Archive for March, 2009

Deleuze 32

March 31, 2009

Delezue 32 德勒茲 Treatise on nomadology 論遊牧學

Translated by Springhero 雄伯


The sea as a smooth space is a specific problem of the war machine. As Virilio shows, it is at sea that the problem of the fleet of being is posed, in other words, the task of occupying an open space with a vortical movement that can rise up at any point. In this respect, the recent studies on rhythm, on the origin of that notion, do not seem entirely convincing. For we are told that rhythm has nothing to do with the movement of waves but rather that it designates “ form” in general, and more specifically the form of a “ measured, cadenced” movement. However, rhythm is never the same as measure. And though the atomist Democritus is one of the authors who speak of rhythm in the sense of form, it should be borne in mind that he does so under very precise conditions of fluctuation and that the forms made by atoms are primarily large, non-metric aggregates, smooth spaces such as the air, the sea, or even the earth. There is indeed such a thing as measured, cadenced rhythm, relating to the coursing of a river between its banks or to the form of a striated space; but there is also a rhythm without measure, which relates to the upswell of a flow, in other words, to the manner in which a fluid occupies a smooth space.




  This opposition, or rather this tension-limit between the two kinds of science—nomad, war machine science and royal, State science—reappears at different moments, on different levels. The work of Anne Querrien enables us to identify two of these moments; one is the construction of Gothic cathedrals in the twelfth century, the other the construction of bridges in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Gothic architecture is indeed inseparable from a will to build churches longer and taller than the Romanesque churches. Even farther, even higher…But this difference is not simply quantitative; it marks a qualitative change: the static relation, form-matter, tends to fade into the background in favor of a dynamic relation, material-forces. It is the cutting of the stone that turns it into material capable of holding and coordinating forces of thrust, and of constructing ever higher and longer vaults. The vault is no longer a form but the line of continuous variation of the stones. It is as if Gothic conquered a smooth space, while Romanesque remained partially within a striated space ( in which the vault depends on the juxtaposition of parallel pillars). But stone cutting is inseparable from, on the one hand, a plane of projection at ground level, which functions as a plane limit, and, on the other hand, a series of successive approximations ( squaring), or placings-in-variation of voluminous stones. Of course, one appealed to the theorematic science of Euclid in order to find a foundation for the enterprise; mathematical figures and equations were thought to be the intelligible form capable of organizing surfaces and volumes. But according to the legend, Bernard de Clairvaux quickly abandoned the effort as too “ difficult,” appealing to the specificity of an operative, Archimedean geometry, a projective and descriptive geometry defined as a minor science, more a mathegraphy than matheology. His journeyman, the monk-mason Garin de Troyes, speaks of an operative logic of movement enabling the “ initiate” to draw, then hew the volumes “ in penetration in space,” to make it so that “ the cutting line propels the equation” One does not represent, one engenders and traverses. This science is characterized less by the absence of equations than by the very different role they play: instead of being form forms absolutely that organize matter, they are “ generated” as “ forces of thrust” by the material, in a qualitative calculus of optimum. This whole current of Archimedean geometry was taken to its highest expression, but was also brought to a temporary standstill, by the remarkable seventeenth-century mathematician Desargues. Like most of his kind, Desargues wrote little; he nevertheless exerted a great influence through his actions and left outlines, rough drafts, and projects, all centered on problem-events: “ Lamentatiions,” “ draft project for the cutting of stones,” “ draft project for grappling with the events of the encounters of a cone and plane,…Desargues, however, was condemned by the parlement of Paris, opposed by the king’s secretary; his practices of perspective were banned. Royal, or State, science only tolerates and appropriates stone cutting by means of templates ( the opposite of squaring), under conditions that restore the primacy of the fixed model of form, mathematical figures, and measurement. Royal science only tolerates and appropriates perspective if it is static, subjected to a central black hole divesting it of its heuristic and ambulatory capacities. But the adventure, or event, of Desargues is the same one that had already occurred among the Gothic “ journeymen” on a collective level. For not only did the Church, in its imperial form, feel the need to strictly control the movement of this nomad science ( it entrusted the Templars with the responsibility of determining its locations and objects, governing the work sites, and regulating construction), but the secular State, in its royal form, turned against the Templars themselves, banning the guilds for a number of reasons, at least one of which was the prohibition of this operative or minor geometry.




March 29, 2009

Deleuze 31 德勒茲 The Exhausted 精疲力竭者

Translated by Springheor


Being exhausted is much more than being tired. “ It’s not just tiredness, I’m not just tired, in spite of the climb.” The tired person no longer has any ( subjective ) at his disposal; he therefore cannot realize the slightest ( objective) possibility. But the latter remains, because one can never realize the whole of the possible; in fact, one even creates the possible to the extent that one realizes it. The tired person has merely exhausted the realization, whereas the exhausted person exhausts the whole of the possible The tired person can not longer realize, but the exhausted person can no longer possbilize. “ That the impossible should be asked of me, good, what else could be asked of me.” There is no longer any possible: a relentless Spinozism. Does he exhausted the possible because he is himself exhausted, or is he exhausted because he has exhausted the possible? He exhausts himself in exhausting the possible, and vice-versa. He exhausts that which, in the possible, is not realized. He has done with possible , beyond all tiredness, “ for to end yet again.”






March 26, 2009

Deleuze31 德勒茲 The Folds of the Soul 靈魂的摺疊

Translated by Springhero 雄伯


We have gone from variable curvature to the origin of curvature ( from the concave side), from variation to point of view, from the fold to envelopment, in a word, from inflection to inclusion. The transition cannot be discerned, somewhat like aright angle that is not measured by a great arc but by a tiny are situation close to the summit: it is at the summit “ that the angle or the inclination of the two lines is found.” We would nonetheless hesitate to say that visibility is located in point of view. We would need a more natural intuition to allow for this passage to the limit. Thus it is a very simple intuition: . Why would something be folded, if it were not to be enveloped, wrapped, or put into something else? It appears that here the envelope acquires its ultimate or perhaps final meaning: it is no longer an envelope of coherence or cohesion, like an egg, in the “ reciprocal envelopment” of organic parts. Nor even a mathematical envelop of adherence or adhesion, where a fold still envelops other folds, as in the enveloping envelope that touches an infinity of curves in an infinity of points. It is an envelope of inherence or unilateral “ inhesion” : inclusion or inherence is the final cause of he fold, such that we move indiscernibly from latter to the former. Between the two, a gap is opened which makes the envelope the reason for the fold: what is folded is the included, the inherent. It can be stated that why is folded is only virtual and currently eists only in a envelope, in something that envelops it.




  From now on it is not exactly point of view that includes: or at least, it does so only as an agent, but not of a final cause or a finished act ( entelechia). Inclusion or inherence has a condition of closure or envelopment, which Leibniz puts forward in his famous formula, “ no windows,” and which point of view does not suffice to explain. When inclusion is accomplished, it is done so continuously, or includes the sense of a finished act that is neither the site, the place, nor the point of view, but what remains in point of view, what occupies point of view, and without which point of view would not be. It is necessarily a soul, a subject. A soul always includes what it apprehends from its point of view, in other words, inflection. Infection is an ideal condition or a virtuality that currently exists only in the soul that envelops it. Thus the soul is what has folds and is full of folds.




  Folds are in the soul and authentically exist only in the social. That is already true for “ innate ideas”: they are pure virtualities, pure powers whose act consists in habitus or arrangements ( folds) in the soul, and whose completed act consists of an inner action of the soul ( an internal deployment). But this is no less true for the world: the whole world is only a virtuality that currently exists only in the folds of the soul which convey it, the soul implementing inner pleats through which it endows itself with a representation of the enclosed world. We are moving from inflection to inclusion in a subject, as if from the virtual to the real, inflection defining the fold, but inclusion defining the soul or the subject, that is, what envelops the fold, its final cause and its completed act.




  Whence the distinction of three kinds of points as three kinds of singularities. The physical point is what runs along inflection or is the point of inflection itself; it is neither an atom nor a Cartesian point, but an elastic or plastic point-fold. Thus it is not exact. On the one hand, it is important to note that it devalorizes the exact point while, on the other, it leads the mathematical point to assume a new status that is rigorous without being exact. On one side, the exact point is effectively not a part of extension, but a conventional extremity of the line. On the other side, the mathematical point in turn loses exactitude in order to become a position, a site, a focus, a place, a point of conjunction of vectors of curvature or, in short, point of view. The latter therefore takes on a genetic value: pure extension will be the continuation or diffusion of the point, but according to the relations of distance that define pace ( between two given points) as the “ place of all places.” However, if the mathematical point thus stops being the extremity of the line in order to become the point of focus, it is nonetheless a simple “ modality.” It I in the body, in the thing extended. But in this way, as we have seen, it is only the projection of a third point in the body. That is the metaphysical point, the soul or the subject. It is what occupies the point of view, it is what is projected in point of view. Thus the soul is not in the body in a point, but is itself a higher point and of another nature, which corresponds with the point. The point of inflection, the point of position, and the point of inclusion will thus be distinguished.




   Everyone knows the name that Leibniz ascribes to the sol or to the subject as a metaphysical point: the monad. He borrows this name from the Neoplatonists who used it to designate a state of One, a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of a “ series.” The One specifically has a power of envelopment and development, while the multiple is inseparable from the folds that it makes when it is enveloped, and of unfoldings when it is developed. But its envelopments and developments, its implications and explications, are nonetheless particular movements that must be understood in a universal Unity that “ complicates” them all, and that complicates all the Ones. Giordano Bruno will bring the system of monads to the level of this universal complication: the Soul of the world that complicates everything. Hence Neo-Platonic emanations give way to a large zone of immanence, even if the rights of a transcendent God or an even higher Unity are formally respected.




  Explication-implication-complication from the triad of the fold, following the variations of the relation of the One-Multiple. But if we ask why the name “ monad” has been associated with Leibniz, it is because of the two ways that Leibniz was going to stabilize the concept. One the one hand, the mathematics of inflection allowed him to posit the enveloping series of multiples as a convergent infinite series. One the other hand, the metaphysics of inclusion allowed him to posit enveloping unity as an irreducible individual unity. In effect, as long as series remained finite or undefined, individuals risked being relative, called upon to melt into a universal spirit or a soul of the world that cold complicate all series. But if the world is an infinite series, it then constitutes the logical comprehension of a notion or of a concept that can now only be individual. It is therefore enveloped by an infinity of individuated souls of which each retains it irreducible point of view. It si the accord of singular points of view, or harmony, that will replace universal complication and ward off the dangers of pantheism or immanence: whence Leibniz’s insistence upon denouncing the hypothesis, or rather the hypostasis, of a Universal Spirit that would turn complication into an abstract operation in which individuals would be swallowed up.




   All of this remains obscure.  For if, by pushing to its limit a metaphor sketched by Plotinus, Leibniz makes of the monad a sort of point of view on the city, must we understand that a certain form corresponds to each point of view? For example, a street of one from or another? In conic sections, there is no separate pint of view to which the ellipse woul return, and another for the parabola, and another for the circle. The point of view, the summit of the cone, is the condition under which we apprehend the group of varied forms or the series of curves to the second degree. It does not suffice too state that the point of view apprehends a perspective, a profile that would each time offer the entirety of a city in its own fashion. For it also brings forth the connection of all the related profiles, the series of all curvatures or inflections. What can be apprehended from one point of view is therefore neither a determined street nor a relation that might be determined with other streets, which are constants, but the variety of all possible connections between the course of a given street and that of another. The city seems to be a labyrinth that can be ordered. The world is an infinite eries of curvatures or inflections, and the entire world is enclosed in the soul from one point of view.




  The world is the infinite curve that touches at an infinity of points an infinity of curves, the curve with a unique variable, the convergent series of all series. But why then is there not a single and universal point of view? Why does Leibniz so strongly deny “ the doctrine of a universal spirit” ? Why are there several points of view and several irreducible souls, an infinity? We can consider the series of the twelve sounds: the series can undergo in turn many variations that are both rhythmic and melodic, but that also follow the contrary, or retrograde, movement. With greater reason an infinite series, even if the variable is unique, cannot be separated from an infinity of variations that make it up: we necessarily take it in accord with all possible orders, and we favor this or that partial sequence at this or that time. That is why only one form—or one street—recovers its rights, but only in respect to the entire series.




March 25, 2009

Deleuze 30 德勒茲 Perception in the Folds 摺疊之感

Translated by Springhero 雄伯


I must have a body, it’s a moral necessity, a “ requirement.” And in the first place, I must have a body because an obscure object lives in me. But, right from this first argument, Leibniz’s originality is tremendous. He is not saying that only the body explains what is obscure in the mind. To the contrary, the mind is obscure, the depths of the mind are dark, and this dark nature is what explains and requires a body. We can call “ primary matter” our passive power or the limitation of our activity: we say that our primary matter requires extension, but also resistance or antitype, and yet an individuated requirement to possess a body that belongs to us. It is because there is an infinity of individual monads that each requires an individuated body, this body resembling the shadow of other monads cast upon it. Nothing obscure lives in us because we have a body, but we must have a body because there is an obscure object in us. In the place of Cartesian physical induction Leibniz substitutes a moral deduction of the body.




But this first argument gives way to another, which seems to contradict it, and which is even more original. This time, we must have a body because our mind possesses a favored—clear and distinct—zone of expression. Now it is that clear zone that is the requirement for having a body. Leibniz will go as far as stating that what I express clearly is what “ relates to my body.” And in effect, if the monad Caesar clearly expresses the crossing of the Rubicon, is it not because the river maintains a relation of proximity with his body? The same holds for all other monads whose zone of clear expression coincides with the body’s immediate environment.




  There are nonetheless find an inversion of causality—justifiable in certain respects—that must not impede our putting together the real order of deduction: (1) each monad condenses a certain number of unique, incorporeal, ideal events that do not put bodies in play, although they can only be stated in the form, “ Caesar crosses the Rubicon, he is assassinated by Brutus…”; ( 2) these unique events included in the monad as primary predicates constitute its zone of clear expression, or its “ subdivision”; (3) they necessarily relate to a body that belongs to this monad, and are incarnated in bodies that act immediately upon it. In brief, it is because every monad posses a clear zone that it must have a body, this zone constituting a relation with the body, not a given relation, but a genetic relation that engenders its own “ relation.” It is because we have a clear zone that we must have a body charged with traveling through it or exploring it, from birth to death.




  Here we confront two difficulties. Why is the requirement of having a body sometimes based on a principle of passivity, in obscurity and confusion, and at others on our activity, on clarity and distinction? And more particularly, how does the existence of the body derive from the clear and distinct? As Arnauld states, how can what I express clearly and distinctly have anything to do with my body, the sum of whose movements are known only in obscurity?




  Singularities proper to each monad are extended as far as the singularities of others and in all senses. Every monad thus expresses the entire world, but obscurely and dimply because it is finite and the world is infinite. That is why the lower depths of the monad are so dark. Since it does not exist outside of the monads that convey it, the world is included in each one in the form of perceptions or “ representatives,” present and infinitely minute elements. Still again, since the monad does not exist outside of other monads, these are minute perceptions lacking an object, that is, hallucinatory micro-perceptions. The world exists only in its representatives as long as they are included in each monad. It is a lapping of waves, rumor, a fog, or a mass of dancing particles of dust. It is a state of death or catalepsy, of sleep, drowsiness, or of numbness. It is as if the depths of every monad were made from infinity of tiny folds( inflections) endlessly furling and unfurling in every direction, so that the monad’s spontaneity resembles that of agitated sleepers who twist and turn on their mattresses?



德勒茲 29

March 24, 2009

Deleuze 29 德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧學

Translated by Springhero 雄伯


Proposition III: The exteriority of the war machine is also attested to by epistemology, which intimates the existence and perpetuation of “ nomad” or “ minor science.”




   There is a kind of science, or treatment of science, that seems very difficult to classify, whose history is even difficult to follow. What we are referring to are not “ technologies” in the usual sense of the term. But neither are they “ sciences” in the royal or legal sense established by history. According to a recent book by Michel Serres, both the atomic physics of Democritus and Lucretius and the geometry of Archimedes are marked by it. The characteristics of this kind of eccentric science would seem to be the following.




   !. First of all, it uses a hydraulic model, rather than a theory of solids treating fluids as a special case; ancient atomism is inseparable from flows, and flux is reality itself, or consistency.




   2. The model in question is one of becoming and heterogeneity, a opposed to the stable, the ternal, the identical, the constant. It is a “ paradox” to make becoming itself a model, and no longer a secondary characteristic, a copy; in the Timaeus, Plato raises this possibility, but only in order to exclude it and conjure it away in the name of royal science. By contrast, in atomism, just such a model of heterogeneity, and of passage or becoming in the heterogeneous, furnished by the famed declination of the atom. The clinamen, as the minimum angle, ha meaning only between a straight line and a curve, the curve and its tangent, and constitutes the original curvature of the movement of the atom. The clinamen is the smallest angle by which an atom deviates from a straight path. It is a passage to the limit, an exhaustion, a paradoxical “ exhaustive” model. The same applies to Archimedean geometry, in which the straight line, defined as “ the shortest path between two points,” is just a way of defining the length of a curve in a predifferential calculus.




