Lacan: The Absolute Master 10

Lacan: The Absolute Master 10
拉康:绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

What this celebrated thesis means is precisely that man never rejoins or appropriates his Being. Ek-sistentialism is not a “humanism”: the moment when human Dasein finally realizes its ultimate possibility is the moment of its death—that is, the impossible moment when it no longer ek-sists, or when it simply is no longer there (Nicht-mehr-Dasein). Dasein’s freedom, which makes it transcend all being, is a “freedom-toward-death” (Freiheit zum Tode) and, as such, cannot be appropriated. Thus, Being-there, as long as it ek-sists, is nothing but a perpetual “Being-toward-death” (Sein-zum~ Tode).

这个著名命题的意涵,确实是,人从没有没有重新加入,或佔有他的生命实存:「当人的生命实存最后体现它的最终的可能的时刻,就是它死亡的时刻—换句话说,当它不再存在的不可能的时刻,或是当它就是不再那里的时刻。生命实存的自由,让它超验所以的存在,这是一种「朝向死亡的自由」。作为这样一种自由,它无法被佔用。因此,在那里的生命实存,只要它是外部存在,它仅是永远的「朝向死亡的生命实存」。

Kojeve reformulated this thesis—translating and commenting on Hegel’s passage about the Spirit that “endures [death] and maintains itself in it”—by saying that “human Being … is the death which lives a human life,”39 to which Lacan in turn, quoting Oedipus at ColonuSy replied that such a life is properly inhuman. Yes, Oedipus “lives a life that is dead,” but is the sense of this life “as human as all that?”: “Am I a man,” exclaims Oedipus (1988b, 232/271, 229/268), “in the hour that I cease to be?”

科耶夫阐述这个主题—翻译并且评论黑格尔关于精神的段落,「精神承载死亡,在死亡里维持它自己」–凭借说「人类是过著人的生命的死亡」。拉康则是引述「在科伦拿斯的伊狄浦斯」。他回答说,这样的生命合宜地说,是非人类的。没错,伊狄浦斯「过着死去的生命」,但是这个生命的意义是「实实在在的人类吗?」伊狄浦斯惊叫着:「当我不再拥有生命实存的那个时刻,我是人吗?」(1988b, 232/271, 229/268),

All of this, very briefly summarized, will have to suffice in explaining the extent to which Heidegger’s Dasein differs not only from Hegel’s Spirit but also from the Man-God of “atheistic humanism.” Nevertheless, it was to precisely such an amalgam, under the name of “human reality,” that Kojeve invited his fascinated listeners. “Human reality” was the term proposed by Henry Corbin to translate Heidegger’s Dasein into French. Was Kojeve influenced by that translation, which in so many ways is “monstrous,” to recall Derrida’s term?40 Or should we believe instead that the translation was itself an effect of Kojeve’s teaching, since he began using the term in 1933?

所有这一切,简单总结起来,将必须足够用来解释,海德格的「生命实存」不但不同于黑格尔的精神,而且不同于「无神论的人本主义」人即上帝。可是,以「人类的现实」的名义,科耶夫邀请他的著迷的听众,确实就是这样的合金。「人类现实」是亨利、寇宾建议的术语,将海德格的「生命实存」翻译成为法文。科耶夫受到这样的影响吗?在很多方面,这个翻译是古怪的,让人想起德希达的术语?」或者,我们应该相信,这个翻译的本身是科耶夫的教学的结果?因为他在1933年开始使用这个术语。

(As Denis Hollier notes in his collection from the College de sociologie,41 Corbin originally translated Dasein as “existence,” and it was not until 1938 that he opted for “human reality,” carrying Sartre along with him.) That matters very little here; what really matters is that, right from the second paragraph of the text which opens the Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, we find this philosophical monster—and in the company of that other monster, itself destined for a glorious future under Lacan’s pen: “Desire.”

