拉岡講座228

拉岡講座228

THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THE DRIVE
驅力的解構

I ended my last talk by pointing out the place where I had taken you with the topological schematization of a certain division, and of a perimeter involuted upon which is that constituted
by what is usually called, quite incorrectly, the analytic situation.

結束上一次的談話時，我曾指出，我引導你們到達某個區分的地形基型，某個一般被誤稱的精神分析領域的範圍。

This topology is intended to give you some notion of the location of the point of disjuncture and conjuncture, of union and frontier, that can be occupied only by the desire of the analyst.

這個地形基型是用來讓你們了解，精神分析師的欲望，所盤據的位置，何處是分裂及結合，何處是統一及邊陲。

To go further, to show you how this mapping is necessitated by all the deviations, of concept and of practice, that a long experience of analysis and of its doctrinal statements enables one to accumulate, I must—for those who have not been able, for purely practical reasons, to follow my earlier seminars— put forward the fourth concept that I have proposed as essential to the analytic experience—that of drive.

在我先前幾次的演講，有些人由於沒有進入狀況，聽得不甚了然。我進一步澄清一下，這個地形基型所以成為必要，是因為精神分析的經驗及原理，長久以來，累積的觀念與做法有許多變遷。我還必須提出，精神分析經驗有非常重要的第四個觀念：驅力的觀念。

I
I can only write this introduction—this Einjuihrung, to use Freud’s term—in the wake of Freud, in so far as this notion is absolutely new in Freud.

我只能追隨佛洛伊德之後，替「驅力」這個術語做個導引。佛洛伊德的選用這術語，確實是匠心獨具。

The term Trieb certainly has a long history, not only in psychology or in physiology, but in physics itself and, of course, it is no accident that Freud chose this term. But he gave to Trieb so specific a use, and Trieb is so integrated into analytic practice itself; that its past is truly concealed. Just as the past
of the term unconscious weights on the use of the term in analytic theory—so, as far as Trieb is concerned, everyone uses it as a designation of a sort of radical given of our experience.

驅力這個術語有漫長的歷史淵源，不但在心理學或在生理學，而且在物理學本身。當然，佛洛伊德選用這個術語，並非偶然。他指定驅力一個明確的用途。 驅力被合併到精神分析工作的本身後，它原先的意義隱而不見。正如無意識的原先意義，應用到精神分析理論時，還是隱隱若現，就驅力而言，大家使用時，還是會望文生義，意味著精神分析經驗的長驅直入。

Sometimes, people even go so far as to invoke it against my doctrine of the unconscious, which they see as some kind of intellectualization—if they knew what I think of intelligence, they would certainly retract this criticism—as if I were ignoring what any analyst knows from experience, namely the domain of the drive.

有時候，人們甚至用「驅力」，來我跟我主張的無意識的原理分庭抗禮，好像我對精神分析師知道的這個經驗一無所知，換言之，驅力的領域。他們甚至將無意識，看著是某種的知性主義，其實他們若是瞭解我對於知性的看法，他們一定會撤銷對我的這種批評。

We will meet in experience something that has an irrepressible character even through repressions— indeed, if repression there must be, it is because there is something beyond that is pressing in. There is no need to go further in an adult analysis; one has only to be a child therapist to know the element that constitutes the clinical weight of each of the cases we have to deal with, namely, the drive. There seems to be here, therefore, a reference to some ultimate given, something archaic, primal. Such a recourse, which my teaching invites you to renounce if you are to understand the unconscious, seems inevitable here.

在生活經驗中，我們常遇到某件具有無法壓抑，也壓抑不住的東西。的確，假如有某件東西非壓抑不可，那是因為有某個外來的力量一直逼進來。我們也無需到成年人的精神分析經驗，去找更進一步的例子。任何小孩的心理治療師都會知道，在診所，我們所必須處理的每一個個案，組成最大份量的因素，換言之，就是驅力。因此，這裡似乎牽涉到某件根本、原始、及蠻荒的東西。
這個東西，我曾要求你們暫時擱置，但假如你們想要了解無意識，訴諸於這樣的途徑，似乎是無可避免的。

Now, is what we are dealing with in the drive essentially organic? Is it thus that we should interpret what Freud says in a text belonging to Jenseis des Lustprinzips—that the drive, Trieb, represents the Ausserung der Trag/zeit, some manifestation of inertia in the organic life? Is it a simple notion, which might be completed with reference to some storing away of this inertia, namely, to fixation, Fixierung?
Not only do I not think so, but I think that a serious examination of Freud’s elaboration of the notion of drive runs counter to it.

現在，我們所正在處理的這個驅力，基本上是有機體嗎？因此，我們應該用屬於驅力的內涵，來詮釋佛洛伊德的學說嗎？這個驅力，就代表在有機體的生命所展現的慣性力量嗎？ 它是一個單純的觀念，只要用慣性力量的蓄勢待發，就可以自圓其說嗎？我不但不這樣認為，而且我認為，假如我們仔細審察，佛洛伊德對驅力的詳細闡述，那恰恰相反。

Drive (pulsion) is not thrust (poussee). Trieb is not .Drang, if only for the following reason. In an article written in 1915—that is, a year after the Einftihrung zum Narzissmus, you will see the importance of this reminder soon—entitled Trieb und Triebschicksale—one should avoid translating it by avatar. Triebwandlungen would be avatar, Schicksal is adventure, vicissitude— in this article, then, Freud says that it is important to distinguish four terms in the drive: Drang, thrust; Quelle the source; Objekt, the object; Ziel, the aim. Of course, such a list may seem a quite natural one. My purpose is to prove to youthat the whole text was written to show us that it is not as natural as that.

驅力並不是衝動，欲念也不是性衝動，理由如下：在1915年，佛洛伊德發表一篇文章，題目是「驅力與性欲望」。這篇文章發表於「自戀導論」之後的那一年，你們不久將會發現，我提醒年代，是別有用意的。我們應該避免將 Trieb und Triebschicksale 翻譯成「神人思凡」。Triebwandlungen 才是神人思凡， Schicksal 是冒險與刺激交加。在這篇文章，佛洛伊德說，區別有關「驅力」的四個術語是很重要的：衝動、來源、目標、目的。當然，這樣一個名單可能似乎是一個很自然的名單。我的目的是要對你們證明，他寫這篇文章，就是要告訴我們：這個名單並不是那麼自然。

First of all, it is essential to remember that Freud himself tells us at the beginning of this article that the drive is a Grundbegriff, a fundamental concept. He adds, and in doing so shows himself to be a good epistemologist, that, from the moment when he, Freud, introduced the drive into science, one was
faced with a choice between two possibilities—either this concept would be preserved, or it would be rejected. It would be preserved if it functioned, as one would now say—I would say if it traced its way in the real that it set out to penetrate.

首先，我們必須記住，在文章的開始，佛洛伊德自己告訴我們，驅力是一個基本原理。他補充說，我們從他補充的內容，可看出他是一位哲學的認識論者。他補充說，自從他介紹驅力的原理，到精神分析這門科學，我們就面臨兩個可能的選擇：這個原理要就保存，要不然就捨棄。現在有人會說，假如這個原理能夠自圓其說，自然就會被保存。我的說法是：假如它能在它準備要貫穿的真實界領域自圓其說，它才會被保存。

This is the case with all the other Grundbegrzfe in the scientific domain. What we see emerging here in Freud’s mind are the fundamental concepts of physics. His masters in physiology are those who strive to bring to realization, for example, the integration of physiology with the fundamental concepts of modern physics, especially those connected with energy. How often, in the course of history, have the notions of energy and force been taken up and used again upon an increasingly totalized reality!

在其它科學領域的驅力，道理也是一樣。佛洛伊德心目中所構想的，就是物理學的基本原理。他的生理學的教授曾經設法讓他體會到，人的生理學跟夠用現代物理學的基本原理來解釋，特別是那些跟精力有關的部份。從人類的知識史日趨完備的過程來看，精力跟力量的原理，曾經被廣泛應用的次數，真是不知凡幾！

This is certainly what Freud foresaw. The progress of knowledge, he said, can beat no Starrheit, no fascination with definitions. Somewhere else, he says that the drive belongs to our myths.

這確實是佛洛伊德的先知之明。他說，知識無論如何進步，都無法跳脫對於界定範疇，界定涵義的迷戀。驅力被定義在別的地方，他說，驅力屬於我們人類的神話。

For my part, I will ignore this term myth—indeed, in the same text, in the first paragraph, Freud uses the word konvention, convention, which is much closer to what we are talking about and to which I would apply the Benthamite term, fiction, which I have mapped for my followers. This term, I should say in passing, is much more preferable than that of model, which has been all too much abused. In any case, model is never a Grundbegrzf, for, in a certain field, several models may function correlatively. This is not the case for a Grundbegrzf, for a fundamental concept, nor for a fundamental fiction.

至於我，我將不用神話這個術語。的確，在同一篇文章，在第一段，佛洛伊德使用「想像成俗」一詞。 這個詞比較靠近我們所正在談論的，以及我曾經跟大家提過的，功利主義者邊沁用的術語「虛構」。容我再補充一下，這個術語比「典範」這個被用得浮濫的術語，更加受人喜愛。無論如何，「典範」一詞從來不是一個基本的原理，因為在某一個領域，就會有好幾個典範彼此糾纏不清。假如他們是出於一個基本的原理，即使是一個基本的虛構，就不會是這樣。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座227

拉岡講座227

The entrance into the unconscious
進入無意識
Anna 0. and Freud’s desire
安娜與佛洛伊德

3
In order not to leave you thunderstruck by an affirmation that might seem to you somewhat risky, I shall do no more than remind you how Freud sees the entrance into the unconscious.

為了不要危言聳聽，我將只提醒你們佛洛伊德如何看待進入無意識。

Anna 0.—let us drop this story of 0 and call her by her real name, Bertha Pappenheim, one of the great names in the world of social welfare in Germany—not long ago one of my pupils brought me a small German postage stamp bearing her face, so you see she left some mark in history. It was in the case of Anna 0. that the transference was discovered. Breuer was quite delighted with the smooth way the operation was going. At that time, no one would have challenged the signifier, if it had been
possible to restore this word to life from the Stoic vocabulary.

讓我們不要再將安娜作為虛構人物，而直呼其真實姓名，帛莎、巴扁汗，那也是德國社會奮鬥史的偉人的名字。不久以前，我的一位學生給我一張德國郵票，上面有她的肖像。你們看出她在歷史名聲還有一席之地。我們在安娜的病例，可發現到移情的現象。布魯爾對於移情發生的一帆風順，還有點沾沾自喜。在當時，沒有人會去挑戰移情的這個意符，即使我們將這個字詞恢復到禁欲學派的原來意義。

The more Anna provided signifiers, the more she chattered on, the better it went. It was a case of the chimney-sweeping treatment. There was no trace, in all this, of the least embarrassing thing. Look again. No sexuality, either under the microscope or in the distance.

安娜提供的意符愈多，她愈喋喋不休，狀況進行得愈好。這是清掃內心污穢的治療方式。治療過程，絲毫沒有什麼令人尷尬的跡象。請再注意一下。沒有性的醜聞，不管你用顯微鏡或望遠鏡去看。

Yet sexuality was nevertheless introduced by Breuer. Something even began to come back to him, it came back to him from himself— you are rather preoccupied by it. Thereupon, the dear man, somewhat alarmed, good husband that he was, decided that things had gone quite far enough—in response to which, as you know, 0. displayed the magnificent and dramatic manifestations of what, in scientific language, is called pseudo-cyesis or, more familiarly, she blew up with what is called a nervous pregnancy.

可是，布魯爾這邊卻牽扯到性。他開始發生一些變化，他不知不覺意識到自己「你過份投入這個個案」。這位精神分析師，是一位循規蹈矩的丈夫，他因此驚慌失措地決定要懸崖勒馬。如大家知道，安娜的反應是顯示出聳人聽聞的症狀，用科學的術語說，是「假性懷孕」，或用通俗話說，她用所謂的心因性懷孕，爆發這件醜聞。

What did she show by this? One may speculate, but one must refrain from resorting too precipitously to the language of the body. Let us say simply that the domain of sexuality shows a natural functioning of signs. At this level, they are not signifiers, for the nervous pregnancy is a symptom, and, according to the definition of the sign, something intended for someone. The signifier, being something quite different, represents a subject for another signifier.

