确实意味着空无。

What I’m explaining to you here has all the characteristics of the myth that
I was tempted to mention on that occasion and that M. Marcel Griaule
recounted to you last year – namely, the division into four of the primeval
placenta. The first was the fox who, tearing out his portion of the placenta,
introduced an imbalance from which there stemmed the cycle that would
involve the division of the fields, the bonds of kinship, etc.8 What I’m
recounting to you is also a myth, for I in no way believe that there is anywhere
at all a moment, a stage, at which the subject first acquires the primitive
signifier, that subsequently the play of meanings is introduced, and that
after that, signifier and signified having linked arms, we then enter the domain
of discourse.

我在此正在跟你们解释的东西,具有这个神话的所有特性。在那个场合,我忍不住地提到这个神话,马赛尔、格瑞乐去年跟你们叙述的神话。原始的胎盘被区分成为四份。第一份是狐狸,它撕开它在胎盘的部分,介绍一种不平衡。从这个不平衡,就产生牵涉到领域的区分,亲属的契约,等等的循环。我现在正在跟你们叙述的东西,也是一种神话。因为我根本就不相信,有任何地方,有一个时刻,一个阶段,主体首先获得这个能指,随后,各种意义的运作就被介绍。经过这个阶段之后,能指与所指就手臂相连,我们因此就进入辞说的领域。

All the same, there is a representation here that is so indispensable that I
feel comfortable about giving it to you, so as to satisfy your demands, but
also because Freud himself tends in this direction – we shall have to wait and
see how.

尽管如此,在此会有一个再现表象是如此的不可或缺,所以我觉得很自在地将它给予你们,为了满足你们的要求。但是也是因为弗洛依德自己倾向朝这个方向。我们将必须等着瞧,那是怎样的再现表象。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神病 167

December 27, 2013

精神病 167
2
These premises alone cast doubt on a theory of analytic treatment that with
ever-increasing insistence is reduced to a relation of two. It’s henceforth captivated
in the relationship between the subject’s ego and the ideal ego, between
the ego and the other, an other whose qualities may no doubt vary, but who
will always be – experience proves it – the one unique other of the imaginary
relation.

光是这些假设就对精神分析治疗的理论,投于怀疑。随着越来越增加的坚持,精神分析治疗的理论被简化成为两者的关系。它因此著迷于主体的自我与理想的自我之间的关系,自我与他者之间的关系。这个他者的性质,无可置疑,会有不同变化。但是,这个他者将总是—精神分析经验证明它—想象的关系的这个独特的他者。

As for the supposed object relation that is to be rehabilitated, the subject
is reduced to a curious experience that could be called the Kleinian substructure
of the imaginary, namely, the oral complex. Of course, in a subject who
isn’t inclined towards alienation of his own accord this can only persist on
the basis of a misunderstanding constituted by a sort of imaginary incorporation
or devouring which, given that the analytic relation is a relation of
speech, can only be an incorporation of the analyst’s discourse. On this deviant
conception analysis can’t be anything other than the incorporation of the
suggested, even supposed, discourse of the analyst – that is, the exact contrary
of analysis.

至于这个应该被重新复健的被认为的客体关系,主体被简化成为一个奇怪的经验。这个经验能够被称为所想象的次级结构。换句话说,在主体没有自动自发地倾向于异化时,它是口腔情结。这种口腔情结,仅是根据一种想象的合并,或吞食,形1的误解作为基础。假如考虑到,精神分析的关系是言说的关系,这种想象的合并或吞食,仅是精神分析家的辞说的合并。对于这个偏离的观念,精神分析实实在在不是别的,而是精神分析家的被建议,甚至是被假设的辞说的合并。也就是,跟精神分恰恰背道而驰。

On the rejection of a primordial signifier 147

I’m lighting my lantern and I shall therefore tell you my thesis. I’m going
to tell it to you the wrong way round – that is, by situating it on this genetic
level that seems to be so necessary for you to feel at ease. I shall tell you
afterwards that this isn’t it, but still, let’s begin by saying that if this were it
then it would be as I’m about to say it is.

我正在点亮我的灯笼。因此,我将告诉你们我的主题。我将以迂回的方式告诉你们。也就是说,凭借定位它在起源的层次。为了让你们感到自在,这似乎是如此的必要。我随后将告诉你们,这并不是我的主题。可是,让我们开始这样说,假如这就是我的主题,那么它将就是如同我即将说它就是我的主题。

It’s a question of a thesis involving the entire psychical economy, which is
important for an understanding of the confused debates still going on over
the Kleinian fantasmatic, for the refutation of certain objections made against it, and also for better situating what it can truly or fruitfully contribute to an
understanding of the precocity of the repressions it implies. As a matter of
fact, contrary to what Freud says, that there is no repression properly so called
before the decline of the Oedipus complex, the Kleinian theory on the
other hand entails the claim that repression exists right from the earliest preoedipal
stages.

主题的问题牵涉到整个的心理的生命活力。这个生命活力是重要的,因为对于这些混淆的辩论的理解,依旧还在进行当中,对于克莱恩的幻见理论,对于它的某种反对意见的反驳,以及对于更加精确地定位,它确实有成果地促成理解,它所建议的各种潜抑的早熟。事实上,跟弗洛依德所说恰恰相反,在伊狄浦斯情结衰微之前,并没有适当地所谓的潜抑。在另一方面,克莱恩的理论涵盖这个宣称:潜抑从最早期的前伊狄浦斯阶段,就存在。

168

My thesis may equally throw light on a contradiction concerning autoerotism
that appears insoluble in Freud himself. On the one hand he talks about
the primitive object of the first mother-child relation. On the other he formulates
the notion of primordial autoerotism, that is to say, of a stage, however
short we suppose it to be, in which there is no external world for the
child.3

我的主题同样地启明一个关于自动性爱化的悖论。在弗洛依德的自身,这个悖论似乎没有解决。在一方面,他谈论到最早母亲与小孩的关系的原初的客体。在另一方面,他说没原初的自动性爱的观念。换句话说,无论我们认为这个阶段是如何简短,在这个阶段里,对于小孩而言,并没有外在的世界/

The question is that of the human being’s primordial access to his reality
insofar as we assume that there is a reality correlative to him – an assumption
always implied at the outset of this theme, but which we also know that we
shall have in part to abandon, because there would be no question about this
reality were it itself not constantly being called into question. Is there anything
in man that has this both enveloping and coapted character which causes
us to invent the notion of Umwelt for animals?

这个问题是人类的原初接近他的现实界的问题。我们假设,有一个跟他相关的现实界—这种假设总是暗示着这个主题的开始。但是我们也知道,我们将必须部分放弃这个假设。因为将不可能有这个现实界,假如它自身没有不断地受到置疑;在人身上,有没有任何东西拥有既涵盖,又缝合的特性,让我们替动物发明「无意识」的这个观念?

I point out to you in passing that we make use of this hypothesis concerning
animals to the extent that an animal is for us an object and that there are
conditions that are in fact strictly indispensable to its existence. We’re happy
to investigate how an animal functions so as always to be in harmony with
these primordial conditions, and this is what we call an instinct, an instinc-
tual cycle or instinctual behavior – if there are things that aren’t in there, one
has to assume that we can’t see them, and since we can’t see them we’re
happy, and in fact why shouldn’t we be?

