Archive for July, 2014

如何言说真理 10

July 31, 2014

如何言说真理 10

雅克慎论拉康

Let us concede for a moment that this may be so, and that the pact of speech precedes its violent and imaginary degradation. Will we have solved the problem of the difference between the two types of speech—from the perspective of truth} Not at all. In fact, whether death is avoided in speech because of the slave’s fear or, on the contrary, because a preexisting code of chivalry structures the fight, death is still avoided. And yet for Lacan this is precisely the ultimate criterion of truth, the one that should have allowed the two types of speech to be distinguished: Is death as such confronted? Yes or no? Does the nothingness of the subject’s desire reveal itself to him as “the deepest secret of his being”? Yes or no?

让我们暂时承认,情况可能是这样。言说的盟约早先存在于它的暴力与想像的堕落。我们将会已经解决两种言说的这个差异的难题吗?从真理的观点!根本就没有,事实上,死亡在言说里是否被避免,因为奴隶的恐惧,或相反地,因为对待女士的骑士风度先前存在的符码,作为战斗的结构,死亡依旧被避免。可是,对于拉康,这确实就是真理的最后标准,这个标准本来就应该让两种言说被区别出来:死亡本身被面对吗?是或不是?主体欲望的空无揭示它自己给他,作为是「他的生命实存的最深的秘密」?是或不是?

But this singular criterion, such as it is, does not allow us to separate the grain of truth from the chaff of error: Death will never reveal itself, except in its avoidance, in the speech that presents it while absenting it as desire. From this point of view (which is the vanishing point of truth), it needs no great genius to notice that so-called true speech and so-called imaginary speech are in the same boat. How, then, can Lacan claim to distinguish between them? Above all, how can he certify the difference between them, since the criterion of truth cannot be exhibited—since the truth about truth is that it shows itself only in its retreat? Indeed, we may grant that the subject fools himself, enviously seeking the truth of his desire in another (who, he believes, possesses it).

但是,这个独特性的标准,虽然是这样,并没有让我们能够区分真理的穀粒跟错误的糟糠。死亡将永远不会揭示它自己,除了避免死亡的状态,在呈现它的言说里。当言说让死亡缺席,作为欲望。从这个观点(这是真理的消失点),不需要伟大天才,也能注意到,所谓的真实界的言说与所谓的想像界的言说,是同在一条船上。因此,拉康如何宣称区别它们?尤其重要的是,他如何能够确认它们之间的差异?因为真理的标准无法被展示—因为关于真理的真理就是,真理仅有在它的撤退时,才显示它自己。的确,我们可以承认,主体在愚弄它自己,妒嫉地寻求他的欲望的真理,在另外一个主体那里(他相信,那个主体拥有它。)

Nevertheless, by Lacan’s own admission, only by fooling himself and the other can the subject, at best, be given the shattering revelation of that truth’s concealment. In other words, truth “reveals” itself at the same level as imaginary speech, in the same “miscognizing” speech. “Authenticity,” exactly as in Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, is finally nothing but the paradoxical revelation of “inauthenticity”; therefore, strictly speaking, the two should not be ‘ opposable.

可是,拉康自己承认,仅有凭借愚弄他自己及他者,主体充其量才能够被给予那个真理的隐藏的这个令人震惊的启示。换句话说,真理「启示」它自己,在跟想像界的言说相同的层次,用相同的「误认」的言说。「真诚」,如同在海德格的「存在与时间」,最后仅是「不真诚」的悖论的启示。因此,严格地说,这两个不应该是「可以对立」。

Lacan, moreover, did not neglect to indicate this himself in the first seminar, where his approach, still rather open, attempts to capture the reality of analysis. Thus we read that the speech of revelation is “another side” of the speech of mediation (1988a, 48/59); and, a bit farther on, “Between these two extremes, a whole gamut of modes of realization of speech is deployed” (1988a, 50/61). It could not be clearer that the difference between these two “types of speech” is less a difference in nature than a difference in degree, within a single, fundamentally two-faced, enduringly ambiguous speech. Transference-resistance, the “swinging” of speech toward the other, its revealing stagger—all of this is inextricably the “approach” or, as Heidegger would say, the “de-severing” [Ent-fernung] toward truth: “The moment when the subject interrupts himself is usually the most significant moment in his approach toward the truth.

而且,拉康在他的第一研讨班,自己并没有忽略地指出这一点。在那个研讨班,虽然他的探讨依旧相当开放,企图捕捉精神分析的现实。因此,我们阅读到,启示的言说是中介的言说的「另外一面」(1988a,48-59)。稍微深入一点,「在这两个极端之间,言说的实践的全面的模式被运作」(1988a,50/61)。这两种「言说」之间的差异,并不是特性的差异,而是程度的差异,持续模糊的言说的一体两面的程度的差异。这一点是再清楚不过了。移情-抗拒,言说朝向他者的「摇摆」,它的启示的摇晃—所有这一切无法挣脱地是这个「方法」,或者,如同海德格过去常说:朝向死亡的「除掉-分裂」:「当主体中断他自己的那个时刻,通常就是最重要的时刻,在他朝向真理的接近。

At this point we gain a sense of resistance in its pure state, which culminates in the feeling, often tinged with anxiety, of the analyst’s presence” (1988a, 52/63). And the analyst, correctively, is always simultaneously in the place of the imaginary alter ego and the symbolic Other—hence the “paradox of [his] position” (1988a, 51/61), since he cannot serve as a prop for the speech of the subject’s truth except at the price of simultaneously alienating him (1988a, 51/61-62). Between/among these two/four poles—subject/ego, other/Other—the interminable spiral of analytic speech is instituted (1988a, 283/312), where A is the subject, B is the analyst, O is the “unconscious notion of the ego,” and O’ is the “specularity of the image.” Between the poles, simultaneously separating and joining them, is a flat mirror. Finally, C is the arrow of speech that flies toward the imaginary other.

在这个时刻,我们获得抗拒的感觉,处于它的纯粹状态。抗拒在精神分析家在场的这种感觉里达到高潮,经常是充满焦虑)(1988a,52/63)。正确地说,精神分析家总是同时既是处于想像界的他-我的立场,又是象征界的大他者的立场。因此,「精神分析家的立场」的悖论(1988a,54/61)。因为他无法充当主体的真理的言说的支持,除了付出同时让他异化的代价(1988a,51-61-62)。在这两极或四极之间,主体/自我,小他者/大他者—精神分析言说的永无止境的旋涡被开启(1988a,283/312)。在那里,A是主体,B是精神分析家,O是「自我的无意识的观念」,O‘ 是「镜像的魅影理想」。在这两极之间,同时分开它们,又同时连接他们的是一个偏平的镜子。最后,C是言说的箭头,朝向想像界的他者飞去。

Propelled by what has never been said or recognized in O (the “imaginary fixations which were unassimilable to the symbolic development”), the arrow lodges itself in O’, the counterpart, where it repeats the same meconnaissance of desire: “What is on the side of O passes over to the side of O’. Everything which is profifered from A, from the side of the subject, makes itself heard in B, on the side of the analyst.” In other words, the subject speaks himself in the other, speaks the zero, O, of his desire in the double, O’, in whom he recognizes/”miscognizes” himself.

这个箭头受到在O点没有被说出,没有被体认的东西推动,(无法被吸收到象征的发展的想像界的固著)。这个箭头在O’点,这个类似物那里,固著它自己。在那里,它重复欲望的相同的误识:「在O的这一面的东西,通过到O’的那一面。从A点,从主体的这一面被提供的一切东西,在B点,在精神分析家的这一边,让它自己被听见。」换句话说,主体在他者那里言说他自己,言说他的欲望的这个零度,O,在双重者O’那里,他体认/误认他自己。

And sure enough, when the analyst approaches O’, “a critical phenomenon takes place … resistance in the most acute form in which it manifests itself—silence” (1988a, 284/312-313). A critical moment indeed, since by trying to push through this resistance—as if the silence hid something—the analyst would actually only reinforce it (as Lacan says elsewhere, “In analysis, the only resistance is the analyst’s”; 1966, 377). But the analyst also returns this revealing silence to the subject, since the subject speaks himself through the analyst. “Everything proffered by A . . . makes itself heard in B,” and the arrow goes flying back again:

的确,当精神分析家靠近O’点时,一个危险的现象发生、、、最激烈的形态的抗拒,展现它自己—沉默(1988a,284/312-313)。的确是一个危机的时刻,因为凭借尝试强行通过这个抗—好像这个沉默隐藏某件东西—精神分析家实际上仅是强化它(如同拉康在别处所说,「在精神分析里,唯一的抗拒是精神分析家的抗拒」(1966,377)。但是精神分析家也将这个启示的沉默还给主体,因为主体通过精神分析家言说他自己。被A点提供的每样东西,让它自己在B点被听见」,这个箭头再次飞回来:

The analyst hears it, but, in return, so does the subject. The echo of his discourse is symmetrical to the specularity of the image. This revolving dialectic, which I represent on the schema by a spiral, binds O’ and O more and more tightly. The progress of the subject in his being must finally bring him to O, via a series of points spaced between A and O. On this line, the subject, settling down to his labor, over and over again . . . makes progress into the order of fundamental symbolic relations in which he has to find the time, resolving the halts and the inhibitions which make up the super-ego [that is, the imaginary master]. You need time for that” [1988a, 284/312; translation modified].

精神分析家听见它,但是,回转地,主体也听见它。他自己的辞说的回声,跟镜像的魅影理想,给予均称化。这个旋转的辩证法,我用这个基模代表的辩证法,凭借一个旋涡,连接O’dian与O点,越来越紧密。主体在他的生命实存的这个进展,最后必须带他到O点,经由布置在A点与O点之间的一系列的点。在这条线上,主体,反复地满意于他的努力,进展进入基本的象征关系的秩序。在那里,他必须找到时间,来解决组成超我(也就是,想像界的主人)的这个阻隔与压抑。你需要时间这样做)(1988a,284/312)。

And so it really is one and the same speech, simultaneously imaginary and symbolic, turning and returning around the empty center of desire, opening “the subject to [that] fertile mistake through which genuine speech joins up once again with the discourse of error” (1988a, 282-283/311). Joins up with it—by catching up with it, joining itself to it, and certainly not by passing it, for, if “you need time for that,” it is really because the arrow of speech never arrives at its target, O—except by missing it, in the O’, where it breaks (hence the broken line of the diagram).

所以,这确实完全相同的言说,同时既是想像界,又是象征界,一再地绕着欲望的空洞的中心旋转,将主体展开于那个肥沃的错误。通过这个错误,真正的言说再次跟错误的辞说连接一块。(1988a,282-283/311)。跟它连接一块—凭借追赶上它,将自己连接上它,确实并不是通过它,因为,「假如你需要时间这样做」,那确实是因为言说的箭头从来没有到达它的目标,O—除了凭借错过它,在O’点。在那里,它中断(因此,图形的这个中断的线)。

Anyway, why O and O’? Lacan answers this question by referring to an early presentation of this diagram: “A little girl.. . one day came up with this pretty phrase—Oh, you mustn’t think Vll spend my whole life in O and O’. Poor thing! Of course you’ll spend your life in O and O’, the same as everyone else” (1988a, 165/187; translation modified

无论如何,为什么是O与O’点?拉康回答这个问题,凭借提到这个图形的早期的呈现:「有一位小女孩带着这个漂亮的词语前来—哦,你一定不要认为,我将会度过我全部的一生在O与O’点。可怜的傢伙!当然,你将会度过你全部的一生,在O与O’点,就像每个其他人一样」(1988a,165/187;)。

雄伯译
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https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 9

July 31, 2014

如何言说真理 9

雅克慎论拉康

And so verily (en verite), verily, I, truth (la verite), say unto you, it is in error, forgetting, slips of the tongue, bungled actions, deformation, and pretense that I reveal myself to you, you men who insist on pursuing me where I am not: “Our abortive actions are actions which succeed, those of our words which come to grief are words which own up. These acts, these words reveal a truth from behind” (1988a, 265/292). Such, according to Lacan, was the revelation made to Freud (“It is none other than Freud who had this revelation, and he called his discovery the unconscious”; 1977a, 159/509): faltering speech, false speech, is finally the true revelation, the only apokalupsis of desire—its Apocalypse, therefore, but in the precise sense that the Apocalypse takes place only in being avoided. Signor, Herr> the “absolute Master,” everything that an “apocalyptic wind” swept from Freud’s speech—none of it was true except as it was forgotten, covered over, transposed, failed, and there was nothing that could have been made conscious in order finally to unveil the unconscious desire.

所以,的确,的确,我,真理,跟你们言说。就在错误,遗忘,口误,搞砸的行动,畸形转变,伪装,我,真理,启示自己给你们,你们坚持在我并不存在的地方,追寻我:「我们半途而废的行动,是成功的行动,我们的话语的那些结果完全失败的行动,都是承认失败的行动。这些行动,这些话语从背后启示一项真理」(1988a,265/292)。依照拉康,弗洛依德获得的启示就是如此(「获得这个启示的人,确实就是弗洛依德,他称他的发现为无意识」;1977a,159/509)闪烁的言说,虚假的言说,最后成为真实的启示,欲望的唯一的启示录—因此,也是它的启示录。但是准确的意义是:启示录仅是发生在它被避免的地方。Signor, Herr, 「绝对的主人」,从弗洛依德那里,「启示录的风」横扫出来的一切。它们没有一样是真实的,除了它被遗忘,被掩饰,被调换,被挫败。而且,没有一样东西会让它意识到,为了最后揭露这个无意识的欲望。

On the contrary, it was in Freud’s mistake, in the ungraspable, fugitive moment of stammering, that the Apocalypse of desire had already taken place. In other words, the Apocalypse is not still to come; rather, it is we who, catastrophically, always come too late to receive it. The Apocalypse of desire is endless, as endless as the Word (Parole) in which it takes “place,” for repression is absolutely the Last Judgment of desire, and the resurrection of the flesh of truth therefore takes place only halfway (a mi-corps)—amputated, castrated, divided in speech. And so, verily, verily, I say unto you,

相反地,就在弗洛依德的错误里,就在结结巴巴的这个无法被掌握的逃离的时刻,欲望的启示理已经发生。换句话说,启示录并非依旧还没有来到;相反地,悲惨的是我们,总是来得太迟,来不及接受它。欲望的启示录是永无止境,像真理之道那样永无止境。启示录发生在真理之道那里,因为潜抑绝对是欲望的最后的审判。真理的肉身的复活因此仅发生在半途—在言说里被切除,被阉割,被分裂。所以,的确,的确,我跟你们说。

There is no error which does not present and promulgate itself as truth. In short, error is the habitual incarnation of the truth. And if we wanted to be entirely rigorous, we would say that, as long as the truth isn’t entirely revealed, that is to say in all probability until the end of time, its nature will be to propagate itself in the form of error. You don’t have to go much further to see in this a structure constitutive of the revelation of being as such [1988a, 263/289-290].

每个错误都呈现它自己,宣告它自己,作为是真理。总是,错误是真理的惯常的化身。假如我们想要完全地确实,我们将会说,只要真理并没有完全被启示,换句话说,很有可能,至到时间的结束,真理的特性将是以错误的形式来宣告它自己。你们无需捨近求远,就能在这里面看出,一个建构生命实存自身的启示的结构。

But here, by the same token, we are truly “burning”—and not only because the Revelation is written in letters of fire; as Lacan immediately objects, “How, from within speech, will error ever be discerned?” (1988a, 263/290) In fact, if the absolutely last revelation of being, of desire, and of the subject takes place in erroneous speech, what distinguishes it from that other “error”: the alienated and “miscognizing” speech of the imaginary ego} In other words, what distinguishes repression, as the revealing-absenting of desire in speech, from resistance, as the presenting-avoiding of desire in that same speech? Indeed, it is one thing to strictly separate the domain of the real (which is neither true nor false) from the domain of speech (which is simultaneously true and false); it is something completely different to separate, with equal precision, two types of speech—one of which, now baptized “symbolic,” is supposed to be more true than the other, which is reputedly “imaginary.”

但是,同样地,我们确实是正在「燃烧」–不仅是启示录被书写在火的信息里,如同拉康马上反驳说,「错误如何从言说内部被觉察出来?」(1988a,263/290)。事实上,假如生命实存,欲望,与主体的绝对是最后的启示,发生在错误的言说里,是什么东西区别它跟那个另外的「错误」不同:想像界的自我的异化与「误认」的言说。换句话说,是什么区别潜抑跟抗拒的不同?潜抑作为言说里的欲望的启示/缺席,抗拒则是作为在相同的言说里,欲望的呈现/避免?的确,要严格分开实在界的领域与言说的领域是一回事,因为前者既非真实,也非虚假,而后者则是同时既是真实,又是虚假;完全不同的另外一回事是,要同等地准确地分开两种的言说—其中一种现在被命名为「象征界」,被认为是比另外一种被命名为「想像界」更加真实。

This famous distinction between the symbolic and the imaginary cuts across the domain of speech, and thus we cannot be content with simply relegating the imaginary to the domain of specular vision: as we have seen, Lacan actually does describe the resistance of the imaginary ego in terms of alienated speech, just as, inversely, it is actually in terms of alienation that Lacan continues to describe true and revealing symbolic speech: “Speech is founded in the existence of the Other [capital O]” (1988b, 244/286), particularly when this speech lies, since then it “speculates on faith in testimony” (1977a, 43/252), on “the Other witness,” which permits it to “present itself as Truth” (1977a, 305/807). In short, truth still speaks itself through the mediation of the Other.

象征界与想像界之间的这个著名的区别,横切过言说的领域。因此,我们无法仅是满意于仅是将想像界分配给魅影-幻想的领域:如同我们已经看出,拉康实际上确实描述想像界的自我的抗拒,用被异化的术语。正如相反地,拉康继续描述真实而启示的象征界的言说,确实是用异化的术语:「言说以大他者「大写的O」的存在作为基础(1988b,244/286),特别是当这个言说说谎,因为它因此「以对证词的信心作为猜测」(1077a,43/252),「以大他者的见证作为猜测」,这让它能够「呈现它自己作为真理」(1977a,305/807)。总之,真理依旧言说它自己,通过大他者的中介。

From that point on, from the perspective of truth, what difference is there between these two types of speech (speech of alienation, speech of mediation): between the speech of imaginary resistance, in which the subject avoids his desire by calling on the other (small o) “to bear witness,” and the speech of symbolic revelation, in which he manifests his desire in its absence by lying to “the Other [capital O] witness”? For instance, what is the difference between well-mannered speech, which permits Freud to forget the “absolute Master” (thanks to the alibi provided by his interlocutor), and apocalyptic speech, in which death reveals itself to him in his forgetting? Isn’t it the same speech in either case, still just as deceitful, still just as true? And is it enough, in this respect, to invoke the insidious violence of imaginary speech as opposed to the contract supposedly instituted by symbolic speech?

从那个时刻开始,从真理的观点开始,在这两种言说之间(异化的言说与中介的言说之间),有怎样的差异?在想像界的抗菌的言说,与象征界的启示的言说之间?在前者,主体避免他的欲望,以召唤他者(小他者)作为见证;在后者,主体在它的缺席里,展示他的欲望,对大他者(大写字母O)的见证说谎。譬如,井井有条的言说,与启示录的言说之间的差异是什么?前者让弗洛依德能够忘记「绝对的主人」(由于他的对谈者提供藉口);在后者,由于他的遗忘,死亡对他揭示它自己?无论是哪一种情况,这难道不是相同的言说吗?依旧同样欺骗,依旧同样真实?在这方面,仅是召唤想像界的言说的潜在暴力,作为跟象征界的言说构成的约定成俗对立,这难道还不足够吗?

^ Indeed, Lacan alleges that imaginary speech avoids (the fight to the) death only at the price of an envious submission to the little master in whom the subject alienates his desire, and the peace that this seems to institute is therefore always pregnant with an “implicit violence,” a “degradation… of speech” (1988a, 51/62). Symbolic speech, by contrast, seals a pact with the other—a pact that Lacan calls “symbolic” because the subject, by agreeing to exchange speech, agrees to break the “sword” and transform it into a sign of recognition, a symbolic tessera, a sumbolon. Through speech, I recognize the Other (who is not me) as the very locus of truth (and of my truth), since it is actually necessary for me to call on him to witness the truth of my speech, even if I do this to lie to him and fool him. In other words, the game of truth presupposes a law, a rule of the game—and that, as Lacan clarifies in an astonishing rereading of the dialectic of master and slave, is why mortal violence is avoided here. Why does the slave accept submission to the master? From fear of death, according to Hegel; and yet, Lacan adds,

的确,拉康宣称,想像界的言说避免(奋斗)至死,仅是以妒忌地顺服于这位小主子作为代价,在这位小主子那里,主体异化他自己的欲望。这在表面上开启的和平,因此总是孕育着「暗含的暴力」,「言说的堕落」(1988a,51/62)。对照起来,象征界的言说,跟大他者签订盟约—拉康称这种盟约为「象征界的盟约」。因为由于同意交换言说,主体同意折断这把「剑」,然后将它转移成为承认的信息,一种象征的瓷砖。通过言说,我体认(并非是我的)大他者,作为是真理的轨迹(我的真理的轨迹)。因为我确实有必要召唤他见证我的言说的真理。即使我这样做,是为了跟他说谎,是要愚弄他。换句话说,真理的遊戏预先假设一个法则,遊戏的规则—如同拉康澄清说,当他令人惊奇地重新阅读主人与奴隶的辩证法。那就是为什么在此,人会死亡的暴力被避免。奴隶为什么接受顺服于主任?依照黑格尔的说法是:由于对于死亡的恐惧。可是,拉康补充说:

It is not sufficient for him to plead for mercy, he has to go to work. And when you go to work, there are rules, hours—we enter into the domain of the symbolic. If you look at it closely, this domain of the symbolic does not have a simple relation of succession to the imaginary domain whose pivot is the fatal intersubjective relation. We do not pass from one to the other in one jump from the anterior to the posterior, once the pact and the symbol are established. In fact, the [Hegelian] myth itself can only be conceived of as already bounded by the register of the symbolic. … In the Hegelian myth, death is not even structured like a fear, it is structured like a risk, and, in a word, like a stake. From the beginning, between the master and the slave, there’s a rule of the game [1988a, 223/248-249].

他仅是请求饶命并不足够,他必须工作。当你工作时,会有些规则,会有些时刻—我们进入象征界的领域。假如你们仔细观看它,象征界的这个领域并没有一个简单的接续关系,跟想像界的领域。想像界的领域的轴心是致命的互为主体性的关系。我们并没有一步跳跃,从前者通过到后者,从前庭跳跃到后院。一旦约定俗成与象征被建立。事实上,黑格尔的神话的本身,仅能够被构想,作为已经是受到象征界的铭记所约束、、、在黑格尔的神话,死亡甚至并不是像恐惧一样被作为结构,死亡的结构像是冒险。总之,像是赌注。从一开始,在主人与奴隶之间,就有这个遊戏的规则(1988a,223-249)。

The origin of truth, in other words, is not imaginary violence but the symbolic contract (which also means that this origin, for Lacan, is no genesis: from the real to the symbolic, the imaginary inference is no good, for we get from one to the other only by way of a leap— the pact of truth—which hollows out the abyss that it straddles).28

换句话说,真理的起源并不是想像界的暴力,而是象征界的契约(这也意味着,对于拉康而言,这个起源并不是创世纪:从实在界到象征界,想像界的推论并没有什么帮助。因为我们仅是凭借跳跃,从实在界跳跃到象征界,获得真理的这个盟约—它掏空它横跨的这个深渊。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 8

July 30, 2014

如何言说真理 8

雅克慎论拉康

The Apocalypse of Speech
言说启示录

When will this train arrive at the station? When will speech arrive at its destination? We find ourselves once more (we have never left) in the train that is taking Freud from Ragusa to Herzegovina. We now understand that the speech addressed by Freud to his traveling companion is just as “true” as it is “false,” just as revealing as repressive: “Truth is introduced along with [speech], and so is the lie…. Speech is in its essence ambiguous” (1988a, 228-229/254).

什么时候火车将到达火车站?什么时候言说将到达它的目的地? 我们再次发现我们自己在火车上(我们从未离开),这班火车正载着弗洛依德从瑞格马,到赫齐加维那。我们现在理解,弗洛依德对他的同车乘客所对谈的言说,,同样真实,也同样虚假,如同又是启示,又是潜抑。「真理跟言说一起被介绍,如同谎言跟言说一起被介绍。言说在它的本质上是模糊暧昧」(1988a,228-229/254)。

Speaking of this and that, instead of uttering the “veridical,” fateful speech that would have placed him before his own nothingness (before his own desire), Freud misspeaks himself at the very moment he tries to speak the truth. Exactly who did paint the frescoes of the Apocalypse? The word is quite literally missing, (1975b, 295), and other words crowd into its place. The “sword of speech” remains fixed in his interlocutor, in the alter ego who inhibits him to the same extent that Freud uses him as a handy shield to avoid his own death. In short, Freud calls on the other “to bear witness” (1988a, 50/60-61); he leaves it to him to speak the true word of his desire (“But of course, you know, that painter … the one who did the famous frescoes at Orvieto . . .”), in return for which, Lacan comments, he resists the revelation of his desire, resists it through the mediation of the imaginary “ego” in which he alienates his speech, through which he speaks. Resistance, Lacan repeats after Freud, is a resistance of the ego (let us add: as it is incarnated in an alter ego; cf. 1966, 374), and it “makes itself felt in the guise of transference” (1988a, 46/57), when speech, as if possessed and hypnotized (1988a, 56/67-68; 1966, 377-378), swings entirely toward the other:

当弗洛依德言说这个与那个,而不是表达「跟现实吻合」的致命的言说。那种言说本来会将他放置在他自己的空无面前(在他自己的欲望面前)。弗洛依德错误地言说他自己,就在他尝试言说真理的时刻。当时确实是谁在绘画启示录的壁画?这个真理的字实质上是失落,(1975b,295),其他的字蜂拥而来取代它。「言说的剑」始终固定在他的对谈者那里,在驻居他身上的他-我。弗洛依德甚至使用他,作为现成的甲胄,避免他自己的死亡。总之,弗洛依德召唤他者,作为「见证」(1988a,50/60-61);他将他自己的死亡,留个他者言说他的欲望的这个真实的话语。(但是当然,你们知道,那位画家、、、在奥维图画那个著名的壁画的那个人、、、),拉康评论说,为了回报这个,他抗拒他的欲望的启示,抗拒它,通过想像的自我的中介。在想像的自我那里,他让他的言说异化,他通过这个言说在言说。拉康跟随弗洛依德重复强调,抗拒就是自我的抗拒(让我们补充:如同在一个他-我那里,自我的抗拒被具体化身;1966,374)。抗拒让它自己被感觉,伪装成移情)(1988a,46/57)当言说摇摆,完全朝向他者,好像被著魔与被催眠(1988a,56/67-68;1966,377-378)。

It is insofar as the confession of being doesn’t come to term that speech runs entirely along the slope by which it hooks on to the other. . .. Resistance is produced at the moment when the speech of revelation is not said, when… the subject can no longer get himself out of it. He hooks on to the other because what is pressing towards speech cannot attain it. . . . If speech then functions as mediation, it is on account of its revelation not having been accomplished. . . . For resistance, in fact, is embodied in the system of the ego and the other. . .. But it emanates from somewhere else, namely, from the subject’s impotence to end up in the domain in which his truth is realized [1988a, 48-50/59-61].

因为生命实存的告白并不妥协,言说完全沿着斜坡进行,在斜坡上,言说挂住他者、、、抗拒被产生,当启示的言说没有被说出、、、当主体不再能够让自己挣脱它。主体挂住他者,因为正在逼迫朝向言说的东西,无法获得它、、、假如言说因此充当中介,那是因为它的启示从来没有被完成、、、事实上,抗拒被具体表现,在自我与他者的系统里。但是它从某个其他地方被散发出来,换句话说,从主体的无能在这个领域,作为终结,在那里,真理被实践(1988a,48-50/59-612)。

And yet, from another angle, Freud’s error really does reveal “the deepest secret of his being,” the forgetting on which the null and mortal point of his desire must necessarily founder. Desire— which is nothing, or “being” as non-being—arises only in speech where the subject speaks himself while abolishing himself (that is also to say, while killing himself) as “real.” Lacan states this more specifically in the last sessions of the first seminar, once more taking up Kojeve’s directions for the distinction between the real and the true: “Before speech, no-thing neither is nor is not [rien n’est, ni n’est pas]. … Truth hollows out its way into the real, thanks to the dimension of speech. There is neither true nor false prior to speech. . . . Symmetrically, the hole, the gap of being as such, is hollowed out in the real” (1988a, 228-229/254; translation modified). A bit farther on, with respect to desire in Freud, he says, “The repressed desire made manifest in the dream is identified with this register [injto which I am trying to get you to enter—what is waiting to be revealed is being. . . . Depending on the way one envisions it, this hole in the real is called being or nothingness. This being and this nothingness are essentially linked to the phenomenon of speech” (1988a, 270-271/297).

可是,从另外一个角度,弗洛依德的错误确实启示「生命实存的最深的秘密」,这个遗忘。在遗忘的这一点,他的欲望的徒劳与有限点必然会崩塌。欲望—作为空无或作为非-存在的「存在」的,仅有在主体言说他自己的言说里产生,当他废除他自己,作为「实在界」,(换句话说,杀死他自己)。拉康更加明确地陈述这个,在第一研讨班的最后几节课。他再次採取科耶夫的方向,朝向实在界与真实界的区别:「在言说之前,空无既非存在,也非不存在。)由于言说的维度,真理掏空它的途径,进入实在界。在言说之前,既没有真实,也没有虚假、、、均称地,这个空洞,生命实存作为自身的空隙,在实在界被掏空」(1988a,228/229/254)。稍微深入,关于在弗洛依德的欲望,拉康说:「在梦里被展现的潜抑的欲望,被认同于这个铭记,我正在邀请你们进入的铭记—正在等待被启示的东西是生命实存。依靠我们拟想它的途径,实在界的这个空洞被称为生命实存或空无。这个生命实存与这个空无基本上跟言说的现象息息相关(1988a,270-271/297)

In other words, speech is the manifestation of desire as being-nothing, just as it is truth in opposition to reality. This is precisely why Lacan, speaking of the forgetting of “Signorelli,” said that “the man who, in the act of speaking, breaks the bread of truth with his counterpart, shares the lie.” Speech is simultaneously true and false—false in regard to the reality that it annuls, and all the more true in regard to the nothing that it evokes. Freud’s “error”—the error he formulates in speaking to his traveling companion—is thus more “true” than any adequacy to the thing to be expressed, and this is what Lacan calls by a very strong name: the revelation of unconscious desire. In fact, shortly after having described resistance as the “hooking” of speech onto the imaginary alter ego, he continues:

换句话说,言说是欲望的展示,作为生命实存-空无,正如它是真理与现实作为对立。这确实是为什么拉康,言说”Signorelli” 的这个遗忘时,他说:「正在言说时的这个人,分享真理的面包,给他的同伴,分享这个谎言。」言说同时既是真实,又是虚假—关于它宣告无效的现实,它是虚假。关于它召唤的这个空无,它是更加地真实。弗洛依德的「错误」–他跟他的同车乘客言说时诠释的这个错误,因此更加地「真实」,比起应该被表达的物象的胜任。这就是为什么拉康用一个强烈的名字称呼:「无意识的欲望的启示」。事实上,他将抗拒描述为言说「挂住」想像界的他-我时,他继续说:

But there is another side to speech—revelation. Revelation and not expression—the unconscious is not expressed, except by deformation, Entstel-lungy distortion, transportation. This summer I wrote The Function and Field of Speech and Language, intentionally without using the term ‘expression’, because the whole of Freud’s work unfolds in the dimension of revelation, and not of expression. Revelation is the ultimate source of what we are searching for in the analytic experience [1988a, 48-49/59].27

言说有另外的一面—启示。启示而且不是表达—无意识没有被表达,除了凭借畸形转变。扭曲,运转。今年夏天,我写「言说与语言的功能与领域」,特意不使用「表达」这个术语,因为整个的弗洛依德的著作,展开于启示的维度,而不是表达的维度。在精神分析的经验里,启示是我们正在寻求的东西的最后根源(1988a,48-49/59)。

如何言说真理 7

July 30, 2014

如何言说真理 7

雅克慎论拉康

Since truth, as unveiling/veiling of Being in beings, has been reinterpreted once and for all as an unveiling/veiling of the subject in his “auto”enunciation (or “auto”representation), the result is that truth, under Lacan’s pen, reveals itself in lies, mistakes, deceptions, and fiction. This is the second important modification that Lacan brings to Heidegger’s aletheia: its total (and, from a strictly Hei-deggerian point of view, aberrant) reformulation in terms of adequacy/inadequacy to the thing and/or to itself. Indeed, to the extent that Lacan continues (in the tradition “of Kojeve) to circulate in the problematic of (auto)enunciation (of logos as “discourse,” “judgment,” “reason,” “concept,” “representation,” and so on), he is brought by the same token to reinscribe the unfathomable “logic” of aletheia into logic pure and simple, even if he must therefore constantly (and complacently) use paradoxes, aporias, and auto-destructive “formalizations.”

因为真理,作为生命实存的揭露/遮蔽,曾经一劳永逸地被全新诠释,作为是主体的揭露-遮蔽,在他的「自动」表述(或「自动」再现)。结果是,在拉康笔下,真理揭示它自己,在谎言,欺骗,与幻想里。这是拉康带给海德格的真理的第二个重要的修正,对真理的完整的重新诠释(从严紧海德格的观点,是偏离的重新诠释),用的术语是:物象/物自体的充足/不充足。的确,在科耶夫的传统里,拉康甚至继续流通「自动——表述的这个难题(逻各斯的表述,作为「辞说」,「判断」,「理性」,「观念」,「再现表象」,等等),他同样被迫重新铭记真理的深不可测的「逻辑」,成为纯粹而单纯的逻辑,即使他因此必须不断地,(而且自负地)使用悖论,疑置法,与自动-毁灭的「形式主义」。

Thus, whereas Heidegger spoke of an initial “errancy” of truth, attempting to indicate a “truth” prior to the alternatives “true”/”false,” Lacan, for his part, said that “error is the habitual incarnation of truth,” that truth “emerges in the most ctearcut representative of the mistake” (1988a, 263/289, 265/292), and that truth has a “fictional organization” or “structure” (1977a, 306/808; 1966,17,451,742). Moreover, whereas Heidegger wrote that “das Ding dingt” patiently kneading language to make it say the truth of “the thing,” outside any problematic of adequacy or inadequacy of discourse to res,23 Lacan abruptly announced that “the thing speaks of itself.” Whereas Heidegger attempted to think of truth beyond any “representation” of a “reality,”24 Lacan would immediately translate, saying that truth distinguishes itself from reality (1977a, 306/808; 1966, 740)—indeed, it sets itself against reality (1966, 351). And whereas Heidegger proposed understanding truth as a retracted gift of Being, Lacan quite simply said that the truth is spoken in cheating, trickery, and lying.

因此,虽然海德格言说真理的最初的「错误」,企图指示一个早先于选择性的「真/假」的「真理」,就拉康而言,他说,「错误是真理的惯常的化身」,「真理出现,作为错误的最清晰的代表」(1988a,263/289,265/292)。真理拥有「幻想的组织」或「结构」(1977a,306/808;1966,17,451,742)。而且,虽然海德格写道,「生命实存」耐心地揉搓语言,让语言说出「生命实存」的真理,外在于辞说的充足/不充足之外。拉康突然地宣告,「物象言说它自己」。虽然海德格企图将真理认为是超越「现实」的「再现表象」之外。拉康则是马上翻译说,真理区别它自己跟现实不同(1977a,306/808;1966,740)–的确,真理竖立它自己,对抗现实(1955,351)。虽然海德格建议理解真理,作为生命实存的被限制的天赋,拉康则仅是说,真理在欺骗,诡计,与谎言中被说出。

What does Truth—Woman and Diana that she is—say in the fabulous and fabling mouth of Freud-Actaeon-Lacan? She says that she is the “great cheater” (the “great show-off,” as Klossowski wrote25): If the cunning of reason, no matter how disdainful of you, stayed open to your faith, I—truth—would be . . . the great deceiver, since it is not only through duplicity that my ways pass but also through the crack too narrow to find without dissembling and through the inaccessible cloud of dreams, through the pointless fascination of the mediocre and the seductive impasse of absurdity. Seek, dogs that you become upon hearing me…. Enroll to my call, and howl at my voice. There you are, lost already, I give way, I defy you, 1 slip away: you say that I defend myself” (1966, 411).

假如真理是女人,是黛安娜,那么,在弗洛依德-阿塔安-拉康的匪夷所思的寓意的嘴巴里说出什么?真理这位女人说,她是「大欺骗者」(大炫耀者,如同克罗索斯基所写的):假如理性的狡狯,始终开放给你的信仰,无论她多么地藐视你,真理将是这位大欺骗者。因为我的途径不但通过欺骗,而且通过必须伪装才能找到的罅隙,通过不可靠近的梦的云层,通过无意义的著迷于平庸与诱拐的荒谬的僵局。去寻求吧!当你们一听见我,你们就变成狗群、、、遵照我的呼唤滚动,对着我的声音吠叫。你们在那里,已经迷失,我让步,我挑衅你们,我溜走:你们说,我替我自己辩护)(1966,411)。

Truth says, in short, “I am lying” (the well-known “liar’s paradox”), which, strictly understood, in no way means that truth is an error (a bit earlier, Lacan has been railing against “the shoddy Nietzschean notion of the lie of life”; 1977a, 118/405); it means that truth, as truth, speaks itself and reveals itself in its own concealment. This would bring us back once more to aletheia except for Lacan’s intentionally “logical” formulation and, especially, for his insistence on lying and cheating. Here, we see, truth is all the more true for being false and deceptive. There is in Lacan a sort of privileging of the lie, and this is because the lie, being inadequate to the thing it speaks about, is better able to reveal the truth of the subject as “speaking thing” (or as res cogitans, since Lacan also explicitly compares the “I lie” to the “I think”; cf. 1977b, 140-141/ 128-129). Indeed, by lying, the subject speaks his truth “most truly” (1966, 21), which is to be precisely nothing, no reality. “An adequate thought, [as a] thought,” Lacan says, “always avoids . . . the same thing. Here, the real is what always comes back to the same place—to the place where the subject, as thinker (res cogitans), does not meet it” (1977b, 49/49; my emphasis).

总之,真理说,「我正在说谎」(这个著名的「谎言的悖论」)。这句话严谨地理解,丝毫并不意味着,真理是一个错误(早期,拉康曾经抨击尼采的生命的谎言这个低俗观念)(1977a,118/405)。这意味着,作为真理,真理言说它自己,并且启示它自己,在它自己的隐藏里。这将会带我们再次回到「真理」aletheia,除了拉康意图「逻辑」方式的诠释。特别是当他坚持谎言与欺骗。在此,我们看出,真理正因为是虚假与欺骗而更加成为真实。在拉康,谎言具有某种的特权。这是因为谎言,由于不能胜任它言说的物象,更加能够揭露主体的真理,作为是「言说的物象」,(或者,作为「我思故我在」,因为拉康明确将「我说谎」跟「我思想」相提并论;1877b,140-141),128-129)。的确,凭借谎言,主体「非常确实地」言说他的真理(1966,21),那确实是空无,并不是现实。拉康说:「一个充足的思想,作为思想,总是避免相同的事情。在此,实在界就是总是回到相同的地方的东西—回到主体作为思想者,没有遇见它的地方」(1977b,49/49)

Once we concede, with Kojeve, that the subject cannot speak himself (or think himself) in his truth except by abolishing himself as reality (which is exactly what happens to the Cartesian subject at the moment of the hypothesis of the Evil Demon), it goes without saying that truth will define itself as inadequate to reality, and that it will therefore be (this is Lacan’s imperturbably logical conclusion) all the more true and “adequate” insofar as it is inadequate. Since the “thing” (the res) is irretrievably lost as soon as it “speaks of itself,” then (according to a sort of “logic of the worst,” which brings to mind certain Gnostic—or Klossowskian—schemas) the lie, the masquerade, and the simulacrum will, paradoxically, conform more closely to it than
the accurate (conforming) discourse will: “Speech appears all the more truly to be speech the less its truth is founded on what is called adequacy to the thing; thus, true speech, paradoxically, is opposed to true discourse” (1966,351). Truth, when it reveals itself, is forced to say, “I lie,” because that is the only way to speak the truth in a fallen world (that of language) where inadequacy is the rule. So here it is:

一旦我们跟科耶夫一起承认,主体无法在他的真理当中,言说他自己(或思想他自己),除了废除他自己作为现实(这确实是笛卡尔的主体发生的状况,假设邪恶恶魔的时刻)。自不待言的是,真理将会定义它自己,作为不能胜任现实。真理因此将会正因为它的不能胜任,将会更加地真实,更加地「胜任」,(这是拉康的冷静的逻辑的结论)。因为这个「物象」无法赎回地失落,当它一开始「言说它自己」。因此,依照「最遭糕状况的逻辑」,这个「物象」让人想起某个诺斯教派(或克罗索斯基的基模),谎言,伪装,与虚拟幻境,将会悖论地更加密切的符合真理,比起正确(符合)的辞说:「言说越是不要以所谓的胜任物象作为基础,它越是更加真确地出现在言说那里。因此,悖论地,真实的言说跟真实的辞说恰恰背道而驰(1966
,351)。当真理启示它自己时,真理被迫说:「我说谎」,因为在堕落的世界(语言的世界),这就是唯一的方式说出真理,在那里,不能胜任就是常规。
所以,就是这么一回事:

Two Jews met in a railway carriage at a station in Galicia. “Where are you going?” asked one. “To Cracow,” was the answer. “What a liar you are!” broke out the other. “If you say you’re going to Cracow, you want me to believe you’re going to Lemberg. But I know that in fact you’re going to Cracow. So why are you lying to me?26

两个犹太人在高立西的火车站的火车车厢里相遇。「你要去哪里?」其中一位问。「去加利西亚」,对方回答。「你是说谎者!」另一位喊叫起来。「假如你要去加利西亚,你想要我相信,你是去雷伯格。但是我知道,事实上,你是去加利西亚。所以,你为什么跟我说谎?」

Because it’s the truth, of course! All Galicians, in the memory of Central European Jews, have been inveterate liars, and so in this universe where trains and words circulate indiscriminately in all directions, there is no other means of speaking the truth than to lie truly.

因为这是真理,当然!在中欧的犹太人的记忆里,所有加利西亚人都是根深蒂固的说谎者。所以在这个宇宙里,火车与话语都朝四面八方不分皂白地流散。没有其它方法来言说真理,除了确实地说谎。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 6

July 29, 2014

如何言说真理 6

雅克慎论拉康

Therefore, this truth says, “/, truth, speak”—and not (a statement more in agreement with Heidegger) “Logos is aletheia” We know the famous prosopopoeia in which truth, through Lacan’s voice (1966, 866-867), “speaks of herself” (of herself and all alone [d’elle-meme]) “in Freud’s mouth” (1977a, 121/408):

因此,这个真理说,「我,真理,在言说」–而不是「逻各斯是真理」(这个陈述比较跟海德格一致)。我们知道这个著名的这个化身,在化身那里,真理通过拉康,「借弗洛依德的嘴巴」,「言说她自己」(仅有言说她自己)(1977a,121/408)。

So for you I am the enigma of her who vanishes as soon as she appears, men who try so hard to hide me under the tawdry finery of your proprieties! But I am prepared to believe that your embarrassment is sincere, for even when you take it upon yourselves to serve as my heralds, you place no greater value on wearing my colors than your own, which are like you yourselves, phantoms that you are. Where, then, will I pass into you? Where was I before I entered you? Perhaps one day I will tell you? But so that you will find me where I am, I will teach you by what sign you will recognize me. Men, listen, I am giving you the secret. I, truth, speak [1977a, 121/408—409].

所以,对于你,我是她的这个谜团,当她一出现,就消失的她的谜团。如此努力要隐藏我,在你们的装潢的俗丽饰品底下的人们!但是,我准备要相信,你的尴尬是诚恳的,因为当你们自己承担起充当我的先锋,穿戴我的颜色标志,就是你们最大的价值。你们自己的颜色标志就像你们自己,虽然你们是魅影理想。那么,我将从那里进入你们?在我进入你们之前,我在哪里?
或许,有一天,我将告诉你们?但是为了让你们在我所在的地方找到我,我将教导你们,凭借你们将认出我的标志。人们,请倾听,我正在给予你们这个秘密。我,真理,在言说(1977a。
121/408)。

This is a fabulous statement, which we must certainly not construe in the sense of its presenting a determined subject (Freud and/ or Lacan) who speaks the “thing itself” and thus is himself (the same as) the truth. As Lacan writes, in an obvious allusion to Klossowski’s he Bain de Diane (Diana’s Bath),21 truth is “akin to death… Diana perhaps” (1977a, 145/436), and so no subject can claim to possess her. Actaeon will never rejoin the Virgin Hunter in the place where she is Her-Self, before the event of her mortal and impure appearance, and this means that the identity between subject and truth (between speaker and statement) is radically forbidden, impossible—as is the “real,” where they would be at the “same place” (1977b, 49/49). Thus the “real,” as Kojeve taught, is abolished as soon as spoken, and this is equally (and even especially) true of the reality of whoever speaks himself in discourse. No one, in reality, can speak “those intolerable words: ‘I, truth, speak.. .'” (1966, 867): “To hear those words as they should be spoken—in horror—think of the unnameable thing that, by being able to speak them, would reach the being of language” (1966, 867). It would be a sacred horror indeed, for this “thing,” if it could speak itself in reality, would say, “I am dead” (as in Poe’s “The Facts in the Case of M. Valdemar,” discussed by Lacan in 1988b, 231/270, and in 1966, 486). But this thing without a name (the torn flesh that Actaeon became in the teeth of Diana’s dogs, the foul carcass of Poe’s mesmerized character): Just how could it say “I”?

这是一个令人愉悦的陈述,我们一定不要用它呈现一个决心的主体的意义诠释它。不要将弗洛依德与(或)拉康,当成决心的主体,言说「物自体」,因此他自己就等同是真理。如同拉康所写的,当他明显提到克罗索斯基的「黛安娜的沐浴」,「真理类同于死亡、、、或许类同于黛安娜」(1977a,145/436)。所以,没有主体能够宣称拥有她。阿塔安将永远不会跟这位处女猎人重新结合,在她作为她的自性的地方,在她具有人的肉身与不纯洁的表象的事件面前。这意味着,在主体与真理之间的认同(在言说者与陈述之间的认同),强烈地被禁止,成为不可能—如同「实在界」的不可能,在那里,他们将会处于相同的地方(1977b,49/49)。因此,如科耶夫教导的,这个「实在界」一被谈到,就被禁止。就凡是用辞说言说自己的人们的现实而言,这个情况同样可以适用,甚至特别可以适用。实际上,没有人能够言说「那些无法被容忍的字词」:「我,真理,在言说」(1966,867):「怀着恐惧,听到那些话语,如同它们应该被说出的方式—思维那个无法命名的物象,由于能够言说它们,这个物象将会到达语言的生命实存」(1966,367)。的确,这将是一个神圣的恐惧,因为这个「物象」,假如它能够在现实言说它自己,它将会说:「我死了」(如同拉康讨论的爱伦坡的「瓦德玛的情境」,1988b,231/270;1966,486)但是,这个没有名字的物象:它如何能够说「我」!(在黛安娜的狗群的牙齿,阿塔安被撕裂,爱伦坡的被催眠的人物的污秽身体)。

Thus the statement “I, truth, speak,” rather than saying what it seems to say, signifies just the opposite—that is, its essential and radical inadequacy—to the one who speaks it. The “I” in the statement is not the same as the “he” who, speaking himself in it, absents himself in the statement by presenting himself in it. The truth, she who says “I, truth, speak,” speaks the truth—which is precisely that she can only be spoken (hence Lacan’s rejection of any metalanguage claiming to speak the truth about truth: “No language can speak the truth about truth, since truth establishes herself by speaking, and by having no other means to do so” 1966,867-868). And so she speaks herself mischievously—fictionally, mythically— because she “hides herself” as soon as she is spoken (“as soon as she has appeared”) and because this is the only possible truth, separated from any reality that would come to vouch for her. Where will Actaeon ever see dedy the Goddess,22 in her splendid nudity, if not in the fable (“Diana’s Bath,” “The Freudian Thing”) where he speaks her impossible theophany and tells her untellable revelation?

因此,「我,真理,在言说」的这个陈述,并不说出它表明说的东西。它的意涵恰恰相反—换句话说,对于言说它的这个真理,它本质上强烈地不适任。在陈述中的这个「我」,跟这个「他」并不相同。这个「他」在它那里言说他自己,他在陈述里,作为缺席,凭借呈现他自己在陈述里。真理,这位说出「我,真理,在言说」的这个她,言说真理。这确实是真理她,仅能够被说出的方式,(因此,拉康拒绝任何的形上语言,宣称言说有关真理的真理:「没有语言能够言说有关真理的真理,因为真理凭借言说,凭借没有其他方法能够这样做,来建立她自己。」(1966,867-868)。所以,她恶意地言说她自己—幻想地,神秘地—因为她「隐藏她自己」,当她被言说时(当她一出现)。因为这是唯一可能的真理,跟任何前来保证她的的现实分开。阿塔安将会在哪里看见这位女神处于辉煌的裸身?难道不就是在寓言里(「黛安娜的沐浴」,「弗洛依德的物象」?)在那里,阿塔安言说黛安娜的不可能的可见化身,然后告诉她无法说出的启示?

With these details clarified, the fact remains that this truth, when she reveals herself “in Freud’s mouth” and through Lacan’s “voice,” says,” J, truth, speak.” Like it or not, the Word that reveals only itself is the word of a subject who speaks himself in his truth; witness the shifter “I,” which designates him in the statement. (What would become of Lacan’s demonstration if the “I” were to disappear?) Even if this word is no one’s word, it is still the word and the truth of (no) one—of the silent mouth of Freud-Actaeon, for example, through which it reveals itself in so fabulously loquacious a manner. In the fable of Diana, it is truly himself (the secret of his desire) that Actaeon seeks in the Goddess, just as it is the Freudian thing that (un)veils itself in the truth-who-speaks “in Freud’s mouth.” Here, aletheia is in reality (if one can use that phrase) the “nothing” (the “hole in the real”; 1988a, 271/297) that the inexpressible subject of the enunciation (or of “discourse,” as Kojeve would prefer to say) becomes at the very moment when he speaks himself. Abolished in his reality, he emerges into it in the truth of his Being, which is to be precisely nothing (nothing “real”), as Lacan says elsewhere, in one of his many commentaries on Freud’s Wo Es war, soil Ich werden:

虽然这些细节被澄清,这个事实依旧在,这个真理,当她揭示她自己,「借弗洛依德的嘴巴」,通过拉康的「声音」说,「我,真理,在言说」。无论你喜欢与否,仅有启示它自己的这个「真理」是主体在他的真理里言说他自己的真理。请你们见证「我」这个转接词,它在陈述里指明他。 万一这个「我」消失,拉康的展示将会是怎样的情况?即使这个真理并不是任何人的真理,它依旧是真理,是一个人(没有人)的真理,属于弗洛依德-阿塔安的沉默的嘴巴的真理。譬若,通过这个真理,它启示它自己,用如此侃侃的方式。在黛安娜的寓言里,阿塔安在女神那里寻求的,确实就是他自己,(他的欲望的秘密)。正如弗洛依德的物象,遮蔽(揭露)它自己,在作为言说的真理里,用弗洛依德的嘴巴。在此,真理实际上是空无(假如我们能够使用那个字眼,实在界的空洞)。(1988a,271/197。这位表述的无法被表达的主体(或者这位辞说的主体,依照科耶夫的说法),就是他言说他自己的时刻,变成空无。当他在他的现实里被废除,他出现进入它,以他的生命实存的真理。依照拉康在别处的说法,这个生命实存的真理确实就是空无(实在界的空无),在其中一篇评论,关于弗洛依德的「本我所在,自我必然回归」。

There where it was just now, there where it was for a while, between an extinction which is still glowing and a birth that is retarded, “I” can come into being and disappear from what I say. An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself … what remains here if not the trace of what must be in order to fall from Being? … Being of non-Being, that is how / as subject comes on the scene [1977a, 300/801 -802].

就是刚才那里,有一阵子在那里,处于依旧闪耀的消灭与迟缓的诞生之间,「我」能够从我所说的东西,出现,并且消失。抨击它自己的表述,放弃它自己的陈述、、、在此剩余的东西,难道不就是必须存在的这个痕迹,为了从生命实存掉落?非-存在的生命实存,那就是作为主体的「我」,如何来到现场(1077a,300/801-802)。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 5

July 29, 2014

如何言说真理 5

雅克慎论拉康

Before any characterization of truth in terms of enunciation, propositional judgment, adequacy/inadequacy of discourse to things or to itself, we must think of truth and language as a veiling unveiling. This is also to say that, before any opposition of truth to error, we must think of truth and language as irreducible “errancy” (Jr-ren). This, indeed, is the unavoidable conclusion of this whole line of reasoning. The lethe inherent in aletheia, since it is the forgetting of nothing, is strictly insurmountable and can thus no longer be qualified as error unless we add that this “error” is “truth” itself: “The disclosure of beings as such is simultaneously and intrinsically the concealing of being as a whole. In the simultaneity of disclosure and concealing, errancy holds sway. Errancy and the concealing of what is concealed belong to the primordial essence of truth.”,8

在任何真理的特性之前,无论是用表述,命题的判断,辞说的充足/不充足,对于物象或它自身,我们必须将真理与语言认为是一种遮蔽-揭示。这样说是说,在真理与错误的任何对立之前,我们必须将真理与语言认为是无法还原的「错误」。这确实是这种推理的整个脉络无法避免的结论。在aletheia里本质具有的这个lethe,因为它是「空无」的遗忘,是绝对无法克服的,因此也不再是资格作为错误。除非我们补充说,这个「错误」是「真理」自身:生命实存的揭露,同时而且本质上,就是生命实存作为整体的隐藏。在揭露与隐藏的同时,错误具有影响力。错误与被隐藏物的这个隐藏,属于真理的原初本质。

With this brief recapitulation of Heidegger’s doctrine of truth, it is certainly easier to see how Lacan came to make repression and forgetting the paradoxical “truth” of desire. Repression—insofar as it is, for Lacan, tied to the speech by which man breaks the bread of truth with his counterpart and shares the lie—is heir to all the formal characteristics of the logos-aletheia: the “lying” subject speaks the “truth” of his desire, to the extent that this desire, in its pure nullity, appears only by disappearing, and so on. In short, logos-repression is the aletheia of desire.

将海德格的真理的信条简短地作这个总结,确实比较容易看出拉康如何逐渐将潜抑与遗忘当成是欲望的悖论「真理」。对于拉康,潜抑跟言说息息相关。人跟他的伙伴裂开真理的面包,然后分享谎言—这是逻各斯与真理的所有的正式的特征的传承:「说谎」的主体言说他的欲望的「真理」。甚至,这个欲望,处于纯粹无效的状态,仅是凭借消失而出现,等等。总之,逻各斯-潜抑就是欲望的真理。

But all of this should not conceal the important modifications that Lacan simultaneously brings to Heidegger’s concept of aletheia. Indeed, whatever their apparent formal kinship may be, Lacan’s “truth” cannot be purely and simply reduced to Heidegger’s (making the latter the “truth” of the former). Lacan’s truth, no matter how unfathomable and repressed, remains none the less the truth of a desire—that is, of a subject. It could hardly be otherwise in psychoanalysis. Isn’t the patient invited to recount himself—that is, to reveal himself to himself through autorepresentation and auto-enunciation? Thus Lacan tirelessly recalls that Freud’s “domain” “is that of the truth of the subject. . . .

但是所有这一切,不应该隐藏重要的修正,拉康同时带给海德格的真理的观念的
重要的修正。的确,无论他们的外表的正式关系是怎样,拉康的「真理」无法纯粹而单纯地还原成为海德格的「真理」(让海德格的真理成为拉康的真理)。无论多么深不可测与潜抑,拉康的真理始终仍然是欲望的真理–换句话说,主体的真理。在精神分析,那几乎不可能是别的真理。换句话说,病人被邀请来叙述他自己,难道不就是要对自己揭露他自己,通过自动-再现与自动-表述?因此,拉康孜孜不倦地提醒,弗洛依德的「领域」是主体的真理的领域、、、

What is at stake is the realization of the truth of the subject, like a dimension peculiar to it which must be detached in its distinctiveness (originalite) in relation to the very notion of reality” (1988a, 20—21/29). Indeed, in analysis it is unimportant whether the discourse of the subject conforms to reality; what is important is that the subject speak himself in his truth. Consequently, for Lacan—agreeing, on this point, with Kojeve’s teaching—truth is essentially distinct from reality. Better yet, truth is opposed to reality insofar as it arises only in the discourse through which the subject speaks himself by negating or “nihilating” the “Real”—for example (an example par excellence), in the form of “error.”19 In a word, the subject “realizes” his truth only in the discourse of autorepresentation or autoenunciation, by reducing reality (including his own) to nothing—the classic move that we recognize from Cartesian doubt (or even the “path of doubt and despair” spoken of by Hegel).

岌岌可危的是主体的真理的实践,就像是它特有的维度,这个维度在它跟现实的观念的清晰度,必须被隔离(1988a,20-21/29)。的确,在精神分析,主体的辞说跟现实是否一致,并不重要;重要的是,主体在他的真理里言说他自己。结果,对于拉康而言,在这一点,他同意科耶夫的教导—真理本质上并不同于现实。更贴切地说,真理跟现实对立,因为真理仅是在辞说里产生,凭借这个辞说,主体言说他自己,凭借否定或「消灭」「实在界」。譬如,(最佳的例子),以「错误」的形式。总之,主体「实践」他的真理,仅是在自动-再现或自动-表述的辞说里,凭借将现实(包括他自己的现实)还原成为空无—这个经典的行动,我们从笛卡尔的怀疑论体认出来,(或甚至从黑格尔谈论的「怀疑与绝望的途径」)。

Formally, the Lacanian definition of the “truth of the subject” is nothing other than truth as subjective certainty— which, by the same token, takes us far from Heidegger, for in Heidegger’s eyes nothing is more foreign to the original essence of truth than truth thought of as the certainty of a subject assuring himself of himself in his representations or discourse. On the contrary, truth as subjective representation is instead the total oblivion of truth’s original essence, as soon as it makes truth (as the “saying”—or “thought”—of Being) the certainty of a subject who speaks and thinks himself as Being (“I think, I am”).

正式来说,拉康的「主体的真理」的定义,实实在在就是作为主体的确定性的真理—同样地,这个定义带领我们远离海德格。因为在海德格的观点,对于真理的原初的本质而言,被认为是主体的确定性的真理,是最为陌生的。因为这种主体在他的再现表象与辞说里对他自己确定他自己。相反地,作为主体的再现表象的真理,会完全遗忘真理的原初的本质,当它让真理(作为生命实存的言说与思想的真理),成为主体的确定性时。因为这一个主体言说他自己,并且认为他自己,作为生命实存(我思故我在)。

Nevertheless, it is precisely this same concept of truth, as auto-representation or autoenunciation, that Lacan, in his irrepressible combinatory passion, bizarrely mixes with Heidegger’s aletheia. For the Freudo-Hegelian that Lacan continues to be, the “truth” is the word by which a subject speaks himself, represents and exposes himself, through the mediation of the inter-subjective interlocution (whose model, let us stress once more, is furnished by psychoanalytic interlocution in its detachment from any reality). As for the “Being” thus unveiled, it likewise remains the “nucleus of our being” (1977a, 173/526, 228/587; my emphasis), just as, in the prosopopoeia of “The Freudian Thing,” truth herself rather brusquely tells her “lover,” Heidegger, “In any case, in order to judge your defeat, isn’t it enough to see me escape, first, from the dungeon of the fortress where you are so sure of detaining me by placing me not in yourself, but in being itself? I wander around in what you take to be the least true essentially: in dreams,” and so on (1977a, 122/410); translation modified).

可是,确实就是真理的这个相同的观念,作为自动-再现与自动-表述,拉康以无法自抑的激情交加,古怪地跟海德格的真理混淆一块。拉康继续成为弗洛依德与黑格尔学派,这个「真理」是主体言说他自己,代表与表露他自己时,凭借的字词,通过互为主体的互相表达的中介(让我们再次强调,它的模式,由精神分析的互相表达所供应,在它跟任何现实隔离的状态)。至于因此而被揭露的「生命实存」,它同样始终是「我们生命实存的核心」(1977a,173/526,228/587)。正如作为「弗洛依德的物象」的具体化身,真理自身相当古怪地告诉她的「恋人」,海德格,「无论如何,为了判断你的失败,看见我逃避出来,难道还不足够吗?首先,看见我从这个保垒的地牢逃避出来?在那里,你是如此确定拘囚我,将我放置,不是在你自己里面,而是在物自体里面?我四处漫游,在你认为是基本上最不真实的地方:在梦那里」,等等(1977a,122/410)。

Thus we see that Lacan wholly maintains the concept of truth as the autoenunciation of a subject while at the same time, in agreement with Heidegger’s logos-aletheia, making it an enunciation of nothing (or, if you will, of desire: “Whatever animates, what any enunciation speaks of, belongs to desire”; 1977b, 141/129). The result of this strange montage is that, under Lacan’s pen, the unveiling/veiling of Being becomes an unveiling/veiling of the subject to himself. The “auto” (that is, the subject) of the enunciation having been very literally reduced to nothing (to the nothing that “is” Being and/or desire as no-thing), we can deduce, and very logically indeed, that truth is a (dis)appearance of the subject of the enunciation into the subject of the statement.20 The subject, in sum, heir to all the features of Heidegger’s Being, is now considered to speak himself in every statement—but also to disappear in every statement, since the subject speaks himself as nothing and as pure desire of self. Truth/certainty, classically defined since Descartes by the statement’s subject being identical to the subject of the enunciation, now becomes—once it has passed through the burning fire of aletheia— the non-self-identity of the “same” subject.

因此,我们看出,拉康完全主张真理的这个观念,作为是主体的自动-表述。而同时,他又同意海德格的逻各斯-真理,让它成为空无的表述(或者,不妨说,欲望的表述:无论是什么东西激发,无论是任何表述谈论什么,都归属于欲望;1977b,141/129)。这种怪异的蒙太奇的结果是,在拉康的笔下,生命实存的揭露与遮蔽,变成是主体对它自己的揭露与遮蔽。当表述的这个「自动」(也就是,表述的这个主体),实质上已经被还原成为空无(还原成为生命实存的空无,生命实存与(或)欲望作为空无),我们能够推论,的确可以根据逻辑推论,真理是表述的主体的出现(消失),进入陈述的主体。总之,主体,作为海德格的生命实存的所有的特征,现在被认为在每个陈述里言谈它自己。而且也在每个陈述里消失。因为主体言说它自己,作为空无,作为自性的纯粹欲望。真理/确定性,自从笛卡尔以来的经典的定义,是根据陈述的主体认同于表述的主体。现在,陈述的主体则是成为这位「相同的」主体的非-自性-认同,因为它已经经历过真理之火的燃烧。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 4

July 28, 2014

如何言说真理 4

雅克慎论拉康

I Truth, Lie’9

我,真理,说谎

Here, we feel that we are really “getting very warm,” as Lacan says at the moment when he enters on “Freudian truth” and the “revelation” of the unconscious made to Freud (1977a, 158/509). What is this burning truth, which we reach only in blindness (or blindfolded, since there seems to be a game of hide-and-go-seek going on)? We need not look very far, since Lacan leads us by the hand, citing the “being-toward-death” in the presence of which Freud’s speech could only “be extinguished.” The allusion to Being and Time is clear: this “Freudian truth” is apparently none other than the aletheia of Martin Heidegger—to whom, by the way, Lacan’s references become more and more insistent, and whose “sovereign word” (1977a, 175/528) begins to compete seriously with that of the “master,” Kojeve.14

在此,我们感觉确实「较为温暖」,如同拉康说,当他进入「弗洛依德的真理」与无意识给予弗洛依德的「启示」的时刻91977a.158/509)。这个正在燃烧的真理是什么?我们仅是在盲目中抵达的真理(或眼睛被蒙住,因为似乎正在进行捉迷藏的遊戏)。我们并不需要眼看远方,因为拉康用手引导我们,引述「朝向死亡的生命实存」。在这个「朝向死亡的生命实存」面前,弗洛依德的言说仅能被消灭。这里清楚地提到海德格的「存在与时间」:「弗洛依德的真理」显而易见地实实在在地就是马丁、海德格的aletheia真理。顺便说一下,拉康越来越持续地提到海德格。海德格的「统辖的道」(1977a,175/528)开始认真地競争,跟科耶夫的「主人的道」。

Indeed, to say that repression (that is, forgetting) is the truth of desire amounts to saying that this truth reveals nothing (“causes to be what is not”) and thus veils itself in its very unveiling. As we know, this is the principal characteristic of truth as rethought by Heidegger in terms of presentation/withdrawal of Being. “Truth,” as Heidegger continually recalls, is called a-letheia in Greek, which literally means “unveiling.” In other words, what is “true” in this initial sense “is” what holds itself “unveiled” in the light, what presents itself in the “opening” of the “non-occulted,” of the “non-hidden.” Prior to any truth conceived in terms of “correctness” of gaze or “accuracy” of enunciation, “truth” is a pure offering to a gaze—and thus, by the same token, a pure withdrawal in the face of that gaze.

的确,说潜抑(也就是,遗忘)是欲望的真理,等于是说,这个真理启示「空无」(导致并不存在的东西),因此遮蔽它自己,在它的揭示当中。我们知道,这是作为真理的特性的原则,如同海德格重新思索的,用生命实存的呈现与隐退的术语。海德格继续提醒,真理就是希腊文所谓的「道」,实质的意思是「揭示」。换句话说,属于「真理」的东西,在它最初的意义,意味着光亮里的「揭示」。呈现它自己,在「非-神秘」,「非隐藏」的「展露」。早先于任何用凝视的「正确」,或表达的「正确」的术语构想的真理,「真理」是一种纯粹的提供给凝视—因此,同样地,面临那个凝视时,「真理」是一种纯粹的隐退。

To see (to be ek-statically open to what opens itself, in what Heidegger calls the “dimensionality” or the “lightening” of Being) is always to see something, and thus not to see something else. Unless one is God, one never sees the two sides of the tree simultaneously, the six faces of the cube. The dimension of the transcendent exteriority (where philosophy has always placed the problem of truth) is necessarily the dimension of the shown/hidden, and the same is true of the transcendental and ek-static archispatiality of Heideggerian “dimensionality,” although here the structure of the shown/hidden is thought in its essence. For Heidegger, the “revealing” (apophantic) essence of truth is to “hide”—what? Nothing, no being (for such a being, once unveiled, would in turn veil, and so on). The aletheia (according to Heidegger, still hammering away) inevitably carries a portion of occultation and forgetting (lethe): nothing can unveil itself in the opening of presence except on condition of occulting—not this or that, but its own essential disocculta-tion. Unveiled, the being-present “veils” the unveiling itself—which is nothing, for it “is” the very thing that opens the possibility of everything that is (being, present, and so on). It follows that truth is essentially an unveiling (a presentation, an “offering” of being) that is equivalent to a veiling (since Being, in its very disclosure, withdraws into veiling).

看见(狂喜地开展给开展它自己的东西,在海德格所谓的生命实存的「维度」或「轻盈」),看见总是想要看见某件东西,因此,并不是想要看见某件其他的东西。除非我们是上帝,我们永远无法同时看见这棵树的两边,立方体的六个刻面。超验的外在性的维度(哲学总是将真理的难题摆放在那里),必然是显示/隐藏的维度。就海德格的「维度」超验与狂喜的「建筑-空间」而言,道理也是一样。虽然在此显示/隐藏的结构,在它的本质被思维。对于海德格,真理的「启示」的本质就是「隐藏」–什么?隐藏空无,生命实存的不存在(因为这样的生命实存,一旦被「揭示」,会反过来遮蔽,等等)。
这个真理(海德格依旧孜孜不倦地探索),无可避免地带着些微的奥秘与遗忘:在存在的开展时,没有一样东西能够揭示它自己,除了就是在奥秘的情况—不是这个,或是那个,而是它自己的本质的「除掉奥秘」。当它被揭示时,生命实存-存在「遮蔽」这个揭示的本身—那就是空无。因为就是这个「生命实存」的东西,开展一切(生命实存,存在,等等)的可能性。因此,我们推论,真理基本上是一种揭示(一种呈现,生命实存的一种提供)。它相等于是一种遮蔽(因为生命实存,由于它自己的封闭,隐退进入遮蔽)。

A passage from Heidegger’s article “Logos” will perhaps state the matter even more clearly, and it is worth the trouble of citing here, for it is probably one of the principal “sources” of what is, as we shall see, Lacan’s rather peculiar Heideggerianism.15 In this article, Heidegger closely ties aletheia, understood as (un)veiling, to logos, even going so far as to make the two terms synonyms. Note, however, that this in no way means that language “speaks” the truth; even less does it mean that language, by this very fact, is the condition of truth. Just as aletheia initially has nothing to do with truth (understood as adequate judgment or statement), so logos originally has nothing to do with language (understood as phone semantike, a sonorous emission “signifying” or “expressing” something). Logos, as Heidegger was already saying in Being and Time, is a “letting something be seen” (apophansis),16 and here he says the same thing again, defining logos etymologically as a “gathering-presencing” that “lets lie before”:

从海德格的文章「逻各斯」的一个段落,或许将这件事情陈述得更加清楚,值得在这里引述一下。我们将会看出,因为它或许是拉康对于特殊的海德格思想的其中一个主要的来源。在这篇文章里,海德格仔细地将被理解作为揭示的真理,跟逻各斯连接一块。甚至过分到让两个术语成为同义语。可是,请你们注意,这丝毫并不意味着,语言「言说」真理。更没有意味著,根据这个事实,语言就是真理的条件。正如「道」最初跟真理无关(被理解作为响亮的发出「能指化」或「表达」某件事情)。如同海德格在「存在与时间」已经说出的,逻各斯是「让某件东西被看见」的东西。在此,他再次说相同的事情,将逻各斯从词源学定义为「先前让躺在那里的聚集-存在」。

A&yos lays that which is present before and down into presencing. … Because the A6yo9 lets lie before us what lies before as such, it discloses [unveils] what is present in its presencing. But disclosure is ‘AX^^eta. This and Aoyo? are the Same. Aeyevv lets akr)$ea, the unconcealed as such, lie before us. . . . Ail disclosure releases what is present from concealment. Disclosure needs concealment. The *A-A*»)08MX rests in A^fli?, drawing from it and laying before us whatever remains deposited in M\By). Aoyos is in itself and at the same time a revealing and a concealing. It is ‘AX^flfiux.17

A&yos 将先前存在在底下的东西,摆放进入存在。因为A&yos 让先前存在的本身,躺在我们的面前。它在它的存在当中揭示所存在的东西。但是揭示是AX^^。 这个AX^^eta跟A&yos 是相同的。被揭示者的本身,躺在我们面前。所有的揭示都释放存在的东西,不再隐藏。揭示需要隐藏。前者依靠后者,从它那里获得剩余的东西,摆放在我们面前。生命实存的本身,同时既是揭示,又是隐藏。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 3

July 28, 2014

如何言说真理 3

雅克慎论拉康

Repression = Return of the Repressed
潜抑=被潜抑者的回来

So far, so good. Freud, we could say, forgot his desire in the other, repressed in him the “truthful” point of his speech—and this is why, instead of the sovereign Signor, he has only the debris of desire, halves of words: bo . . . , elli. . ., traffio. … In Hegelian terms, the slave defers and alienates his desire by entering into the mediation of labor and is thereby reduced to picking up the master’s crumbs. In Freudian terms, desire, once social censorship has been internalized, can express itself only through “formations of compromise”—symptoms, slips of the tongue, forgetting, and bungled actions.

直到现在,一切还好。我们可以说,弗洛依德忘记他这他者的欲望。在他身上,他的言说的「真理的」的观点被潜抑。这就是为什么他仅拥有欲望的残骸,字词的半边,而不是统辖的Signor:bo . . . , elli. . ., traffio. …用黑格尔的术语,奴隶拖延并且异化他的欲望,凭借进入劳动的中介,因此被沦于检拾主人的残渣。用弗洛依德的术语,一旦社会的审查已经被内化,欲望仅能够经由「妥协的形成」来表达它自己—病征,口误,遗忘,与搞砸的行动。

There is just one problem: Could the desire in question have been expressed before its repression? Above all, “can we content ourselves here with speaking of repression,” as Lacan immediately asks himself (1966, 379)? A very interesting question indeed, and the answer is no less interesting: yes and no.

只是会有一个难题:受到质疑的这个欲望,在它被潜抑之前,本来能够被表达吗?尤其重要的是,我们能够在此满足于潜抑的言说吗?如同拉康立即询问自己(1966,379)这确实是一个有趣的问题,答案也是同样有趣:既是能够,又是不能够。

Yes, Lacan begins, this forgetting of the “Lord” (Seigneur) is a true repression, in the sense that repression is equivalent to not (being capable of) speaking the truth: “We can certainly affirm that [repression] is there, simply by Freud’s overdeterminations of the phenomenon. We can also, by the actuality of its circumstances, confirm the range of what I want you to understand in the formula: the unconscious is the discourse of the Other. The man who, in the act of speaking, breaks the bread of truth with his counterpart, shares the lie” (1966, 379).

是的,拉康开始说,「先生」(Seigneur)的这个遗忘,是一个真实的潜抑。这意味着,潜抑相等于是不言说(不能够言说)真相:「我们能够确实肯定,(潜抑)在那里,仅是由于弗洛依德对于这个现象的过分决定。由于这个现象的情况的实际,我们也能够肯定我想要你们理解的这个范围,在这个公式:无意识是大他者的辞说。正在言说的时,跟他的伙伴撕开真理的面包,分享谎言」(1966,379)。

Indeed, to speak to the other is first of all to defer desire, to not say it, and therefore to not be able to say it: thus it becomes unavailable to the subject, “unconscious,” “repressed” as it is in that Other (capital O) which is the discourse addressed to the other (small o). To speak, in this first sense, is equivalent to not speaking the truth: it is to break the sword of speech, come to terms with the “counterpart” instead of fighting with him; therefore, in its sharing of bread rather than death with him, it is to lie, to hide the nocturnal truth of desire. Every society, insofar as it rests on such a symbolic exchange, Lacan says (1977a, 61—62/ 272 ff.) following Levi-Strauss, presupposes the “breaking” that transforms the sword into a tessera, into a sumbolon (1966,380)— and, by the same token, it presupposes the “sharing of the lie” that is repression and the forgetting of desire.

的确,跟他者言说,首先就是拖延欲望,不要说出欲望,因此想要不能够说出欲望:因此,欲望并无法让主体利用,作为「无意识」,「潜抑」的主体,在那个大他者(大写的O)那里,辞说针对小他者(小写的o)对谈。从这个最初的意义言,言说相等于是没有说出真相:言说是要断裂话语的这把剑,要跟「伙伴」达成妥协,而不是跟他战斗;因此,是跟「伙伴」分享面包,而不是分享死亡。那就是要说谎,要隐藏夜间的欲望的真理。 每个社会都依靠诸如其类的象征的交换,拉康说(1977a,61-62/272)。 遵循列文、史特劳斯,拉康预先假定这个「断裂」,将这把剑转变成为瓷砖,成为马赛克瓷砖(1966,380)。同样地,它预先假定「谎言的分享」,那就是欲望的潜抑与分享。

But, Lacan says, no—repression is still something other than lying, and forgetting is not simply a mistake. As for “the speech omitted here, how could it not be extinguished in the presence of being-toward-death?” (1966, 379). The truth of desire cannot actually be spoken, since it is precisely what cuts off speech. Consequently, repression can no longer be reduced to a lying by omission, a “not saying the truth.” On the contrary, it must now be conceded that this lie is the truths insofar as truth is literally unspeakable. Indeed, repression represses and forgets nothings thus, strictly speaking, there is no longer any question of a dissimulating veil behind which desire could hide.

但是拉康说,不是的—潜抑依旧是某件并非是谎言的东西,遗忘不仅仅是错误。至于「在此被省略的言说,在朝向死亡的生命实存的面前,它如何能够不被消灭?(1966,379)。欲望的真理无法实际被言说,因为它确实是隔绝言说的东西。结果,潜抑不再能够被沦为是被省略的谎言,一种「不说出真相」。相反地,我们现在必须承认,这个谎言就是那些真相,因为真理实质上是无法言说的。的确,潜抑因此并没有潜抑与遗忘任何东西,严格地说,不再有让欲望能够隐藏那里的遮蔽的面纱的可能。

Desire, Kojeve says, is the nothing (the negation) of everything that is. Thus, Lacan concludes, repression (which negates, denies, reneges, and so on) constitutes its paradoxical “presentation,” for (as he writes here, in extremely condensed formulations) death, which is certainly “what negates discourse,” is also what “introduces negation” into discourse (an allusion to Kojeve’s theses about the roots of discursive negativity in human finitude).10 “The negativity of discourse” (or of the “symbolic order,” as Lacan still says) is thus its “manifestation,” in the sense that it “causes to be what is not” (1966, 379—380).

科耶夫说,欲望就是每样具有生命实存者的这个空无(否定)。因此,拉康下结论地说,潜抑(否定,否认,失信,等等)形成它的悖论的「呈现」。因为死亡,(拉康在此用极端精炼的诠释写著),确实「否定辞说的东西」,也是「介绍否定成为辞说」的东西」(提到科耶夫的论题,关于人类的有限性里,辞说的否定的根源)。「辞说的否定」(或是象征的秩序,拉康依旧这样说),因此是它的「征明」,因为它意味着,它「导致成为并非是生命实存的东西」(1966,379-380)

Indeed, how could desire—the “revealed nothingness” of which Kojeve speaks—”reveal” itself, if not by negating everything that could present it, incarnate it, realize it, and satisfy it? Thus, for Lacan, desire “reveals” itself always and only through Verneinung, through the negation that makes a thing present by its absence. “That is not my mother,” Freud’s patient says about the content of a dream, thus presenting the void of his desire in the absence of his mother.11 “Go away!” (“Fort?*) says the little boy to the reel as he throws it away—and his desire is “there” (“Da!”) in the distancing of its object.12 “Botticelli? Boltraffio? No> that’s not it,” Freud says to himself—and there it is, death is “present” (1988a, 48/59) in its repression, in its forgetting.

因此,对于拉康,欲望「显示」它自己,总是而且仅是凭借Verneinung否定,凭借物象的缺席来让物象存在的否定。弗洛依德的病人谈到关于梦的内容说,「那并不是我的母亲」。他因此在母亲的缺席里,将他的欲望的空无呈现出来。「走开!」(Fort),小男孩说,当他将线轴抛开—他的欲望就是在「那里」(Da),跟它的客体拉开距离。弗洛依德跟他自己说:Botticelli?Boltraffio?不,那并是不它。」就在那里,死亡「出现」,在它的潜抑里,在它的遗忘里(1988a,48/59)

In other words, repression is the “revelation” of that non-being: desire. “Repression and the return of the repressed,” Lacan repeats after Freud,13 “are merely the inside and the outside of the same thing” (1981,21,94; 1988a, 191/216), and for him this means that repression is the truth of desire, its one and only (re)presentation. To repress is undoubtedly to lie, to not speak the truth of desire (the “veridical speech” that Freud should have spoken, instead of saying something else to his traveling companion); but to repress is also to speak the truth—the empty, deadly truth that can only be (not) said, “half-said” (mi-dite), since all adequacy of discourse to the “thing itself” of desire is radically forbidden (interdite). It follows, in the strange “logic” established here, that there is only a lying truth, only repressed desire. The forgetting of the name Signorelli, far from being an “error of memory,” is the very truth of Freud’s desire.

换句话说,潜抑就是那个非-存在的「启示」:欲望。拉康重复弗洛依德的话说:「潜抑与潜抑者的回来,仅仅就是同样物象的内在与外在」(1981,21,94;1988a,191/216)。对于他,这意味着,潜抑就是欲望的真理,欲望的仅有的呈现(再现)。潜抑无可置疑地是说谎,没有说出欲望的真相(「跟现实巧合的言说」,这是弗洛依德本来应该谈论的,而不是对他的同车乘客说出某件其他东西)。但是,潜抑也等于是说出真相—那个空洞的,致命的,仅能够被说一半,「半说」的真相。因为辞说想要完全充足「物自体」,这是强烈被禁止的。根据在此建立的奇怪的「逻辑」,我们推论,仅存在着说谎的真相,仅有被潜抑的欲望。Signorelli这个名字的被遗忘,根本就不是「记忆的错误」,它是弗洛依德的欲望的这个真相。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理 2

July 27, 2014

如何言说真理 2

雅克慎论拉康

Therefore, something that Freud left unsaid brought on this complex play of displacements and substitutions. But what, exactly, was it? “Repressed thoughts,” Freud contents himself with saying—leaving us the trouble of guessing that they had to do with some guilty wish, irreconcilable with the conscious ego. A death wish regarding his patient, perhaps? Was he afraid that the phantom would return, revive—like the chosen ones in the fresco of Orvieto—to judge him? We will never know: Freud, in this auto-analytic fragment, ultimately unveils himself very little (unlike S/gnorelli, Sigmund does not leave us his self-portrait)/

因此,某件弗洛依德留下没有说出的东西,导致取代与替换的这个复杂的运作。但是,那确实是什么?「被潜抑的思想」,弗洛依德满足于这样说—留给我们必须猜测这个困扰:被潜抑的思想跟某个罪恶感的愿望必然息息相关,跟意识的自我无法和解的某个罪恶感。关于他的病人的死亡的愿望,或许?他当时害怕,这个魅影将会回来,会复活—就像在奥维阿特的壁画的被选择的那些魅影—会回来,复活,为了对他做最后审判?我们永远无法知道:弗洛依德,在这篇自我-分析的片段里,最后揭示他自己的东西并不多(不像Signorelli, 弗洛依德并没有留下他的自我-肖像给我们。

But at least we know that the repressed (Hell) is formed of “thoughts,” of Gedanken—in short, of cogitationes, of representations. This conforms to Freud’s established theory: repression is not carried out on the drive (Trieb), but only on the drive’s psychic “representatives” {Reprd$entanten)y “representations” (Vorstel-lungen)—”ideas,” “thoughts,” “phantasies,” “memories,” and so on. A drive as such (or “instinct,” as Strachey prefers to translate), Freud says in a famous passage, escapes from the opposition “conscious/unconscious”: “I am in fact of the opinion that the antithesis of conscious and unconscious is not applicable to instincts. An instinct can never become an object of consciousness (Objekt des Bewusstseins)—only the idea that represents it (die Vorstellung, die ihr reprdsentiert) can. Even in the unconscious, moreover, an instinct cannot be represented (reprdsentiert sein) otherwise than by an idea.”7 In other words, only the representation can be shown to or hidden from consciousness (in the manner of an object, Objekt), and that is why repression, according to Freud, has no other prey. Unable to repress the drive (or, if you will, the affect that is its non-objectal, non-representational “representative”), repression, for lack of anything better, falls back on the “thoughts” attached to the drive. In a word, repression is carried out on a “wish,” but in the sense that this Wunschy as Lacan insists, is a “wish” (voeu), a desire that is formulated (“conceived of,” “represented”) in the unconscious (1977a, 256/620 ff.).
但是,至少我们知道,这个被潜抑的(地狱)是由思想组成,总之,由再现表象组成。这符合弗洛依德建立的理论:潜抑并非是在冲动层面进行,而仅是在冲动的心理的「代表」,「再现表象」,「理念」,「思想」,「幻见」,「记忆」等等层面进行。弗洛依德在一篇著名的文章说,冲动的本身,(或本能本身,如史拉奇喜欢这样翻译),从「意识与无意识」的对立里逃离出来:「我事实上认为,意识与无意识的正反对立,并不适用于本能。本能永远不会成为意识的客体—仅有代表本能的理念才会成为意识的客体。而且,即使在无意识里,除了用理念代表以外,本能也无法被代表。换句话说,仅有再现表象能够被显示给意识,或隐藏不给意识知道(用客体的方式)。那就是为什么弗洛依德会说,潜抑并没有另外一个猎物。潜抑并无法潜抑冲动(或者,不妨说,并无法潜抑作为它的非-客体,非再现表象,非代表的情感),潜抑仅有依靠跟冲动依附的思想,因为它没有更好的东西可依靠。总之,潜抑依靠「愿望」在进行,但是如同拉康坚持的,这是一个愿望,在无意识里被诠释,(被「构想」,被「代表」)的欲望(1977a,256/629)。

Since the repressed wish belongs to the order of representation, we can see by the same token that its unconscious statement, as Freud often says, can be “translated” into a conscious representation. Thus, in our example, the “repressed thoughts” have actually been hidden/replaced by other representations (by the name Signorelli, and then by what Freud calls a “sequence of letters”).8 But nothing in Freud’s theory opposes the final unveiling of these thoughts to consciousness—once it is actually a question, “even in the unconscious,” of “thoughts.” In short, what has been silenced (the desire, the “thoughts-of-desire”) should be able to be spoken; and, according to Freud, this is exactly what happens in a successful analysis (or interpretation).

因为这个被潜抑的愿望属于再现表象的秩序,我们同样能够看见,它的无意识的陈述,如同弗洛依德经常说的,能够被「翻译」成为意识的再现表象。因此,在我们的例子里,这些「被潜抑的思想」,实际上被隐藏,被取代,被其他的再现表象(被Signorelli这个名字,因此,被弗洛依德所谓的「字母的顺序」)。但是在弗洛依德的理论里,没有一样东西将这些思想最后被揭示给意识—一旦「即使在无意识」,那实质上是「这些思想的」问题。总之,曾经被沉默下来的东西,(欲望,「欲望-的-思想」),应该能够被说出。依照弗洛依德,这确实是成功的精神分析(或解释),所发生的情况。

Is it the same in Lacan’s theory of desire? Not at all. Not, of course, that Lacan questions Freud’s having made the connection between desire and representation (or, if you will, between the unconscious and discourse); on the contrary—in Lacan, this connection excludes all others. Whereas Freud, in spite of everything, did not neglect to leave room for a non-representational unconscious (“unconscious feelings” or a non-repressed “Id,” for example), Lacan settles the matter more roughly: there is no drive that is not always already represented, no desire that is not always already articulated in Vorstellungsreprasentanten—that is (the equivalence is invariable in Lacan), in statements, in “signifiers” (1966, 714). In Lacan, however (and this changes everything), this articulation in discourse is also the very thing that makes desire “inarticulable” and “inexpressible” (1977a, 253/616). In contrast to what happens in Freud, desire is now what can never be (wn)said—necessarily so, because to speak is to speak (of) death—that is, of what “negates discourse” (1966, 379).

在拉康的欲望的理论,这是相同的吗?不,根本不相同。当然不相同。拉康质疑弗洛德从事欲望与再现表象之间的连接(或是不妨说,从事无意识与辞说之间的连接)。相反地,在拉康那里,这个连接将所有的其他连接都排除。虽然弗洛依德无论如何并没有忽略要留下空间,给非-再现表象的无意识(譬如,「无意识的感觉」,或非潜抑的「本我」)。拉康则是更加粗略地解决这个问题:每个冲动总是已经被代表,每个欲望总是已经被表达,在Vorstellungsreprasentante那里。换句话说,在各种陈述,各种「能指」那里,(在拉康那里,有不同变化的相等语)(1966,714)。可是,在拉康那里,(这会改变一切),在辞说的表达,也就是让欲望「无法表达」,与「无法表述」的这个东西(19077a,253/616)。对照于在弗洛依德所发生的情况,欲望现在既是无法被说出,又是无法不被说出的东西—它必然是如此,因为言说就是等于言说死亡。换句话说,就是言说「否定辞说」的东西(1966,379)。

Indeed, this is the interpretation of Freud’s forgetting that Lacan proposes in the first seminar (1977b) and elsewhere: the last word of Freud’s desire is death, and thus there is no last word of desire, any more than there is a definitive interpretation or final unveiling of truth. What does Freud repress by forgetting the name Signorelli? “Signor along with Herry the absolute Master, is sucked up and repressed by the apocalyptic wind that arises in Freud’s unconscious, on the echo of the conversation he is having: the disturbance… of a theme that has just emerged by way of an earlier theme—which, indeed, is that of accepted death” (1966, 447; see also 1977b, 27/29).

的确。这就是弗洛依德的遗忘的解释。拉康在第一研讨班(1977b),以及别的地方建议:弗洛依德的欲望的最后话语是死亡。因此,欲望没有最后的话语,正如真理的最后的揭示,并没有一个明确的诠释。弗洛依德遗忘Signorelli这个名字时,他潜抑的东西是什么?「Signor,以及Herr,这位绝对的主人,它们被吸收,被潜抑,被弗洛依德的无意识里升起的那阵末日启示录的风。在他正在进行的对谈到回声里:一个经由早先的主题,刚刚出现的主题的扰乱。这个早先的主题就是死亡的主题」。

“Absolute Master,” “accepted death”: the “return to Freud,” as we see, once again takes place through Kojeve and the “fight to the death for pure prestige.” The truth of Freud’s forgetting is certainly a desire, but this desire in turn has no truth other than suicide and the sovereign acceptance of death. If Fteud is guilty, it is not (as we might have expected, following Freudian doctrine) because of some unspeakable “Oedipal” death-wish, but rather because he “gave up on his desire” (1986, 368)—his desire of nothingness.

我们看出,「绝对主人」,「被接受的死亡」,「回归弗洛依德」,通过科耶夫与「为了纯粹自尊奋斗至死」,再次发生。弗洛依德的遗忘的真理,确实是一个欲望,但是这个欲望这边除了自杀与接受死亡作为统辖外,并没有其他真理。假如弗洛依德具有罪恶感,那并不是因为某件无法言说的「伊狄浦斯」死亡-愿望(若是遵循弗洛依德的信条,那是我们本来会预期的)。相反地,而是因为他「对于他的欲望却步退让」(1986,368)–他对于空无的欲望。

What Freud had to say, and did not say, was speech9 at the level of death, a “veridical speech” that would speak his desire and the “deepest secret of [his] being”: “God knows that it can reverberate a great deal, this veridical speech. What is at issue?—if not the absolute, namely death, which is present in it, and which Freud tells us that he preferred .. . not to confront .. . too closely” (1988a, 48/59). And so he alienates his desire in the other, by identifying with his companion and with what he imagines the other’s desire to be. Rather than carry death in speech, he keeps silent for propriety’s sake (What will he think of me?):

弗洛依德必须说出,没有说出的东西,就是在死亡的层次的言说。这是一个「最后审判的言说」,它将会言说出他的欲望,以及「他的生命实存的最深处的秘密」:「天晓得,它会迴响隆隆,这个最后审判的话语!受到争议的是什么?难道不就是这个绝对,也就是,这个死亡?这个绝对,这个死亡出现在最后审判的话语里,弗洛依德告诉我们,他宁可不要面对,不要太过靠近地面对」(1988a,48/59)。所以,他将他的欲望在大他者的欲望那里异化,凭借认同他的同车乘客,认同他想像的大他者的欲望的生命实存的东西。弗洛依德并没有在言说理实践死亡,他保持沉默,为了礼貌得体缘故(人家对我会怎么看?):

The impossibility in which Freud finds himself, the impossibility of citing the name Signorelli in the dialogue he is pursuing with his colleague (in this case, his fellow traveler), is due to the fact that by censoring, in his prior conversation with the other, everything that the latter’s words suggested (as much by their content as by the memories that they trailed along with them) about the relation of man and doctor with death, and thus with the absolute Master, Herr> signor—by censoring all this, Freud literally left behind in his partner (and thus cut off from himself) the broken half (let this be understood in the most material sense of the term) of the sword of speech; and for a time, precisely the time during which he continued addressing his partner, he could no longer use that term as signifying material, because it remained attached to the repressed signification [1966, 379].

弗洛依德发现他处于这个不可能的处境,不可能引述Signorelli的这个名字,在他跟同事正在进行的这个对话里,(在这个情况,他的同车的乘客)。这是由于这个事实:凭借审查,在他跟他者的先前对话,他者的话语所暗示的每样事情(根据他们的对话内容,也根据他们的回溯话语的记忆),关于人与医生跟死亡的关系,因此也同样跟绝对主人,Herr,signor的关系。凭借审查所有这一切,弗洛依德实质上,在他的同车乘客那里(因此跟他自己隔离),留下言说的这把剑的断裂的一半。有段时间, 确实就是在这段时间,他继续跟他的同车乘客进行对话,他不再使用那个术语,作为能指意义的材料,因为它始终跟这个被潜抑的意义依附依块。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

如何言说真理

July 26, 2014

如何言说真理

雅克慎论拉康

\How Can We Speak the Truth?
我们如何言说真理?

For God’s sake!—quick!—quick!—put me to sleep— or, quick!—waken me!—quick!—I say to you that I
am deadl —Edgar Allan Poe •

看在上帝份子!—快!—快!让我沉睡—要不然,快!–唤醒我!—快!–我跟你们说我死了!
艾格尔、爱伦坡

The imaginary, we have just been saying, is a “denial” of death, a meconnaissance of desire, a “defense” against the anxiety of the absolute Master. Must we conclude, then, that desire is repressed in the specular relation (in the “imaginary transference”)? Indeed, according to good Freudian doctrine, it could be argued that desire—or, rather, the wish (Wunsch)2—is fulfilled “in the imaginary,” in phantasy (Phantasie), only on condition that repression and censorship forbid its fulfillment in reality. “A dream? Freud declares, “is a (disguised) fulfillment of a (suppressed or repressed) wish?3 and the same goes for all phantasmatic productions, not to mention the symptoms and transferences that prolong them. To reconcile Freud and Lacan, then, could we say that the analyst’s action consists in disengaging desire from the various imaginary formations in which it is deceptively “fulfilled” because of repression?

我能刚刚一直在说,想像界是死亡的「否认」,欲望的「误识」,对抗绝对主任的焦虑的「防卫」。我们因此必须下结论地说:欲望在魅影理想的关系里被压抑吗?在「想像界的移情」里被压抑吗?的确,依照美好的弗洛依德的信条,我们能够主张:仅有当欲望,或愿望的满足在现实受到压抑与审查时,它们才会在「想像界」里,在「幻见」里获得满足。弗洛依德宣称:「梦是受到压抑或潜抑的愿望的一种(伪装的)满足。相同的道路适用于幻见成形的产生,更不用说是延长幻见的病征与移情。那么,将弗洛伊德与拉康融合来看,我们能够说:精神分析家的行动就在于将欲望与各种的想像的形成分开吗?因为在各种想像的形成里,欲望因为受到潜抑的关系,欺骗地「被满足」?

What is the goal of an analysis (and, more generally, of an analytic interpretation)? To become conscious of the repressed wish, says Freud; to recognize the desire of the subject, says Lacan (“That the subject should come to recognize and to name his desire, that is the efficacious action of analysis”; 1988b, 228-229/267). Isn’t this the same thing? Once the Freudian Wunsch has been reinterpreted in terms of Kojevian “Desire,” doesn’t Lacan, in sum, propose to conceive of analysis as an unveiling of desire from its imaginary coverings—in short, as a progression through the realm of truth, as a “passage from ignorance to knowledge”?

精神分析的目标是什么?更通俗地说,精神分析的解释的目标是什么?弗洛依德说,那是为了意识到被潜抑的欲望,拉康则是说,是为了体认主体的欲望(主体应该逐渐体认,并且命名他的欲望,那就是精神分析的有效的行动」1988a,228-229/267)。这难道不是一件相同的事情吗?一旦弗洛依德的Wunsch,用科耶夫的「欲望」的术语来重新解释,总之,拉康难道不就是建议要将精神分析构想成为,将欲望从想像的掩饰里揭露出来?总之,作为通过真理的领域的一种进展,作为从「无知通过到启悟」?

Yes; but how can we continue to speak of the repression, disguising, veiling of desire, if this repression represses nothing, veils nothing} And how can we unveil “nothing”? How can we speak (name, recognize) the truth of desire?

是的,但是我们如何继续谈论潜抑,伪装,欲望的揭露,假如这种潜抑空无,遮蔽空无?我们如何能够揭露「空无」?我们如何能够言说(命名,体认)欲望的真理?

“Herr, What Is there to Be Said?”

「先生,有什么能够被说的吗?」

Let us take a famous example of repression: the forgetting of the name Signorelli, an incident that Freud analyzed in the opening chapter of Psychopathology of Everyday Life. Freud is on a train that is taking him from Ragusa to Herzegovina, and he is talking with a fellow traveler. At one point in the conversation, he has just mentioned the impressive frescoes in Orvieto cathedral, representing the Apocalypse (Death, Judgment, Hell, and Heaven) and painted by … by whom? Botticelli? Boltraffio? No, that’s not it. Freud can see the images of the Apocalypse quite clearly before him—and even the image of the painter himself.4 Nevertheless, no matter how hard he tries, he can no longer remember the painter’s name: Signorelli. Why not?

让我们举出潜抑的一个著名例子:Signorelli这个名字的遗忘,在「日常生活心理病理学」的开头章节,弗洛依德分析这个意外事件。弗洛依德正搭乘congRagus到Herzegovina的火车,他正在跟同车乘客谈话。在交谈的某个时刻,他刚刚提到在Orvieto大教堂的令人印象深刻的壁画,代表启示录(死亡,最后审判,地狱,天堂)的壁画,那是谁画的?Bortticelli?Boltraffio?不,并不是他。弗洛依德能够相当清楚地看出,在他面前的这个启示录壁画—甚至画家本人的形象。可是,无论他怎么尝试,他就是不再能够想起画家的名字:Signorelli。为什么?

It was, Freud tells us, as if this name had been swallowed up by the repression of other thoughts that the immediately preceding conversation had evoked. This conversation concerned the customs of the Turks living in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially their fatalistic attitude toward death: “Herr [Sir], what is there to be said?” was their customary reply to the doctor who gave them the bad news. At that moment, Freud had also thought of their diametrically opposed attitude toward the loss of sexual potency: “Herr, you must know that if that comes to an end, then life is of no value.” But Freud had said nothing about this to his companion, out of a sense of propriety. Sex? Death? At any rate, Freud preferred not to think about it any more, shaken as he was at the time by the news, which he had learned at Trafoi, about the suicide of one of his patients, who suffered from “an incurable sexual disorder.” He, too, Herr Doktor Freud, had failed in the face of death. Well, what was there for him to say?

弗洛依德告诉我们,好像这个名字已经被其他思想的潜抑所吞没,就在先前谈话所召唤的其他的思想。这个谈话牵涉到居住在Bosnia与Herzegovina的土耳其人的海关,特别是他们对待死亡的宿命论的态度:「先生,还有什么能够被说的?」当医生告诉他们不治之病的坏消息时,他们的习惯性回答。在那个时刻,弗洛依德也想到他们的极端对立的态度,对于性的能力的丧失:「先生,你必须要知道,假如没有了性的能力,那么人生就没有价值。」但是弗洛依德由于礼貌客气,对于他的同车乘客并没有说出什么话。性?死亡?无论如何,弗洛依德宁可不要再去思想它,虽然他当时对于这个坏消息不无震惊。他在Trafoi那里曾经获知,关于他的一位病人的死亡。这位病人遭受「无法治疗的性的疾病」的痛苦。在面临死亡时,他,弗洛依德先生,也束手无策。呵呵,他能够有什么话好说?

Right away, he said what there was to say, without saying it, by forgetting (repressing) the name Signorelli into the Hell of the expressible, where it was henceforth to burn along with Herr (Sig-nor)y in Herzegovina. All that remains now are halves of words (rather like the chosen ones in the fresco of Judgment, whose half-bodies emerge from the earth where they had been lying): Bottice///, Boltraffio . .. which gives us the following “fresco”:5

马上,他说出应该被说出的话语,但是没有将Signorelli这个名字说出来,因为他将它遗忘(潜抑),进入无法被表达的地狱里。在那里,Signorelli这个名字,跟Herr(Signor)一同应该被焚烧,在Herzegovina。现在仅剩下的东西,各个字词的一半(有点像是在「最后审判」壁画里,那些被选择的人们,他们的身体的一半从他们横躺那里的地面出现:Botticelli, Boltraffio、、、这些名字给予以下的「壁画」:

Signorelli—Herzegovian andBoani—Botticelli
Signorelli—Hersegovina and Bosina—Boltraffio
Signorelli—Herr, what is there to be said,etc。
Signorelli—Herr—Death and sexuality — (repressed thoughts)
(Repressed thought)—Trafoi—Boltraff

雄伯译
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