她這樣做意圖何在？我們可以各自想像，但是我們務必不要匆促就聯想到跟身體的語言有關。我們不妨這樣說，性的領域會顯示出一些符號的自然運作。在這個層次上，它們不是意符，因為心因性懷孕是一個病癥，依照這個名詞的定義，就是對於某人有意圖。這個意符代表另一個意符的主體，雖然兩個意符並不相同。

There is a great difference to be articulated here, for, and not without cause, there is a tendency to say quite simply that it was Bertha’s fault. But I would beg you to suspend your thoughts on this matter for a moment—why is it that we do not consider Bertha’s pregnancy rather, according to my formula
man’s desire is the desire of the Other, as the manifestation of Breuer’s desire? Why do you not go as far as to think that it was Breuer who had a desire for a child? I will give you the beginning of a proof; namely that Breuer, setting off for Italy with his wife, lost no time in giving her a child, as Ernest Jones
reminds his interlocutor—a child which, from being born in these conditions, says the imperturbable Weishman, had just, moment when Jones was speaking, committed suicide.

在此我們要區別一個很大的差異，大家都傾向於說，這都是帛莎自己不對。這也不是沒有道理，但是我要求你們對這件事情，暫時不要這樣定調。我們何不將帛莎的心因性懷孕，認為是布魯爾的欲望的顯示，依照我的公式就是「人的欲望是對於大它者的欲望」？你們何不進一步認為，是布魯爾渴望要有小孩？我將開始給你們一些証據，布魯爾與他的太太動身前往義大利，馬上讓她懷孕生下小孩，律師恩尼司、瓊茲提醒詢問者。在這些情況生下小孩，意味著，這位處變不驚的德國精神分析師已經自殺，就在瓊茲替他辯解的時候。

Let us leave to one side what we might in fact think of a desire to which even this outcome is not indifferent. But let us observe what Freud says to Breuer— What! The transference is the spontaneity
of the said Bertha’s unconscious. It’s not yours, not your desire, it’s the desire of the Other. I think Freud treats Breuer as a hysteric here, since he says to him: Your desire is the desire of the Other. The
curious thing is, he does not make him feel less guilty, but he certainly makes him feel less anxious— those who know the difference that I am making between these two levels may take
this as an instance of it.

讓我們將欲望的一般看法先擱置一旁，雖然它跟這件事情的結果不是沒有關係。讓我們先觀察佛洛伊德對於布魯爾怎麼說：「什麼！移情是帛莎無意識的情不自禁？她的移情不是對你的欲望，對你本人的欲望，而是對於大它者的欲望。」我想佛洛依德是將布魯爾，看著是歇斯底里症者，因為他對他說：「對於你的欲望，就是對於大它者的欲望。」耐人尋味的是，佛洛伊德並沒有使布魯爾減少罪惡感，但是確實使他不再那麼焦慮。各位若是知道我現在正使用的兩個名詞層次的不同，你們可視它為一個例子。

This brings us to the question of what Freud’s desire decided, in diverting the whole apprehension of the transference in a direction that has now reached its final term of absurdity, to the point at which an analyst may say that the whole theory of the transference is merely a defence of the analyst.

這讓我們碰到一個問題：當佛洛伊德將移情的完整理解，轉移到一個方向，這個方向現在到它充滿荒謬的術語，到達精神分析師可以說，整個移情理論僅僅就是在替精神分析師做辯解。佛洛伊德的欲望決定了什麼？

I swing this extreme term in another direction. Indeed, I show precisely the opposite side when I say that it is the desire of the analyst. You must follow my thinking here. It’s not simply a matter of turning things upside-down. With this key, read some general account of the question of the transference, written by anybody—anyone who could write “ Que sais-je?” on psycho-analysis can just as easily give you a general account of the transference. So read his general account of the transference, which I designate here adequately enough, and draw your own conclusions with this in mind.

我將這個極端的術語轉移到另一個方向。的確，當我說移情是精神分析師的欲望，我給你們看到相反的一面。請你們聽我詳述。這不僅是一個翻轉事理的問題。關鍵就在此，你們若閱讀有關移情的問題的一般描述，任何人寫的均可，類似「蔡志忠」有關精神分析的「佛洛伊德說」漫畫書，你們會很容易了解移情的一般觀念。你們閱讀他對於移情的一般描述，我在此也曾經一提再提過，你們就會得到你們跟我一樣的結論。

Is not the contribution that each individual, Freud apart, brings to the subject of the transference something in which his desire is perfectly legible? I could do an analysis of Abraham for you simply on the basis of his theory of part-objects. It is not only a question of what the analyst wants to do with his
patient in the matter. It is also a question of what his patient wants to do with him. Abraham, we might say, wanted to be a complete mother.

除了佛洛伊德外，每個人所做的貢獻，不就是企圖將他自己的欲望，清楚表達地傳遞到移情的主體？例如，光憑藉佛洛伊德的「部份客體」理論，我就能夠將阿伯拉罕做個精神分析。這個問題不是，精神分析師要如何治療他的病人。這個問題也是，他的病人要如何跟他打交道。阿伯拉罕想要成為一位完美的母親，我們不妨這樣說。

Then I might also amuse myself by punctuating the fringes of Ferenczi’s theory with a famous song by Georgius Je suis fils-père (‘I am son-father’).

我也想引用精神分析師菲蘭基，有關喬吉思的一首著名歌曲（我是父親的兒子）的理論，牽強附會自娛一下。

Nunberg, too, has his own intentions, and in his truly remarkable article on Love and Transference, he shows himself to be in the position of arbiter between the powers of life and death, in which one cannot fail to see an aspiration to the divine position.

蘭伯革精神分析師也有他自己的各種企圖。在他那篇「論愛情與移情」的精闢的文章，他表現他自己，作為是一位生與死的力量的仲裁者的立場。在那個立場，我們必然會觀看到一種對於聖靈地位的渴望。

All this may be no more than a kind of game. But it is in the course of some such story that one can isolate functions like those that I wished to reproduce here on the blackboard.

所有這些可能只是某種遊戲。但是在這些故事的過程，我們能夠摘取出一些功用。我現在將他們複製在黑板上。

In order to conjugate the schema of the net with those I have made in response to a psychologizing theory of the psychoanalytic personality, you have only to turn the obturator I referred to earlier into a camera shutter, except that it would be a mirror. It is in this little mirror, which shuts out what is on the other side, that the subject sees emerge the game by means of which he may—according to the illusion of what is obtained in the experiment of the inverted bunch of flowers, that is to say, a real image — accommodate his own image around what appears, the petit a.

為了將我的網圈的基型，跟我回應精神分析人格理論的基型，聯想在一起，你們只要將我早先提到的封閉器，轉換成照相機的快門，除了後者是一面鏡子。從遮蔽了另一面的鏡子上，主體看到遊戲的出現。作為遊戲，他可以繞著出現的小客體，調適他自己的形象，依照他自己的幻想，真實影象的倒轉，例如花束擺設的位置的倒轉。

It is in the sum of these accommodations of images that the subject must find the opportunity for an essential integration. What do we know of all this ?—if it is only at the mercy of fluctuations in the history of analysis, of the commitment of the desire of each analyst, we manage to add some small detail, some corroborating observation, some incidental addition or refinement, which enables us to define the presence, at the level of desire, of each of the analysts. This was the band, as Freud put it, that he left behind to follow him.

從眾多的影像的調適，主體一定可以找到機會，為自己的形像，作一個基本的整合。問題是，對於這些，我們知道多少？受到精神分析學發展的不同階段的理論的影響，每一位精神分析師的欲望，所奉獻的領域各有不同，有人設法增加一些細節，有人設法強化一些觀察，有人心血來潮的潤飾或美化一下。這些都使我們能夠說明，每一位精神分析師都存在於他自己的欲望層次。

After all, the people who followed Christ were not so brilliant. Freud was not Christ, but he was perhaps something like Viridiana.2 The characters who are photographed, so ironically in that film, with a small apparatus, sometimes remind me irresistibly of the group, also photographed innumerable times, of those who were Freud’s apostles and epigones.

畢竟，跟隨耶穌的那些信徒未必個個傑出。佛洛伊德不是耶穌，倒是像布紐爾的影片中，模擬達文西「最後的晚餐」的那位匹瑞地安那。一台小相機，將一起照相的那些人物，在影片中的荒謬舉止，照得原形畢露。這個畫面，有時讓我不由自主地想到那個團體，也曾被照相無數次的佛洛伊德的使徒與追隨者。

Does this diminish them in any way? No more than the apostles. It is precisely at this level that they could bear the best witness. It is by virtue of a certain naivety, a certain poverty, a certain innocence that they have most instructed us. It is true that those around Socrates were more brilliant and that they teach us no less about the transference—those who remember my seminar on this subject will bear me out. I will take this up again next time, when I will try to articulate for you the significance of the function of the analyst’s desire.

說他們不過是佛洛伊德的使徒，算是詆毀他們嗎？確實就是在使徒的這個層次，他們可以替佛洛伊德做最好的見證。他們對我們講得頭頭是道，反而顯示他們自己的幼稚及貧瘠，卻又自以為是。的確，那些環繞蘇格拉底的那些門徒，還比較有自知之明，他們的表現也同樣是一種移情。那些聽過我演講的人可以替我證實。我下一次再談這個問題。我將清楚地跟你們解釋，精神分析師的欲望的功用，有何意義。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座226

拉岡講座226

Against Jung and against hermeneutics of reality.
反對榮格及反對真實界的解釋學

2
Where is all this leading? It is leading us to the question as to whether we must regard the unconscious as a remanence of that archaic junction between thought and sexual reality. If sexuality is the reality of the unconscious—just think what this involves—the thing is so difficult of access that we may be able
to elucidate it only by a consideration of history.

這會將我們引導到何方？它引導我們去質疑，我們是否必須認為，在古代，思想先是被認為就是性的真實界，難於自圓其說後，就演變成為無意識才是。假如性是無意識的真實界，想想看，那將牽涉到什麼？那個真實界如此困難進入，我們只有回溯一下歷史，才有辦法說明。

The solution, which, in history, has taken form in the thought of Jung, where the relation between the psychical world of the subject and reality are embodied under the term archetype, is to restore the level at which man’s thought follows those aspects of the sexual experience that have been reduced by the invasion of science.

在歷史上，解決的方法在榮格的思想，自成一家之言。榮格將主體的心理世界與真實界的關係，用原型的術語具體表現。解決的方法就是要將層次恢復到，在性的經驗領域，人的思想是如何運作，因為性學領域已經被視為一門科學從事研究。

Now, Jungianism—in so far as it makes of the primitive modes of articulating the world something that survives, the kernel, he says, of the psyche itself—is necessarily accompanied by a repudiation of the term libido, by the neutralization of this function by recourse to a notion of psychical energy, a much
more generalized notion of interest.

榮格學派訴諸於心理精力的觀念，這個觀念雖然引人興趣，卻較為空泛。因此，它必須伴隨著排斥佛洛伊德將力比多作為生命力的這個術語，以及將力比多的功用中立化。換言之，榮格學派以某件殘存的東西，也就他所謂的心理自我的核心，作為表達世界的原始模式。

What we have here is not some scholastic quibble, some small difference of opinion. For what Freud intends to make present in the function of this libido is not some archaic relation, some primitive mode of access of thoughts, some world that is there like some shade of an ancient world surviving in ours.

我們在此遇到的，並不是思想學派彼此術語些微不同，在學術上的無稽之談。佛洛伊德有意以力比多的功用呈現的，並不是某些過時的關係，接近某些思想的原始模式，某個存在那裡的世界，好像某個古代世界的陰影還殘存在我們的世界。

The libido is the effective presence, as such, of desire. It is what now remains to indicate desire—which is not substance, but which is there at the level of the primary process, and which
governs the very mode of our approach.

力比多是欲望本身的活生生的存在。它是現在仍然殘留下來，可以被指明是欲望的東西。它不是物質，而是處在最初過程的層次的東西。它統轄我們研究的模式。

I was recently rereading, in the context of an address I gave to a congress that took place in 1960, what someone else said about the unconscious. This person—it was M. Ricceur in fact —was trying to remove himself as far as possible from his own position in order to conceptualize our domain. He had certainly gone a long way to reach what, for a philosopher, is the area most difficult of access, namely, the reality of the unconscious— that the unconscious is not an ambiguity of acts, future knowledge that is already known not to be known, but lacuna, cut, rupture inscribed in a certain lack. M. Ricceur concedes that there is something of this dimension to be retained. But, philosopher that he is, he monopolizes it for himself. He calls it hermeneutics.