我顺便跟你们指出,我们使用关于动物的这个假设,甚至,对于我们而言,动物是一种客体,事实上,它的存在会有些绝对不可免除的情况。我们很乐意研究,动物如何发挥功能,为了总是跟这些原初的情况和谐。这就是我们所谓的本能,本能的迴圈,或本能的行为。假如有些东西并不存在那里,我们必须假定:我们无法看见它们。而且,因为我们无法看见它们,我们很乐意。事实上,有何不可呢?

It’s very clear that this is inadequate where man is concerned. The open
and proliferating nature of his world prevents us from making it into his
biological correlate. This is where I try, because it seems coherent and useful
for me to do so, to differentiate for you between the three orders of the
symbolic, the imaginary, and the real. It’s abundantly clear that everything
that our analytic experience shows us can be satisfactorily classified into these
three orders of relationships, the question being at what moment each of
these relationships is established.

显而易见地,就人类而言,这是不足够的。人的世界具有开放而且繁殖的特性,让我们不可能就将它当作是人的生物的相关因素。这就是我尝试要跟你们区别的地方,象征界,想象界,与实在界的这三个秩序之间,因为我一贯而且有用地如此做。这是非常显见的,我们精神分析经验跟我们显示的东西,能够令人满意地分类为这三个关系的秩序。问题是,在什么时刻,这三个关系的每一个被建立。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神病 165

December 26, 2013

精神病 165

1

The question of the ego is obviously primordial in the psychoses since the ego

in its function of relating to the external world is what breaks down. It’s

therefore not free of paradox to want to give it the power to handle the relationship

with reality and transform it for the aims of what is defined as defense.

Defense, in the cursory form in which it’s currently understood, is said to

be at the origin of paranoia. The ego, which is gaining in strength in the

modern conception of analysis, in effect having the power to bring the external

world into play in various ways, is in the case of psychosis said to cause a

signal, intended as a warning, to appear in the external world in the form of

a hallucination. Here we rediscover this archaic idea that a pressure [poussie]

emerges which is perceived by the ego as dangerous.

在精神病,自我的问题显而易见是原初性。因为自我在跟外在世界的相关的功用里,是瓦解的东西。因此,想要给予自我这个力量,来处理跟现实界的关系,并且将自我转变,为了被定义为防卫的这些目的,并无法免除悖论。防卫目前被理解的粗略的形式,被认为是偏执狂的起源。在精神分析的现代观念里,逐渐获得增强力量的自我,实际上,拥有各种方式来运作外在的世界。但是在精神病的情况,这个自我被认为是引起一种被用来作为警告的讯息。自我出现在外在的世界,以幻觉的形式。在此,我们重新发现这个过时的观念:被自我感受到的压力,出现作为危险的压力。

 

165

 

I should like to remind you here of the sense of what I say regarding the

ego and to phrase it in another way.

 

我在此想要提醒你们这个意义,关于自我,我所说的意义,并且用另一种方式来诠释它。

 

Whatever the appropriate role to attribute to it in psychical economy is,

the ego is never alone. It always implies a strange twin, the ideal ego, which

I spoke of in my seminar two years ago. * The most apparent phenomenology

of psychosis tells us that this ideal ego speaks. It’s a fantasm [fantaisie], but

unlike the fantasm, or fantasy [fantasme], that we highlight in the phenomena

of neurosis it’s a fantasm that speaks, or more exactly, it’s a spoken fantasm.

 

在心理的生命活力里,不管我们归属给自我怎样的合宜的角色,自我从来就不是单独的。自我总是暗示着一位陌生的双胞胎,也就是理想的自我。两年前,我在我的研讨班提到的理想的自我。精神病最为明显的现象让我们知道,这个理想自我会言说。它是一种幻见,但是不同于一般的幻见,我们在神经症的各种现象强调的幻见。它是一种会言说的幻见,或者更确实地说,它是一种被言说的幻见。

 

This is where this character who echoes the subject’s thoughts, who intervenes,

spies upon him, names his actions in the sequence in which they occur,

and commands them is not adequately explained by the theory of the imaginary

and the specular ego.

 

这就是这个人物回响主体的思想,他介入,侦查他,在他的行动发生的系列里,命名他的行动,并且命令这些行动。这个人物,靠着想象界与魅影自我的理论,并没有充分地解释。

 

I tried last time to show you that the ego, whatever we make of its function,

and I shall go no further than to give it the function of a discourse of reality,

always implies as a correlate a discourse that has nothing to do with reality.

 

我上次尝试跟你们显示,这个自我,无论我们如何解释它的功用,我将还是仅给予它作为现实界的辞说的功用。这个自我总是暗示着一个跟现实界毫无关系的辞说,作为相关因素。

 

With the impertinence that, as everyone knows, is characteristic of me I designated

this the discourse of freedom, essential to modern man insofar as he

is structured by a certain conception of his own autonomy. I pointed out its

fundamentally biased and incomplete [partiel et partial], inexpressible, fragmentary,

differentiated, and profoundly delusional nature. I set out from this

general parallel to point out to you what, in relation to the ego, is apt, in the

subject fallen prey to psychosis, to proliferate into a delusion. I’m not saying

it’s the same thing. I’m saying it’s in the same place.

 

众所周知,中肯而论是我的特色。我中肯地指明这个辞实,作为是自由的辞说,对于现代人至关紧要。因为现代人以他自己的自主权的某种观念,来架构自己。我指出自由的辞说基本上是具有偏见,而且不完整,无法表达,片段,差异,而且深具妄想的特性。我从这个一般性的并列出发,跟你们指出,关于这个自我,在作为精神病的猎物的主体身上,很容易繁殖成为妄想症。我并不是这是相同的东西。我仅是是,它处于相同的位置。

 

There is, then, no ego without this twin that is, let’s say, big with delusion.

Our patient, who provides us with valuable images from time to time, says

at one stage that he is a leprous corpse leading another leprous corpse along behind

him.2 A nice image indeed of the ego, since there is in the ego something that

is fundamentally dead and always lined with this twin discourse. The question

we are asking ourselves is this – how does it happen that this double,

which only ever makes the ego half of the subject, becomes a speaking double?

Who is speaking?

 

因此,每个自我,都会有这个双胞胎。我们不妨说,这个孕育着妄想的双胞胎。我们的病人,他有时会提供宝贵的各种意象给我们。

 

Is it the other whose function of reflection in the dialectic of narcissism I

have expounded, the other of the imaginary part of the master-slave dialectic

which we have sought in the transitivism of children, in the games of prestige

in which the integration of the socius is put into effect, the other whom the

captivating action of the total image in the counterpart encapsulates so well?

Is it really this reflected other, this imaginary other, this other that for us is

every counterpart in so far as he gives us our own image, captivates us by an appearance, and provides the projection of our totality – is it he who is speaking?

 

这就是这个他者吗?我曾经阐述过的自恋的辩证法,有个他者具有反思的功能,主人与奴隶的辩证法的想象的部分的他者,我们曾经在小孩玩威权遊戏时的认同转变寻求的他者。在那里,社会的融合被实施,在双重者的完整意象的迷人行动封包得如此完好的他者。它确实就是这个被反射的他者吗?这个想象界的他者吗?对于我们,这个他者就是每个双重者,因为他给予我们自己的形象,凭借一种表象,让我们感到著迷。并且提供我们的完整性的投射。就是这个他者在言说吗?

