Archive for the ‘Jacques Lacan’ Category

从重复到诉诸行动

November 17, 2015

FROM REPETITION TO ENACTMENT
从重复到诉诸行动

In 1954–55 Lacan devoted a substantial part of his Seminar II to a
theoretical analysis of Freud’s concept of the compulsion to repeat
(Wiederholungszwang). As he explained on at least two occasions
during this Seminar (1988c[1954–55]:118, 123), this was a logical
step to take after having dissected the phenomenology of transference,
taking account of the amalgamation of transference and repetition in
Freud’s works.28 It was also an occasion for Lacan to address a
Freudian dilemma Lagache had rehashed in his numerous
contributions to the topic of transference: does transference conform
to the repetition of a need, or to a need for repetition? (Lagache
1952:94–95; 1953[1951]:4–5; 1993[1954]:137).

在1954-55年,拉康专注他的第二研讨班上很充实的部分,探讨弗洛伊德的强迫的观念的理论的分析,为了要重复。他在这个研讨班期间,至少在两个场合,他继续解释。这是一个必要採取的逻辑的步骤,当他已经解剖移情的现象学,描述移情与重复的合并,在弗洛伊德的著作里。那也是一个场合,让拉康能够处理弗洛伊德的困境。拉佳奇曾经在他许多的贡献,探讨移情的主题,曾经复述弗洛伊德的困境:移情符合需求的重复吗?或是符合重复的需求?

In presenting this
dilemma, Lagache had opposed Freud’s description of transference
as the repetition of an unfulfilled need for love (Freud 1912b:100),
following the pleasure principle, to his subsequent account of
transference as a derivative of the compulsion to repeat, and thus of
what functions beyond the pleasure principle (Freud 1920g:20–21).
Hence, the apparently futile question raised by Lagache opened up
onto a cardinal issue: does transference operate in keeping with the
pleasure principle, or does it work against it?29

当拉佳奇呈现这个困境时,他将弗洛伊德对于移情的描述,跟没有被满足的爱的需求的重复,相提并论。他遵循快乐原则,到弗洛伊德随后的描述移情,作为是重复的强迫的衍生物。因此,是超越快乐原则的功能的东西的衍生物。因此,拉佳奇提出的这个表面上说徒劳的问题,展开进入一个主要的议题:移情的运作,符合快乐原则吗?或者抵触快乐原则吗?

Lacan’s trajectory in Seminar II sparked a new interpretation of
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (Freud 1920g), in which Freud had
conceptualized the repetition compulsion as an infernal cycle compelling
people to re-experience unpleasurable events time and again. By analogy
with the notion of resistance, Lacan dubbed the repetition compulsion
an insistence, linking its compulsive nature to the continuous return of
the signifiers within the symbolic order.

拉康在第二研讨班的探讨引发对于“超越快乐原则”的新的铨释。在” 超越快乐原则“的文章,弗洛伊德曾经建构重复的强迫的观念,作为是内部的迴圈,强迫人们一再地重新经验令人不愉快的事件。拉康则是将它跟抗拒的观念类比,称重复的强迫是一种抗拒。拉康将重复强迫的特性,跟象征秩序内部,能指的继续回落联接一块。

Again minimizing the explanatory
value of the Zeigarnik effect, he attributed the repetition compulsion to
the incessant intrusion of the symbolic machinery which governs all
human life forms, similar to the ongoing exchange of messages within
an isolated, closed circuit (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:87–90). Hence, if
transference follows the repetition compulsion and the latter equals the
insistence of the signifiers within the symbolic order, then transference
must be characterized by that same symbolic insistence and not, for that
matter, by the power of resistance.

再次,当拉康淡化哲噶米克的解释的价值,他将重复的强迫归属于象征的机器的不断的闯入。这个象征的机器统辖所有的人类的生命的形式。类似于正在进行的讯息的交换,在一个孤立的,封闭的迴圈里。因此,假如移情遵循重复的强迫,而重复的强迫相等于是能指的坚持,在象征的秩序里,那么,移情必然是有相同的象征的坚持表现特征。就那件事情而言,移情并不是由抗拒的力量表现特征。

This conclusion urged Lacan to decide
in favour of the analysand’s transference as an unconscious, symbolic
need for repetition functioning beyond the pleasure principle, and it
bolstered his critique of clinicians advocating the analysis of the
transference as a resistance.30 This is not to say that Lacan completely
rejected the resistance side of transference, but he considered it an
unproductive, deceitful departure from its bona fide repetition side—a
deterioration for whose emergence the analyst is as much responsible as
for that of the symbolic insistence.

这个结论催促拉康作决定赞同分析者的移情,作为是无意识,象征的需求重复,发挥功能,超越快乐原则。这个结论支撑临床医生的批判。这些临床医生主张移情的精神分析,作为抗拒。这并不是说,拉康完全排斥移情具有抗拒的一面。代替的,他认为移情是一个没有生产的欺骗的出发,从它的真诚的重复的那一面出发—这是一种恶化。对于这个恶化,分析家同样要负责,如同负责象征的坚持的出现。

Armed with this new distinction between transference insistence
(symbolic repetition) and transference resistance (imaginary projection),
Lacan returned to the case-studies of Dora and the young homosexual
woman, putting Freud’s technical errors into a different light. Following
a juxtaposition of the two cases in Seminar IV, he argued that whereas in
the Dora case Freud had radically ignored the imaginary element of deceit
within Dora’s transference, in the case of the young homosexual woman
he had made exactly the opposite mistake, concentrating exclusively on
the deceitfulness of her dream (to be a happily married woman) without
acknowledging its truthful symbolic articulation (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:
135–136).

拉康装备著这个新的区别,处于移情的坚持(象征的重复),与移情的抗拒(想像的投射)之间的区别,他回转到朵拉与这位年轻同性恋的女人的个案研究,他将弗洛伊德的技术的错误,从不同的观点观看。拉康在第四研讨班,将这两个个案相提并论。他主张说,在朵拉的个案,弗洛伊德强烈地忽略欺骗的想像的元素,在朵拉的移情的内部。而在年轻的同性恋的女人,弗洛伊德犯了确实是相反的错误,他专注地集中于梦的欺骗性(成为婚姻快乐的女人),而没有承认欺骗性是真实的象征的表达。

In his treatment of Dora Freud was led astray by his
unshakeable belief that his patient was unconsciously, yet honestly
reliving her love for Mr K in her relationship with her analyst, whilst in
his analysis of the young homosexual girl he was mistaken in excluding
the possibility that her dream of a happily married life transpired a deeply
felt, though unconscious wish.

在他治疗朵拉时,弗洛伊德的导致迷失,是由于他的没有动摇的信念:他的病人无意识地,可是有诚实地重新经历她对K先生的爱,在她跟她的分析家的关系。弗洛伊德对这位年轻的同性恋者从事精神分析时,他犯错误地排除这个可能性:她对于快乐婚姻的生活的梦想散发出一股深深被感觉,虽然是无意识的愿望。

At the end of the 1950s, with Seminar VII (1992[1959–60]), a radical
shift of perspective took place. Although the entire seminar was intended
as a revaluation of the aims and objectives of psychoanalytic treatment,
Lacan entered into a digression concerning the relation between the
pleasure and reality principles in Freud’s oeuvre to redefine the status of
the signifier.

在1950年代的结束,在第七研讨班,拉康的观点发生强烈的改变。虽然整个的研讨班被意图充当重新评估精神分析治疗的目标与目的。拉康从事离题讨论,关于弗洛伊德的著作里,快乐原则与现实原则之间的关系的离题讨论。为了重新定义能指的地位。

Contrary to what he had proffered in previous seminars, he
now located the signifier, or what Freud had called Vorstellung
(representation), firmly within the realm of the pleasure principle (ibid.:
134). Relying on Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’
(1950a[1895]), Lacan intimated that the pleasure principle, the primary
unconscious process regulating the distribution of libidinal energy
between representations, cannot operate without these representations.
Rather than being an agency functioning beyond the pleasure principle,
the signifier thus became part and parcel of the primary process.

跟在前几个研讨班,他提供的东西恰恰相反,拉康现在定位这个能指,或弗洛伊德所谓的“再现表象”,牢固地定位在快乐原则的领域内部。拉康依靠弗洛伊德的“科学心理学的计划”主张说:快乐原则是最初的无意识的过程,规范力比多的精力的分配,在再现表象之间。假如没有这些再现表象,快乐原则无法运作。能指并非是超越快乐原则发挥功能的代理者,能指因此变成是原初的过程的部分与领域。

This new conception of the signifier evidently challenged the
connection between transference and repetition. Initially, Lacan had
correlated transference with the repetition compulsion and the latter with
the insistence of the signifier beyond the pleasure principle. Now, with
the new alliance between the signifier and the pleasure principle,
transference could no longer be associated with the repetition compulsion,
unless the symbolic mechanism of transference itself was entirely revised.
In addition, the proposed congruence of transference, the signifier and
the pleasure principle seemed to topple Lacan’s original take on Lagache’s
polarization (need for repetition vs. repetition of need) into the opposite
direction, transference appearing quite conspicuously as the repetition
of a need.

能指的这个新的观念明显地挑战移情与重复之间的连接。最初,拉康曾经将移情跟重复的强迫连接一块,将重复的强迫跟能指的坚持超越快乐原则连接一块。现在,随着这个新的联盟,处于能指与快乐之家的新的联盟,移情不再能够跟重复的强迫连想一块。除非移情本身的象征的机制完全被修订。除外,移情,能指与快乐原则的被建议的调和似乎坍塌拉康的原先的接纳拉噶奇的两极化(重复的需求,对抗需求的重复),坍塌成为相反的方向,移情相当显著地出现,作为是需求的重复。

Avoiding this inconsistency in Seminar VII, Lacan devoted his next
seminar entirely to the topic of transference, which incited him to ponder
the two sides of Lagache’s opposition again and to offer the following
provisional solution:

拉康避免在第七研讨班的这个不一贯,他专注他的下一个研讨班,专注探讨移情的主题。移情的主题激发他再次沉思拉噶奇的对立的两面,并且提供以下的暂时的解决:

[I]t seems impossible to me to eliminate from the phenomenon of
transference the fact that it manifests itself in relation to somebody
spoken to. This is a constitutive fact. It constitutes a frontier and it
simultaneously indicates to us that we should not drown the
phenomenon of transference in the general possibility of repetition
constituted by the existence of the unconscious. In analysis, there
are of course repetitions linked to the constancy of the signifying
chain in the subject. These repetitions need to be distinguished
strictly from what we call transference, even when in some cases
they may have homologous effects.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:208)

我似乎不可能从移情的现象里,减少这个事实:移情展示它自己,相关于某个被对谈的人。这是一个具有形成本质的事实。它形成一个边界,它同时跟我们指示,我们不应该将移情的这个现象,淹没于重复的一般可能里,无意识的存在形成的重复的可能里。在精神分析,当然会有重复跟主体里的成为能指的锁链的固定常数连接一块。这些重复需要严格地被区别,跟我们所谓的移情,即使当在某些的情况,他们可能会有同质性的影响。

It would be erroneous to infer from this passage that Lacan took issue
with his own previous equivalence of transference and the need for
repetition, now realigning the occurrence of transference with the
repetition of a need. As a matter of fact, he was making a rudimentary
case for the radical separation of transference and repetition on the basis
of an evaluation of the inherently creative dimension in the transference
phenomenon.

这将是错误的,假如我们从这个段落推论,拉康争议他自己先前将移情与重复的需求的相等。现在则是将移情的发生,跟需求的重复重新等同。事实上,拉康正在建构一个基本的个案,朝向将移情跟重复强烈地分开,基础是评估移情的现象的本质上创造的维度。

On the one hand, Freud’s definition of transference as the
analysand’s reproduction in acts of a repressed historical event within
the presence of the analytic situation (Freud 1914g:150) encouraged
Lacan to loosen the knot between transference and the compulsion to
repeat.

一方面,弗洛伊德的定义移情,作为是分析者的复制,在被压抑的历史的事件的行动里,在分析的情况的存在里面。这鼓励拉康松开这个环结,处于移情于重复的强迫之间的环结。

The element of acting and the incessant implication of the present
within the transference prompted him to approach transference as
something more than the emergence of the compulsion to repeat. On the
other hand, he questioned the view of transference as the repetition of an
ancient unfulfilled need from the vantage point that the analysand never
simply succumbs to this need, but always recreates it within the novel
context of the analytic experience (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:206–207).

在移情内部,行动的元素与目前的不断的暗示,激发拉康探讨移情,作为是某件不仅是重复的强迫的出现。在另一方面,他质问移情的观点,作为旧时没有被满足的需求的重复,从分析者从来没有仅是屈从这个需求的观看点。而是总是重新创造这个需要,在精神分析经验的新奇的内文里。

The vexed issue of the relationship between transference and repetition
was reopened in 1962–63, when Lacan spent a whole year investigating
the topic of anxiety. Broaching yet again the conjunction of transference
and the compulsion to repeat, he underscored that transference cannot
be reduced to the reproduction of an anterior, unresolved conflict. If the
analysand’s transference is marked by love, this affect is always already
related to an object in the present, which Lacan (1991b[1960–61]: 179–
195) illustrated with Socrates’ interpretation of Alcibiades’ love in Plato’s
Symposium (Plato 1951).31

移情与重复之间的关系的恼人的问题重新被展开,当拉康花费一整年的时间,研究焦虑的议题。拉康再次将移情与重复的强迫分开,他强调,移情无法被化简成为前期,没有被解救的冲突的复制。假如分析者的移情被标记著爱,这个情感总是已经恩目前的客体相关。拉康举例说明目前这个客体,用苏格拉底的解释阿西比底斯的爱,这柏拉图的“会饮篇”里。

Concurrently, he insisted that the reduction
of transference to repetition obfuscates the importance of the analyst’s
own part in the entire affair. For if the transference always integrates an
object in the present, analysts cannot escape their being made into the
object of their analy sands’ transference, through which they not only
elicit but also crucially shape their patients’ reactions. Down-playing
the repetitive component of transference and upgrading the analyst’s
creative part in it, Lacan also replaced his previous definition of
countertransference as the sum of the analyst’s prejudices, insufficient
information, passions and difficulties, by the analyst’s essential
implication in the analysand’s transference, whose cautious management
must proceed from the purified desire of the analyst (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]: 221; 1962–63: session of 27 February 1963).32

同时,拉康坚持,移情化简成为重复,抹除分析家扮演的角色的重要性,在整个的情事里。因此,假如移情总是合并目前的客体,分析家无法逃避他们的存在,被填加到他们的分析者的移情的客体里。通过分析者的移情,他们不但召唤,而且关键地塑造他们的病人的反应。贬抑移情的重复的成分,并且提升分析者在移情的重复里扮演创造性的角色,拉康也更换他的先前的反-移情的定义,作为是分析家的各种偏见,不充分的资讯,激情与困难的总和。由于分析家的基本的暗示,在分析者的移情里。对于分析者的谨慎的管理必须前进,从分析家的被纯净化的欲望里。

Lacan’s most distinguished view on the nature of transference
appeared in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]), in which he designated
transference and repetition as two distinct fundamental concepts of
psychoanalysis.33 Disregarding his own previous assertions and criticizing
Freud for presenting a confused account, Lacan proclaimed that repetition
has nothing in common with transference (ibid.: 33, 69).

拉康探讨移情的特性的最明显的观点,出现在第11研讨班。在那里,他指明移情与重复,作为精神分析的两个不同的基本的观念。拉康忽视他自己先前的主张,并且批评弗洛伊德,因为呈现一个感到困惑的描述。拉康宣称,重复跟移情根本没有任何共通的地方。

Whereas
repetition occurs when a missed, traumatic encounter (beyond the
pleasure principle) is integrated within the network of signifiers (following
the pleasure principle), transference ‘is the enactment of the reality of
the unconscious’ (ibid.: 146, 149).34 Gradually disclosing the meaning
of this new, highly aphoristic description of transference, Lacan specified
that the reality of the unconscious is always sexual and that this
unconscious sexual reality underpins all the analysand’s demands within
the transference.

重复发生,当一个被错过的,创伤的遭遇(超越快乐原则)被合并到能指的网络内部(遵循快乐原则),移情就是“无意识的现实的诉诸行动”。拉康逐渐揭露这个新的,高度警语的描述移情的意义。他并且指明,无意识的现实总是性化,这个无意识的性的现实,作为是所有分析者在移情内部的要求。

For example, if an analysand demands that the analyst
say something because she has the impression that the latter does not
seem to be interested in her associations, this demand represents an avatar
of the analysand’s unconscious sexual reality, notably that she derives
excitement from awakening people’s interest and that she cannot tolerate
the idea that somebody might not be attracted to her.

譬如,假如分析者要求:分析家应该说出某件东西。因为她拥有这个印象,分析家似乎对她的联想,没有感到興趣。这个要求代表分析者的无意识的性的现实的具体表现,特别是,分析者获得興奋,从唤醒人们的興趣,她无法容忍这个观念:某个人没有被她吸引。

If the analyst remains
mute, the analysand is bound to interpret his silence as an indication of
the analyst’s lack of interest or, more commonly, as evidence of his lack
of professionalism, and she is likely to employ this interpretation as an
explanation for her own lack of analytic progress. More specifically, she
will attribute the fact that the analyst is not giving her enough (nice
interpretations, kind words, love) to his being a bad practitioner, and she
will try to change his habits by intermittently threatening him with her
imminent departure.

假如分析家始终沉默不语,分析者一定要解释他的沉默,作为是指示分析家的欠缺興趣,或是,更加普遍地,作为证明分析家欠缺专业精神。分析者很可能运用这个解释,作为解释她自己的欠缺精神分析的进步。更加明确地,分析者将个事实:分析家并没有给予她充分的(解释,仁慈的话语,爱),归咎于分析家是差劲的执业者。她将尝试改变分析家的态度,凭借间歇地威胁他,用她的快要来临的离去。

Conversely, when an analysand requests that the
analyst remain silent so that he can devote himself fully to the exploration
of his thoughts, this demand too harbours an unconscious sexual reality,
inasmuch as the analysand might enjoy destroying whatever interest
people may show in him so that he can devote himself quietly to the
narcissistic enjoyment of his own isolated condition.

相反地,当分析者要求:分析家应该始终保持沉默,这样,他才能够充分地专注他自己,探索他的思想。这个要求也怀抱著一个无意识的性的现实。因为分析者可能喜欢恢灭任何让人们在他身上显示的任何興趣。这样,他才会安静地专注他自己,于他自己的孤立的情况的自恋的享受。

Substantiating earlier statements on the analyst’s responsibility,
Lacan added that this enactment of the sexual reality of the unconscious
should not be understood as a mere effect of the analysand’s psychic
structure:

拉康将他早期对于分析家的责任的陈述具体表现,然后补充说,无意识里的性的现实的这个诉诸行动,不应该被理解,作为仅是分析者的心灵的结构的结果。

The transference is a phenomenon in which subject and
psychoanalyst are both included. To divide it in terms of
transference and countertransference—however bold, however
confident what is said on this theme may be—is never more than a
way of avoiding the essence of the matter.
(ibid.: 231)

移情是主体与精神分析家两种都包含在内的现象。用移情与反移情来区分,从来就是逃避问题的本质的方式。无论针对这个主题所说出的话语是多么勇敢,多么自信。

Apropos of the aforementioned examples, this means that the analysand
in the first case will not regard the analyst as a passive figure who lacks
all interest and commitment, expressly formulating the demand that he
start working and acting as a proper analyst, if the latter did not cultivate
an attitude of prolonged silence. Mutatis mutandis, the analysand in the
second case will not vilify the analyst for intervening, impressing on
him the idea that good analysts are supposed to listen and not talk, if the
analyst himself did not engage regularly in asking questions and launching
interpretations.

关于前面所述的例子,这意味着,在第一个个案里的分析者,将不会视分析家,作为一个被动的人物。他欠缺所有的興趣与奉献。他生动地阐述这个要求:他应该开始工作与形动,作为一位恰如分的分析家。假如后者并没有培养延长的沉默的态度。比照起来,在第二个个案的分析者将不会抨击分析家,因为介入,让他接受这个观念:好的分析家被认为是倾听,而不是谈话。假如分析家自己并没有规律地参与询问问题,并发动解释。

The analyst’s conduct in these two cases is crucial for
the emergence of the analysand’s transference as the enactment of the
sexual reality of the unconscious and it simultaneously gives form to it.

在这两个个案里,分析家的行为是重要的,对于分析者的移情的出现,作为是无意识的性的现实的诉诸行动。分析家的行为同时也给予它形式。

Needless to say that the analyst’s conduct in these matters reflects a
particular desire and rests upon an appreciation of the psychic structure of
the analysand before and during analytic sessions. In the first case, the
analyst’s sustained silence will normally proceed from a diagnosis of the
analysand as a hysteric, whereas in the second case the analyst’s nagging
interventions will be based on a diagnosis of obsessional neurosis. Since
hysteria revolves around an ardent desire to elicit the desire of the Other,
the analyst’s silence encompasses a refusal to enter the hysterical dynamics
and is well suited to trigger the hysteric’s fantasy within the transference.

自不待言的是,分析家的行为,在这些事情里,反映出特殊的欲望,并依靠分析者的心灵的结构的赏识,在精神分析节数之前与期间。在第一个个案,分析家的持续的沉默,正常地前进,从诊断分析者,作为癔症。在第二个个案,分析家的唠叨的介入,将会以妄想症的神经症作为基础。因为癔症环绕热切的欲望旋转,为了召唤大他者的欲望。分析家的沉默涵盖拒绝进入癔症的动力结构,并且非常合适地触发癔症的幻见,在移情的内部。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire’ Lacan wrote:
[A] calculated vacillation of the analyst’s ‘neutrality’ may be more
valuable for a hysteric than any amount of interpretation, despite
the frenzy which may result from it. That is to say, so that this
frenzy does not entail a rupture and the sequel convinces the subject
that the desire of the analyst was by no means involved.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:321–322, translation modified)

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”,拉康书写到:「比起任何数量的解释,分析家保持“中立”的审慎评估的摇摆,可能更加有价值。尽管从这个摇摆可能造成的狂热。换句话说,这个狂热并没有涵盖中断。这个过程让主体相信,分析家的欲望根本就没有被牵涉在内。

Vice versa, since obsessional neurosis hinges on a desire to neutralize
the desire of the Other, the analyst’s interventions confront the analysand
with a living presence by which the analyst guards himself against the
tentacles of the obsessional apparatus and conjures up the obsessional
fantasy.35 In these two cases, the analyst’s attitude is complementary, yet
in each case it is based on what Lacan called the desire of the analyst, i.e.
a desire that analysands reach the point where they avow their own desire.
Strategies of transference 123

反过来说,因为妄想症的神经症依靠大他者的欲望的保持中立。分析家的介入,让分析者面临一个活生生的存在。凭借这个活生的存在,分析家警戒他自己,对抗妄想症的工具的碰触,并且召唤妄想症者的幻想。在这两个个案里,分析家的态度是互补的。可是,在每个个案,它的基础上是拉康所谓的分析家的欲望。譬如,分析者的欲望到达这一点,在那里,他们宣称他们自己的欲望。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 4

October 12, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

THE CAUSE OF PSYCHOSIS
精神病的原因

In Seminar III, Lacan did not content himself with describing the principal
features of psychotic communication—the exclusion of the Other, the
semantic ‘shallowness’ of language, a code that has become message
and a message that has been reduced to its code, and the compulsory
nature of the exchange—he also tried to delineate the cause of these
features.

在第三研讨班,拉康并没有满足于描述精神病者的沟通的主要特征—大他者的排除,语言的语意的“浮浅化”,已经变成讯息的符码,以及被化简成为它的符码的讯息,跟交换的强迫性的特性。拉康也尝试描述这特征的原因。

Assuming that the dimension of the Other and the possibility to define
positions within a particular exchange are due to the wall imposed by
language, Lacan had to conclude that in psychosis this wall has somehow
not been erected. In psychotic patients, language has not been anchored.

当拉康假设,大他者的维度与定义特殊的交换里的立场的可能性,是由于被语言赋加的墙壁所形成。拉康必须获得结论:在精神病,这个墙壁因为某种原故,并没有被竖立。在精神病的病人身上,语言并没有被锚定。

Rather than a firmly embedded, solid structure, it is a free-floating, flat
and permeable screen. Implicitly referring to Freud’s idea that in
psychosis the link between the word-presentation and the thingpresentation
has been severed, Lacan defined this non-embedment of
language as a lack of ‘quilting points’ (points de capiton) between the
signifier and the signified (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:268–270), for which
he in turn held the foreclosure (forclusion) of the Name-of-the-Father
responsible (Lacan 1977h[1957–58]:215).8

非但不是被坚固的镶嵌的牢固的结构,在神经病者的语言是一种自由漂浮,平坦与可被污染的帘幕。拉康暗示地提到弗洛伊德的观念:在精神病者,字词表象与物表象已经被撕裂开来。拉康定义语言的非-镶嵌,作为是处于能指与所指的“锚定点的欠缺”。因为这样,精神病者自己将“以父之名”的除权封闭负起责任。

In the final session of Seminar III Lacan proposed ‘foreclosure’ as
the best translation of Freud’s term Verwerfung (Lacan 1993[1955–
56]:321). In Freud’s works, Verwerfung can hardly lay claim to conceptual
status— there are very few passages in which the term appears—and it
is not really elaborated as the specific cause of psychosis.9 In
conceptualizing Verwerfung as a distinct mechanism for psychosis, Lacan
took his main lead from Freud’s formula in his case-study of the Wolf
Man that a ‘repression [Verdrangung] is something very different from
a condemning judgement [Verwerfung]’ (Freud 1918b[1914]:79–80).

在第三研讨班的最后一堂,拉康建议“除权弃绝”作为是弗洛伊德的术语“否认”的最佳翻译。在弗洛伊德的著作里,“否认”几乎无法宣称具有观念的地位—这个术语出现的段落非常少—这个术语并没有确实地建构,作为是精神病的明确的原因。当拉康将“否认”形成观念,作为是精神病的明显的心理机制,他主要是从弗洛伊德的公式引申而来,在他研究“狼人”的个案:压抑跟谴责的判断是某件非常不同的东西。

Between 1954 and 1956, he then tried to define Verwerfung in opposition
to repression, but also in relation to the mechanisms of Verneinung
(negation) and Bejahung (affirmation), which Freud had discussed in
his paper ‘Negation’ (1925h). Eventually, Lacan reached the conclusion
that Verwerfung and Verdrangung differ with regard to their effects:
What comes under the effect of repression returns, for repression
and the return of the repressed are just the two sides of the same
coin. The repressed is always there, expressed in a perfectly
articulate manner in symptoms and a host of other phenomena. By
contrast, what falls under the effect of Verwerfung has a completely
different destiny …[W]hatever is refused in the symbolic order, in
the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:12–13)

在1054年与1056年之间,拉康因此尝试定义“否认”跟“压抑”作为对立,而且也跟“否定”与“肯定”的心理机制息息相关。弗洛伊德在1925年曾经有篇论文“论否定”讨论到。最后,拉康获得这个结论:否认与除权弃绝关于它们的影响,有所不同。在压抑的影响下来临的东西,回再回来,因为压抑与被压抑物的回来,仅是相同铜板的两面。被压抑物总是在那里,用非常清楚的方式被表达,在症状与许多其他的现象。对照起来,在“否认”的影响下发生的东西,具有完全不同的命运。在象征秩序被拒绝的任何东西,用“否认”的意义来说,会重新出现在实在界。

The meaning Lacan gave to Verwerfung here—a process through which
something reappears (as a hallucination) in the real—tallies with Freud’s
description of the mechanism of psychotic symptom formation in his
Schreber study. A paranoid patient suffering from hallucinations or
persecutory delusions was in Freud’s opinion subject to a process whereby
‘an internal perception is suppressed, and…its content enters
consciousness in the form of an external perception’ (Freud 1911c
[1910]:66).

在此,拉康给予“否认”这个意义:某件东西在实在界的重新出现(作为幻觉)的过程。这个意义符合弗洛伊德对于精神病的症状的形成的心理机制的描述,在他研究许瑞伯的案例。依照弗洛伊德,遭受幻觉或迫害狂的幻觉的妄想症的病人,隶属于这一个过程:“内部的感觉被压制,它的内容进入意识,以外在的感觉的形态”。

Initially, Freud called this process ‘projection’, but owing to
the fact that people regularly attribute their mental states to external rather
than internal causes—which also deserves to be called projection—he
came to question his own designation: ‘It was incorrect to say that the
perception which was suppressed internally is projected outwards; the
truth is rather…that what was abolished internally returns from without’
(ibid.: 71). Lacan must have noticed that Freud was looking in vain for
an appropriate denominator to grasp the psychic mechanism of psychosis,
which prompted him to designate the mechanism as Verwerfung, bearing
in mind that Freud himself had conceived Verwerfung as radically
different from repression.

起初,弗洛伊德称这个过程为“投射”,但是由于这个事实:人们规律地将他们的心灵的状态,归属于外在,而不是内在的原因–这也应该被称为是投射–弗洛伊德逐渐质疑他自己的指定:“这是不正确的,假如我们说,内部被压制的感知被投射到外部。相反地,真相是:内部被废除的东西,从外部回来。拉康当时一定曾注意到,弗洛伊德白费力气地正在寻找一个适当的分母,为了要理解精神病的心灵结构。这激发他指明这个心理机制,作为是”否认“。他切记在心:弗洛伊德自己曾经构型”否认“作为是跟压抑强烈不同的东西。

In ultimately choosing to translate Verwerfung as foreclosure, Lacan
re-emphasized the linguistic nature of the psychotic mechanism. Indeed,
whereas foreclosure is a juridical term expressing the expiration of a
person’s assigned rights (for instance, the legal access to one’s children
after a divorce) when he does not exercise them, Lacan took it from a
paper on the nature of French negations by Damourette and Pichon
(1928). With French negations generally consisting of two parts—as in
ne…pas and ne…jamais—Damourette and Pichon redefined the first part
as the discordant component and the second one as the foreclosure,
observing that the latter part is more akin to the rough logical negation
than the former, which can in some cases even be omitted without the
meaning of the sentence being lost.

当拉康最后选择将”否认“翻译成为”除权弃绝“时,他重新强调精神病的心理机制的语言的特性。的确,虽然”除权弃绝“是一个司法的术语,表达一个人的被指定的权利的终止,(譬如,离婚之后,合法地承接自己的小孩),当他没有运用这些权利时。拉康从达摩瑞特与皮琼探讨法文的”否定词“的特性的论文,获得这个观念。法文的否定词通常由两个部分组成–如同在ne…pas and ne…jamais–达摩瑞特与皮琼重新定义第一部分,作为是不协调的成分,将第二部分定义作为”除权弃绝“。他们观察到,后者部分更加类似简陋的逻辑的否定,比起前者。在某些的情况,前者会被省略,而不会丧失句子的意义。

They also considered foreclosure to
be the linguistic index of a desire to exclude the possibility that a certain
event exists or happens again, a phenomenon which they compared to
the excision (scotomization) of a perception from the field of vision.10
Without restricting himself to this particular structure of French negation,
Lacan substituted foreclosure for other translations of Verwerfung,
because in his view the operation epitomized the exclusion of a linguistic
element (a signifier) rather than an ‘internal perception’. As to the exact
nature of this signifier, he explored various avenues throughout Seminar
III, finally designating it as the Name-of-the-Father from his 1957–58
text on psychosis onwards.

他们也将”除权弃绝“认为是欲望的语言索引,欲望要排除这个可能性:某个事件存在或再次发生。某个现象,他们将它类比赛某个感知的切除,从视觉的景象里被切除。拉康并没有限制自己于法文的否定词的这个特殊结构。他将”除权弃绝“用来替换”否认“的其他翻译。因为依他的看法,除权弃绝的这个运作描绘语言元素(一个能指)的被排除,而不是”内部的感知“。至于这个能指的确是对特性,拉康探索各式各样的管道,在第三研讨班。他最后指明能指的意义,作为是”以父之名“。从拉康的1957年到1958年探讨精神病的文本开始。

Lacan had introduced the concept of the Name-of-the-Father in a 1953
lecture on the neurotic’s individual myth, in order to separate the real
father, a flesh and blood man, from the symbolic ‘function of the father’,
which he interpreted as the culturally determined regulation of the natural
order of things (Lacan 1979[1953]:422–423). In the contemporaneous
‘Rome Discourse’, he further specified that ‘in the name of the father…
we must recognize the support of the symbolic function which, from the
dawn of history, has identified his person [the person of the father] with
the figure of the law (Lacan 1977e[1953]:67).11

在1963年的演讲,拉康介绍以父之名的这个观念。他探讨神经症者的个人神话,为了将现实的父亲,血肉之躯的人,跟象征的“父亲的功能”区分开。他解释象征的父亲的功能,作为是事情的自然的秩序的文化所决定的规范。在同时间的“罗马辞说”,他更进一步地指明,以父之名,我们必须体认错象征功能的支持,自古以来,象征功能的支持已经将父亲这个人,跟法则的人物认同一致。

Hence, in Lacan’s theory
of the 1950s the signifier of the Name-of-the-Father bears a striking
resemblance to how the Jewish God Yahweh was understood by Freud in
his Moses and Monotheism (1939a[1937–39]). Yahweh is an upholding,
yet demanding agency which never reveals its true face. An immaterial,
yet speaking creature which promises redemption in exchange for a strict
obeyance to the divine law, whose first indication is the act of
circumcision, it is an abstract intangible principle imposing an alternative,
symbolic order onto the people of Israel, which reshapes their natural
living conditions.