我最近重新閱讀某人提問的無意識，那是在1960年舉行的會議，我發表的演講的內容。那個人就是里克爾。他當時盡量擺脫他自己原有的立場，為了理解我們的領域的概念。就一位哲學家而言，他確實煞費苦心到達那個費解的領域，換言之，無意識的真實界。無意識並不是行為的曖昧不明處，無法理解的未來的知識，而是被鐫刻在某個欠缺處的脫漏、割痕、及斷裂。里克爾承認，這個領域的某件東西應該要被保存下來。但是他是一位哲學家。他將這個領域據為己有，稱之為「詮釋學」。

A lot of fuss is made nowadays of what is called hermeneutics. Hermeneutics not only objects to what I have called our analytic adventure, it objects to structuralism, as it appears in the works of Levi-Strauss. Now, what is hermeneutics, if it is not to read, in the succession of man’s mutations, the progress of the signs according to which he constitutes his history, the progress of his history—a history that may also, at the fringes, extend into less definite times? And so M. Ricceur casts into the limbo of pure contingency what the analysts at every stage are dealing with. One has to admit that, from the outside, the corporation of analysts does not give him the impression of an agreement so fundamental as to impress him. But this is no reason to leave the field to him.

目前，所謂的解釋學正在風起雲湧。解釋學不但反對我們所認為的精神分析的研究，它也反對結構主義，如列維、史特勞斯的研究。現在，什麼是解釋學？難道不就是要閱讀，在人類進化的過程，符號的演變嗎？依照這個符號，人類形成自己的歷史及歷史的進展，這個歷史還可能回溯到遠古沒有文字記載的時代。所以，里克爾將我們精神分析學在每一個階段所正在從事的研究，認為是無稽之談。我們必須承認，從外表看來，我們精神分析師的團體並沒有得到他根本上的認同，遑論讚賞了。不過，這並不構成他可以據為己有的理由。

I maintain that it is at the level of analysis —if we can take a few more steps forward—that the nodal point by which the pulsation of the unconscious is linked to sexual reality must be revealed. This nodal point is called desire, and the theoretical elaboration that I have pursued in recent years will show you,
through each stage of clinical experience, how desire is situated in dependence on demand—which, by being articulated in signifiers, leaves a metonymic remainder that runs under it, an element that is not indeterminate, which is a condition both, absolute and unapprehensible, an element necessarily lacking,
unsatisfied, impossible, misconstrued (méconnu), an element that is called desire. It is this that makes the junction with the field defined by Freud as that of the sexual agency at the level of the primary process.

我主張，無意識的悸動，跟性的真實界有關的這個關鍵點，必須要顯示在精神分析的這個層次，我們才能夠有進一步的發展。這個關鍵點被稱之為欲望。最近幾年來，我從事的研究理論架構顯示：從診所經驗的每一階段，凡是有需求的依賴，就會發現有欲望。由於是用意符表達，欲望只能藉用換喻讓人理解，但是又意在言外地撲朔迷離。這個元素並非不能確定，它既是一個絕對，又是無法理解的狀況。它是必然是一個欠缺、無法滿足、不可能、常被人誤認的元素。這一個元素被稱為欲望

The function of desire is a last residuum of the effect of the signifier in the subject. Desidero is the Freudian cogito. It is necessarily there that the essential of the primary process is established. Note well what Freud says of this field, in which the impulse is satisfied essentially by hallucination. No mechanism-schema will ever be able to do justice to what is given as a regression on the reflex arc. What enters by the sensorium must leave by the motorium, and if the motorium does not work, it goes back.

欲望的功用是意符影響主體的最後殘渣。「我欲」是佛洛伊德的「我在」。生命的最初始的過程必然是建立在那裡。請注意佛洛伊德對於這個領域的說法：人的欲念的滿足基本上是有賴於幻覺。無論再精緻的機械理論，都無法充份描述性愛時的那種倒轉的衝動反應。進入時是感官，出來時必然是動力。假如動力停擺，又回到感官。

But if it goes back, how can we conceive that this constitutes a perception—if not by the image of something which, from an arrested current, makes the energy flow back in the form of a lamp which lights up, but for whom? The dimension of the third party is essential in this supposed regression. It can only be conceived in a form strictly analogical with what, the other day, I drew on the blackboard in the form of the duplicity between the subject of the statement and the subject of the enunciation. Only the presence of the desiring and sexually desiring, subject, brings us that dimension of natural metaphor from which the supposed identity of perception is decided.

但是假如又回到感官，我們如何構想感官的形成，若非憑藉某件東西的意象，使精力像電燈光亮般流動回來？這個燈亮起來，但是為了誰而亮？只有以類似我前幾天我在黑板上所畫的，陳述的主體與表達的主體互相欺騙的方式，我們才能自圓其說。只有主體的欲望及性的慾望存在時，我們才能理解，這個被誤認為決定感官極致的性的自然的妙喻。

Freud maintains the libido as the essential element of the primary process. This means—contrary to how it may seem in the texts in which he tries to illustrate his theory—that in hallucination, the simplest hallucination of the simplest of needs, the hallucination of food, as it occurred in the dream of
little Anna when she speaks of tart, strawberries, eggs, and other delicacies, there is not purely and simply a making present of the objects of a need. It is only on account of the sexualization of these objects that the hallucination of the dream is possible —for, as you will notice, little Anna only hallucinates forbidden objects.

佛洛伊德主張，力比多是生命最初始過程的基本元素。這不同於他原先設法解釋自己的理論。
這意味著，在幻覺時，即使是單純需要時的單純幻覺，食物的幻覺，如同小安娜的夢中幻覺，當她提到餡餅、草莓、蛋及其它點心，這並不純然是需要的東西的呈現。只因為這些東西具有性的暗示，夢的幻覺才有可能，如你們將注意到的，小安娜只幻想那些被禁忌的東西。

One can argue over each case, but it is absolutely essential to map the dimension of signification in every hallucination if we are to grasp what the pleasure principle means. It is from the point at which the subject desires that the connotation of reality is given in the hallucination. And if Freud contrasts the reality principle with the pleasure principle, it is precisely in so far as reality is defined as desexualized.

所有的個案都可以商榷，但是假如我們想要理解快樂原理是什麼意思，將意義定位在幻覺的向度是絕對必要的。就是從那個向度，主體渴望，真實界的意義能在幻覺中被表現出來。佛洛伊德所以將現實原理跟快樂原理對比並列，確實就是因為現實界被定義為性的被禁制。

A lot is said in the most recent analytic theories about desexualized functions. It is said, for example, that the ego ideal rests on the investment of a desexualized libido. It seems to me very difficult to speak of a desexualized libido. But the notion that the approach of reality involves a desexualization lies at
the very principle of Freud’s definition of the Zwei Prinzipien des Geschehens, of the two principles into which psychical ‘eventiality’ is divided.

在最近的精神分析理論，有關性的禁制的功用談論甚多。例如，自我的理想有賴於全神貫注於禁制性的力比多。這對於我而言，真是匪夷所思。但是「現實界的接近，牽涉到性的被禁制」的這個觀念，就在於佛洛伊德將心理的「主體」區分為現實原理與快樂原理。

What does this mean? It means that in the transference we must see established the weight of sexual reality. Largely unknown happens at the level of the analytic discourse, which is well and truly, as it takes form, that of demand—it is not for nothing that all experience leads us to throw it on to the side of the terms frustration and gratification.

這是什麼意思？這意味著，在移情時，我們必然看到性在真實界佔的份量很重。我們在精神分析的表述層次，發現許多我們不知道的東西，具體地說，就是渴望要的東西。根據精神分析的經驗，我們用挫折與滿足這樣的術語來形容它，不是憑空杜撰的。

I tried to draw on the blackboard the topology of the subject according to a sign that I once called the interior 8. This is certainly reminiscent of Euler’s famous circles, except, as you will see, that Euler was concerned with a surface that could actually be made. The edge is continuous, except that at one point it does not proceed without being concealed by the surface that has previously unfolded

我曾設法在黑板上畫一個主體的地形位置，我稱之為八號内部圖的符號。這確實讓人聯想到猶洛那個著名的雙層圓形圈，如你們所見，差別的地方是，猶洛關心的是如何將表面畫好。邊線一直繼續，除了在某一點，它的前進被先前展開的表面隱藏。

This drawing, seen from a certain perspective, may seem to represent two intersecting fields. I have placed the libido at the point at which the lobe defined as field of the development of the unconscious covers and conceals the other lobe, that of sexual reality. The libido, then, would be that which belongs to both—the point of intersection, as one says in logic. But this is precisely what it does not mean.
For this sector at which the fields appear to overlap is, if you see the true profile of the surface, a void.

從某個角度觀看，這個雙層圓形圖似乎代表兩個有趣的領域。被定義為無意識發展的領域，蓋住及隱藏另一領域，也就是性的真實界的領域。我就將力比多放置在那個交叉點。邏輯引申來說，力比多在那個交叉點將會左右逢源。但其實上恰恰相反，因為似乎是重疊的部份是空無，假如你看到表面圖的輪廓的話。

This surface belongs to another whose topology I have described to my pupils at various times, and which is called the cross-cap, in order words, the mitre. I have not drawn it here, but I would simply ask you to note what is its most obvious characteristic. You can obtain it from the interior 8. Bring the
edges together two by two as they are presented here, by a complementary surface, and close it. In a way, it plays the same role as complement in relation to the Initial 8 as a sphere in relation to a circle, a sphere that would close what the circle would already offer itself as ready to contain.

這個表面屬於另一個表面，其地形圖我曾經對我的學生描述過好幾次。這就是我所謂的重疊帽，換言之，雙疊帽。我不曾在這裡畫過那個圖，但是我只是要你們注意它最明顯的特徵。你們可以從八號內部圖也可以看得出來。用一個互補的表面，將邊緣重疊畫在一起，然後再封閉它，就會呈現出來。在某方面，它跟八號內部圖的關係，如同球形跟圓圈的關係，都是扮演相同的互補的角色。這個球形將會封閉圓圈呈現自己作為包容的部份。

Well! This surface is a Moebius surface, and its outside continues its inside. There is a second necessity that emerges from this figure, that is, that it must, in order to close its curve, traverse at some point
the preceding surface, at that point, according to the line that I have just reproduced here on the second model.

不錯！這個表面是莫比思的那個表面，它的外面繼續到內面。從這個圖形，出現第二道需要，換言之，為了封閉它的曲弧線，它必須在某個點穿越過先前那個表面，依照我在第二個圖形所複製的那條線。

This image enables us to figure desire as a locus of junction between the field of demand, in which the syncopes of the unconscious are made present, and sexual reality. All this depends on a line that I will call the line of desire, linked to demand, and by which the effects of sexuality are made present in experience.

從這個意象，我們能夠將欲望想像為渴望的領域，跟性的真實界之間的交叉軌跡。無意識的若有若無在那裡被顯現出來。這一切都端賴我所謂的欲望的線，跟渴望的需求聯接。性所產生的影響，在精神分析的經驗上昭然若揭。

What is this desire? Do you think it is there that I designate the agency of the transference? Yes and no. You will see that the thing is not so simple, if I tell you that the desire we are concerned with here is the desire of the analyst.

這個欲望是什麼？你們認為我是將移情的代理放置在那裡？可以說是，也可以說不是。你們將會看到，事情沒有那麼單純。容我告訴你們！我們在此所關心的欲望，是精神分析師的欲望。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座225

拉岡講座225
12
SEXUALITY IN THE DEFILES OF THE SIGNIFIER

意符之褻瀆與性

The reality of the unconscious is sexual
無意識的真實界是性
Of Chinese astronomy.
論中國天文學

Last time, I ended with a formula which, I later realized, was well received, which I can attribute only to the fact that it contains promises, since, in its aphoristic form, it was not yet developed.

上一次，我結束時提出一個公式，我後來發現還頗受好評。它之所以受人接納，主要是因為它包含許多展望。不過那只是一句警語，還沒有充份發展。

I said that we would be dealing with the following proposition—the transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious. What is implied here is precisely what one tends most to avoid in the analysis of the transference.

我說過，我們將會處理以下的命題：移情是無意識在真實界的扮演。這個意涵恰恰是精神分析的移情極力要避免的。

I
In advancing this proposition, I find myself in a problematic position—for what have I taught about the unconscious? The unconscious is constituted by the effects of speech on the subject, it is the dimension in which the subject is determined in the development of the effects of speech, consequently, the unconscious is structured like a language. Such a direction seems well fitted to snatch any apprehension of the unconscious from an orientation to reality, other than that of the constitution of the
subject.

在推展這個命題時，我發現自己進退維谷。對於無意識，我到底在教導些什麼？無意識的組成是主體言說產生的影響。這是個主體在言說產生的影響過程，被制約的國度，結果形成，無意識的結構像個語言。這樣的推展似乎非常適合用來理解，無意識在真實界的定向，以及主體組成的定向。

And yet this teaching has had, in its approach, an end that I have called transferential. In order to recentre those of my listeners with whom I was most concerned—the psychoanalysts—in a direction conforming with analytic experience, the very handling of the concept must, depending on the level
at which the teacher’s speech is placed, take into account the effects of the formulation on the listener. We are all such that we, the teacher included, are in a relation to the reality of the unconscious, which my intervention not only elucidates, but, to a certain point engenders.

