Archive for the ‘kohut’ Category

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 09

June 12, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 09
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

And now a few words about the re-interpretation of the Oedipus myth that I promised you before. It is a remarkable fact that nobody, as far as I know, has pointed out, at least not in an effective way, a feature of the Oedipus myth which refers to the intergenerational relationship in aspect of the story which is truly remarkable, especially by comparison with the parallel aspect of the intergenerational story about Odysseus and Telemachus as told us by Homer. It is as if analysts had reversed their usual stance as regards King Oedipus by taking the manifest content father murder, incest as the essence, while disregarding clues, in particular genetic clues, that may allow us to see the relationship between parents and son in a different light.

現在就先前我跟你們承諾的重心詮釋伊底普斯神話,我現在說幾句話。這是一件引人注意的事實,據我所知,沒有人曾經指出伊底普斯神話的特徵,至少不是以一種有效的方式。這個特徵提到兩代之間的關係,從故事的層面,是非常引人注意的,特別是跟荷馬告訴我們的奧德賽及鐵力馬丘斯的兩代之間的對比層面,比較起來。好像精神分析學家已經倒轉它們平常的立場,關於伊底普斯國王,將明顯的內容,如弑父,亂倫,作為本質,而忽視線索,特別是基因的線索。它們可能讓我們能夠從不同的觀點,看待父母與兒子的關係。

Is it not the most significant dynamic-genetic feature of the Oedipus story that Oedipus was a rejected child? Never mind the all-explanatory oracle that served as a convenient vehicle for rationalizing a human failure as obedience to the gods. The fact is that Oedipus was not wanted by his parents and that he was put out into the cold by them. He was abandoned in the wilderness to die. While his appealing-assertive baby self found substitute parents’ own deep the sense of his original rejection must have remained. Does our attention to this part of the story not allow us to see King Oedipus’ ‘Oedipus complex’ in a different light?

伊底普斯原本是一個被拋棄的小孩,這難道不是最重要的動力與基因的特徵?我們不要在意詮釋一切的預言,充當一種方便的工具,作為人類未能服從神祗的合理化。事實上,伊底普斯原先被父母拋棄,他被他們丟棄於寒冷的荒郊,他被拋棄于荒野,任其死亡。雖然他的訴求與主張的嬰兒的自我找到替代父母的自己的自我,他原先被拋棄感覺始終刻骨銘心。我們若是注意故事的這個部分,難道不會讓我們能夠從不同觀點,看待「伊底普斯情結」?

And does it not, by stark contrast, illuminate even further, how Odysseus’ normal intergenerational response, the semi-circle of his plough, led to a relationship between father and son ,remind you of their shoulder-to-shoulder fight against outside disturbers, thus re-establishing the interrupted intra-familial bond which, I submit is the true and nuclear essence of humanness. This nuclear essence of man is not a surface phenomenon, not part of a precariously maintained civilized crust of the personality or of a reaction formation. It constitutes the essential nucleus of the self and the access to it in our patients is often attained only with the greatest difficulty. But now I will stop.

憑藉明顯的對比,奧德賽的正常的兩代之間的回應,他的犁的半圓,如何導致父親與兒子之間的關係,難道不是啟明得更為深刻?難道沒有讓你想到他們並肩作戰,對抗外來的侵犯者,因此重新建立受到干擾的家庭內部的默契?我認為這個家庭內部的默契,就是人性的真實與核心本質。人的核心本質並不是外表的現象,不是人格的搖搖欲墜的文明的外殼部分,或是反動的形成的部分。它組成自我的基本核心,從我們父母身上接近它,往往是費盡困難,才能獲得。但是現在,我點到為止。

My main message today is the same that I gave twenty-five years ago when I was jarred into action because I saw that the operational mismatch that led to the psychobiological framework of analytic theory, had brought about severe distortions of our perception of man’s psychological essence without yet achieving a true integration of analysis with biology and medicine.

今天,我的主要訊息是跟我二十五年前提出的相同,當時我被刺激採取行動,因為我看出,運作的不協調,導致精神分析理論的心理與生物架構,曾經促成我們對於人的心理本質的感覺有嚴重的扭曲,可是也沒有獲得精神分析學與生物學及醫學真正的融合。

It was, in particular, Freud’s positing of the primacy of the drives that had provided the basis for a specific, incomplete concept of psychological man,guilty Man, told to be civilized, and unwilling to comply. On the other hand, I felt that the two universes accessible to science are defined operationally via the basic stance of the observer. The sciences which explore the fields that are accessible via extrospection: the physical and biological sciences. And the sciences which explore the fields that are accessible via introspection: psychoanalysis par excellence.

特別是,佛洛伊德提出欲望驅力的優先地位,供應基礎,作為心理人,明確而不完整的觀念。人作為罪惡人,被告訴要文明化,但是又不願意順從。在另一方面,我覺得,科學得以接近的這兩個宇宙,一是經由觀察者的基本立場,來運作性定義。探索經由外視而獲得接近的領域的科學:也就是物理與生物科學。另外一種是探索經由內視而獲得接近的領域;最為重要的就是精神分析學。

The first part of my paper repeated what I said twenty-five years ago. And I hope that I have now stated my message regarding the basic experience-distant theory of psychoanalysis clearly and intelligibly.

我的論文的第一部分,重複我二十五年前所說的。我希望,我現在清楚而明白地陳述我的訊息,關於精神分析學基本的遠距經驗理論。

In the second part I re-interpreted the position and significance of an experience-near theory, the theory of the Oedipus complex, in the light of the shift that I advocate from psycho-biology to psychology, from homo natura to homo psychologicus. And I advanced the claim that the force that impels us to carry out the semi-circle of Odysseus’ plough lies at the most central core of our self, while the forces that motivate us towards the deeds of King Oedipus constitute a more superficial layer of the self that covers the core.

在第二個部分,我重新詮釋一個鄰近經驗的立場與重要性。伊底普斯情結的理論,根據我主張的轉化的觀點,從心理與生物學到心理學,從人類天性到人類心理因素。我提出這個主張:驅使我們執行奧德賽的犁的半圓的力量,在於我們自我最中央的核心。而激發我們朝向伊底普斯國王的力量,則是組成一個更加浮淺的覆蓋核心的自我的表層。

Is this conclusion motivated by the falsifying need for an optimistic outlook on man? It is not. Science must be neither optimistic nor pessimistic that observes and explains. As a depth psychologist I observe regularly that behind the oedipal disturbance lie flawed selfobject responses. And that behind them the primary hope for a normal, self-growth-promoting milieu is still alive. Should, in the future, data become available that demonstrate still deeper layers, we will verify the evidence and change our theory.

這個結論是受到虛假的需要樂觀的對於人的觀點所啟發嗎?作為觀察與詮釋的科學,既不是樂觀,也不是悲觀。做為一位深度心理學家,我規律地觀察,位於伊底普斯的困擾背後,是具有瑕疵的自體客體的回應。在它們背後,原初希望作為正常的提升自我成長的環境,依舊鮮活。有朝一日,假如證明更深層的資訊能夠被獲得,我們將會驗證這個證據,然後改變我們的理論。

What I cannot see changing, however, is the psychological outlook. If such a change were to come about, it would indeed mean that analysis, that depth-psychology has been superseded and a thing of the past. But this possibility need not concern us now. Analysis is in its childhood. Hampered by such misleading medical analogies as the removal of disease instead of the reestablishment of psychological health by the interpretive, empathic responsiveness to its claims, psychoanalysis has hardly yet scratched the surface of the fascinating mystery of man.

可是,我看不出會改變的是心理學的外觀。萬一這樣一種改變發生,那將確實意味著,精神分析學已經被取代,成為昨日黃花。但是這個可能性,我們現在不需要杞人憂天。精神分析學還在發展初期。儘管受到如此誤導的醫學類比所妨礙,去充當疾病的消除,而不是充當心理鍵康的重新建立,以詮釋的同理心,去回應它的主張,人類的迷人的神秘的表面,還是沒有受到太大的刮傷。

And how can analysis return to its nuclear self, move on to fulfil its destiny by realizing its essential programme of action? It can do so only if it can make the decisive developmental step of the full transmuting internalization of the great parental selfobject of its past. If it succeeds in this task, it will be able to do what it must in order to stay alive, to reach its peak before it declines: it must turn from the study of Freud to the study of man.

精神分析學如何回答它的核心自我,以實現它的基本的行動計畫,來實踐它的命運?只有當它跨出這個決定性的發展的一步,將過去的父母的自體客體的內化充分地轉化,它才有可能做到這樣。假如它成功完成這件工作,它將能夠做它所必需做的事,為了保持鮮活,為了在它衰微之前,到達它的顛峰,它必須從佛洛伊德的研究,轉向對於人的研究。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 08

June 12, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

What instruments does a critic have at his disposal to counteract Freud’s magic? Two, I believe: one weaker and one stronger. The weaker one is the attempt to undermine the power of the myth that has supported Freud’s concept by analysing it in order to demonstrate not only that it does not support the original theory but that in fact, it supports the new one that is now advanced to supplant the old. This is the rational approach. The stronger one must drive out the Devil with Beelzebub, as the saying goes,to present a dose of counter-magic in order to neutralize and overcome that which supports established rule. I will for the moment postpone the first task, the re-interpretation of the myth, and will turn directly to the second one, which, I will add, has provided me with the undoubtedly puzzling final part of the title of my paper. I will, in other words, now turn to the ‘semi-circle of mental health’.

一位批評者擁有什麼工具可供使用,來對抗佛洛伊德的魔力?我相信有兩個; 一個較弱,一個較強。較弱的工具企圖以分析支持佛洛伊德的觀念的神話的力量,來逐漸損壞它,為了不但要證明,這個力量並沒有支持原先的理論,而是事實上,它支持現在正在被提出的新的理論,用來代替舊的。這是理性的方法。較強的工具必須以惡魔驅除惡魔,如同諺語所說,為了呈現一劑對抗魔力,才能中立並克服支援既有規則的魔力。目前我將暫時拖延第一件工作,神話的重新解釋,然後直接轉向第二個工作。容我補充一下,第二個工作曾經供應我無可置疑的我的論文標題的最後一項。換句話說,我現在將轉向「精神健康的半圓」。

My counter-magic is derived from a story told by Homer. It is not a tragic story in the sense of tragos, the sacrificial he-goat of the Dionysian cult, from which tragedy, as represented by Sophocles, evolved and got its name, but tragic in a human sense, as represented by Euripides striving, resourceful man, attempting to unfold his innermost self, battling against external and internal obstacles to its unfolding; and warmly committed to the next generation, to the son in whose unfolding and growth he joyfully participates thus experiencing man’s deepest and most central joy, that of being a link in the chain of generations.

我的對抗魔力是從荷馬所說的故事得來。這並是不一個悲劇的故事,從「悲劇」的意義而言。戴奧尼修斯教派的犧性的公羊。從那裏,由索弗克利斯代表的悲劇發展然後獲得名聲,但是從人類意義來看悲劇,由尤利皮底斯奮鬥而機智的人所代表。他企圖解開他的最內在的自我,對抗外在己內部的阻礙它的展開,然後熱烈地奉獻於下一代,奉獻于兒子。在兒子的展開及成長中,他快樂地參與,因此經驗人的最深處及最中央的快樂,在世代相傳的鎖鏈的一環的快樂。

Have you guessed by now who the embodiment of my counter magic may be? And have you hit on the solution of the riddle that I posed for you when, in the title that I gave to this paper, I spoke of the ‘semi-circle of mental health’? If not, I will no longer keep you in suspense and will tell you the story that will relieve you of uncertainty.

你們現在已經猜想到,我的對抗魔力的具體代表可能是誰?你們已經想到我跟你提出的這個謎團的解答嗎?在這篇論文我給予的標題,我談論到「精神健康的半圓」?假如沒有猜想到,我不再讓你們留在謎團當中,我將告訴你們這個故事,解除你們的猜疑。

It is, I like to think, the first story concerned with an individual who, although still surrounded by demi-god heroes, is a modern man. And we can thus, I think, identify with him more easily than with the ritually destroyed victim of Sophocles’ tragedy, and can understand him and his human trials and tribulations more easily and reliably than we can King Oedipus, who is propelled toward his doom. It is the story of the first would-be draft evader in literature, the story of Odysseus.

