Archive for February, 2014

精神病 286

February 28, 2014

精神病 286

The notion of Verwerfung indicates that there must already have been something
in the relation to the signifier previously lacking here in the initial introduction
to fundamental signifiers.


This is, quite clearly, an absence undiscoverable by experimental research.
There is no way of grasping something that lacks at the time it lacks. In the
case of President Schreber this would have been the absence of the primordial
male signifier to which for years he was able to appear to be equal – he looked
as if he, like everyone else, were upholding his role as a man and of being
somebody. Virility does signify something for him, since it’s equally the object
of his very lively protestations at the time the delusion erupts, which initially
presents itself in the form of a question over his sex, an interpellation [appel]
that comes to him from outside, as in the fantasy – how nice it would be to be
a woman undergoing intercourse. The delusion’s development expresses the
fact that for him there is no other way of realizing himself, of affirming himself
as sexual, than through admitting he is a woman, transformed into a
woman. This is the axis of the delusion. For there are two planes to distinguish.


On the one hand, the course of the delusion reveals the need to reconstruct
the cosmos, the world’s entire organization, around the fact that there is a
man who can only be the wife of a universal god. On the other hand, let’s
not forget that in his common discourse up to the critical period of his existence
this man appeared to know just like everyone else that he was a man,
and what he somewhere calls his manly honor cries out aloud when he happens
suddenly to be aroused a bit too strongly by the enigma of the absolute
Other entering into play, which emerges with the first signs of the delusion.
In short, we are led here to the distinction that is the thread running through
everything we have until now deduced from the very structuration of the
analytic situation – namely, what I have called the little other and the absolute


The former, the other with a small o, is the imaginary other, the otherness
in a mirror image, which makes us dependent upon the form of our counterpart.
The latter, the absolute Other; is the one we address ourselves to beyond
this counterpart, the one we are forced to admit beyond the relation of mirage,
the one who accepts or is refused opposite us,5 the one who will on occasion
deceive us, the one of whom we will never know whether he is deceiving us,
the one to whom we always address ourselves. His existence is such that the
fact of addressing ourselves to him, of sharing something like language with
5 . . . celui qui accepte ouquise refuse en face de nous . . .him, is more important than anything that may be placed at stake between him and us.


Misrecognizing the distinction between these two others in analysis, where
it’s present throughout, lies at the origin of all the false problems, and in
particular of the one that appears now that the primacy of the object relation
is being emphasized.


Indeed, there is an obvious discrepancy between the Freudian position
according to which the newborn, on entering the world, is in a so-called
autoerotic relation, that is, a relation in which the object doesn’t exist, and
the clinical observation that from the beginning of life we undoubtedly have
every indication that all sorts of objects exist for the newborn. The solution
to this difficulty can only be found by distinguishing between the imaginary
other insofar as he is structurally the originary form of the field in which a
multiplicity of objects is structured for the human newborn, and the absolute
Other, the Other with a big O, which is surely what Freud was driving at –
and which analysts have subsequently neglected – when speaking of the nonexistence,
originally, of any Other.


There is a good reason for this, which is that this Other lies entirely within
itself, Freud says, but at the same time entirely outside itself.
The ecstatic relation to the Other is an issue that didn’t arise yesterday,
but because it has been left in the background for several centuries it’s worth
our while, for we analysts who are constantly dealing with it, to reexamine


In the Middle Ages a distinction was drawn between what was called the
physical theory and the ecstatic theory of love. This is the way the question
of the subject’s relation to the absolute Other was raised. Let’s say that in
order to understand the psychoses we have to make the love relation with the
Other qua radically Other, and the mirror situation, everything of the order
of the imaginary, animus and antnta, which is located according to the sexes
at one or other of the places, overlap in our little schema.


Where does the difference between someone who is psychotic and someone
who isn’t come from? It comes from the fact that for the psychotic a love
relation that abolishes him as subject is possible insofar as it allows a radical
heterogeneity of the Other. But this love is also a dead love.


It may seem to you that it’s a curious and unusual detour to resort to a
medieval theory of love in order to introduce the question of psychosis. It is,
however, impossible to conceive the nature of madness otherwise.
Think about, sociologically, the forms of enamoration, of falling in love, attested in culture.



精神病 285

February 27, 2014

精神病 285

Many clinicians have shown an interest in the psychotic’s prior history.


Helene Deutsch has emphasized a certain as t/that appears to mark the first
stages of development in those who at some moment sink into psychosis.
They never enter the game of signifiers, except through a kind of external
imitation.4 The non-integration of the subject into the register of the signifier
indicates the direction from which the question of the preconditions of psychosis
arises – which is undoubtedly soluble only through analytic investigation.

海伦娜、杜西曾经强调,对于在某个时刻,曾经陷入精神病的那些人们,标示发展的早期阶段,有某个「好像」。他们从来进入能指的遊戏,除了经由某种的外在的模仿。主体没有融入能指的铭记,指示著这个方向。精神病的先前情况的问题,就朝这个方向产生。 无可置疑地,仅有经由精神分析的研究,这个问题才能够被解决。

It sometimes happens that we take prepsychotics into analysis, and we
know what that produces – it produces psychotics. The question of the contraindications
of analysis would not arise if we didn’t all recall some particular
case in our practice, or in the practice of our colleagues, where a full-blown
psychosis – a hallucinatory psychosis, I‘m not speaking of a precipitated
schizophrenia – is triggered during the first analytic sessions in which things
heat up a bit, at which point the poor analyst rapidly becomes the transmitter
who makes known to the analysand [analyst] what he must do and must not


Aren’t we here touching on what in our very own experience, without our
having to look any further, lies at the heart of the reasons for the onset of
psychosis? It’s one of the most difficult things that can be proposed to a man,
with which his being in the world doesn’t confront him all that often – it’s
what is called speaking out [frendre la parole), I mean speaking out one’s own
speech, which is quite the opposite of saying yes, yes to the speech of one’s
neighbor. This isn’t necessarily put into words. The clinic shows that, provided
one knows how to discern it at very different levels, it is at precisely
this moment that psychosis breaks out.


It’s sometimes a question of a tiny spot of speaking out, whereas previously
the subject had been living in his cocoon like a moth-worm. This is the form
that Clerambault characterized very well under the name of the mental automatism
of old maids. I’m thinking of the marvelous richness characteristic of
his style – how could Cterambault have failed to dwell on the facts? There
was really no reason to pick out these unfortunate beings, forgotten by everybody,
whose existence he describes so well and in whom, at the slightest
provocation, mental automatism emerges from this discourse that had always
remained latent and unexpressed in them.


If we allow that the failing [dtfaillance] of the subject on encountering real
speech locates his entry, his sliding, into the critical phenomenon, the inaugural
phase, of psychosis, then we can begin to see how this comes to link up
with what we have already expounded.



精神病 282

February 26, 2014

精神病 282

Freud wasn’t unaware of what hieroglyphic writing really is. He was in
love with everything touching on the culture of ancient Egypt. Very often he
would make reference to the style, to the signifying structure, of hieroglyphs
and to the sometimes contradictory, superimposed, way of thinking of the
beliefs of the ancient Egyptians. And he readily refers to this to give, for
example, an image expressive of a certain way in which contradictory concepts
coexist in neurotics.


At the end of this passage he evokes the language of symptoms and speaks
of the specificity of the signifying structuration in the different forms of neuroses
and psychoses. Then suddenly, in a striking summary, he compares the
three great neuropsychoses. For instance, he says, what a hysteric expresses by
vomiting an obsessional will express by painstaking protective measures against
infection, while a paraphrenic mil be led to complaints or suspicions that he is
being poisoned. These are all of them different representations of the patients wish
to become pregnant which have been repressed into the unconscious, or of his defensive
reaction against that wish.1


That was to set us going.

Let’s return to our subject.


We’re not far away from it with the theme of procreation, which lies at the
heart of the symptomatology in the Schreber case. But even today we shall
not get there immediately.


I would like, from yet another angle, and concerning what you heard on
Monday evening from our friend Serge Leclaire, to raise once again the issue
of what I call the ultimate signifier in neurosis.


Even though it’s essentially a signifier, it of course isn’t a signifier without
meaning. I stress this fact that it doesn’t depend on meaning but is the source
of meaning.


The two sides, male and female, of sexuality are not given data, are nothing
that could be deduced from experience. How could the individual situate
himself within sexuality if he didn’t already possess the system of signifiers,
insofar as it institutes the space that enables him to see, at a distance, as an
enigmatic object, the thing that is the most difficult of access, namely his
own death? This is no more difficult of access, if you think about it, if you
think precisely of the long dialectical process necessary for an individual to
accomplish it and of the extent to which our experience consists of too much
and too little in one’s access to the male and female poles – a reality that may
make us wonder whether it’s so much as graspable outside the signifiers that
isolate it.


The notion we have of reality as that around which the setbacks and obstacles
of neurosis revolve must not deflect us from remarking that the reality
with which we are concerned is upheld, woven through, constituted, by a
tress of signifiers. We have to bring out the point of view, the plane, the
particular dimension, of the human being’s relationship to the signifier if we
are to know even what we are saying when for example we say that in psychosis
something becomes lacking in the subject’s relation to reality. As a
matter of fact it’s a question of a reality structured by the presence of a particular
signifier that is inherited, traditional, transmitted – but how? Of course,
by virtue of the fact that all around the subject people speak.



精神病 283

If we now admit as a fact of common experience that not to have undergone
the trial of Oedipus, not to have seen its conflicts and its dead ends open
before one, and not to have resolved it, leaves the subject with a certain.
defect, in a certain state of inability to bring about the correct distance that
is called human reality, this is because we hold that reality implies the subject’s
integration into a particular play of signifiers. Here I’m only formulating
what everyone admits, in a kind of implicit way, in analytic experience.


We have indicated in passing that what characterizes the hysterical position
is a question that refers precisely to the two signifying poles of male and
female. The hysteric addresses it with all his being – how can one be either
male or female? – which implies that the hysteric nevertheless has reference
to it. The question is this – what is it that the entire structure of the hysteric,
with his fundamental identification with the individual of the sex opposite to
his own by which his own sex is questioned, is introduced into, suspended
from, and preserved in? The hysterical manner of questioning, either… or
. . . , contrasts with the obsessional^ response, negation, neither. . . nor…,
neither male nor female. This negation comes about against a background of
mortal experience and of hiding his being from the question, which is a way
of remaining suspended from it. The obsessional is precisely neither one nor
the other – one may also say that he is both at once.


I shall move on, since that was only intended to situate what happens in
the psychotic, who contrasts with the position of each of the subjects of the
two great neuroses.


In my talk on Freud a fortnight ago I spoke of language insofar as it’s
inhabited by the subject who to a greater or lesser extent speaks out in Ian
guage with all his being, that is, in part unknowingly. How can one fail to
see in the phenomenology of psychosis that everything from beginning to end
stems from a particular relationship between the subject and this language
that has suddenly been thrust into the foreground, that speaks all by itself,
out loud, in its noise and furor, as well as in its neutrality? If the neurotic
inhabits language, the psychotic is inhabited, possessed, by language.


What comes to the foreground reveals that the subject is subjected to a
trial, to the problem of some fault concerning the permanent discourse that
supports the everyday, the miscellany, of human experience. Something
detaches itself from the permanent monologue and appears as some kind of
music for several voices. It’s worthwhile dwelling on its structure so as to ask
ourselves why it’s made in this way.


This is, at the level of the phenomena, something that immediately gives
us the impression of being structured. Don’t forget that the very notion of
structure is borrowed from language. To misrecognize this, to reduce it to a
mechanism, is as conclusive as it is ironic. What is it that Clframbault has
isolated under the name of the elementary phenomena of psychosis – the
repeated, contradicted, commanded thoughts – if it’s not this discourse that
is augmented, recapitulated in antitheses? But on the pretext that there is an
entirely formal structuration here – and Clcrambault is absolutely right to
insist upon this – the conclusion he draws is that we are dealing with simple
mechanical phenomena. This is totally inadequate. It’s much more promising
to think of it in terms of the internal structure of language.


The merit of Cl&ambault is to have shown its ideationally neutral nature,
which in his language means that it’s in total discord with the subject’s mental
state, that no mechanism of the affects adequately explains it, and which
in ours means that it’s structural. The weakness of the etiological or pathogenic
deduction is of little concern to us in comparison with what he stresses,
namely that the nucleus of psychosis has to be linked to a relationship between
the subject and the signifier in its most formal dimension, in its dimension as
a pure signifier, and that everything constructed around this consists only of
affective reactions to the primary phenomenon, the relationship to the signifier.


The subject’s relation of exteriority to the signifier is so striking that all
clinicians have emphasized it in one way or another. The syndrome of influence
still leaves some things vague, but the syndrome of action from without,
as naive as it appears, does underline the essential dimension of the phenomenon,
the psychotic’s exteriority in relation to the entire apparatus of language.
Hence the question arises whether the psychotic has really entered



精神病 277

February 26, 2014

精神病 277
The appeal, the allusion

If we reflect that the means of representation in dreams are principally visual images
and not words, we shall see that it is even more appropriate to compare dreams
with a system of writing than with a language. In fact the interpretation of dreams
is completely analogous to the decipherment of an ancient pictographic script such
as Egyptian hieroglyphs. In both cases there are certain elements which are not
intended to be interpreted (or read, as the case may be) but are only designed to
serve as “determinatives,” that is to establish the meaning of some other element*


The ambiguity of various elements of dreams finds a parallel in these ancient systems
of writing; and so too does the omission of various relations which have in
both cases to be supplied from the context. If this conception of the method of
representation in dreams has not yet been followed up, this, as will be readily
understood, must be ascribed to the fact that psychoanalysts are entirely ignorant
of the attitude and knowledge with which a philologist would approach such a
problem as that presented by dreams.1


1 Sigmund Freud, “The Claims of Psycho-Analysis to Scientific Interest,” SE
— 弗洛依德「精神分析宣称具有科学的興趣」

This passage is clear enough. The apparent flagrant contradiction that you
can draw from it on the basis of Freud’s remark that dreams are expressed in
images rather than otherwise is restored and resituated as soon as he shows
the sort of images in question – namely, images that occur in writing, that is
not even for their literal sense since there is a number of them that will not
be there to be read, but simply to contribute an exponent without which this
would remain enigmatic.


The other day I wrote some Chinese characters on the board. I could just
as easily have written some ancient hieroglyphs – the first person pronoun,
for example, which is drawn as two little signs that have a phonetic value and
may be accompanied by a more or less fleshed-out image which is there to
give the other signs their sense. But the other signs are no less autographic
than the little fellow2 and have to be read in a phonetic register.


The comparison with hieroglyphs is rendered all the more valid and certain
by the fact that it’s dispersed throughout The Traumdeutung and that Freud
returns to it constantly.



精神病 276

February 25, 2014

精神病 276

But for us, workers, scholars, doctors, technicians, what direction does
this return to the truth of Freud indicate?


It is the direction of a positive study whose methods and forms are given
to us in this sphere of the so-called human sciences, which concerns the order
of language, linguistics. Psychoanalysis should be the science of language
inhabited by the subject. From the Freudian point of view man is the subject
captured and tortured by language.


Psychoanalysis introduces us to a psychology, to be sure, but which one?
Psychology properly so-called is effectively a science of perfectly well-defined
objects. But, undoubtedly, by virtue of the significant resonances of the word,
we slide into confusing it with something that refers to the soul. One thinks
that everyone has his own psychology. One would be better off, in this second
usage, to give it the name it could be given. Let’s make no mistake – psychoanalysis
isn’t an egology. From the Freudian perspective of man’s relationship
to language, this ego isn’t at all unitary, synthetic. It’s decomposed,
rendered complex in various agencies – the ego, the superego, the id. It
would certainly be inappropriate to make each of these terms a little subject
in its own right, which is a crude myth that makes no advance, illuminates


Freud could not have been in any doubt about the dangers confronting his
work. When, in 1938, he took up his pen for his final preface to Moses and
Monotheism he added a very curious note -1 do not share, he says, the opinion
of my contemporary Bernard Shaw, who claims that man would be capable of
achieving something only if he could live to be three hundred years old. I do not
believe this prolongation of life would have any advantages unless, as the translation
goes, the conditions of the future were totally transformed. There you have
the sad nature of these translations. In German, this has quite a different
sense – many other thing would have to be profoundly altered, at the base, at the
root, in the determinations of life.12


This note by Freud written when he was old, continuing to pursue his
meditation before leaving his message to decompose, to me appears to echo
the terms in which the chorus accompanies the final steps of Oedipus towards
the little wood of Colonus. Accompanied by the wisdom of the people, he
meditates upon the desires that bring man to pursue shadows, he indicates
that it’s his having strayed that makes him unable even to know where the
woods are. I’m astonished that nobody – except for someone who rendered
this into Latin reasonably well – has ever managed to translate properly the
mi phunat that the chorus then utters.13 It’s reduced to the value of a verse
that says it’s better not to have been born, whereas the sense is absolutely clear
– the only way to overcome all this business of logos, the only way to be rid
of it all, would be not to have been born like this. This is the very sense accompanying
the gesture of the old Freud, when he rejected with his hand any
wish that his life be prolonged.

弗洛依德老年时写的这个注释,当他继续追寻他的沉思,以免他的讯息瓦解消失。对我而言,这个注释迴响这些术语,合唱队伴随着伊狄浦斯的最后的脚步,朝向科伦纳斯的小树林。伊狄浦斯由这些人们的智慧伴随着,他沉思引导人追寻阴间幽魂的各种欲望。他指示著,由于自己曾经迷失,他才会甚至不能够知道,他的树林在哪里。我甚感奇怪,没有人曾经成功地正确翻译合唱队当时表达的这个me phunai,除了有某个人,将这个字合情合理地翻译成拉丁文。这个字被诠释成为一首诗的的价值,内容是说:「人最好当初就不该出生。」这个意涵绝对是清楚的:要克服理性的所有这一切的唯一方法,要摆脱理性的一切掌控的唯一方法,就是像这样,人当初就不应该出生。这个意涵伴随着老年的弗洛依德的身影。当他用他的手,排斥让他寿命延长的任何愿望。

It’s true that somewhere in his work on the Witz, in other words on the
quip, he indicates a reply – Much better not to have been born – unfortunately,
this happens barely once in two hundred thousand.”


I give you this reply.



精神病 274

February 24, 2014

精神病 274

There is a twofold alienation in the movement of Freudian theory.


There is the other as imaginary. It’s here in the imaginary relation with the
other that traditional Selbst-Beimisstsein or self-consciousness is instituted.
There is no way that the unity of the subject can be brought about in this
direction. The ego isn’t even the place, the indication, the rallying point, the
organizing center of the subject. It’s profoundly dissymmetrical to it. Although
it is in this sense that he is going to begin by getting one to understand the
Freudian dialectic – 1 can in no way expect to attain my accomplishment and
my unity from the recognition of an other who is caught up with me in a
relation of mirage.


There is also the other who speaks from my place, apparently, this other
who is within me. This is an other of a totally different nature from the other,
my counterpart.


That’s what Freud contributes.


If this still required confirmation, we would only have to observe the way
in which the technique of the transference is prepared. Everything is designed
to avoid the relation of ego to ego, the imaginary relation that could be established
with the analyst. The subject isn’t face to face with the analyst. Everything
is designed to efface the entire dual, counterpart-to-counterpart relation.


On the other hand, analytic technique derives from the necessity for an
ear, an other, a listener. The analysis of a subject can only be brought about
with an analyst. This is a reminder to us that the unconscious is essentially
speech, speech of the other, and can only be recognized when the other sends
it back to you.


Before I finish I would still like to speak about what Freud added towards
the end of his life, when he had already left his troop of followers behind him
a long time before. I’m unable to doubt for one instant, merely from the
evidence of the style and tone of Freud’s dialogue with all around him, that
he had a profound notion of their radical inadequacy, of their total incomprehension.


There is a period in Freud’s work, between 1920 and 1924, when
he quite simply broke off. He knew that he didn’t have very long to live – he
died at 83 years of age, in 1939 – and he went straight to the heart of the
problem, namely the compulsion to repeat [automatism de repetition].


This notion of repetition is so perplexing for us that one tries to reduce it
to a repetition of needs. If on the contrary we read Freud we see that the
compulsion to repeat was based, as it always had been from the beginning of
his entire theory of memory, on the question raised for him by the insistence
of speech which returns in the subject until it has said its final word, speech
that must return, despite the resistance of the ego which is a defense, that is,
the adherence to the imaginary misconstrual of identification with the other.
Repetition is fundamentally the insistence of speech.



精神病 273

February 24, 2014

精神病 273

The main, unique reference of contemporary analytic theory and practice,
namely the famous so-called pregenital stages of the libido which are thought
to date from the beginning of Freud’s work, date from 1915. “On Narcissism”
dates from 1914.


There can be no mistaking Freud’s intentions in emphasizing the theory
of the ego. It was a question of avoiding two traps. The first is dualism. There
is a kind of mania in some analysts which consists in turning the unconscious
into another ego, a bad ego, a double, a symmetrical counterpart to the ego
– whereas the theory of the ego in Freud is on the contrary designed to show
that what we call our ego is a certain image we have of ourselves, which gives
us a mirage, of totality no doubt. These leading mirages don’t at all orientate
the subject in the direction of so-called profound – an adjective I personally
don’t care for – self-knowledge. The ego’s function is explicitly designated
in Freud as analogous in every way to what in the theory of writing is called
a determinative.


Not all forms of writing are alphabetic. Some are ideophonetic and contain
determinatives. In Chinese a thing like this means something more or less just,
but if you add this, which is a determinative, it becomes to govern. And if
instead of putting in this determinative you put in a different one it means
illness. The determinative emphasizes in a particular way, inserts into a class
of meanings, something that already has its phonetic individuality as a signifier.


Well then, for Freud the ego is precisely a sort of determinative whereby
certain of the subject’s elements are associated with a special function that
appears on the horizon of his theory at that moment, namely aggressiveness,
considered as characteristic of the imaginary relationship with the other in
which the ego constitutes itself through successive and superimposed identifications.
Its variable value, its value as a sign, essentially distinguishes it
from the entity of the organism as a whole. And, indeed, this is the other
trap that Freud was avoiding.


As a matter of fact, even as Freud rallies the personality that speaks in the
unconscious around a center, he wanted to avoid the mirage of the famous
total personality that hasn’t failed to regain the upper hand throughout the
entire American school which continues to relish the term, promoting the
restoration of the primacy of the ego. This is a complete misrecognition of Freud’s teaching.


The total personality is precisely what Freud intends to
characterize as fundamentally foreign to the function of the ego as it has been
regarded by psychologists until now.



精神病 272

February 24, 2014

精神病 272

Freud’s originality, which disconcerts our sentiment but alone enables the
effect of his work to be understood, is his recourse to the letter. This is the
spice in Freud’s discovery and in analytic practice. If some of this hadn’t
fundamentally remained, there would have been nothing left of psychoanalysis
a long time ago. Everything stems from here. Who is this other who
speaks in the subject, of whom the subject is neither the master nor the
counterpart, who is the other who speaks in him? Everything is here.


It’s not enough to say that it’s his desire, for his desire is libido, which,
let’s not forget, above all means whim [lubie], unbounded desire, due to the
fact that he speaks. If there were no signifiers to support this rupture, these
fragmentations, displacements, transmutations, perversions, this insulation
of human desire, the latter would have none of these characteristics that make
up the substance of the signifying material provided by analysis.


Nor is it enough to say that this other is in some way our counterpart, on
the pretext that he speaks the same language as what we may call common
discourse, which is thought to be rational and which, as it happens, sometimes
is. For in this discourse of the other what I take to be me is no longer
a subject but an object. It’s a function of mirage, in which the subject refinds
himself only as misrecognition and negation.


It’s on this basis that the theory of the ego is best understood.

Freud produced it in a number of stages, and one would be wrong to think
that it must date from Das Es.10 Perhaps you’ve already heard mention of the
famous Freudian topography. I fear that you’ve heard only too much mention
of it, since the way it’s interpreted goes in a sense contrary to Freud’s
reason for introducing it. It was in 1914, with his major article “On Narcissism,”
which is prior to this topography that has now come to the foreground,
that Freud constructed a theory of the ego.



精神病 273

精神病 270

February 23, 2014

精神病 270

M. Emil Ludwig wrote a book against Freud, almost defamatory in its
unfairness, in which he evokes the impression of delusional alienation that
one is supposed to get from reading him.81 should almost say that I prefer
such a testimony to the wearing down of the angles, to the softening, reductive
smoothing out being brought about by analytic literature claiming to
follow Freud. The incomprehension, the refusal, the shock displayed by Emil
Ludwig – whether he’s being honest or acting in bad faith doesn’t matter to
us much – is greater testimony than the disintegration of Freud’s work that
is being achieved in the decadence analysis is sliding into.


How has it been possible to omit the fundamental role of the structure of
the signifier? Of course, we understand why. What is expressed within the
apparatus and the play of signifiers is something that comes from the bowels
of the subject, which can be called his desire. As soon as this desire is caught
up in the signifier it’s a signified desire. And thus we are all fascinated by the
meaning of this desire. And we forget, despite Freud’s reminders, the apparatus
of the signifier.


精神病 270
Freud emphasizes, however, that the elaboration of the dream is what makes
the dream the leading model of symptom formation. Now, this elaboration
bears a strong resemblance to a logical and grammatical analysis, just slightly
more erudite than what we did at school. This register is the normal level of
Freudian work. It’s the very register that makes linguistics the most advanced
of the human sciences, provided one is simply prepared to acknowledge that
what is distinctive about positive science, modern science, isn’t quantification
but mathematization and specifically combinatory, that is to say linguistic,
mathematization which includes series and iteration.


This is what stands out in Freud’s work. Without it nothing of what he
subsequently develops is so much as thinkable.


I’m not alone in saying this. We have recently published the first volume
of the journal in which we inaugurate our attempt to renew the Freudian
inspiration, and you can read there that at the bottom of the Freudian mechanisms
one rediscovers these old figures of rhetoric which over time have
come to lose their sense for us but which for centuries elicited a prodigious
degree of interest. Rhetoric, or the art of oration, was a science and not just
an art. We now wonder, as if at an enigma, why these exercises could have
captivated whole groups of men for such a long time. If this is an anomaly
it’s analogous to the existence of psychoanalysts, and it’s perhaps the same
anomaly that’s involved in man’s relationships to language, returning over
the course of history, recurrently, with different ramifications and now presenting
itself to us from a scientific angle in Freud’s discovery. Freud
encountered it in his medical practice when he came upon this field in which
the mechanisms of language can be seen to dominate and organize the construction
of certain so-called neurotic disorders, unbeknown to the subject,
outside his conscious ego.



精神病 269

February 23, 2014

精神病 269
As a matter of fact, nobody was taken in by it. Psychoanalysis does in fact
manifest something of the positive spirit of science qua explanatory. Psychoanalysis
is as far removed as is possible from any form of intuitionism. It has
nothing to do with this hasty, short-circuited understanding that so simplifies
and limits its significance. To put it back into its proper perspective, one
only has to open Freud’s work and see-the place that a particular dimension,
which has never been really emphasized, has there. The value of this for
opposing the current evolution of analysis can now be recognized, named,
and orientated towards a real reform of analytic studies.


I shall light my lantern and I’ll tell you what this is in a way that attempts
to be both rapid and striking.


Open The Interpretation of Dreams, You will find nothing there resembling
this graphology of children’s drawings that has ended up becoming the paradigm
of analytic interpretation, none of these ascending and descending
manifestations of the waking dream. If there is anything this resembles, it’s
deciphering. And the dimension in question is that of the signifier. Take any
of Freud’s dreams and you will see that a word, such as Autodidasker, predominates.


6 This is a neologism. From here we get Lasker, plus a number of
other memories. The very form of the word is absolutely essential where
interpretation is concerned. An initial interpretation, an orientation or a
dichotomy, will direct us towards Lassalle. Here one discovers Alex, Freud’s
brother, through the intermediary of another, purely phonetic and verbal
transformation. Freud finds in his recollection a novel by Zola in which a
character by the name of Sandoz appears. In the way Freud reconstructs it,
Zola constructed Sandoz out of Aloz, the anonym of his name, by replacing
Aloz the beginning of Alexander, by the third syllable sand. Thus, just as it
was possible to make Sandoz from Zola, so Alex is included in the Lasker that
Freud dreamed as the last part of the word Autodidasker.

这是一个新杜撰的字。从这里,我们得到Lasker这个字。外加许多其他的记忆。就梦的解析而言,这个字的形式绝对是必要的。最初的解析,一种定向,或一种二分法,将会引导我们朝向Lassalle。在此,我们发现亚力克,他是弗洛依德的弟弟,经由另外一个字的中介,纯粹是语音与文词的转换。弗洛依德在他的回忆里找到一本左拉写的小说。在这部小说里,一位名叫桑豆兹Sandoz的人物出现。以弗洛依德建构它的方式,左拉用他的名字的笔名 Aloz这个字,来建构桑豆兹Sandoz。他用第三音节sand,来取代Aloz,作为Alexander这个字的开始。因此,正如有可能用左拉Zola这个人,来建构桑豆兹Sandoz,阿力克Alex这个字也被包含在拉斯科Lasker这个字里。弗洛依德梦见这个Lasker,作为Autodidasker这个字的最后部分。

I’m telling you what Freud did. I’m telling you how his method proceeds.
And, as a matter of fact, one only has to open any page of the book, The
Traumdeutung, to find an equivalent. I could have taken any other dream, the
one for example where he speaks of jokes that have been made on his name,
or the one that features a swimming bladder.7 You will always find a sequence
of homonyms or metonyms, of onomastic constructions that are absolutely
essential to an understanding of the dream and without which it dissipates,

我正在告诉你们弗洛依的做些什么。我正在告诉你们他的方法如何进行。事实上,我们只要打开「梦的解析」这本书的任何一页, 我们就会找到一个相等语。我还可以拿任何其它一个梦为例,譬如,在一个梦里,他谈论到人家对他的名字所开的玩笑。或是以一个正在游泳的胆囊作为特色的笑话。你们总是会发现一系列的同音异词或是换喻,一系列的专有名词的建构。它们是必要的,为了理解这个梦。假如没有它们,梦会散开消失。