Archive for December, 2008

Zizek 04

December 8, 2008

Organs without bodies by Zizek 紀傑克:沒有身體的器官

Translated by Springhero 雄伯譯

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

Memes, Memes Everywhere

模擬,模擬,到處都是模擬

 

In the 1990s, a Japanese toy called tamagochi was very popular. It reduced the other with whom we communicate ( usually a pet animal) to a purely virtual presence on a screen. The game played with it involves acting as if there is a real, living creature behind the screen—we get excited, cry for it, although we know very well that there is nothing behind, just a meaningless digital network. If we take seriously what we just said, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the Other Person with whom we communicate is ultimately also a kind of tamagochi. When we communicate with another subject, we get signals from him, we observe his face as a screen, but, not only do we, partners in communication, never get to know what is “ behind the screen”; the same goes for the concerned subject himself ( i.e., the subject does not know what lies behind the screen of his very own ( self) consciousness, what kind of a Thing he is in the Real! ( Self) consciousness is a surface-screen that products the effect of “ depth,” of a dimension beneath it. And yet, this dimension is accessible only from the standpoint of the surface, as a kind of surface-effect; if we effectively reach behind the screen, the very effect of the “ depth of a person” dissolves. What we are left with is just a set of meaningless processes that are neuronal, biochemical, and so forth. For that reason, the usual polemics about the respective roles of “ genes versus environment” ( of biology versus cultural influence, of nature versus nurture) in the formation of the subject misses the key dimension, namely, that of the interface that both connects and distinguishes the two. The “ subject” emerges when the “ membrane,” the surface that delimits the Inside from the Outside—instead from the Outside—instead of being just a passive medium of their interaction—starts to function as their active mediator.

 

在九十年代,一種被稱為電子雞的日本玩具非常流行。它將我們溝通的對象(通常是寵物)簡化成為在螢幕上純粹虛擬的存在。這個遊戲好似有一個真實的活生生的動物在螢幕背景後,我們為之興奮哭泣,雖然明知背後啥都沒有,只是無意義的數位網絡。假如我們剛才所說的認真看待,我們無法避免這個結論:我們平常溝通的對方終究也是一種電子雞。當我們跟另外一個主體溝通,我們從他那裡得到訊號,我們察言觀色當著螢幕,但是我們作為溝通的伙伴,我們不但不知「螢幕背後」是什麼,對於相關的主體也是一樣(例如,主體不知道他自己意識的螢幕背後是什麼,在真實界他是何許人也。)自我意識是一種表面螢幕,產生底下向量的的「深度」效應。可是,這種向量只能從表面的標準才能靠近當著表面效應。假如我們有效地達到螢幕背後,「一個人的深度」的效應就會瓦解。我們所剩餘的只是一堆無意義的過程,像中子及生化等等。因此,在形成一個主體時,「基因對抗環境」(生物對抗文化影響,自然對抗教養)所扮演的各別角色的通常爭辯常忽略這個關鍵的向量,換言之,連接及區別兩端的介面向量。「主體」會出現,當「薄膜」,也就是除掉內外界線的表面,開始充當他們主動的中介者時,而不僅僅是被動的互動媒介。

 

   The conclusion is then that, even if science defines and starts to manipulate the human genome, this will not enable it to dominate and manipulate human subjectivity. What makes me “ unique” is neither my genetic formula nor the way my dispositions were developed due to the influence of the environment but the unique self-relationship emerging out of the interaction between the two. More precisely, even the word is not quite adequate here, insofar as it still implies the mutual influence of two given sets of positive conditions ( genes and environment), thus failing to cover the crucial feature of Selbst-Beziehung ( the self-referential loop due to which, in the way I relate to my environment, I never reach the “ zero-level” of being passively influenced by it, since, instead, I always –already relate to myself in relating to it, that is, I always-already, with a minimum of “ freedom,” determines in advance the way I will be determined by the environment, up to the most elementary level of sensible perceptions). The way I “ see myself,” the imaginary and symbolic features that constitute my “ self-image” ( or, even more fundamentally, the fantasy that provides the ultimate coordinate of my being), is neither in the genes nor imposed by the environment but in the unique way each subject relates to himself, “ chooses himself,” in relationship to his environs, as well as to ( what he perceives as ) his “ nature.”

  

    結論因此是,即使科學界定並開始操控人類的基因,它也不能夠支配或操控人的主體性。我之所以「獨特」,既不在於我的基因公式,也不在於由於環境的影響所發展的我的性情的方式,而是在於兩者之間互動所出現的獨特自我關係。更準確地說,即使是「互動」這個字眼都未盡貼切。因為它依舊暗示兩組特定條件的互相影響(基因跟環境),因此未能涵蓋自我的特徵(自我指涉的圈套,我跟環境的關係,我從未到達被動被環境影響的「零度」,因為跟環境相關時,我總是已經先跟我自己相關,換言之,我總是已經擁有少量的「自由」,事先決定我被環境決定的方式,我有基本的認知的感覺。)我「看待自己」的方式,組成我「自我形象」的想像及符號特徵(跟基本地說,供應我存在的最後座標的幻見),既不是在基因,也不是環境所賦予,而是在每個主體如何自我相關,「自行選擇」跟環境相關,及跟自己所認知的「天性」相關。

 

   We are thus dealing with a kind of “ bootstrap” mechanism that cannot be reduced to the interaction of myself as a biological entity and my environment; a third mediating agency emerges ( the subject, precisely), that has no positive substantial Being since, in a way, its status is purely “ performative” ( i.e., it is a kind of self-inflamed flame, nothing but the outcome of its activity—what Fichte called a Tathandlung, the pure act of self-referential Selbst-Setzung). Yes,  I emerge through the interaction between my biological bodily base and my environs—but, what both my environs and my bodily base are  is always “ mediated” by my activity. It is interesting to note how today’s most advanced cognitive scientists take over ( or, rather, develop out of their own research) this motif of minimal self-reference that the great German Idealists were trying to formulate in terms of “ transcendental spontaneity.” So, in the case of human clones ( or, already today, of identical twins), what accounts for the uniqueness of each of them is not simply that they were exposed to different environments but the way that each of them formed a unique structure of self-reference out of the interaction between his genetic substance and his environment.

 

   我們因此所處理的是一種「拔襪帶」機械,無法被化簡到自我的互動是生物的實體及環境:還有第三個仲介機構出現(準確地說就是主體),它沒有正面的實質存在,因為它的地位在某方面是「生成的」(例如,它是一種自我燃燒的火焰,僅是它行動的結果,菲希特所謂自我指涉的純粹行動。)是的,透過我生物的身體跟我的環境的互動,我才出現。但是我的環境跟我的身體總是要先由我的動作來「仲介」。我們感到興趣地注意到,這個基本的自我指涉的主題,以前是德國唯心論哲學家設法用「超驗的自發性」來詮釋,今天由最先進的認知科學家接管(或經由他們研究的發展)。所以就基因(或同卵雙胞胎)而言,他們獨特性的解釋不僅僅是,他們暴露在不同的環境,而是他們各別用他的基因材料跟境的互動,組成一個獨特的結構。

 

   The Deleuzian topic of pseudo cause can thus be correlated to the Hegelian notion of the ( retroactive) positing of presuppositions: the direct causality is that of the real interaction of bodies, whereas the pseudo causality is that of retroactively positing the agent’s presuppositions, of ideally assuming what is already imposed on the agent. And what if this also accounts for the emergence of the Subject as a free/autonomous agent? The only “ real” causality occurs at the bodily level of interacting multitudes, while the Subject acts as a “ pseudo cause” that creates events in an autonomous way—again, Deleuze here comes unexpectedly close to Hegel. In the modern sciences, this closed circle of the self-referential “ positing ( of ) the presuppositions,” which Hegel already perceived as the fundamental characteristic of a living entity, is designated as “ autopoiesis”; in a kind of retroactive loop, the result ( the living entity) generates the very material conditions that engender and sustain it. In the tradition of German Idealism, the living organism’s relation to its external other is always-already its self-relationship ( i.e., each organism “ posits” its presupposed environment.)

 

    德勒茲所謂假原因的議題跟黑格爾預設的(反動)關念密切相關:直接的因果律是身體真實互動的因果律,而假原因的因果律則是反動地提出代理者的預設,理念上假設代理者所已經賦予的東西。這樣即使能解釋主體的出現當著是自由或自動的代理者又如何?唯一「真正」的因果律會發生在互動多重性的身體層次,而主體則充當「假原因」,以自主的方式創造事件。在這一點,德勒茲出乎意料地接近黑格爾的說法。在現代科學,這種自我指涉的「提出預設」的封閉圈套,黑格爾曾認為是生命實體的基本特徵,被指明是「自體更生」;以一種反動的圈套,結果(生命實體)產生物質條件,再由物資條件產生及維持生命實體的結果。在德國唯心論哲學的傳統,生命有機體跟它外在它者的關係總是已經在它的自我關係(例如,每個有機體「提出」它預設的環境)。

 

    The problem with this autopoietic notion of life, elaborated by Maturana and Verela in their classic Autopoiesis and Cognition, does not reside in the question “ Does this notion of autopoiesis effectively overcome the mechanistic paradigm?” but, rather, in the question “ how are we to pass from this self-enclosed loop of Life to ( Self) Consciousness?” Other ( Self-consciousness also reflexive, self-relating in its relationship to an Other. However this reflexivity is thoroughly different from the organism’s self-enclosure. A ( self-) conscious living being displays what Hegel calls the infinite power of Understanding, of abstract ( and abstracting) thought—it is able, in its thoughts, to tear apart the organic Whole of Life, to submit it to a mortifying analysis, to reduce the organism to its isolated elements. ( Self) consciousness thus reintroduces the dimension of Death into organic Life; language itself is a mortifying “ mechanism” that colonizes the Organism. ( This, according to Lacan, is what Freud was after in his hypothesis on the “ death drive.” It was ( again) already Hegel who formulated this tension ( among other places) at the beginning of the chapter on Self-Consciousness in his Phenomenology of Spirit, in which he opposed the two forms of “ Life” qua self-relating through relating to the Other: ( organic-biological) life, and ( self) consciousness. The true problem is not ( only ) how to pass from preorganic matter to life but how life itself can break its autopoietic closure and ex-statically turn into the mortifying objectivization of Understanding). The problem is not Life but the Death-in-Life ( “ tarrying with the negative”) of the speaking organism.

 

   莫丘蘭達跟范銳拉在他們經典「自體更生及認知」中,所構想的生命自體更生這個觀念的問題,並不在於「自體更生的觀念能有效地克服機械範例嗎?」,而是在這個問題「我們如何從生命這個自我封閉的圈套傳遞到自我意識?」自我意識在跟一個它者相關時的自我關係時,也是反射性的。可是,這個反射性完全不同於有機體的自我封閉。一個(自我)意識的生命展示黑格爾所謂的理解的無限力量,抽象的思想。在思想中它能夠拆解生命的有機整體,並將它做令人羞任辱的分析,將有機體化簡到孤立的元素。(自我)意識因此重新介紹死亡的向量到有機生命:語言本身就是一個令人羞辱的「機械」殖民化這個有機體。(依照拉岡的說法,這是佛洛依德在論「死亡驅力」的假設時所追求的。)黑格爾在「精神現象學」論自我意識這一章的開始,也已經說明這個緊張。在此,他將生命的兩個形式,透過跟大它者相關而自我關係:(有機體跟生物)的生命及(自我)意識。真正的問題不但是如何從有機體之前的物質傳遞到生命,而是生命本身如何突破它自體更生的封閉,動態地開始更它外在的大它者相關(這個動態的開放也轉變成理解的令人羞辱的客觀化)。這個問題不是生命,而是生命中的死亡,言說主體的(負面等待)。

 

    Within the history of biology, this topic of autopoiesis is part of the “ idealist” tendency of hylozoism: everything that exists, the whole of nature, is alive—it suffers and enjoys. There is no death in this universe; what happens in the case of “ death” is just that a particular coordination of living elements disintegrates, whereas Life goes on, both the Life of the Whole and the lif of the elementary constituents of reality. ( The Sadean “ absolute crime” aims at destroying precisely this second life that survives biological death. We find this position from Aristotle ( his notion of soul as the One-Form of the body) and traditional Soticism through Denis Diderot ( for whom even stones feel pain; it’s just that we don’t hear them—reminding us of the ingenious Patricia Highsmith short story about a woman who wa able to hear the trees shouting when being cut down) and the Schellingian Romantic notion of the World-Soul, up to the whole panoply of today’s theories, from the notion of Gaia (Earth as a living organism) to Deleuze, the last great philosopher of the One, the “ body without organs” that thrives in the multitude of its modalities. One should also add to this series thinkers as different as Francisco Varela, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger, who all search for the unity of body and subject, the point at which the subject directly ( is” his or her body.

 

    在生物的歷史中,自體更生的議題萬有生命論的「唯心論」傾向:存在的萬物,自然界整體,都是有生命的,它會痛苦及歡樂。在宇宙中沒有死亡;在「死亡」的狀況所發生的僅僅是,生命元素的特別座標瓦解而已,生命仍然繼續,不管是整體的生命或是現實界基本成分的生命。(沙德所謂「終極的罪」目標就是要毀滅這個生物死亡之後的第二個生命。)我們也找個這個立場,從亞力斯多德(他將靈魂當著身體的一種形式)及傳統禁欲學派,到狄特羅(對他而言,即使石頭都能感受痛苦,只是我們沒有聽見。這讓我們想到天才橫溢的海史密斯的短篇小說,描寫一位女人能夠聽見樹被砍伐時的喊叫),以及謝林對於世界靈魂的浪漫想法,一直到今天理論的整個氣氛,從歌亞的觀念(地球作為有生命的機體)到德勒茲這位一體論的最後大師,「沒有器官的身體」靠著眾多補助而生存。我們還有再增加一些不同的思想家,維銳拉、龐帝、海徳格。他們都尋求身體與主體的一致性,此時主體直接就是他或是她的身體。

 

    Against this tradition stands the Cartesian tradition to which Lacan fully subscribes: the body exists in the order of having I am not my body, I have it, and this gap renders possible the Gnostic dream of Virtual Reality in which I will be able to shift from one to another virtual body. For Lacan, the key implication of the Cartesian reduction of the body to res extensa is that jouissance is evacuated from bodies, in contrast to mylozoism, in which the body enjoys itself; “ ca jouit,” as Lacan and Deleuze put it. In today’s science and technology, a “ body in pieces” is emerging, a composite of replaceable organs ( pacemakers, artificial limbs, transposed skin, heart, liver, and other transplants—up to the prospect of genetically cultivatd reserve organs). This trend culminates in today’s biogenetics: the lesson of the genome project is that the true center of a living body is not its Soul but its genetic algorithm. It was already Wismann, one of Freud’s key references, who, more than one hundred years ago, established the distinction between an organism’s “ mortal” and “ immortal” parts; its “ soma,” the external body-envelope that grows and disintegrates, and the “ germ-cells,” the genetic component that reproduces itself, remaining the same from one to another generation. Richard Dawkins provided the ultimate formula of this distinction with his notion of the “ the selfish gene”: it is not that individual organisms use their genes to replicate themselves; it is, on the contrary, individual organisms that are the means for the genes to reproduce themselves.

 

     拉岡所認同的笛卡爾的傳統跟這個傳統剛好相反:身體存在於擁有的秩序,我的存在不是身體,而是擁有身體。這個差距使得諾斯神秘教派的虛擬真實界成為可能:我能夠從一個虛擬身體轉移到另一個虛擬身體。對於拉岡,笛卡爾將身體化簡到生理層次,關鍵的意涵是:從身體可以得到歡樂,不同於萬有生命論的:身體享受自己。如拉岡跟德勒茲所說的:自己爽。在今天的科學跟科技,「零件的身體」正在出現。一種可替代器官的組合(心臟起搏器、人工義肢、移植皮膚、心臟、肝、及其它移植,直到基因培育的預備器官。)這種趨勢在今天的基因學達到巔峰。基因計畫的教導是:身體生命的真實中心不是它的靈魂,而是它基因的軌跡。佛洛依德常引用的韋思曼,在一百多年前已經區別有機體「會腐朽」及「不朽」的部份:它的「細胞體」,外在的皮囊會成長及瓦解,及「細菌胞」,基因的成份會繁殖自己,從一代到另一代都保持一樣。李查、道慶對於這個區別用「自私基因」的觀念,提供一個最後的公式:不是各別的有機體使用它們的基因來複製自己,相反的,個別的有機體才是基因複製自己的工具。

 

   The properly materialist problem is, How does subjectivity emerge in this reproductive cycle of genes? The line from germ to genome radicalizes the notion of the body within a body, of the real “ immortal” body persisting, reproducing itself, through the generation and corruption of passing mortal bodies. The Lacanian subject is neither the organic Form-Soul—one of the body, nor the germ-genome, the body within the body. The emergence of subjectivity introduces a complication here. Richard Dawkins tries to elaborate a parallel between genes and memes—in the same way bodies are just means for the reproduction of genes, individuals are just means qua elementary units of meaning. The problem here is that, with the symbolic order, the passing individual is not just S, the soma, the disposable envelope, but $ , the barred subject, the self-relating negativity that perverts/inverts the natural order, introducing a radical “ pathological “ imbalance. It is the individual who uses the memes for his or her own purposes. “ Memes” the ( symbolic tradition) are a secondary attempt to reintroduce a kind of stability and order, to reestablish the proper subordination of the particular to the universal, that was disturbed by the emergence of subjectivity: “ subject” is the mortal vanishing accident that posits itself as a infinite end-in-itself.

 

    典型唯物論的問題是:在這個基因的繁殖循環中,主體性如何出現?從細菌到細胞的演變激化一些觀念,像身體中的身體,真正的「不朽」持續下去,繁殖自己,透過會腐朽身體的代代傳承。拉岡的主體既不是有機的靈魂形式,身體的一種,也不是細菌及細胞,身體中的身體。主體性的出現在此介紹一個併發症。李查、道慶設法構想一個基因跟模擬之間的對比,就像是身體只是基因繁殖的工具,個人只是作為意義基本單位的工具。在此的問題是,以這種符號的秩序,過程中的個人不僅僅是某甲,可用完即丟的細胞體皮囊,而是被禁制的某甲人,自我相關的負面使自然的秩序變態或倒轉,介紹一種激進的「病理學」的不平衡。這個個人使用模擬來當他或她自己的目的。「模擬」(符號的傳統)是其次的企圖要重新介紹一種穩定跟秩序,重新建立從特殊到普及的受到主體性出現而被擾亂的適當座標:主體是會腐朽的消失意外,現在提出自己當著無限的目標本身。

 

    One should be careful not to miss the specific level of the notion of memes. A “ memes” spreads neither because of its actual beneficial effects upon its bearers( say, those who adopt it are more successful in life and thus gain an upper hand in the struggle for survival) nor because of its characteristics that make it subjectively attractive to its bearers ( one would naturally tend to give privilege to the idea that promises happiness over the idea that promises nothing but misery and renunciation). Like a computer virus, the meme proliferates simply by programming its own retransmission. Recall the classic example of two missionaries working in a politically stable and opulent country. One says, “ The end is near—repent or you will suffer immensely, “ whereas the other’s message is just to enjoy a happy life. Although the second one’s message is much more attractive and beneficent, the first one will win—why? Because, if you really believe that the end is near, you will exert a tremendous effort to convert as many people as possible, whereas the other belief does not require such an extreme engagement in proselytizing. What is so unsettling about this notion is that we, humans endowed with mind, well, and an experience of meaning, are nonetheless unwitting victims of a “ thought contagion” that operates blindly, spreading itself like a computer virus. No wonder that, when talking about memes, Dennett regularly resorts to the same metaphors as Lacan apropos of language: in both cases, we are dealing with a parasite that penetrates and occupies the human individual, using it for its own purposes. And, effectively, does “ memetics” not ( re)discover the notion of a specifi symbolic level that operates outside ( and, consequently, cannot be reduced to) the standard couple of objective biological facts ( beneficent “ real” effects) and subjective experience ( the attraction of the meaning of a meme)? In a liminal case, an idea can spread even if, in the long term, it brings only destruction to its bearers and is even experienced as unattractive.

 

我們應該小心不要忽略模擬的觀念這明確的層次。模擬會擴大,不是因為它本身對於模擬者有實際的利益(例如,使用模擬的人生涯更成功,因此在生存鬥爭中佔上風。)也不是因為它的特性主觀上吸引模擬者(我們當然會認可給我們帶來幸福的觀念,勝過於僅僅帶來悲慘跟捨棄的觀念。)像電腦病毒,模擬僅僅憑藉程式一再轉變來繁殖。回想一下兩位在政治穩定而富裕的國家工作的傳教士的經典例子。其中一位說:「末日已經到了。懺悔吧,否則會痛苦萬分。」而另一位的訊息只是享受你的生命。雖然第二個訊息更加迷人而有益,第一個訊息會贏。為什麼?因為假如你真的末日來臨,你會盡巨大努力改變更多人的信仰,而另一外那一種信仰並沒有要求這樣一種激進的參與改變信仰。這個觀念讓人不安的地方在於,我們作為具有心靈的人類竟然不智地會成「思想疫病」的受害者,當這種疫病像電腦病毒般地擴散。難怪,談到模擬時,鄧尼慣常地使用跟拉岡談到語言時的相同的比喻。兩種情形都是在處理貫穿並佔據人類個人作為己用的寄生物。就效用而言,模擬難道不是重新發現運作在外的明確符號的觀念,結果無法被化簡成為兩三個客觀的生物的事實(有利益的真實效果)及主觀的經驗(模擬意義的吸引人)?就引發的情形而言,一個觀念能夠擴散,即使它最後會帶來毀滅給模擬者,甚至被當著不愉快的經驗。

 

    Is there not a surprising parallel between this notion of memes and the Marxist-Hegelian notion of alienation? In the same way memes, misperceived by us, subjects, as means of our communication, effectively run the show ( they use us to reproduce and multiply themselves), productive forces, which appear to us as means to satisfy our needs and desires, effectively run the show. The true aim of the process, its end-in-itself, is the development of the productive forces, and the satisfaction of our needs and desires( i.e., hat appears to us as the goal) is effectively ust the means for the development of the productive forces. This reversal, unbearable to our narcissism, is paradigmatic of modern science, of its production of knowledge that is, in a way, too traumatic t be incorporated into the beliefs which structure our daily lives. Already, quantum physics can no longer be : understood: ( its results cannot be integrated into our everyday view of reality). The same goes for biogenetics. Although we accept its truth, we simultaneously maintain toward it the attitude of fetishist disavowal. We refuse to believe not in a religious doctrine beyond scientific knowledge but in what scientific knowledge itself is telling us about ourselves.

 

   在模擬的觀念跟馬克思及黑格爾的疏離觀念之間,難道不是有著令人驚奇的對比?同樣的,模擬被我們主體錯誤地當著是溝通的工具,有效地在運作它的展示(模擬使用我門來繁殖及增倍自己),它的生產力,對於我們似乎是一種滿足我們需要跟慾望的工具,卻是有效地運作它的展示。這個過程的真正目的,本身就是目的,就是生產力的發展,而我們需要跟慾望的滿足(例如,滿足我們的目標。)在效用上洽是生產力發展的工具。這種倒轉,對於我們的自戀是情何以堪,卻是現代科學的典範,知識的生產在某方面是過於令人創傷,跟架構我們日常生活的信仰格格不入。量子物理現在已經不能讓人理解(它的結果不再能合併到現實生活的觀點裏)。生物基因學也是相同情形。雖然我們接受它的真理,我們同時也把它當物神般敬而遠之。我們拒絕相信,不是因為宗教的教條超越科學的知識,而是科學知識的本身所告知我們的令人匪夷所思。

雄伯手記971204b

December 4, 2008

雄伯手記971204b

 

家教學生月考請假,出乎意料地冒出一個星期的空閒。原想搭機到廈門試辦一下落地簽證,恰好又碰到W自台北聽經回來,又開溜不得。只好乖乖待在家裡,翻譯兩三篇德勒茲及紀傑克的哲學,外加將零散的高一高二英作文及克漏字測驗編輯得較有條理。自信心的增加跟心靈充實的感覺絲毫不亞於出去自助旅行。正如德勒茲所說,從混沌中整理出一個秩序出來,本身就深具生產力跟創造力。

 

從東華大學圖書館借到一本羅蘭、巴特的S/Z英譯本。忍不住拿來跟屠友祥中譯本對照一下,發現還是略有出入。

 

“ Paris is a very hospitable place, “ she said, “ It accepts everything, shameful fortunes and bloodstained fortunes. Crime and infamy can find asylum here. Only virtue has no alters here. Yes, pure souls have their home in heaven!

 

「巴黎是個好接納的地方,」她說。「一切事物,可恥的財富也罷,血污的財富也罷,它一概來者不拒。罪惡和醜行都能在這兒得到庇護權。唯獨美德沒有聖壇。是呵,純潔的靈魂在天國自有安身之地!」(屠友祥譯)

 

最後一句明明是祈願句的省略:May pure souls have their home in heaven! (但願純潔的靈魂在天國找到安身之地!)

 

羅蘭、巴特的注釋也是別有心裁:Sublime alibi for castration ( heaven will justify the castrati we have become). Moral code ( virtue is not of the world). 文化符碼:關於閹割的崇高託辭(我們已變成閹人,天國將為咱們這些人提供庇護)。道德符碼:(美德不屬於這個世界。)

 

對於愛情懷有聖潔崇高情操的美德成為「此物只應天上有,人間哪得幾回見」,被羅蘭、巴特振振有理justify用來嘲諷我們猶有嚮往的人為「美德」的閹人。現實情境如此這般,難怪自「薩拉辛」的作者巴爾札克,到評釋者羅蘭,巴特,到咱們讀書尋找崇高託辭sublime alibi的「欠缺愛情美德之根」的閹人,不得不仿效敘述者候爵夫人憂思以終remains pensive

 

 

Zizek 03

December 4, 2008

Organs without bodies by Zizek 紀傑克:沒有身體的器官

Translated by Springhero 雄伯譯

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

When the Fantasy Fails Apart

幻見崩塌時

 

One should here go to a crucial step further into the disintegration of fantasy. David Lynch’s Mulholland Drive perfectly depicts this gradual disintegration. The two main stages of this process are, first, the excessively intense acting in the test scene, and, then, when the autonomous partial object ( “ organ without a body” )emerges in the scene in the nightclub Silenicie. Here, the movement is from the excess, which is still contained in reality although already disturbing it, sticking out of it, to its full autonomization, which causes the disintegration of reality itself; say, from the pathological distortion of a mouth to the mouth leaving the body and floating around as a spectral partial object ( the same as in Syberberg’s Parsifal, in which we pass from the wound on the body to the wound as autonomous organ without a body, outside it). This excess is what Lacan calls lamella, the infinitely plastic object that can transpose itself from one to another medium: from excessive ( trans-semantic) scream to a stain ( or anamorphic visual distortion). Is this not what takes place in Much’s Scream ? The scream is silent, a bone stuck in the throat, a stoppage that cannot be vocalized and can express itself only in the guise of s silent visual distortion, curving the space around the screaming subject.

 

我們應該更進重要的一步探討幻見的崩塌。大衛、林區的「穆荷蘭大道」描述這種逐漸的崩塌,可說是淋漓盡致。這個過程的兩個主要舞台,首先是測試場景的激情演出,然後,當自主的部分客體(沒有身體的器官)出現在「西蘭尼」夜總會的場景。在此,動作已經不再有真實中蘊含的激情,雖然仍受干擾,冒升出來,自主行動,而引起真實本身的崩塌,換言之,嘴巴一個個病態地變形,離開身體,到處飄蕩當著魅影的部分客體(跟辛伯格的「巴西非」一樣,我們身體上的傷口到外面沒有身體的器官)。這種過度就是拉岡所說的「薄膜」,純粹膠狀般的客體能夠自主地到處轉移,從過度的(語意上的比擬)喊叫,到汙點(或變形的視覺的扭曲)。這不就是孟克的「吶喊」?吶喊是無聲的,骨頭卡在喉嚨,無法發聲的停頓,卻依舊偽裝無聲的視覺扭曲來表達自己,而扭曲吶喊主體四周的空間。

 

    In Silencio, where Betty and Rita go after successfully making love, a singer sings Roy Orbison’s “ Crying” in Spanish. When the singer collapses, the song goes on. At this point, the fantasy collapses too—not in the sense that, from within,  as it were, fantasy loses its mooring in reality and gets autonomized, as a pure spectral apparition of a bodiless “ undead” voice ( a rendering of the Real of the Voice similar to that at the beginning of Sergio Leone’s Once upon a Time in America, in which we see a phone ringing loudly, and, when a hand picks up the receiver, the ringing goes on). The shot of the voice continuing to sing even when its bodily support collapses is the inversion of the famous Balanchine ballet staging of a short piece by Webern: in this staging, the dancing goes on even after the music stops. We have thus, in one case, the voice that insists even when deprived of its bodily support, and, in the other case, the bodily movements that insist even when deprived of their vocal ( musical) support. The effect is not simply symmetrical because, in the first case, we hav the undead vocal drive, the immortal life, going on, whereas in the second case, the figures that continue to dance are “ dead men dancing,” shadows deprived of their life-substance. However, in both cases what we witness is the dissociation between reality and the real; in both cases the Real insists even when reality disintegrates. This real, of course, is the fantasmatic Real at its purest. And, to put it in Deleuzian terms, is this “ autonomization “ of the partial object not the very moment of the extraction of the virtual from the actual? The status of the “ organ without the body” is that of the virtual—in other words, in the opposition between the virtual and the actual, the Lacanian Real is on the side of the virtual.

 

在「西蘭尼」夜總會,貝蒂跟瑞達興奮地做愛,一位歌手以西班牙語哼唱奧彬森的「哭泣」。當歌手崩潰時,歌聲依舊進行。此時,幻見也崩塌,倒不是「迷霧散開,我們重囘清醒的現實」,而是從裡面,幻見失去在真實的停泊點,以沒有器官的「不死」的聲音的純粹魅影方式,自主行動(聲音扭曲真實界類似李昂尼的「美國往事」,我們看到電話大聲鈴響,一隻手拿起聽筒,鈴聲依舊響著)。身體的支持崩塌後,聲音繼續哼唱的拍攝,跟了維伯的著名芭蕾舞短片相反:在舞台上,音樂已經停止,舞蹈繼續。在前者,喪失身體的支持後,聲音堅持下去;在後者,喪失他們的聲音(音樂)的支持後,身體的動作堅持下去。這種效果不僅僅是均稱,在前者,我們有不死的聲音驅力,不朽的生命進行下去;在後者,持續舞蹈的身體是「死亡者之舞」,喪失他們生命精髓的幽魂。可是,在兩種情形裡,我們都見證到現實界與真實界的分裂。在兩種情形裡,即使現實界崩塌,真實界持續下去。這個真實界當然是將幻見的真實界表現得淋漓盡致。用德樂茲的術語來說,部份客體的「自主化」難道不就是虛擬從現實中抽離出來?「沒有身體的器官」的地位就是虛擬的地位。換言之,在虛擬與現實的對立時,拉岡的真實界是站在虛擬這一邊。

 

   Of course, in all of these cases, the shock effect is followed by an explanation that relocates it back within ordinary reality. In the night club scene in Mulholland Drive, we are warned at the very outset that we are listening to prerecorded music, that the singers just mimic the act of singing; in the case from Leone, the phone we continue to hear ringing after the receiver is picked up is another phone, and so forth. However, what is nonetheless crucial is that, for a short moment, part of reality was (mis)perceived as a nightmarish apparition—and, in a way, this apparition was “ more real than reality itself,” since, in it, the Real shone through. In short, one should discern which part of reality is “ transfunctionalized” through fantasy, so that, although it is part of reality, it is perceived in a fictional mode. Much more difficult than to denounce/unmask ( what appears as ) reality as fiction is to recognize in “ real” reality the part of fiction. Is this not what happens in transference, in which, while we relate to a “ real person: in front of us, we effectively relate to the fiction of, say our father? Recall also Home Alone especially part two. In both parts, there is a cut two-thirds into the film; although the story seems to take place in a continuous diegetic place, it is clear that, with the final confrontation between the small kid and the two robbers, we enter a different ontological realm, a plastic cartoon-space in which there is no death, in which may head can explode, yet I go on as normal in the next scene. Again, part of reality is fictionalized.

 

當然,在所有的情形,震撼效應到頭來還是會被現實界重新被要回去。在「穆荷蘭大道」夜總會的場景,我們一開頭就被警告,我們聽到的是預先錄好的音樂,歌手只是模擬歌唱的動作。在李昂尼的情形,在聽筒已被取下,我們所聽到的電話鈴聲是另外一部電話,等等。可是,重要的是,有那麼一段時刻,部份的現實界被認為或誤認為是夢魘的魅影,而且在某方面,這個魅影比現實界還要更真實,因為真實在裡面光耀。總之,我們應該覺察到,現實界有哪個部份是藉由幻見來「超越功用」,這樣它雖然是現實界的部份,它可被感覺像是幻想模式。除了揭開及抨擊(看起來似乎是)現實界,更困難的是要在「真實」的現實界辯認出幻想的部份。這在移情時時常發生,當我們提到我們面前「真實的人」,我們所提的其實是我們的幻想,例如就父親而言。也回顧一下「獨自在家」這部小說,特別是第二章。這兩章有三分之二被改編成電影。雖然故事似乎是在不斷描述中發生,很明顯的,隨著小孩跟強盜的最後衝突,我們進入不同的本體領域,一個膠狀的沒有死亡的卡通空間,我的頭會爆炸,可是下一場景,我仍舊繼續。再一次,部份的現實界被幻想化。

 

   It is such a fictionalized partial object that also serves as the support of voice. In his advice to young composers, Richard Wagner wrote that, after elaborating the contours of the musical piece one wants to compose, one should erase everything and just focus one’s mind on a lone head floating freely in a dark void and wait for the moment when this white apparition starts to move its lips and sing. This music should be the germ of the work to be composed. Is this procedure not that of getting the partial object to sing? It is not a person’s ( a subject)—the object itself should start to sing.

 

   就是如此一個幻想化的部份客體也充當聲音的支持。李察;華格納有一次勸告年輕作曲家寫到,構想好我們想要作曲的音樂劇的輪廓後,我們應該抹除一切,專注於一個孤獨的頭顱自由地在黑暗的空無中飄蕩,等待這個白色魅影開始移動嘴唇歌唱的時刻。這個音樂應該就是所作之曲的開端。這種程序難道不就是使部份客體開始歌唱的程序嗎?那不是一個人(主體),而是客體本身應該開始歌唱。

Zizek 02

December 2, 2008

Looking Awry by Zizek 紀傑克:歪斜看

Translated by Springhero                        雄伯譯

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

 

The Woman Does Not Exist

那位女人不存在

 

  Given the central status of deception in relation to the symbolic order, one has to draw a radical conclusion the only way not to be deceived is to maintain a distance from the symbolic order, i.e., to assume a psychotic position. A psychotic is precisely a subject who is not duped by the symbolic order.

 

   假如考慮到欺騙跟符號秩序相關的地位,我們必須得到一個激進的結論:唯一不要被欺騙的方法就是跟符號秩序保持距離,換言之,採取變態的立場。變態狂準確就是不被符號秩序欺騙的人。

 

   Let us approach this psychotic position via Hitchcock’s The Lady Vanishes, probably the most beautiful and effective variation on the theme of the “ disappearance that everybody denies.” The story is usually told from the point of view of a hero who, quite by chance, becomes acquainted with a pleasant, somewhat eccentric person; soon afterward, this person disappears and when the hero tries to find him or her, all those who saw them together remember nothing about the other ( or even remember positively that the hero was alone), so that the very existence of this missing person passes for a hallucinatory  idée fixe of the hero. In his conversations with Truffaut, Hitchcock himself mentions the original of this series of variations; it is the story of an old lady who  disappeared from her hotel room in Paris in 1880, at the time of the Great Exhibition. After the Lady Vanishes, the most famous variation is undoubtedly Cornell Woolrich’s roman noir, Phantom Lady, in which the hero spends the evening with a beautiful, unknown woman whom he encounters at a bar. This woman, who subsequently disappears and whom no on will admit seeing, turns out to be the only alibi the hero has to encounter a charge of murder.

 

    讓我們藉由希區考克的「失蹤疑雲」可能是最美麗生動的描繪有關「人人否認的失蹤」的主題。這故事通常是主角的觀點敘述。他偶然地結識一位爽朗卻怪僻的人,不久這個人失蹤。當主角設法尋找他或她時,所有看見過他們在一起的人都否認記得認何事情(有些人甚至肯定地說主角是單獨的)。因此這個失蹤者的存在被認為是主角的幻想。跟特拉佛談話時,希區考克提到這一系列主題的原先出處是1880年巴黎博覽會時,一位老婦人從旅館失蹤。繼「失蹤疑雲」後,最著名的同樣主題影片是吳瑞奇導演的偵探影片「魅影女人」。主角跟一位在酒吧認識的美麗陌生女子過了一夜。這個女子隨後失蹤,沒有人承認見過,卻成為唯一個理由主角必須面對謀殺的控訴。

 

   In spite of the utter improbability of these plots, there is something “ psychologically convincing” about them—as if they touched some chord in our unconscious. To understand the apparent “ rightness” of these plots, we should note first of all that the person who disappears is as a rule a very ladylike woman. It is difficult not to recognize in this phantomlike figure the apparition of Woman, of the woman who could fill out the lack in man, the ideal partner with whom the sexual relationship would finally be possible, in short. The Woman who, according to Lacanian theory, precisely does not exist. The nonexistence of this woman is rendered manifest to the hero by the absence of the inscription in the socio-symbolic network: the intersubjective community of the hero acts as if she does not exist, as if she were only his idee fixe.

  

     儘管這些情節匪夷所思,心理層面還是有些讓人深信不疑之處,好似他們觸及到我們的無意識的共鳴。為了瞭解到這些情節的顯然「合理」,我們首先要注意到,失蹤的人通常是高貴婦人。我們很難不在這個魅影的人物中認出一種女人的魅影,能夠填補男人的欠缺,總之,跟這樣理想的伴侶,性關係最後才成為可能。依照拉岡的理論,這樣的女人並不存在。在社會符號網絡中並沒有銘記使這樣的女人的不存在更為明顯:主角所生存的人際互動的社會表現得她好似不存在,好似她只是他的幻見

 

 

    Where should we locate the “ falsity” and at the same time the attraction, the irresistible charm, of this theme of the “ disappearance which everybody denies”? According to the ordinary ending of this kind of story the lady who disappeared was not, in spite of all evidence to the contrary, simply the hero’s hallucination. In other words, The Woman does exist. The structure of this fiction is the same as that of well-known joke about a psychiatrist to whom a patient complains that there is a crocodile under his bed. The psychiatrist tries to convince the patient that this is just a hallucination , that in reality there is no crocodile under his bed. At the next secession, the man persists in his complaints and the psychiatrist continues his efforts of persuasion. When the man doe not come for the third session, the psychiatrist is convinced that the patient has been cured. Some time later, upon meeting one of the man’s friends, the psychiatrist asks him how his former patient is doing, the friend replies: “ Whom do you mean exactly. The won who was eaten by a crocodile?”

   

    對於這「人人否認的失蹤」的主題,我們該從那裡找出「虛假」的位置,而同時又覺得其迷人及無法抗拒的魅力?依照這種故事的普通結局,失縱的女人其實沒有失蹤,儘管相反的證據,只是主角的幻想。換言之,女人確實存在。這種幻想影片的結構類同於一個精神分析師的著名笑話:一位病人抱怨床下有隻鱷魚。精神分析師設法說服病人,這只是幻想,實際上,在他床下並沒有鱷魚。在下次諮商時,那個人持續抱怨,精神分析師繼續說服。第三次那人沒有人,精神分析師相信病人已經痊癒。隔一段時間後,遇到那個人的朋友,精神分析師問他他先前病人的近況。他的朋有回答說:「你是講哪一位?被鱷魚吃掉的那一位?」

 

    At first sight, the point of this kind of story seems to be that the subject was right to oppose the doxa of the other : the truth is on the side of his idée fixe, even though his insistence on it threatened to exclude him from the symbolic community. Such a reading nevertheless obscures an essential feature, which can be approached via another, slightly different variation on the theme of the “ realized hallucination.” Robert Heinlein’s science fiction short “ They.” Its hero, confined to a lunatic asylum, is convinced that the whole of external, objective reality is a gigantic mise-en-scene staged by “ them” in order to dupe him. All the people around him are part of this trickery, including his wife. ( Thing became “clear” to him a few months previously while setting out a Sunday drive with his family. He was already in the car, it was raining outside, when he suddenly remembered that he had forgotten some small detail and returned to the house. Casually looking through the rear window on the second floor, he noticed that the sun was shining brightly, and realized that “ they” had made a small mistake by forgetting to stage the rain behind the house!” His benevolent psychiatrist, his lovely wife, all his friends try desperately to bring him back to “ reality”; when he finds himself alone with his wife and she professes her love for him, he is almost duped for an instant into believing her, but his old conviction stubbornly prevails. The end of the story : after leaving him, the women posing as his wife reports to some unidentified agency: “ We failed with subject X, he still has doubts, mainly because of our mistake over the rain-effect: we forgot to arrange it behind his house.”

 

    乍看來,這種故事的要點是主體反對大它者的支配是有道理的。真理是在幻見的這一邊,即使他對於幻見的堅持威脅到使他被排除在符號社會之外。可是這樣的閱讀方式模糊掉一個基本特徵,對於「幻想實現」的主題,我們若是藉由羅勃、海連的科幻短篇故事「他們」,我們可以得到另一種稍微不同的看法。它的主角被拘留在瘋人院,相信整個的外在真實是「他們」展示的巨大的舞台,只是為了詐騙他。所有的人都是詭計的一部份,包括他的太太。(事情變得更加明朗,就在前幾個月,他跟家人星期日出去兜風。他已經在汽車裡,外面下著雨。他突然想起一歇細節,回到房屋。偶爾透過二樓的後窗,他發現到陽光燦爛照耀,然後體會到「他們」犯了一個小錯誤,忘了在屋後展示雨景!)他的善意的精神分析師,他可愛的太太,所有他的朋友都極力將他帶回現實。當他發現跟太太單獨在一起時,她宣稱她愛他,有那麼一瞬間他被誘拐相信她,但是他原有的信念頑強地佔優勢。故事的結局:離開他後,這位扮演他妻子的女人向不明的單位報告:「我們對於X目標失敗,他依舊有懷疑,主要是我們對於雨景效果弄砸。我們忘了在他屋後安排雨景。」

 

   Here, as well as with the joke about the crocodile, the denoument is not interpretive, it does not transpose us into another frame of reference. In the end, we are thrown back to the beginning: the patient is convinced that there is a crocodile under his bed, and there really is a crocodile under his bed: Heinlein’s hero thinks that objective reality a mise-en-scene organized by them.” What we have here is a kind of successful encounter: the final surprise is produced by the fact that a certain gap ( the contents of the hallucination) and “ reality” ) is abolished. This collapse of “ fiction” ( the contents of the hallucination) and “ reality” defines the psychotic universe. It is, however, only the second story ( “ They” that enables us to isolate the crucial feature of the mechanism at work; there the deception of the big Other is located in an agent, another subject ( “ they”) who is not deceived. This subject, who holds and manipulates the threads of the deception proper to the symbolic order, is what Lacan calls “ the Other of the Other.” This other emerges as such, acquires visible existence, in paranoia, in the form of the persecutor supposed to master the game of deception.

  

   跟鱷魚的笑話一樣,這裡的結局並不是解釋性的。它並沒有將我們轉移到另一個解說的架構。最後,我們被拋回到開始:病人相信有鱷魚在他的床下;海連的主角認為客體真實是「他們」組辦的舞台。我們在此所擁有的是一種成功的遭遇:某種差距(分開幻想與現實)被袪除產生了最後的驚奇。「幻想」(幻想的內容)及「真實」的崩塌界定了變態狂的宇宙。可是,這只是「他們」的第二個故事,使我們能夠將運作中的機構的重要特徵孤立出來,大他者的欺騙位於代理人,另外一個沒有被欺騙的主體。擁有及操控符號秩序的欺騙本體,就是拉岡所謂的「大他者的大他者」。這個大他者如此地出現在偏執狂身上,得到可見的存在,以應該事操控欺騙遊戲的迫害者的身分。

 

   Herein lies then the crucial feature the psychotic subject’s distrust of the big Other, his idée foxe that the big Other ( embodied in the intersubjective community) is trying to deceive him, is always and necessarily supported by an unshakable belief in a consistent Other, an Other without gaps, an “ Other of the Other” ( “ they” in Heinlein’s story). When the paranoid subject clings to his distrust of the Other of the symbolic community, of “ common opinion,” he implies thereby the existence of “ Other of this Other,” of a nondeceived agent who holds the reins. The paranoiac’s mistake does not consist in his radical disbelief, in his conviction that there is a universal deception—here he is quite right, the symbolic order is ultimately the order of a fundamental deception—but rather, in his belief in a hidden agent who manipulates this deception, who tries to dupe him into accepting that “ The Woman does not exist,” for example. This would be, then, the paranoid version of the fact that “ The Woman does not exist”: she certainly does exist; the impression of her nonexistence is nothing but an effect of the deception staged by the conspiratory Other, like the gang of conspirators in The Lady Vanishes who try to dupe the heroine into accepting that the lady who vanished never existed.

 

   變態狂的主體不信任大他者的重要特徵就在這裡(鑲嵌於互為主體的社會)。他的幻想大他者正在欺騙他,總是而且是必須不可動搖的信仰一貫的大他者所支持,在海連的故事中,是一個沒有差距的大他者。當偏執狂的主體緊緊捉住對於符號社會大他者及「共同意見」的不信任,他因此暗示著「這個大他者的大他者」的存在,主導一切的非欺騙的代理人的存在。這位偏執狂的錯誤並不是在於他激進的不信仰,在此他完全沒錯,符號秩序最後就是基本欺騙的秩序,而是在他信仰隱藏的代理人操控這個欺騙,設法欺騙他接受例如「這個女人不存在」。因此,這將事偏執狂對於女人不存在的事實的說法:「這個女人確實存在」。不存在的印象僅僅是陰謀大他者展現的欺騙的效果,就像「失蹤疑雲」中的那群陰謀黨徒,設法欺騙主角接受失蹤的女人從未存在過

 

    The lady who vanishes is thus ultimately the woman with whom the sexual relationship would be possible, the elusive shadow of a Woman who would not be just another woman; which is why the disappearance of this woman is a means by which filmic romance takes cognizance of the fact that “ The Woman does not exist” and that there is, therefore, no sexual relationship. Joseph mankiewicz’s classic Hollywood melodrama A Letter to Three Wives, also a story of a lady who vanishes, presents this impossibility of the sexual relationship in another, more with one of their husbands. refined way. The lady who vanishes, although never seen on screen, is here constantly present in the form of what Michel Chion called la voix accousmatique. The story is introduced by the off-screen voice of Attie Ross, a small town femme fataale: she has arranged for a letter to be delivered to three women taking a Sunday trip down the river. The letter informs them that on this very day while they are absent from town, she will run off with one of their husbands. During the trip, each of the three women recalls in a flashback the difficulties of her marriage; each of them fears that Attic has chosen precisely her husband to run off with, because to each of them Attie represents the ideal woman, a refined lady possessing that “ something” that the wife lacks, causing the marriage itself to seem less than perfect. The first wife is a nurse, an uneducated, simple-minded girl married to a rich man she met in the hospital; the second is a rather vulgar, professionally active woman, earning much more than her husband, a professor and writer; the third is a working-class parvenu, married, with no illusion of love, to a rich merchant, simply for the purpose of financial independence.” The result is of course a happy ending, but with an interesting undertone. It turns out that Attie planned to run off with the third woman’s husband, the rich merchant, who, however, at the last moment changes his mind, returns home, and confesses all to his wife. Although she could divorce him and obtain a substantial alimony, she forgives him, discovering that she loves him after all. The three couples are thus reunited at the end, the menace that seemed to threaten their marriages disappears. The happy ending is never pure, it always implies a kind of renuncation—an acceptance of the fact that the woman with whom we live is never Woman, that there is a permanent threat of disharmony, that any moment another woman might appear who will embody what seems to be lacking in the marital relation. What enables the happy ending, it, a return to the first woman, is precisely the experience that the Other woman “ does not exist,” that she is ultimately just a fantasy figure filling out the void of our relation with a woman. In other words, the happy ending is possible only with the first woman. If the hero were to decide for the Other Woman ( whose exemplary case is of course the femme fatale in film noir), he would necessarily pay for his choice by catastrophe, even by death. What we encounter here is the same paradox as that of the incest prohibition, ie, the prohibition of something that is already in itself impossible. The Other Woman is prohibited insofar as she “ does not exist”, she is mortally dangerous because of the ultimate discord between her fantasy figure and the “ the empirical” woman who, quite by chance, finds herself occupying this fantasy place. It is precisely this impossible relationship between the fantasy figure of the Othe Woman and the “ empirical” woman who finds herself elevated to this sublime place that is the subject of Hitchcock’s Vertigo.

 

失蹤的女人因此最後是性關係成為可能的女人,獨特的女人的捉摸不定的陰影。這就是為什麼女人的失蹤是一個工具,讓電影的浪漫情懷認識到女人不存在的事實,因此沒有性關係。曼奇維思的古典好萊塢的影劇「給三位妻子的一封信」,也是一個女人失蹤的故事,以另一個更微妙的方式,呈現性關係的不可能。失蹤的女人雖然始終沒有出現在銀幕上,卻是以米奇、齊安所謂的「影音特效」的方式,不斷地呈現。這個故事以小鎮的女殺手,阿提、阿提在螢幕外的聲音開導:她安排一封信送交給三個在星期天到河邊渡假的女人。她將跟其中一位的丈夫私奔。在旅行中,每一位女人都回憶中想起她們婚姻的困難。每一位都恐劇羅絲選擇要私奔的正是她們的丈夫。因為對於每一位女人,阿提代表理想的女人,擁有作為妻子所欠缺的高貴,使得婚姻的本身顯得不完美。第一位妻子是護士,未受過教育的純樸女人,嫁給她在醫院所認識的有錢人;第二位是相當粗俗,熱心事業的女強人,賺的錢比當教授及作家的丈夫還多。第三位是工人階級的暴發戶,嫁給一位有錢商人,卻對愛情沒有幻想,只是為了財政上的安全感。純真的普通女孩,事業心旺盛的女強人,狡猾的釣金龜婿者,三個介紹婚姻不和諧的方法,三個成為不適任妻子角色的方式。在這三個案例中,阿提、羅絲出現當著「另一種女人」,擁有她們所欠缺的:經驗、女性的嬌柔、財政的獨立。結局當然是皆大歡喜,但是帶有有趣的暗示。阿提計劃跟第三位女人的丈夫,那位富有的商人私奔,可是對方在最後一刻改變心意,回家跟妻子懺悔一切。雖然她可能跟它離婚,獲得可觀的贍養費,她原諒她,發現她畢竟是愛他的。這三對夫妻最後大團圓。似乎威脅他們婚姻的危險消失了。可是,這個影片的教訓似乎比外表看起來的還要曖昧。快樂的結局不是那麼單純,它暗示一種拒絕,接受這個事實:我們相處的女人永遠不是女人。不和諧的威脅永遠是存在著,隨時會有大她者的女人出現,顯示我們在婚姻中所欠缺的。皆大歡喜之所以可能(例如第一位女人的丈夫的悔悟),準確地就是經驗倒:大她者的女人並不存在,她只是填補我們跟女人關係空無的幻想。換句話說,快樂結局只有跟第一個女人才有可能。假如主角要決定跟另一個女人私奔(作為典範的案例就是黑色電影中的女殺手),他將必須以災難,甚至是死亡作為代價。我們在此所遇到的是跟亂倫禁忌的矛盾相同,也就是不可能的愛的禁忌。大他者的女人被禁忌,因為她並不存在。她注定是危險的,因為她幻想中的人物跟「實際的」女人卻佔據這個幻想的位置,最終是格格不入。就是大她者女人的幻想人物跟「實際的」女人卻發現自己提升到這個崇高的地位,這種不可能的關係就是希區考克「迷情記」的主體

 

   

雄伯舊記9303

December 2, 2008

E0425

 

    聽辦公室同仁T意氣風發地暢談為子女在台北購置公寓大樓。我對豪宅並沒有艷羨之情,但也不免感到一絲黯然的心情。自從自己當年選擇婚姻的的劣勢經濟結構,餘生似乎就始終在勉以度日的邊緣掙扎。如今W將在台北聽經聞法的經濟開銷視為理所當然的權利,我更無任何餘裕作任何改善的可能。不敢率爾退休,是因為可以想見以後日子的每況愈下了。

 

   班上班級羽球競賽得到第二名,合唱比賽第三名,學生明講暗喻要吃比薩或蛋糕均可,甚至將比薩特價的廣告單貼在講桌上,「別班老師都有請呢!」問題是一人請眾人,大略估算一下,也要兩三千元的價位。不敢率爾答應,先顧左右而言他,爭取一點緩衝的時間再說。

 

   上課正入神時in full swing,學生突然不約而同向外注視,驚奇不置。原來是操場上大風起兮塵飛揚,變天了。果然,今天早晨醒來就發現細雨綿綿,看來是要進入梅雨季節了。想一想,每天忙碌於工作讀書,對於季節的變遷幾乎達到漠視的程度,實在是有愧於理應是適應氣候變化,作為動物性的人。季節的更迭不就是意謂著年歲又向前推移,也就是距離大限的日子越來越近了,能不悚然以懼乎?至少總該內心自惕一下罷?

 

   不知為何最近心神不寧,夜間老是惡夢連連。明知這只是自己劣勢的潛意識符號,在重新排列組合所造成的心裡現象,跟現實世界的吉凶禍福,理應沒有直接的關聯。醒來後,還是不免自惕,說話行事務必要盡量低調謹慎,免得無端為人所構陷,或成眾矢之的,為人指指點點。之所以會形成如此神經質式的性格,想是成長歷程中看過太多人際之間互相陷害鬥爭的現實,自然不希望重蹈他人覆轍的命運。

 

   .偶爾看了幾次電視連續劇「雍正王朝」,好奇心被撩起來,趁著空檔到圖書館借幾本「帝王系列」及「清宮之謎」讀一讀。發現歷史小說跟文學評論一樣,也有所謂的原型人物,也就歷代人名朝朝不同,但權力傾軋仍然有一定模式可言。弄到後來,也沒有幾位有好場的。其中習得的智慧就是:越是峰迴路轉的時候,越是要知道隱遁避禍的重要性。

 

   從網路上下載到「傑克、倫敦」Jack London 的「馬丁、伊頓」Martin Eden的英文版。其中有一段我以前閱讀時耳熟能想詳。描述馬丁貧窮落魄時,女友Lizzi因家庭反對離他而去。等到他獲得國家文學獎後,功成名就時,Lizzi 回來相會的那段對白:

 

   “ I could die for you! I could die for you!’ Lizzie’s words were ringing in his ears.

   “ Why didn’t you dare it before? “ he asked harshly. “ When I hadn’t a job? When I was starving? When I was just as I am now, as a man, as artist, the same Martin Eden?” That’s the question I’ve been propounding to myself for many a day—not concerning you merely, but concerning everybody. You see I have not changed, though my sudden apparent appreciation in value compels me constantly to reassure myself on that point! I’ve got the same flesh on my bones, the same ten fingers and toes. I am the same. I have not developed any new strength nor virtue. My brain is the same brain. I haven’t made even one new generalization on literature or philosophy. I am personally of the same value that I was when nobody wanted me. And what is puzzling me is why they want me now. Surely they don’t want me for myself, for myself is the same old self they did not want. Then they must want me for something else, for something that is outside of me, for something that is not I! Shall I tell you what that something is? It is for the recognition I have received. That recognition is not I. It resides in the minds of others. Then again for the money I have earned and am earning. But that money is not I. It resides in banks and in the pockets of Tom, Dick and Harry. And is it for that, for the recognition and the money, that you now want me?

 

   功成名就了,還這樣死腦筋看不開,最後的下場只有孤獨地游向冰冷的海底,餵鯊魚去了!

雄伯舊記9302

December 2, 2008

E0201

 

    月底的星期日,W終於選擇回來。大概是需錢孔急,攻擊的架勢頗為劍拔弩張。只好提醒她說:「請先算好了,想好了再吵。好嗎?」

 

    教師會的學校願景初稿草擬好了,可是卻絲毫沒有想要提出的念頭。道理很簡單,問題不是如何寫,而是如何去實踐。想一想,反正都是抽象理念的空話,就讓P去做官樣文章,滿足主管的領導慾望罷!

 

    辦公室電腦汰舊換新,四位老師共用一台主機。上星期我自行灌了一個中英日文的翻譯軟體,正志得意滿之際,第二天主機卻影像全無,一副當機的樣子。同仁眼光好似是我灌軟體惹的禍,心裡大為忐忑不安。今天早上我正在電腦主機螢幕前,思索研判問題的關鍵,坐在斜對面的R就大為緊張:「電腦當機最好請電腦公司或電腦老師來修理,免得我們自己越弄越糟。」我還是不為所動地反駁:「電腦有狀況是家常便飯,若要等電腦公司,不知要等到何時?輕微的情形,我們自己要有自行判斷,自力救濟的能力,才是獨立思考的人。」

 

   幸好,另一個角落的H剛好走過來,建議說從後面從新開機即可解決。果然,重新開機後,Window出現,我的尷尬自然紓困。

 

   跟人相處必須注意到對方的思維習性。對於自己越是外行,越是不熟悉的東西,越是盲目地相信權威。試驗和摸索的過程常會給人帶來無謂的驚慌跟畏懼,沒有人願意將自己的珍貴之物當你的白老鼠。問題是,人的一生本身不就是試驗跟模索的過程?越是高深的知識,越是各方學說異議紛陳。

 

   學生更是如此,學測的前幾天,看到報紙上有什麼名師權威的指導方針,幾乎是人云亦云地盲目信從,好像記者所採訪的對象就是命題人員一般。我忍不住地提醒她們:「學測試題內容不可能事先洩漏,否則會釀成法律問題。那些名師充其量就個人的教學經驗及以往的命題趨向,作大概的預測而已。學測是在考過去兩年半來,你們的學習成果,而不是誰有本事臨時猜到題目。」

  

   還有一位學生手裡拿了一張英文成語表,慌亂地要我再給予擴充,只好處變不驚地再提醒:「由於英文學測並沒有固定範圍,成語、單字、或文法,其實是永遠背不完的。我們只能綜合起來跟閱讀一起學習,一方面培養從文章上下文推理研判的能力,一方面有文章,就有成語、單字跟文法。各別分開來,會變得支離破碎。盡量溫習已經學習過的東西,然後考前睡好覺,讓腦筋清楚一點,其他就不要患得患失了。」

雄伯舊記9301

December 2, 2008

D1026

開車遠遊兜風固然可帶來心曠神怡的酣暢,付出的代價也相對的提高。例行性的油錢保養姑且不論,稍有故障,送修理廠小修一下動輒都萬把塊以上,整個月的鐘點費就泡湯了。看來這是有錢人玩的東西,要節制慾望,得先從這種奢侈品精簡起。在家讀書和打電腦似乎還比較省錢些。

 

  「理未易明,事未易察」,好像「荀子」說過這樣的話。錯綜複雜的人事糾紛,有誰真正弄得清楚因果關係的來龍去脈?電腦、汽車、身體的各種症狀,即使專業如醫生、技師,有時也是憑學理和經驗,邊摸索、邊猜測。更糟糕的是,為了利之所在,眛著良心虛構專業的知識,故弄玄虛,詐取錢財,更是令人浩嘆,而除了將他列為拒絕往來戶,敬之不敏外,別無良策。

 

    清晨起來,因為汽車送修,只好以摩扥車送W到火車站。臨下車時,W突然回頭講了一句:「人的煩腦就是心的煩惱。」我不禁訝然失笑,哲理的本身並沒有什麼語病,問題是這幾天來我煩惱的問題是:旅遊過程中,在豐濱的一頓簡易三道菜午餐被索取七百八十元,在台東因為大燈不亮被索取一千六百元,回來後因為汽車底盤有雜音,被原廠保養場被索取一萬九千多元。深為商業社會的浮誇詐取的傾向所懊惱。解脫之道理應是精簡不需要的奢侈開銷,以減少被剝削的機會跟可能性。問題是一談到金錢問題,W自己的在台北的聽經聞法,也是處處非錢莫行。非但不可能刪減她的原有預算,還處處動腦筋,劍拔孥張地擴張及追加預算的額度。我的煩惱固然可以說是心的煩惱:要不要顧家?要不要照顧比我謀生能力更弱的親人?更具體的說,W能不能減少經濟上的開銷?這已經是牽涉到物質經濟層面的問題。

 

   無獨有偶,今天下午作為召集人的J 突然請教我一個問題:我們英文科教師請產假的老師有兩位,為什麼不請外面代課?我只好坦白告訴她:你們年輕女老師,沒有家計負擔,當然課越少越輕鬆。傳統以來,男老師因為家庭經濟需求,對於兼課代課,並不排斥。在三十幾年前,甚至還有為爭兼鐘點時數而爭吵者,你們大慨是無法想像的。

 

   TTA的會員代表大會,因為剛好與學校的親職座談會撞期,看來只有棄權了事。T高中打電話前來拉理監事的票,只好坦白告知。幸好「無欲則剛」,否則煩惱的大概不只是「心的問題」了。