我想要認為,這是第一個故事關係到是現代人的個人,雖然它依舊被半神的英雄所包圍。因此,我認為,我們更加容易能夠辨認他,比辨認索弗克利斯的悲劇,在儀式中被毀滅的受害者,並且能夠更加容易於可信地瞭解他和他的人性考驗及磨難,比我們瞭解伊底普斯國王,他被逼迫走向他的宿命。這是文學中第一位自願應徵的逃避者的故事,奧德賽的故事。

When, as told by Homer, the Greeks began to organize themselves for their Trojan expedition, they drafted all the chieftains to join them with their men, ships and supplies. But Odysseus, ruler of Ithaca, in the prime of young adulthood, with a young wife and a baby son, was anything but enthusiastic about going to war. When the delegates of the Greek states arrived to assess the situation and to compel Odysseus’ compliance, he malingered, faking insanity.

依照荷馬所描述的,希臘人開始組織自己為了特洛伊的遠征。他們徵召所有的族長帶著部下,船隻及補給。但是奧德賽,這位伊沙卡的族長,正在青春盛年,有一位年輕的妻子及小男孩,對於參加戰爭,並不是很熱衷。當希臘城邦的代表到達,評估這個情況,並且逼迫奧德賽同意,他就假裝瘋狂,逃避責任。

The emissaries Agamemnon, Menelaus, and Palamedes found him ploughing with an ox and an ass yoked together, and flinging salt over his shoulders into the furrows; on his head was a silly, conically shaped hat, as usually worn by Orientals. He pretended not to know his visitors and gave every sign that he had taken leave of his senses. But Palamedes suspected him of trickery. He seized Telemachus, Odysseus’ infant son, and flung him in front of Odysseus’ advancing plough. Odysseus immediately made a semi-circle with his plough to avoid injuring his son. The movement demonstrated his mental health and made him confess that he had only feigned madness in order to escape going to Troy.

阿加曼諾,門尼勞斯,及帕拉米底斯等特使,發現他帶著公牛跟驢子套軛在一塊犁田,往後撒鹽,進入犁溝,頭上戴著一頂難看的圓錐形的帽子,如同東方人通常所戴的。他假裝不認識他的訪客,裝模作樣,他已經喪失理智。但是帕拉米底斯覺察出他的詭計。他捉住鐵力馬丘斯,奧德賽的小嬰孩,將他投擲在奧德賽前進的犁前。奧德賽立刻將他的犁轉半圈,以避免傷害他的兒子。這個舉動證明他的精神健康,使他不得不承認,他僅是偽裝瘋狂,為了要逃避前去特洛伊。

Here then is the solution to the puzzle. It is the semi-circle of Odysseus which, as the semi-circle of mental health, I am holding up against the father murder of Oedipus non-scientific, perhaps, and emotional in its appeal (and appealing in its simple humanness); but then, so is the appeal of King Oedipus and his complex.

在此就是這個謎團的答案。我正在舉措奧德賽的半圓,作為精神健康的半圓,以對抗伊底普世的弑父。這可能不合乎科學,卻是訴諸於它的情感(單純人性的訴求)。但是伊底普斯及其情結的訴求,也是如此。

The semi-circle of Odysseus’ plough proves nothing, of course, but it is a fitting symbol of that joyful awareness of the human self of being temporal, of having an unrolling destiny: a preparatory beginning, a flourishing middle, and a retrospective end; a fitting symbol of the fact that healthy man experiences, and with deepest joy, the next generation as an extension of his own self.

當然,奧德賽的犁的半圓並沒有證明什麼,但是它是一個適當的象徵,愉悅地知道人性的自我是短暫,擁有展開的命運:它是一種準備的開始,一種興盛的中間,及一個回顧的結尾。這是一個事實的適當象徵:健康的人,深深歡喜地經驗到下一代,作為他自己自我的延伸。

It is the primacy of the support for the succeeding generation, therefore, which is normal and human, and not intergenerational strife and mutual wishes to kill and to destroy however frequently and perhaps even ubiquitously, we may be able to find traces of those pathological disintegration products of which traditional analysis has made us think as a normal developmental phase, a normal experience of the child.

因此,對於接續的一代的支持,具有優先地位,這是正常而合乎人性,而不是兩代之間的衝突與互相願望殺害及毀滅,雖然我們不時在許多地方,發現那些病態的解離的產物。傳統的精神分析使我們想到,那是小孩作為一個正常的發展的部分,一個正常的經驗。

It is only when the self of the parent is not a normal, healthy self, cohesive, vigorous, and harmonious, that it will react with competitiveness and seductiveness rather than with pride and affection when the child, at the age of 5, is making an exhilarating move toward a heretofore not achieved degree of assertiveness, generosity, and affection. And it is in response to such a flawed parental self which cannot resonate with the child’s experience in empathic identification that the newly constituted assertive-affectionate self of the child disintegrates and that the break-up products of hostility and lust of the Oedipus complex make their appearance.

只有當父母的自我不是一個正常,健康的自我,具有凝聚性,活力性及和諧,它才會以競爭及誘拐作為反應,而不是以驕傲及情感。當小孩在五歲時,他舉止令人高興,直到當時,他尚未獲得任何主張,慷慨及情感。就在回應父母具有瑕疵的自我,這種自我無法跟小孩的經驗共鳴,在同理心認同。小孩剛剛形成都主張與情感的自我會解離,伊底普斯情結的敵意與欲望的解離產物,就會出現。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 07

June 11, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 07
海因茲、科胡特

SUMMARY
綱要

And how does the self-psychological evaluation of the centrality of the intergenerational conflict, in particular in the specific form of the Oedipus complex, compare with that of traditional analysis? In a nutshell: (1) it agrees with the estimate of the near-ubiquity of its occurrence, it agrees that, at least in traces, its presence can very frequently be ascertained. And it also agrees, though its agreement is based on the significant modification that it is only a link, and not the deepest one at that, in a causal chain, that the Oedipus complex is a constituent in a set of causal factors and that it contributes to the vis a tergo that results in deleterious action and/or neurotic suffering.

這個以兩代之間的衝突作為中心的自體心理的評估,特別是以伊底普斯情結的明確形式,如何跟傳統的精神分析學的評估相比較呢?簡言之,它跟它發生事件的近乎無所不在的評估相一致。它同意,至少在追蹤方面,它的存在時常受到確定。它也同意,雖然它的同意是以重要的修正為基礎,它僅是一種連接,而且並不是最深層的連接,在因果的鎖鏈。伊底普世情結是一套因果因素裏的一種成分,它促成這種「推動力」,造成神奇的行動及(或)神經症的痛苦。

(2) Self-psychology, however, disagrees completely with traditional psychoanalysis concerning the significance of human intergenerational strife. Specifically, traditional analysis believes that man’s essential nature is comprehensively defined when he is seen as ‘Guilty Man’, as man in hopeless conflict between the drives that spring from the biological bedrock of homo natura and the civilizing influences emanating from the social environment as embodied in the superego. Self-psychology believes that man’s essence is defined when seen as a self and that homo psychologicus (if you excuse this term that is meant to contrast with homo natura) is, on the deepest level, ‘Tragic Man’, attempting, and never quite succeeding, to realize the programme laid down in his depth during the span of his life.

可是,自體心理學跟傳統的精神分析學完全格格不入,關於人類的兩代之間的衝突的重要性。明確地說,傳統的精神分析相信,人的基本特性是全面性地定義,當他被視為是「罪惡人」。因為起源於人類天性的生物的根基的欲望驅力,與發自社會環境的文明化的影響,作為嵌入超我裏面,兩者之間的無助衝突的就是人。自體心理學相信,人的本質被定義,是被視為一種自我。那種「人類心理」(恕我採用這個術語,用來跟「人類天性」作對比)。在更深層意義看,是「悲劇人」。他企圖實現這個計畫,但是並不完成成功。在他一生的期間,心靈深處被安置的計畫。

What stands in the way of the acceptance of our outlook, why can we not convince more of those who have espoused the traditional psychoanalytic outlook that intergenerational strife, mutual killing wishes, pathological ‘Oedipus complex’ (as distinguished from the normal ‘oedipal stage’ of development) refers not to the essence of man but, that they are deviations from the normal, however frequently they may occur?

是什麼妨礙我們的觀點被人接納?為什麼我們不能夠說服更多那些曾經擁護傳統精神分析學觀點的人?兩代之間的衝突,互相殺戮的願望,病態的「伊底普斯情結」,(跟正常的發展的「伊底普斯階段」有所區別),不是提到人的本質,而是它們偏離正常,無論它們多麼時常發生。

Why can’t we convince our colleagues that the normal state, however rare in pure form, is a joyfully experienced developmental forward move in childhood, including the step into the oedipal stage, to which the parental generation responds with pride, with self-expanding empathy, with joyful mirroring, to the next generation, thus affirming the younger generation’s right to unfold and to be different? We believe, in other words, that in the last analysis we are not dealing with an uninfluentiable conflict of basic opposing instincts (Thanatos battling Eros) but with, at least potentially remediable, interferences that impinge on normal development.

為什麼我們不能說服我們的同事,無論純粹形態的正常狀態多麼稀少,它是童年期間一種讓人快樂經驗到底發展的向前動作,包括進入伊底普斯階段的步驟。父母這一代驕傲地回應這個階段,帶著自我擴張的同理心,帶著歡愉的反映,對於下一代,因此肯定年輕的一代的直接開展及不同表現。換句話說,我們相信,終歸到底,我們正在處理的,並不是基本對立本能的一個不受影響的衝突(自我毀滅戰鬥性愛),而是侵犯正常發展的干擾,這些干擾至少在潛力上,是可以彌補的。

I will not, as some of you might now expect, talk about ‘resistances’ to our view. Instead, I would like to turn to a feature of Freud’s skills as a promulgator of his ideas, a feature which was deeply rooted in his personality yet which has not been given the attention it deserves. It is his great ability to mythologize the key concepts of his scientific system and thus to plant them firmly, via name and ingrained cultural association, into the minds of the ever-broadening circle of his followers.

我將不會談論我們對於「阻抗」的觀點,如同現在你們有些人可能會期盼的。代替的,我想要轉向佛洛伊德技巧的一個特徵,作為他的觀念的傳播者。這個特徵深深根源於他的人格,可是這個特徵還沒有被給予它應得到注意。那就是,佛洛伊德擁有一種能力,將他的科學的系統的關鍵觀念,使用神話詮釋,然後經由名字及根深蒂固的文化的聯想,將它們牢固在那裏,深入他圈子越來越寬廣的追隨者的心靈裏。

Although the means by which Freud achieved his historical stature in the history of thought are worthy of psychological investigation, I will not dwell here on the possible genetic roots and dynamic functions of this aspect of Freud’s genius but will fasten only on a specific feature of its scientific results: namely, that the critic who wishes to question certain basic views proposed by Freud confronts a task that is vastly more extensive than that aspect of it that requires logical argument and the presentation of supportive clinical evidence. After all is said and done, and however carefully and convincingly the argument may have been presented after a while Freud’s formulation asserts again its old hold on our minds via a deeply-rooted attraction, and the logic and evidence recede.

雖然在思想史上,佛洛伊德藉以獲得他歷史的地位的工具,是值得心理的研究。我在此不會詳述佛洛伊德天才這一面的可能基因的根源,及動力的功用。但是我僅是緊盯住它的科學的結果的一個明確的特徵:也就是說,批評者若是想要質疑佛洛伊德建議的某些基本的觀點,他會面臨一件更加廣泛的工作,比起處理它要求邏輯論點及支援的臨床證據的那一面。衡量一切之後,這個論點無論多麼細心及具有說服力地呈現,,隔了一段時間,佛洛伊德的說明再一次地主張它對於我們的心靈舊有的影響,經由一種根深蒂固的吸引力,這時邏輯與證據就無足輕重了。

You realize, of course, that I am raising this issue not in abstracto, but in order to illuminate our difficulty when we attempt to reassess the explanatory power of Freud’s concept of ‘Guilty Man’, his view that man’s essential nature is defined with reference to intergenerational strife, above all and in particular, when we attempt to reassess the paradigmatic intergenerational conflict between father and son in short: the ‘Oedipus complex’.