因此,在拉康的1950年的理论,以父之名的能指具有明显的类似,跟犹太教的耶威上帝被弗洛伊德理解的方式,在他的“摩西与一神教。耶威是一位作为支撑,可是要求的代理者。它从来没有显露它的真实的面貌。它是一位抽象,可是会言说的神性,它承诺给予救赎,以交换严格的服从神性的法则。这个神性法则的第一个指示是切割包皮。这是一个抽象的非实质的原则,赋加一个替代的象征的秩序,给以色列的民族,它重新塑造自然是•生活的情况。

Lacan’s concept of the Name-of-the-Father conveys a similar meaning,
because it is held to represent an imposed transcendence of natural
provisions with a view of a higher order of mental and social functioning.
Although Lacan’s notion betrays its grounding in religion, he extended
its operation beyond this realm, conceiving it as the guiding principle of
every sociocultural organization. Similar to Moses’ God, the Name-ofthe-
Father thereby remained an essentially linguistic principle, not so
much due to the fact that it speaks, but rather because Lacan regarded it
as the cornerstone of a shared language system. He also pointed out that
in most cultures and throughout history the representation of this
regulatory father-function is considered to be one of the tasks of real
fathers, their relationships with children being less irrefutable than those
of real mothers.12

拉康对于以父之名的观念,传递类似的意义,因为以父之名被认为是代表自然情况的被赋加的超验神性。具有更高秩序的精神与社会的功能的观的。虽然拉康的观念显露它以宗教作为基础,他延伸它的运作,超越这个领域,构想它作为是每个社会与文化的组织的引导原则。跟摩西的上帝一样,以父之名因此始终是以语言为基础的原则。倒不是因为它会言说的这个事实,而是因为拉康将它视为是共享的语言的系统的基石。他也指出,在大部分的文化,有史以来,规范的父亲的功能的表象被认为是现实的父亲的其中一个工作,他们跟小孩的关系,不像现实的母亲的那些关心,那么容易反驳。

The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father in psychosis thus means
that an individual has been excluded from the possibility of substituting
a culturally determined symbolic pact, including injunctions, prohibitions
and allowances, for an unblemished, yet chaotic natural condition.13 In
Lacan’s view, the psychotic is literally an outlaw, because she has not
assimilated the cultural laws of language. As described on p. 12, the
effect is not that language is completely eradicated, but that it no longer
sets a barrier between the individual and his environment. This foreclosure
of the Name-of-the-Father and the ensuing absence of quilting points
between the signifier and the signified also entail that the meaning of
words no longer shifts, but solidifies to the point where it becomes
petrified on the level of the code itself.

精神病者的以父之名的除权封闭意味着,个人已经被排除这个可能:替换被文化决定的象征的盟约,包含命令,禁止与容许,替换一个没有被污染,可是混乱的自然的情况。依照拉康的观点,精神病实质上是一个非法之徒。因为她并没有接受语言的文化的法则。如同第12页所描述的,结果并不是语言完全被抹除,,而是语言不再竖立一个阻碍,在个人与环境之间。父亲之名的除权弃绝与随后的能指与所指之间的缝合点的缺席,也意味着,字词的意义不再改变,而是凝固到这个程度,字词变得僵化,在符码自身的层面。

This may seem odd when taking into account that the absence of
quilting points appears to suggest an endless fluctuation of the signified
(the thing-presentation, the culturally imposed meaning) under the
signifier (the word-presentation), whereas firmly established quilting
points would signal the allocation of a fixed meaning to certain signifiers.

这看起来是古怪的,当我们考虑到,缝合点的缺陷,似乎意味着所指的永无止境地摇摆,(物表象,被文化赋加的意义),在能指之下(字词表象)。另一方面,坚固被建立的缝合点将会指示著固定的意义被分配给某些的能指。

Yet, as Lacan saw it, the absence of quilting points precludes semantic
ambiguity, because equivocality presupposes that at least two different
meanings can be balanced against each other, which in turn requires that
at least one meaning has been established.14 In Freudian terms, the
installation of a link between the word-presentation and the thing presentation
implies that the literal meaning of a word can be weighed
against the figurative one, whereas the absence of such a link makes this
process impossible.

可是,依照拉康的看法,缝合点缺席预先包含语意的模糊嗳昧。因为模糊嗳昧预先假设:至少有两个不同的意义能够被互相对抗与平衡。这反过来会要求:至少有一个意义已经被建立。用弗洛伊德的术语来说,字词表象与物表象之间的关联的安置暗示着:字词的实质意义能够被用来跟想像的意义互相抗衡。另一方面,这样的联接的缺席让这个过程成为不可能。

Who or what is responsible for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-
Father is a particularly vexed issue within Lacanian theory. In the final
pages of his 1957–58 paper on psychosis Lacan proceeded with the
greatest caution when broaching this question.

在拉康的理论里,一个特殊的令人懊恼的问题是:谁来负责,或什么在负责以父之名的这个除权封闭?在1957年到1958年之久的最后几页,拉康探讨精神病,他小心翼翼地进行,当他揭露这个问题。
First of all, he repudiated
the idea that foreclosure stems from the parent’s mutual competition to
win and sustain the child’s love, whereby the mother would for instance
ridicule the father systematically in front of her child. Instead of this
parental rivalry to the detriment of one parent (notably the father), Lacan
highlighted the place each parent accords to the symbolic position of the
Name-of-the-Father in his or her relationship with the child. In this way,
he decomposed the classic Oedipal triangle of mother-father-child into
two sub-structures, mother-child-Name-of-the-Father and father-child18
Name-of-the-Father.

首先,他排除这个观念:除权弃绝起源于病人的互相竸争要战胜,并且维持小孩的爱。譬如,母亲经常会在小孩的面前,习惯性嘲笑父亲。并不是父母的敌对,结果伤害其中一位父母(特别是父亲)。相反地,拉康强调这个位置,每位父母给予以父之名的象征的地位,在他跟小孩的关系。以这个方式,他瓦解古典的伊狄浦斯的母亲-父亲-儿子的三角地位,成为是次级结构:母亲-小孩-以父之名,与父亲-小孩-以父之名。

Within each of these sub-structures, the parental
agencies ought to ensure that the transcendental, symbolic paternal
function is acknowledged. This implies that the father and the mother
need to let the child know in no uncertain terms that they are subjected
to a symbolic order which they cannot alter or control. Both the father
and the mother need to acknowledge that they do not epitomize the law,
but that the law transcends them and that they themselves are forced to
comply with it as much as everybody else. To put it in even more concrete
terms, this comes down to the parents telling their children that they are
expected to observe certain social rules (for example, the basic ‘Freudian
rule’ of the incest prohibition) and that this expectation also applies to
them, despite the fact that they are in a parental position. Such a
concession might pose serious difficulties, as Lacan stressed, to those
fathers who really have the function of legislators (Lacan 1977h[1957–
58]: 218–219).

在每个这些次级结构里,父母作为代理者应该保证,这个超验,象征的父母的功能比承认。这暗示着,父亲与母亲需要让小孩知道,用明确的术语,他们隶属于象征的秩序,他们无法改变或控制这个象征秩序。父亲与母亲需要承认,他们并没有具体体现法则,而是法则作为他们的超验神性。他们自己被迫同意法则,如同其他的人一样。用更加具体的术语言,这总结作为父母告须他们的小孩,他们被期望遵守某些的社会的规则(譬如,乱论禁忌作为基本的弗洛伊德的规则)。这个期望也运用到他们身上。尽皆这个事实:他们处于父母的立场。这样一种退让可能形成严重的困难,如同拉康强调的,对于那些拥有立法的功能的父亲。

Needless to say that Lacan’s deconstruction of the Freudian Oedipal
triangle into two distinct triads does not yet outline the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father and
the ensuing emergence of a psychotic structure in the child. Is it sufficient
for one of the child’s parents to dishonour the paternal function, or should
the parents do it in tandem? And if the Name-of-the-Father is debased
by both parents, does that automatically induce psychosis in the child or
should some auxiliary condition be fulfilled?

自不待言,拉康的解构弗洛伊德的三角位置,成为两个清楚的三角位置,并没有描绘以父之名的除权弃绝的必要与充分的条件。以及在小孩身上,精神病的结构的随后的出现。让小孩的父母的其中一位不尊敬父权的功能就足够了吗?或者,父母应该协调来不尊敬父权的功能?假如以父之名被父母亲除掉基础,那会自动自发地导致小孩的精神病吗?或是,某个辅助的条件应该被满足?

On occasion, people
commenting on Lacan’s theory have argued that the mother’s refusal to
accept the paternal authority is sufficient for psychosis to occur in the
child, by which they have reduced Lacan’s complex Oedipal schema to
its simple triangular roots, and by which they have also realigned it with
the post-Freudian view that a child’s psychic normality is predicated
upon its separation from the pre-Oedipal dyadic relation with the mother,
through the intervention of the father and the concurrent ‘triangulation’.15

有时,评论拉康的理论的人们争辩说:母亲的拒绝接受父权的权威,就足够让精神病发生在小孩身上。凭借这个,他们将拉康的复杂的伊狄浦斯情结的基模化简成为简单的三角位置的根源。评借这个,他们也重新安排它,用后-弗洛伊德的观点: 小孩的心灵的正常被陈述在它跟前-伊狄浦斯跟母亲的二元关系的分开。通过父亲与同时间的“三角位置”的介入。

Nowhere does Lacan’s work allow us to make these kinds of inferences,
yet neither does it suggest a good alternative answer to the problem.
Jacques-Alain Miller (1987) has proposed to complicate Lacan’s
model even further by taking into account the child’s own involvement.
Explicitly eschewing a structuralist (social constructionist) conception
of Lacanian theory, Miller took his bearings from Lacan’s 1946 essay
on psychic causality, in which he had asserted that psychosis ultimately
rests upon an ‘unfathomable decision of being’ (Lacan
1966a[1946]:177).16

拉康的研究根本没有让我们能够从事这些种类的推测。它也没有暗示对于这个难题有一个好的替代答案。艾伦 米勒曾经建议要将拉康的模式甚至变得更加复杂。他考虑到小孩自己的参与。当米勒明确地规避拉康的理论的结构主义(社会建构主义)的观念。他从拉康的1946年的论文“探讨心灵的因果律”开始申论。在那篇论文,拉康曾经主张,精神病最后依靠“深不可测的生命实存的决定”。

According to Miller, ‘the formula of foreclosure
has paralysed the debate on madness to such an extent that it has become
impossible for us to read what is supporting this formula, notably that it
is unthinkable without the implication of a subjective position’ (Miller
1987:143). When human beings become psychotic, it is not simply
because they have been the passive victim of deleterious parental attitudes,
but because they themselves have ‘decided’ to reject the Name-of-the-
Father, just as much as neurotics themselves, rather than their parents,
have repressed certain traumatic incidents.