 

166

The question is worth raising. One implicitly resolves it each time one

mentions the mechanism of projection.

 

这个问题值得提出。每次我们提到投射到机制,我们暗示地解决它。

 

Projection doesn’t always have the same sense, but for our part we restrict

it to this imaginary transitivism by means of which when a child hits his

counterpart he can say without lying -He hit me, because for him it’s exactly

the same thing. This defines an imaginary order of relations that is constantly

found in all sorts of mechanisms. In this sense there is a type of jealousy by

projection, one that projects onto the other the subject’s unfaithful tendencies,

or the accusations of unfaithfulness that he himself has to bear.

 

投射并不总是拥有相同的意义。但是就我们而言,我们限制它到想象的认同1转变。凭借这个认同转变,当小孩打到他的双重者时,他能够并不是谎言地说:他打我」。因为对于小孩而言,这确实就是相同的事情。这定义在各种的心理机制里经常发现的各种关系的想象的秩序。从这个意义,有一种投射到忌妒的意义。将主体的不忠实的倾向投射给他者的一种投射,或是控诉他自己必须忍受的不忠实。

 

It’s a rudimentary observation that delusional projection has nothing in

common with this. One may well say that it, too, is a mechanism of projection

in the sense that something whose source is within the subject appears

without, but it’s certainly not the same as the one I have just presented to

you as the transitivism of evil intentions, which is much closer to so-called

common or normal jealousy. One need only examine the phenomena to see

this, and the distinction is fully drawn in Freud’s own writings on jealousy.

The mechanisms at work in psychosis are not limited to the imaginary register.

Where shall we look for them, given that they escape libidinal investment?

 

这是一个初步的观察,妄想症的投射跟这个投射毫无关联。我们很有理由说,这也是一种投射的机制,因为某件东西的来源是在主体之内,这个某件东西似乎并不存在。但是这确实并不相同,跟我刚刚呈现给与你们,作为是邪恶意图的认同转变的这个投射。这个邪恶意图的认同转变,更加靠近所谓的共同或正常的忌妒。我们只要检视这些现象,我们就会看出这点。在弗洛依德论忌妒的著作里,这种区别充分地描绘。在精神病运作的这些机制,并没有限制于想象的铭记。假如考虑到,它们逃避生命力比多的投注,我们将到哪里寻找它们?

 

Is it sufficient to appeal to libidinal reinvestment of the body? This mechanism,

commonly held to be that of narcissism, is explicitly invoked by Freud

himself to explain the phenomenon of psychosis. Briefly put, in order to

mobilize the delusional relationship, it’s supposed to be a matter of nothing

other than enabling him, as one so quickly says, to become an object again.

 

假如我们诉诸于身体的生命力比多的投注,这就足够吗?这种机制被公认为是自恋的机制,它明确地由弗洛依德自己召唤,来解释精神病的现象。简言之,为了启动妄想症的关系,它被认为是,就是要让他能够再次成为客体的问题,我们不妨这样说。

 

From one angle this coincides with a number of the phenomena involved,

but it doesn’t exhaust the problem. Each and every one of us knows, provided

he’s a psychiatrist, that in a fully developed paranoiac there is no question

of mobilizing this investment, while in schizophrenics the properly

psychotic disturbance is as a rule much more extensive than in the paranoiac.

 

从一个角度,这巧合于许多牵涉到的现象。但是它并没有穷尽这个难题。我们每一个人都知道,假如他是一位精神科医生,对于一位症状明显的偏执狂,我们不可能启动这种投注。但是在精神分裂症者,这种确实是精神病的疾病,通常比在偏执狂身上,更加地广泛。

 

Wouldn’t this be because in the imaginary order there is no way of giving

a precise meaning to the term narcissism? Alienation is constitutive of the

imaginary order. Alienation is the imaginary as such. Nothing is to be expected

from the way psychosis is explored at the level of the imaginary, since the

imaginary mechanism is what gives psychotic alienation its form but not its

dynamics.

 

这难道不是因为,在想象界的秩序,我们不可能给出一个明确的意义,给自恋」这个术语?异化形成想象界的秩序。异化就是想象界的本身。从精神病被探索的方式,没有一样东西是被期望在想象界的层次,因为想象的机制就是给予它的形式,给精神病异化的东西,但是没有给予它的动力。

 

167

This is the point we always get to together, and if we don’t get there unarmed,

if we don’t give in, it’s precisely because in our exploration of analytic technique,

and then of beyond the pleasure principle with the structural definition

of the ego that it implies, we have the idea that beyond the little other of

the imaginary we have to admit the existence of another Other.

 

这就是我们总是一起到达的时刻。假如我们到达时,空手无凭,假如我们不屈不饶,那确实是因为我们对于精神分析技术的探索,以及我们对于快乐原则的探索,用它所暗示的这个自我的结构的定义,我们拥有这个观念:除1理想象界的这个小他者,我们必须承认,另外一个大他者的存在。

 

It’s not only because we give it a capital letter that we are satisfied with it,

but because we locate it as the necessary correlate of speech.

 

这不仅是因为我们给予它一个大写的字母,我们就对它感到满意。而是因为我们将大他者定位,作为是言说的必要相关因素。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

XI论原初能指的拒绝

December 25, 2013

XI
On the rejection of a primordial signifier
论原初能指的拒绝

A TWIN THAT IS BIG WITH DELUSION
孕育妄想的双胞胎

DAY AND NIGHT
日与夜

VERWERFUNG
拒绝

LETTER 52
52封信

We’ve been approaching the problem of the psychoses via the question of
Freudian structures. This approach is a modest one, and it isn’t actually
going in the direction in which our investigations are pointing, namely that
of the economy of the psychoses, which we are investigating through an analysis
of the structure.

我们一直凭借着弗洛依德的结构的问题,来探究精神病的难题。这种探究是温和的探究。它并没有确实地朝着我们的各种研究指出的方向。也就是说,精神病的生命活力的的方向。为们正在凭借结构的精神分析,研究精神病。

The structure appears in what can be called the phenomenon, in the strict
sense of the term. It would be surprising if nothing of the structure were to
appear in the way that, for example, the delusion presented itself. But our
confidence in the analysis of the phenomenon is quite distinct from that of
the phenomenological point of view, which strives to discover what it contains
of reality in itself. From the point of view that guides us we don’t have
this a priori confidence in the phenomenon, for the simple reason that our
way of proceeding is scientific and that it’s the starting point of modern science
not to trust the phenomena and to look for something more subsistent
behind them that explains them.

这个结构出现在所谓的这个现象,从这个术语的严格意义来说。这将令人大吃一惊,假如结构的的东西,没有一样以这种方式出现,譬如,妄想呈现自己的方式。但是我们对于现象的精神分析的信心,完全不同于现象学的观点。后者努力去发现象在现实界本身所包含的东西。从引导我们的这个观点,我们对于现象,并没有由因推果的这种信心。理由很简单,我们进行的方式是科学的。而现代科学的启始点,就是不信任各种现象,并且寻找现象背后更加真实的东西,来解释现象。

One must not retreat from this word. If some time ago psychiatry took a
backward step that consisted in distrusting explanation so as to extol understanding,
it was because the explanatory path had led to dead ends. But we
ourselves have evidence of the explanatory efficacity of analytic investigation,
and it’s on the assumption that here, too, an appropriate analysis of the phenomenon
will lead us to the structure and the economy that we shall make
advances in the domain of the psychoses.

我们一定不要从这个字词撤退。假如不久之前,精神病学採取后退的一步,因为它不信任为了理解而给予的解释。那是因为这个解释的途径导致行不通的死路。但是我们自己拥有证据:精神分析研究具有解释的有效性。这是根据这个假设:在此,对于现象的合宜的精神分析,也将会引导我们到达这个结构与在精神病的领域,我们将前进的生命活力。

It is not for the simple pleasures of the nosographer that we’re grappling
with the distinction between the neuroses and the psychoses. This distinction
is only too evident. It’s by comparing the two that relationships, symmetries,
and contrasts will appear that will enable us to erect an admissible structure
for psychosis.

我们正在努力澄清神经症与精神病的这个区别,并不纯然是分类学者的喜悦。这个区别太显而易见。凭借比较这两者的区别,各种关系,均称,对照将会出现。它们将会让我们能够替精神病竖立起一个准许进入的结构。

Our starting point is this – the unconscious is present but not functioning.
Contrary to what has been thought, the fact that it’s present doesn’t imply a
solution but, on the contrary, a very special inertia. Furthermore, psychoanalysis
doesn’t consist in making thought conscious or in making the ego’s
defenses less paradoxical, so as to obtain what is rashly called its strengthening.
This rejection of the two paths psychoanalysis took, first at its emergence
and then in its present, deviated state, is almost self-evident when one explores
the psychoses.

我们的启始点是这个: 无意识出现,但是没有发挥功能。跟一般的想法相反,无意识出现的这个事实,并没有暗示有解决方法。相反地,无意识具有非常特别的惰性。而且,精神分析并不是在于让思想意识到,或让自我的防卫减少矛盾,为了要获得大约所谓的强化自我。精神分析採取的这两条途径的这个拒绝,首先当无意识出现时,然后就是当无意识处于它目前的偏离的状态时,这种拒绝几乎是自明的,当我们探索精神病时。

In the forthcoming journal of our Society, in its first number on language
and speech, you will find this statement in the foreword – If psychoanalysis
inhabits language, in its discourse it cannot misrecognize it with impunity. This is
the whole sense of what I have been teaching you for a number of years, and
this is where we are with respect to the psychoses. The emphasis on, the
importance given to, language phenomena in psychosis is for us the most
fruitful lesson of all.

在我们的社团的将出版的这期杂志,它的第一期探讨语言与言说。你们将在发刊词发现这个陈述:假如精神分析驻居在语言里,在语言的辞说里,那么精神分析每次误识语言与辞说时,它总是遭受处罚。这就是完整的意义,我许多年来,一直在教导你们的。这就是我们目前关于精神病的立场。在精神病,给予语言现象的强调与重视,对于我们而言,是最具有成果的教学。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神病 159

December 24, 2013

精神病 159

On the signifier in the real and the bellowing-miracle 141

 

The other miracles, for which he constructs an entire theory of divine creation,

consist in the call of a number of living beings which in general are

singing birds – as distinct from the speaking birds that form part of the

divine entourage – that he sees in the garden. There are also known species

of insects – the subject had an entomologist great grandfather – created quite

intentionally for him by the omnipotence of divine speech. Thus between

these two poles, the bellowing-miracle and the call for help, a transition occurs

in which can be seen traces of the passage of the subject absorbed in an

undeniably erotized link. The connotations are there – this is a male-female

relationship.

 

其他的奇迹,他为了它们而建造神性创造的整个理论。这些奇迹在于许多生物的呼唤,一般而言,是歌唱的鸟的呼唤。它们跟他在花园里看见的,形成神的护卫的部分的言说的鸟群不一样。也有已知的昆虫的族类主体的曾祖父是昆虫学家。这些昆虫族类相当刻意地为他而创造,由神性语言的无所不能。因此,处于这两个极端之间,咆哮的奇迹与呼喊救命之间,发生一个转换,在这个转换里,专注于无可否认的性爱化的连接的主体,经历过的痕迹能够被看见。这些内涵的指称在那里这是男性与女性的关系。

 

The fundamental phenomenon of Schreber’s delusion stabilized into an

Unsinnig, nonsensical, field of erotized meanings. With time the subject managed

to neutralize to its utmost the task he set himself, which consisted in

completing the interrupted sentences. Any other way of responding, by questioning

them or by insulting them, would not have been playing the game. It

is necessary, he says, for me to be linked to the activity of God himself who

speaks to me in his fundamental language, however absurd or humiliating

the character of his questioning. Well then, whenever the subject leaves this

enigmatic field, whenever a state occurs whose arrival one would think he

must be wishing for as a respite, an illumination occurs on the fringe of the

external world and goes through him with all the component elements of

language in a dissociated form. On the one hand there is vocal activity in its

most elementary form, even accompanied by a sort of feeling of disarray

linked in the subject to a certain sense of shame. On the other hand there is

a meaning that has the connotation of being a call for help, correlated at that

moment with his abandonment and, subsequently, with this something which

on our analysis ultimately appears much more hallucinatory than these language

phenomena that on the whole remain entirely mysterious. Furthermore,

he never calls them anything but internal speech.

 

许瑞伯的妄想症的基本现象,稳定成为一种非意义的领域,性爱化的意义的领域。随着时间过去,主体成功地中立化,到他替自己竖立的工作的极致。这个工作在于完成被中断的句子。假如换任何其他回应的方式,凭借质疑它们,或污辱它们,这个遊戏将玩不起来。他说,这是必要的,让我被跟上帝自身的活动连接一块。上帝自身用他的基本语言跟我言说,无论他的质问的特性,是多么的荒谬,或令人羞辱。呵呵,当当主体离开这个谜团一般的领域,每当一种情状发生,我们将会认为,他一定是正在期待这种情况的到达,作为一种解脱。一种启蒙发生在外在世界的边缘,并且通过他,带着语言的各种组成的成分,处于一种瓦解的形态。在一方面,有声音的活动,处于它的最基本的形态,甚至伴随着一种散乱的感觉,在主体身上,跟某种的羞愧感息息相关。在另一方面,有一种具有呼唤救命的外延意义。在那个时刻,跟他的放弃息息相关,随后,跟在我们的精神分析里,最后似乎比这些语言现象更加是幻觉的这个某件东西息息相关。大体而言,这些语言现象始终是完全神秘。而且,他称呼这些语言现象,从来就不是别的,那就是内部的言说。

 

160

Schreber describes the peculiar trajectory of the rays that precede the

induction of the divine words – transformed into threads of which he has a

certain visual, or at least spatial, apprehension, they come towards him from

the horizon, spin around inside his head, and finally stab into him from behind.

All this leads us to think that this phenomenon, which is a prelude to the

coming into play of the divine discourse as such, unfolds in what could be

called a trans-space linked to the structure of the signifier and of meaning, a

spatialization prior to any possible dualization of the phenomenon of language.

 

许瑞伯描述在神的语言的推论之前的这个特殊的光的投射这些光的投射被转换成为他具有某种的视觉景象的脉络,或至少数空间的理解。它们从地平线前来他这里,在他的头脑内部旋转,最后,从背后刺进他。所有这一切让我们认为,这个现象是神的辞说自身的运作的序曲。这个现象展开,用所谓的跨越的空间,跟这个能指与意义的结构相关的跨越的空间。这种空间化,早先于语言现象的任何可能的双重化。

 

What happens when this phenomenon ceases is different. Reality becomes

the support of other phenomena, those that are classically reduced to belief.

If the term hallucination must be attributed to a transformation of reality, this

is the only level at which we have the right to maintain it, if we are to preserve

any coherence for our language. What indicates a hallucination is this unusual

sense the subject has at the border between the sense of reality and the sense

of unreality, a sense of proximate birth, of novelty – and not just of any

novelty but of novelty over its use breaking through into the external world.

This is not of the same order as what appears with respect to meaning or

meaningfulness. It is a created reality, one that manifests itself well and truly

within reality as something new. Hallucination, as the invention of reality,

here constitutes the support for what the subject is experiencing.

 

当这个现象停止时,发生的事情是不同的。现实界变成是其他现象的支持,那些传统上被还原成为信仰的那些现象。假如幻觉」这个术语必须被归属于现实界的转变,这是唯一的层次,我们拥有权利来支持它,假如我们想要替我们的语言保存任何的一贯性。指示幻觉的东西,就是主体拥有的这个不寻常的意义,处于现实界的意义,与非现实界的意义之间的边界,当下诞生的意义,新奇的意义,不仅是任何的新奇,而且是它习惯于突破进入外在世界的新奇。这并不是属于跟象征界出现的意义,它是不相同的秩序。它是一种被创造的现实界,它在现实界之内,实实在在证明它自己,作为是某件新东西的现实界。幻觉作为是现实界的发明,在此,它构成这个支持,支持主体正在经验的东西。

 

I think today I’ve got you to grasp the schema I have tried to present, with

all the problems it comprises.

 

今天,我认为我已经让你们理解我曾经尝试呈现的这个基模,用它涵盖的各种的难题。

 

142 The psychoses

 

We are inquiring into the sense to give the term hallucination. In order to

be able to classify hallucinations in the appropriate way, it’s best to observe

them in the reciprocal contrasts, the complementary oppositions, that the

subject himself points out. As a matter of fact, these oppositions form part

of the one same subjective organization and, having been given by the subject,

they have greater value than if they were provided by the observer.

 

我们正在探究这个意义,给予幻觉」这个术语的意义。为了能够将幻觉以适当的方式分类,我们最后观察它们,用互动的对照,互补的对立,这是主体自己指出的。事实上,这些对立,形成这一个相同的主观的组织的部分。而且,当它们由主体给出后,它们具有更大的价值,比起假如它们是由观察者提供。

 

Moreover, one has to fllow their progress over time.

I have tried to give you an idea of how in Schreber there is something that

is always liable to surprise him, that never unveils itself, but is located in the

order of his relations with language, of these language phenomena that the

subject remains attached to by a very special compulsion and that constitute

the center in which the resolution of his delusion finally results.

 

而且,我们必须随着时光过去,遵照它们的进展。

我曾经尝试让你们理解,在许瑞伯身上,有某件东西总是容易让他大吃一惊。这个东西从来没有揭露它自己,但是它位于他跟语言的各种关系的秩序,这些语言现象的秩序。主体始终保持跟一种特别的冲动相连一块。这些语言现象构成这个核心,他的妄想的解决最后造成的核心。

 

There is a subjective topology here based entirely upon the fact, given to

us by analysis, that there may be an unconscious signifier. We need to know

how this unconscious signifier is situated in psychosis. It appears to be external

to the subject, but it’s another exteriority than the one that is evoked

when hallucination and delusion are presented to us as a disturbance of reality,

since the subject remains attached to it through an erotic fixation. Here

we have to conceive of space speaking as such, so that the subject can’t do

without it without a dramatic transition in which hallucinatory phenomena

appear, that is, in which reality itself is presented as affected and also as

signifying.

 

在此,有一个主体的拓扑学,完全以这个事实作为基础。精神分析将它给予我们:可能存在着一种无意识的能指。我们需要知道,这个无意识的能指在精神病里,如何被定位。对于主体而言,它似乎是外在的。但是这是另外的一种外在性,不同于这种外在性,当幻觉与妄想被呈现给予我们,作为现实界的困扰。因为主体始终凭借性爱的固执,跟它连接一块。在此,我们必须构想言说的空间,作为它原来的样子。这样,主体每次免除不用它时,主体就会有激烈的转移,在这个转移当中,幻觉现象会出现。换句话说,在这个转移里,现实界的自身被呈现,作为是受到影响,也作为是能指化。

 

161

This topographical notion tends in the same direction as the question already

raised about the difference between Verwerfung and Verdrangung as to their

subjective localization. What I’ve tried to get you to understand today constitutes

a first approach to this opposition.

8 February 1956

 

这个拓扑学的观念,倾向于朝著跟问题相同的方向,关于Verwerflung除权弃绝与Veerdrangung潜抑之间的差异,所已经产生的的问题。今天,我尝试让你们理解的东西,构成一个初步的方法,探究这个对立面。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

 

精神病 158

December 23, 2013

精神病 158

3

I said last time that the continuity of this perpetual discourse is not only felt

by the subject as a test of his capacities for discourse, but also as a challenge

and a requirement in the absence of which he suddenly feels he is at the

mercy of a rupture with the sole presence in the world that still exists at the

time of his delusion, that of this absolute Other, this interlocutor who has

emptied the universe of any authentic presence. Where does the ineffable

voluptuousness – a fundamental feature of the subject’s life – which is attached

to this discourse, stem from?

 

我上次说,这个永恒的辞说的继续,不但被主体感觉到,作为是他具有辞说的能力,而且作为一种挑战与要求。欠缺这种挑战与要求时,他会突然地感觉,他受到他在世界里的唯一的生命实存的断裂的支配。这个世界的唯一的生命实存仍然存在于他的妄想的时刻,这位绝对大他者的时刻。这位对谈者已经将这个宇宙掏空任何真诚的生命实存。这个无以名喻的淫猥起源于哪里呢?主体生活的基本的特征,它跟这个辞说连接一块。

 

In this particularly true-to-life observation, and with an infrangible attachment

to the truth, Schreber notes what happens when this discourse upon

which he is painfully dependent ceases. Different phenomena from those of

the continuous internal discourse arise – things slow down, there are interruptions,

discontinuities, which the subject is forced to complement.