當然,你們體會到,我正在提出這個問題,不是從理論上,而是為了闡明我們的困難,當我們企圖重新評估佛洛伊德對於「罪惡人」的觀念的解釋的力量。他的觀點:人的基本天性是根據兩代之間的衝突來定義,尤其重要的,特別是當我們企圖重新評估作為典範的父子兩代之間的衝突,總之,就是「伊底普斯情結」。

How flat do our arguments sound when we assert a textbook normality in analogy to ‘normal’ anatomy, ‘normal’ physiology, ‘normal’ metabolism (a normality so beautifully defined by Daly King (1945) as ‘that which functions in accordance with its design’) by comparison with Freud’s pithy and powerfully evocative terminology. How insipid is the normality of an oedipal stage, joyfully experienced by parent and child, against the dramatic silent background of the Oedipus complex: King Oedipus, the mythologized exalted figure who in Sophocles’ tragedy is presented to us as an automaton who inexorably makes step after step to a pre-ordained doom and whose humanness and freedom are confined to the ability to react to his unspeakable pain via word and communicative action.

我們的論點聽起來多麼平淡無力,當我們主張一本教科書的正常性,類比于「正常」的解剖,「正常」的生理學,「正常」的新陳代謝(這種正常,被達利、金恩如此漂亮地定義,作為「功用與設計相吻合的正常」),跟佛洛伊德簡潔有力,撼人心弦的術語相比較起來。一種伊底普斯階段的正常性,是多麼的平淡無趣,雖然它被父母與小孩快樂地經驗到,戲劇性的沉默背景是伊底普斯情結。伊底普斯國王,這位被神話推崇的人物,在索弗克利斯的悲劇裏,被呈現給于我們,作為一種機械反應的人。他一步一步地走入預先安排好的命運。他的人性與自由受限於這個能力:他只能藉由文字及溝通的行動,來對他無以言喻的痛苦起反應。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 06

June 11, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 06
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

All the foregoing conclusions were stated (or, at least, clearly implied) in my 1959 essay. And I also showed then what the specific deleterious consequences are that forced me to underline the fact that ‘the drive’ does not belong in a system of psychology. Specifically, I showed the distortions of our psychological perceptions in the area of ‘independence’, ‘dependence’, ‘free will’, and in the area of the set of phenomena we have now come to call selfobject transferences.

所有前述的結論在我1959年的論文被陳述(或,至少清楚地被暗示)。我當時也顯示,是怎樣的明確的神奇的結果,迫使我去強調這個事實:「欲望驅力」並不適用於一個心理學的系統。明確地說,我揭露我們心理感覺受到的扭曲,在「獨立」,「依賴」,「自由意志」的領域,及我們現在漸漸稱為自體客體移情的這組現象的領域。

And what have I said since then in support of my viewpoint, and what remains to be said today? A good deal, indeed, not only as concerns yesterday and today but, above all, as concerns the tomorrow in which the work begun by my colleagues and me must be continued by a younger generation of self-psychologically informed psychoanalysts.

自從那時,我所說的話,為了支持我的觀點,以及今天有待要說的是什麼?確實是很多,不但作為對昨天及今天的關心,而且,尤其是,作為對明天的關心。在明天,我的同事跟我開始的這項工作,必須有年輕一代具有自體心理學知識道精神分析師繼續下去。

Again, I am forced to assume that many of you are familiar with my work even though I know full well that while many may have quickly sampled my writings, there are only a few who have immersed themselves into them by devoting sufficient time and energy to the task to be able to say that they have actually read them. But since I can obviously not repeat here what I have now said in hundreds of pages during the last ten years or more, I will restrict myself to identifying more or less briefly certain important areas on which I cannot focus extensively today.

而且,我被迫要假定:你們許多人對於我的工作已經耳熟能詳,即使我心知肚明,雖然對於我的著作快速流覽的人很多,只有少數人全神貫注地研讀它們,傾注充分的時間跟精力于這項工作,為了能夠說出,他們確實曾經閱讀它們。但是因為我很明顯並沒有在此重複過去十多年來,我以好幾百頁的文字所說的話,我將限制我自己於相當簡短地辨認某些重要的地區,那是地區是我今天無法廣泛地個個關注。

As the first of these I will mention the interrelatedness of drive-psychology, on the one hand, and the hidden morality courageously-facing-the-truth morality and independence morality on the other hand, that characterizes traditional analysis. And, secondly, I will remind you of my previous efforts to raise into my colleagues’ awareness the view of man, of the essential nature of man, of normal man, as it were, that traditional analysis has espoused: namely, man as an insufficiently and incompletely tamed animal, reluctant to give up his wish to live by the pleasure principle, unable to relinquish his innate destructiveness.

首先,我將提到,一方面是欲望驅力心理學,另一方面是隱藏的道德,勇敢面對真理的道德,獨立的道德,它們之間的互動關係,表現傳統精神分析學的特色。最近,我將提醒你們,有關我先前的努力,為了要提升人的觀點,讓我的同事知道,人的基本特性,也就是正常人的基本特性。這是傳統精神分析學所信奉的。換句話說,人作為一種並不充分,也不完全被馴服的動物,他只是勉強放棄他自己的願望,為了要憑藉快樂原則來生活,因此他無法放棄他天生的毀滅性。

Since the second of these two basic characteristics of psychoanalysis will form the starting point of the second major topic of today’s presentation, I will, in preparation for the step into new territory that I promised you for today, elaborate my thoughts concerning the view of man that traditional analysis had adopted from the Zeitgeist in which it arose in view of man to which most analysts subscribe as a matter of course. I will first remind you that we are referring to the concept of man’s psychological nature espoused by traditional analysis as the concept of ‘Guilty Man’, while we designate the corresponding view of self-psychology by the term ‘Tragic Man’. I will not discuss these two views of the nature of man again but will only add a comment that, so far as I know, I have not made before.

精神分析學的這兩個基本特性的第二個,將會形成今天演講的第二個主要議題的出發點。當我正在準備走入我今天跟你許渃的新的疆域,我將精心構想我關於人的觀點的思想。那是傳統的精神分析學曾經從「時代精神」採用過來。在時代精神裏,這個觀點是因為人而引起,這是大部分的精神分析師同意,作為天經地義的事情。我將會提醒你們,我們正在提到人的心理特性的觀念。這是傳統精神分析學信奉,作為「罪惡人」的觀念。而我們則是以「悲劇人」的術語指明自體心理學的對應觀點。我將不會重複討論人的天性的這兩個觀點,而僅是增加一個評論。據我所知,在以前我並沒有做過這樣的評論。

Even though Freud professed the belief that the subject matter of psychoanalysis was homo natura and that the investigation of his inner life should, therefore, be regarded as falling within the domain of the natural sciences, integrated, in particular, as closely as possible, with biology and medicine, the espousal of the quasi-biological concept of drives processed by a neutral apparatus has in fact not led to a biological concept of man. What emerged was not homo natura, a biological unit interacting with its surroundings, but ‘Guilty Man’, a psychological and moral view of man, a conception of man seen as reluctant to give up his old pleasure aims, however non-adaptive, and thus ‘resisting’ therapeutic analysis; a conception of man seen as unwilling to allow his aggressive-destructive aims to be tamed, and thus engaging in wars and/or prone to self-destruction (Freud, 1933).

即使佛洛伊德都自稱這個信仰:精神分析學的主體事情是「人類天性」。而對於人內在生活的研究,因此應該被認為是掉入自然科學的領域,特別要盡可能跟生物學及醫學合併。這種對於欲望驅力受到中立器官處理的類似生物學的觀念的信奉,,事實上,並沒有導致生物學的人的觀念。所出現的,並不是「人的天性」,一種生物學的單位,跟它的四周環境互動,而是「罪惡的人」,一種心理及道德的人的觀點。人的觀念被看作是不願意放棄他的舊有快樂目標,無論它是多麼的不適應,因此「阻抗」治療的精神分析,這是一種人的觀念,被視為不願意容許他的攻擊性及毀滅性的目標被馴服,因此從事于戰鬥,並且(或者)傾向於自我毀滅。(佛洛伊德1933年)

Within certain strict limits the explanatory framework of ‘Guilty Man’ has been very useful. But, unless it is supplemented by, and subordinated to, the self-psychological viewpoint which can put the self experience into the centre of a psychological view of man, the traditional outlook will be misleading. Self-psychology has freed itself from the distorted view of psychological man espoused by traditional analysis because, having accepted the fact that the field-defining observational stance of introspection and empathy is absolute and indeed axiomatic, it does not pose as biology or psycho-biology but accepts itself as psychology through and through.

在某種嚴格的限制內,「罪惡人」的解釋的架構是非常有用的。但是,除非它被補充,或隸屬於自體心理學的觀點,這個觀點將自體經驗納入人的心理觀點的中心,傳統的觀點將會是一種誤導。自體心理學曾經把它自己,從傳統精神分析學信奉的受到扭曲的心理的人解放出來。因為它一旦接受這個事實:內視及同理心的定義領域的觀察的立場,是絕對而且確實是自明的。它並沒有提出它自己,當作是生物學或是心理生物學,而是接受它自己,充當徹徹底底的心理學。

Traditional analysis, on the other hand, had to carry the burden imposed on it by its need to make a bow to biology via the quasi-biological conception of primary drives which are seen as being processed by a mental apparatus. The end result is, as I said before, not homo natura but a distorted psychological view which will be misleading because it considers a frequently encountered set of pathological phenomena as constituting ‘normality’ and leads thus to a serious misunderstanding of man in the therapeutic setting and of man in the arena of history.

在另一方面,傳統的精神分析學,必須帶著由它的需要賦加在它身上的負擔,為了要臣服於生物學,經有原初欲望驅力的類似生物學的觀念。這些原初欲望驅力被視為是由精神的器官所處理。如我先前所說,最終的結果並不是「人類天性」,而是一種將會是誤導的受到扭曲的心理的觀點。因為它認為一組時常被遭遇到的病理的現象,當著是組成「正常性」,因此而導致一種嚴重的誤解人,在治療的背景及人在歷史的鬥技場。

The new step that I will now take, a task of reformulation that I have up to now only alluded to, is the re-evaluation of man’s intergenerational relationships and, par excellence, the re-evaluation of the depth-psychological matrix in which, in the view of traditional analysis, certain crucial normal developments of childhood are embedded. It is, of course, the Oedipus complex that I will be talking about.

我現在將採取得新的一步,一件重新說明的工作,直到現在我僅是提到。這一步就是重新評估人的兩代之間的關係。尤其重要的是,重新評估深度心理學的基模。在這個基模裏,從傳統的精神分析學的觀點,某些重要的正常的童年的發展被深嵌腦中。當然,我將談論到的是伊底普斯情結。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 05

June 11, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

I will not attempt here to support my stance by adducing a series of facts about developments in other sciences that are analogous to those which, in the form of self-psychology, I am advocating for psychoanalysis. I will simply point out that twentieth-century physics, too, has progressed decisively by relegating the relevance of certain constituents of its observational and explanatory framework which up to now had held unlimited sway, such as time, space, and causality, to certain clearly delimited areas. And I also only mention in passing the, for depth-psychology, crucially important point that modern physics has, with regard to certain areas that it investigates, posited a new kind of objectivity, namely a scientific objectivity which includes the subjective.

我在此將不企圖引用一系列的事實,關於在其他科學的發展,來支持我的立場。這些科學類同於我正在以自體心理學的形式,替精神分析學作擁護的科學。我將僅是指出,十九世紀的物理學,也曾經因為放棄它的觀察及解釋的架構的某些相關成分,而獲得突飛猛進。這些架構直到當時曾具有無限的影響力,譬如時間,空間,及因果律,對於某些除掉限制的地區。而且,我僅是偶爾提到對於深度心理學是至關緊要的一點:關於某些它研究的領域,現代物理學提出一種新的客觀性,換句話說,一種包含主觀性的科學的客觀性。

Instead I have decided that it would be appropriate within the framework of this presentation to share with you a personal factor that may have contributed to my partial failure twenty-five years ago to make it harder for the original discussants of my ‘Introspection and empathy’ essay to misunderstand my intent. For reasons that I cannot explain I have, so far as I can judge, ever since my childhood been familiar with the relativity of our perceptions of reality and with the relativity of the framework of ordering concepts that shape our observations and explanations. I had always assumed that everybody else shared this knowledge.