依照米勒,除权弃绝的公式让对于疯狂的辩论动弹不得。我们甚至不可能阅读支持这个公式的东西。特别是,这是不可思议的,假如没有主体的立场的暗示。当人类变成精神病,这不仅是因为他们是灵巧的父亲的态度的受害者,而且是因为他们自己已经“决定”要拒绝以父之名。如同神经症者已经压抑某些的创伤的意外,而不是他们的父母亲压抑。

However, Lacan’s statement
also underscored that it is impossible to probe into the exact nature of
this ‘decision’. Although foreclosure cannot be operative without a
supporting subject, how, when and where this component has entered,
or will enter the play remains a mystery. In its impenetrability, the decision
is both untraceable and unforeseeable. Likewise, we are forced to remain
silent concerning the question as to whether this decision implies a free
choice or has already been shaped by the demands and desires of others,
and perhaps also as to whether it is modifiable or not.

可是,拉康的陈述也被强调。我们不可能探索这个“决定”的确实的特性。虽然除权弃绝无法运作,而没有一个支持的主体。这个成分用什么方式,何时,何地,进入,或将会进入这个运作,始终是个神秘。由于它的不可贯穿,这个决定既是无法追踪,也是无法预先看见。同样地,我们被迫保持沉默,关于这个问题,关于这个决定是否暗示一个自由的选择。或已经被塑造,被别人的要求与欲望,或许,也关于它是否可以被修改。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成31

June 30, 2014

无意识的形成31
雅克、拉康
20.11.57 42

This is the whole story of the novel and it seems that to a
certain extent it is a very instructive and moral story that
could be used at the level of what we want to demonstrate.
Here then we have our Heinrich Heine who has created this
character as a background, and this character has produced with
the signifier famillionaire, the double dimension of metaphorical
creation, and on the other hand a sort of new metonymical object,
the famillionaire, whose position you can situate here and here.

这就是小说的整个故事。似乎到某个程度,这是一个具有启发性与道德教喻的故事。它能够被使用在我们想要证明的层层。在此,我们因此拥有我们的海瑞其、海因,他曾经创造这个人物,作为背景。这个人物曾经用能指创造famillionaire,这是隐喻创造的双重维度。在另一方面,这是一种新的换喻的客体,这个famillionaire,它的立场,你能够在此定位。

I showed you last day that to conceive of the existence of the
signifying creation called the famillionaire we can find here,
even though here of course attention is not drawn to this aspect
of things, all the debris, all the ordinary waste from the
reflection of a metaphorical creation on an object; namely, all
(13) the underlying signifiers, all the signifying packets into
which we can break the term famillionaire, the fames, the fama,
the infamy, in fact anything you like, the famulus, everything
that Hirsen-Hyacinth effectively is for his caricature of a boss,
Cristoforo Gumpelino.

上次我跟你们显示,所谓的famillionaire的能指意义的创造的存在,我们在此能够发现,即使在此注意力当然并不没有被吸引到事情的这个层面,所有的残骸,所有的普通的废料,从对于客体的隐喻的创造的反思,换句话说,作为基础的能指,所有的能指意义的包裹,我们将famillionaire这个术语,这个名声,这些恶名,分解成为所有的能指意义的包裹。事实上,任何你喜欢的任何东西,学者的侍从,海辛斯嘲讽老板时表现的一切。

And here in this place, we should
systematically search every time we are dealing with a formation
of the unconscious as such, for what I have called the debris of
the metonymical object which certainly, for reasons that are
altogether clear from experience, are shown to be naturally more
important when the metaphorical creation, one might say, has not
succeeded.

在此,在这个位置,我们应该系统地寻找,每当我们正在处理无意识本身的形成,因为我所谓换喻的客体的残骸。的确,因为根据精神分析非常清楚的理由,这些客体显示自然更加重要,当隐喻的创作并没有成功。我们不妨这样说。

I mean when it has culminated in nothing, as in the
case that I have just shown you of the forgetting of a name; when
the name Signorelli is forgotten to rediscover the trace of this
hollow, of this hole that we find at the level of metaphor, the
metonymical debris take on all their importance.

我的意思是,虽然它在空无里达到巅峰,如同在我刚刚跟你们显示的情况,忘掉名字。当Signorelli这个名字被忘记,为了重新发现这个空洞的痕迹,我们在隐喻的层次发现的这个空洞,换喻的残骸具有它们的重要性。

The fact that at the level of the disappearance of the term
“Herr”, it is something that forms part of the whole metonymical
context within which “Herr” is isolated, namely the context of
Bosnia Herzogovina, that allows us to restore it, takes on here
all its importance.

在这个术语的消失的层次,有某件东西形成整个换喻的内容。在这个内容里,“Herr” 被孤立出来,换句话说,Bosnia Herzogovina 的内容。它让我们能够恢复它,在此具有它的一切意义。

But let us return to our famillionaire.
Our famillionaire is produced then at the level of the message. I
(13) pointed out to you that we would find ourselves at the level
of f amillionaire when we were dealing with the metonymical
correspondences of the paradoxical formation that is produced at
the level of the forgetting of a name.

但是让我们回到famillionaire。 我们的famillionaire 当时在讯息的层次被产生。我跟你们指出,我们将会发现我们自己处于famillionaire的层次,当我们正在处理悖论形成的换喻的对应。这个悖论的形成在忘记名字的层次被产生。

In the case of Signorelli
we should also find something corresponding to the concealment,
to the disappearance of Signor, in the case of the forgetting of
a name.

在Signorelli的情况,我们也应该发现某件东西,对应于这个隐藏,对应于Signor 的消失,在忘记名字的这个情况。

We should also find it at the level of the witticism.
This is where we stopped. How can we think, reflect on what
happens at the level of famillionaire, given that the witty
metaphor has succeeded in this case? There must be something
that up to a certain point corresponds, marks in some way, the
residue, the refuse of the metaphorical creation.

我们也应该发现它,在机智语的层次。这是我们停止的地方。假如考虑到这个机智的隐喻在这个情况曾经成功,我们要如何思维,如何反思famillionaire的层次,所发生的事情?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成30

June 30, 2014

无意识的形成30
雅克、拉康
20.11.57 33

I showed some equivalent things that are very like it in the
order of pure and simple parapraxes – but which on the contrary
found, in the conditions that the accident occurs, to be
registered and given a value as a meaningful phenomenon;
precisely of being a generation of meaning at the level of a
Signifying neo-formation, of a sort of co-lapsing, of signifiers
that in this instance, as Freud puts it, are compressed into one
another, stuck one against the other, and that this created
meaning, and I showed you its nuances and its enigmatic
qualities. Between what and what?

我显示跟它很相像的的相等的东西,在单纯而简单的口误的秩序。但是相反地,在意外发生的情况,发现它们被铭记与被给予一种价值,作为一个有意义的现象。
在能指意义的新的形成的层次,确实是产生意义的现象,一种共同失误,一种能指。就这个例子而言,如同弗洛依德所说,它们互相被压缩在一块,互相牴触,这个被创造的意义,我跟你们显示它的细节差异,与它的谜团般的特性。在什么与什么之间?

Between a certain evocation of
(10) a properly metaphorical manner of being: “he treated me
quite famillionairely”; and a certain evocation of a particular
type of being, a verbal being that is ready to take on the
peculiar animation whose ghost I already brandished before you
with the famillionaire;

在生命实存的合宜隐喻的方式的某种召唤:「他对待我,相当famillionairely」。与某个特别的生命实存的某种召唤之间,后者是文辞的生命实存,准备呈现这个特别的动画,这个动画的鬼魂,我已经在你们面前展示,用这个famillionaire。

the famillionaire in so far as he makes
his entry into the world as the representative of something that
is very likely to take on for us a much more consistent reality
and weight than the more hidden reality and weight of the
millionaire,

这个famillionaire,因为他进入这个世界,作为是某件东西的代表。对于我们,这个东西很可能呈现一个更加一贯的现实与份量,比起millionaire(百万富翁)那个更加隐藏的现实与重量。

but which I also showed you as having a certain
something in existence that is vivid enough to really represent a
personage characteristic of a certain historical epoque. And I
pointed out to you that Heine was not the only one to have
invented it, I talked to you about Gide’s Prometheus ill-bound
and his “miglionnaire”.

但是,这个东西,我也跟你们显示,作为拥有某件存在的东西,它足够生动地确实代表一个人物,具有某个历史时代的特色。我跟你们指出,海因并不是唯一曾经发明它的人。我跟你们谈论到纪德的「普罗米修斯的囚桎」,与他的miglionnaire。

It would be very interesting to pause for an instant at the
Gidean creation of Prometheus ill-bound. The millionaire in
Prometheus ill-bound is the banker Zeus, and there is nothing
more surprising than the way this character is elaborated. I do
not know why in our memories of Gide’s work, it is eclipsed
perhaps by the ineffable brilliance of Palude, of which it is
nonetheless a sort of correspondent and double.

耐人寻味地,让我们稍微探索一下纪德的创作「普罗米修斯的囚桎」。在「普罗米修斯的囚桎」里的millionaire(百万富翁)是银行家宙斯,最令人惊奇的事情是,这个人物被建构的方式。我不知道为什么在我们对纪德的著作的记忆,跟Palude的无与伦比的杰出相较,它或许相形失色。可是,它仍然是一种对应者与双重者。

It is the same character who is involved in both. There are many features here
(11) that overlap: the millionaire, in any case, is someone who
is found to have rather peculiar relationships with his fellows,
because it is here that we see emerge the idea of the gratuitous
act. Zeus, the banker, who is incapable of having with any other
person a true and authentic interchange, since he is identified
one might say with absolute power, with this aspect of the pure
signifier that there is in money, that questions one might say
the existence of every possible kind of significant exchange, can
find no other way of escaping from his solitude than to proceed
in the following way:

相同的这个人物牵涉到对应者与双重者。在此有许多重叠的特征;无论如何,百万富翁跟这个人物,被发现具有相当特殊的关系。因为就在这里,我们看见无缘无故的行为的观念。宙斯,这位银行家,无法跟任何其他人有任何真实而诚恳的感情交流,因为他认同于绝对的权力,我们不妨这样说。他是金钱里的纯粹能指的这一面。这个绝对权力质疑每个感情交流的可能存在。他找不到别的方式逃避孤独,除了用以下的方式前进。

as Gide puts it, to go out on the street
with in one hand an envelope containing what at the time was
something of value, a five hundred franc note, and in the other
hand a box in the ear, if one can put it like that; he lets the
envelope fall and, when someone obligingly picks it up, asks him
to write a name on the envelope, in return for which he gives him
a blow in the face.

如同纪德所表达,宙斯这位银行家在街上走路,一手拿着信封,里面装著某件有价值的东西,五百法郎的钞票,另一手拿着箱子的提把,我们不妨这样说。他让他的信封掉落,当某个人帮忙检起,要求他在信封上签名,他却打对方一个拳头,作为回报。

And it it is not for nothing that he is Zeus.
It is a tremendous blow that leaves him dazed and hurt; then he
goes off and sends the contents of the envelope to the person
whose name had been written by the person whom he had just
treated so roughly.

他是宙斯,并非没有意涵。一个巨大的打击让他晕眩与受伤。然后,他离开,将信封里面的东西送给名字写在上面的那个人,他刚刚如此粗暴地对待的那个人。

In this way he finds himself in the position of not having to
make a choice, of having compensated, one might say for a
gratuitous piece of badness by a gift that owes absolutely
(12) nothing to him.

以这种方式,他发现他自己处于并不需要做选择的力场。不妨说是,补偿的力场,补偿一个根本就不属于他的礼物的带来的无缘无故的恶行。

His choice is to restore by his action the
circuit of exchange into which he cannot introduce himself in any
way or from any angle, to participate in it in this way by
attraction, as it were, to engender a sort of debt in which he
does not participate, and all of whose consequences, which will
develop in the rest of the novel through the fact that the two
characters themselves never succeed in connecting what they owe
to one another; one will become almost blind and the other will
die of it.
他的选择就是凭借行动恢复交换的流通,他无法以任何方式或任何角度,介绍自己参与它,由于被吸引产生某种的债务,他并没有参与的债务。所有这一切都结果,在小说的其余部分发展,经由这个事实:这两个人物本身并没有成功地连接他们互相亏欠的东西。一位变得几乎是盲目于他所亏欠,另一位则因为他所亏欠的而死。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成 29

June 29, 2014

无意识的形成 29
雅克、拉康
20.11.57 40
This had of course already made its appearance, but only up to a
certain point and masked in some way; masked in so far as what is
graspable at the level of discourse, of the concrete discourse,
always presents itself with respect to this generation of meaning
in an ambiguous position;
这个语言当然已经出现,但是直到某个时刻,而且以某种方式遮蔽。这个语言被遮蔽,因为在辞说的层次,具体的辞说所能够被理解的东西,总是呈现它自己,关于意义的这个产生,以模糊暧昧的立场。

this language, in effect, being already
turned towards objects that include in themselves something of
the creation that they have received from language itself and
(8) something that had already been the object precisely of a
whole tradition, even of a whole philosophical rhetoric, that
which asks the question in the most general sense of the critique
of judgement:

实际上,这个语言由于已经被转向客体,本身包含某创造的东西的客体。它们从语言本身已经接收的创造,这个某件东西确实已经是整个传统的客体,甚至是整个哲学修饰的客体,以最通俗的判断力的批判的意义,询问这个问题的东西:

what is the value of language? What do these
connections represent in relation to the connections at which
they appear to culminate? That they should even put themselves
forward as representing the connections that exist in the real
order.

语言的价值是什么?相对于它们似乎淋漓尽致的连接的这些连接代表什么?这些连接甚至应该提出自己,作为代表存在于真实秩序的各种连接。

It is at all of this, in fact, that there culminates a critical
tradition, a philosophical tradition, whose high point and summit
we can define by Kant, and already we can in a certain way
interpret, think of Kant’s critique as the most profound
questionning of every kind of reality, in so far as it is submitted
to a priori categories not only of aesthetics but also of logic.

事实上,有一个批判的传统,一个哲学的传统,在这一切,表现得淋漓尽致。这个传统的高潮与巅峰,我们能够用康德来定义。我们已经能够用某种的方式来解释,将康德的批判认为是最深刻的质疑每一种的现实。因为它们屈从于先验的范畴,不但是美学,而且是逻辑的范畴。

Here indeed is something that represents a pivotal point from
which human meditation can begin again to rediscover that
something that was not at all perceived in the way of asking the
question at the level of discourse, at the level of logical
discourse, at the level of the correspondence between a certain
syntax of the intentional circle

在此,确实有某件东西代表一种枢纽点。从这个枢纽点,人类的沉思能够再次开始重新发现,以在辞说的层次,在逻辑的层次,在意图的循环的某个句法的对应的层次,询问这个问题,根本就没有感知到的东西。

in so far as it is closed in each sentence, to take it up again right through this book on the critique of logical discourse, to reconsider again the action of
the word in this creative chain in which it is always capable of
engendering new meanings, most obviously by means of metaphor;
(9) and by way of metonymy in a fashion that – I will explain why
in due course – has up to recent times always remained profoundly
masked.

因为这个意图的循环被封闭在每个句子里,再次探讨它,根据针对逻辑辞说批判的这本书,再次重新考虑这个字段行动,在这个创造的锁链。在那里,它总是能够产生新的意义。使用的方式,直到最近,始终是深刻地受到遮蔽。到时候,我还解释为什么。

This introduction is already difficult enough to make me return
to my example of famillionaire and to make us try here to
complete it.

这个介绍已经足够困难,让我回到famillionaire的例子,并且让我们在此尝试完成它。

We only arrived at this notion in the course of an intentional
discourse in which, while the subject presents himself as wishing
to say something, something else is produced that goes beyond his
wish, something that presents itself as an accident, as a
paradox, as a scandal, a neo-formation, that appears with certain
features that are not at all the negative ones of a sort of
stumbling like in a parapraxis which is what it might have been –

我们仅是到达这个观念,在一个意图性的辞说的过程。在那里,主体呈现它自己,作为希望说出某件东西,某件其他东西被产生,超越这个愿望,某件东西呈现它自己,作为是一个意外,作为一个悖论,作为一个丑闻,一个新的形成。它出现,带有某些的特征,这些特征根本就不是某种胡言乱语的负面的特征,类似于某种的口误表明看起来的样子。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成 28

June 28, 2014

无意识的形成 28
雅克、拉康
20.11.57 39
But naming them is not what is important. The core of what he
puts forward, the key to his analysis is this recognition of
common structural laws. This, as he says, is how you recognize
that a process has been drawn into the unconscious. It is what
is structured according to the laws, structured according to
their types. This is what is in question when the unconscious is
in question.

但是命名它们并非重要的事情。弗洛伊德提出的东西的核心,他的精神分析的关键是要体认出共通的结构的价值。如他所说,这就是你体认的方式:过程已经被吸收到无意识里。这就是依照法则所作为结构的东西,依照它们的类型作为结构的东西。这就是受到质疑的东西,当无意识受到质疑。

What happens then? What happens at the level of what I am
teaching you, is that we are now able, that is after Freud, to
recognize this event that is all the more demonstrative because
it is really extremely surprising.

那么,发生什么事情呢?在我正在教导你们的东西的层次,所发生的事情是,追随弗洛依德之后,我们现在能够体认出这个事件。这个事件更加具有展示性,因为它确实极端令人吃惊。

That these laws, this
structure of the unconscious, that by which a phenomenon can be
recognized as belonging to the formations of the unconscious is
strictly identifiable with, overlaps, and I would even say
further, overlaps in an exhaustive fashion what linguistic
analysis allows us to detect as being the essential modes of the
(6) formation of meaning, in so far as this meaning is engendered
by combinations of signifiers.

这些法则,无意识的这个结构,凭借它,现象能够被体认出来,作为归属于无意识的形成的东西,可严谨地被辨认出来。它重叠,我甚至不妨更深入地说,它重叠,以语言学的分析容许我们觉察的穷尽一切的方式重叠,作为是基本上是意义形成的基本模式。因为这个意义被产生,根据各种能指的联结。

The term signifier takes on its full meaning from a certain
moment in the evolution of linguistics, that at which there is
isolated the notion of the signifying element, a notion very
closely linked in the actual history to the separating out of the
notion of the phoneme.

从语言学的进化的某个时刻开始,能指这个术语就具有它充分的意义。能指意义的元素的观念在语言学被揭示出来。这个观念跟语素的观念的分隔出来的实际历史息息相关。

Since it is uniquely localized by its
associations with this notion, the notion of signifier, in so far
as it allows us to take language at the level of a certain
elementary register, can be doubly defined, on the one hand as a
diachronic chain, and, as a possibility within this chain, of a
permanent possibility of substitution in the synchronic sense.

因为它独特地被找出位置,凭借跟这个观念的联想,能指的这个观念。因为它让我们能够在某个初级的铭记接纳语言。它能够双重地被定义;一方面,作为历时性的锁链;另一方面,作为这个锁链里面的可能性,根据共时性的意义,作为替换的永久价值。

This grasp at an elementary level of the functions of the
signifier is a recognition at the level of this function of an
original power which is precisely that in which we can localize a
certain generation of something called meaning, and something
that in itself is very rich in psychological implications, and
that receives a kind of complement, without even needing to push
any further its own way, its research, to plough any further its
own furrow, in what Freud himself had already prepared for us at
this point of conjunction between the field of linguistics and
the proper field of psychoanalysis.

从能指的功能的初级层次的这种理解,是从原初的力量的这个功能的层次的体认。这个原初的力量,确实就是我们在那里能够找出某件所谓的意义的东西某个产生的位置。这个东西非常富有心理学的意涵,它接收某种的辅助,它甚至不需要更进一步前进,或探索,不需要更深入挖掘它自己的犁耕。在弗洛依德自己已经为我们准备好的东西,在语言学的领域与精神分析的本土领域之间的联结的这个时刻。

It is to show us that these
psychological effects, that these effects of the generation of
(7) meaning are nothing other than this, and overlap exactly what
Freud show us as being the formations of the unconscious.

它要跟我们显示,这些心理的影响,意义产生的这些影响,实实在在就是这个,并且确实重叠,跟弗洛依德告诉我们的东西重叠,作为无意识的形成的东西。

In other words, we are able to grasp something that remained
elided up to then in what can be called the place of man, and it
is precisely this: the relationship that there is between the
fact that for him there exist objects of a heterogeneity, of a
diversity, of a variability that is truly surprising compared to
the biological objects that we could expect as corresponding to
his existence as a living organism, namely something particular
that presents a certain style, a certain superabundant and
luxuriant diversity, and at the same time something impossible to
grasp as such as a biological object, something that comes from
the world of human objects, something that is found in this
instance to be closely and indissolubly related to the
submission, to the subduction, of the human being by the
phenomenon of language.

换句话说,我们能够理解直到当时始终失落的某件东西,在所谓的人的位置。
确实就是这个:对人而言,存在着异质性的各种客体,多样性的各种客体,变异的各种客体。这个事实之间的关系确实令人惊奇,跟生物的各种客体比较起来。我们能够预期生物的各种客体,作为对应于他作为生命有机体的存在。换句话说,某件特殊的东西呈现某种的风格,某种的超级丰富与奢华的多样性。同时,它本身作为生物的客体,又是不可能理解的东西,某件来自人的各种客体的世界。在这个例子里,这个东西被发现息息相关,跟人类由于语言的现象,受到屈服,受到压制息息相关,密不可分。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成 27

June 27, 2014

无意识的形成 27
雅克、拉康
20.11.57 38

There is no need to refer to it since a simple, sincere inspection of the life of any one of us helps us to see that this so-called power of synthesis is more than held in check; and that really, unless we are dealing in fiction, there
is nothing more common in experience than what we can call not
just the incoherence of our motives, but even more, I would say
the sentiment of their profound lack of motivation, of their
fundamental alienation.

没有必要提到它。因为假如我们单纯而诚恳地检视我们任何一位的生活,我们将会看出,这个所谓的综合的力量相当受到约束。而且确实地,除非我们正在处理幻想,在精神分析经验里,最为常见的就是,我们所谓的不仅是我们动机的不一贯,尤有甚者,我不妨说,这些动机深深欠缺触动的情感,这些动机基本的异化的情感。

So that if Freud puts forward a notion of
the subject that operates beyond this, this subject that is so
difficult to grasp in ourselves, if he shows us its sources and
its action, there is something that should always have given us
pause, namely that this subject – in so far as it introduces a
hidden unity, a secret unity into what is apparent to us at the
most banal level of experience, our profound division, our
profound fragmentation, our profound alienation with respect to
(4) our own motives – that this subject is other.

因此,假如弗洛依德提出主体的观念,超越这个运作的主体,在我们自身如此难以理解的主体,假如弗洛依德告诉我们主体的来源与主体的行动,有某件东西应该让我们停顿一下。换句话说,这位主体,因为它介绍一种隐藏的一致性,一个秘密的一致性,在我们即使是最寻常的经验里,对于我们甚为明显的东西。我们深刻的区分,我们深刻的碎片化,我们深刻的异化,关于我们自己的动机—这个主体是别的。

Is it simply a kind of double, a subject that is perhaps a bad
ego, as some have said, since in fact it conceals some rather
surprising tendencies, or simply another ego, or as you might
rather think I am saying, the true ego? Is that really what is in
question? Is it simply an understudy, purely and simply an other
whom we can conceive of as being structured like the ego of our
experience?

这仅是一种双重者,主体或许是坏的自我,如同某些人曾经说过。因为事实上,主体隐藏某些相当令人惊奇的倾向,或是仅是隐藏另外一个自我,或者,如同你可能认为我正在说的,主体隐藏真实的自我。那确实就是受到质疑的东西吗?主体仅是替身演员,仅是我们构想到一位他者?作为像我们精神分析经验的自我的结构的他者?

That is the question, and that is also why we approach it this
year at the level and under the title of formations of the
unconscious.

那就是问题。那也是为什么我们今年探讨它,在无意识的形成的层次与标题之下。

The question is of course already present, and offers a response.
It is not structured in the same way: in this experiential I
(moi) something is presented that has its own laws. It has in
fact an organization of its formations, and has not only a style
but also a particular structure.

这个问题当然已经存在,并且提供一种回答。主体并不是以相同方式作为结构:在这个经验的「我」当中,某件拥有它自己的法则的东西被呈现。实际上,主体具有它的形成的组织,它不但有风格,而且有特殊的结构。

Freud approaches this structure
and deconstructs it at the level of neuroses, at the level of
symptoms, at the level of dreams, at the level of parapraxes, at
the level of the witticism. He recognizes it as being unique and
homogeneous.

弗洛依德探索并且解构它,从神经症的层次,从病征的层次,从梦的层次,从口误的层次,从机智语的层次。弗洛依德体认出主体,作为是独特而且是同质性。。

The whole core of what he exposes to us at the
level of the witticism, and this is the reason why I chose it as
a point of entry, rests on this; it is his fundamental argument
for making of the witticism a manifestation of the unconscious.

弗洛依德在机智语的层次跟我们揭露的东西的整个核心,依靠这个。这就是为什么我选择它作为一个进入点。弗洛依德的基本论点,就是让机智语成为无意识的展示。

This means that it is structured, that it is organized according
(5) to the same laws as those we find in the dream. He recalls
these laws to us, he enumerates them, he articulates them, he
recognizes them in the structure of the witticism.

这意味着,主体的结构,主体被组织,依照相同的法则,跟我们在梦里发现的法则相同。弗洛依德跟我们提醒这些法则,他列举这些法则,他表达这些法则,他在机智语的结构里体认出这些法则。

They are the
laws of condensation; the laws of displacement; essentially and
above all something of the other adheres to them; he also
recognizes in them what I translated at the end of my article as
égards aux nécessités de la mise en scene (tr: considerations of
representability). He introduces this also as a third element.

这些法则就是凝缩的法则,替换的法者。基本上,尤其重要的是,他者的某件东西坚持这些法则。弗洛依德也在这些法则当中体认出,我在我的文章结束时翻译的东西,作为再现表象的考虑。弗洛依德也介绍这个,作为第三个元素。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神分析的侵凌性 3/4

June 3, 2014

A point, let it be said in passing, whose anthropological
implications cannot be too highly stressed. What concerns us here is the function that I shall call the pacifying function of the ego ideal, the connexion between its libidinal
normativity and a cultural normativity bound up from the dawn of history with the imago
of the father. Here, obviously, lies the import that Freud’s work, Totem and Taboo, still
retains, despite the mythical circularity that vitiates it, in so far as it derives from the
mythological event, the murder of the father, the subjective dimension that gives this
event meaning, namely, guilt.

让我们顺便提到,有一点,它具有人类学的暗示,无论如何强调也不过分。我们在此所关心的事情,是我所谓的自我理想具有安抚的功能,它的生命力比多的规范,与文化的规范之间的联结,自古以来,它就跟父亲的意象息息相关。在此,显而易见地,弗洛依德的著作「图腾与禁忌」的意义就在那里。尽管神秘的流通让它无效,因为它从神话事件得来,它依旧保留弑父 ,给予这个事件的意义的主体性维度,那就是罪恶感。

Freud shows us, in fact, that the need to participate, which neutralizes the conflict
inscribed after the murder in the situation of rivalry between the brothers, is the basis of
the identification with the paternal Totem. Thus the Oedipal identification is that by
which the subject transcends the aggressivity that is constitutive of the primary subjective
individuation. I have stressed elsewhere how it constitutes a step in the establishment of
that distance by which, with feelings like respect, is realized a whole affective
assumption of one’s neighbour.

实际上,弗洛依德跟我们显示,参与的必要让这个冲突中立,在兄弟之间的敌意的情况,弑父之后被铭记的冲突。这个参与的需要就是认同父亲的图腾的基础。因此,伊狄浦斯的认同是,主体超越作为原初的主体的个人主义的结构的侵凌性。我曾经在别处强调,它如何构成建立距离的步骤。凭借这个距离,对于邻居的情感的假设被实现,对于像尊敬这样的情感。

Only the anti-dialectical mentality of a culture which, in order to be dominated by
objectifying ends, tends to reduce all subjective activity to the being of the ego, can
justify the astonishment of a Van den Steinen when confronted by a Bororo who says:
‘I’m an ara.’

只有反对辩证的精神的文化,才会认为史坦因的惊奇是有道理,当他面对一位博罗罗人对他说:「我是鹦鹉」。这样的文化精神倾向于将主体性的活动,还原为自我的生命实存,为了要受到客体化的目的所支配。

And all the sociologists of ‘the primitive mind’ busy themselves around this
profession of identity, which, on reflexion, is no more surprising than declaring, ‘I’m a
doctor’ or ‘I’m a citizen of the French Republic’, and which certainly presents fewer
logical difficulties than the statement, ‘I’m a man’, which at most can mean no more
than, ‘I’m like he whom I recognize to be a man, and so recognize myself as being such.’
In the last resort, these various formulas are to be understood only in reference to the
truth of ‘I is an other’, an observation that is less astonishing to the intuition of the poet
than obvious to the gaze of the psychoanalyst.

所有探索「原始心灵」的社会学家,孜孜从事于研究这种认同的工作。仔细思维之下,博罗罗的人这种认同,并不足为奇,如同有人宣称「我是医生」,或是「我是法国共和国的公民」。这种认同的工作呈现的逻辑的困难,并不难理解,如同有人陈述:「我是一个人」。他的意思充其量仅是「我体认他是人,我是像他这样的人,所以我体认为自己是这样的人。」追根究底,这些不同的公式,仅是应该从「我是一位他者」的真理来理解。这样的观察,与其说是让诗人的直觉感到惊奇,不如说是让精神分析家的洞见显而易见。

Who, if not us, will question once more the objective status of this ‘I’, which a
historical evolution peculiar to our culture tends to confuse with the subject? This
anomaly should be manifested in its particular effects on every level of language, and
first and foremost in the grammatical subject of the first person in our languages, in the ‘I
love’ that hypostatizes the tendency of a subject who denies it. An impossible mirage in
linguistic forms among which the most ancient are to be found, and in which the subject
appears fundamentally in the position of being determinant or instrumental of action.

除了我们精神分析家,还有谁会再次质疑这个「我」的客体的地位?这是我们文化特有的历史的进化倾向于将「我」的客体地位跟主体混淆。在语言的每个层面,这种异常混淆应该会在它的特殊的影响里被展示出来。尤其重要的是,在我们的语言里,第一人称作为文法的主词。在否认它的主体的倾向被,认为是真实的「我爱」。在语言的各种形式里,这是一个不可能的幻象,即使是最古老的语言形式也能够被找到。在这些语言形式里,主体出现,基本上是从决定行动或作为工具的立场。

Let us leave aside the critique of all the abuses of the cogito ergo sum, and recall that,
in my experience, the ego represents the centre of all the resistances to the treatment of
symptoms.

让我们将「我思故我在」的各种浮滥使用的批判放置一旁,提醒一下,在我的精神分析经验里,自我代表所有的抗拒的核心,抗拒对于病征的治疗。

It was inevitable that analysis, after stressing the reintegration of the tendencies
excluded by the ego, in so far as they are subjacent to the symptoms that it tackled in the
first instance, and which were bound up for the most part with the failures of Oedipal
identification, should eventually discover the ‘moral’ dimension of the problem.

这是无可避免的,精神分析强调被自我排除的这些倾向的合并,因为它们迹近于它起初克服的病征。它们跟伊狄浦斯认同的失败,大部分都息息相关。精神分析最后发现这个难题的「道德」维度。

And, in a parallel fashion, there came to the forefront the role played by the aggressive
tendencies in the structure of the symptoms and of the personality, on the one hand, and,
on the other, all sorts of conceptions that stressed the value of the liberated libido, one of
the first of which can be attributed to French psychoanalysts under the register of
oblativity.

同样地,在前台至关紧要的事,一方面,是病征的结构与人格的结构里,侵凌性的倾向扮演的角色,。另一方面,是各种强调生命力比多被解放的价值的观念。前者有一项能够被归功于精神分析家,被铭记为「爱是牺牲」。

It is clear, in effect, that genital libido operates as a supersession, indeed a blind
supersession, of the individual in favour of the species, and that its sublimating effects in
the Oedipal crisis lie at the origin of the whole process of the cultural subordination of man.

显而易见,那些性器官的生命力比多运作作为一种牺牲的替代。的确,这是一种盲目的牺性替代,为了种族而牺牲个人。它在伊狄浦斯的危机里,具有升华的影响,作为人隶属于文化的整个过程的起源。

Nevertheless, one cannot stress too strongly the irreducible character of the
narcissistic structure, and the ambiguity of a notion that tends to ignore the constancy of
aggressive tension in all moral life that involves subjection to this structure: in fact no
notion of oblativity could produce altruism from that structure.

可是,我们无论如何也要强调,自恋结构具有无法化减的特性,以及在一切的道德生活里,
侵凌性紧张作为常态,倾向于受到忽视的观念的暧昧性。因为一切的道德生活都牵涉到隶属于这个结构。事实上,再多的「爱是牺牲」的观念,都无法从那个结构产生出利他主义。

And that is why La
Rochefoucauld could formulate his maxim, in which his rigour matches the fundamental
theme of this thought, on the incompatibility of marriage and sexual pleasure (délices).

那就是为什么罗歇福柯能够侃侃而谈他的道德箴言:婚姻与性的快乐彼此不和谐。在他的道德箴言里,他的一板正经跟他思想的基本主题,不相上下。

We would allow the sharpness of our experience to become blunted if we deluded
ourselves, if not our patients, into believing in some kind of pre-established harmony that
would free of all aggressive induction in the subject the social conformisms made
possible by the reduction of symptoms.

我们将会让我们精神分析的敏锐变得迟钝,假如我们欺骗自己,甚至欺骗我们的病人,让大家相信,有某种预先建立的和谐,会让适应社会机能者,解除主体身上的一切侵凌性的诱导,以及病征的减少能够让大家适应社会的机能。

And the theoreticians of the Middle Ages showed another kind of penetration, by
which the problem of love was discussed in terms of the two poles of a ‘physical’ theory
and an ‘ecstatic’ theory, each involving the re-absorption of man’s ego, whether by reintegration
into a universal good, or by the effusion of the subject towards an object
without alterity.

中世纪的理论家显示另外一种洞察力。他们用「生理」理论与「狂喜」理论的两个极端,来探讨爱的难题。每一个极端都牵涉到重新吸纳人的自我,无论是凭借重新融合于普遍性的善,或是凭借主体朝着没有他者的客体绽放。

This narcissistic moment in the subject is to be found in all the genetic phases of the
individual, in all the degrees of human accomplishment in the person, in an earlier stage
in which it must assume a libidinal frustration and a later stage in which it is transcended
in a normative sublimation.

主体身上的自恋时刻能够被找到,在个人的基因的部分,在各种程度的个人的人类的成就里。在这些成就的早期阶段,主体必须承受生命力比多的挫折;在个人的人类成就的后期阶段,主体以规范性的升华,作为提升到神性。

This conception allows us to understand the aggressivity involved in the effects of all
regression, all arrested development, all rejection of typical development in the subject,
especially on the plane of sexual realization, and more specifically with each of the great
phases that the libidinal transformations determine in human life, the crucial function of
which has been demonstrated by analysis: weaning, the Oedipal stage, puberty, maturity,
or motherhood, even the climacteric.

这个观念让我们能够理解,侵凌性牵涉到各种的主体身上倒退的效应,各种被阻碍的发展,各种典型发展的被排斥。特别是在性的实现的层面,更加明确的是,在人类生活里,受到生命力比多的转换决定的每个重要的时期。精神分析曾经展示出这些时期的关键功能:断奶,伊狄浦斯的阶段,成熟,或成为母亲,甚至更年期。

And I have often said that the emphasis that was
placed at first in psychoanalytic theory on the aggressive turning round of the Oedipal
conflict upon the subject’s own self was due to the fact that the effects of the complex
were first perceived in failures to resolve it.

我经常说过,精神分析理论起初强调,伊狄浦斯跟主体的自己的自我的冲突,会产生侵凌性的翻转,那是由于这个事实:伊狄浦斯情结的影响首先被感知,因为没有办法化解伊狄浦斯。

There is no need to emphasize that a coherent theory of the narcissistic phase clarifies
the fact of the ambivalence proper to the ‘partial drives’ of scoptophilia, sadomasochism,
and homosexuality, as well as the stereotyped, ceremonial formalism of the aggressivity
that is manifested in them: we are dealing here with the often very little ‘realized’ aspect
of the apprehension of others in the practice of certain of these perversions, their
subjective value, in actual fact very different from that given to them in the existential
reconstructions, striking though they be, of a Sartre.

我们没有需要强调,自恋时期的一贯理论澄清爱恨交加的这个事实:爱恨交加是窥视狂,虐待与自虐,以及同性恋的「部份冲突」的本体,以及他们身上展现的侵凌性,具有典型化,仪式化的形式主义。我们在此正在谈论的是,对于这些的变态行为,别人经常会有罕为人体会的焦虑。实际上,他们的主体的价值,相当不同于在萨特的存在主义的重新建构里被给予他们的主体的价值,尽管它们令人嘱目。

I should also like to mention in passing that the decisive function that we attribute to
the imago of one’s own body in the determination of the narcissistic phase enables us to
understand the clinical relation between the congenital anomalies of functional
lateralization (left-handedness) and all forms of inversion of sexual and cultural
normalization. This reminds one of the role attributed to gymnastics in the ‘beautiful and
good’ ideal of education among the Ancient Greeks and leads us to the social thesis with
which I will conclude.
我也想顺便提到,当我们决定自恋时期时,我们归属于自己身体的「形象」的决定性功能,让我们能够理解这个临床的关系,处于左脑与右脑的功能的协调异常(左手癖),以及各式各样的性与文化正常化的倒错。这让我们回想到,古代希腊人们,将美育与品德教育的理想,归属于体育扮演的角色。并且引导我们来到我将作为结论的社会的命题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhero.wordpress.ocm

无意识的形成 26

June 1, 2014

无意识的形成 26
雅克、拉康

37.11.57 1
Seminar 3: 20 november ,1957

We have approached our task then by way of the witticism, the
first example of which we began to analyse the last day, the one
that Freud made his own in the famillionaire joke, while at the
same time attributing it to Hirsch-Hyacinth, himself a very
significant poetic creation.

我们已经凭借机智语来从事我们的工作。其中第一个例子,我们前一日开始分析。那是弗洛依德自己创造的例子,也就是famillionaire的笑话。同时,他将它归功于Hirsch-Hyacinth,他自己则是重要的诗的创作。

It is not by chance that it is
against this background of poetic creation that Freud chose his
first example, and that we ourselves have found, as is usually
the case, that this original example turned out to be
particularly suitable to portray, to demonstrate, what we want to
demonstrate here.

弗洛依德选择他的第一个例子,以诗的创作作背景,这并非纯属偶然。通常在这种情况,我们自己会发现,这个原创的例子结果特别适合于描述,证明,我们在此想要证明的东西。

You have no doubt perceived that this brings us to the analysis
of the psychological phenomenon that is in question in the
witticism, at the level of a signifying articulation which, no
doubt, even though it may interest you, at least I hope a good
number of you, is nonetheless the object, as you can well
(2) imagine, of something that might easily appear disturbing. I
mean that without doubt this something that surprises, upsets
your way of thinking is also at the very core of the renewal of
the analytic experience that I am carrying on here with you, and
concerns the place, I would say up to a certain point the
existence, of the subject. Someone asked me about this, someone
who is certainly far from being badly informed, nor indeed badly
informed about the question itself, nor badly informed about what
I am trying to contribute to it.

无可置疑,你们已经感知,这让我们前来分析机智语受到质疑的心理的现象,处于能指化表达的层面。无可置疑,即使你们可能感到興趣,至少我希望你们有许多人感到興趣,能指化的表达仍然是这个客体,如同你们很有理由想像,某件很容易令人困扰的东西的客体。我的意思是,无可置疑,某件令人惊奇的东西,扰乱你们的思维方式,它也属于精神分析经验的更新的核心。我在此正在跟你们从事的精神分析经验的更新,跟这个地方息息相关。我不妨说,直到某个时刻,跟主体的存在息息相关。某个曾经询问我,关于某位知识颇为广博的人,关于这个问题的本身,他确实拥有不赖的知识,关于我正在尝试贡献给这个问题的东西,他确实拥有不赖的知识。

Someone asked me the question: “But what then becomes of the
subject? Where is it?”

某个人询问我这个问题;「主体因此发生什么事?它在哪里?」

The reply is easy when you are dealing with philosophers, because
it was a philosopher who asked me the question at the
Philosophical Society where I was speaking. I was tempted to
reply: “But on this point I could easily ask you to answer your
own question, and say that I leave it to philosophers to speak
about it. After all, I do not see why I should do all the work.”

当你们正在跟哲学家打交道时,这个回答很容易,因为是一位哲学家询问我这个问题,在我当时正在演讲的哲学学会。我忍不住地回答:「针对这一点,我可以容易地要求你回答你自己的问题,并且说,我将这个问题留给哲学家来谈论它。毕竟,我不明白为什么我竟然从事所有这个工作。」

This question of the elaboration of the notion of the subject
certainly needs to be revised as a result of the Freudian
experience. If there is something that has to be modified in it,
this is hardly a cause for surprise.

主体的观念的建构的问题,确实需要修正,由于弗洛依德的精神分析经验的结果。假如有某件东西必须在它里面被修正,这几乎没有什么好大惊小怪。

In other words, if Freud
has introduced something essential, should we still really expect
to see intelligent people, particularly psychoanalysts, all the
(3) more completely overwhelmed by a particular notion of the
subject, embodied in a certain style of thinking, as being simply
the ego – which is nothing but a return to what we can call the
grammatical confusions of the problem of the subject, the
identification of the ego with a power of synthesis that
certainly no data of experience can allow us to sustain. You
could even say that there is no need to draw on the Freudian
experience.

换句话说,假如弗洛依德已经介绍某件基本的东西,我们依旧会预期看见某些有识之士,特别是精神分析家,被主体的这个特殊的观念,更加搞得昏头转向。主体被用某种的思维方式具体表现,当著仅是这个自我。而自我仅是回到我们所谓的跟主体的难题的文法上的混淆。将自我认同是综合的力量。的确,无论再多的精神分析经验的资料,也无法让我们能够维持这样的综合的力量。你们甚至能够说,主体并不需要依靠弗洛依德的精神分析经验。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

无意识的形成 25

May 31, 2014

无意识的形成 25
雅克、拉康
13.11.57 36
Here lies the distinction between the witticism compared to what
is pure and simple phenomenon, the relating of a symptom, for
example; it is in the passage to the second function that the
witticism itself lies.

跟纯粹而单纯的现象比较起来,机智语的区别就是这里,这跟病征息息相关。譬如,机智语本身就在于抵达第二个功能的过程。

But on the other hand if all that I have
just told you today did not exist, namely what happens at the
level of the signifying conjunction which is its essential
phenomenon, and of what it develops as such, in so far as it
participates in the essential dimensions of the signifier, namely
metaphor and metonymy, there would be no sanction possible, no
other distinction possible for the witticism. For example in
comparison with the comic there would be none possible; or
compared to the jest, or compared to the raw phenomenon of
laughter.

但是在另一方面,假如我今天刚刚告诉你们的东西,也就是,在能指化的联接的层面所发生的事情,那是它的基本现象,以及它作为自身的发展,因为它参与能指的基本维度。换句话说,隐喻与换喻。对于机智语而言,那将不会有任何可能的认可,没有任何可能的区别。譬如,跟滑稽比较,或跟恶作剧比较,或跟哈哈大笑的粗鄙现象比较,将不会哟任何可能的区别,任何可能的认同。

In order to understand what is in question in the witticism qua
signifying phenomenon, we had to isolate its aspects, its
particularities, its attachments, all its ins and outs at the
(41) level of the signifier, and that the fact that the Witz
(S?), something that is at such an elevated level of signifying
elaboration, was dwelt on by Freud in order to see in it a
particular example of the formation of the unconscious, is also
something that retains us, it is also this whose importance you
should begin to see when I have shown you in this connection how
it allows us to advance in a rigorous fashion into a phenomenon
that is itself psychopathological as such, namely the parapraxis.

为了理解机智语受到质疑的东西,作为能指化的现象。我们必须突显出它的各个层面,它的各个特殊性,它的各个关联,在能指的层面,它的里外细节。机智语是某件属于能指的建构的升华的层面的东西,弗洛依德详述它,为了在它里面看出无意识形成的特殊的例子。机智语也是某件始终就是我们本质的东西。就是这个本质的重要性,你们应该开始看出,当我跟你们显示关于这一点,机智语如何让我们能够以积极的方式前往进入自身就是病理的现象,换句话说,口误,笔误等等。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com