 

在这个特别地对生命表现真诚的观察,由于跟真理具有不容违背的联接,许瑞伯注意到发生什麽事情,当他痛苦地依赖的这个辞说停顿的时刻。这就产生跟这个连续性的内部的辞说不同的的诸多现象事情缓慢下来,主体被迫要求弥补各种中断与不连续。

 

The withdrawal of the ambiguous and double god in question, who habitually

presents himself in his so-called lower form, is accompanied by sensations

that are very painful for the subject, but above all by four connotations

of a linguistic order.4

 

受到质疑的模糊暧昧与作为双重者的神的隐退,这个神习惯性呈现他自己,以它所谓的低层的化身形态,伴随着各种让主体痛苦不堪的感觉。但是尤其重要的是,伴随着语言秩序的四个指称。

 

 

In the first place, there is what he calls the bellowing-miracle. He is unable

to contain a prolonged shout, which grips him so brutally that, as he himself

notes, if at that instant he had had anything in his mouth it would have forced

him to spit it out. He has to restrain himself if this is not to occur in public,

and he is a long way from always being able to do so – quite a striking

phenomenon if we see in this shouting the mouth’s motor participation in

speech reduced to its most extreme aspect. If there is anything by means of

which speech comes to be combined with an absolutely a-signifying vocal

function, and which nevertheless contains all possible signifiers, it must surely

be what it is that makes us shiver in a dog’s baying at the moon.

 

首先,会有他所谓的怒吼的奇迹。他不由自主地发出长声的吼叫。他自己注意点,这种吼叫如此残酷地掌握他,假如在那个时刻,他的嘴巴里有任何东西,这个吼叫会逼使他吐出来。假如这个情况不让它在公开场合发生,他必须要约束他自己。他根本就无法这样做。这是相当引人注意的现象,假如我们在这种吼叫里,看出嘴巴作为动力的参与那个被还原到最极端层面的言说。假如有任何东西,言说凭借它逐渐跟绝对是非能指化的声音的功能连接一块,可是,它仍然包括所有可能的能指,它确实一定是让我们不寒而栗的东西,如同狗吠月亮。

 

Secondly, there is the call for help, supposedly heard coming from the

divine nerves that have become separated from God but that trail a sort of

comet’s tail behind them. In the first period, at the time of the tying-tocelestial-

bodies, Schreber could not enter into effusive communion with the

divine rays without having one or more tested souls leap into his mouth. But

following a certain stabilization of his imaginary world, this no longer occurred.

In contrast, anxiety-making phenomena recur when some of these animated

entities that he is living in the midst of are, on God’s withdrawal, left trailing

and call out for help.

 

其次,他认为会有来自神的神经的呼唤救命被听见,这个神的神经已经跟上帝隔离,但是在背后还某种彗星尾巴的痕迹。在这第一个时期,在跟天庭息息相关的各种身体的时期,每次许瑞伯跟神性的光辉从事热情洋溢的沟通时,他总是遭遇一两个被考验的灵魂跳跃进入他的嘴巴里。但是当他遵循他的想象的世界的某种稳定,这种现象就不再发生。对照起来,形成焦虑的诸多现象会重复发生,当有些被激发起来的各种实体,他正生活在它们中间,在上帝隐退时,这些实体离开彗星尾巴的痕迹而呼喊救命。

 

This phenomenon of the call for help is different from the bellowing. The

bellowing is a pure signifier only, whereas the call for aid has a meaning,

however elementary.

 

呼喊救命的这个现象,不同于怒吼喊叫。怒吼喊叫仅是纯净的能指,而呼喊救命则具有意义,无论是多么基本的意义。

 

This isn’t all. Thirdly, there are all sorts of noises from without, whatever

they might be – something that happens in the corridor of the mental home,

or a noise outside, a bark or a neigh which, he says, has been miracled, done

expressly for him. It’s always something that has a human meaning.

Between the vanishing meaning of the bellowing and the emission obtained

from the call for help – which is not even his according to him, since it

surprises him from without – we can observe a whole range of phenomena

that are characterized by the outbreak of meaning. Schreber is well aware

that these are real noises that he is accustomed to hearing in his surroundings,

nevertheless he is convinced that they do not occur by chance just at that

moment, but for his sake, on their return to abandonment in the external

world, and in a way that corresponds to the intermediate periods of absorption

in the delusional world. consists of blasts of wind that coincide with pauses in Schreber’s thinking.

 

这并非全部。第三指称是,有各式各样的噪音从外面进来,无论它们是什么噪音。某件东西会发生在金属家中的走道,或是外面的噪音,狗吠或是马鸣,他说,它们已经成为奇迹,生动地为他而发生。总是有某件东西具有人类的意义。在这个怒吼喊叫的逐渐消失的意义,与从呼喊救命所包含的发出声音之间依照他的说法,这甚至不是他的呼喊救命我们能够观察到整个现象的范围。这些现象的特征是意义的爆发。许瑞伯清楚知道,这些是他在周遭习惯于听见的实在界的声音,可是他仍然相信,这些声音并不是仅是在那个时刻偶然发生,而是为了他的缘故才发生,当它们回到外在世界的放弃。以某种的方式,外在世界的放弃,对应于专注妄想的世界的当下的时期,它包括在许瑞伯的思想的各种停顿巧合的风的狂吹。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

 

 

 

精神病 138 The psychoses

December 22, 2013

138 The psychoses

I don’t want to give an overly philosophical discourse here but want to

show you for example what I mean when I tell you that discourse is essentially

directed at something for which we have no other term than being.

I ask you, then, to think about this for a moment. You are at the close of

a stormy and tiring day, you regard the darkness that is beginning to fall

upon your surroundings, and something comes to mind, embodied in the

expression, the peace of the evening.

 

我不想要在此给出一个过分哲学的辞说,但是想要跟你们显示我是什么意思,譬如,当我告诉你们,辞说基本上是朝向某件东西。这个东西,我们无以名之,除了就是生命实存」。因此,我要求你们稍微思维一下。当你们处于暴风雨而令人疲倦的一天的结束,你们看待这个即将开始降临你们周遭环境的黑暗。某件东西浮现脑海,具体表现出来,那就是黄昏的宁静」。

 

I don’t think anybody who has a normal affective life is unaware that this

is something that exists and has a completely different value from the phenomenal

apprehension of the close of the clamor of the day, of an attenuation

of contours and passions. There is in the peace of the evening both a presence

and a choice from everything that surrounds you.

 

我不认为,任何过着正常的情感生活的人们,会不知道,这是某件存在的东西。它具有完全不同的价值,跟白天的喧哗的结束的巨大焦虑,对于身体与激情的衰弱的巨大焦虑。在黄昏的宁静里,有一种存在与选择,从你周遭的一切事物。

 

What link is there between the expression the peace of the evening and what

you experience? It’s not absurd to ask oneself whether beings who didn’t give

this peace of the evening a distinct existence, who didn’t formulate it verbally,

could distinguish it from any of the other registers under which temporal

reality may be apprehended. This might be a panic feeling, for example,

over the presence of the world, an agitation that you observe at that moment

in the behavior of your cat which appears to be searching left and right for

the presence of a ghost, or this anxiety which, although unknown to us, we

attribute to primitive peoples over the setting of the sun, when we think they

are perhaps afraid that the sun will not return – which, moreover, isn’t

unthinkable. In short, a feeling of disquiet, of a quest. There’s something

here – isn’t there? – that leaves intact the question of what the relationship

is between this order of being, which has its existence equivalent to all sorts

of other existences in our lived experience, and which is called the peace of

the evening, and its verbal expression.

 

黄昏的宁静」的这个表达,与你所经验的东西,有怎样的关联?这不算是荒谬,假如我们询问自己,是否有人能够区别它,跟任何其他的铭记有何不同,跟时间的现实可能被理解的铭记。任何没有给予黄昏的宁静一种清楚的生命实存,他并没有用文辞说明它。这可能会有一种惊慌的感觉,譬如,对于这个世界的生命实存,你们在那个时刻观察到的激动,当你们观察到你家的猫的行为。它似乎正在到处寻找,寻找鬼魂的存在,或是这种焦虑,虽然我们并不知道,我们将这种焦虑归属于原始的民族对于太阳下山的焦虑。当我们想到他们或许是害怕,太阳将永远不会再回来。而且,这并不是不可思议的。总之,一直不宁静的感觉,一种追求的感觉。在此,有件东西,不是吗?它让这个问题保持完整在生命实存的这个秩序与它的文辞表达之间,有怎样的关联?生命实存具有它的存在,相等于各种的其他的存在,在我们生活经历过的经验。

 

We can now observe that something quite different happens according to

whether we, who have called up this peace of the evening ourselves, have

formulated this expression before uttering it, or whether it takes us by surprise

or interrupts us, calming the movement of agitation that dwelled within

us. It’s precisely when we are not listening for it, when it’s outside our field

and suddenly hits us from behind, that it assumes its full value, surprised as

we are by this more or less endophasic, more or less inspired, expression that

comes to us like a murmur from without, a manifestation of discourse insofar

as it barely belongs to us, which comes as an echo of what it is that is all of a

sudden significant for us in this presence, an utterance such that we don’t

know whether it comes from without or from within – the peace of the evening.

 

我们现在能够观察到,某件完全不同的东西发生,依照我们是否在表达之前,曾经说明这个表达,我们是否受到惊吓或中断,驻居我们内心的激情的运动是否平静下来。这确实是当我们并没有在倾听它的时刻,当它是在我们的领域之外,突然地从背后襲击我们。它具有它的充分的价值,让我们大吃一惊,因为我们有几分程度是寄居动物,有几分程度受到启发。这个表达浮现我们脑海,就像从外面来到喃喃之声,辞说的证明,因为它几乎不属于我们。它作为它的本质的回声前来,对于我们而言,在这个生命实存,它的本质突然重要起来。这是这样一种表达,以致于我们不知道,它是否来自外面,或来自里面这个黄昏的宁静。

 

Without going to the heart of the issue of the relationship between the

signifier, qua signifier of language, and something that without it would never

be named, it’s noticeable that the less we express it, the less we speak, the

more it speaks to us. The more foreign we are to what is at issue in this being,

the more it has a tendency to present itself to us, accompanied by this pacifying

expression that presents itself as indeterminate, lying on the border

between the field of our motor autonomy and this something that is said to

us from outside, this something through which the world borders on speaking

to us.

 

我们没有探究到这个关系的问题的核心,能指,作为语言的能指,与某件假如没有它就无法命名的东西之间的关系。值得注意的是,我们越少表达它,我们越少言说它,它就越常跟我们言说。对于这个生命实存受到争议的东西,我们越是感到陌生,它越是有这个倾向呈现它自己在我们面前。它伴随着这个让人平静的表达,呈现它自己作为是不确定,位于我们的动力的自主权的领域,与从外面来的我们这里的某件东西之间,通过这个东西,这个世界处于跟我们言说的边界。

 

On the signifier in the real and the bellowing-miracle 139

 

What does this being, or not, of language, this the peace of the evening,

mean? To the extent that we’re not expecting it, or wishing for it, or haven’t

even thought about it for a long time, its essentially as a signifier that it

presents itself to us. No experimentalist construction can justify its existence,

there is a datum here, a certain way to take this time of the evening as a

signifier, and we can be open to it or closed to it. And it’s precisely insofar as

we have been closed to it that we receive it through this peculiar echo phenomenon,

or at least the start of it, which consists in the appearance, at the

limit of the phenomenon’s grip on us of what will most commonly be expressed

for us by these words, the peace of the evening. We have now come to the limit

at which discourse* if it opens onto anything beyond meaning, opens onto

the signifier in the real. We shall never know, in the perfect ambiguity in

which it dwells, what it owes to this marriage with discourse.

 

语言的这个生命实存,这个黄昏的宁静,是什么意思?甚至我们并没有正在期望它,或希望获得它,或我们甚至有长久时间,没有思维到它,它基本上出现在我们面前,是作为一个能指。无论再多的尝试性的建构,都无法替它的存在自圆其说。在此,有一个资料,有某种的方式,来接纳黄昏的这个时刻,作为一个能指。我们有时接纳它,有时封闭它。这确实是因为我们封闭它时,我们通过这个特别的回声的现象,我们接收到它。或至少,接收到它的讯息。它的讯息在于这个出现,在这个现象对我们的影响的极限,,常见的是,用黄昏的宁静」的这些文字跟我们表达。我们现在已经来到这个极限,在那里,假如辞说展开进入任何超越意义的任何东西,它展开进入实在界的这个能指。我们将永远不会知道,由于它的全然的模糊暧昧。它驻居在这个模糊暧昧里,它归属于跟辞说的结合的东西。

 

You can see how the more this signifier takes us by surprise, that is, in

principle escapes us, the more it’s already presented to us with a more or less

appropriate fringe of discourse phenomena. Well then, the issue for us – this

is the working hypothesis I propose – is to look for what there is at the center

of President Schreber’s experience, what he senses without knowing it at the

edge of the field of his experience, at the fringe, carried away as he is in the

froth created by this signifier he fails to perceive as one but which, at its

limit, organizes all these phenomena.

 

你们能够看出,这个能指越是惊吓我们,也就是说,原则上,我们无法理解它,它就越是已经呈现给于我们,用相当合适的辞说的现象的边缘。呵呵,对于我们的问题这是运作中的假设我建议问题是要寻找许瑞伯庭长的经验的核心,存在着什么东西。他感觉到的东西,却不知道它,处于他的经验的领域的边缘。在这个边缘,尽管他陶醉于这个能指创造的泡沫。他无法感觉这个能指作为一个能指。而在它的极限,这个能指组织所有这些现象。

 

雄伯译

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

https://springhero.wordpress.com

 

精神病 154

December 21, 2013

精神病 154

Here I have to take the same path I’ve already somewhat bored you with,

by reminding you of the very foundations of the order of discourse and by

rejecting its status as superstructure, its relationship of pure and simple reference

to reality, its having the character of signs, and the equivalence that

is supposed to exist between naming and the world of objects. Let’s try to reexamine

the question from an angle that is a bit closer to experience.

在此,我必须採取我已经让你们相当厌烦的相同的途径?我提醒你们关于辞说的秩序的这些基础,拒绝它作为超级结构的地位,它跟现实界的纯粹而简单的指称的关系,它具有讯息符码的特征,以及各种客体的命名与世界的被认为相等。让我们尝试重新检视这个问题,从稍微靠近精神分析经验的角度。

 

Nothing is as ambiguous as verbal hallucination. The classical analyses

already give us some indication, at least for a portion of the cases, of the

subject’s role in their creation. This is what has been called the psychomotor

verbal hallucination, and the observed adumbrations of utterances have been

gleefully recorded because they offer the hope of a satisfactory rational explanation

of the phenomenon of hallucination. If this problem warrants investigation,

the starting point is the relationship between the mouth and the ear.

This doesn’t only exist between subjects, but also exists for each subject himself,

who when he speaks hears himself. Having got this far, one thinks that

one has already taken a step forward and gained insight into a whole lot of

things. In fact, though, the remarkable sterility of the analysis of the problem

of verbal hallucination is due to the inadequacy of this observation. That the

subject hears what he says is precisely the point at which it’s appropriate not

to stop but to return to the experience of what is going on when he hears

someone else.

 

文辞的幻觉的模糊暧昧是最无与伦比的。古典的精神分析已经给予我们这个指示:主体在他们的创造中,扮演的角色,至少就一部分的个案而言。这是所谓的心理动力的文辞的幻觉,这些被观察到的表达的粗胚轮廓曾经興奋地被记录下来,因为

 

What happens if you pay attention solely to the saying of what you hear,

to the accent, or even to the regional expressions, to whatever is literal, in

registering your interlocutor’s discourse? You have to bring a little imagination

to this, since it can perhaps never be carried out entirely, but it’s very

clear when a foreign language is involved – what you understand in a discourse

is different from what is registered acoustically. It’s even simpler if

we think of deaf-mutes, who are able to receive a discourse through visual

signs given by means of the fingers, according to the deaf-mute alphabet. If

a deaf-mute is fascinated by the pretty hands of his interlocutor, he will fail

to register the discourse the hands convey. I would add this – can it be said

that properly speaking he sees what he registers, namely the sequence of

signs, their opposition without which there is no sequence?

 

假如你仅是注意你所听见的所说内容,注意重音,甚至注意地区性的表达,注意任何实质上的东西,当你铭记你的对话者的辞说?你必须要带来一些想象到这里,因为它或许永远不会被完全被实践。但是显而易见的是,当一种外国语言被牵涉,你在一种辞说里所了解的东西,不同于声韵上的铭记。假如我们想到耳聋与哑,问题就更加单纯。他们能够接收一种辞说,通过由手指头给出的视觉的讯息符号。假如耳聋与哑巴对于对谈者的美丽的手感的著迷,他将无法铭记手传递的辞说。我将补充这点:我们能够这样说吗?适当来说,他看见他所铭记的东西,也就是,讯息符号的系列,它们的对立。假如没有这种对立,就没有系列。

 

On the signifier in the real and the bellowing-miracle 137

 

Even so, we can’t stop there. As it happens, a deaf-mute, even as he reg

isters the sequence put to him, may well understand nothing if addressed in

a language he doesn’t know. Like someone who hears a discourse in a foreign

language, he will have seen the said sentence perfectly well, but it will be a

dead sentence. The sentence becomes alive only when it conveys a meaning.

What does this mean? Even if we are quite convinced that the meaning

always relates to something, that it has value only to the extent that it refers

to another meaning, it’s clear that the life of a sentence is very deeply bound

up with the fact that the subject is listening in, that he intends this meaning

for himself. What makes the sentence as understood different from the sentence

as not understood, which doesn’t prevent it from being heard, is precisely

what the phenomenology of delusion highlights so well, namely the

anticipation of meaning.

 

即使是这样,我们不能个停在那里。恰巧地,一位耳聋兼哑巴,即使当他铭记传递给他的系列,他很有理由什么都不了解,假如对他表达的是他并不理解的语言。就像某个人听见外国语言的辞说,他将会很清楚地看见所被说出的句子,但是那是一个死去的句子。仅有当这个句子表达一种意义,这个句子才会鲜活起来。这是什么意思?即使我们完全相信,这个意义总是跟某件事情有关系,它具有的价值,仅是当它提到另外一个意义。显而易见地,一个句子的生命,跟主体在那里倾听的这个事实息息相关,跟他打算要拥有这个意义息息相关。让这个句子作为被了解的东西,不同于跟这个句子作为不被了解的东西。后者并没有阻止它不被听见。这确实是妄想如此清楚强调的现象学,也就是,对于意义的预期。

 

155

It’s of the nature of meaning, insofar as it takes shape, continually to tend

to close itself off for the listener. In other words the contribution of the listener

of the discourse to the listener who is uttering it is constant and there

is a link between listening and speaking which isn’t external, in the sense in

which one hears oneself speak, but which is located at the level of the language

phenomenon itself. It’s at the level at which the signifier conveys

meaning, and not at the sensory level of the phenomenon, that listening and

speaking are like front and back. To listen to words, to give them one’s.

hearing, is already more or less to obey them. To obey is nothing else, it’s to

be on the look-out, in listening.

 

它属于意义的特性,当这个意义成形时,它继续倾向于对倾听者封闭它自己。换句话说,辞说的倾听者对于表达它的倾听者的贡献是不停地。在倾听与并非是外在的言说之间,有一层关联,我们听见我们自己在言说。但是它被定位在语言现象本身的层层。就在这个层次,能指传递意义,而不是在这个现象的感官的层次。倾听与言说就像正面与反美。倾听文字,给予它们我们的听见,已经是多多少少在服从它们。服从并不是别的事情。那就是在倾听时,要专注。

 

Let me sum this up. The sense is always moving towards something, towards

another meaning, towards the closure of meaning. It always refers to something

that is out ahead or that turns back upon itself, but there is a direction.

Does this mean that we have no endpoint? I’m sure that this point still remains

uncertain in your mind given the insistence with which I state that meaning

always refers to meaning. You are wondering whether the aim of discourse,

which is not simply to cover over or even conceal the world of things, but to

find a foothold there from time to time, would not in the end be an irremediable

failure.

 

让我们将这个总结一下。这个意义总是朝向某件东西移动,朝向另外一个意义,朝向意义的封闭。它总是提到某件遥遥领先或回转到它自己的东西。但是有一个方向。这难道不是意味着,我们没有终点?我确定,在你们的心里,这个终点始终是不确定的,假如考虑到我陈述那个意义的这个坚持,总是提到意义。你们想要知道,辞说的目的,它是否不仅要掩盖或甚至要隐藏物象的世界,而且要有时在那里找到一个立足点?这个辞说的目的,追根究底,难道不是一个无法修补的失败?

 

Now, in no way can we consider that the fundamental endpoint is to point

to a thing. There is an absolute non-equivalence between discourse and

pointing. Whatever you take the ultimate element of discourse to be reduced

to, you will never be able to replace it with your index finger – recall the

quite correct remark by Saint Augustine. If I designate something by pointing

to it, no one will ever know whether my finger is designating the object’s

color or its matter, or whether it’s designating a stain or a crack, etc. You

need words, discourse, to discern this. Discourse has an original property in

comparison with pointing. But that’s not where we shall find the fundamental

reference of discourse. Are we looking for where it stops? Well then, it’s

always at the level of this problematical term called being.

 

现在,我们根本无法认为,这个基本的终点就是要指向一件东西。在辞说与所指之间,有一个绝对的相等。无论你们将辞说的最后的因素被减化到什么,你们将永远不能个用你们的食指替代它。请你们回忆一下圣奥古斯丁那个相当中肯的话语。假如我凭借指向某件东西,来指明它,没有人将会知道,是否我的手指指的是这个客体的颜色,或是它的物质,或是否它指明一个污点或一个裂缝,等等。你们需要文字,辞说,来辨明这个。辞说具有创始的属性,跟所指比较起来。但是这并不是我们将会发现辞说的基本指称所在。我们正在寻找它在哪里停止吗?呵呵,它总是在生命实存」这个棘手的术语的层次。

 

雄伯译

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