代替的,我已經決定,在這場演講的框架之內,這將是適當的,假如我跟你們分享一個個人的因素。這個個人因素曾經促成我二十五年前部分的失敗,為了使我「內視與同理心」論文的原先參與討論者,更加困難誤解我的意圖。因為我無法解釋的理由,自從我的童年以來,根據我所能判斷的,我對於我們現實界的感覺的相對性,及塑造我們的觀察與解釋的秩序觀念觀念的架構的相對性。我總是假定,每一個其他的人分享他的知識。

And when, later in life, during my adolescence, I studied the work of the great classical investigators of human cognition (from Plato to Kant) and talked with my friends about their writings, I was puzzled about the difficulties they seemed to have in understanding them. And the same was true when, much later, I acquired an, at least superficial, acquaintance with the scientific outlook of modern physics Einstein’s and, par excellence, that of Planck and Heisenberg. While the intricacies of the application of their outlook were beyond my grasp, it was always easy for me to accept their basic stance almost as a matter of course.

後來,在我青少年時期,我研讀那些對於人的認知的偉大經典研究者(從柏拉圖到康得)的著作,並且跟我的朋友談論有關他們的著作。我感到困惑,因為他們似乎很困難來瞭解他們。
用樣的狀況也發生,後來,當我對於現代物理學的觀點,至少獲得粗淺的認識,特別是愛因斯坦,尤其是普蘭克及海森堡的物理學。雖然他們觀點的應用的複雜性,不是我所瞭解,我總是輕易就能接受他們的基本立場,幾乎當著是理所當然。

Twenty-five years ago in my paper on ‘Introspection, empathy and psychoanalysis’ I spelled out the application of this basic stance in the field of depth-psychology ,namely that an objective reality is in principle unreachable and that we can only report the results of specific operations. I simply assumed that I shared this basic stance with all of my scientific colleagues and expected that they would, therefore, in their reactions to what I had to say not question the basic stance itself but only reject, approve, or partially reject and approve some of the detailed conclusions that I had drawn from my consistent application of the aforementioned basic principle.

二十五年前,在我的論文「內省、同理心與精神分析學」,我解釋這個基本立場的應用,在身度心理學。換句話說,一個客觀的現實原則上是可以獲得的。我們只是報導明確運作的結果。我僅是假定我跟我的科學的同事,分享基本的立場,並且期望,在對我必須說的話裏,他們因此將不會質疑基本立場的本身,而僅是拒絕,贊同,或是部分拒絕及贊同有些的細節的結論。這些結論是我從我一貫地應用以上提到的基本原則。

I had never seriously considered the fact that I would have to define or defend my ‘operationalism’, my clearly established knowledge that reality per se, whether extrospective or introspective, is unknowable and that we can only describe what we see within the framework of what we have done to see it.

我從來沒有認真地考慮到這個事實,我將必須定義或是防衛我的「運作主義」,我清楚建立的知識:現實界的本身,無論是外視或是內視,都是未可知的。我們只能在我們曾經做過的部分看到它的架構裏面,描述我們所看見的。

I have paid dearly for my naive assumption that all my colleagues shared this knowledge of the unknowability the unknowability in principle of reality. I was completely unprepared personally for the misunderstanding from the side of my colleagues of the issues the debatable issues that I had presented to them. I was completely unprepared for the fact that the only thing discussed was for me a non-issue, hardly in need to be stated at all.

我已經付出巨大代價,因為我天真地假定:我所有的同事都會分享我的未知論的這個知識:在現實界的原理的未知論。對於從我的同事這一邊會產生的誤解,關於我提供給他們的這些具有爭議性的問題,我個人完全沒有心理準備。對於這個事實:正在討論的唯一的事情,對我而言,根本就不是問題,根本就是無庸陳述,我完全沒有心理準備。

Yet, in retrospect, I have come to see that I could probably have done nothing at that time that would have prevented the storm. I have come to see that indeed the gradual explanation and elucidation of my basic stance, as now undertaken by me and by an increasing number of those among my colleagues who do understand it, constitutes a phase of scientific working through that might ultimately facilitate the thoughtful consideration of the changes in theory and practice in psychoanalysis that self-psychology is proposing.

可是,回顧起來,我已經漸漸看出,當時我本來也可能會是束手無策,即使我想要阻止那場風暴。我已經漸漸看出,的確,對於我的基本立場的解釋跟說明,如同我現在正在從事,以及越來越多的瞭解這個觀點的我的同事,組成一個科學運作的部分。這個科學運作最後會使自體心理學所正在建議的精神分析學,在理論與實踐的改變,會更方便地從事審慎的思考。

But now, finally, into medias res and to some of the concrete issues which twenty-five years ago prompted me to start on the scientific road that I have been following since. For our present purposes I will concentrate on a single issue: the drive concept in psychoanalysis and its consequences. And I will immediately emphasize once again that it is not the presence of the drive concept per se, not the isolated inconsistency of the intrusion of a vague and insipid biological concept into a marvellous system of psychology that would have spurred me toward scientific action and the same can be said with regard to my attitude vis-a-vis the concepts of ‘dependence’, ‘autonomy’, ‘identity’, and ‘adaptation’ imported from social psychology. It was not theoretical inconsistency that prompted my reflections but only my conviction that the drive concept (as well as the aforementioned sociological intruders into depth psychology) has had significant deleterious consequences for psychoanalysis.

但是現在,最後進入從中間階段開始敍述,對於這些具體的問題,二十五年前激發我開始步上我從此一直在追尋的科學的路途。作為我們目前的用途,我將集中在單一的議題:在精神分析學欲望驅力及其結果的觀念。我將立刻再一次強調,並不是欲望驅力觀念的本身的存在,並不是一個模糊而無趣的生物學的觀念闖入心理學的神奇系統,而造成孤立的前後矛盾,當時才激發我從事科學的舉動。關於從社會心理學借用過來的「依賴」「自主」「認同」及「適應等觀念,我面面相覷的態度,道理也是同樣。不但是理論的前後矛盾,激發我的反思,而且激發我的信念:對於精神分析學,欲望驅力的觀念(以及前述的社會學科闖入深度心理學),曾經有過重要的神奇的結果。

Under normal circumstances we do not encounter drives via introspection and empathy. We always experience the not-further-reducable psychological unit of a loving self, a lusting self, an assertive self, a hostile-destructive self. When drives achieve experiential primacy, we are dealing with disintegration products: in the realm of Eros, the fragmenting self watching helplessly as it is being replaced by a feverishly intensified pleasure experience, by the ascendancy of a pleasure-giving erogenic zone, and thus of the drive over the self; or, in the realm of Thanatos, the fragmenting self watching helplessly as it is being replaced by a feverishly intensified rage experience, by the ascendancy of a destructive and/or self-destructive orgy, and thus, again, of the drive over the self.

在正常的情況,我們並沒有經由內視及同理心,來遭遇欲望驅力。我們總是經驗到,一個可愛的自我,一個充滿欲念的自我,一個肯定的自我,一個敵意及毀滅的自我,會有無法再進一步還原的心理的單位。當欲望驅力獲得經驗的最優先地位,我們正在處理在性愛的領域,受到瓦解的產物。這個碎片化的自我無助地觀望,當它正在被激情強化對快樂經驗所取代,被給予快樂的性欲地區的提升所取代,無助地觀望的自我的碎片化,被激情強烈的暴怒經驗所取代,被毀滅性及(或)自我毀滅的狂歡的提升所取代,而且因此也被欲望驅力操控完整自我所取代。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

I will not attempt here to support my stance by adducing a series of facts about developments in other sciences that are analogous to those which, in the form of self-psychology, I am advocating for psychoanalysis. I will simply point out that twentieth-century physics, too, has progressed decisively by relegating the relevance of certain constituents of its observational and explanatory framework which up to now had held unlimited sway, such as time, space, and causality, to certain clearly delimited areas. And I also only mention in passing the, for depth-psychology, crucially important point that modern physics has, with regard to certain areas that it investigates, posited a new kind of objectivity, namely a scientific objectivity which includes the subjective.

我在此將不企圖引用一系列的事實,關於在其他科學的發展,來支持我的立場。這些科學類同於我正在以自體心理學的形式,替精神分析學作擁護的科學。我將僅是指出,十九世紀的物理學,也曾經因為放棄它的觀察及解釋的架構的某些相關成分,而獲得突飛猛進。這些架構直到當時曾具有無限的影響力,譬如時間,空間,及因果律,對於某些除掉限制的地區。而且,我僅是偶爾提到對於深度心理學是至關緊要的一點:關於某些它研究的領域,現代物理學提出一種新的客觀性,換句話說,一種包含主觀性的科學的客觀性。

Instead I have decided that it would be appropriate within the framework of this presentation to share with you a personal factor that may have contributed to my partial failure twenty-five years ago to make it harder for the original discussants of my ‘Introspection and empathy’ essay to misunderstand my intent. For reasons that I cannot explain I have, so far as I can judge, ever since my childhood been familiar with the relativity of our perceptions of reality and with the relativity of the framework of ordering concepts that shape our observations and explanations. I had always assumed that everybody else shared this knowledge.

代替的,我已經決定,在這場演講的框架之內,這將是適當的,假如我跟你們分享一個個人的因素。這個個人因素曾經促成我二十五年前部分的失敗,為了使我「內視與同理心」論文的原先參與討論者,更加困難誤解我的意圖。因為我無法解釋的理由,自從我的童年以來,根據我所能判斷的,我對於我們現實界的感覺的相對性,及塑造我們的觀察與解釋的秩序觀念觀念的架構的相對性。我總是假定,每一個其他的人分享他的知識。

And when, later in life, during my adolescence, I studied the work of the great classical investigators of human cognition (from Plato to Kant) and talked with my friends about their writings, I was puzzled about the difficulties they seemed to have in understanding them. And the same was true when, much later, I acquired an, at least superficial, acquaintance with the scientific outlook of modern physics Einstein’s and, par excellence, that of Planck and Heisenberg. While the intricacies of the application of their outlook were beyond my grasp, it was always easy for me to accept their basic stance almost as a matter of course.

後來,在我青少年時期,我研讀那些對於人的認知的偉大經典研究者(從柏拉圖到康得)的著作,並且跟我的朋友談論有關他們的著作。我感到困惑,因為他們似乎很困難來瞭解他們。
用樣的狀況也發生,後來,當我對於現代物理學的觀點,至少獲得粗淺的認識,特別是愛因斯坦,尤其是普蘭克及海森堡的物理學。雖然他們觀點的應用的複雜性,不是我所瞭解,我總是輕易就能接受他們的基本立場,幾乎當著是理所當然。

Twenty-five years ago in my paper on ‘Introspection, empathy and psychoanalysis’ I spelled out the application of this basic stance in the field of depth-psychology ,namely that an objective reality is in principle unreachable and that we can only report the results of specific operations. I simply assumed that I shared this basic stance with all of my scientific colleagues and expected that they would, therefore, in their reactions to what I had to say not question the basic stance itself but only reject, approve, or partially reject and approve some of the detailed conclusions that I had drawn from my consistent application of the aforementioned basic principle.

二十五年前,在我的論文「內省、同理心與精神分析學」,我解釋這個基本立場的應用,在身度心理學。換句話說,一個客觀的現實原則上是可以獲得的。我們只是報導明確運作的結果。我僅是假定我跟我的科學的同事,分享基本的立場,並且期望,在對我必須說的話裏,他們因此將不會質疑基本立場的本身,而僅是拒絕,贊同,或是部分拒絕及贊同有些的細節的結論。這些結論是我從我一貫地應用以上提到的基本原則。

I had never seriously considered the fact that I would have to define or defend my ‘operationalism’, my clearly established knowledge that reality per se, whether extrospective or introspective, is unknowable and that we can only describe what we see within the framework of what we have done to see it.

我從來沒有認真地考慮到這個事實,我將必須定義或是防衛我的「運作主義」,我清楚建立的知識:現實界的本身,無論是外視或是內視,都是未可知的。我們只能在我們曾經做過的部分看到它的架構裏面,描述我們所看見的。

I have paid dearly for my naive assumption that all my colleagues shared this knowledge of the unknowability the unknowability in principle of reality. I was completely unprepared personally for the misunderstanding from the side of my colleagues of the issues the debatable issues that I had presented to them. I was completely unprepared for the fact that the only thing discussed was for me a non-issue, hardly in need to be stated at all.

我已經付出巨大代價,因為我天真地假定:我所有的同事都會分享我的未知論的這個知識:在現實界的原理的未知論。對於從我的同事這一邊會產生的誤解,關於我提供給他們的這些具有爭議性的問題,我個人完全沒有心理準備。對於這個事實:正在討論的唯一的事情,對我而言,根本就不是問題,根本就是無庸陳述,我完全沒有心理準備。

Yet, in retrospect, I have come to see that I could probably have done nothing at that time that would have prevented the storm. I have come to see that indeed the gradual explanation and elucidation of my basic stance, as now undertaken by me and by an increasing number of those among my colleagues who do understand it, constitutes a phase of scientific working through that might ultimately facilitate the thoughtful consideration of the changes in theory and practice in psychoanalysis that self-psychology is proposing.

可是,回顧起來,我已經漸漸看出,當時我本來也可能會是束手無策,即使我想要阻止那場風暴。我已經漸漸看出,的確,對於我的基本立場的解釋跟說明,如同我現在正在從事,以及越來越多的瞭解這個觀點的我的同事,組成一個科學運作的部分。這個科學運作最後會使自體心理學所正在建議的精神分析學,在理論與實踐的改變,會更方便地從事審慎的思考。

But now, finally, into medias res and to some of the concrete issues which twenty-five years ago prompted me to start on the scientific road that I have been following since. For our present purposes I will concentrate on a single issue: the drive concept in psychoanalysis and its consequences. And I will immediately emphasize once again that it is not the presence of the drive concept per se, not the isolated inconsistency of the intrusion of a vague and insipid biological concept into a marvellous system of psychology that would have spurred me toward scientific action and the same can be said with regard to my attitude vis-a-vis the concepts of ‘dependence’, ‘autonomy’, ‘identity’, and ‘adaptation’ imported from social psychology. It was not theoretical inconsistency that prompted my reflections but only my conviction that the drive concept (as well as the aforementioned sociological intruders into depth psychology) has had significant deleterious consequences for psychoanalysis.

但是現在,最後進入從中間階段開始敍述,對於這些具體的問題,二十五年前激發我開始步上我從此一直在追尋的科學的路途。作為我們目前的用途,我將集中在單一的議題:在精神分析學欲望驅力及其結果的觀念。我將立刻再一次強調,並不是欲望驅力觀念的本身的存在,並不是一個模糊而無趣的生物學的觀念闖入心理學的神奇系統,而造成孤立的前後矛盾,當時才激發我從事科學的舉動。關於從社會心理學借用過來的「依賴」「自主」「認同」及「適應等觀念,我面面相覷的態度,道理也是同樣。不但是理論的前後矛盾,激發我的反思,而且激發我的信念:對於精神分析學,欲望驅力的觀念(以及前述的社會學科闖入深度心理學),曾經有過重要的神奇的結果。

Under normal circumstances we do not encounter drives via introspection and empathy. We always experience the not-further-reducable psychological unit of a loving self, a lusting self, an assertive self, a hostile-destructive self. When drives achieve experiential primacy, we are dealing with disintegration products: in the realm of Eros, the fragmenting self watching helplessly as it is being replaced by a feverishly intensified pleasure experience, by the ascendancy of a pleasure-giving erogenic zone, and thus of the drive over the self; or, in the realm of Thanatos, the fragmenting self watching helplessly as it is being replaced by a feverishly intensified rage experience, by the ascendancy of a destructive and/or self-destructive orgy, and thus, again, of the drive over the self.

在正常的情況,我們並沒有經由內視及同理心,來遭遇欲望驅力。我們總是經驗到,一個可愛的自我,一個充滿欲念的自我,一個肯定的自我,一個敵意及毀滅的自我,會有無法再進一步還原的心理的單位。當欲望驅力獲得經驗的最優先地位,我們正在處理在性愛的領域,受到瓦解的產物。這個碎片化的自我無助地觀望,當它正在被激情強化對快樂經驗所取代,被給予快樂的性欲地區的提升所取代,無助地觀望的自我的碎片化,被激情強烈的暴怒經驗所取代,被毀滅性及(或)自我毀滅的狂歡的提升所取代,而且因此也被欲望驅力操控完整自我所取代。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 04

June 10, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

But now, after sharing with you this personal information about the triggers that prompted me to embark on an inquiry into experience-distant theory, I will attempt to enumerate those factors that justified the 1959 examination on substantial, intrinsically scientific grounds. I am using the word ‘substantial’ advisedly, because I would like to do what I can to prevent having my 1959 thoughts brushed aside, whether in ridicule or with respect, as being the unnourishing fruit of pedantry or purism (see Kohut, 1980, pp. 477f).

但是現在,跟你們分享這個個人的資訊,關於激發我從事研究遠距經驗理論的動機,我將設法列舉那些因素自圓其說,證明1959年的檢視,根據具有實質理由及本質是科學的理由。我正在使用「實質的」這個字詞,是經過慎密考慮的,因為我想要盡我的能力,阻止我1959年的思想被排擠一旁,無論是以諷刺或表示尊敬,作為學究及純粹學術的沒有滋養的成果。

Thus, had it been only for the fact that I felt that Alexander’s psycho-biology and Alexander’s and Hartmann’s socio-psychology had introduced concepts into the framework of analysis which, belonging to a different world of scientific discourse, were foreign bodies there and could not be accommodated, I would still have been inclined to welcome these, in and of themselves, valuable and impressive contributions to science. I would not have felt the need to outline the operationally-determined borders of psychoanalysis and thus to define the essence of this science.

因此,假如不是因為我感覺到的這個事實:亞歷山大的心理-生物學,及亞歷山大跟哈特曼的社會-心理學曾經介紹觀念到精神分析的架構裏,這些觀念由於屬於不同的科學論述的世界,在那裏是外來的身體,而且無法被接納。我當時本來會依舊傾向於歡迎這些對於科學有價值及令人印象深刻的貢獻,在它們本身,也屬於它們本身。我當時本來會感覺有這個需要,描繪出精神分析學由運作功用定義的邊界,因此定義這門科學的本質。

If it were not the need for theoretical exactitude and harmony, what was it that in fact impelled me to set out in 1959 on this excursion into epistemology? And what sustained my interest in pursuing my goal, however subordinated to other tasks, since then (see Kohut, 1977, Chapter 7) ? I have no doubt that it was the fact that this unacknowledged shift in the quintessentially significant basic stance of the analyst had led not only to changes in theory but also and this is the substantial issue for me to a covertly proceeding, gradually increasing distortion of the analyst’s perceptions in his function as a researcher in the applied field and, most importantly, in his therapeutic function as a professional practitioner.

假如不是因為理論的精確及和諧,事實上會是什麼驅使我在1959年出發探索認識論?從此以後,會是什麼維持我追求我的目標的興趣,無論它是多麽隸屬於其他的工作?我並不懷疑,這個沒有被承認的轉變,精神分析師本質上非常重要的基本態度,不但導致理論的改變,而且這是實質上的問題,要我秘密地繼續,慢慢地增加精神分析師感覺的扭曲,在他作為應用領域的研究員的功用。最重要的是,在他行使治療的功用,作為專業的開業治療師。

Leaving aside for this occasion the by no means second-in-importance responsibility of the psychoanalyst vis-a-vis such fields as literary criticism, medicine, anthropology, sociology, and, par excellence, political science and history, I will turn directly to the prevalent task of the analyst: the therapeutic analysis. How have the aforementioned foreign bodies in depth psychology the biologically understood concept of ‘drive’, the socio-psychologically understood concepts of ‘dependence’ and ‘adaptation’ led, as I think they did, to the decisive shift of the essence of analysis, to an alteration of the analyst’s basic stance that is more significant in the long run than external threats, such as that via its absorption by psychiatry, which are openly faced and resisted?

為了這個場合,我擱置精神分析師決非是此要的責任,那就是要面對這些領域,諸如文學批評,醫藥,人類學,社會學,尤其重要的,政治科學與歷史。我將直接轉向精神分析師最為盛行的工作:治療的精神分析。在深度心理學,以上所提的外來的身體,諸如,「欲望驅力」的觀念,從生物立場來瞭解,「依賴」及「適應」的觀念,從社會-心理學的立場來瞭解,依照我對於它們的實際看法,它們會導致精神分析學本質的決定性改變,導致精神分析師基本的態度的改變。這種改變最後將是比外在的威脅更加重要嗎?例如,公開被面對及阻抗的外在威脅 :精神分析學被併入精神病學。

The answer, broadly speaking, is that they have done so by becoming the unacknowledged and unquestioned basis of an unacknowledged and unquestioned value system and of an unacknowledged and unquestioned total view of the essence of man and of the essence of his life. Despite innumerable protestations to the contrary analysis has, under the influence of the aforementioned concepts become less of a science and more of a moral system, and psychoanalysis as therapy has become simultaneously less of a scientific procedure based on the elucidation of dynamic and genetic relationships and more an educational procedure, aiming at predetermined and thus extraneous goals which, again, are unacknowledged and unquestioned toward which the patient is led and which, on the basis of an unacknowledged and unquestioned dimension of his transference, the patient tries to reach.

廣義來說,這個回答是:它們曾經這樣做,是因為它們變成一個未受承認及未受質疑的基礎,充當一個未受承認及未受質疑的價值系統,及一個未受承認及未受質疑的人的本質的完全觀點,跟他的生命的本質的完全觀點。儘管無數的相反的異議,精神分析學在以上提到的觀念的影響之下,已經變成與其說是屬於科學,不如說是屬於道德系統。作為治療的精神分析學,同時也變得與其說是屬於科學的程式,以動力跟病因關係的說明作為基礎,不如說是一種教育程式,目標朝著預先決定,因此是外來的目標。而且,病人被引導前往的這些目標,未受承認及未受質疑。病人設法到達他的移情的一個未受承認及未受質疑的向度。

What are these values of traditional psychoanalysis which have been directing the analyst’s focus of attention and thus, secondarily, the goals that he pursues, both as researcher and therapist? No one familiar with my writings of recent years can be unacquainted with my answer. It is the fact that knowledge values and independence values have been the leading values of the psychoanalyst, and that they have guided him toward selective perception and selective action within the psychological field in which he has his home. It is not that I object to these values. Indeed, I subscribe to them. Yet, I believe that their unacknowledged influence distorts the depth-psychological scientist’s perception and here the effects are even more palpable that their unacknowledged presence interferes with the analyst’s ability to allow his analysands to develop in accordance with their own nuclear programme and destiny.

傳統精神分析學的這些價值是什麼呢?它們曾經引導精神分析師的專注關心,然後次要地,引導他所追求的目標,既作為研究員,又為治療師。對於我最近幾年的著作熟悉的人,莫不耳熟能詳我的答案。事實上,知識的價質與獨立的價值一直是精神分析師的主要價值,它們一直引導他朝向屬於他的家園的心理的領域內,選擇性的感覺與選擇性的行動。倒不是因為我反對這些價值。的確,我同意它們。可是,我相信它們未受承認的影響,扭曲了深度心理學科學家的感覺。在此更加可觸知的是這些影響:他們未受承認的存在,干涉到精神分析師容許他的分析物件發展的能力,以便符合他們自己的核心計畫及命運。

I am aware of the hold that the aforementioned ideals have had on Western Man, and, as a deeply-rooted member of Western civilization, I am, myself, strongly influenced by them. I know how difficult it is for us even to be aware of these basic ideals and thus to make them the target of our scrutiny. And, within certain limits, I do indeed not question them. What I do question is their abiding primacy in the hierarchy of Man’s values their primacy at all times and under all conditions.

我知道以上提到的理想曾經影響西方的人。作為深受西方文明薰陶的成員,我自己強烈受到他們的影響。我知道這是多麼困難,甚至要我們知道這些基本理想,然後讓他們成為我們審查的對象。然後,在某些限制內,我確實沒有去質疑它們。我所質疑的是它們在人的價值的階層,作為持久不變的首要地位,亙古以來,無論任何情況的它們的首要地位。

However great their importance for Western Man, they cannot serve as the ultimate guidepost by which the depth-psychological researcher evaluates Man and as the scale on which the depth-psychological therapist marks the goals and measures the degree of success or failure of the psychoanalytic treatment. On the contrary, I hold the view that these two values have prevented us from recognizing the central position of the self and its vicissitudes in Man’s psychological make-up and, above all as concerns the man of our time and his era-specifically prevalent psychopathology. They have prevented us, in other words, from acknowledging the significance of the innermost programme of the self, and the importance which the realization or non-realization of its potential has for the individual in deciding whether he feels psychologically ill or whether he feels that he is healthy.

對於西方人,這些價值的重要性,無論如何重大,它們無法充當深度心理學的研究員評估人的最後的指標,以及充當深度心理學治療師標示目標的準繩,並且充當測量精神分析的治療的成功或失敗的標準。相反地,我持有這個觀點:這兩種價值曾經阻礙我們,使我們無法體認出:在人的心理天性,完整自我及其興衰具有中央的地位,尤其是關係到我們時代的人,及其具有明確時代性的盛行的心理病理學。換句話說,它們曾經阻礙我們,使我們無法承認完整自我的最內在的內涵的重要性,以及它的潛力的實現或是沒有實現,對於個人的重要性,當他在決定是否他感覺心理有病或是他感覺是健康。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http;//springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 03

June 10, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

Let me first support my claim 宣稱that the assertion 主張 that the presence of empathy per se 本身 is beneficial 有利 is a scientific hypothesis 假設and not an outgrowth 產物 of vague 模糊 sentimentality 情感or mysticism 神秘主義. It is the former 前者because it suggests an explanation for certain observable contents內容 and/or sequences 系列 of events in man’s psychic 心靈life; it is not the latter 後者because it is not the expression of hopes or wishes and/or of an openly espoused 擁護 or more or less hidden morality. 道德

讓我首先支持我的宣稱:同理心本身的存在是有利的這個主張,是一種科學的假設,而不是模糊的情感或神秘主義的產物。這是前者,因為它建議在人的心靈生命裏,解釋某種可觀察的內容,以及(或是)事件的系列。這不是後者,因為它並不是一種公開被擁護,或有點隱藏的道德,希望或願望的表達。

For the rest, in view of the fact that I am basically 基本上 dealing today, at least in the first part of my presentation 呈現, with experience-distant, epistemological 認識論的 considerations about the interrelationship 相互關係between empathy as a mode 模式of observation 觀察 and psychoanalytic theory, I will restrict 限制myself to enumerating 列舉a number of concrete 具體examples of the beneficial 有利effect of the mere presence of empathy 神入to which I have referred in my writings. I will first mention my hypothesis 假設that the fear of death and the fear of psychosis精神病 are, in many instances, the expression of the fear of the loss of the empathic milieu 周圍環境that in responding 回應to the self keeps it psychologically alive. Secondly I will adduce 引用 again the experiences of the astronauts 太空人when their space capsule太空船艙 seemed out of control 失去控制, an episode 軼事 which I described in my correspondence 通信with Professor Erich Heller. Thirdly I will again call attention to the psychologically destructive毀滅性的 effect of having faced impersonal 客觀, dehumanized 除掉人性的 ‘extermination’ 毀滅experienced by those who survived 存貨the Nazi 納粹concentration camps 集中營is opposed to the far less psychologically destructive 毀滅的experience of having been exposed 暴露於to impassioned 冷靜hate-motivated 被仇恨的killing.

至於其餘,由於我今天正在處理的這個事實,至少在我演講的第一部分,以遠距經驗,認識論的考慮,關於同理心作為一種觀察模式,及精神分析理論的互動關,我將限制於列舉許多的具體例子,關於我在著作中提到的,僅是同理心的存在就能產生的影響。我將首先提到我的假設:對於死亡的恐懼及對於精神病的恐懼,在許多例子裏,都是在表達對於同理心環境喪失的恐懼。在跟完整自我作回應時,這種同理心的環境會保持同理心的鮮活。其次,我將會再一次引用太空人的經驗,當他們的太空船艙似乎失去控制時。我描述這件軼事,在我跟阿瑞奇、黑樂教授通信時。第三,我將再一次提醒注意:那些納粹集中營的浩劫餘生者,所經歷的無情的泯沒人性的「滅絕」,產生的心理上毀滅性的影響,跟曾經暴露於被仇恨煽起的冷血殺戮,心理上比較不那麼具有毀滅性的經驗,對立並存。

– 398 –
And I remind you of the artistic renditions 表演 of the experience of exposure 暴露to the total 完全absence 欠缺of empathy 神人 (mainly by Kafka, as in Metamorphosis 變形記, but also by O’Neill, as in Long Day’s Journey into Night

我提醒你們:暴露于同理心的完全欠缺的這個經驗,卻仍然巧妙地演出,(舉其犖犖大者,如卡夫卡的「蛻變」,奧尼爾的「長夜迢迢日漫漫」)。

And, finally, I will refer to the significance 重要性 for self-development of the shift轉變 from the sustaining 維持effect of early empathy-informed physical contact 接觸between mother and child (that is, contact which occurs without direct, discrete 分離的 ‘responses’ on the part of the mother) to the sustaining 維持effect of the mother’s empathic 神人response 回應itself (as when the child moves away and, turning around, sees the mother’s face expressing pride in the child’s achievement). And alternately 輪流地 I will mention that the shift from the sustenance 維持supplied 供應by the analyst’s ‘understanding’ to the sustenance signified 表示by his ‘explaining’ can be understood as a shift 轉變from a lower to a higher form of empathy, analogous類同 to the aforementioned 前述的 shift 轉變in early development.

最後,我將提到這個轉變的自我的發展的重要性,從母親與小孩之間的早期同理心啟動的身體的接觸,產生持續的影響開始,(換句話說,在母親這一邊,這些接觸發生並沒有直接及分離的回應),到母親同理心回應的本身的持續的影響,(例如,當小孩走開,然後轉身,看到母親的臉上表現驕傲,對於小孩的成就。)輪流地,我將提到:從精神分析師的「理解」供應的支援,到他的「解釋」表示的支持,這種轉變被瞭解為從低層次形式的同理心,到高層次形式的同理心的轉變。類同於前述的在早期發展的轉變。

It is with the foregoing 前述的considerations in mind that I will now return to the scientific ‘high road’, to empathy 神入as a mode of observation 觀察, in order to spell out 說明once more the essential 基本的content 內容of my original essay on empathy. Specifically明確地說, I will give you my reasons for undertaking 從事the epistemological 認識investigation 研究of the analyst’s observational stance 態度, for my conclusion 結論 that psychoanalysis cannot do anything but employ the introspective-empathic 內觀神入stance 態度, and that it must, therefore, be a psychology, and, finally, for my assessment 評估of the pragmatic 實用consequences 結果that were brought about 導致by the consistent 一貫的application 應用of the new theory concerning關於 the operationally 運作 defined 定義basis on which analysis rests 依靠

記住前述的考慮,我現在將回到科學的「高端道路」,將同理心作為一種觀察到模式,為了要再一次說明,我原先探討同理心的論文的基本內容。明確地說,我將跟你們說明我的理由:我什麼我從事認識論研究精神分析師的觀察態度?以及我的結論:精神分析學無法從事別的,除了就是使用內視與同理心的態度。而且,精神分析學必須是一門心理學。最後,我要說明,這個理論的一貫運用促成的實用結果,我所做的評估,因為它關係到精神分析學賴以成立的運作定義的基礎。

What prompted me to undertake an epistemological investigation concerning the quintessence of psychoanalysis? What prompted me, in other words, to undertake a venture in basic theorizing that in general is not to my taste? It was my growing discomfort with the fact that the significance of the quintessential best in psychoanalysis was being increasingly downplayed by modern analysis and that this process was taking place without anyone’s seemingly knowing about it or, at least, without anyone’s openly acknowledging its very consequential and, in my judgment, deleterious presence. While it is not only legitimate but, of course, even desirable to apply psychoanalysis to biology and social psychology, as I saw already then with reasonable clarity and as I have since then come to see more clearly still, these exports beyond the bounds of the basic rule were not acknowledged as such. Instead it was simply taken for granted that these new developments which will provide conspicuous examples immediately were true expansions of analysis itself.

是什麼激發我從事認識論的研究,關於精神分析學的本質?換句話說,是什麼激發我以通常並非我的喜好的基本理論從事探索?那是因為我對於這個事實,逐漸感到很不自在:精神分析學最精髓部分的重要性,漸漸受到現代精神分析學的貶低。而且這種過程正在發生,似乎沒有任何人警覺到。或至少,沒有任何人公開地承認它造成的後果,依我的判斷,是有害的存在。雖然將精神分析學應用到生物學及社會心理學不但是合理,當然還是被渴望,我卻已經清楚明白地看出,從此以後,更是漸漸看得更加透徹:基本規則的範圍之外的報導並沒于如實地被承認。代替的,這些新的發展是精神分析本身的擴展,雖然它們將會供應顯著的例理。這件事被視為是理所當然。

I selected the examples that I will mention now for two reasons. First, having been formulated by outstanding minds and with courageous directness, they are easy to discern. Second, because, so far as I can judge in retrospect, they were the actual triggers that led me from my overall vague discomfort with the developments that analysis had undergone to the decisive scientific action, embodied in my essay of 1959.

我選擇我現在將會提到的例子,因為兩個理由。首先,因為它們曾經由傑出的心靈帶著勇敢的坦率說明過,所有它們很容易辨認。其次,根據我回顧判斷,它們是實際的啟動者,引導我脫離全面性的朦朧的局促不安,這是精神分析學曾經經歷的,為了採取在1959年我的論文具體呈現的決定性的科學的行動。

The examples that I will adduce are the following three. First and foremost, Franz Alexander’s application of psychoanalysis to biology, in particular his explanation of the various medical syndromes that he had selected for depth-psychological investigation via the pivotal concept of the vector of ‘the drives’. Secondly, Alexander’s application of psychoanalysis to social psychology, in particular his explanation of large sectors of human behaviour via the pivotal concept of man’s oral-drive-fuelled inclination toward ‘dependence’. And thirdly, Heinz Hartmann’s introduction of the pivotal concept of an ‘adaptive point of view’ as an expansion of psychoanalysis, I stress, not as an application of psychoanalysis to the field of social psychology.

我將會引用的例子是底下三個。首先最為重要的是法蘭茲、亞歷山大將精神分析下應用到生物,特別是他對於各種醫學病徵的解釋。這些病徵,他曾經挑選作為深度心理學的研究,透過「欲望驅力」的引導的軸心觀念。其次,亞歷山大應用精神分析學到社會心理學,特別是他對於人類行為的巨大引導大解釋,經由人類的口腔驅力激起朝向「依賴」的傾向的軸心觀念。第三,海因茲、哈德曼的軸心觀念的介紹「適應觀點」,作為精神分析學的擴展。我強調一下,不是作為精神分析學應用到社會心理學的領域。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.com

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓 02

June 9, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內視,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

What does my 1959 essay discuss, what was its objective 目標? The answer to this question was spelled out 解釋in its title. It was to be ‘An examination of the relationship between mode of observation 觀察 and theory’. I did not write about empathy as a psychic activity. I did not write about empathy as associated with any specific 明確emotion 情感 such as, in particular, compassion同情 or affection 感情. It may be motivated 引發動機 by, and used in the service of, hostile-destructive 敵意及毀滅 aims. I did not write about empathy as associated with intuition 直覺.

我1959年的論文討論什麼?它的目標是什麼?這個問題的回答從它的標題可獲得解釋:這篇論文是要「檢視觀察模式與理論的關係」。我沒有寫到同理心作為心靈的活動。我沒有寫到同理心,作為跟任何明確情感的聯想,譬如,特別是同情心或情感。同理心的激發及使用,在於服侍敵意–毀滅的目標。我並沒有寫到同理心,作為跟直覺的聯想。

As is the case with extrospection , it may, occasionally, be used seemingly intuitively 直覺by experts: that is, via 經由mental processes 過度of observation that identify 辨認complex 複雜configurations 形態pre-consciously and at great speed. But mostly, certainly in psychoanalysis, empathy is used non-intuitively 非直覺, ploddingly 孜孜工作, if you wish, by trial and error.嘗試與錯誤 I did not write about empathy as being always correct and accurate 正確.

如同在外視的情況,有時它似乎被專家直覺地使用,也就是,經觀察到精神過程,前意識地而且快速地辨認複雜的形態。但是大部分來說,確實就是在精神分析學,同理心是非直覺地,孜孜不倦地,嘗試與錯誤地被使用。我並沒有書寫同理心,當著總是正確無誤。

As is the case with extrospection and external 外在reality, introspection and empathy may misperceive 錯誤 the psychic reality we scrutinize 審查(already on the level of data collection), either because we are guided by erroneous錯誤 expectations, by misleading theories that distort 扭曲our perception, or because we are not sufficiently充分 conscientious用心 and rigorous嚴格 in immersing沉浸于 ourselves for protracted延長 periods in the field of our observation觀察. We must, in other words, be able to tolerate 容忍uncertainty and to postpone 拖延our closures. 封閉

就外視及外在的現實的情況而言,內視及同理心可能會錯誤地感受我們審查的心靈的現實(已經是在資料收集的層次),要就是我們被錯誤的期望,誤導的理論所引導,這些理論扭曲我們的感覺。要不就是因為我們沒有充分地用心及嚴謹,當我們自己沉浸於我們觀察領域過分長久。換句話說,我們必須能夠容忍不確定,並拖延我們心靈的封閉。

But now, while I could, of course, go on and enlarge擴大 the list of the areas that I did not address處理 in my original essay, I will turn from the negative 負面to the positive正面 , from telling you what I did not say in 1959 to what, in fact, I said. I will begin with a general statement 陳述. There are, to speak descriptively 描述第 and implying no value judgment whatever, two roads in science. Let me call them the high road and the low road in science. The low road is the empirical 試驗stance態度的data 資料collection and experience-near theory vis-a-vis 面對面 the field that is investigated.

但是現在,我當然能夠繼續並且擴大,我原先論文沒有處理的這些地區的名單。我將從負面到正面,從告訴您們在1959年我沒有說的部分,到事實上我說出的部分。我將會以一般性的陳述開始。描述地,而且根本不含價值判斷地說,科學有兩條道路。讓我稱它們為科學的高端道路跟低端道路。低端道路是試驗性態度資料收集,及鄰近經驗理論,跟被研究的領域面面相覷。

The high road is the epistemological 認識stance 態度. It examines the relationship between the data already collected and, especially, the relationship between the experience-near theories that have already been formulated 說明. On the basis of these cognitive 認知 manoeuvres 策略 , it formulates 說明a broad and comprehensive 全面的 experience-distant 遙遠經驗theory. I believe that science needs to proceed 繼續on both of these roads. I rebel against 反叛 a purely speculative 推測的stance 態度when theory is built upon theory and the observation of the field is neglected 忽略.

高端道路上認識論的態度。它檢視已經收集的資料之間的關係,特別是已經被說明的鄰近經驗理論之間的關係。根據這些認知策略的基礎,它說明一個寬廣而全面性的遠距經驗理論。我相信,科學需要繼續沿著這兩條道路前進。我反抗的是一種純粹推測的態度,以理論建立在理論之上,而對於領域的觀察則是被忽略。

But I also know that every science must be aware of the experience-distant theories that provide the framework for its experience-near investigations and that it must, from time to time, re-examine the experience-distant theories it has espoused 擁護even those that seem so basic to its outlook 外觀that they are hardly considered to be theories anymore. Luckily, there is a voice in us that will tell us, however dimly we may perceive it at first, and however reluctant 不願意we may be to acknowledge承認 its message, that the time has come for us to question our basic theories. This voice will, in general, speak to us after we have been, persistently 持續地and increasingly, uncomfortable with the pragmatic 實用的results that we have been obtaining 獲得. It is then that we should move from the low road of pragmatism 實用主義to the high road of epistemology 認識論only to return to the first in order to test the new theoretical vantage 最佳的 point, that we may now have adopted 採用.
但是我也知道,每個科學必須知道遠距經驗的理論。這種理論提供架構給它的鄰近經驗的研究,有時它必須重新檢視它曾經擁護的遠距經驗,甚至是那些對它的外觀似乎如此基本的,以致於幾乎不再被認為是理論。幸運地,我們內心有一個聲音會告訴我們,無論起初我們只是模糊地感覺到它,無論我們多麼不願意承認它的訊息,我們質問我們基本理論的時間已經來到。一般來說,這個聲音會跟我們說,在我們持續而且逐漸地,對於我們一直獲得的實用結果,感覺不自在。就在那時,我們應該從實用主義的低端道路,轉移到認識論的高端道路。結果卻是回到低端道路,為了要測試新的理論最佳面相點,那是我們可能已經採用的。

In order to prevent confusion let me stress 強調here that during the first half of today’s presentation I will be primarily talking about empathy in the context 內容 in which I had used it in my 1959 paper and in which I have continued to use it, until very recently, almost entirely (for exceptions cf. Kohut, 1973a), (1973b). I will, in other words, be talking about empathy in an epistemological 認識論context. In this context, as should go without saying, empathy is a value-neutral 價值中立mode of observation; a mode of observation attuned適合於 to the inner life of man, just as extrospection 外觀is a mode of observation attuned to the external 外在的world.

為了阻擋混淆,讓我在此強調,在今天演講的前面一半,我將首先討論內容的同理心部分。這是在1959年的論文我曾經用過。後來我繼續使用它。直到最近,我幾乎是全部使用它。(1973a年及1973b 那兩篇例外)。換句話說,我將會從認識論的內容,來討論同理心。在這個內容裏,自不待言的是,同理心是一種價值中立的觀察模式,一種適合於人的內在生命的觀察模式。正如外視是一種觀察模式,適合於外在模式。

– 397 –
It is true, however, that, as I mentioned earlier, empathy can and should also be examined and evaluated 評估in an empirical 試驗性地 context as a mental 精神的activity, whether employed 運用in everyday life or in scientific pursuits 追求. And I have indeed, very recently, begun to look upon empathy from this point of view, complex 複雜but still manageable 可處理 undertaking 從事, if one keeps in mind that even with regard to關於 this ‘low road’, that is, with regard to this experience-near approach, we must differentiate區別 between two levels: (a) empathy as an information-gathering activity, and (b) empathy as a powerful emotional 情感的bond 契合between people. Before addressing 處理myself, as I did in 1959, to the role of empathy in the most experience-distant, epistemological 認識論sense, let me therefore briefly consider the specifics 明確 of the examination of empathy in these latter two more experience-near contexts 內容.

可是,確實的,如同我早先提到,同理心能夠而且應該在試驗性地內容被檢視及評估,,作為一種精神的活動,無論是被運用在日常的生活,或是在從事科學的追求。的確在最近,我曾經開始從這個觀點看待同理心。這是複雜但是還是可以掌控的從事,假如我們心裏記住,即使關於這個「低端道路」,也就是說,關於鄰近經驗的方法,我們必須區別兩個層次:其一,同理心作為一種收集資訊的活動;其二,同理心作為一種人際之間的強烈的情感默契。如同1959年,我從最遠距經驗的認識論的意義,先處理同理心扮演的角色。因此讓我簡短地考慮到對於同理心的檢視的明確細節,在這兩個更加鄰近經驗的內容裏。

As an information-collecting, data-gathering 收集資料 activity, empathy, as I have stressed 強調many times since 1971, can be right or wrong, in the service of compassion同情 or hostility 敵意, pursued 追求slowly and ploddingly 孜孜不倦or ‘intuitively’直覺, that is, at great speed. In this sense empathy is never by itself supportive 支持or therapeutic 治療. It is, however, a necessary precondition先決條件 to being successfully supportive 支持 and therapeutic 治療. In other words, even if a mother’s empathy is correct and accurate 正確, even if her aims are affectionate 情感, it is not her empathy that satisfies her child’s selfobject needs. Her actions, her responses 回應to the child will do this. In order, however, to achieve their end properly, these actions and responses have to be guided by correct and accurate 正確empathy. Empathy is thus a precondition 先決條件for a mother’s appropriate 適當functioning 功用as the child’s selfobject, 自我客體 it informs parental selfobject function vis-a-vis 面對面the child, but it is not, by itself, the selfobject function 功用that is needed by the child.

作為收集資訊,收集資料的活動,如同我自從19971年曾經強調好幾次,無論對錯,同理心能夠服侍同情或敵意,緩慢而孜孜不倦,或「直覺地」追求,換句話說,快速地追求。以這個意義,同理心本身從來不是支持或是治療。可是,對於要成功地支持及治療,它是一個先決條件。換句話說,即使母親的同理心是正確無誤,即使她的目標是情感,滿足她的小孩自身客體的需要,並不是同理心。她對於小孩的行動與回應,將可以滿足這個需要。可是,為了適當地達成它們的目標,這些行動與回應必須由正確無誤的同理心引導。同理心因此是母親適當充當小孩的自身客體功用的先決條件,它跟小孩當面告知父母親的自身客體的功用。它本身並不是小孩需要的自身客體的功用。

I wish that I could stop my discussion of empathy as a concrete 具體的force in human life at this point without having to make one further step which appears to contradict 矛盾everything that I have said so far, and which exposes me to the suspicion 懷疑of abandoning放棄 scientific sobriety 清醒and of entering the land of mysticism 神秘主義or of sentimentality 感傷性. I assure 告訴you that I would like to avoid making this step and that it is not the absence of scientific rigour 精力but submission 順服 to it that forces me to tell you that even though everything I have said up to now remains fully valid有效 so long as we evaluate評估 empathy as an instrument 工具of observation and as an informer of supportive 支持, therapeutic 治療and psychoanalytic action (in therapeutic analysis the action is called interpretation 解釋), I must now, unfortunately, add that empathy per se, the mere presence of empathy, has also a beneficial 有利, in a broad sense, a therapeutic 治療effect both in the clinical setting 背景and in human life, in general.

我但願,我能夠在這個時候停止我對於同理心的討論,當著述人類生命的具體力量,而不必須再跨前一步,把我迄今所說的一切,似乎弄得互相牴觸。向前一步會將我承受這種懷疑:我是在放棄科學的清晰態度,並且進入神秘主義或情感作用的領域。我告訴你們,我真想要避免跨出這一步。不是由於欠缺科學的精神,而是遵照科學的精神,我不得不告訴大家:即使我迄今所說的一切,始終充分有效,只要我們評估同理心,作為一種觀察的工具,及作為支持,治療及精神分析的行動(在治療的精神分析,這個行動被稱為解釋)。不幸地,我現在必須補充一句:同理心本身,僅是同理心的存在,廣義來說,就已經有治療的效果,在臨床的背景及一般的人際相處。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

內视,同理心,及精神健康的半圓

June 8, 2011

Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health. (1982)
Int. J. Psycho-Anal., 63:395-407 (IJP)
Introspection, Empathy, and the Semi-Circle of Mental Health
Heinz Kohut

內视,同理心,及精神健康的半圓
海因茲、科胡特

195
SUMMARY
綱要

Written shortly before his death, Heinz Kohut’s last paper opens with a discussion of the paper ‘Introspection 內觀 , empathy 神入, and psychoanalysis’, written in 1959, which he presented at the Twenty-fifth Anniversary 周年Meeting of the Chicago Institute for Psychoanalysis.

海因茲、科胡特最後的論文寫於過世前不久。它開始先生討論「內视,同理心,及精神分析學」這篇輪文。這篇論文寫於1959年,在芝加哥的精神分析研究所的第二十五周年的會議發表。

In his first essay on the role of empathy in psychoanalysis, an essay that according to Kohut provided a foundation 基礎for many of his subsequent 隨後 investigations in the field of depth psychology, he advanced 提出 the thesis 論點 that the introspective-empathic 內觀與神入的stance 態度of the observer 觀察者 defines the science of psychoanalysis.

這是他討論精神分析學神入扮演的角色的第一篇論文。依照科胡特的說法,這篇論文給予在深度心理學的領域,他隨後的許多研究,提供一個基礎。在論文裏,他提出這個論點:觀察者的內觀與神入的態度,定義精神分析學的科學。

The author explains that he was moved to propose this operational 運作的definition of psychoanalysis twenty-five years before because he felt that the introduction of the psychobiological concept of the drives (as well as various social psychological concepts) had not led to a true integration合併 of psychoanalysis with biology or medicine but to a psychological and moral view of ‘Guilty Man’ that worked to distort 扭曲the analyst’s perception in the clinical and applied field. Kohut asserts 主張 that by defining itself operationally 運作, psychoanalysis can accept itself as psychology , a psychology that studies man in terms of a self attempting to realize the programme laid down 安排in his depth psychology during the span期間 of his life.

作者解釋,他被迫去建議,二十五年前,精神分析學的這個運作的定義。因為他覺得,欲望驅力的心理兼生物的觀念(以及各種社會及心理的觀念),並沒有導致精神分析學跟生物學或醫學真正的合併,而是導致心理學與道德的「罪惡人」的觀點。這個觀點的盛行扭曲了精神分析師的感覺,在臨床及應用的領域。科胡特主張,精神分析學從運作觀點定義自己時,它能夠接納自己作為一門心理學。這門心理學從自我的術語研究人,企圖實現終其一生期間,他的深度心理學奠定的計劃。

The final section of the paper is devoted to 專注a re-examination of man’s intergenerational 合併 relationships in light of the shift Kohut advocates 主張from psychobiology to psychology. The Oedipus complex is not to be understood as the end product of the uninfluentiable 無可影響到conflict of basic opposing instincts 本能but as the result of interferences 介入that impinge 侵犯on man’s development. Acknowledging 承認the mythic 神秘power of Freud’s formulation 說明of the Oedipus complex, the author offers a dose of mythical counter-magic 反魔術 (to which the ‘semi-circle of mental health’ in the paper’s title 標題refers) and a re-interpretation 重新解釋of the story of King Oedipus. Kohut believes that the essence 本質of human experience is not to be found in the biologically inevitable 無可避免conflict 衝突between generations but in intergenerational continuity. Access to this essential nucleus 核心of man’s self can best be gained if psychoanalysis shifts from psychobiology to psychology. In this way, Kohut concludes, psychoanalysis can return to its own nuclear 核心self, can realize its own essential 基本的programme of action.

這篇論文的第一部分專注于重新審查人的兩代之間的關係,這是科胡特根據心理生物學及心理學,所主張的轉變的觀點。伊底普斯情結不應該被瞭解為「基本的對立本能的無可影響的衝突的終端產物」。而是應該被理解為「由於侵犯到男人發展的介入的結果」。雖然作者承認佛洛伊德對於伊底普斯情結的說明,具有神秘的力量,他提出一劑神秘的「反魔力」,(論文的標題「精神健康的半圓」提到這個神秘的反魔力)。當科胡特重新解釋伊底普斯國王的故事,他相信,人類經驗的本質,不應該是在兩代之間生物上無可避免的衝突被找到。而是要在兩代之間的連續性被找到。假如精神分析學從心理生物學轉移到心理學,人類自我的這個基本核心最能夠被獲得。

Twenty-five years ago, I spoke at the twenty-fifth anniversary周年 of our Institute 研究所. That celebration contained only two presentations 呈現and lasted only one day: Half the day was devoted to a paper by Therese Benedek (1960) on a psychosomatic 身心失調topic主題, I believe, discussed by several analysts especially interested in that field. During the other half day I presented my paper (1959) Introspection 內觀, empathy 神入, and psychoanalysis’ which was discussed by Rudolph Loewenstein, Helen McLean, Maxwell Gitelson, and Franz Alexander.

二十五年前,我在研究所的二十五周年發表演講。這個周年慶只包含兩場演講,只持續一天。其中有半天專注于邊尼達克(1960年)探討「身心失調的主題」。我相信,有好幾位對於那個領域特別感到興趣的精神分析師,加入討論。另外半天則是我發表我的論文(1959年)「內觀,神入與精神分析學」。參與討論的有羅文斯坦、麥克立恩、吉特孫及亞歷山大。

In view of 因為the fact that my address 演說today will take off 開始from the point that I had reached then, I will remark briefly on the former occasion. The discussants 商討者differed widely in their feelings about my paper: from Alexander’s intense強烈, angry, almost violent objections 反對to it, over Loewenstein’s severe but respectful critique and Gitelson’s middle position to, finally, Helen McLean’s warmly expressed acceptance and praise 讚賞. And yet, as I knew only dimly at that time but as I have come to see ever more clearly since, all the discussants, whether laudatory 稱讚 or disapproving 不同意, had fastened 緊附on issues 問題that were unrelated to the subject matter of my paper. They all missed 錯過the essential, simple and clear scientific message that it contains. I will begin then, today, by spelling out 解釋this message once again, hoping that I will succeed in adding further colleagues 同事to the list of those who have come to understand it. And I will then, today, from the secure basis that I established twenty-five years ago, proceed further and take an additional step in a new direction.

因為這個事實,我今天的演講將會從我當時結論的這一點開始。容我簡短地談論一些上一次的情況。討論者對於我的論文的感覺,意見相當分歧:從亞歷山大強烈的憤怒,幾乎是猛烈的反對,羅文斯坦嚴厲但是表示尊重的批評,吉特孫的中間立場,到麥克立恩熱烈表達的接納與讚賞。可是,在當時我只是模糊地知道,但是我漸漸地更加清楚地看出,所有的討論者,無論是讚賞,或表示異議,他們都緊附著跟我論文的主題不相關的議題。他們都錯過我的論文包含的基本,簡單,而清楚的科學的訊息。今天,我將再一次開始說明這個訊息,希望我將會成功地將我更多的同事,納入已經瞭解它的人數的名單裏。從二十五年前我建立的這個安定的基礎,今天我將繼續朝著一個新的方向,更進一步前進。

After the disappointment I experienced at being faced with a total absence of response 回應to what I had proposed, you might expect that I would go about 從事the task to which I decided to devote the first half of today’s presentation with some diffidence 缺乏自信. But this is not the case. Both my capacity for dispassionate 冷靜的reflection 反思and my sense of humour have sustained 維持me during the past twenty-five years, and they do sustain me now.

我曾經提出的這個議題,當時面臨完全的缺乏迴響,我經歷這場失望後,你們可能會預期,我可能會缺乏信心,對於今天講演的前半天,我所要從事的這件工作。在過去二十五年來,我始終具有這個能力,維持冷靜的思維及幽默感。現在,我依舊具有。

In one of my favourite novels, Tristram Shandy, Laurence Sterne describes an episode 軼事which is relevant 相關in the present context 內容. Let me retell 重述it in Sterne’s words.
‘Twas nothing, I did not lose two drops 滴of blood by it —thousands suffer by choice, what I did by accident. Slop made ten times more of it, than there was occasion ? ‘The chambermaid 女僕had left no ******* *** [clearly: chamber pot] under the bed: cannot you contrive圖謀, master, quoth Susannah, lifting up the sash 窗框with one hand, as she spoke, and helping me up the window seat with the other, cannot you manage, my dear, for a single time to **** *** ** *** ******?’ [Clearly, the last four words are ‘out of the window’ the four-lettered first, the decisive 決定的verb, I’ll leave for you to fill in.]

勞倫斯、史坦恩的「特瑞斯、山帝」是我最喜愛的一本小說。它描述一件跟目前內容相關的軼事。讓我以史坦恩的話語重述一遍:「那根本沒有怎樣。我並沒有因為割你包皮讓你失去兩滴血。好幾千人因為選擇割包皮而痛苦,而我所做的僅是意外。史拉普醫生動的手術,流的血更多十倍。女僕人並沒有留下、、、、、、(顯然是指便壺)在床下。 主人,你能不能想個辦法?蘇珊娜說,用一隻手抬起窗框,當她一邊說著,用另外一隻手幫忙扶我上窗戶位置,親愛的,你能不能嘗試一次幫我、、、、、」(顯而易見的,最後四個字是「跳出窗戶」,先是四個字的髒話,這是關鍵的動詞。我讓你們自己填進那沒有說出的字眼。)

‘I was five years old.? Susannah did not consider that nothing was well-hung in our family, to slap重擊 came the sash down like lightning upon us; nothing is left, cried Susannah, nothing is left for me, but to run my country.’ ‘My Uncle Toby’s house was a much kinder sanctuary庇護所; and so Susannah fled to it.’ (Vol. V, Chapter XVII, p. 284.)

「我當時五歲?蘇珊娜並不認為我們家人的陰莖有什麼。用窗框猛力落下,就像閃電擊中我們,包皮就脫落。我別無選擇,蘇珊娜叫著,我別無選擇,除了逃離我的國家。」「我叔父統比的家,是一個比較安全的庇護所,因此蘇珊娜就逃到那裏。」

I must deprive 剝奪you of all the delightfully presented intervening 介入references to the incident in question the guilt 罪of Uncle Toby, and of his factotum 總務管家 Trim who had removed the weights and pulleys from the sash windows because Toby needed them for his war games; the father’s intensive 密集study of the ritual 儀式of circumcision 割包皮in order to find out whether his son had become a Jew, an Egyptian, a Syrian, or a Phoenician, to name only a few, and the fight between Susannah and the doctor while applying a poultice 敷藥 to Tristram’s injured penis陰莖 and turn directly to the, for us, pivotal軸心的 conclusion. Dr Slop (Vol. VI,
– 396 –

我必須阻擋你,將受到置疑的意外,裏面牽扯到隱情秘事,怪罪到統比叔叔及他的總務管家特瑞姆。他們曾經將窗框的鎮石及皮帶滑輪移除,因為統比需要它們來從事戰爭的遊戲。父親密集地研究切割包皮的儀式,為了要找出是否他的兒子已經成為猶太人,埃及人,敘利亞人,腓尼基人,只舉幾個例子。蘇珊娜與醫生之間的爭戰,當他們替特瑞斯坦的受傷的陰莖敷藥時,然後就直接轉向對於我們是軸心的結論。

Chapter XIV, p. 329) had apparently 明顯spoken in an exaggerated 誇張way about ‘Susannah’s accident’ and, within a week everybody was saying ‘That Poor Master Shandy [21 asterisks] entirely.完全地’ And in three further days the rumour 謠言 was established ‘That the nursery window had not only [28 asterisks];but that [21 asterisks], also.’ A family council 會議was thereupon held. It concluded with the following pithy 簡潔的 dialogue: ‘I should show him publicly 公開, said my Uncle Toby, at the market cross 交會. ‘?Twill have no effect, said my father.’

第十四章很明顯用一種誇張的方式談論到蘇珊娜的意外。在一個星期內,每個人都在說:「可憐的山帝少爺完全地被、、、、、。」又過了三天,這個謠言被證實。嬰兒房的窗戶不但、、、、、而且、、、、、。一個家庭會議因此被召開。結論是以下簡潔的對話:「我應該讓他在市集公開展示」統比叔叔說。「那沒有效果。」我的父親說。

But now, disregarding不顧 Tristram’s father’s opinion that once people have espoused支持 a certain strong belief even the most direct and plain demonstration 證明to the contrary will have no effect, I will expose揭露 the central message of my old introspection內觀 essay, sound and undamaged in its essence like Tristram’s penis after the sash came down, once more in the market place.

但是現在,不顧特瑞斯坦父親的意見:一旦人們支持某種強烈的信仰,再直接明白的相反證明,都沒有什麼效果。我要揭露我自己內觀論文的中央訊息,在論文本質上健全而沒有受到損害的部分,就像窗框掉落下來的特瑞斯坦的陰莖,再一次我在市集的地方展示。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com