Abstinence (Rule of)
= D.: Abstinenz (Grundsatz der).–Es.: abstinencia (regla de).–Fr.: abstinence (règle d’).–
I.: astinenza (regola di).–P.: abstinência (regra de).
Rule according to which the analytic treatment should be so organised as to ensure
that the patient finds as few substitutive satisfactions for his symptoms as possible. The
implication for the analyst is that he should refuse on principle to satisfy the patient’s
demands and to fulfil the roles which the patient tends to impose upon him. In certain
cases, and at certain moments during the treatment, the rule of abstinence may be given
explicit expression in the form of advice about the patient’s repetitive behaviour which is hindering the work of recollection and the working out*.
节制
依照一些规则,精神分析的治疗应该被组织,为了保证病人尽可能找到一些替代的满足,替代他的病征。对于精神分析家的建议是,他在原则上应该拒绝满足病人的要求,去实践病人倾向于赋加在他身上的角色。在某些的个案,在治疗的某些时刻,节制的这条规则可能会被给予明确的表达,用劝告的方式,关于病人的重复性的行为—因为它们正在阻碍回忆与解决的工作。
The justification for the rule of abstinence is of an essentially economic* order. The
analyst must make sure that the quantities of libido released by the treatment are not
immediately redirected towards a fresh cathexis of external objects; they must so far as
possible be transferred into the analytic situation. The libidinal energy is thus monopolised
by the transference* and deprived of any occasion for discharge other than through verbal
expression.
节制的规则的理由基本上属于经济层次。精神分析家必须确定,治疗发出的力比多的数量并没有立即重新引导朝向外在对象的新鲜清涤。它们必须尽可能地被转移成为精神分析的情境。力比多的能源因此被移情所拢垄断,并且被剥夺任何发泄的机会,除了通过文辞的表达。
From the dynamic* point of view, the treatment relies basically on the existence of
suffering brought about by frustration – a suffering which tends to decrease as the symptoms
are replaced by more satisfying substitutive behaviour. The important thing, therefore, is to
maintain or to re-establish the frustration so as to assure the progress of the treatment.
Implicitly, the notion of abstinence is linked to the whole principle of the analytic
method, in that interpretation* is its fundamental aim–not the gratification of the patient’s
libidinal demands. It should come as no surprise that when Freud tackles the question of
abstinence directly, in 1915, it is apropos of a particularly pressing demand–the one
inevitably associated with transference-love: ‘I shall state it as a fundamental principle that
the patient’s need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, in order that they may
serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes, and that we must beware of
appeasing these forces by means of surrogates’ (1).
从动力学的观点,治疗基本上依靠挫折导致的痛苦的存在。这种痛苦倾向于减少,随着病征被更加令人满意的替代行为取代。因此,重要的事情是要维持或重新建立挫折,为了确定治疗的进展。暗示地,节制的观念跟精神分析的方法息息相关,因为解释是它的基本目标—而不是满足病人的力比多的要求。这应该不足为奇,当弗洛依德直接处理节制的问题,在1915年,关于一个特别迫切的要求—跟移情-爱无可避免相关的迫切的要求:「我将陈述它,作为一个基本的原则,病人的需要与渴望应该被允许持续存在在她身上,为了它们可以充当逼迫她从事工作及改变的力量。我们必须知道平息这些力量,凭借替换物。
It was with Ferenczi that the technical problems posed by the observance of the rule of
abstinence were to come to the forefront of psycho-analytic debate. In certain cases, Freud
maintained, measures should be taken which tend to drive away the surrogate satisfactions
which the patient finds both within the treatment and outside it. In his concluding address to
the Budapest Congress of 1918, Freud approved such measures on principle and offered a
theoretical justification for them: ‘Cruel though it may sound, we must see to it that the
patient’s suffering, to a degree that is in some way or other effective, does not come to an end
prematurely. If, owing to the symptoms having been taken apart, and having lost their value,
his suffering becomes mitigated, we must re-instate it elsewhere in the form of some
appreciable privation’ (2).
由于遵守节制的规则,由于费仁奇提出技术性的问题,将会面临精神分析如火如荼的辩论。在某些的个案,弗洛依德主张,应该採取倾向于驱散替换物满足的措施,病人在治疗内部与外面找到的替换物满足。在他作为结论的演说,对1918年的布达佩斯的年会,弗洛依德原则上同意这样的措施,并且提供它们的理论上的理由:「虽然听起来很残酷,我们必须负责,病人的痛苦,在某些方面,有某个程度的效果。它并没有早熟地结束。由于病征已经被拆解,并且已经丧失它们的价值,他的痛苦变得缓和,我们必须在别的地方重新安置它,以某种相当轻微的形式。
The notion of abstinence is still the subject of debate. In our opinion, it is worth while
drawing a clear distinction here between abstinence as a rule to be followed by the analyst–a
simple consequence of his neutrality*–and those active measures* which he takes in order to
get the patient to abstain from certain things of his own accord. Such measures range from
interpretations whose persistent repetition makes them tantamount to injunctions, to
categorical prohibitions. The latter, when they are not designed to forbid the patient all sexual
relations, are usually directed against specific forms of sexual activity (perversions) or
specific manoeuvres of a repetitive character which seem to be paralysing the work of
analysis. The majority of analysts have serious reservations about recourse to active measures
of this type–notably on the grounds that in this way the analyst may with justice be accused
of expressing repressive authority.
节制的观念依旧是辩论的主题。依我们之见,在此值得给予清楚的划分,精神分析家通常应该遵照的节制,跟那些主动的措施之间的划分。前者是他保持中立的单纯结果;后者是他採取的主动措施,为了让病人抑制避开他自动自发的某些东西。这些措施范围从解释到各种的禁止,解释的持续的重复让它们相等于是命令。各种的禁止并不是被设计来禁止病人的各种性的关系。它们通常被引导,阻止明确形式的性的活动(变态的性活动),或是具有重复性质地明确的策略,它们似乎逐渐瘫痪精神分析的工作。大多数的精神分析家带有严肃的保留,关于诉诸于这种的主动的措施—最主要的理由是,以这种方式,精神分析家可能会理由充分地被控诉,因为他表达压抑的权威。
(1) Freud, S., G.W., X, 313; S.E., XII, 165.
(2) 2 Freud, S. ‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a [1918]), G.W., XII,
188; S.E., XVII, 163.