不過，這個教導方式有一個目的，我稱之為因材施教。為了引導我念茲在茲的精神分析師的聽眾，認同精神分析的經驗，對於觀念的處理，我必須依照教導內容的深淺，考慮到聽眾是否能理解的效果。

Let us look at the facts. The reality of the unconscious is sexual reality—an untenable truth. At every opportunity, Freud defended his formula, if I may say so, with tooth and nail. Why is it an untenable reality?

讓我們觀看一些事實。佛洛伊德說，無意識的真實界就是性的真實界，這是難於自圓其說。一有機會，佛洛伊德總是不厭其煩地辯解他的公式，容我這樣說。為什麼這個性的真實界那麼難於自圓其說？

On the question of sex, we have, since the time when Freud articulated his discovery of the unconscious, that is to say, the I900s, or the last years of the nineteenth century, made some
scientific progress. However integrated it may be in our mental imagery, it must not be thought that the knowledge we have obtained of sex since then has always been there. We now know a little more about sex. We know that sexual division, in so far as it reigns over most living beings, is that which ensures
the survival of a species.

對於性的問題，自從佛洛伊德宣佈他發現無意識，換言之，自從二十世紀，或十九世紀末，我們的科學已經突飛猛進。不論我們心理學方面的形象如何先進，我們切不可以認為，從此以後，我們有關性的知識已經完備。我們現在對於性的知識，比起以前是稍微更加豐富。我們知道，雄性與雌性的區別，統轄大部份的生物界，使得物種得以延續後代。

Whether, with Plato, we place the species among the Ideas, or whether we say, with Aristotle, that it is to be found nowhere but in the individuals that support it, hardly matters here. Let us say that the species survives in the form of its individuals. Nevertheless, the survival of the horse as a species has a meaning —each horse is transitory and dies. So you see, the link between sex and death, sex and the death of the individual, is fundamental.

不論是柏拉圖將物種定位在「理型界」，或亞利斯多德的說法，物種只能在各別的存在個體上找到，這些並多大關係。容我們假設說，物種是以各別的形式繁衍存在。可是馬的繁衍存在有一個意義：每匹馬都是存活一段時間，然後死亡。所以，你瞧，性跟死亡之間的關係，性跟個體的死亡，是最根本的。

Existence, thanks to sexual division, rests upon copulation, accentuated in two poles that time-honoured tradition has tried to characterize as the male pole and the female pole. This is
because the mainspring of reproduction is to be found there. Around this fundamental reality, there have always been grouped, harmonized, other characteristics, more or less bound up with the finality of reproduction. I can do no more than point out here, what, in the biological register, is associated with sexual differentiation, in the form of secondary sexual characteristics and functions.

由於性的區別，物種繁衍便有賴於雄雌雙方的交媾，自古以來的傳統，曾設法界定其特徵，為雄雌兩個極端。這是因為繁殖的主要泉源就被發現在那裡。以這個真實界作為基礎，才開始有群居、和睦、等其它特徵，最終或多或少都跟繁殖的功能有牽連關係。我在此只能指出一些在生物學的領域，跟性別差異有關的聯想，以及一些次要的性的運作特徵的形式。

We know today how, in society, a whole distribution of functions in a play of alternation is grounded on this terrain. It is modern structuralism that has brought this out best, by showing that it is at the level of matrimonial alliance, as opposed to natural generation, to biological lineal descent—at the level therefore of the signifier—that the fundamental exchanges take place and it is there that we find once again that the most elementary structures of social functioning are inscribed in the terms of a combinatory.
我們今天知道，在社會上，男女地位互動的千變萬化，都建立在這個平台。現代的結構主義將這一點發揮得最為淋漓盡致。它指出，社會的基本的交換功能，就發生在婚姻結盟的層次，因此也是在意符的層次上，而非僅僅是自然界生物代代相傳的繁殖。就在那個層次上，我們再一次發現到，社會功能的最基本的結構，都是以聯盟的形式呈現。

The integration of this combinatory into sexual reality raises the question of whether it is not in this way that the signifier came into the world, into the world of man.

聯盟被合併成為性的真實界的部份，引起的問題是：意符進入世界，進入人的世界，是否就是以這種方式。

What would make it legitimate to maintain that it is through sexual reality that the signifier came into the world — that man learnt to think—is the recent field of discoveries that begins by a more accurate study of mitosis. There are then revealed the modes according to which the maturation of sexual cells operates, namely, the double process of reduction. What is involved, in this reduction, is the loss of a certain number of visible elements, chromosomes. This, of course, brings us to genetics. And what emerges from this genetics if not the dominant function, in the determination of certain elements of the living organism, of a combinatory that operates at certain of its stages by the expulsion of remainders?

意符透過性的真實界進入世界，也就是人類思想的開始，這種主張之所以能夠自圓其說，從最近細胞有絲分裂的正確研究所獲得的發現，可以得到印證。因此我們能夠看出，性細胞的成熟的賴以運作，會遵循一些模式，換言之，還原的雙重功能。在這種還原過程，會牽涉到某些數量的可見的因素，也就是某些遺傳因子的喪失。這當然會引導我們來談基因學。從這個基因學，我們發現的難道不就是，有機體受到某些因素的操控，必須以聯盟來發揮積極的功能？也就是，聯盟的運作在某些的階段，必須要排除一些剩餘。

The only thing that I am bringing to the light of day at this point is the remark that, in fact, in history, primitive science has taken root in a mode of thinking which, playing on a cornbinatory, on such oppositions as those of Yin and Yang, water and fire, hot and cold, make them lead the dance—the word is chosen for its more than metaphorical implications, for their dance is based on dance ritual profoundly motivated by the sexual divisions in society.

目前我能清楚告訴你們的部份是，事實上，遠古以來，原始的科學就建立在陰與陽、水與火、熱與冷，相對物質的聯盟結合上。這種思維模式構成社會舞蹈的主流。我們選用舞蹈這個字詞，是因為它有比喻跟實際的一語雙關。他們的舞蹈要以舞蹈儀式為基礎，而這個舞蹈儀式則是源自社會的男女性別區分。

I am not rushing into analogical speculation by referring here to the function of the petit a—I am simply pointing out an affinity between the enigmas of sexuality and the play of the signifier.

我並不是因為提到小客體的功用，就匆促地牽強附會。我只是指出，性的奧祕，跟意符的運作，有千絲萬縷的關係。

This is not the place to embark on a lecture, even a short one, on Chinese astronomy. Amuse yourselves by opening the book by Leopold de Saussure—geniuses tend to pop up from time to time in that family. You will see there that Chinese astronomy is based on the play of the signifiers that reverberate from top to bottom in politics, the social structure, ethics, the regulation of the slightest acts, and that it is, nevertheless, a very fine astronomical science. It is true that, up to a certain point, all the reality of the heavens may be inscribed in nothing more than a vast constellation of signifiers.

我在這裡不是要長篇大論中國的天文學。你們不妨欣賞一下李奧波、索緒爾的著作。那個家族有時會出現一些天才人物。在那本著作中，你會發現，中國的天文學的基礎，充斥著從最上層到最最下層的政治意符的運作，社會結構，倫理，及日常生活細節的規範。可是，那仍然是一門有條不紊的天文科學。的確，自古迄今，所有天上星座的真實界，僅僅是人間意符的衍生詮釋。

To carry the thing to its limit, one might say that primitive science is a sort of sexual technique. It is not possible to say where the limit occurs, for it is certainly a science. Their perfectly valid observations show us that the Chinese had a perfectly efficient system for predicting diurnal and nocturnal
variations, for example, at a very early period—which because of their signifying plotting we can date, because it is far enough away for the precession of the equinoxes to be marked in it on the figure of the heavens, and because the pole star does not appear in it in the same place as in our time. This is not a line of demarcation between experimental collation which remains valid for all and the principles that have guided it. Any more, Claude Levi-Strauss emphasizes, than one can say that everything in primitive magic is phantasy and mystification, since an enormous collation of quite usuable experiences is contained in it.

中國天文學真是奧妙無窮，我們甚至可以說，原始的科學是一種性愛的技巧。天文學能應用到什麼程度，我們很難說，因為那確實是一門科學。我們從他們的明確觀察得知，例如，中國在很早時期，就有一套非常有效的系統，來預測日夜星辰的變化。因為他們具有意義的規劃，我們能夠定下日期，因為春分與秋分的劃分可以預先標示在星座的構圖上，因為北極星的位置跟我們這個時代的位置不一樣。其間的差別並不是，他們只是一些始終有效的巧妙組合，而我們就是有引導的原理。列維、史特勞斯強調得最為有力：原始時代的魔術，都是幻術跟奧秘，因為裡面包含相當多的日常經驗巧合的東西。

But, nevertheless, there comes a moment, with the sexual initiation of the mechanism, when the moorings are broken. Paradoxical as it may seem, the break occurs all the later as the function of the signifier is more implicit, less mapped in this mechanism.

但是，從性的心理機制去啟動，幻術或奧秘被破解的時刻。這似乎有點弔詭，但是破解隨後會發生，因為性的意符的功用越來越含蓄，越來越模糊。

I will illustrate what I mean. Well after the Cartesian revolution and the Newtonian revolution, we still see, at the heart of positivist doctrine, a religious theory of the earth as a great fetish, perfectly coherent with a statement to be found in Comte, namely, that we shall never know anything about the chemical composition of the stars, that the stars will continue to be stuck to their places, that is to say—if we can see it from another perspective—purely as signifiers. Tough luck! At almost that very moment, the analysis of light enabled us to see in the stars many things at once, including their chemical
composition. The break was then consummated between astronomy and astrology—which does not mean that astrology is not alive for a great many people.

讓我舉例說明是什麼意思。笛卡爾提出「我思故我在」的主體革命，以及牛頓提出的地球物理革命後，我們在科學實證主義的核心，依舊看到一個把地球物理當著是宗教理論的唯物論，跟哲學實證論者孔德所提出的主張，若合一契。換言之，孔德認為，我們將永遠無法知道組成星座的化學成份，換言之，即使我們能夠從另外一個角度來看，視星座為人的意符的運作，星座將繼續存在於原有位置，不為所動。真是誤打誤撞！幾乎就在那個時刻，物理學對於光的分析，使我們能夠同時看到星座上的許多東西，包含他們的化學組成。這個破解在天文學跟星相學的關係，被發揮得淋漓盡致。可是，這並不意味著，對於許多人，星相學從此就消聲匿跡。

雄伯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座224

拉岡講座224
Transference and the Drive
移情與驅力

The validity of psychology,
心理學的有效性
Illusion and its rectification
幻覺及其矯正
The transference is the enaction of the reality of the unconscious
移情是無意識在真實界的扮演
3
Any departure taken from the relation of the subject to a real context may have its raison d’être in this or that psychologist’s experience. It may produce results, have effects, make possible the drawing up of tables. Of course, this will always be in contexts in which it is we who make reality—for example,
when we arrange for the subject to take tests, tests which have been organized by us. It is the domain of validity of what is called psychology, which has nothing to do with the level at which we sustain the psycho-analytic experience, and which, if I may say so, reinforces to an incredible degree the denudation of the subject.

只要出發立場是主體跟真實界的關係，從心理學家的經驗來看，都能自圓其說，因為它可能產生結果，影響所及，井然有序，有如飛機班次表的排定。當然，場域總是要在人間，我們作為人的主體在創造真實界。例如，我們安排主體接受心理測驗，測驗內容的編寫者是我們自己。這就是我們所謂的心理學的有效性，跟我們所主張的精神分析的經驗風馬牛不相及，因為它百般耍弄主體，到匪夷所思的程度。

What I have called the psychological isolate is not the old, or ever young, monad traditionally set up as the centre of knowledge, for the Leibnizian monad, for example, is not isolated, it is the centre of knowledge; it is not separable from a cosmology, it is, in the cosmos, the centre from which, according
to the inflections, what is contemplation or harmony takes place. The psychological isolate comes up again in the concept of the ego, which—by a deviation which, I think, is merely a detour—is confused, in psycho-analytic thinking, with the subject in distress in the relation to reality.

我所謂內心總是孤獨的主體，並不是以往哲學，或曾經盛行的學說，傳統上建立作為知識中心的單子主體。例如萊布尼斯主張的單子主體並不孤獨。他是知識的中心，他跟宇宙論的天地精神相往來。他沉緬思維或淡泊寧靜，甚至顛沛流離，都是以自己作為寰宇的核心。另外，自我的觀念也同樣涉及到主體的內心總是孤獨的主張。可是，這種主張常被誤認為是主體痛苦於真實界的疏離，從精神分析的角度來看，我認為這僅是一種迂迴的偏離。

I would first like to stress that this way of theorizing the operation is in flagrant contradiction, totally at variance, with what in other respects experience leads me to stress, and which we cannot eliminate from the analytic text, namely, the function of the internal object.

我首先要強調，那些理論的主張，所顯現的矛盾昭然若揭，跟我以精神分析經驗所要強調的內容格格不入，我要揭露的，換言之，就是內部客體的功能。

The terms introjection or projection are always used rather recklessly. But, certainly, even in this context of unsatisfactory theorization, something is given to us that comes into the foreground on all sides, namely, the function of the internal object. In the end, this function is polarized into the extremes
of that good or bad object, around which, for some, revolves everything in a subject’s behavior that represents distortion, inflection, paradoxical fear, foreign body. It is thus the operating point on which, in conditions of urgency—those, for example, involving the selection of subjects for various responsible jobs, in cybernetics or management, for example, or when it is a question of training air-line pilots or train-drivers—some have pointed out that it was a question of concentrating
the focusing of a rapid analysis, even of a lightning-analysis, even of the use of certain so called personality tests.

投射或融入這樣的術語總是被使用得浮濫。但是，那些理論儘管不盡人意，他們提供的東西還是紛至沓來，換言之，內部客體的功能。最後，這個功能被分為善與惡兩個極端客體，主體的行為，諸如扭曲、變態、驚恐交加、或被惡魔附身等，都繞這兩個善與惡的客體牽強附會。因此，這就是他們的運作點。有迫切需要時，例如，選拔各個工作單位的員工，無論是資訊業或業務部門，航空飛行員或高鐵駕駛員，有人曾指出，問題出在要求精神分析的急功近利，甚至還有「閃電分析」，使用某種所謂的「人格性向測驗」。

We cannot avoid posing the question of the status of this internal object. Is it an object of perception? From what angle do we approach it? Where does it come from? Following this rectification, in what would the analysis of the transference consist?

我們無法避免要質疑，內部客體的地位是什麼？它是一種感官的客體嗎？我們要從哪一個角度接近它？它來自哪裡？移情的精神分析經過這樣的矯枉過正，它的內容是什麼？

I will present you with a model, which will have to be improved a great deal later, so take it as a problematic model. The schemata centered on the function of rectifying illusion have such adhesive power that I will never be able to launch anything too prematurely that, at the very least, acts as an
obstacle to them.

我舉一個模式給你們看。這個模式還必須改進，所以我們就把它當著是一個問題模式。這個矯正人的幻覺的基型，很多心理學家樂此不疲，我現在不宜過早給它下定論，但至少，我要阻攔它一下。

If the unconscious is what closes up again as soon as it has opened, in accordance with a temporal pulsation, if furthermore repetition is not simply a stereotype of behavior, but repetition in relation to something always missed, you see here and now that the transference—as it is represented to us, as a
mode of access to what is hidden in the unconscious—could only be of itself a precarious way. If the transference is only repetition, it will always be repetition of the same missed encounter. If the transference is supposed, through this repetition, to restore the continuity of a history, it will do so
only by reviving a relation that is, of its nature, syncopated.

假如無意識是心靈的瞬間悸動，一展開就封閉，假如進一步的重複不僅只是制式的行為，而且徒有重複的行為，沒有靈犀，你在此時此地將會看到，移情本身只是飄忽不定，因為它呈現給我們，作為無意識若有若無的接觸模式。假如移情只是重複，那總是邂逅的失落的重複。假如經由重複，移情被認為能夠重續往事的綿綿舊情，那充其量是重溫彼此的關係。

We see, then, that the transference, as operating mode, cannot be satisfied with being confused with the efficacity of repetition, with the restoration of what is concealed in the unconscious, even with the catharsis of the unconscious elements. When I speak to you of the unconscious as of that which
appears in the temporal pulsation, you may picture it to yourselves as a hoop net (nasse) which opens slightly at the neck and at the bottom of which the catch of fish will be found.

因此，我們看出，移情作為一種運作模式，無法僅是滿足於能夠有效地重複，或滿足於無意識隱約的恢復，甚至無法僅是滿足於無意識的昇華。當我跟你們提到，無意識作為瞬間悸動所展現的東西，你們可以自己將它想像成為一種「圈套魚網」，圈套開口稍微展開，底端的魚獲源源不絕。

Whereas according to the image of the double sack (besace), the unconscious is something kept in reserve, closed up inside, in which we have to penetrate from the outside. I therefore reverse the topology of the traditional imagery by presenting to you the following schema.

類似雙層袋的意象，無意識是某件被貯藏的東西，內裡封閉，我們必須從外面貫穿。我因此到轉傳統意象的地形學，提供給你們以下的基型。

You will have to superimpose it upon the optical model I gave in my article Remarque sur Ic rapport de Daniel Lagache,’ concerning the ideal ego and the ego ideal. You will then see that it is in the Other that the subject is constituted as ideal, that he has to regulate the completion of what comes as ego, or
ideal ego—which is not the ego ideal—that is to say, to constitute himself in his imaginary reality. This schema makes Schema of the hoop net clear—I stress it in relation to the latest elements I have
introduced around the scopic drive—that where the subject sees namely, where that real, inverted image of his own body that is given in the schema of the ego is forged, it is not from there that he looks at himself.

我在「理想的自我與自我的理想」那篇文章中，曾提出視覺的模式，你們不妨參照一下。你們會看出，就在大它者處，主體形成為一種理想，他必須調適作為自我的完成，或成為理想的自我。這還算不是自我的理想，換言之，他只是在他想像中的真實界塑造自己。這個基型可以使「圈套魚網」的基型更加清楚。在最近介紹視覺驅力時，我曾強調，主體觀看的地方，換言之，在自我的基型中，被賦予的身體，倒轉形象成為真實被鍛造的地方，主體並不是從那個地方觀看他自己。

But, certainly, it is in the space of the Other that he sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself is also in that space. Now, this is also the point from which he speaks,. since in so far as he speaks, it is in the locus of the Other that he begins to constitute that truthful lie by which is initiated that which participates in desire at the level of the unconscious.

但是，的確，就在大它者的空間，主體看到他自己。他觀看他自己的那個點，也是在那個空間。現在，這就是他言說出發的那個點。當他言說的時候，他是在大它者的軌跡上，開始建構那個真理的謊言。憑藉那個真理的謊言，無意識層次的欲望的參與被撩撥起來。

So we must consider the subject, in terms of the hoop net—especially in relation to its orifice, which constitutes its essential structure—as being inside. What matters is not what goes in there, as the Gospel has it, but what comes out.

用圈套魚網的模式，特別是主體跟洞口的關係，因為那個關係形成它基本的結構，我們必須認為主體存在於自己內部。但是，重要的不是內部那裡發生什麼事，如聖經福音書所說，而是出現到外面的東西。

We can conceive of the closing of the unconscious through the effect of something that plays the role of obturator—the objet a, sucked, breathed, into the orifice of the net. You can draw an image like those great balls in which the number to be drawn in a lottery are enclosed. What is concocted in this great roulette out of the first statements of free association emerges from it in the interval in which the object is not blocking the orifice. This brutal, elementary image enables you to restore the constitutive function of the symbolic in its reciprocal contraposition. It is the subject’s game of odds and evens constituted by his renewed meetings with that which in the effective action of the analytic maneuver is made present in the subject.

透過類似封印扮演的角色，我們能夠構想無意識的封閉是個小客體，無意識被吸收、被吸進圈套魚網的洞口。你可以得到一個意象，六合彩會被抽中的的那些滾球的數字被封閉。人生就是我們憑藉自由想像，構想的大輪盤賭檯，精巧設計的東西間隔一段時間會出現，小客體並沒有堵塞這個洞口。這個殘酷而基本的意象，使你能夠將組成人生的意符，恢復在其互動位置的功用。人生有如奇數與偶數重新組合的一場賭，經由精神分析師有效地操盤，主體的真實是否顯現在此一搏。

This schema is quite inadequate, but it is a bulldozer schema which renders congruent the notion that the transference is both an obstacle to remembering, and a making present of the closure of the unconscious, which is the act of missing the right meeting just at the right moment.

這個描繪輪廓並不十分週延，但是足以充份讓人明白以下的觀念：移情既是一道回憶的阻礙，又是一個無意識封閉的展現，因緣際會的情愫，若有若無。

1 could illustrate all this from the variety and divergence of the definitions that analysts have given of the function of the transference. What is certain is that the transference is one thing, the therapeutic end another. Nor is the transference to be confused with a mere means. The two extremes of what has been formulated in analytic literature are situated here.

對於移情的功用，精神分析師所下過的定義多樣繁複，但都可以讓我作為例證。確定的是，移情是一回事，治療又是另一回事。精神分析領域曾經研究過的，有兩個極端說法，我表述如下。

How often will you read formulas that associate, for example, the transference with identification, whereas identification is merely a pause, a false termination of the analysis which is very frequently confused with its normal termination. Its relation with the transference is close, but precisely in that by which the transference has not been analysed. On the other hand, you will see the function of the transference formulated as a means of rectification from the standpoint of reality, to which everything
I am saying today is opposed.

你難道不曾好幾次聽過這樣的說法？例如，移情跟認同被聯想在一起，而認同僅僅是一個病徵的停頓，一種精神分析的虛假的療治，往往跟正常的療治混為一談。認同跟移情的關係是非常密切，但那只是因為我們對於移情並未仔細分析。在另一方面，你將會看到移情的功用，從真實界的觀點，是被用來當著從事矯治的媒介。這跟我上面所提到的各家說法，可是大相逕庭。

It is impossible to situate the transference correctly in any of these references. Since it is a question of reality, it is on this plane that I wish to bring my criticism to bear. Today I will leave you with an aphorism by way of introduction to what I will say next time—the transference is not the enactment
(mist en acte) of the illusion that seems to drive us to this alienating identification that any conformity constitutes, even when it is with an ideal model, of which the analyst, in any case, cannot be the support—the transference is the enactment of the reality of the unconscious.

我們不可能要將移情正確地茍同以上的各家說法。因為這是一個真實界的問題，我希望將我的批判建立在這個基準上。今天，我將留給你們一句箴言，作為我下一次要介紹的起點：移情是無意識在真實界的扮演，而不是幻覺的扮演。幻覺似乎驅使我們到這個人云亦云的疏離的認同，即使認同的是一位理想的典範，但是精神分析師無論怎樣，也支撐不了這個理想的典範。

I have left this in suspense in the concept of the unconscious —oddly enough, it is the very thing that is more and more forgotten that I have not recalled until now. I hope, later, to be able to explain why this is so. In discussing the unconscious, I have been concerned so far to remind you of the effects of the
constitutive act of the subject, because this is my primary concern here. But let us not omit what is especially stressed by Freud as being strictly consubstantial with the dimension of the unconscious, namely, sexuality. Because it has increasingly forgotten what this relation of the unconscious to the sexual means, analysis has inherited a conception of reality that no longer has anything to do with reality as situated by Freud at the level of the secondary process. So it is by positing the transference as the enactment of the reality of the unconscious that I shall begin next time.

我將移情的問題懸置在無意識的觀念領域。說來奇怪，無意識越來越被人遺忘，我自己也是直到現在才回想到它。以後，我希望能夠解釋，為什麼會發生這樣的情形。談論到無意識時，我迄今所關心的是提醒你們，構成人作為主體的本質會產生怎樣的影響，因為這是我念茲在茲的關懷。但是我們不要忽略，佛洛伊德曾特別強調，跟無意識的國度幾乎是同時並存的還有性。性跟無意識的關係有何意義，越來越被人忘記，所以精神分析學就接管了真實界的觀念領域。不過我這個真實界的觀念，跟佛洛伊德定位在次級過程的真實界，已經沒有多大關係。所以，我假設移情是無意識在真實界的扮演，下一次我再細談。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座223

拉岡講座223

The I lie and the I think•
我說謊及我思故我在
2
You will see why the relation of the subject to the signifier is the reference-point that I wished to place at the forefront of a general rectification of analytic theory, for it is as primary and constitutive in the establishment of analytic experience as it is primary and constitutive in the radical function of the
unconscious.

你們將看出，為什麼主體跟意符的關係是我希望擺置在分析理論矯正的前鋒的符號點，因為那個關係是精神分析經驗建立的根基，如同它是無意識的積極運作的根基。

It is, no doubt, one of the effects of my teaching to limit the unconscious to what might be called its narrowest platform. But it is in relation to this point of division that I cannot err on the side of any substantification.

無疑地，將無意識局限於它最狹窄的平台，是我講學受到影響的不得不然。由於這個區分點，我要將無意識具體表述時，我才不會犯錯誤。

I will centre things on the four-cornered schema of my graph, which purposely distinguishes the level of the enunciation (énonciation) from the level of the statement (énoncé). Its use can be illustrated from the fact that a too formal logical thinking introduces absurdities, even an antinomy of reason in the statement I am lying, whereas everyone knows that there is no such thing.

我將主題集中於我圖形的四個角落的基型，這樣我才可以刻意區分表達的層次跟陳述的層次。它的用途可以從以下事實看出端倪：太過正式的邏輯推理會導致自相矛盾的悖論，即使在「我正在說謊」這句陳述，本身就是邏輯上自相否定的矛盾，可是大家卻習焉不察。

It is quite wrong to reply to this I am lying—If you say, I am lying, you are telling the truth, and therefore you are not lying, and so on. It is quite clear that the I am lying, despite its paradox, is perfectly valid. Indeed, the I of the enunciation is not the same as the I of the statement, that is to say, the shifter which, in the statement, designates him. So, from the point at which I state, it is quite possible for me to formulate in a valid way that the I—the I who, at that moment, formulates the
statement—is lying, that he lied a little before, that he is lying afterwards, or even, that in saying I am lying, he declares that he has the intention of deceiving. One does not have to go very far to illustrate this with an example—take the Jewish joke in which one Jew tells another that he is catching the
train for Lemberg.

「我正在說謊」這句話怎麼回答都會有矛盾。假如你說「我正在說謊」，這句話屬實，那麼你就不算是正在說謊。可是，顯而易見地，「我正在說謊話」這句話，雖然本身矛盾，卻又是千真萬確。的確，作為表達的「我」跟作為陳述的「我」，並不相同，換言之，在陳述中，「我」被轉換成為指明是「他」。所以，從我在陳述這個角度來看，我明確地說明，在當時，正在說明這句陳述的「我」，其實是在說謊。他先前說謊，他隨後又圓謊說，在說「我正在說謊」時，他宣稱他是有意說謊。這樣的情境是可能存在的。這樣的例子多到不勝枚舉。例如，有個猶太人的笑話。一位猶太人告訴另一位猶太人，他正在趕搭乘開往列伯革的火車

Why are you telling me you are going to Lemberg, the other replies, since you really are going there, and that, jf you are telling me this, it is so that I shall think that you are going to Cracow?

「你為什麼告訴我，你正在往列伯革途中？」另一位猶太人問，「假如你真的正在那裡的途中，那在我面前是誰？我們現在搭乘的是開往克拉羅的火車。」

This division between the statement and the enunciation means that, in effect, from the I am lying which is at the level of the chain of the statement—the I am lying is a signifier, forming part, in the Other, of the treasury of vocabulary in which the I, determined retroactively, becomes a signification, engendered at the level of the statement, of what it produces at the level of the enunciation—what results is an I am deceiving you. The I am deceiving you arises from the point at which the analyst awaits the subject, and sends back to him, according to the formula, his own message in its true signification, that is to say, in an inverted form. He says to him— in this I am deceiving you,
What you are sending as message is what I express to you, and in doing so you are felling the truth.

陳述主體跟表達主體的區分意味著，從「我正在說謊」這句陳述的鎖鏈層次而言，「我正在說謊」是意符，在大它者那裡組成辭彙集錦的部份。在辭彙集錦裡，「我」勢必被反應成為一種符號意義，這個意義在陳述的層次被產生。而在表達層次所產生的結果，就變成一句「我正在欺騙你」。「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述之所以成立，因為精神分析師正在等待主體的時刻，將自己的訊息的真實意義，禮尚往來地回饋給他，換言之，以一種倒轉的方式。他對他說，「我正在欺騙你」這句陳述，你所要傳送的訊息，是我對你所表達的內容，當你在傳送訊息時，你正在說實話。

In the way of deception in which the subject is venturing, the analyst is in a position to formulate this you are telling the truth, and my interpretation has meaning only in this dimension.

主體正在欺騙，精神分析師回之以欺騙，他的立場能夠說「你正在欺騙我」這句話是實話。我的詮釋只有從這個角度來看，才有意義。

I would like to show you how this schema can help us in grasping Freud’s fundamental approach, which became possible with the discovery of the unconscious—which, of course, has always been there, at the time of Thales and at the level of the most primitive inter-human modes of relations.

我想要告訴你們，這個基型如何能夠幫忙我們，設法了解佛洛伊德在發現無意識之後，建立的一些基本的研究途徑。當然，自古以來，即使在原始的人際關係模式中，無意識早已經存在。

Let us bring to this schema the Cartesian I think. Certainly, the distinction between the enunciation and the statement is what makes their sliding away (glissement) always possible, and their possible stumbling block. In effect, if anything is established by the cogito, it is the register of thought, in so far as it is extracted from an opposition to extension—a fragile status, but a sufficient status in the order of the constitution.

讓我們再回到笛卡爾的「我思故我在」。的確，表達跟陳述之間的區別是彼此閃失，障礙的原因。事實上，在認知的「我」方面，可成立的部份就是思想，因為思想是從其相對的部份（也就是身體）延伸出來。這是一個脆弱的地位，但是在構成的秩序上卻能自成一方。

Let us say that it is by taking its place at the level of the enunciation that the cogito acquires its certainty. But the status of the I think is as reduced, as minimal, as punctual—and might be just as affected by the connotation of the that is meaningless— as that of the I am lying referred to earlier.

我們不妨這樣說，就是認知的我思，在表達的層次上替而代之，他才得到自己的確定性。但是這個「我思」的地位，跟我先前所提到的「我正在說謊」一樣，是抵銷，是妄自菲薄的確定，同樣受到「我說的是空話」的內涵的影響。

Perhaps the I think, reduced to this punctuality of being certain only of the absolute doubt concerning all signification, its own included, has a still more fragile status than that in which we were able to attack the I am lying.

也許這個「我思」甚至比「我正在說謊」的地位還更加脆弱，因為它淪落的地位，是確定他對於所有意義都絕對懷疑

I will now dare to define the Cartesian I think as participating, in its striving towards certainty, in a sort of abortion. The difference of status given to the subject by the discovered dimension of the Freudian unconscious derives from desire, which must be situated at the level of the cogito. Whatever animates, that which any enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire. I would remark in passing that desire, as I formulate it, in relation to what Freud contributes here, goes further.

我現在大膽地把笛卡爾的「我思故我在」定義為：一邊追求確定性，一邊又參與廢除確定性。佛洛伊德所發現的無意識國度，使主體的地位整個改觀，其根源來自欲望，位於「我思故我在」的層次。任何激發生命力的東西，任何表達所提到的東西，都屬於欲望。容我再三地說，我所闡述的，以及佛洛伊德所發現的這個欲望，影響還不僅僅是這些。

I will pinpoint the function of the Cartesian cogito by the term monster or homunculus. This function is illustrated by the curve, which has not failed to occur in the history of what is called thought, which consists in taking this I of the cogito for the homunculus who has long been represented whenever one has wished to practise psychology—whenever one has wished to account for inanity or psychological discordance by the presence, inside man, of the celebrated little fellow who governs him, who is the driver, the point of synthesis, as we now say. The function of this little fellow was already denounced by pre-Socratic thought.

我想要用怪物或侏儒的觀念，來詮釋笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的功用。在所謂的思想史上，「我思」的地位有其興衰的變化。有時，「我思故我在」的「我」被認為是怪物。每當我們希望從事心理學，我們就以這個怪物的「我思」當代表。而每當我們希望解釋，由於支配人的這位著名的侏儒怪物「我思」存在於人的內部，產生了生命的麻木不仁及不協調，這個侏儒的怪物又成為人的行為的驅動者，成為總其事者，如我們現在的說法。這個「我思」的侏儒怪物的功用，在前蘇格拉底思想的時代，就已經受到抨擊。

In my own vocabulary, on the other hand, I symbolize the subject by the barred S [$1, in so far as it is constituted as secondary in relation to the signifier. In order to illustrate this, I will remind you that the thing may be presented in the simplest possible way by the single stroke. The first signifier is the notch by which it is indicated, for example, that the subject has killed one animal, by means of which he will not become confused in his memory when he has killed ten others. He will not have to remember which is which, and it is by means of this single stroke that he will count them.

另一方面，以我的術語，我用中間畫一條斜線槓的S，來象徵作為主體的人，因為意符與主體組成的關係的層次是次級。我要提醒你們，這一條斜線的槓，簡單地呈現人的真相。第一層次的意符就是那被指明的猛力一擊，例如，主體殺死一隻動物，這第一次的殺戮記憶最為鮮明，即使當他後來又殺死十隻其它動物。他不需要去記住哪一次是哪一隻，憑藉那猛力一擊，他就能夠算得清楚。

The subject himself is marked off by the single stroke, and first he marks himself as a taboo, the first of the signifiers. When this signifier, this one, is established—the reckoning is one one. It is at the level, not of the one, but of the one one, at the level of the reckoning, that the subject has to situate himself as such. In this respect, the two ones are already distinguished. Thus is marked the first split that makes the subject as such distinguish himself from the sign in relation to which, at first, he has been able to constitute himself as subject. I would now warn you against confusing the function of the $ with the image of the objet a, in so far as it is thus that the subject sees himself duplicated— sees himself as constituted by the reflected, momentary, precarious image of mastery, imagines himself to be a man
merely by virtue of the fact that he imagines himself.

主體本身就是由那一擊標示出來。首先，他標示自己是一個受到禁忌的主體，是意符的第一層次。當這個意符，這個第一次，被建立的時刻，刻骨銘心的就是這個第一次。主體將自己的位置，不是定在意符的刻痕，而是定在刻骨銘心的第一次。在這一方面，兩個主體的第一次就被區分出來。主體的第一次分裂在此被標示，區別他自己跟符號有所不同。起初，他還能夠維持跟符號的互動關係，組成自己作為主體。不過，我現在要警告你們，不要將這個欲望被禁制的主體的功能，跟小客體的形象混為一談。在小客體的地方，主體看到自己被複製，看到組成自己的形象，是倒影、是瞬間、是身不由己的變化無常。他想像自己作為人的主體，只存在於自己的想像之中。

In analytic practice, mapping the subject in relation to reality, such as it is supposed to constitute us, and not in relation to the signifier, amounts to falling already into the degradation of the psychological constitution of the subject.

在精神分析領域，不是找出主體跟意符的關係，而是找出主體跟真實界的關係，因為主體應該是在真實界組成。不過，這等於是倒退到以前的說法：人是個心理組成的主體。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記981224

雄伯手記981224

「C真是好能幹！」A望洋興嘆。
「能幹有什麼不好？」B 問道。
「太能幹的人就太容易成功。」
「成功有什麼不好？我們不都也曾經渴望成功？」
「問題是在成功的人眼中，原先的大它者都會成為小客體。」
「能夠當人家的小客體也不錯，難道你還真以為你曾經是人家的大它者？」
「沒什麼。我只是突然聯想到列維納斯Levinas在整體與無限Totality and Infinity 開頭第一句所說的 Real life is absence and we are in the world. （真實的生命是欠缺，而我們在世界裡。）」
「那有什麼好大驚小怪的。拉岡不也說過：You never look at me from the place I see you.!」

拉岡講座223

拉岡講座222

II
ANALYSIS AND TRUTH OR
THE CLOSURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS
精神分析與真理 或無意識的封閉

Telling the truth, lying, being wrong•
說實話、說謊話、說錯誤的話

Last time, I introduced the concept of the transference. I did so in a rather problematic way, from the standpoint of the difficulties it presented to the analyst. I took the opportunity offered me by an article published in a recent number of the most official organ of psycho-analysis, The International Journal
of Psycho-Analysis, which went so far as to question the use in analysis of the notion of transference. I now intend to return to this article.

上一次，我介紹移情的觀念。從它呈現給精神分析師的困境的觀點而言，我介紹得相當具有爭議性。國際精神分析雜誌是精神分析的官方喉舌，最近剛出版的一期有一篇文章，囂張地質疑移情在精神分析學的用途。我利用人家送給我看的機會，借題發揮。

I
According to the author, the analyst is supposed to point out to the patient the effects of more or less manifest discordances that occur with regard to the reality of the analytic situation, namely, the two real subjects who are present in it.

依照作者，精神分析師應該對病人指出，在精神分析的情境現況中，多多少少會發生一些明顯不協調的印象，換言之，出現在現場的是兩位生命的主體。

First, there are the cases in which the effect of discordance is very obvious. It is illustrated, in a humorous way, by Spitz, one of the old guard, and no fool, by way of amusing his public. He takes as an example one of his patients, who, in a dream that is called a transference dream—that is to say, a
dream involving the realization of erotic desires with one’s analyst, with Spitz himself; as it happens—sees him sporting a head of luxuriant blond hair—which, for anyone who has seen
the bald pate of the character in question, and it is well enough known to be regarded as famous, would seem to be a case in which the analyst could quite easily show the subject just how far the effects of the unconscious can give rise to distortion.

首先，有些情形，不協調的印象甚為顯著。史匹茲是捍衛精神分析學的前輩，不是泛泛之輩。他幽默地舉出一個例子博君一笑。他取他的一位病人當例子。這位病人在所謂移情之夢中，換言之，這個夢的內容是跟她的精神分析師，也就是史匹茲他自己，實現性慾望的滿足。她在夢中偶然地看到他展現一頭蓬勃的金髮。對於曾見過史匹茲光禿頭頂的人，知道那個禿頂還鼎鼎大名，這個夢會讓人詼諧失笑。精神分析師能夠很輕易地告訴病人，無意識的情懷會產生多大的扭曲。

But when it is a question of qualifying a patient’s behavior as uncomplimentary to the analyst, You have the choice of two things, says Szasz—the analyst’s view is correct and is considered
‘reality’; the patient’s view is incorrect, and is considered ‘transference’. This brings us back to that at once mythical and idealizing pole that Szasz calls the integrity of the analyst.

但是病人的行為若是貶抑精神分析師，要如何處理？薩茲說你有兩種選擇：一是精神分析師的觀點正確，而且是「真實」所在，二是病人的觀點不正確，並且被認為是一種「移情」。這讓我們又回到，薩茲所稱為的精神分析師的尊嚴，扮演既神秘又理想化的角色。

What can this mean, if it is not a recall to the dimension of truth? 1 can only situate this article, then, in the perspective in which its author himself places it, considering him as operating not in a heuristic, but in an eristic way, manifesting, in the impasse into which his reflection has led him, the presence of a true crisis of conscience in the function of the analyst. This crisis of conscience concerns us only in an incidental way, since I have shown that a certain one-sided way of theorizing the practice of the analysis of the transference would necessarily lead to it. It is a slippery slope that I myself have been denouncing for a long time.

這難道不是意味著真理向度的被撤銷？因此，我只能將這篇文章定位為作者自己身陷僵局，進退維谷時的自白，文章的開展不是啟發探索，而是辯解自道，因為精神分析師的功能，在良心的煎熬中危急存亡。這個良心的危機，我們只是偶然遭遇。我曾說過，一廂情願地建構移情在精神分析的理論，必然會導致這樣的窘困。

To bring us back to the almost phenomenological data that enable us to resituate the problem where it actually is, I showed you last time that in the relation of the one with the other that is set up in analysis, one dimension is eluded.

我們再回到近乎現象學的資訊，我們才能夠將此難題放置回原來位置。上一次，我說過，我們跟它者在精神分析所建立的關係，有一個向度被閃躲掉。

It is clear that this relation is established on a plane that is not reciprocal, not symmetrical. This much Szasz observes, only, quite wrongly, to deplore it—in this relation of the one with the other, there is established a search for truth in which the one is supposed to know, or at least to know more than the other.

顯而易見，這個關係不是被建立於互惠或平衡的基準上。薩茲已經觀察到，卻只是痛心疾首：在我們跟它者的關係，建立的基礎是對於真理的追尋。在追尋真理的過程，有一方應該知道，至少應該知道得比另一方多。

From the latter, the thought immediately arises that not only must he not make a mistake (se trompa) , but also that he can be misled (on pent le tromper). The making a mistake (se tromper) is, by the same token, thrown back upon the subject. It is not simply that the subject is, in a static way, lacking, in error. It is that, in a moving way, in his discourse, he is essentially situated in the dimension of the making a mistake (se tromper).

就後者而言，他立刻會浮起這樣的念頭：他不但一定不要犯錯誤，而且他有被誤導的可能。同樣地，犯錯誤在前者也會發生。並不僅是因為主體本身的欠缺，犯錯誤本是家常便飯，而且因為在他極力表述真理時，他基本的位置就是錯誤頻仍的國度。

I have found a description of this from yet another analyst. I am referring to Nunberg, who, in the International Journal of Psycho-analysis, published, in 1926, an article entitled The Will of Recovery. By recovery, he means not so much guérison (cure), as restauration (restoration), retour (return). The word is very well chosen and poses a question well worth our attention. What, in the last resort, can drive the patient to have recourse to the analyst, to ask him for something he calls health, when his
symptom—so the theory says—is created in order to bring him certain satisfactions?

我曾經從另外一位精神分析師找到這樣的描述。我指的是任伯格。在1926年出版的國際精神分析雜誌，他發表一篇文章，標題是「康復的意志」。所謂康復，他的意思不是治療，而是恢復健康。他精挑細選的這個字詞，暴露一個值得我們注意的問題。依據理論的說法，病徵的出現是為了讓病人得到心理的補償。那追根究底，是什麼動機驅使病人尋求精神分析師的幫助，要求給予他所謂的健康？

With a great many examples, many of them humorous, Nunberg has no difficulty in showing that one doesn’t have to have gone very far in analysis to see, sometimes with great clarity, that what motivated the patient in his search for health, for balance, is precisely his unconscious aim, in its most immediate implications. What shelter, for example, does recourse to analysis have to offer him, in order to re-establish peace in his home, when some hitch has occurred in his sexual function, or some extra-marital desire!

用許多幽默的例子，任伯格輕而易舉地顯示，我們甚至不需要是精神分析的行家，有時也會很明白地看出，病人尋求恢復健康及平衡的動機，確實就是他的無意識的目標，他當下的起心動念。若是這樣，例如，萬一病人的起心動念發生在性欲望的蠢動，外遇或劈腿的念頭，精神分析有什麼方法給予求助者庇護，可以讓他重新建立他在家裡的平靜？

From the outset, the patient admits to a desire, in the form of a temporary suspension of his presence at home, the opposite of what he came to propose as the first aim of his analysis—not the restoration of
his marriage, but a break with it.

從一開頭，病人就坦白承認，他的欲望，跟他來尋求精神分析的首要目的相反，只是暫時擺脫處在家中的困境。他的欲望不是要恢復他的婚姻，而是要終止它。

We now find ourselves at last—in the very act of the commitment to analysis and certainly, therefore, in its first stages —in maximum contact with the profound ambiguity of any assertion on the part of the patient, and the fact that it is, of itself; double-sided. In the first instance, it is as establishing itself in, and even by, a certain lie, that we see set up the dimension of truth, in which respect it is not, strictly speaking, shaken, since the lie as such is itself posited in this dimension of truth.

我們現在發現，當我們還在精神分析的前面幾個階段努力從事，我們自己最後大量接觸到的是，病人方面的主張極端曖昧，以及精神分析本身就是雙邊互動的事實。在第一個情形，精神分析的立場就是謊言，及根據謊言。我們看到某些的謊言建立了真理的國度。在這一方面，嚴格說，謊言並沒有受到動搖，因為謊言本身就被定位在真理的國度。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座221

拉岡講座201

An article in The International Journal
國際雜誌的一篇文章

4
There is a crisis in analysis and, to show that there is nothing biased in this, I would support my view by citing a recent article that demonstrates this in the most striking way—and it is the work of no mediocre mind. It is a closely argued, very engaging article by Thomas S. Szasz—who hails from Syracuse, which fact, unfortunately, does not make him any more closely related to Archimedes, for this Syracuse is in New York State—which appeared in the latest number of The International
Journal of Psychoanalysis

精神分析界有一個危機。為了表示我不是危言聳聽，我引述一篇文章支持我的觀點。這篇文章一針見血地揭露時弊，足見其睿智不凡。這是一篇頗具爭議性的引人注意的文章，發表在「國際精神分析學雜誌」，作者是湯姆士、薩茲。他從錫拉丘茲發聲，不幸地，這個事實未能讓他沾上跟阿基米德有什麼關係的光，因為這是位於的美國錫拉丘茲。

The author was inspired to write this article by an idea in keeping with the line of investigation that inspired his earlier articles, a truly moving search for the authenticity of the analytic way. It is quite striking that an author, who is indeed one of the most highly regarded in his circle, which is specifically that of American psychoanalysis , should regard transference as nothing more than a defence on the part of the psycho-analyst, and should arrive at the following conclusion—the transference is the pivot on which the entire structure of psycho-analytic treatment rests.

作者寫這篇文章的動機，是他早先曾發表文章，苦心孤詣地探索精神分析學的真誠問題。他現在想要繼續觀察是否有新的發展。耐人尋味地，這位作者在其學界，明確地說，在美國精神分析學的學界頗受人敬仰。但是他卻將移情視為僅僅是精神分析師單方面的一種防衛，並且竟然得到以下的結論：移情是精神分析治療整個架構所依賴的軸心。

This is a concept that he calls inspired—I am always suspicious of faux arnie in English vocabulary, so I have tried to tread warily when translating it. This inspired, it seemed to me, did not mean inspire, but something like offiicieux. It is an inspired and indispensable concept—I quote—yet it harbors the seeds, not only of its own destruction, but of the destruction of psycho-analysis itself. Why? Because it tends to place the person of the analyst beyond the reality testing of patients, colleagues, and self . This hazard must be frankly recognized. Neither professionalization, nor the ‘raising of standards’, nor coerced training analyses can protect us from this danger. And here the confusion arises—only the integrity of the analyst and of the analytic situation can safeguard from extinction the unique dialogue between analysand and analyst.

這是一個觀念，他稱之為「啟發」。法文是faux arnie，英文辭彙我不太把握，所以翻譯時我掙扎了很久。我覺得「啟發」並不完全是望文生義地啟發，而是有點類似法文的 offiicieux啟悟。這是一個受到啟發的不可欠缺的觀念，容我引述一下：「可是它不但蘊含會毀滅自己，而且會毀滅精神分析界的種子。為什麼？因為它傾向於將精神分析師這個位置放置於病人、同事、跟自己的考驗場域之外。這個危險，我們必須坦白承認，因為再多的專業，再怎樣的提高水準，再怎樣的強制分析訓練，都無法保護我們避開這個危險。」但是矛盾的地方就在此：「只有精神分析師跟精神分析情境的尊嚴，才能捍衛病人跟精神分析師之間的對話，免於消滅。」

This blind alley that Szasz has created for himself is, for him, necessitated by the very fact that he can conceive of the analysis of the transference only in terms of an assent obtained from the healthy part of the ego, that part which is capable of judging reality and of separating it from illusion.

薩茲自己創建出來的這道死巷，存在的必要是由於以下這個事實：他只有從自我的健全得到同意，他才能夠構想移情的分析，而且自我的健全要有能力判斷現實以及分開現實跟幻覺。

His article begins thus, quite logically— Transference is similar to such concepts as delusion, illusion, and phantasy. Once the presence of the transference has been established, it is a question of agreement between the analysand and the analyst, except that here the analyst is a judge against whom there is neither appeal nor recourse, we are led to call any analysis of the transference a field of pure, uncontrolled hazard.

他的推論因此順理成章開展：「移情類同於幻覺、幻想、及幻見。」移情的存在一但被建立，那就是病人跟精神分析師之間兩相同意的問題。唯一不同的是，精神分析師本身是法官，無法對他提出抗告或訴訟。我們不得不認為任何這種移情的分析，是一個危機四伏的場域。

I have taken this article only as an extreme case, but a very revealing one, so as to encourage us to restore here a determination that should bring into play another order—that of truth. Truth is based only on the fact that speech, even when it consists of lies, appeals to it and gives rise to it. This dimension
is always absent from the logical positivism that happens to dominate Szasz’s analysis of the concept of transference.

我引述這篇文章，只是當著是一個極端的例子，但是它頗引人深省，鼓勵我們重振旗鼓，探討另一個運作的層次，真理的層次。作為真理基礎的事實是：話語訴諸於真理，並產生真理，即使話語本身有時是由謊言組成。可是，薩茲談論移情的觀念的分析時，他表現的理性實證主義，總是欠缺這個自知之明。

My own conception of the dynamics of the unconscious has been called an intellectualization—on the grounds that I based the function of the signifier in the forefront. Is it not apparent that it is in this operational mode—in which everything makes light of the confrontation between a reality and a connotation of illusion attributed to the phenomenon of the transference— that this supposed intellectualization really resides?

我自己對於無意識作為生命力的觀念，一直被稱為科學的知性研究，因為我將意符的功用擺置在前鋒。這難道不是顯而易見？我們所被認為的知性研究，基礎不就在於無意識與意符之間的這個運作的模式，也就是，移情現象產生的幻想，意味著，它完全不把跟現實之間的衝突，當著一回事？

Far from us having to consider two subjects, in a dual position, to discuss an objectivity that appears to have been posited there as the gravitational effect of a compression in behaviour, we must bring out the domain of possible deception.

這個幻想跟現實分離的現象，我們絲毫不需要考慮到是兩個主體處於雙重立場。似乎有人已經提出：在存在的客觀環境，人的行為會受到類似地心引力的壓縮的影響。為了討論這個客觀環境，我們必須顯示，這裡有可能是欺騙的領域，

When I introduced you to the subject of Cartesian certainty as the necessary starting-point of all our speculations as to what the unconscious reveals, I pointed out the role of essential balancer played in Descartes by the Other which, it is said, must on no account be deceptive. In analysis, the danger is that this Other will be deceived. This is not the only dimension to be apprehended in the transference. But one has to admit that if there is one domain in which, in discourse, deception has some chance of success, it is certainly love that provides its model.

我跟你們介紹過，笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的這個主體是確定性，是我們研究無意識顯露出什麼的一個必須的出發點。我曾指出，笛卡爾用來扮演重要的平衡角色的這個大它者，有人說，必然是欺騙性的。在精神分析學，危險所在是，大它者將會被欺騙。談到移情時，我們所要理解的還不僅僅是這個角度。我們還需要承認，在真理表述時，假如還有讓欺騙有得逞的機會，確實只有愛情表述時，庶幾可以類比。

What better way of assuring oneself, on the point on which one is mistaken, than to persuade the other of the truth of what one says! Is not this a fundamental structure of the dimension of love that the transference gives us the opportunity of depicting?

在我們受人誤解的時刻，除了說服對方，我們所說的內容是千真萬確外，還有什麼更好的方法來確信我們自己的心？移情之所以讓我們有表述的機會，難道不就是愛情表述這個基本的結構？

In persuading the other that he has that which may complement us, we assure ourselves of being able to continue to misunderstand precisely what we lack. The circle of deception, in so far as it highlights the dimension of love at the point named—this will serve us as an exemplary door to demonstrate the trick next time.

在說服對方，他擁有跟我們互補的東西，我們讓自己確信，我們能夠繼續誤解我們自己確實所欠缺的。這是欺騙的循環，因為它強調愛之所以為愛的角度。這是個典範的例子，下一次我們要証明移情的詭計時還會用到。

But this is not all I have to show you, for it is not what radically causes the closure involved in the transference. What causes it, and this will be the other side of our examination of the concepts of the transference, is—to come back to the question mark inscribed in the left part, the shaded, reserved
part—what I have designated by the objet a.

不過，這還不是我要告訴你們的全部，因為移情牽涉到的封閉，主要的原因還不是在此。引起封閉的原因，位於移情的觀念受到審查的另一邊，讓我們回到左邊的這個問號，這個陰影的保留區，也就是我曾經指明小客體的東西。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡220

拉岡講座200

The Presence of Analysts
精神分析師在現場

The Other, already there•
大它者已經在那裡

The unconscious is outside
無意識在外面。

3
This brings us to the function of the transference. For this indeterminate of pure being that has no point of access to determination, this primary position of the unconscious that is articulated as constituted by the indetermination of the subject—it is to this that the transference gives us access, in an enigmatic way. It is a Gordian knot that leads us to the following conclusion—the subject is looking for his certainty. And the certainty of the analyst himself concerning the unconscious cannot be derived from the concept of the transference.

這使我們又回到移情的功用。純粹存在的不確定性並沒有讓確定性有進入的點，無意識的原初位置被表達為由主體的不確定性所組成，所以只有靠著移情才能接近這個地方。這似乎有點奧秘，像高地安的三環相扣的結，因此我們得到以下的結論：主體正在尋找他自己的確定性。關於無意識，從移情的觀念那裡，我們也無法得到精神分析師自己的確定性。

It is striking, therefore, to observe the multiplicity, the plurality, the plurivalence even, of the conceptions of the transference that have been formulated in analysis. I do not claim to be able to provide you with an exhaustive account of them. I shall simply try to guide you through the paths of a
chosen exploration.

因此，耐人尋味的，我們觀察到，精神分析學所闡釋的移情的觀念具有多重性、多樣性、甚至像是多重原子價。我不敢確定，我能夠提供給你們詳盡的描述。我只是設法引導你們穿過這條我們苦心孤詣探索的小徑。

At its emergence in the writings and teachings of Freud, a sliding-away (glissenzent), which we cannot impute to him, lies in wait for us —this consists in seeing in the concept of the transference no more than the concept of repetition itself. Let us not forget that when Freud presents it to us, he says —what
cannot be remembered is repeated in behaviour. This behaviour, in order to reveal what it repeats, is handed over to the analyst’s reconstruction.

佛洛伊德的著作及學說出現時，等待我們去接觸的就是欠缺。這不能怪罪於他，倒是讓我們從移情的觀念上看到僅僅是重複本身的觀念。我們不要忘記，佛洛伊德傳道授業時，他說：「我們忘記的事，會在行為表現出來。」為了讓這個行為顯露它的重複，我們只好將它送到精神分析師那裡重新建構。

One may go so far as to believe that the opacity of the trauma—as it was then maintained in its initial function by Freud’s thought, that is to say, in my terms, its resistance to signification—is then specifically held responsible for the limits of remembering. And, after all, it is hardly surprising,
given my own theorization, that I should see this as a highly significant moment in the transfer of powers from the subject to the Other, what I call the capital Other (le grand Autre), the locus of speech and, potentially, the locus of truth.

有人甚至相信，我們的記憶所以受阻，是因為創傷的難於釋懷，這是佛洛伊德在早期的學說所主張，換言之，我的說法是，創傷抗拒符號化。畢竟，從我的理論系統，我竟然會將這一點看著是權力從主體轉移到大它者的非常重要的時刻，並不足為奇。我用大寫字母的這個大它者，是言說的軌跡，潛藏著真理的軌跡。

Is this the point at which the concept of the transference appears? It would seem so, and one often goes no further. But let us look at it more closely. In Freud, this moment is not simply the moment-limit that seems to correspond to what I designated as the moment of the closing up of the unconscious, a temporal pulsation that makes it disappear at a certain point of its statement (enonce). When Freud introduces the function of the transference, he is careful to mark this moment as the cause of what we call the transference. The Other, latent or not, is, even beforehand, present in the subjective revelation, It is already there, when something has begun to yield itself from the unconscious.

移情的觀念就出現在這個時刻嗎？看起來似乎是這樣，然後有些人就不再探究下去。但是讓我們更仔細觀察一下。佛洛伊德認為，這個時刻並不僅僅是限制的時刻，似乎對應於我所指明是無意識封閉的時刻，一個瞬間的悸動，在表達的某個時刻消失。佛洛伊德介紹移情的功用時，他很謹慎地將這個時刻標明為我們所謂的移情的原因。大它者，無論潛藏與否，存在於主體的啟悟，甚是事先存在。大它者已經先在那裡，然後從無意識那裡，某種情愫開始產生。

The analyst’s interpretation merely reflects the fact that the unconscious, if it is what I say it is, namely, a play of the signifier, has already in its formations—dreams, slips of tongue or pen, witticisms or symptoms—proceeded by interpretation.

精神分析師的解釋僅僅反映這個事實，無意識若是我說的那個樣子，換言之，是意符的運作，它在形成時，我們解釋所運用的夢、口誤或筆誤、機智語或病徵等，都已經先存在。

The Other, the capital Other, is already there in every opening, however fleeting it may be, of the unconscious. What Freud shows us, from the outset, is that the transference is essentially resistant, Ubertragungiwiderstand. The transference is the means by which the communication of the unconscious is interrupted, by which the unconscious closes up again. Far from being the handing over of powers to the unconscious, the transference is, on the contrary, its closing up.

大它者、字母大寫的它者，已經在無意識的每道開口的地方，無論是多麼的瞬間短暫。從一開始，佛洛伊德就告訴我們，移情本質上具有抗拒作用。移情是一個媒介，無意識的溝通被這個媒介所中斷，無意識因而又再關閉。

This is essential in noting the paradox that is expressed quite commonly in the fact —which may even be found in Freud’s writings—that the analyst must await the transference before beginning to give his interpretation.

我們必須注意到一個時常聽到的矛盾，在佛洛伊德著作也可能找到的矛盾：精神分析師必須先等待對方移情，才開始解釋。

I want to stress this question because it is the dividing line between the correct and incorrect conception of the transference. In analytic practice, there are many ways of conceiving the transference. They are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They may be defined at different levels. For example, although the conceptions of the relation of the subject to one or other of• those agencies which, in the second stage of his Topography, Freud was able to define as the ego-ideal or the super-ego, are partial, this is often simply to give a lateralized view of what is essentially the relation with the capital Other.

我要強調這個問題，因為這是移情的觀念正確或不正確的分界線。在精神分析學領域，有關移情的看法很多種。這些看法未必都互相排斥。他們可能有不同層次的定義。例如，在佛洛伊德用地形學詮釋的第二階段，他能夠將主體與代理主體的關係的觀念，定義為自我的理想或超我。雖然這個觀念只是部份說法，它時常被用來片面解釋，基本上它是跟大它者的關係。

But there are other divergences that are irreducible. There is a conception which, wherever it is formulated, can only contaminate practice—I am referring to the conception which would have the analysis of the transference proceed on the basis of an alliance with the healthy part of the subject’s ego, and consists in appealing to his common sense, by way of pointing out to him the illusory character of certain of his actions in his relation with the analyst.

但是有些其他的歧義無法如此一目了然。有一個不知是何方神聖提出的觀念，卻只會污染精神分析的領域。這個觀念，將移情的分析牽扯到要維護主體的自我的建康，訴諸於他自己的俗見，作為詮釋他跟精神分析師互動時的一廂情願的幻想。

This is a thesis that subverts what it is all about, namely the bringing to awareness of this split in the subject, realized here, in fact, in presence. To appeal to some healthy part of the subject thought to be there in the real, capable of judging with the analyst what is happening in the transference, is to misunderstand that it is precisely this part that is concerned in the transference, that it is this part that closes the door, or the window, or the shutters, or whatever—and that the beauty with whom one wishes to speak is there, behind, only too willing to open the shutters again. That is why it is at this moment that interpretation becomes decisive, for it is to the beauty one must speak.

這樣的觀點實在是顛倒是非，換言之，這個觀點忽略了，主體自己的這個分裂被醒悟到，事實上，就在精神分析師在現場時被體會到。訴諸於被認為是處於真實界的主體的建康部份，以為這樣就能夠跟分析師一起分享移情所發生的情愫，實在是誤解跟移情有關的這一部份，也誤解門扉、窗戶、或窗簾等等被封閉的這一部份。甚至誤解我們樂於跟其交談的這位美麗的人，以為她就在那裡，很願意將心扉再一次打開。這就是為什麼在這個時刻，解釋就非常重要，因為我們必須交談的就是這位美麗的人。

I can do no more than suggest here the reversion involved in this schema in relation to the model one has of it in one’s head. I say somewhere that the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. Now, the discourse of the Other that is to be realized, that of the unconscious, is not beyond the closure, it is outside. It is this discourse, which, through the mouth of the analyst, calls for the reopening of the shutter.

我在此只能建議，不妨將我們腦海裡若有類似剛才牽扯的思維模式反轉過來。我曾經說過，無意識是大它者的真理表述。現在，即將要被實現的大它者的這個表述，也就是無意識的表述，不是在封閉之外，而是在外面。只是這個真理的表述，透過精神分析師之口，要求心扉重新再打開。

Nevertheless, there is a paradox in designating this movement of closure as the initial moment when the interpretation may assume its full force. And here is revealed the permanent conceptual crisis that exists in analysis concerning the way in which the function of the transference should be conceived.
The contradiction of its function, which causes it to be apprehended as the point of impact of the force of the interpretation by the very fact that, in relation to the unconscious, it is a moment of closure—this is why we must treat it as what it is, namely, a knot. Whether or not we treat it as a Gordian knot remains to be seen. It is a knot, and it prompts us to account for it—as I have been doing for several years—by considerations of topology. It will not be thought unnecessary, I hope, to remind you of these.

可是，有一個矛盾存在，當我們指明封閉的動作是最初的動作，各種解釋可能會就此紛至沓來。這裡顯示，關於移情的功用應該如何構想的問題，有一個觀念上的危機，常久存在於精神分析領域。移情功用的矛盾，使它被人理解為精神分析師解釋的力量產生影響的時刻，因為相較於無意識，移情是一個封閉的時刻。這就是為什麼我們必須依照它的本質處理它，換言之，把它當著一個結。至於這個結，是否能像高地安的三環結一般被我們解開，還有待觀察。它是一個結，它激勵我們去解開它，如同我過去幾年來用地形學的思維方法一直在從事的。我不厭其煩再提醒你們一次是有必要的。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw