Archive for July, 2010

Logic of phantasy 10 JACQUES LACAN

July 31, 2010

Logic of phantasy 10
雅克 拉岡

The Logic of Fantasy 4

The question of the way in which the field of interpretation is presumed, the mode in which Freud’s technique offers an opportunity for it, free association in other words, carries us to the heart of this formal orgnisation from which there are outlined the first paths of a mathematical logic, which has a name which, all the same, could not possibly have failed to tickle the ears of all of you, that is called network (reseau) – yes, and it is specified, but it is not my function today to specify and to remind you of what is called a trellis or lattice (an English transposition of the word treillis).


This is what is involved in what Freud, as much in his first outlines of the new psychology, as in the fashion in which, subsequently, he organises the handling of the analytic session as such, this is what he constructs in advance (avant la lettre), as I might say, And when the objection is put to him, at a precise point of the Traumdeutung (as it happens I did not bring today the copy in which I had picked out the page for you), he has to respond to the objection: “of course, with your way of proceeding, at every cross-roads you will indeed have the opportunity of finding a signified which will provide the bridge between two meanings and with this fashion of organising the bridges, you will always go from somewhere to somewhere else”. (It is not for nothing that I had put the little poster taken from Aurus Apollo, as it happens, namely, from an interpretation in the (5) XVIth century of Egyptian hieroglyphs, on a journal which has now disappeared which was called “La Psychanalyse”: the Ear and the Bridge.) This is what is involved in Freud, and every point of convergence of this network or lattice, in which he teaches us to ground the first questioning, is in effect a little bridge.


This is what is involved in Freud, and every point of convergence of this network or lattice, in which he teaches us to ground the first questioning, is in effect a little bridge. This is how it functions and the objection made to him is that in this way everything will explain everything else. In other words, what is fundamentally opposed to psychoanalytic interpretation, is not at all any kind of “scientific critique” (in quotes) – as is imagined from what is ordinarily the only piece of baggage that minds who enter the field of medicine shill have from their year of philosophy, namely, that the scientific is founded on experience!


Naturally, they have not opened Claude Bernard, but they still know the title. It is not a scientific objection, it is an objection which goes back to the medieval tradition, when people knew what logic was. It was much more widespread than in our time, despite the means of diffusion that we have.


Things have, in fact, got to the point that, having let slip recently in one of the interviews that I spoke to you about, that I had got my taste for commentary from an old practice of the scholastics, I asked them to take it out. God knows what people would have deduced from it! (laughter).


Anyway, in short, in the Middle Ages people knew that: Ex falso sequitur quod libet. In other words, that it is characteristic of the false to make everything true. The characteristic of the false, is that one deduces from it in the same step, on the same footing, the false and the true. It does not exclude the true. If it excluded the true, it would be too easy to recognise it! Only in order to see that, it is necessary precisely to have carried out a certain minimal number of exercises in logic, which up to now, as far as I know, do not form part of medical studies, and it is very regrettable! And it is clear that the fashion in which Freud responds, brings us immediately onto the terrain of the structure of the network. He does not express it, of course, in every detail, in the modern specifications that we could give it. It would be interesting moreover to know how he was able and how he was not able to profit from Brentano’s teaching, which he was certainly not unaware of – we have the proof in his university cursus.


The function of the structure of the network, the way in which the lines – of association, precisely – come to overlap one another, to cross-check with one another, to converge at elective points from which they depart again electively, this is what is indicated by Freud. We know enough by all his subsequent work, the unease, we would say, the veritable concern, to be more precise, that he had about this dimension which is indeed properly speaking that of the truth. Because from the point of view of reality, one (6) is at ease! Even to know that perhaps the trauma is only a phantasy. In a certain fashion, a phantasy is even more sure, as I am in the process of showing you; it is structural. But this does not leave Freud – who was just as capable of inventing this as I am, as you can imagine – this does not leave him any more at peace. Where is here, he asks, the criterion of truth? And he would not have written the Wolfman, if it were not on this track, on this particular requirement: is it true or not?


“Is it true?”

He supports this by what is discovered in questioning the fundamental figure manifesto in the repetition dream of the Wolfman. And “is it true?”, is not reduced to knowing whether yes or no and at what age he experienced something which had been reconstructed with the help of this figure of the dream. The essential – it is enough to read Freud in order to perceive it – is to know how the subject, the Wolfman, had been able to verify this scene – to verify it with his whole being. It is through his symptom. Which means – foes not doubt the reality of the original scene – which means: now had he been able to articulate it properly in terms of signifier?


You only have to remind yourselves of the figure of the Roman five, for example, in so far as it is involved and reappears everywhere in the outspread legs of a woman, or the beating of the wings of a butterfly, to know, to comprehend that what is involved is the handling of the signifier.


The relation of the truth to the signifier, the detour through which analytic experience rejoins the most modern process of logic, consists precisely in the fact that this relation of the signifier to the truth can short-circuit all the thinking which supports it. And just as a sort of aim is outlined at the horizon of modern logic – one which reduces logic to a correct handling of what is simply writing – in the same way for us, the question of verification, concerning what we have to deal with, passes along the direct line of the operation of the signifier, in so far as on it alone the question of the truth remains suspended.


It is not easy to put forward a term like that of the true, without making immediately resonate all the echoes in which there come to slip in the most suspect “intuitions” (in inverted commas) and without immediately producing objections, made up from the old experiences that those who engage themselves on this terrain know only too well, so that, like scalded cats, they fear cold water. But who says that because I make you say: “Me, the truth, I speak”, that through this I am allowing the re-entry off the theme of Being, for example? Let us look twice at it, at least in order to know. Let us be content with this very particular knot that I have just made between the truth -! and by this I have not indicated any person, except the one whom I made say these words: “Mek the truth, I speak”. No person, divine (7) or human is involved outside her, namely: the point of origin of the relations between the signifier and the truth.



Logic of Phantasy 9 Jacques Lacan

July 29, 2010

Logic of Phantasy 9
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The
Logic of Fantasy 4
Seminar 4: Wednesday, December 6, 1966

You were able, the last time we met here, to hear what Jacques-Alain Miller put to you. I was not able to add many observations to it by reason of time.


I think that you were able to notice in this presentation – marked by a sure knowledge of what, properly speaking, was inaugurated, we can say, on the whole, as modern logic, by the work and the labour of Boole – (it is perhaps not a matter of my last lecture, let us say, who had not been able either to have it communicated to him, since I myself only got the text two days ago, found himself then, by the path and the presentation that he chose … and you were able also to sense very well, I think, that at the moment that I announced him at my last lecture, I was not too sure of the subject that he had chosen. These remarks have their interest, precisely, because of the extraordinary convergence, let us say, or again if you wish reapplication of what ha was able to state before you, no doubt, of course, knowing what he was about, namely, knowing what are the principles and, as I might say, the axioms around which, for the moment, my development is turning …).


It is nevertheless striking, that with the help of Boole – in whom, of course, there is absent this major articulation that no signifier is able to signify itself – that in starting from Boole’s logic … namely, from this turning point at which, in a way, one sees, by having wanted to formalist classical logic, that this formalisation itself allows there to be brought to it not simply major extensions, but is revealed to be the hidden essence on which this logic had been able to orient itself and to construct itself, while believing it was following something which was not really its foundation, while believing that it was following what we are going to try to (2) circumscribe today in order, in a way, to set it apart from the field in which we are going to proceed, in so far as we have announced: the logic of phantasy.


The surprising ease with which, from fields left blank in the logic of Boole, Miller rediscovered the situation, the place, where the signifier in its proper function is in a way elided, in this famous (-1), whose exclusion he admirably separated out in the logic of Boole – the fashion in which, by this very elision, he indicated the place where what I am trying to articulate here is situated, is here something which I believe, has its importance, not at all that I am complimenting him on it here, but which allows you to grasp the consistency, the straight line, in which there is inserted this logic that we are obliged to found in the name of the facts of the unconscious and which, as is to be expected, if we are what we are, namely, rationalists – what must be expected, is, of course, not at all that the previous logic `should be in some way overturned, but that it should rediscover there its proper foundations.


Moreover you were able to see it being marked, in passing, that in this point which requires for us the bringing into play of a certain symbol, this something which corresponds to this (-1) which Boole does not use, or forbids himself to use, not being sure whether this (-1) is the best to use. For what is proper to a logic, to a formal logic, is that it operates, and what we have to bring out this year are new operators whose shadow, in a way, has already been profiled in the fact that, depending on the ears to which I was addressing myself, I already tried to articulate in a manageable fashion – manageable for what had to be handled, which was nothing other, on that occasion, than analytic praxis – but what, this year, we are taking to its limits, to its edges properly speaking, obliges us to give more rigorous formulations to circumscribe what we are dealing with, and which deserves in some aspects to be taken, to be undertaken, in the most general articulation which is given to us at the moment in the matter of
logic, namely: what is centred on the function of sets.


I leave this subject, of what Miller brought us then the last time, less as an articulation of what I am developing before you, than as confirmation, assurance, a framework in the margin. It is not without interest to highlight for you that in designating, in Sartre, under the name of “thetic self-consciousness”, the fashion in which, in a way, he occupies the place where this logical articulation resides – which is our task this year – what is involved here is indeed only what is called a substitute (tenant-lieu) – very properly – namely: that which, what we have to occupy ourselves with, we analysts, only in a fashion that is strictly equivalent to the way in which we occupy ourselves with other substitutes, when we have to handle what is an effect of the unconscious.


(3) This is the reason why one can say that in no way can what I am stating about the structure be situated with respect to Sartre, since this fundamental point, around which turns the privilege that he tries to maintain of the subject, is properly this sort of substitute which can in no way interest me except in the register of its interpretation.

Logic, then, of the phantasy … It is almost necessary to recall – but we can only do it very rapidly in the way that, touching a bell with the tip of the finger, one makes it vibrate for an instant – to remind you on this point of the unextinguished vacillation of what is attached to the tradition, that the term “university” will pinpoint here (if we give to this sense not at all anything whatsoever which designates or shames a geographical point, but this sense of Universitas litterarum or a cursus classici, let us say), it is not useless in passing to indicate that – whatever may be the other much more historical sense that one can give to this term of “university” – there is here some allusion to what I called the Universe of discourse. At least it is not vain to bring the two terms together.


Now, it is clear that in this hesitation (remember the waltz) that the professor of philosophy – in the year I think you all went through, more or less as many of you as are here – performed around logic, (namely: what is involved in it, the laws of thinking or its norms, the way it functions and that we are going to extract scientifically, will we say, or the way it ought to be conducted?) – you must admit that in so far as this debate has not yet been settled, perhaps a suspicion may arise for us that the function of the University in the sense that I articulated it earlier, is perhaps precisely to put off the decision about it.
all that I can say is that this decision, perhaps, is more involved – I am speaking about logic – in what is happening in Vietnam, for example, than what is involved in thinking, if in fact it still remains suspended in this way, in this dilemma between its laws … which in that case leaves us asking ourselves whether it is applied to the “world” as they say, let us say rather: to the real, in other words: whether it is not dreaming? (I am not losing my psychoanalytic bearings. I am speaking about things that interest us, us analysts, because for us analysts, to know whether the man who is thinking is dreaming is a question that has the most concrete sense. To whet your appetite, to keep you in suspense, you should know that I have indeed the intention of posing the question, this year, of what is involved in the waking state …) Norms of thinking, opposed to the other, here indeed is something that also interests us, and in the dimension that is not reduced by this little sand papering by which generally, the professor, when he is dealing with logic in the philosophy class, will end up by ensuring that these laws and these (4) norms end up by being presented with the same “smoothness”, which allows one to pass one’s finger from one to the other, in other words to handle all of that blindly.


For us, the relief has not been lost (I am saying, us analysts) of this dimension which is entitled: that of the true. In so far as, after all, it does not require, does not imply in itself the support of thinking, and that if in questioning what it is – the true that is at stake – in connection with which there is stirred up the phantasy of a norm, undoubtedly, it clearly appears – from the origin – that this is not immanent to thinking. If I allowed myself, to touch the ears that it was necessary to make vibrate, to write one day, erecting a figure which it was not moreover very difficult to bring to life – that of the truth, emerging from the well, as it has always been depicted – in order to make it say: “Me, the truth, I speak”, it is indeed in effect to highlight this relief in which it is a matter for us of maintaining that to which, properly speaking, our experience is attached and which is absolutely impossible to exclude from the articulation of Freud: for Freud is here put, immediately, up against it – and there is no need to intervene for that: he put himself there himself.



Logic of phantasy 08 Jacques Lacan

July 26, 2010

Logic of phantasy 08
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 07
Seminar 3: Wednesday, November 30, 1966

There will be one next Friday at 10:45, which is what is called, I have been assured, a “peak listening time” (laughter). I am thinking: not for those who are listening to me here at this hour, precisely, because I think at this peak listening time, they are at the hospital.


Anyway, too bad, you can organise things as you wish and I hope after all to be able to communicate this text if the Ardio is willing to give me the authorisation. There will be another one on Monday – you can see that they are in a hurry. For the first, it is Georget Charbonnier who is kind enough – I will not say to receive it – to give me a place and for the second it is M. Sipridio, thanks to whom you will perhaps have something a bit more lively than the first one, since it will be a dialogue with the person who is most qualified to sustain it, namely, Francois Wahl who is here and was kind enough to agree to carry out this exercise with me.


Now then, (in the audience: “At what time?”) Well it appears that it is at … I (5) would not swear to it, it appears that it is starting at 6:15, only they are not going to be speaking just about my book and I cannot very well tell you at what stage it will appear between 6:15 and 7PM, each one having his quarter of an hour…. What then, is there another question? It is a peak listening time (laughter) which in general is accompanied by exercises in gymnastics. There you are, anyway, we will see how all of that works out.


And now I give the floor to Jacques-Alain Miller (the audience: “Oh!”).

I am going all the same to communicate something very amusing to you, which was brought to me by one of my faithful followers. It is a little paper done by a sort of special journal, linked, I think, both to IBM machines and what has been done on an experimental level in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT, as it is usually called) and which speaks to us about the use of one of these high-level machines that are being made now, to which there was given – and certainly not for nothing – the name of Elisa; at least it is called Elisa for the use that is made of it – that I am going to tell you about … (Elisa is, as you know, the person who in a well known play – Pygmalion – the person who is taught to speak properly; she was a little flower seller on a busy London street and it is a matter of training her to be able to express herself in the best society, when it is noticed that she does not belong to it).

我仍然要跟你们说一件有趣的事情,这是我的一位忠实的听众告诉我的。有一个特别的杂志,登载了一篇小论文,关系到IBM 的电脑机器及麻省科技研究所(通常简称文MIT)。这篇论文跟我们谈到这些正在制造的高科技机器的使用,这种机器被取名为「艾丽莎」,真是名符其实。至少,它被称为艾丽莎的原因,是跟它的用途有关。现在,我要跟你们谈到,众所皆知,艾丽莎是一齣名剧「卖花女」的女主角。她被教导如何讲话要得体。她原先是伦敦街上的一位卖花女,然后一位语言学家训练她成为能在上流社会表达自己。

It is something of this order which emerges with this little machine; in truth, what is involved is not properly speaking that a machine should be capable of giving articulated answers, simply when one speaks to it – I am not saying when one questions it – it is something which now proves to be a game and which puts in question what can happen in terms of obtaining responses from the one who is speaking to it.


The thing, faith, is not absolutely articulated in a fashion which would be completely satisfying for a situation, in effect, that is so usable for us – which gives us such an interesting reference in the discourse pursued here – it is not properly speaking stated in a fashion which would satisfy us completely – in other words which takes into account the framework into which we might insert it – nevertheless, it is very interesting because, when all is said and done, there is something suggested which may be considered as a therapeutic function of the machine and in a word, it is nothing less than the analogue of a sort of transference which can be produced in this relationship, about which the question is raised.


The thing did not dissatisfy me. I would like simply in this connection … – since moreover it is not unrelated to everything that I am leaving open concerning the fashion in which, in short, I have to manage the diffusion of what is called my teaching – I could say that what you will find in terms of the handling of a first symbolic chain (designed in its time, for me, to give me the notion that (6) psychoanalysts are required to conceive of … the notion to which their mind should accommodate itself, to centre in a proper fashion on what Freud called memory (rememoration), to give them a sort model that is suggestive of that), in the construction of this symbolic chain and of its own kind of memory, that is undoubtedly consistent and even insistent, which is articulated in what comes now in this book, in the second, let us say chapter or moment, namely, in the inverse position in which the Introduction to the purloined letter which precedes it is fixed in this book, namely, just after The purloined letter.

我对於这种状况並不满意。在这方面,我只是想要、、、而且,它跟我展开的一切並非没有关系,总之,我必须处理所谓我的教学的扩散。我可以这样说,你们所发现的是,在处理一个初起的符号的锁链时,这个锁链被设计,为了要给我精神分析师所被要求构想的这个观念:他们的心智应该接纳它自己进入这个观念, 为了要以适当的方式,专注於佛洛伊德所谓的记忆,给他们一种有如此意涵的模式,在建构这个符号的锁链,以及它自己的记忆。无可置疑地,那是具有一贯性,甚至是持续性的。这是将要出版的这本书的内容。其次,让我们谈到章节,换句话说,採用倒转的立场,在它之前的「偷窃的信的导论」,在这本书中,被修正过来。换句话说,它出现在「偷窃的信」之后。

I recall to those who were listening to me at that time that this construction, like all the others, was made before them and for them, step by step, and that I started very exactly: first of all, from an examination, starting from a text by Poe, about the way in which the mind works on this theme: can one win in the game of odds and evens, and that my second step was the following: to imagine a machine, precisely of this kind – and what is effectively produced today differs in nothing from what I articulated then – simply: the machine is supposed by the subject to be provided with a programme which takes into account the gains and the losses.


I mean that starting from this: that the subject might question the aforesaid machine, by playing the game of odds and evens with it – starting from this single supposition, that it preserves, at least for a certain number of throws, the memory of its gains and its losses, one can construct this sequence of: +, +, -, +, – … which encompass, united in a parenthesis of a typical length and which is displaced by a notch each time, allows us to establish this trajectory that I constructed and upon which I am founding this first most elementary type of the model … (We do not need to consider memory under the register of the physiological impression but only of the symbolic memorial),…

我的意思是,从这里开始,小说的主角可能置疑到前述的那台机器,用它来玩精打细算的遊戏,从这个单一的假设开始,它保留,至少投掷几次后,它保留了获利跟损失的记忆。我们能够建构这种系列:+, +, -, +- …。这个系列涵盖到某个长度后,会用括弧把它们联合起来,每一次都用一个刻痕来替代。这样它使我们能够建立这个我建构的投掷的轨道,也是我目前正在創建的这个最基本的模式、、、(我们不需要将记忆放置在生理的印象层次,而仅仅放置在符号的记念层次。)

It is starting from a hypothetical game with what was not yet perhaps in a position to function then at this level, but which all the same existed as such, as electronic machine, namely, in fact, something which can be written on paper (this is the modern definition of the machine), it is starting from there – well before, then, this got onto the agenda of the preoccupations of engineers, who devoted themselves to these apparatuses, as you know, that are always progressing, because people expect nothing less than automatic translation – it is starting from there that 15 years ago I constructed a first model for the proper use of psychoanalysts, with the goal of producing in their mens, mind, this sort of necessary detachment from the idea that the functioning of the signifier is necessarily the flower of consciousness, which was at that time to introduce a step that was absolutely unprecedented.


Over to you … (There follows the presentation of <b>M Jacques-Alain Miller</b> on Boolean logic) <b>Doctor Lacan</b>: – I am not going to add any commentary. I consider that the work which has been pronounced before you as being truly able to guarantee by the perfect ease of its presentation, something which supports, grounds, corresponds to what I introduced the last time as being the absolutely necessary starting point for any logic which is properly the one the psychoanalytic terrain requires.


This commentary is not to be considered as a reduplication. It showed you something in the confrontation with the first of these sets, in the mathematical-logic sense of the term: which was given by this Boole set and the confrontation of this Boole set – in so far as it finds itself apparently much more homogeneous with classical logic – You have seen that from this set itself, we are allowed to construct this logical precedence, this necessity which radically distinguishes the status of meaning and its origin in the signifier – I find that you have had there, at once a very elegant demonstration and at the same time this constitutes a which was necessary for the assimilation, in a way, and the complement, the control, the configuration of what, the last time, I succeeded in bringing before you and which you will have the continuation of the next time.



.Logic of phantasy 06 Jacques Lacan

July 26, 2010

.Logic of phantasy 07
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 07
Seminar 3: Wednesday, November 30, 1966

Today you are going to hear a piece of work, a paper by Jacques-Alain Miller. This – about which I warned you the last time, perhaps a little late, a part of the audience having already dispersed when I announced it – marks the fact that I would like there to remain justified this curious name of seminar, which was attached to my teaching from the time of Sainte-Anne where, as you know, it was held for ten years.


To speak only of the two previous years here, some of you are not unaware – to your great annoyance – that I wanted this seminar to be held in an effective fashion, believing that this effectiveness could be linked to a certain reduction in this so numerous and so kindly audience that you offer me through your assiduity and attention. And, good God, so much assiduity and attention deserve a lot of respect, and they made the sorting out that was necessary for this reduction very difficult. So that, in total, your more reduced number was not such that from the point of view of quantity – which plays such an important role in communication – the scale of things changed to any great extent. So I will leave in suspense this year the solution of this difficult problem. Until further notice and without in any way committing myself to it, I am not closing any of these Wednesdays whether they are terminal, semi-terminal or other.


I Would like simply that there should be at least maintained this name of seminar, in a more marked style than we experienced as Saint-Anne, where up to the very last years there were meetings in which I delegated the role of speaking to one or other of those who were following me at that time.


Nevertheless, some ambiguity remains, which suspends this appellation of seminar between the proper usage of a category: – a place where something ought to be exchanged, where the (2) transmission, the dissemination of a doctrine ought to be manifested as such, namely, in the process of being transmitted – there remained some ambiguity between this usage proper to the category and some other usage or other, not properly speaking of the proper name – because every discussion of the proper name can become engaged in this – let us say a nomination par excellence, the which nomination par excellence might become a nomination par ironie. Hence, in order to mark clearly that it is not the state of things in which I intend there to be stabilised the use of this appellation, you will see intervening periodically a certain number of people who show themselves disposed to it.


Undoubtedly, Jacques-Alain Miller, in inaugurating what follows, has some right, this year, since he provided you with this index in my book, with this reasoned index of concepts, which, according to what I hear is very welcome for many people, who find a great advantage in this Ariadne’s thread which allows them to move through a succession of articles in which one or other notion, one or other concept (as the term is used more correctly), is found at diverse stages.


A tiny detail: I note, to answer a question which has been put to me by someone, that in this index, the numbers in italics mark the essential passages, the straight or roman numbers, mark the passages where the concept is involved more in passing. It can happen that on the page that is designated for you, what is referred to in this way is simply limited to an indication in one line of the page. This will tell you the care with which this little apparatus, which is so usable, is constructed.


I am told, in this connection, that this book is, as they say in this franglais which I, for my part, do not reject, “out of print”, which means epuise (exhausted). I find “out of print” nicer, with epuise people ask what has happened to it (laughter). I hope that this “out of print” will not last too long, it is what is called a success, but a success in terms of sales. Let us not prejudge the other success. We have to wait and see and this, after all, leaves the question open. It has been remarked that I was hardly in a hurry to put this book into circulation.


If I delayed so long in doing so, one could pose this question: “Why now?” “What do I expect from it?” It is clear that the reply: “that it should be of service to you!” was no less valid a year or two ago, or even earlier. The question is therefore not simple. It involves everything about my relations with what plays the function of a base, namely, psychoanalysis in its incarnated – we might say quickly – or again subjectified form, in other words: with psychoanalysts themselves. It is certain that there were many elements which appeared to me to justify that what I was trying to construct should remain in a reserved field, which allowed, in a way, this selection (3) which was made of those who wanted to decide to recognise what the study of Freud implied as a consequence in their practice.


Finally, things never happen in the way you plan, in these difficult matters in which resistance is not restricted to what must be designated in the narrow sense of this term in analytic praxis, but where it has another form, in which the social context is not without its impact. This indeed is what makes it very delicate for me to explain myself before such a large audience.


This indeed is why, in everything which concerns the external relations of my teaching – for I do not envisage in any other way the hullabaloo and the to-do around a certain number of my terms, with which I see myself associated in a way that I do not like, including that of structuralism, which for the moment benefiting from a certain fashion, is not the least to inspire my suspicion – nevertheless, here again, it is not the case – except in as much as I am forced to it by some incidence of what I called earlier the success of the book – this is something for which I am in no way disposed to take time here, to eat into this measured time in which you see – in which you ought to sense more or less by your experience of these last years – that I have no time to lose, if I want to state things before you at the level of the construction that you saw me inaugurating in its style by my last seminar and the points on which I wanted to establish the beginning of this logic that I have to develop before you this year.


Hence, and since all the same this book exists with the first movements that it is bringing with it – which will be followed by others – and that, in short, the two or three points that I have brought up like that, as principal – but there others – risk remaining in suspense for you, I believe that because of this, I ought to warn you that you will find, faith, the explanation – at least a sufficient explanation to permit you to respond to at least some of the questions which may remain in suspense for you – in two sorts of conversations, as they say, or again interviews, which are going to appear, I believe – if my information is correct, this week – in places, God knows, which have nothing of the fairground about them, which are called respectively the Figaro litteraire and Lettres francaises, where perhaps you will get to know a little more about these points.


Besides, since I cannot help myself, every time that I have one of these kinds of external relation, putting into it all the same what is on-going, it is possible that you will find here and there something which refers to our discourse of this year.


It is obvious that I have some scruples – for example, as I did the last time, in speaking to you about the repetition of the unary stroke, as being situated, (4) established fundamentally from this repetition (of which one can say that it only happens once, which means all the same that it is double, otherwise there would be no repetition) which right away, in short, for whoever wants to delay on it a little, establishes in its most radical foundation the division of the subject – I cannot avoid having some scruple at having announced it before you the last time almost in passing, while at this congress which took place at Johns Hopkins – as a certain number of you know) in October, I chewed it over for about three quarters of an hour. It is perhaps because I give you greater credit than my listeners at that time; certain echoes received since having showed me that the structuralist ear – to take up again the term from earlier – well then, my God, the structuralist ear, whoever may be its bearer on a particular occasion, is capable of
showing itself to be a little deaf! (laughter).


There are two still more unexpected places, where you will perhaps see … (in the audience: “We can’t hear!” – <b>Doctor Lacan</b>: “What? Who can’t hear? How long have you not been able to hear anything?” (laughter)) – Good, then, in still more unexpected places you will perhaps find on these different themes – up to and including these little initial indications, my God, which can never come too soon – on certain themes which I will have to develop subsequently and, for example, in passing, on the function of the preconscious – a curious thing, that people do not seem to have occupied themselves with for a long time, namely, ever since people mixed up everything while believing they had kept it distinct, people no longer occupy themselves after all so much with the functions that Freud reserved for it – it slipped in in passing, if I remember rightly, in one of these conversations, I cannot remember which one, to which, then, it would be well to add the two other unexpected ones, I think, for you, which are
conversations at the O.R.T.F.

还有两个你们意想不到的地方,你们可能会看到、、、(听从喊说:「我们听不见!」「什麽?谁听不见?你们什麽时候,能够听得见什麽?」(笑声)。好,在一个你们可能会碰到的更加出乎意料之外的地方,关於这个不同的主题,包括这些小小的开头的指示,我的天,还是越早讲越好,关於我随后必须开展的某些的主题。随便举个例子,关於前意识的功用,说来奇怪,人们似乎有一段长时间,並没有专注於它,换句话说,当人们以为自己将前意识清楚区分出来,其实他们将一切都混肴。畢竟,人们不再那麽专注於佛洛伊德保留给它的功用。可是,前意识却还是会偶然滑溜进来。假如我记得没有错,在有一次这样的谈话中,哪一次我记不得。再多填加两次其它的谈话,也还是适用。我想,你们会记得在O.R.T.F 电视台的那些谈话会。


Logic of phantasy 06 Jacques Lacan

July 22, 2010

Logic of phantasy 06
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 06

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

Here indeed is where there may be situated the phantasy which is properly the poetic phantasy par excellence, the one which obsessed Mallarme: of the absolute Book.


It is at this level where things are tied together at the level of the use not of pure signifier, but of the purified signifier, in so far as I say – and that I write that say – that the signifier is here articulated as distinct from any signified and I then see there being outlined the possibility of this absolute Book, whose property would be that it would encompass the whole signifying chain, properly in the following: that it may no longer signify anything. In this, then, there is something that proes to be founded in existence at the level of the Universe of discourse, but (11) we have to suspend this existence on the proper logic which that of the phantasy may constitute, because moreover, it is the only one that can tell us the way in which this region is attached to the Universe of discourse.


Undoubtedly, it is not excluded that it should enter it, but on the other hand, it is quite certain that it specifies itself in it, not at all by this purification of which I spoke earlier, for purification is not at all possible of what is essential to the Universe of discourse, namely, meaning. And were I to speak to you for another four hours about this absolute Book it would nevertheless remain that everything that I tell you has a sense.


What characterises the structure of this B – in so far as we know where to situate it in the Universe of discourse, inside or outside – is very precisely this feature that A announced earlier, in making for you the circle, simply of this A B C D E, in so far as, by simply closing the chain, there results that each group of four can easily leave outside itself the extraneous signifier, which can serve to designate the group, for the simple reason that it is not represented in it, and that nevertheless the whole chain will be found to constitute the totality of all these signifiers, giving rise to this additional unit, uncountable as such, which is essential for a whole series of structures, which are precisely the ones on which I founded, since the year 1960, my whole operation (operatoire) of identification.


Namely, what you find of it, for example, in the structure of the torus, being quite obvious that by buckling on the torus a certain number of circuits, by making operate a series of complete circuits at a cut and by making of them the number that you like (naturally the more of them there are, the more satisfying it is, but the more obscure it is). It is enough to make two of them to see there appearing at the same time this third required for these two to buckle together and, as I might say, for the line to bite its own tail: it will be this third circuit, which is assured by the buckling around the central hole, through which it is impossible not to pass in order for the first two loops to cut one another.


If I am not making any drawing on the board today, it is because in truth – in saying it – I am saying enough about it for you to understand me and also a good deal too little for me to show you that they are at least two paths, at the origin, along which this can be effected and that the result is not at all the same as regards the emergence of this additional One (Un en plus) that I am in the process of speaking to you about.


This simply suggestive indication contains nothing to exhaust the richness of what the least topological study provides us with.


What it is a matter simply of indicating today, is that the specificity of this world of writing is precisely to distinguish itself from discourse by the fact that it can close. And, closing on itself, it is precisely from there that there arises this possibility of a “one” which has a completely different status to that of the one which unifies and encompasses.


But from this “one” which already, from the simple closing – without there being any need to go into the status of repetition, which nevertheless (12) is closely linked to it – just from its closing, it gives rise to what has the status of the additional One, in so far as it is only sustained by writing and that it is nevertheless open, in its possibility, to the Universe of discourse: since it is sufficient, as I pointed out to you, for me to write – but it is necessary that this writing should take place – what I say about the exclusion of this one, this is enough to generate this other plane where there unfolds properly speaking the whole function of logic: the thing being sufficiently indicated to us by the stimulus that logic received, by submitting itself to the simple operation of writing, except for the fact that it still fails to remember that this only reposes on the function of a lack, in the very thing that is written and which constitutes the status, as such, of the function of writing.


I am saying simple things to you today, and perhaps this in itself risks making this discourse appear disappointing to you. Nevertheless, you would be wrong not to see that this is inserted into a register of questions which henceforth give to the function of writing something which cannot but have repercussions down to the deepest level of any possible conception of structure. For if the writing of which I speak is only supported from the return buckled onto itself, from a cut (as I illustrated it from the function of the torus), we find ourselves lead to the following: that precisely the most fundamental studies, linked to the progress of mathematical analysis, have put us in a position to isolate in it the function of the edge.


Now, once we speak about edge, there is nothing which can make us substantify this function, in so far as here you might improperly deduce that this function of writing is to limit this changeability (mouvant) of which I spoke to you earlier as being that of our thoughts or of the Universe of discourse. Far from it! If there is something which is structured as edge, what it itself limits is in a position to enter in its turn into the edging function. And here indeed is what we are going to have to deal with.


Or indeed – and this is the other face on which I intend to end – it is the reminder of what has always been known about this function of the unary stroke (trait unaire)


I will end by evoking the 26th verse of a book which I have already made use of, at one time, to begin to make understood what is involved in the function of the signifier: the book of Daniel and in connection with the story about the zouave’s trousers which is designated in it by a word which remains in the state of what is called an hapax and which is impossible to translate unless it was the socks that the characters in question wore.


In the book of Daniel, you already have the theory of the subject that I am presenting to you, and precisely arising at the limit of this Universe of discourse. It is the famous story of the dramatic festival of which we no longer find, moreover, the slightest trace in the annals, but no matter!


(13) Mene, Mene, for this is how verse 26 is expressed, Mene, Mene, Tekel, Parsin, which is usually transcribed in the famous Mene, Tekel, Parsin. It does not seem useless to me for us to notice that Mene, Mene which means “counted” – as Daniel pointed out in interpreting it to the worried prince – is expressed twice in order to show the most simple repetition of what constitutes counting: it is enough to count up to two for everything that is involved in this additional One, which is the true root of the function of repetition in Freud, to take place and to be marked in the following: except for the fact that contrary to what occurs in set theory, one does not say it.

「计算,计算,」这确实是第二十六诗篇的表达,「计算,计算,铁克,欠缺重量 」这几句通常被书写在这篇著名的「计算,铁克,欠缺重量」。我们如果注意到 Mene Mene 的意思是「计算」,对於理解似乎不无帮助。如丹尼尔对这位焦虑的王子的解释,「计算」一词被表达两次,为了显示组成计算的最简单的重复;牵涉到这个「额外的个体」的每一样东西,计算到两次,也就足够了。这个「额外的个体」,在佛洛伊德的着作里,重复的功用的真实的根源。它运作及被标示如下:除了这个事实,跟集合理论相反,我们不将它说出来。

One does not say the following: that what repetition seeks to repeat is precisely what escapes, because of the very function of the mark, in so far as the mark is original in the function of repetition. That is why repetition takes place, not because the mark is repeated, but that for the mark to provoke the sought-for repetition, it is necessary that on what is sought because the mark marks the first time, this very mark in effaced at the level of what it has marked and that is why what is sought for in repetition, of its nature slips away, allows there to be lost the fact that the mark cannot not be reduplicated, except by effacing, on what is to be repeated, the first mark, namely, to let it slip out of reach.


Mene, Mene … something in what is rediscovered lacks weight: Tekel. The prophet Daniel interprets it, and interprets it by saying to the prince that he was in effect weighed, but that something is missing there, which is expressed as “Parsin”. This radical lack, this first lack which flows from the very function of the counted as such, this additional One that one cannot count, it is this which constitutes properly this lack to which it is a matter for us of giving its logical function, in order that it should secure what is involved in the final “Parsin”, the bubble, of the empire in question, of the sufficiency of what is closed in on the image of the imaginary whole.


Here is exactly the path along which there is brought to bear the effect of the entry of what structures discourse at the most radical point, which is undoubtedly – as I always said and accentuated, to the extent of employing the most popular images for it – the letter that is involved, but the letter in so far as it is excluded, as it is lacking.


This is indeed about what – that moreover, since today A am making anew irruption into this Jewish tradition – to tell the truth, I had so many things prepared, even to the extent of having come to grips with a little exercise of learning to read Massoretic, a whole work which was in a way put in cold storage because of the fact that I was not able to construct the thematic that I had intended to develop around the Name of the Father – and that moreover, there remains something of all of this and specifically that at the level of history of Creation: “Berechit, Bara, Elohim” the Book begins, namely by a Beth. And it is said that this very letter that we have used today, the capital A, otherwise called Aleph, was not, at the beginning, among those from which there emerged the whole of creation.

确实就是这种情况。因为「阿拉」我,今天从新闯入这个犹太教的传统,坦白说,我事先做了许多预备的功课,甚至殚精竭力地学习阅读犹太教经文的学者马索惹提克的着作,他的全部着作曾经受到世人冷淡地对待,因为我没有能力建构我的主题宣扬它们。环绕「以天父之名」的这个主题,我曾经打算周延建构,可是在创世纪的历史的层次,总是有某件东西,很明确地漏失:创世纪书的开始写着:「Berechit, Bara,Elohim」,换句话说,作者是伯利恒的人。据说,这就是我们今天还在使用的这个「字词」,这个大写的字母「A」,也被称为「阿拉」,在开始的时候,並没有被列入整个宇宙的创造者之一。

(14) This indeed is here to indicate to us, but in a fashion that is in a way turned in on itself, that it is in so far as one of these letters is absent that the others function, but that no doubt it is in its very lack that there resides the whole fruitfulness of the operation.



Logic of phantasy 05 Jacques Lacan

July 22, 2010

Logic of phantasy 05
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 05

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

(8) But let us leave “obsolete” and let us start from the opposition that Russell sets up to mark something which is supposed to be a contradiction in the formula which might be stated as follows:
(B A / S W S)
of a sub-set B whose status it would be impossible to guarantee, starting from the fact that it would be specified in a different set A, by a characteristic such that an element of A would not contain itself.
Is there some sub-set, defined by this proposition of the existence of elements which do not contain themselves?



It is undoubtedly easy, in this condition, to show the contradiction that exists in this because we have only to take an element y as forming part of B, as an element of B: for us to see the consequences that there then are in making it at the same time, as such, form part, as an element, of A:
(y E B) (y E A / y ~E y)

在这种情况下,要指出存在於这里的这个矛盾,毫无疑问是很容易,因为我们只需要拿一个y的元素,来组成B意符的一个部分,我们就能看出所有的这些结果,当我们同时也使它当一个元素,来组成A的意符的一个部分。(y E B) (y E A / y ~E y)

And not being an element of itself. The contradiction is revealed by putting B in the place of y:
(B E B) (B E A / B ~E B)

(B E B) (B E A / B ~E B)

and seeing that the formula operates from the fact that every time we make B an element of B, there results, because of the solidarity of the formula, that since B forms part of A, it ought not to form part of itself. If on the other hand — B having been put, substituted for the place of this y – if on the other hand it does not form part of itself, satisfying the parenthesis on the right of the formula, it the forms part of itself being one of these y’s which are elements of B.


This is the contradiction before which Russell’s paradox put us.


It is a matter of knowing whether, in our register, we can stop at it, provided we notice in passing what is meant by the contradiction highlighted in set theory, which would allow us perhaps to say the way in which set theory is specified in logic, namely, what step forward it constitutes as compared to the more radical one that we are trying to establish here.


The contradiction involved at this level where Russell’s paradox is articulated, depends precisely – as the simple usage of words shows us – on the fact that I say it. For if I do not say it, nothing prevents this formula, the second one, very precisely, from holding up as such, written out and there is nothing to say that its use will stop there.


What I say here is no word play, for set theory as such has absolutely no other support except the fact that I write as such, that everything that can be (9) said about a difference between the elements is excluded from the operation.


To write, to manipulate the literal operation which constitutes set theory consists in writing, as such, what I am saying there: namely, that the first set can be formed at once from the charming person who is in the process today, for the first time, of typing my discourse, from the mist on this window and from an idea which just now is going through my head, that this constitutes a set, from this fact, that I say expressly that no other difference exists than the one which is constituted by the fact that I can apply to these three objects, that I have just named and which you see are rather heteroclite, a unary stroke upon each one and nothing else.


Here then is what ensures that since we are not at the level of such speculation, since what I bring into play is the Universe of discourse, my question does not encounter Russell’s paradox, namely, that there is deduced no impasse, no impossibility to the following, that B which I do not know, but which I have begun to suppose forms part of the Universe of discourse, undoubtedly for its part, although constituted from the specification that the signifier cannot signify itself, may perhaps have this sort of relation to itself which escape Russell’s paradox, namely, demonstrate to us something which might be perhaps its own dimension and in connection with which we are going to see in which status it forms part or not of the Universe of discourse.


In effect, if I was careful to remind you of the existence of Russell’s paradox, it is probably because I am going to be able to make use of it to make you sense something. I am going to make you sense it first of all in the simplest fashion and, after that, in a fashion that is a little bit richer. I am going to make you sense it in the simplest fashion because I am prepared, for some time now, for any concession (laughter). People want me to say simple things, well then, I will say simple things! You are already, all the same, sufficiently formed to the following, thanks to my care, to know that there is not such a direct path towards understanding. Perhaps, even if what I tell you appears simple, there will remain with you, all the same, a little mistrust …


A catalogue of catalogues: here indeed, in a first approach, is what is involved as a signifier. Why should we be surprised that it does not contain itself? Naturally, since this seems, to us, to be required from the beginning.


Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent the catalogue of all the catalogues which do not contain themselves, from printing itself, inside it! In truth, nothing would prevent it, even the contradiction that Lord Russell would deduce from it!


But let us consider precisely this possibility that exists, that in order not to contradict itself, it does not inscribe itself in itself.


Let us take the first catalogue; there are only four catalogues, up to then, which do not contain themselves:

(10) Let us suppose that there appears another catalogue which does not contain itself, we add it on: E.
Why is it inconceivable to think that there is a first catalogue which contains A B C D, a second catalogue which contains B C D E, and not be surprised that each of them lacks this letter which is properly the one which would designate itself?

(十)让我们假定,又出现另外一本没有包括自己的分类目录。我们就给它填加为:E。为什麽我们那麽难於想像地认为,有这麽第一本分类目录,包括A B C D,然后又有第二本分类目录,包括B C D E,然后不大吃一惊,每一本分类目录都短缺这个将会适当地指明自己的字母?

But from the moment that you generate this sequence, you have only to arrange it around the circumference of a disc and see that it is not because in each catalogue one of them will be missing, indeed even a greater number, that the circle of these catalogues will not add up to something which is precisely what corresponds to the catalogue of all the catalogues which do not contain themselves. Simply what will constitute this chain will have this property of being an additional signifier (un signifiant en plus) which is constituted from the closure of the chain. An uncountable signifier and which, precisely because of this fact, is able to be designated by a signifier.


Because, being nowhere, there is no difficulty in a signifier arising which designates it as the additional signifier: the one that is not grasped in the chain.


I take another example: catalogues are not made, in the first place, to catalogue catalogues, they catalogue objects which have some right (titre) to be there (the word “titre” having here all its importance). It would be easy to become engaged on this path in order to open up the dialectic of the catalogue of all the catalogues, but I am going to go to a more lively path, since it is necessary that I should leave you some exercises for your own imagination.

The book: with the book we enter, apparently, into the Universe of discourse. Nevertheless, in the measure that the book has some referent and that it also may be a book that has to cover a certain surface, in the register of some title (titre), the book will include a bibliography. Which means something which is presented properly for us to image the following, what results in so far as the catalogues live or do not live in the Universe of discourse. If I make the catalogue of all the books that a bibliography contains, naturally I am not making a catalogue of bibliographies! Nevertheless, in cataloguing these books, in so far as in the bibliographies they refer on to one another, I may very well cover the totality of all the bibliographies.



Logic of phantasy 04 Jacques Lacan

July 21, 2010

Logic of phantasy 04
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 04

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

(5) Mathematical usage which depends precisely on the fact that when we have somewhere – and not only, as you know, in an exercise of algebra – when we have posited somewhere a letter, capital A, we take it up, subsequently, as if it were still the same the second time that we make use of it. Do not raise this objection; today is not the day I am going to give you a class in mathematics.

(五)数学的用法主要是依靠这个事实,当我们在某个地方拥有, 不单是在代数的练习中,你们知道,而且在某个地方,我们提到一个大写字母A,我们随后接纳它,好似我们第二使用它时,它都会一成不变。

You should know, simply, that no correct statement about any use whatsoever of letters – even if it were, precisely, in what is closest to us today, for example, in the use of a Markov chain – would require of any teacher (and this is what Markov himself did) a stage, which is in a way propaedeutic, to make clear the impasse, the arbitrariness, what is absolutely unjustifiable (quite apparent moreover) in employing A the second time to represent the first A, as if it were still the same. It is a difficulty which is at the source of the mathematical use of so-called identity.


We do not have to deal with it explicitly here today, because we are not dealing with mathematics. I want simply to recall to you that the foundation, that the signifier is not grounded by signifying itself, is admitted by those very people who, on occasion, may make a use that is contradictory to this principle – at least in appearance. It would be easy to see the intermediary by which this is possible, but I do not have the time to go astray in this. I want simply to pursue – and without tiring you any more – my proposition which is then the following: what is the consequence in this Universe of discourse of this principle: that the signifier cannot signify itself?


What does this axiom specify in this Universe of discourse in so far as it is constituted, in short, by everything that can be said? What sort of specification is it and does the specification that this axiom determines, form part of the Universe of discourse? If it does not form part of it, this is undoubtedly a problem for us. What specifies, I repeat, the axiomatic statement that the signifier cannot signify itself, will have the consequence of specifying something which, as such, would not be in the Universe of discourse. Even though, precisely, we have admitted saying that it encompasses everything that can be said, into its ambit. Are we going to find ourselves in some diversion which would signify that what, thus, cannot form part of the Universe of discourse, cannot be said in some way or other?


And, of course, it is clear that since we are speaking about it, about what I am bringing to you, it is obviously not to tell you that it is the ineffable thematic regarding which you know that from pure consistency and without for all that belonging to the school of Mr. Wittgenstein, I consider as: that it is vain to speak.


(6) Before coming to such a formula, and you can see after all that I am not sparing you either bits relief or the impasse that it constitutes, since moreover we are going to have to come back to it – really do everything to open up the paths to what I am trying to get you to follow me in – let us take care to put to the test the following: that what specifies the axiom that the signifier cannot signify itself, remains part of the Universe of discourse.


What do we then have to posit? What is at stake in, what specifies the relation that I stated in the form that the signifier cannot signify itself – let us take arbitrarily the usage of a little sign which serves in this logic which is founded on writing, this Win which you will recognise the shape (these games are not perhaps purely accidental) of my diamond, in a way with its hat knocked off, that has been opened up like a little box, and which serves, this W, to designate, in the logic of sets, exclusion. In other words, what is designated by the Latin ora, which is expressed by an aut: one or the other. The signifier, in its repeated presentation, only functions qua functioning the first time or functioning the second. Between one and the other there is a radical gap, this is what is meant by: the signifier cannot signify itself.

那麽,我们要提出怎样的命题呢?什麽东西会岌岌可危?在「意符无法使自己被意符化」里,我所陈述的这个关系的明确细节是什麽?让我们随意地拿一个小符号的用法当例子,这个小符号可以运用在以书写为基础的逻辑里。在「赢」这个单字的字首W,你们认出我的方块鑽石的形状(我玩弄这个遊戏,不完全是巧合。)只是它的上一半被踢掉,它像一个小盒子被打开,这个W 的形状,在集合的逻辑里,指明的意义是:排除。换句话说,ora这个拉丁字,在法文是aut, 指明的是:一个或另外一个。这个意符,以重复地出现的方式,充当的功用仅仅是,作为第一次的功用,或第二次的功用。在一个或另外一个之间,有一道很大的鸿沟,那就是它的意思:意符无法使自己被意符化。代号就是:S W S

We suppose, as we have said, that what determines this axiom as a specification in the Universe of discourse is what we are going to designate by a signifier, B – an essential signifier which you will notice can be appropriated to something the axiom specifies: that it cannot, in a certain relation and from a certain relation, generate any meaning. B is very specifically the signifier which can be specified, without objection, by the fact that it marks, as I might say, this sterility. The signifier in itself being characterised precisely by the fact that there is nothing obligatory, that it is far from being in the first spurt that it generates a meaning. It is this that gives me the right to symbolise by the signifier B this feature: that the relation of the signifier to itself does not generate any meaning.


But let us start, to begin with, from the following which after all seems to be required: the fact is that something that I am in the process of stating to you forms part of the Universe of discourse. Let us see what results from that. That is why I make use for the moment – because after all it does not seem to me to be inappropriate – of my little diamond in order to say that B forms part of A, that it has relations with it whose richness I will certainly have to bring into play, for you, throughout this year, and whose complexity I indicated to you the last time, by decomposing this little sign in all the binary fashions in which it can be done.

但是首先让我们从以下的问题开始,畢竟那似乎是必要的条件,这个事实是,我目前正在跟你们陈述的某件事情,组成了真理论述的宇宙的某一部分。让我们瞧一瞧,那造成的结果是什麽。那就是为什麽,我现在会使用我那个小方块鑽石的符号(畢竟这样使用,对我而言,似乎並没有什麽不适当),为了要说,B的意符组成A的意符的一部分。B的意符跟A的意符,彼此关系的繁复,今年一整年,我确实还要跟你们一再演说。它们的复杂性,我上一次已经跟你们指明,我拆开这个小符号,以双边的关系,可以书写成公式如下:B A的念法是: B的意符大於或小於A的意符。

(7) It is a matter of knowing, then, whether there is not some contradiction resulting from it. Namely, whether from the very fact that we have written that the signifier cannot signify itself, we can write that this B, not signifies itself, but, forming part of the Universe of discourse, can be considered as something which, in the style which characterises what we have called a specification, can be written: B forms part of itself. It is clear that the question arises: does B form part of itself? In other words what the notion of specification grounds, namely, what we have learned to distinguish in several logical varieties, I mean that I hope that I hope that there are enough people here who know that the functioning of a set is not strictly speaking super-imposable on that of a class, but that in fact all of this at the origin, must be rooted in this principle of a specification.


Here, we find ourselves before something whose kinship in fact should sufficiently resonate in your ears with what I called the last time Russell’s paradox, in so far as to what I am stating, that here, in the terms which interest us, the function of sets – in so far as it does something that I, for my part, have not yet done, for I am not here to introduce it but to maintain you in a field which logically is on this hither side, but to introduce something that there is an opportunity to grasp in this connection: namely, what is grounded by the bringing into play of the apparatus described as set theory, which today is presented as something quite original, undoubtedly, for any mathematical statement, and for which logic is nothing but what mathematical symbolism can grasp – this function of sets will also be the principle, and this is what I put in question, of the whole foundation of logic.


If there is a logic of the phantasy, it is because it is more fundamental (principielle) than any logic which flows into the formalising defiles where it has revealed itself, as I have said, to be so fruitful in the modern epoch.


Let us try then to see what Russell’s paradox means, when it covers something which is not far from what is there on the board. Simply, it promotes as altogether enveloping this fact of a type of signifier, that it takes moreover to be a class. A strange error! … To say, for example, that the word “obsolete” represents a class in which it would itself be included, under the pretext that the word “obsolete” is obsolete, is undoubtedly a little conjuring trick, which has strictly no interest except to found, as a class, the signifiers which do not signify themselves. While precisely we posit as an axiom, here, that in no case can the signifier signify itself and that it is from there that one must start to sort oneself out, even if it were only to see that it is necessary to explain differently that the word “obsolete” can be qualified as obsolete. It is absolutely indispensable to bring into it what the division of the subject introduces.



Logic of phantasy 03 Jacques Lacan

July 20, 2010

Logic of phantasy 03
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14: The Logic of Fantasy 03

Seminar 2: Wednesday, November 23, 1966

I am going to try today to trace out for your use some relations that, I would say, are essential and fundamental to secure at the beginning what constitutes our subject this year. I hope that no one is going to object that they are abstract, for the simple reason that this would be a quite improper term, as you are going to see!


There is nothing more concrete than what I am going to put forward, even if this term does not correspond to the quality of density which is its connotation for many. It is a matter of making tangible for you one or other proposition like the one that up to now I have only put forward under the appearance of a sort of aphorism, which may have played at one or other turning point of our discourse the role of axiom, such as the following: there is no metalanguage – a formula which has the appearance of being: properly speaking, contrary to everything that is given, if not in the experience, at least in the writings of those who try to ground the function of language.


At the very least, in many cases, they show in language some differentiations that they find it good to begin from, starting, for example, from an object-language, in order to construct on this base a certain number of differentiations. The very act of such an operation seems to imply that in order to speak about language one should use something which is not part of it or which, in a way, is supposed to envelope it in an order different to the one that makes it function.


I believe that the solution of these apparent contradictions which, in short, manifest themselves in discourse, in what is said, is to be found in a function which it seems to me essential to bring out, at least from the angle that I am going to try to inaugurate it today – to bring out and especially for our purposes – because the logic of phantasy, it seems to me, can in no way be articulated without reference to what is involved, namely, to something that at least in order to announce it I pinpoint under the term of writing (l’ecriture).


Naturally, this is not to say, for all that, that it is what you know under the ordinary connotations of this word. But if I choose it, it is because it must have some relation with what I have to state.


A point, precisely, on which we are going to have to operate ceaselessly today is the following: that it is not the same thing, after we have said it, to write it or indeed to write that one is saying it. Because the second operation, essential to the function of writing, precisely from the angle, from the point of view whose importance I am going to show today, as regards our most appropriate references in this year’s subject, this, I am saying, immediately and from the beginning presents itself with paradoxical consequences.


After all, why not, in order to alert you, start from what I already presented before you from a particular angle? Without you being able to say, I believe, that I am repeating myself. It is sufficiently in the nature of the things that are discussed here, that they emerge from some angle, from some line that breaks through a surface to which we are forced to keep by the simple fact of speaking – that they should appear at some moment before they really take on their function. Here, then, I remind you, is what I one day wrote on the board and which someone, after all, who is here will render me the service of writing in my place, so that I do not have to immerse myself to the level of your dear heads.


Madame! Take this little piece of chalk, make a rectangle, write …no! make it very big almost as big as the board, there you are! Write: 1, 2, 3, 4, on the first line. No! inside the frame … 1, 2, 3, 4, and then write: the smallest whole number which is not written on the board, beneath 1, 2, 3, 4 (laughter). No, write the sentence: “the smallest whole number which is not written on this board”.

这位女士!拿着这一支小小的粉笔,画一个长方形,书写、、、不是这样!将它画得跟这个黑板一样大。开始画!在第一行,书写:1、2、3、4。不对!要在框架里。1、2、3、4,然后书写:在黑板上没有书写到的最小的整数,在1、2、3、4 底下。不是这样,请写这个句子:「没有书写在这个黑板上的最小的整数」。

This could have been presented in a different form, namely – instead of doing me the service which has been done, and I thank the person who was good enough to write this sentence that you see written out – that I could, without writing it, have asked you or even, if you wish, made a little person from those mouths there would emerge what they call in comic strips a bubble: “the smallest whole number which is not written on this board”.


In which case you would all have been in agreement, and I would not have contradicted you, that it is the number -. It is clear that from the moment that this sentence is written: “the smallest whole number which is not written on this board”, the number 5 – being written, there by this very fact – is excluded. You have only to search, then, whether the smallest whole number which is not written on the board might not, perchance, be the number 6, and you find yourself with the same difficulty, namely, that from the moment that you pose the question, the number 6 as the smallest whole number which is not written on the board, is written on it and so on.

在这种情形之下,你们大家本来都会同意,我本来也不会反驳你们说,显而易见的,从「没有被书写在黑板上的最小的整数」这个句子被书写开始,就是这个数字,五 ,这个数字,虽然被书写,事实上,它被排除在外。你们只要研究一下,没有被书写在黑板上的最小的整数,有没有可能是六,你们就会发现你们会遭遇到相同的困难。从你们提出这个问题开始,六这个数字,作为没有被书写在黑板上的最小的整数,事实上是已经是被书写,等等

This, like many paradoxes, is only of interest, of course, for what we want to make of it. What follows is going to show you that it was, perhaps, not useless to introduce the function of writing from this angle from which it may present some enigma to you. It is, let us say, properly speaking, a logical enigma and it is no worse a way than any other to show you that there is, in any case, some close relation between the apparatus of writing and what one can call logic.


This also deserves to be recalled, at the start, at the moment at which – the majority of those who are here, I think, having it adequate notion of it, even for those who have done this can serve as a point to hang onto – at which to recall that undoubtedly, if there is something which characterises the new state, undoubtedly, undoubtedly, undoubtedly new … – in this sense that they are far from and in no way able to be contained, to be reabsorbed within the framework of what was called classical or again traditional logic – the new developments, I am saying, of logic are entirely linked to these operations of writing.


So let us pose a question. Ever since I have been speaking about the function of language, ever since, in order to articulate what is involved in the subject of the unconscious, I constructed – I must say that it was necessary for me to do it stage by stage, and before an audience of whom the least one can say is that they needed to be coaxed in order to listen – that I constructed the graph which is designed to order, precisely what, in the function of the word, is defined by this field, this field which the structure of language requires: it is properly what is called the paths of discourse or again what I called the defiles of the signifier.


Somewhere in this graph there is inscribed the letter capital O on the right, on the lower line: if someone would rub this out I could rapidly draw the whole graph for those who do not know it. This small o (sic) that in a sense one can identify to the locus of the Other, which in fact is the locus where there is produced everything that can be described as a statement in the broadest sense of the term, namely, what constitutes what I, incidentally, called the treasury of the signifier – which is not
limited, in principle, to the words in the dictionary.


When, precisely, correlatively to the construction of this graph, I began to speak about the witticism, taking things from the angle, which perhaps appeared the most surprising and the most difficult for my listeners at that time, but which was precisely indispensable to avoid any confusion. The non-sensical feature – not senseless but close to this operation that English defines extremely well, makes resonate under the term of nonsense – that exists in the witticism; whose kinship, after all, in order to make understood the dimension that it was a matter of bringing out, I then showed – at least at the level of reception, of tympanic vibration – the kinship it has with what was, for us, at a testing time, the personal message.


I alluded to the personal message – namely, every statement, in fact, in so far as it is cut up “non-sensically” – the last time, by recalling the celebrated: “Colourless green ideas, etc”. The totality of statements then – I am not saying of propositions – also forms part of this Universe of discourse which is situated in capital O.

我提到这个个人的讯息,换句话说,事实上是每一个陈述,,当它被「无为而治地」被切割粉粹,如上一次,我们回想起那著名的「黯然无色的生涩点子,等等」。陈述(我不是指它的命题)的整体性,也形成定位在大写字母o ,也就是大它者的真理论述的宇宙的一部分。

The question which is posed and which is properly a question of structure, the one which gives its sense to the fact that I say that the unconscious is structured like a language, which in my stating it is a pleonasm, since I identify structure to this “like a language”, in the structure, precisely, that I am going to try today to make function before you.


What is involved in this Universe of discourse, in so far as it implies this operation of the signifier? In so far as it defines these who dimensions of metaphor – in as much as the chain can always graft itself (se enter) with another chain along the path of the operation of substitution – in so far as on the other hand, is its essence, it signifies this sliding which comes from the fact that no signifier belongs properly permits this sea (mer) of variations in what constitutes meanings – this essentially moving and transitory order, where nothing, as I said at one time, can be guaranteed except from the function of what I called in a metaphorical form: buttoning points (points de capiton) – today, it is this Universe of discourse that it is a matter of questioning, starting from this single axiom regarding which it is a matter of knowing what it may specify within this Universe of discourse.


An axiom which is one that I put forward the last time: that the signifier – this signifier that we have, up to now, defined by its function of representing a subject for another signifier – this signifier, what does it represent faced with itself, with its repetition as signifying unit? This is defined by the axiom that no signifier – even if it is, and very precisely when it is, reduced to its minimal form, the one that we call the letter – can signify itself.



The Logic of Phantasy 02

July 19, 2010

Fantasy 02

The Logic of Fantasy 02
Seminar 1: Wednesday, November 16, 1966

The barred subject, in its relation to this o-object, is joined in this formula written on the board, by this something which is presented as a lozenge shape, which I earlier called the diamond (le poincon) and, which, in truth, is a sign that was forged expressly to join together in itself what can be isolated from it, depending on whether you separate it with a vertical stroke or with a horizontal stroke.


Separated by a vertical stroke, it represents a double relation which can be read in the first place as greater (>) or lesser (



S, in so far as it takes the place of the subject, only functions for another signifier.


Urverdrangung, of primal repression, is the following: what a signifier represents for another signifier. It does not bite on anything, it constitutes absolutely nothing, it accommodates itself to an absolute absence of Dasein.


For around sixteen centuries, at least, the Egyptians hieroglyphs remained as solitary as they were
uncomprehended in the desert sands. It is clear and it has always been clear for everyone, that this meant that each of the signifiers cut into stone at least represented a subject for the other signifiers. If it were not so, no one would ever even have taken this to be writing! It is not at all necessary that writing should mean something for anyone at all, for it to be writing, and for it to manifest, as such, that each sign represents a subject for the one that follows it.


If we call that Urverdrangung it means that we are admitting that it appears to us to be in conformity with
experience, to think about what happens – namely, that a subject emerges in the state of barred subject – as something which comes from a locus in which it is supposedly inscribed, into another locus in which it in going to be inscribed anew.


Namely, exactly in the same fashion in which I structured, formerly, the function of metaphor in to far as it is the model of what happens as regard the return of the repressed:
S1 –> $
— / —
$ –>- s


In the same way, it is in the measure that with respect to this primary signifier, and we are going to see what it is, the barred subject that it abolishes comes to emerge at a place to which we are going to be able today to give a formula which has not yet been given: the barred subject, as such, is what represents for a signifier – this signifier from it has a arisen – a sense.


(11) By “sense” I understand exactly what I made you understand at the beginning of one year in the formula: “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously”. Which can be translated into French by the following, which depicts admirably the ordinary order of your cogitations: “Des idees vertement fuligineuses s’assoupissent avec fureur”.

所谓「意义」,在某一年的开始,我确实了解到我曾经使你们了解的,使用以下的公式:「生涩的点子蠢蠢欲动地沉睡」。这个公式生动地描述你们一般的认知过程,能够被翻译成为下面的法文,:”Des idees vertement fuligineuses s’assoupissent avec fureur”.

This, precisely, for want of knowing that they are all addressed to this signifier of the lack of the subject that a certain first signifier becomes, once the subject articulates his discourse. Namely – as all psychoanalysts glimpsed clearly enough, even though they were not able to say anything worthwhile about it – namely, the o-object which, at this level, fulfills precisely the function that Frege distinguishes from sign under the name of Bedeutung. The o object is the first Bedeutung, the first referent, the first reality, the Bedeutung which remains because it is, after all, all that remains of thinking at the end of all the discourses.

一但生命的主体清楚表达他的真理论述,某一个最初的意符确实变成这样, 因为他不知道,他们的表达都是针对着生命主体的这个欠缺。换句话说,如所有的精神分析师足够清楚瞥见的,即使他们不能够说出任何有价值的东西,关於这个小客体。在这个层次上,小客体确实填补的这个功用,福瑞杰以「意义」的名义,将它跟符号区别不同。小客体就是第一个意义,第一个指称,第一个现实界,这个小客体始终是所有的真理论述结束之后,思想的残余物,畢竟,它本来就是这样的残余物。

Namely, what the port can write without knowing that he is saying when he addresses himself to “his mother Intelligence from whom all sweetness flows”: “what is this neglect that allows her milk to dry up?”
Namely, also, what remains of so many thoughts dispensed in the form of a pseudo-scientific hotchpotch that one can also call by its name, as I have long done, about part of analytic literature, and which is called shit. On the admission, moreover, of the authors! I mean except for a tiny failure of reasoning about the function of the o object, one of them can very well articulate that there is no other support for the castration complex than what is modestly called “the anal object”.


This is not then a pinpointing coming from a pure and simple judgement, but much more the necessity of an articulation, the simple statement of which ought to give us pause. Since, after all, it is not formulated by the least qualified writers, and since it will be, in fact, this year, our method, in formulating the logic of the phantasy, to show where, in analytic theory, it has tripped up. I have not, after all, named this author whom many of you know.


Let it be clearly understood that the flaw in reasoning is still reasoned, namely, examinable (arraisonable), but not necessarily so. And the o-object in question can in a certain article show itself quite nakedly while not being appreciated by him. This is what we will have occasion to show in certain texts, after all, which I do not see why, as a kind of practical work, I should not soon distribute rather generally to you, if I have enough at my disposal, which have been given to my function of metaphor from being admitted, (I mean among those of which I have just given you the least ambiguous example) by confusing it with anything whatsoever that makes of it a sort of proportional relation.


When I wrote that substitution – the fact of grafting a signifier substituted for another signifier into the signifying chain – was the source and origin of all meaning, what I articulated is correctly interpreted in the form in which, today, through the emergence of this barred subject as such, I gave you the formula. Which requires of us the task of giving it its logical status, but to demonstrate to you right away the example of the urgency of such a task, or even of its necessity, note that the confusion was made in this four fold relation:
S1 ———> S
S —->- s

(the S1, the two S’s and the small s of the signified) with this relation of proportion in which one of my
interlocutors, M. Perelman, the author of a theory of argumentation, promoting once again an abandoned rhetoric, articulates metaphor, seeing in it the function of analogy, and that it is from the relation of one signifier to another in so far as a third reproduces it by giving rise to an ideal signified that he grounds the function of metaphor. To which I replied, at the appropriate rime. It is only from such a metaphor that there can emerge the formula that was given, namely: S1 over small s of meaning enthroned above a first register of inscription of which the Underdrawn of which the Unterdruckt, of which the other register substantiating the unconscious, is supposed to be constituted by the strange relation of the signifier to another signifier, and we are told that it is from there that language takes its ballast:



I think that you now sense that this formula, described as that of “reduced language” (du langage reduit), is based on an error which is to introduce into this four-fold relation the structure of proportionality. It is difficult to see, in fact, what can emerge from it, since, in fact, the relation S/S then becomes rather difficult to interpret. But we do not see in this reference to a reduced language any other plan (which is moreover admitted) than to reduce our formula that the unconscious is structured like a language – which, more than ever, is to be taken literally.


And since it is obvious that today I will not finish the five points that I announced to you, I am nonetheless able to punctuate, for you, the key of the whole structure which reduces an enterprise articulated in this way – precisely at the beginning of the little collection I spoke about to you earlier which concerns the turning point in my relations with my audience that was constituted by the Congress of Bonneval – to futility. It is erroneous to structure in this way on a so-called myth of reduced language any deduction of the unconscious, for the following reason: it is of the nature of each and every signifier not to be able in any case to signify itself.


It is too late for me to impose on you, in a hurry the writing of this inaugural point for the whole of set theory, which implies that this theory can only function starting from an axiom described as that of specification.


Namely, that the only interest in making a set function is when there exists another set which can be defined by the definition of certain x’s in the first as freely satisfying a certain proposition. “Freely” means: independently of any quantification: small number or all. The result of this, (I will begin my next lecture with these formulae) the result of this is that by positing any set whatsoever, by defining in it the proposition that I indicated as specifying x’s in it, as being simply that x is not a member of itself. – that which, as regards what interests us, namely, for the following, which is necessary once one wishes to introduce the myth of a reduced language that there is a language which is not one, namely, which constitutes, for example the totality of signifiers.

What is proper to the totality of signifiers. I will show it to you in detail, involves the following as necessary – if we simply admit that the signifier cannot signify itself – involves the following as reduced language, simply because of the fact that language cannot constitute a chosen set; in other words: that there is no Universe of discourse.


For those who may have had some difficulty in understanding what I have just formulated, I will recall simply the following which I already said at the appropriate time: that the truths that I have just stated are simply those which appeared in a confused fashion at the naive period of the establishment of set theory in the form of what is wrongly called Russell’s paradox – because it is not a paradox, it is an image – the catalogue of all the catalogues which do not contain themselves. What does that mean? Either it contains itself or it contradicts its definition, or it does not contain itself and in that case it foils in its mission. This is not at all a paradox. One has only to declare that in making such a catalogue one cannot take things all the way, and for good reasons…


But, that I earlier gave you the statement of, in the formula that in the Universe of discourse there is nothing that contains everything, this is something which properly speaking encourages us to be particularly prudent here as regards the handling of that is called whole and part, and requires us, at the origin, to distinguish very severely – this will be the object of my next lecture – the One from the totality – which, precisely, I have just refuted, saying that at the level of discourse there is no Universe, which undoubtedly leaves still more in suspense whether we can suppose it to be anywhere else – to distinguish this One from the countable One in so far as, of its nature, it slips away and slides, and can only be the One by repeating itself at least once and closing in on itself, to establish, at the origin, the lack involved the one involved in the establishment of the subject.



The logic of phantasy 01

July 18, 2010

Fantasy 01


Today I am going to throw out some points that are rather in the nature of a promise.

“Logic of phantasy”, I entitled, this year, what I count on being able to present to you about what is required at the point that we are at on a certain path. A path which implies, I will recall it forcefully today, this sort of very special return that we have already seen, last year, inscribed in the structure and which is properly speaking fundamental in everything that Freudian thinking uncovers. This return is called repetition. To repeat is not to find the same thing again, as we will articulate later, and contrary to what is believed, it is not necessarily to repeat indefinitely.

我今你讲座的名称是「幻见的罗辑」, 这是我相信可呈现给你们,关於目前我们从事某种途径所要求的内容。这个途径暗示着,今天我将清楚地回溯一下,对於去年我们已经看过被铭记在结构中,是佛洛伊德的思想所揭发的一切基本的东西,这是一种非常特别的回转。这种回转被称为重复。重复並不是要再一次找出相同的东西,如我们后来所表达的。跟一般的观念相反,那未必是要无穷尽地重复下去。

We will come back then to themes that I have in a certain fashion already situated for a long time. It is, moreover, because we are at the moment of this return and of its function, that I believed I could no longer put off presenting to you in a unified way what up to now I thought necessary as a minimal indication of this journey, namely, this volume that you already find within hand’s reach. It is because this year it will no doubt be possible for us to study in depth the function of this relation to writing – which after all, in a certain way, I forced myself up to the present if not to avoid, at least to delay – that here again I believed I could take this step.


These few indicative points that I am going today to state before you. I have chosen to be five:


(1)The first consisting in reminding you of the point that we are at about the logical articulation of phantasy, which this year will be, properly speaking, my text.


(2) The second, to the reminder of the relation of this structure of phantasy – which I will have first recalled to you –to the structure of the signifier as such.


(3)The third, to something essential and really fundamental which has to be recalled, about what we can, what we ought, this year, call – if we put in the foreground what I called the logic in question – an essential remark about the Universe of discourse.


(4) The fourth point, some indication relative to its relation to writing as such.


Finally, I will end on the reminder of what Freud indicates to us, in an articulated fashion, about what is involved in the relation of thinking to language and to the unconscious.


S, the logic of phantasy. We will begin from the writing of it that I already constructed, namely, from the formula: S barred diamond small o ($o).

S 代表幻见的逻辑。我们将先从我已经建构好的有关它的书写开始。换句话说,先从这个公式:被禁制的主体、透过小客体,从事迴转的运作 。

I recall what the S barred signifies: the S barred represents, takes the place in this formula of what it returns from concerning the division of the subject, which is found at the source of the whole Freudian discovery and which consists in the fact that the subject is, in part, barred from what properly constitutes it qua function of the unconscious.


This formula establishes something which is a link, a connection between this subject as thus constituted and something else which is called small o. Small o is an object whose status what I am calling, this year, “constructing the logic of phantasy”, will consist in determining – its status, precisely, in a relation which is a logical relation properly speaking.


A strange thing, no doubt, which you will allow me not to go into. I mean what this term phantasy suggests in terms of a relation to phantasia, to the imagination. I will not give myself the pleasure, even for an instant, of marking its contrast with the term logic with which I intend to structure it.


The fact is, no doubt, that phantasy as we claim to instaure its status is not so fundamentally, so radically antinomical as one might first think to this logical characterisation which, properly speaking, disdains it. Moreover, the imaginary feature of what is called the o-object will appear still better to you – in the measure that we will mark what permits it to be characterised as a logical value – to be much less related, it seems to me, at first sight, to the domain of what is properly speaking the imaginary.


The imaginary, rather, is attached to it, surrounds it, accumulates in it. The o-object that a different status. Undoubtedly, it is desirable that those who listen to me this year (3) should have had the opportunity last year to get some grasp, some idea of it. Of course, this o-object is not something which is yet, so easily – for all and especially for those for whom it is the center of their experience, the psychoanalysts, even more – has yet, as I might say, sufficient familiarity for it to be. I would say, presented to them without fear or indeed even without anxiety.


“What have you done then,” one of them said to me, ” what need did you have to invent this little o-object?”


I think, in truth, that taking things from a broader horizon it was about time. Because, without this o-object – whose incidences, it seems to me, have made themselves widely enough felt for the people of our generation – it seems to me that much of what is done as analyses, of subjectivity as well as of history and of its interpretation, and specifically of what we have lived through as contemporary history, and very specifically of what we have, rather crudely, baptised with a most improper term, under the name of totalitarianism … Anyone, who after having understood it, is able to occupy himself in applying to it the function of the category of the o-object, will perhaps see there being illuminated what it returned from, in that for which we still lack, in a surprising manner, satisfying interpretations.