  3. One no longer goes from the straight line to its parallels, in lamellar or laminar flow, but from a curvilinear declination to the formation of spirals and vortices on an inclined plane: the greatest slope for the smallest angle. Form turba to turbo: in other words, from bands or packs of atoms to the great vortical organizations. The model is a vortical one; it operates in an open space throughout which things-flow are distributed, rather than plotting out a closed space for linear and solid things. It is the difference between a smooth ( vectorial  , projective, or topological) space and a striated ( metric) space: in the first case “ space is occupied without being counted,” and in the second case “ space is counted in order to be occupied.”




   4. Finally, the model is problemic, rather than theorematic: figures are considered only from the viewpoint of the affections that befall them: sections, ablations, adjunctions, projections. One does not go by specific differences from a genus to its species, or by deduction from a stable essence to the properties deriving from it, but rather from a problem to the accidents that condition and resolve it. This involves all kinds of deformations, transmutations, passages to the limit, operations in which each figure designates an “ event” much more than an essence; te square no longer exists independently of a quadrature, the cube of a cubature, the straight line of a rectification. Whereas the theorem belongs to the rational order, the problem is affective and inseparable from the metamorphoses, generations, and creations within science itself. Despite what Gabriel Marcel may say, the problem is not an “ obstacle” ; it is the surpassing of the obstacle, a pro-jection,  in other words, a war machine. All of this mvement is what royal science is striving to limit when it reduces as much as possible the range of the “ problem-element” and subordinates it to the “ theorem-element.”




  This Archimedian science, or this conception of science, is bound up in an eseential way with the war machine: the problemata are the war machine itself and are inseparable from inclined planes, passages to the limit, vortices and projections. It would seem that the war machine is projected into an abstract knowledge formally different form the one that doubles the State apparatus. It would seem that a whole nomad science develops eccentrically, one that is very different from the royal or imperial sciences. Furthermore, this nomad science is continually “ barred,” inhibited, or banned by the demands and conditions of State science. Archimedes, vanquished by the Roman State, becomes a symbol. The fact I that the two kinds of science have different modes of formalization, and State science continually imposes its forms of sovereignty on the inventions of nomad science. State science retains of nomad science only what it can appropriate; it turns the rest into a set of strictly limited formulas without any real scientific status, or else simply represses and bans it. It is as if the “ savants” of nomad science were caught between aa rock and a hard place, between the war machine that nourishes and inspires them and the State that imposes upon them an order of reasons. The figure of the engineer ( in particular the military engineer), with all its ambivalence, is illustrative of this situation. Most significant are perhaps borderline phenomena in which nomad science exerts pressure on State science, and , conversely, State science appropriates and transforms the elements of nomad science. This is true of the art of encampments, “ castrametation,” which has always mobilized projections and inclined planes; the State does not appropriate this dimension of the war machine without submitting it to civil and metric rules that strictly limit, control, localize nomad science, and without keeping it from having repercussions throughout the social field ( in this respect, Vauban is like a repeat ofArchiedes, and suffers an analogous defeat). It is true of descriptive and projective geometry, which royal science would like to turn into a mere practical dependency of analytic, or so-called higher, geometry ( thus the ambiguous situation of Monge and Poncelet as “ savants”). It is also true of differential calculus. For a long time, it has only parascientific status and was labeled a “ Gothic hypothesis” ; royal science only accorded it the value of a convenient convention or a well-founded fiction. The great State mathematicians did their best to improve its status, but precisely on the condition that all the dynamic, nomadic notions—such as becoming, heterogeneity, infinitesimal, passage to the limit, continuous variation—be eliminated and civil, static, and ordinal rules be imposed upon it ( Carnot’s ambiguous position in this respect). Finally, it is true of the hydraulic model, for it is certain that the State itself needs a hydraulic science ( there is no going back on Wittfogel’s theses on the importance of large-scale waterworks for an empire). But it needs it in a very different form, because the State needs to subordinate hydraulic force to conduits, pipes, embankments, which prevent turbulence, which constrain movement to go from one point to another, and space itself to be striated and measured, which makes the fluid depend on the solid, and flows proceed by parallel, laminar layers. The hydraulic model of nomad science and war machine, on the other hand, consists in being distributed by turbulence across a smooth space, in producing a movement that holds space and simulataneously affects all of its points, instead of being held by space in a local movement from one specified point to another.. Democritus, manaechmus, Archimedes, Vauban, Desargues, Bernoulli,Monge, Carnot, Poncelet, Perronet, etc; in each case a monograph would be necessary to take into account that special situation of these savants whom State science used only after restraining or disciplining g them, after repressing their social or political conceptions.




March 22, 2009

Deleuze 28 德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧

Translated by Springhero 雄伯


  But why does this argument fail to convince us entirely? We follow Clastres when he demonstrates that the State is explained neither by a development of productive forces nor by a differentiation of political forces. It is the State, on the contrary, that makes possible the undertaking of large-scale projects, the constitution of surpluses, and the organization of the corresponding public functions. The State is what makes the distinction between governors and governed possible. We do not see how the State can be explained by what it presupposes, even with recourse to dialectics. The State seems to rise up in a single stroke, in an imperial form, and does not depend on progressive factors. Its on-the-spot emergence is like a stroke of genius, the birth of Athena. We also follow Clastres when he shows that the war machine is directed against the State, either against potential States whose formation it wards off in advance, or against actual States, whose destruction it purposes. No doubt the war machine is realized more completely in the “ barbaric” assemblages of nomadic warriors than in the “ savage” assemblages of primitive societies. In any case, it is out of the question that the State could be the result of a war in which the conquerors imposed, by the very fact of their victory, a new law on the vanquished, because the organization of the war machine is directed against the State form, actual or virtual. The State is no better accounted for as a result of war than by a progression of economic or political forces. This is where Clastres locates the beak: between “ primitive” counter-State societies and “ monstrous” State societies whose formation it is no longer possible to pleain. Clastres is fascinated by the problem of “voluntary servitude,” in which most certainly did not come to them as the outcome of an involuntary and unfortunate war? They did, after all, having counter-State mechanisms at their disposal: So how and why the State? Why did the State triumph? The more deeply Clastes delved into the problem, the more he seemed to deprive himself of the means of resolving it. He tended to make primitive societies hypostases, self-sufficient entities ( he insisted heavily on this point). He made their formal exteriority into a real independence. Thus he remained an evolutionist, and posited a state of nature. Only this state of nature was, according to him, a fully social reality instead of a pure concept, and the evolution was a sudden mutation instead of a development. For on the one hand, the State rises up in a single stroke, fully formed; on the other, the counter-State societies use very specific mechanisms to ward it off, to prevent it from arising. We believe that these two propositions are valid but that their interlinkage is flawed. There is an old scenario: “ from clans to empires,” or “ from bands to kingdoms.” But nothing says that this constitutes an evolution, since bands and clans are no less organized than empire-kingdoms. We will never leave the evolution hypothesis behind by creating a break between the two terms, that is, by endowing bands with self-sufficiency and the State with an emergence all the more miraculous and monstrous.


那為什麼這個論點不能完全說服我們? 我們可以理解克拉瑞,當他證明國家既不是用生產力的發展,也不是用政治力量的差異來解釋。相反的,國家使大規模計劃的實行,剩餘價值的形成,及相對應的公共機能成為可能。國家使統治者跟被統治者的區分成為可能。可是,即使用辯證方式,我們還是不明白,國家如何用它預先假設的來解釋。國家似乎一下子突然冒出來,以帝國的形式,而不是依靠逐漸發展的因素。國家當下出現,就像是天才的靈感,雅典娜的誕生。我們也可以理解克拉瑞,當他顯示,戰爭機器反對國家,反對它事先防範的潛在國家的形成,也反對它所要消滅的實質的國家。無疑地,戰爭機器在遊牧戰士的「草莽」組合,比在原始社會的「野性」組合,實現得更為徹底。無論如何,國家不可能是戰爭的結果,征服者憑藉勝利的事實,給被擊敗者賦加新的法律,因為戰爭機器的組織反對國家,無論是實質或虛擬的國家。國家無法用戰爭的結果,或經濟及政治的逐漸發展來解釋。這就是克拉瑞發現缺口的地方:在「原始」的反國家社會跟「怪誕」的國家社會之間,後者的形成不再能夠解釋。克拉瑞著迷於「自願奴役」的問題,按照拉波提的說法:人們為什麼想要或渴望奴役?大部份的奴役難道不是非自願及不幸的戰爭的果?畢竟,人們有反對國家的機制可以使用:那麼國家是如何形成?為何形成?為什麼國家會勝利?克拉瑞越探討這個問題,他就越使自己喪失掉解決問題的方法。他傾向於將原始社會當著假設,當著自給自足的實體(他強烈堅持這一點)。他將原始社會正式的外在性,當著是真實的獨立體。因此,他始終是一位進化論者,假定有自然的國家。依照他的說法,只是這個自然國家是一個充份社會化的實體,而不是一個純粹的概念,進化是一個突然的改變,而不是發展。因為在一方面,國家一下子突然出現,組織完整;在另一方面,反對國家的社會使用明確的機制來防範,阻止國家出現。我們相信這兩個假設可以成立,但是他們的關聯性則有瑕疵。古老的說法是:「從黨派到帝國」或「從盜匪到王國」。但是沒有東西可以說,這就組成進化,因為黨派跟盜匪跟帝國及王國都是組織化。我們不會在這兩個術語之間創造一個缺口,就將進化論置之一旁,換言之,盜匪具有自給自足的特性,而國家的出現更加奇蹟而怪誕。


  We are compelled to say that there has always been a State, quite perfect, quite complete. The more discoveries archaeologists make, the more empires they uncover. The hypothesis of the Urstaat seems to be verified: “ The State clearly dates back to the most remote ages of humanity.” It is hard to imagine primitive societies that would not have been in contact with imperial States, at the periphery or in  poorly controlled areas. But of greater importance is the inverse hypothesis: that the State itself has always been in a relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship. The law of the State is not the law of All or Nothing ( State societies or counter-State societies) but that of interior and exterior. The State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over what it is capable of internalizing, of appropriating locally. Not only is there no universal State, but the outside of States cannot be reduced to “ foreign policy,” that is, to a set of relations among States. The outside appears simultaneously in two functions: huge worldwide machines branched out over the entire ecumenon at a given moment. Which enjoy a large measure of autonomy in relation to the States ( for example, commercial organization of the “ multi-national” type or industrial complexes, or even religious formations like Christianity, Islam, certain prophetic or messianic movements, etc.) but also the local mechanisms of bands, margins, minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in opposition to the organs of State power. The modern world can provide us today with particularly machines, but also aneoprimitivism, a new tribal society as described by Marshall McLuhan. These directions are equally present in all social fields, in all periods. It even happens that they partially merge. For example, a commercial organization is also a band of pillage, or piracy, for part of its course and in many of its activities, or it is in bands that a religious formation begins to operate. What becomes clear is that bands, no less than worldwide organizations, imply a form irreducible to the State and that the form of exteriority necessarily presents itself as a diffuse and polymorphous war machine. It is a nomos very different from the “ law.” The State-form, as a form of interiority, has a tendency to reproduce itself, remaining identical to itself across its variations and easily recognizable within the limits of its poles, always seeking public recognition ( there is no masked States). But the war machine’s form of exteriority is such that it exists only in its own metamorphoses; it exists in an industrial innovation as well aas in a technological invention, in a commercial circuit as well as in religious creation, in all flows and currents that only secondarily allow themselves to be appropriated by the State. It is in terms not of independence, but of coexistence and competition in a perpetual field of interaction, that we must conceive of exteriority and interiority, war machines of metamorphosis and State apparatuses of identity, bands and kingdoms, mega-machines and empires. The same field circumscribes its interiority in States, but describes its exteriority in what escapes States or stands against States.




March 22, 2009

Deleuze 27 德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧

Translated Springhero 雄伯


Problem 1: Is there a way of warding off the formation of a State apparatus ( or it equivalents in a group) ?

Proposition II: The exteriority of the war machine is also attested to by ethnology ( a tribute to the memory of Pierre Clastres).





  Primitive, segmentary societies have often been defined as societies without a State, in other words, societies in which distinct organs of power do not appear. But the conclusion has been that these societies did not reach the degree of economic development, or the level of political differentiation, that would make the formation of the State apparatus both possible and inevitable: the implication is that primitive people “ don’t understand” so complex an apparatus. The prime interest in Pierre Clastre’s theories is that they break with this evolutionist postulate. Not only does he doubt that the State is the product of an ascribable economic development, but he asks if it is not a potential concern of primitive societies to ward off or avert that monster they supposedly do not understand. Warding off the formation of a State apparatus, making such a formation impossible, would be the objective of a certain number of primitive social mechanisms, even if they are not consciously understood as such. To be sure, primitive societies have chiefs. Buy the State is not defined by the existence of chiefs; it is defined by the perpetuation of conservation of organs of power. The concern of the State is to conserve. Special institutions are thus necessary to enable a chief to become a man of State, but diffuse, collective mechanisms are just as necessary to prevent a chief from becoming one. Mechanisms for warding off, preventive mechanisms, are a part of chieftainship and keep an apparatus distinct from the social body from crystallizing. Clastres describes the situation for the chief, who has no instituted weapon other than his prestige, no other means of persuasion, no other rule than his sense of the group’s desires. The chief is more like a leader or astar than a man of power and is always in danger of being disavowed, abandoned by his people. But Clastres goes further, identifying war in primitive societies as the surest mechanism directed against the formation of the State” war maintains the dispersl and sementarity of groups, and the warrior himself is caught in a process of accumulating exploits leading him to solitude and prestigious but powerless death. Clastres can thus invoke natural Law while reversing its principal proposition: just as Hobbes saw clearly that the State was against war, so war is against the State, and makes it impossible. It should not be concluded that war is a state of nature, but rather that it is the mode of a social state that wards off and prevents the State. Primitive war does not produce the State any more than it derives from it. And it is no better explained by exchange than by the State: far from deriving from exchange, even a sanction of its failure, war is what limits exchanges, maintains them in the framework of “ alliances” ; it is what prevents them from becoming a State factor, from fusing groups.





  The importance of this thesis is first of all to draw attention to collective mechanisms of inhibition. These mechanisms may be subtle, and function as micromechanisms. This is easily seen in certain band or pack phenomena. For example, in the case of gans of street children in Bogota, Jacques Meunier cites three ways in which the leader is prevented from acquiring stable power: the members of the band meet and undertake their theft activity in common, with collective sharing of the loot, but they disperse to eat or sleep separately; also, and especially, each member of the band is paired off with one, two, or three other member, so if he has a disagreement with the leader, he will not leave alone but will take along his allies, whose combined departure will threaten to break up the entire gang; finally, there is a diffuse age limit, and at about age fifteen a member is inevitably inducedto quit the gang. These mechanisms cannot be understood without renouncing the evolutionist vision that sees bands or packs as a rudimentary, less organized, social form. Even in bands of animals, leadership is a complex mechanism that does not act to promote the strongest but rather inhibits the installation of stable powers, in favor of fabric of immanent relations. One could just as easily compare the form “ high-society life” to the form “ sociability” among the most highly evolved men and women; high-society groups are similar to gangs and operate by the diffusion of prestige rather than by reference to centers of power, as in social groupings ( Proust clearly showed this non-correspondence of high-society values and social values). Eugene Sue, a man of high society and a dandy, whom legitimists reproached for frequenting the Orleans family, used to say: “ I’m not on the side of the family, I side with the pack.” Packs, bands, are groups of the rhizome type, as opposed to the arborescent type that centers around organs of power. That is why bands in general, even those engaged in banditry or high-society life, are metamorphoses of awar machine formally distinct from all State  apparatuses or their equivalents, which are instead what structure centralized societies. We certainly would not say that discipline is what defines a war machine: discipline is the characteristic required of armies after the State has appropriated them. The war machine answers to other rules. We are not saying that they are better, of course, only that they animalte a fundamental indiscipline of the warrior, a questioning of hierarchy, perpetual blackmail by abandonment or betrayal, and a very volatile sense of honor, all of which, once against, impedes the formation of the State.



德勒茲26 論遊牧

March 21, 2009

Deleuze26 德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧

Translated by Springhero


From the standpoint of the State, the originality of the man of war, his eccentricity, necessarily appears in a negative form: stupidity, deformity, madness, illegitimacy, usurpation, sin. Dumezil analyzes the three “ sins” of the warrior in the Indo-European tradition: against the king, against the priest, against the laws originating I the State( for example, a sexual transgression that compromises the distribution of men and women, or even a betrayal of the laws of war as instituted by the State). The warrior is in the position of betraying everything, including the function of the military, o of understanding nothing. It happens that historians, both bourgeois and Soviet, will follow \this negative tradition and explain how Genghis Khan understood nothing: he “ didn’t understand” the phenomenon of the city. An easy thing to say. The problem is that the exteriority of the war machine in relation to the State apparatus is everywhere apparent but remains difficult to conceptualize. It is not enough to affirm that the war machine is external to the apparatus. It is necessary to reach the point of conceiving the war machine as itself a pure form of exteriority, whereas the State apparatus constitutes the forms of interiority we habitually take as a model, or according to which we are in the habit of thinking. What complicates everything is that this extrinsic power of the wa machine tends, under certain circumstances, to become confused with one of the two heads of the State apparatus. Sometimes it is confused with the magic violence of the State, at other times with the State’s military institution. For instance, the war machine invents speed and secrecy; but there is all the same a certain speed and a certain secrecy that pertain to the State, relatively, secondarily. So there is great danger of identifying the structural relation between the two poles of political sovereignty, and the dynamic interrelation of these two poles, with the power of war. Dumerzil cites the lineage of the Roman kings: there is a Romulus-Muma relation that recurs throughout a series, with variants and an alternation between these two types of equally legitimate rulers; but there is also a relation with an : evil king,” Tullus Hostilius, Tarquinius Superbus, an upsurge of the warrior as a disquieting and illegitimate character. Shakespeare’s kings could also be invoked; even violence, murders, and perversion do not prevent the State lineage from producing “ good” kings; but a disturbing character like Richard III slips in, announcing from the outset his intention to reinvent a war machine and impose its line ( deformed, treacherous and traitorous, he claims a “ secret close intent” totally different from the conquest of State power, and another—an other—relation with women). In short, whenever the irruption of war power is confused with the line of State domination, everything gets muddled; the war machine can then be understood only through the categories of the negative, since nothing is left that remains outside the State. But returned to its milieu of exteriority, the war machine is seen to be of another species, of another nature, of another origin. One would have to say that it is located between the two heads of the State, between the two articulations, and that it is necessary in order to pass from one to the other. But “ between” the two, in that instant, even ephemeral, if only a flash, it proclaims its own irreducibility. The State has no war machine of its own, it can only appropriate one in the form of a military institution, one that will continually cause it problems. This explains the mistrust States have toward their military institutions, in that the military institution inherits an extrinsic war machine. Karl von Clausewitz has a general sense of this situation when he treats the flow of absolute war as an Idea that States partially appropriate according to their political needs, and in relation to which they are more or less good “ conductors.”




  Trapped between the two poles of political sovereignty, the man of war seems outmoded, condemned, without a future, reduced to his own fury, which he turns against himself. The descendants of Hercules, Achilles, then Ajax, have enough strength left to proclaim their independence from Agamemnon, a man of the old State, the first man of the modern State. And it is Ulysses who inherits Achilles’ arms, only to convert them to other uses, submitting them to the laws of the State—not Ajax, who is condemned by the goddess he defied and against whom he sinned. No one has portrayed the situation of the man of war, at once eccentric and condemned, better than Kleist. In Penthesilea, Achilles is already separated from his power; the war machine has passed over to the Amazons, a Stateless woman-people whose justice, religion, and loves are organized uniquely in a war mode. Descendants of the Scythians, the Amazons spring forth like lightning, “ between” the two States, the Greek and the Trojan. They sweep away everything in their path. Achilles is brought before his double, Penthesilea. And in his ambiguous struggle, Achilles is unable to prevent himself from marrying the war machine, or from loving Penthesilea, and thus from betraying Agamennon and Ulysses at the same time. Nevertheless, he already belongs enough to the Greek State that Penthesilea, for her part, cannot enter the passional relation of war with him without herself betraying the collective law of her people, the law of the pack that prohibits “ choosing” the enemy and entering into one-to-one relationships or binary distinctions.




  Throughout his work, Kleist celebrates the war machine, setting it against the State apparatus in a struggle that is lost from the start. Doubtless Arminius heralds Germanic war machine that breaks with the imperial order of alliances and armies and stands forever opposed to the Roman State. But the Prince of Homburg lives only a dream and stands condemned for having reached victory in disobedience of the lawa of the law of the State. AS for Kohlhaas, his war machine can no longer be anything more than banditry. Is it the destiny of the war machine, when the State triumphs, to be caught in this alternative: either to be nothing more than the disciplined, military organ of the State apparatus, or to turn again against itself, to become a double suicide machine for solitary man and solitary woman? Goethe and Hegel, State thinkers both, see Kleist as a monster, and Kleist has lost from the start. Why is it, then, that most uncanny modernity lies with him? And in Kleist the secret is no longer a content held within a form of interiority; rather, it becomes a form, identified with the form of exteriority that is always external to itself. Similarly, feelings become uprooted from the interiority of a “ subject,” to be projected violently outward into a milieu f pure exteriority that lends them an incredible velocity, a catapulting force: love and hate, they are no longer feelings but affects. And these affects are so many instances of the be coming-woman, the becoming-animal of the warrior ( the bear, she-dogs). Affects transpierce the body like arrows, they are weapons of war. The deterritorialization velocity of affect. Even dreams ( Homburg’s, Pentheselea’s) are externalized,, by a system of relays and plu-ins, extrinsic linkages belonging to the war machine. Broken rings. This element of exteriority—which dominates everything, which Kleist invents in literature, which he is the fist to invent—will give time a new rhythm: an endless succession of catatonic episodes or fainting spells, and flashes or rushes. Catatonia is: “ The affect is too strong for me,” and a flash is : “ The power of this affect sweeps me away,”  so that the Self is now nothing more than a character whose actions and emotions are desubjectified, perhaps even to the point of death. Such is Kleist’s personal formula: a succession of flights of madness and catatonic freezes in which no subject tive interiority remains. Ther eis much of the East in Kleist: the Japanese fight, interminably still, who then makes a move too quick to see. The Go player. Many things in modern art come from Kleist. Goethe and Hegel are old men next to Kleist. Could it be that it is at the moment the war machine ceases to exist, conquered by the State, that it displays to the utmost its irreducibility, that it scatters into thinking, loving, dying, or creating machines that have at their disposal vital or revolutionary powers capable of challenging the conquering State? Is the war machine already overtaken, condemned, appropriated as part of the same process whereby it takes on new forms, undergoes a metamorphosis, affirms its irreducibility and exteriority, and deploys that milieu of pure exteriority that the occidental man of the State, or the occidental thinker, continually reduces to something other than itself?



德勒茲 25 論遊牧

March 20, 2009

Deleuze 25  德勒茲 Treatise on Nomadology 論遊牧

Translated By Springhero


Axiom 1: The war machine is exterior to the State apparatus.

Proposition 1: This exteriority is first attested to in mythology , epic, drama, and games.




Georges Dumezil, in his definitive analyses of Indo-European mythology, has shown that political sovereignty, or domination, has two heads: the magician-king and the jurist-priest. Rex and flamen, raj and Brahman, Romulus and Numa, Varuna and Mitra, the despot and the legislator, the binder and the organizer. Undoubtedly, these two poles stand in opposition term by term, as the obscure and the clear, the violent and the calm, the quick and the weighty, the fearsome and the regulated, the “ bond” and the “ pact,” etc. But their opposition is only relative; they function as a pair, in alternation, as though they expressed a division of the One or constituted in themselves a sovereign unity. “ At once antithetical and complementary, necessary to one another and consequently without hostility, lacking a mythology of conflict: a specification on any one level automatically calls forth a homologous specification on another. The two together exhaust the field of the function. “ They are the principal elements of a State apparatus that proceeds by a One-Two, distributes binary distinctions, and forms a milieu of interiority. It is a double articulation that makes the State apparatus into a stratusm.




   It will be noted that war is not contained within this apparatus. Either the State has at its disposal a violence that is not channeled through war. Either it uses police officers and jailers in place of warriors, has no arms and no need of them, operates by immediate, magical capture, “ seizes” and “ bind,” preventing all combat—or, the State acquires an army, but in a way that presupposes a juridical integration of war and the organization of a military function. As for the war machines in itself, it seems to be irreducible to the State apparatus, to be outside its sovereignty and prior to its law: it comes from elsewhere. Indra, the warrior gold, is in opposition to Varuna, no less than to Mitra. He can no more be reduced to one or the other than he can constitute a third of thir kind. Rather, he is like a pure and immeasurable multiplicity, the pack, an irruption of the ephemeral and the power of metamorphosis. He unties the bond just as he betrays the pact. He brings a furor to bear against soverienty, a celerity against gravity, secrecy against the public, a power against sovereignty, a machine against the apparatus. He bears witness to another kind of justice, one of incomprehensible cruelty at times, but at others of unequaled pity as well ( because unties bonds…) He bears witness, above all, to other relations with women, with animals, because he sees all things in relations of becoming, rather than implementing binary distributions between “ states” : a veritable becoming-animal o the warrior, a becoming-woman, which lies outside dualities of terms as well as correspondences between relations. In every respect, the war machine is of another species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus.




    Let us take a limited example and compare the war machine and the State apparatus in the context of the theory of games. Let us take chess and Go, from the standpoint of the game pieces, the relations between the pieces and the space involved. Chess is a game of State, or of the court: the emperor of China played it. Chess pieces are coded; they have an internal nature and intrinsic properties from which their movements, situations, and confrontations derive. They have qualities; a knight remains a knight, a pawn a pawn, a bishop a bishop. Each is like a subject of the statement endowed with a relative power, and these relative powers combines in a subject of enunciation, that is, the chess player or the game’s form of interiority. Go pieces, in contrast, are pellets, disks, simple arithmetic units, and have only an anonymous, collective, or third-person function: “ It” makes a move. “ It” could be a man, a woman, a louse, an elephant. Go pieces are elements of a non-subjectified machine assemblage with no intrinsic properties, only situational ones. Thus the relations are very different in the two cases. Within their milieu of interiority, chess pieces entertain biunivocal relations with one another, and with the adversary’s pieces; their functioning is structural. On the other hand, a Go piece has only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations with nebulas or constellation, according to which it fulfills functions of insertion or situation, such as bordering, encircling, shattering. All by itself, a Go piece can destroy an entire constellation synchronically; a chess piece cannot ( or can do so diachronically only). Chess is indeed a war, but an institutionalized, regulated, coded war, with a front, a rear, battles. But what is proper to Go is war without battle lines, with neither confrontation nor retreat, without battles even: pure strategy, whereas chess is a semiology. Finally, the space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point; the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The “ smooth” space of Go, as against the “ striated” space of chess. The nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis. The difference is that chess codes and decodes space, whereas Go proceeds altogether differently, territorializing or deterrritorializing it ( makethe outside a territory in space; consolidate that territory by the construction of a second, adjacent territory;. Deterritoriatlize the enemy by shattering his territory from within; deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere…) Another justice, another movement, another space-time.




    “ They come like fate, without reason, consideration, or pretext…” “ In some way that is incomprehensible they have pushed right into the capital. At any rate, here they are. It seems that every morning there are more of them.” Luc de Heusch  analyzes a Bantu myth that leads us to the same schema: Nkongolo, an indigenous emperor and administrator of public works, a man of the public and a man of the polive, gives his half-sisters to the hunter Mbidi, who assists him and then leaves. Mbidi’s son a man of secrecy, joins up with his father, only to return fromm the outside with that inconceivable thing, an army. He kills Nkongolo and proceeds to build a new State. “ Between” the magical-despotic State and the juridical State containing a military institution, we see the flash of the war machine, arriving from without




March 16, 2009









說來好笑,一些小的生理細節的不祥徵兆就這樣的改變了我的騎行意志。行前途中,掉落雨衣、安全帽、車燈等,這些都可以用金錢買回。在 Rakaia 掉落眼鏡,就讓我頗為懊惱。到了Kaipol 看到一家眼鏡行optician ,光是度數檢查就要59元,鏡片安裝想來不會太便宜,還要我等兩三天。再加幾天來沒有沖牙機沖牙,牙齦隱隱作痛 。本來就不是什麼雄心壯志,一看到火車出乎意外地停到我剛騎到的荒郊野外,我脆弱的意志就振振有詞地把它當著是要我安全歸來的天意。