(丹尼斯、赫勒在他的「大学社会学文选」里注意到,寇宾起初翻译Dasein为「存在」。直到1938年,他才选择「人类的现实」,拉着萨特跟他一块用)。在此,这并无关紧要。在此,确实重要的是,从「阅读黑格尔导言」开始的文本的第二段,我们发现这个哲学的怪物—伴随着那另外一个怪物,它的本身注定会获得光辉灿烂的未来,在拉康的笔下:「欲望」。

Here is what Kojeve wrote: “The analysis of ‘thought,’ ‘reason,’ ‘understanding,’ and so on,. . . never reveals the why or the how of the birth of the word ‘I,’ and consequently of self-consciousness— that is, of human reality. . . . The man who is ‘absorbed’ by the object that he is contemplating can be ‘brought back to himself only by a Desire. .. . The (human) I is the I of a Desire or of Desire.”42 What is going on here? This opening text, entitled “In Place of an Introduction,” is really an annotated translation of Section A of the fourth chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, devoted to the (from then on) famous “dialectic of master and slave.” Why, then, did Kojeve choose to “introduce the reading of Hegel” by that particular section?

在此在科耶夫写的内容:「思想,理想,理解,等等,从来没有显示「我」这个字的诞生的为什么与如何。结果,对于自我-意识,换句话说,人类现实的诞生。人被他正在沉思的客体所吸收,仅有靠着欲望才能够回到它只见、、、人的这个「我」,就是欲望或是属于欲望的我」。这确实是「精神现象学」的第四章的第一部分的注释。它专注于(从那时开始)著名的主人与奴隶的辩证法。因此,为什么科耶夫选择「黑格尔阅的的导引」,以那个特殊的部分?

Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of Spirit discusses “self-consciousness”—that is, consciousness whose object is not the object “in-itself” of theoretical consciousness (described in the first three chapters, which deal with “sense-certainty,” “perception,” and “understanding”), but rather the object “for-itself” of an active freedom. Self-consciousness does not contemplate the object (outside itself), it desires it (for itself).

「精神现象学」第四章探讨「自我-意识」。也就是,意识的客体并非是理论意识的客体「自身内部」(在前三章被描述,它处理「意义-确定性」,「知觉」,「理解」。而是积极自由的「为了它自身」。自我-意识并没有沉思外在于它自己的客体,它欲望它(为了它自己)。

Thus, “self-consciousness,” Hegel writes, “is desire (Begierde) in general,”43 in the very precise sense of knowing no alterity that it does not immediately carry back to itself. Desiring itself through the other, it negates the other (by eating it, Kojeve would clarify, always careful to dot his i‘s). This first phase of self-consciousness is thus that of “Life”—a life that develops of itself, from itself, and so is perfectly free, “independent” of any Other.

因此,黑格尔写的,自我-意识是一般的欲望。确实的意义上,它知道的他者,当下都会回到它自身。通过他者欲望它自己,它否定他者(凭借吃食它,科耶夫澄清,总是小心翼翼地)自我意识到第一时期因此就算「生命」的时期—这种生命自身会发展。因此完全脱离于,独立于任何的大他者。

But this natural life also remains profoundly un-conscious of itself: it does not know itself to be free, does not know itself to be alive. Immediately negating everything that is not itself, at bottom it has no mirror to see itself, and that is why, according to the Hegelian system, it must mediate itself—that is, it must oppose itself to itself and reflect itself in order to know itself. In short, it must confront death, deny itself as natural life to become conscious of itself as freedom.

但是这种自然的生命也始终是它自己的深深的无意识:它并不知道它自己是自由的,并不知道它自己是活动。它当下否定并不是它自己的一切东西,追根究底,它没有镜子来看就它自己。那就是为什么,依照黑格尔的系统,它必须中介它自己。换句话说,它必须将它自己跟它自己对立,并且反映它自己,为了知道它自己。总之,它必须面临死亡,否认它自己,作为自然的生命,为了意识它自己,作为自由。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Leave a Reply

Fill in your details below or click an icon to log in:

WordPress.com Logo

You are commenting using your WordPress.com account. Log Out /  Change )

Google photo

You are commenting using your Google account. Log Out /  Change )

Twitter picture

You are commenting using your Twitter account. Log Out /  Change )

Facebook photo

You are commenting using your Facebook account. Log Out /  Change )

Connecting to %s


%d bloggers like this: