Archive for January, 2010

拉岡講座246

January 31, 2010

拉岡講座246
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者:失蹤

Small letters
小寫字母

4
Certainty, for Descartes, is not a moment that one may regard as acquired, once it has been crossed. Each time and by each person it has to be repeated. It is an ascesis. It is a point of orientation that is particularly difficult to sustain in the incisiveness that makes its value. It is, strictly speaking, the establishment of something separate.

對於笛卡爾而言,確定性並不被認為是一但被得到,就永遠保存。對於每一個人,確定性需要每次調整。它是一種自我克制。因為它的價值在於它的敏銳性,它是一個特別難於維持的定向點。嚴格說,它建立某件分裂的東西。

When Descartes introduces the concept of a certainty that holds entirely in the I think of cogitation, marked by this point of non-exit that exists between the annihilation of knowledge and scepticism, which are not the same thing—one might say that his mistake is to believe that this is knowledge. To say that he knows something of this certainty. Not to make of the I think a mere point of fading. But it is because he has done something quite different, which concerns the field, which he does not name, in which all this knowledge wanders about—all this knowledge which he had said should be placed in a radical suspension. He puts the field of this knowledge at the level of this vaster subject, the subject who is supposed to know, God. You know that Descartes could not help reintroducing the presence
of God. But in what a strange way!

笛卡爾完全用「我思故我在」來介紹確定性的觀念時,我們可以說,他的錯誤在於相信,這就是知識的真理,在於說明確說,對這個確定性,他已經清楚明白,在於沒有將「我思」僅僅解釋為一個出發點。因為毀滅知識的真理,並不等於就是懷疑主義。笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的特徵是,在知識真理的毀滅跟懷疑主義中間,他並沒有找到存在的出口。關於這個領域,他做了某件相當不同的事情,但是他沒有明確說,因為所有這些知識四處流竄,所有他曾經表明過的知識,確定性應該是懸而未決。他將這些知識的領域,放置在更大的主體的層次,那位主體應該無所不知,那就是上帝。大家知道,笛卡爾不得不重新介紹上帝的存在。但是立場是多麼曖昧!

It is here that the question of the eternal verities arises. In order to assure himself that he is not confronted by a deceiving God, he has to pass through the medium of a God—indeed, in his register, it is a question not so much of a perfect, as of an infinite being. Does Descartes, then, remain caught, as everyone up to him did, on the need to guarantee all scientific research on the fact that actual science exists somewhere, in an existing being, called God? —that is to say, on the fact that God is supposed to know?

在此,就產生了永恆的證實問題。為了告訴自己,他面臨的不是一位騙人的上帝,他必須透過作為媒介的上帝。的確,笛卡爾的思維裡,上帝的存在不是完美,而是永恆。笛卡爾以及他的同樣思維人,難道不是面對如何依據科學的研究,證實實際的科學存在於某個地方,存在於在一個現有的存在,被人稱之為上帝的存在?換言之,他難道不是要用科學研究去證實上帝無所不知?

It may seem that I am taking you a long way from the field of our experience, and yet—I would remind you, both by way of an apology and in order to maintain your attention at the level of our experience— the subject who is supposed to know, in analysis, is the analyst.

我現在似乎引導你們遠離精神分析經驗的立場。可是,我要提醒你們,在精神分析學,應該知道的主體是精神分析師。我很抱歉這樣說,但是你們的注意力,還是應該擺在精神分析的層次。

Next time, we shall discuss, in terms of the function of the transference, how it is that we have no need of the idea of a perfect, infinite being—who would dream of attributing these qualities to his analyst ?— to introduce the function of the subject who is supposed to know.

下一次,我們將討論,作為移情的功用,為了要介紹一位無所不知的主體,我們如何能夠免除不用一位完美的永恆的存在。有誰會夢想將這些屬性歸屬於他的精神分析師?

Let us go back to our Descartes, and to his subject who is supposed to know. How does he get rid of it?’ Well, as you know, by his voluntarism, by the primacy given to the will of God. This is certainly one of the most extraordinary sleights of hand that has ever been carried off in the history of the mind—the eternal verities are eternal because God wishes them to be.

讓我們回到笛卡爾,回到他應該無所不知的主體。他如何能免除不用這樣的主體?大家知道,他採用的方法是,願者前來,願意屈從上帝的意志者前來。相較於古聖先賢,這確實是匠心獨具的靈巧:永恆的證實問題,亙古常在,因為這是上帝對我們的期許。

I think you will appreciate the elegance of such a solution, which leaves a whole portion of the truths, in particular the eternal truths, in God’s charge. Let us be quite clear about this, what Descartes means, and says, is that if two and two make four it is, quite simply, because God wishes it so. It is his business.

我相信你們會欣賞這種解決的巧妙。他將全部的真理問題,特別是永恆的真理,留待上帝來負責。讓我們打開天窗說亮話,笛卡爾的意思是:假如二加二等於四,道理很簡單,因為上帝希望如此。那是上帝的事情。

Now, it is true that it is his business and that two and two make four is not something that can be taken for granted without his presence.

這確實是上帝的事情。假如上帝不存在,二加二等於四,如何能夠被視為天經地義?

I’m going to try to illustrate what I mean here. When Descartes speaks to us of his process, of his method, of clear ideas and confused ideas, simple ideas and complex ideas, he places the order to be followed between these two terms of his method.

我將設法說明我的意思。當笛卡爾對我們提到他的過程,他的方法,他的清楚或模糊的觀念,他的簡單或複雜的觀念,他將順序按照他的方法的兩個術語排列。

It is very possible after all that one plus one plus one plus one do not make four and I must tell you that what I am articulating the vel of alienation on is a good example of it. For, in the cardinal
order, this would give more or less something like the following:

I + (‘ + (‘ + (‘ + (… )))).

畢竟,這也是可能的,一加一、再加一、再加一、再加一,並不等於四。我必須告訴你們,我提到的疏離的欲望驅力的累積,就是一個好例子。因為在基數的順序,出現的結果將是如下:

I + (‘ + (‘ + (‘ + (… )))).

Whenever a new term is introduced, one always runs the risk of letting one or several of the others slip between one’s fingers. In order to reach four, what matters is not the cardinal but the ordinal. There is a first mental operation to be carried out and then a second, then a third, then a fourth. If you do not do them in the right order, you fail. To know whether, in the last resort, it makes three, or four, or two, is of secondary importance. That’s God’s business.

每當一個新的術語被介紹,我們時常遇到的危險是,總是會有一個或幾個其它術語消失不見。為了得到四的結果,重要的不是基數,而是序數。先有一個心算運算出來,然後才有第二個心算,然後第三個心算,然後第四個心算。假如你按照正確順序運算,你會算不出來。至於,最後的結果等於三,或四,或二,那是次要的事情。那是上帝的事情。

What Descartes now introduces, and which is illustrated at once, for, at the same time as his discourse on method he introduces his geometry and his dioptrics, is this—he substitutes the small letters, a, b, c, etc., of his algebra for the capital letters. The capital letters, if you will, are the letters of the Hebrew
alphabet with which God created the world and to each of which, as you know, there corresponds a number. The difference between Descartes’ small letters and the capital letters is that Descartes’ small letters do not have a number—they are interchangeable and only the order of the commutations will
define their process.

笛卡爾現在所介紹的方法,跟他在方法論所介紹的幾何學及折光學,同時進行。他用他的代數的一些小寫字母 a, b,.c 等等,來代替大寫字母。你們知道,大寫字母是上帝用來創造世界的希伯來文的字母,每一個字母都有一個數字相對應。笛卡爾的小寫字母跟大寫字母之間的差異是,笛卡爾的小寫字母沒有一個數字相對應。他們彼此可以互換,只有交換的順序的差異,會界定他們的過程。

To show you that the presence of the Other is already implied in number, I need only point out to you that the series of numbers can only be figured by introducing the zero, in a more or less masked way. Now, the zero is the presence of the subject who, at this level, totalizes. We cannot extract it from the
dialectic of the subject and the Other. The apparent neutrality of this field conceals the presence of desire as such. I will illustrate this simply by a return effect. However, we should take a few more steps forward in the function of desire.

為了顯示,大它者的存在總是暗藏在數字裡,我只需要跟你們指出,數字的系列先要隱隱約約地介紹零,然後才能計算。現在,零就是作為完整的主體,在這個層次的存在,在主體與大它者之間的辯證過程,我們不能抽取掉這個零。零這個領域看起來明顯中立,其實隱藏欲望的本身。我只要用驗算的方式,就能證明。可是,對於欲望的功用,我們應該再進一步探討。

In effect, Descartes inaugurates the initial bases of a science in which God has nothing to do. For the characteristic of our science, and its difference with the ancient sciences, is that nobody even dares, without incurring ridicule, to wonder whether God knows anything about it, whether God leafs through modern treatises on mathematics to keep up to date.

事實上,笛卡爾開展的這門科學的最初基礎,跟上帝完全沒有關係。因為我們科學的特性,以及它跟古代科學的差異是,甚至沒有人敢冒著受人嘲笑的危險,去質問上帝是否懂得科學,是否上帝會翻閱現代的科學論文,才不會被時代淘汰。

I have gone far enough today, and I apologize for not going further. I will leave you at this point, and do no more than indicate for you the last aim of my discourse for this year— namely, to pose the question of the position of psycho-analysis in science. Can psycho-analysis be situated in our science, in so far as this science is considered as that in which God has nothing to do?

我今天已經講得夠多了,很抱歉只能先談到這裡。我將在此先告一段落,我只是要告訴你們,今年我的講座的最後目的是什麼。換言之,我的目的是要提出,精神分析學在科學領域的定位是什麼?假如精神分析學被認為跟上帝沒有任何關係,它能夠被列入我們科學的領域嗎?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座245

January 28, 2010

拉岡講座245

Scepticism, certainty and the subject who is supposed to know
懷疑主義、確定性、與應該知道的主體

3
What distinguishes the Cartesian approach from the ancient search of the episteme, what distinguishes it from the skepticism that has been one of its terms, is what we shall try to articulate on the basis of the double function of alienation and separation.

區別笛卡爾的方法,跟古代認識論的尋求有何不同,區別它跟懷疑主義的術語有何不同,正是我們憑藉疏離與分裂的雙重功用的基礎,所要表達的內容。

What is Descartes looking for? He is looking for certainty. I have, he says, an extreme desire to learn to distinguish the true from the false—note the word desire—in order to see clearly—in what?— in my actions, and to walk with assurance in this life.

笛卡爾正在尋找什麼?他正在尋找確定性。他說:「我極度渴望要學會區別真理跟虛假」。請注意渴望這個字,他渴望清楚地看到什麼?「我渴望在我的這一生,在我的立身處世,我要確定知道,我到底為何而為。」

Is not this something quite different from the aim of knowledge? This approach is not that of a dialectician or a professor, still less that of a cavalier. It has been stressed that Descartes’ biography is marked above all by his wanderings in the world, his encounters and, after all, his secret ambition—
Larvatus prodeo. If I point this out, although I am one of those who regard concern for biography as secondary to the meaning of a work, it is because Descartes himself stresses that his biography,
his approach, is essential. to the communication of his method, of the way he has found to truth.

這難道不是相當迴異於知識的目標嗎?這個作風不是一位辯士或一位學者的作風,尤其不是一位浪漫騎士的作風。有人強調,笛卡爾的傳記的特色,尤其是在於他的漫遊各地,他的傳奇際遇,他深藏不露的尋求真理的企圖心。雖然我一向認為笛卡爾著作的偉大,遠勝過他的傳記,我還是指出這一點,那是因為笛卡爾本人強調,他以傳記作體驗的作風,對於他的研究的溝通及尋求真理的方式,是非常重要的。

He makes it quite clear that what he has given is not—as Bacon tried to do some years earlier—the general means of conducting one’s reason correctly, without abdicating it, for example, to experience. It is his own method, in so far as he set out in this direction with the desire to learn to distinguish the
true from the false in order to see clearly—in what? —in my actions. This example, then, is a particular one, and Descartes goes so far as to add that if what was for me, at a particular moment, my way, does not seem right for others, that is their affair, that they should gather from my experience what they
think is worth gathering. This forms part of the introduction by Descartes of his own way to science.

他清楚地表達,他提供我們的方法,跟培根早先幾年提供我們的方法不同。他的方法不是要尋求如何理性地安身立命,而是要親身體驗來證實。當他開始朝這個方向,渴望學習到如何區別真實跟虛假,他就是用這一套方法,看明白「自己的立身處世」。由於這個例子只是他自身的一個特例,笛卡爾繼續補充說:「在特殊時刻,適用於我的方式,似乎未必適用於別人。各人有各人的不同際遇,我的經驗充其量只供參考,他們應該收集他們認為值得收集的。」笛卡爾以科學作為真理之道,就這樣形成。

Does this mean that no knowledge is aimed at? Does it mean that knowledge weighs lightly in Descartes? Not at all, it is with this that he begins—there’s, enough knowledge around and to spare, there always has been, there still is. It is not I who have imposed this allusion here, but Descartes’ own text. He was trained by the best teachers, he was a pupil of the Jesuits at the College de La Flèche and there was no lack of knowledge, or of sapience, there.

這是否意味著,笛卡爾的目標是主觀體驗,而不是客觀知識?這是否意味著,客觀知識對於笛卡爾無足輕重?絕非如此!雖然他從主觀體驗出發,但是存在他四周圍的客觀知識,仍然綽綽有餘,始終存在,也一直存在。這不是我牽強附會,而是笛卡爾自己的文本記載。他接受過無數傑出師長的教導,他在拉、菲列齊學院,是耶穌會的門徒。那裡,客觀知識或雋永睿智,從來是不虞匱乏。

Shall I go so far as to say that it is not for nothing, that it is precisely a result of his Jesuit education, that he acquired his acute feeling of the superabundance of knowledge? Is there not at the heart of what is transmitted through a certain humanist wisdom something like a hidden perinde ac cadaver, which is not where it is usually placed, namely, in the supposed death that the rule of St Ignatius seems to require?

他博聞強識,觸類旁通,不是憑空而來,確實就是他曾接受過耶穌會教育的結果。我這樣說,不算是誇張罷?然而,這個人本主義薈萃的耶穌會核心,所傳遞的智慧,難道沒有透露出某些像是隱藏的「僵化教條」?這些僵化教條早已奄奄一息,依照聖、伊革拿提斯的規章所要求的,不是應該揚棄更新嗎?

Personally, I don’t feel very close to it, and these Jesuits, as I myself see them, from the outside, always seem to me to be very much there, not to say full of life —they make their presence felt, and with a diversity that is far from suggesting that of death. No, the death referred to here is that which is hidden behind the very notion of humanism, at the heart of any humanist consideration. And even when an attempt is made to animate the term as in the phrase the human sciences, there is something that we shall call a skeleton in the cupboard.

就我個人而言,我不覺得它已經到達如此地步。這些耶穌會教士,依我所見,從外表看來,他們似乎還是昂揚自在,有時甚至是意氣風發。他們到處耀武揚威,顯露多方才學,絲毫不會讓人聯想到是奄奄一息。不會的,這裡所提到的奄奄一息,是指人本主義這個觀念,由於背離人本主義的理想核心,所潛藏的危機。現在,即使有人企圖以人本科學這個詞語,使它振衰起蔽,但是我們還是覺得其核心價值,已經積重難返了。

It is here that Descartes finds a new way. His aim is not to refute uncertain knowledge. He is happy to let such knowledge run around quite freely, and with it all the rules of social life. Indeed, like everyone at this historical moment at the beginning of the seventeenth century, in that inaugural moment
of the emergence of the subject, he has present all around him a profusion of libertines who serve as the other term of the vel of alienation. They are in reality Pyrrhonians, sceptics, and Pascal calls them by their name, except that he does not stress in a sufficiently free way its meaning and implications.
Scepticism does not mean the successive doubting, item by item, of all opinions or of all the pathways that accede to knowledge.

笛卡爾就是在這個地方,開闢一條新路。他的目的不是要反駁客觀知識的不確定。他很樂意讓這樣的客觀知識,以及社會生活的規範,順其自然地運作。的確,十七世紀剛開始,是一個歷史轉捩點,是人本主義的主體剛出現的時刻。笛卡爾跟大家一樣,周圍環繞著一大群的自由主義份子。這些人後來充當疏離的欲望驅力的代名詞。他們實際上古代的庇羅主義者,也就是懷疑論者,巴斯卡就直接稱呼其名為懷疑論者,只是不恣意妄為地強調懷疑一詞的意涵及引伸。懷疑主義並不意味著不斷地懷疑,對於所有的意見,對於處理客觀知識的各項途徑,逐一懷疑。

It is holding the subjective position that one can know nothing. There is something here that deserves to be illustrated by the range, the substance, of those who have been its historical embodiments. I would show you that Montaigne is truly the one who has centred not around scepticism but around the living moment of the aphanisis of the subject. And it is in this that he is fruitful, that he is an eternal guide, who goes beyond whatever may be represented of the moment to be defined as a historical turning-point. But this is not scepticism.

人若只堅持主觀的立場,將永遠無法瞭解客觀的知識。任何事情的理解,端賴在歷史上躬逢其會者,他們的見識及才識的範圍。我舉個例子。哲學家蒙田的思想,就不是以人本的懷疑主義的為中心,而是以主體的失蹤作為生命的覺醒時刻為中心。在這一點,蒙田的成就輝煌,足以當我們永遠的嚮導。他超越所謂歷史轉捩點的可能的代表。但是,他並不是懷疑主義者。

Scepticism is something that we no longer know. Scepticism is an ethic. Scepticism is a mode of sustaining man in life, which implies a position so difficult, so heroic, that we can no longer even imagine it—precisely perhaps because of this passage found by Descartes, which led the search for the path of certainty to this very point of the vel of alienation, to which there is only one exit—the way of desire.

懷疑主義現在已經不再盛行。它是一門倫理學,是人安身立命的一種模式。它意味著,人生的處境如此艱難,如此悲壯,以致於它超越我們的想像能力。笛卡爾就在此時開闢一條新的通道。他引導我們尋求確定性的途徑,到達疏離的欲望驅力這裡。這裡只有一個出口,就是透過欲望的途徑

This desire for certainty led Descartes only to doubt—the choice of this way led him to operate a rather strange separation. I would simply like to touch on a few points, which will serve as reference points in grasping an essential function, masked though it may be, which is still vital, present and directive in
our method of investigating the unconscious.

尋求人生確定答案的欲望,導致笛卡爾處處懷疑。這條途徑的選擇,引導他進行一項奇異的分裂。我現在只想先說幾點,可以充當理解一個基本功能的指標。雖然這個功能隱而不顯,它的存在作為指標依舊很重要,當我們設法要探討無意識的時候。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座244

January 27, 2010

拉岡講座244
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者:失蹤

Descartes’ desire
笛卡爾的欲望
2
Do I need to stress that we must understand Representanz here in the sense in which things happens at the real level, where communication takes place in every human domain.

我需要強調,我們在此必須從發生在真實界的意義來了解「符號」嗎?因為每一個人的溝通其實都發生在真實界那裡。

We mean by representatives what we understand when we use the phrase, for example, the representative of France. What do diplomats do when they address one another? They simply exercise, in relation to one another, that function of being pure representatives and, above all, their own signification must not intervene. When diplomats are addressing one another, they are supposed to represent something whose signification, while constantly changing, is, beyond their own persons, France, Britain, etc. In the very exchange of views, each must record only what the other transmits in his pure function as signifier, he must not take into account what the other is, qua presence, as a man who is likable to a greater or lesser degree. Interpsychology is an impurity in this exchange.

我們所謂的「符號」,意思是指當我們使用一個詞語時,我們了解它的意思。例如,法國這個符號代表什麼。當外交家彼此對談時,他們在做些什麼?他們僅僅是互相在運用純粹是語言符號的功能,尤其是,他們是代表國家發言,個人情感務必不要介入。當外交家彼此對談時,他們代表的不應該純屬個人意見,而是法國或英國等自己國家的意見,雖然觀點不斷地改變。在交換彼此意見時,每位外交官都必須記錄,對方的語言所傳遞的訊息。他一定不能只是考慮到在現場的對方,作為有情感的個人的想法。外交家交換意見時,彼此的內心感受在此不列入考慮。

The term Repro.sentanz is to be taken in this sense. The signifier has to be understood in this way, it is at the opposite pole from signification. Signification, on the other hand, comes into play in the Vorstellung.

「符號」這個用詞要用這層意義來理解。意符必需以這種方式來理解,它跟真實意義是背道而馳的。在另一方面,真實意義是在觀念的領域運作。

It is with the Vorstellung that we are dealing in psychology, when the objects of the world are taken in charge, in some way, under the parenthesis of a subject in which a whole series of a, a’, a’, etc., unfolds.

在觀念領域,我們正在處理的是心理學。世界作為一個客體,被放置在在主體的括弧裡來處裡。在那裡,一連串的意符展開運作。

Here is situated the subjectivity on which the theory of knowledge is suspended. Of course, every representation requires a subject, but this subject is never a pure subject. If one believes that each subject is sustained in the world with his original—in both senses of the word (originale ou originelle ) — Weltanschauung, then the path of truth passes—as a backward psychology or psycho-sociology is still showing us —through the inquiry, the totalization, the statistics of different
Weltanschauung. And things might be thus, were there in the world subjects, each entrusted with the task of representing certain conceptions of the world.

知識的理論建立在人的主觀性,這個主觀性的位置就在這裡。當然,每一個符號都要求有一個人的主體。假如我們相信,每一個主體生存於這個世界,都有他自己原創的一套的世界觀,那麼真理經過的道路,必然是穿梭於不同的世界觀之間的探索、整合、及累積。假如世界是由不同的主體組成,事情的情況將是:每一個主體都被委任一個任務,那就代表某種的世界觀。

Indeed, this is the essential flaw in philosophical idealism which, in any case, cannot be sustained and has never been radically sustained. There is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject, and it is in this alienation, in this fundamental division, that the dialectic of the subject is established.

的確,這是哲學的理念主義的基本瑕疵。無論如何,理念主義無法長久維持,也從來沒有風行一時。每一個主體,總是在某個地方,會有主體的失蹤。就是這種疏離,這個基本的區隔,主體被建立。

In order to answer the question I was asked last time concerning my adhesion to the Hegeian dialectic, is it not enough that I should answer that, because of the vel, the sensitive point, point of balance, there is an emergence of the subject at the level of meaning only from its aphanisis in the Other locus, which is that of the unconscious?

為了回答我上一次被問道的問題,關於我一直堅持黑格爾正反合辯證法。我的回答是,因為欲望驅力是一個敏感點與平衡點,只有從在大它者領域,也就是無意識的領域,主體自己失蹤的時刻,主體才出現。我這樣回答夠清楚嗎?

Furthermore, this involves no mediation, and I promise, if I am provoked into doing so, to show that
the effective experience that has been established in the perspective of an absolute knowledge never leads us to anything that may, in any way, illustrate the Hegeian vision of successive syntheses, nothing that provides even so much as a hint of the moment that Hegel in some obscure way links to this stage,
and which someone has been pleased to illustrate by the title of Dimanche de la vie—when no opening remains in the heart of the subject.

而且,主體失蹤與主體出現,沒有仲介。假如你們硬要逼我作個仲介,我只能承諾表示,從絕對知識的觀點,我們精神分析經驗的效用,從來沒有引導我們能像黑格爾正反合辯證法那樣運作,沒有一樣暗示,可以提供我們得黑格爾那樣的精神現象學,像有些人喜歡提到「為國捐軀」那樣的標題。在主體的核心,失蹤與消失沒有仲介。

I should indicate here where the Hegeian lure proceeds from. It is included in the approach of the Cartesian I think, in which I designated the inaugural point that introduces, in history, in our experience, in our necessity, the vel of alienation, which prevents us for ever from misunderstanding it. It is in
the Cartesian approach that the vel was taken for the first time as the constituent of the dialectic of the subject, which now cannot be eliminated in his radical foundation.

我在此應該指出,黑格爾的陷阱從哪裡推展。他的陷阱就潛藏在哲學家笛卡爾的「我思故我在」。我指明這個「我思」,就是導致疏離的驅力起始的地方,不論是歷史上的疏離,我們精神分析經驗的疏離,或我們生命必然的疏離。因為這個疏離,我們永遠無法不誤解它。在笛卡爾的「我思故我在」的方法,欲望驅力第一次被當著是主體辯證法的組成要素,無法從他的根本基礎上被消除掉。

This reference will be useful to me in characterizing the experience of the transference, so I shall be returning to it later in order to articulate certain of its features.

當我在表達移情的經驗的特性時,我們想到「我思」這一點是很有幫助的。以後,我還會回到這一點,為了要清楚表達移情的某些特徵。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座243

January 22, 2010
  • 拉岡講座243

‘7
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: APHANISIS
主體與大它者:失蹤

The question of the Vorstellungsreprasentanz
自由符號的問題

Freedom, Representation, and the Hegelian lure
自由、符號、與黑格爾的陷阱

When I said, at the beginning of these talks— I do not seek, I find, I meant that, in Freud’s field, one has only to bend down and pick up what is to be found. The real implication of the nachtrdglich, for example, has been ignored, though it was there all the time and had only to be picked up. I also remember the surprise of someone who was on the same track as I, seeing one day what could be done with the einziger Zug, the single stroke.

在我這些演講的開始,我說「我並沒有尋求,我只是找到」,我的意思是,在佛洛伊德的學說,我們只需要彎下身,檢拾起我們所必須要找到的東西。例如,「自由」的真正意涵一直受到忽視,僅管它始終是在那裡,我們只需要將它檢拾起來。我也記得有某個人大吃一驚,因為他研究的途徑跟我一樣,有一天他看到,只要敢放手一搏,就會豁然開朗。

Today I would like to show you the importance, already designated by my schema last time, of what Freud calls, at the level of repression, the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.

今天,我想要給你們觀看,佛洛伊德所謂的the Vorstellungsreprasentanz.「表象代表」,在表壓抑的層次,有多麼重要,雖然在上一次,我已經用我的構圖指明過。

Vorstellung involves a sort of defect that leads the German language to put unwarranted ss, which cannot be attached to the normal declension of the determinate, but which are necessary to it when forming composite words. There are therefore two terms— Vorstellung, Representan.

Vorstellung表象,牽涉到某種的缺點,導致德文的語言,沒來由地將Vorstellungs-reprasentanz 表象代表這個複合字,前後兩個字,各有複數的s跟z,這並非是的限定詞的語尾變化的正式用法。可是組成複合字時,卻又無法避免。因此,這裡有兩個術語:表象與代表。

I spoke to you last time about the form of alienation, which I illustrated with several examples, and which I told you could be articulated in a vel of a very special nature. Today we might try to articulate it in some other ways. For example—not something. . . without something else. The dialectic of the slave is obviously no freedom without life, but there will be no life for him without freedom. From one to the other there is a necessary condition. This necessary condition becomes precisely the adequate reason that causes the loss of the original requirement.

我上一次跟你們談到疏離的形式。我用好幾個例子說明,我也告訴你們,我們能夠用一種特別性質的欲望驅力,來表達疏離。今天,我們將用一些其它的方式來表達它。例如,沒有某件東西,就沒有某件其它的東西。奴隸的辯證法邏輯,顯而易見是「要先有生命,才會有自由」,但結果是「沒有自由,生命形同死亡」。從前者到後者,有一個必要的條件。這個必要的條件,確實成為充份的理由,造成原先的要求的喪失。

Perhaps this is something like what also happens among some of my followers. There is no way of following me without passing through my signifiers, but to pass through my signifiers involves this feeling of alienation that incites them to seek, according to Freud’s formula the small difference.

也許,這正是我的某些聽眾也經常發生的事情。假如沒有透過我的意符,他們沒有辦法來了解我的學說,但是要透過我的意符,會牽涉到一種疏離的感覺,因為根據佛洛伊德的模式,這種疏離的感覺會激發他們去尋找這個小小的差異。

Unfortunately, this small difference makes them lose the full significance of the direction I pointed out to them. Heavens, I am not so touchy, I leave everyone to go his own way in the direction that I point out —but I could have done without having to take note of what seemed to a particular individual so worthy of rectification in the translation that I had first given of this Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. I had noted that Freud stresses the fact that repression bears on something that is of the order of representation that he calls the Vorstellungsreprdsentanz.

不幸地,這個小小的差異,使我對他們所標示出來的追尋途徑的意義,全部蕩然無存。我的天呀,我並不是多愁善感,我讓每個人根據我指出的方向各自努力,但是我本來大可自行其是,而不需要去注意,哪一位值得我去糾正他的誤解,我將Vorstellungsrepr&entanz. 「表象代表」這個德文字的翻譯。

As soon as I introduced this remark several years ago— which was also a way of reading what Freud writes under the heading of Verdrängung, the article that follows the one on the unconscious in the series of texts collected together under the term metapsychological—I insisted on the fact that Freud emphasizes that it is not the affect that is repressed. The affect —and we shall see what this means in our theory—goes off somewhere else, as best it can. There will always be enough professors of psychology to justify with the patient that its meaning is to be found precisely where it is no longer in its place. So I insisted on the fact that what is repressed is not the represented of desire, the signification, but the representative (it représentant) —I translated literally—of the representation (de la representation).

好幾年前,我剛介紹這個論述時,我堅持說,佛洛伊德強調,被壓抑的並不是情意。佛洛伊德當時寫的標題是Verdrängun,這一篇文章放在「形上心理學」標題的文集裡,緊跟在「論無意識」那一篇之後。情意會盡其可能,在某個地方迸發。讓我們看看在我們的理論裡,這意味著什麼?不乏眾多的心理學教授跟他們的病人證實:情意的意義,要在它不復存在的地方,才能夠被找到。所以,我堅持說,所被壓抑的東西,並不是欲望的符號所代表的意義,而是符號的代表物,容我照字面翻譯。

Here the function of alienation intervenes for this or that individual, who, more or less animated by a care for the privileges of university authority, and anxious to enter the lists, claims to correct the translation that I have given. The Vorstellungsreprosentanz is the representative representative (le reprCsentant reprIsentatif), let us say.

在此,對於這位或那位先生,疏離發揮了功用。他們相當關心到大學當局的特權,渴望慎重其事,宣稱要糾正我對於這字詞的翻譯。「表象代表」就是「符號的代表物」,容我們這樣說。

This doesn’t seem to amount to very much. But in a little book on psycho-somatics that has just appeared, one finds a whole passage arguing that there is some misunderstanding in something that must be called my theory of desire and, in a small note referring to some inaccessible passage taken from the text offered by two of my pupils, it is stressed that, following me, they make desire the representative representative of need.

這似乎無關緊要。但是在一本剛出版的論心理與生理的小書,有人發現有一整個篇章都在辯駁,我的欲望理論,有誤導的地方。並且在注釋裡,還引用我的兩位學生所提供的文本,再斷章取義地強調說,我的學生追隨我之後,將欲望解釋著需求的代表符號。

I’m not questioning whether in fact my pupils wrote that—we have been unable to find the passage in question—the important thing is that the only pertinent remark in this extremely slight book is as follows—we would say rather that desire is the nonrepresentative representative.

我不是在質疑,事實上是否我的學生所寫的東西,因為我無法找到他們所引述的那個段落。重要的是,在這本無關緊要的書裡,唯一中肯的說法應該如下:我們應該說,欲望是無法代表的代表符號。

Now, that is precisely what I mean, and say—for what I mean, I say—in translating Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc by representative of the representation.

現在,這確實是我的意思。我的意思是要將Vorstellungsrepro.sentanc「表象代表」 翻譯為「符號的代表物」

We can locate this Vorstellungsrepresentanz in our schema of the original mechanisms of alienation in that first signifying coupling that enables us to conceive that the subject appears first in the Other, in so far as the first signifier, the unary signifier, emerges in the field of the Other and represents the
subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the subject. Hence the division of the subject—when the subject appears somewhere as meaning, he is manifested elsewhere as ‘fading’, as disappearance. There is, then, one might say, a matter of life and death between the unary signifier and the subject, qua binary signifier, cause of his disappearance. The Vorstellungsreprtisentanz is the binary signifier.

我們能夠「自由符號」的位置,放在我們原先疏離的機械結構的基模。那個第一個意符的組合,使我們能夠構想,主體首先出現在那個大它者的意符鎖鏈。在大它者的領域,第一個意符出現,代表主體對於另外一個意符。這另外一個意符,擁有主體的失蹤作為自己的影響。因此,主體形成分裂,當主體作為意義,出現在某個地方,他在別的地方,被證明是「隱退」,是消失。我們因此可以說,最初的意符跟主體之間,有一個生死交關的問題,那就是,作為最初的意符,主體造成自己的消失。「表象代表」就是最初的意符。

This signifier constitutes the central point of the Urverdrangung— of what, from having passed into the unconscious, will be, as Freud indicates in his theory, the point of Anziehung, the point of attraction, through which all the other repressions will be possible, all the other similar passages in the locus of the Unterdruckt, of what has passed underneath as signifier. This is what is involved in the term Vorstellungsreprdcentanz.

這個自由意符進入無意識的領域時,處於吸引力的中央位置,如佛洛伊德在其學說所主張。透過這個吸引力的中央位置,所有的其他壓抑,所有通過這個軌跡底下的類似意符,才成為可能。這就是「表象代表」牽涉到的運作。

That by which the subject finds the return way of the vet of alienation is the operation I called, the other day, separation. By separation, the subject finds, one might say, the weak point of the primal dyad of the signifying articulation, in so far as it is alienating in essence. It is in the interval between these two signifiers that resides the desire offered to the mapping of the subject in the experience of the discourse of the Other, of the first Other he has to deal with, let us say, by way of illustration, the mother. It is in so far as his desire is beyond or falls short of what she says, of what she hints at, of what she brings out as meaning, it is in so far as his desire is unknown, it is in this point of lack, that the desire of the subject is constituted.

主體找到疏離的驅力的歸途,就是我前天所稱為的分裂的運作。我們可以說,憑藉這個分裂,主體找到意符表達的原初架構的弱點,因為它在本質上是疏離的。在大它者的論述的經驗中,在主體必須要處理的第一個大它者的領域,例如,母親作為大它者的意符,主體展現的欲望,就駐留在這兩個意符之間的間隔。主體的欲望,常會超越,或沒有達到母親所期望,母親所暗示,以及母親所揭示的意義,因為欲望無以名狀。就在這個欠缺點的地方,主體的欲望被構成。

The subject—by a process that is not without deception, which is not without presenting that fundamental twist by which what the subject rediscovers is not that which animates his movement of rediscovery—comes back, then, to the initial point, which is that of his lack as such, of the lack of his aphanisis.

主體經歷的過程,並非沒有欺騙,並非沒有呈現那個基本的演變,只是在演變的過程,主體重新發現的東西,並不是原先激發他去重新發現的動作的動機。然後,主體又回來,到原初的地方,原先欠缺本身的地方,他失蹤的欠缺處。

We will come back in greater detail to the consequences that flow from it for the analytic treatment itself, and we shall see that this twist effect is essential in integrating the emergence phase of the transference. For the moment, I would like to dwell on what is essential in the function of desire, namely, that it is in as much as the subject plays his part in separation that the binary signifier, the Vorsellungsrepr&sentanz, is untera’rilckt, sunk underneath.

我們將再回來詳述,從精神分析治療本身所觀看到的結果。我們將看到,這個演變的影響的重要性,因為它包含移情出現的部份。目前,我想要先描述欲望的功用最重要的東西,換言之,當主體在分裂的狀況,扮演自己的角色時,這個二元的意符沉落到底下。

The thing is essential if we are to articulate properly—it immediately throws some light on very different regions—what is the sign of interpretation.

假如我們想要表達得貼切,這件事情非常重要。它讓我們明白那截然不同的地區,也就是解釋的符號的地區。

It might be useful in passing to bring out—however metaphysical it may seem, but in any case our technique often makes use, as if it were self-evident, of the expression to free something
—it might be useful to remark that it is there that the whole business of this term freedom, which certainly merits the description of phantom, is played out. What the subject has to free himself of is the aphanisic effect of the binary signifier and, if we look at it more closely, we shall see that in fact it is a question of nothing else in the function of freedom.

聽起來有點形而上地抽象,可是偶爾用它來開導啟發,還是蠻有用途。無論如何,我們精神分析的技巧,經常使用這個表達來解放一些東西,好像這是天經地義。我們也不妨這樣說:「自由」這個術語,聽起來像是天馬行空的幻影,就是在那個主體失蹤的欠缺處耀武揚威。主體必須替自己解放的東西,就是那個二元意符的失蹤的影響。如果我們觀看得更仔細,我們將會看到,事實上,那就是自由的功用,不是別的。

It is not for nothing that having had to justify the term vel of alienation at the level of our experience, the two most obvious supports to occur to us were those two choices which, by their formula, structure, firstly, the position of the slave and, secondly, the position of the master. When the slave is confronted with the choice of his freedom or his life, he decides, no freedom without life–life remains forever deprived of freedom. And, when we stand back to look at things, we will see that the alienation of the master is structured in exactly the same way. For if Hegel shows us that the status of the masters is established in the struggle to the death of pure prestige, it is because it is to bring his choice through death that the master also constitutes his fundamental alienation.

我們必須從精神分析的經驗,來證實疏離的欲望驅力這個術語,並不是沒有道理。我們得到兩個最顯而易見的支持,就是根據這套公式,我們有兩種選擇的架構,首先是奴隸的位置,其次是主人的位置。奴隸面臨「要自由?或是要生命?」的抉擇時,他決定「沒有生命,也等於沒自由」,於是他苟且偷生,始終被剝奪掉自由。可是,當我們回顧那些事情時,我們將會看到,主人的疏離所架構的方式,也確實大同小異。黑格爾告訴我們,主人的地位,自始至終被建立在維護自我的威望跟尊嚴。那是因為主人在將他的抉擇貫徹始終時,也構成了自己基本的疏離感。

Certainly, one can say that the master is no more spared by death than is his slave, that he will always die in the end, and that this is the limit of his freedom. But to say this is insufficient for this death is not the death that constitutes the alienating choice of the master, the death of the struggle to the death of
pure prestige. The revelation of the essence of the master is manifested at the moment of terror, when it is to him that one says freedom or death, and then he has obviously only death to choose in order to have freedom. The supreme image of the master is that character in Claudeian tragedy, Sygne de Confontaine, of whom I have spoken at length in one of my seminars. It is she who wished to abandon nothing of her register, the register of the master, and the values to which she sacrifices bring her, over and above her sacrifice, no more than the need to renounce, in all its depths, her very being. It is in so far as, through the sacrifice of these values, she is forced to renounce her essence, her very being, her most intimate being, that she illustrates, in the end, how much radical alienation of freedom there is in the master

的確,我們能夠說,主人跟奴隸一樣,都沒有被死亡所赦免,他最後還是難逃一死,這是他自由的極限。但是如此說法並不公道,因為這樣的死亡,跟構成主人的疏離的選擇的死亡,跟自始至終護尊嚴威望的死亡,迴然不同。在遭逢恐嚇的時刻,主人的本質顯示得最為明顯。因為是他在說「不自由,毋寧死」,然後,顯而易見地,他只有死亡可以選擇,為了要維護他的自由。主人的崇高意象,就是克勞地安悲劇小說「孔芬坦夫人」 的人物,在我以前的演講,我曾詳細描述過。這位女主角不希望放棄自己的尊嚴,作為主人的尊嚴,以及她願意犧牲一切來維護的價值,正如她不希望放棄生命最真實的存在。可是就在透過這些價值的犧牲,她被迫放棄她的本質,她生命的存在,她最親密的存在。最後,她發揮主人的自由的強烈的疏離,而成為最佳典範。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座242

January 21, 2010

拉岡講座242

THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: ALIENATION
主體與大它者:疏離

The why?
「為什麼」的問題

4
Given the time, I can do no more here than introduce the second operation. It completes the circularity of the relation of the subject to the Other, but an essential twist is revealed in it.

由於時間限制,我現在只能夠介紹這第二回合的運作。它完成主體到大它者的循環,但是在這裡有一個重要的演變。

Whereas the first phase is based on the sub-structure of joining, the second is based on the sub-structure that is called intersection or product. It is situated precisely in that same lunula in which you find the form of the gap, the rim.

雖然第一部份的基礎是聯合的次級結構,第二部份的基礎,是所謂交會或結果的次級結構。它的位置確實就是在那個相同的新月形狀的地分,你會發現到分裂的形狀,邊緣的形狀。

The intersection of two sets is constituted by the elements that belong to the two sets. It is here that the second operation in which the subject is led by this dialectic takes place. It is as essential to define the second operation as the first, because it is there that we shall see the emergence of the field of the transference. I shall call it—introducing my second new term here—separation.

這兩組的交會,分由屬於這兩組的因素所組成。受到辯證法引導的主體的第二次運作,就發生在這裡。第二次運作,可以認定跟第一次運作同樣的重要,因為在這裡,我們將會看到移情的場域出現。我將稱之為分裂,作為我第二個新的術語。

Separare, to separate—I would point out at once the equivocation of the se parare, of the se parer, in all the fluctuating meanings it has in French. It means not only to dress oneself; but also to defend oneself; to provide oneself with what one needs to be on one’s guard, and I will go further still, and Latinists
will bear me out, to the se parere, the s’engendrer, the to be engendered, which is involved here. How, at this level, has the subject to procure himself? For that is the origin of the word that designates in Latin to engender. It is juridical, as indeed, curiously enough, are all the words in Indo-European that designate to put into the world. The word parturition itself originates in a word which, in its root, simply means to procure a child from the husband—a juridical and, it should be said, social operation.

在法文裡,分裂這個字詞有各種模稜兩可的意涵,容我馬上指出它的曖昧雙關處。它的意思不僅是替自己穿衣,而且也是要保衛自己,供應自己防衛所需的東西。我會再詳加說明,分裂這個字詞,意思牽涉到「即將產生」,拉丁語學家可以為我證實。在這個層次上,主體如何實現自己?因為那個字詞起源於拉丁文的原意「即將產生」。確實耐人尋味的是,在所有印歐語系,這個字詞合情合理地指的是「進入世界」。「分娩」這個字詞本身,從字根起源的原意,僅是從丈夫那裡得到一個小孩。我們應該說,這樣的運作是合情合理的。

Next time, I shall try to show how, like the function of the alienating vel, so different from the other vels defined so far, use is to be made of this notion of intersection. We shall see how it emerges from the superimposition of two lacks.

下一次,我將設法顯示,我們如何利用「交會」這個觀念,因為如同疏離的欲望驅力的功用,它跟迄今所談論到其它欲望驅力如此的不同。我們將會看到,從兩個欠缺的重疊處,有交會的現象出現。

A lack is encountered by the subject in the Other, in the very intimation that the Other makes to him by his discourse. In the intervals of the discourse of the Other, there emerges in the experience of the child something that is radically mappable, namely, He is saying this to me, but what does he want?

主體在大它者那裡遭遇到一個欠缺,由於大它者憑藉自己的論述,給予它種種耳提面命。在大它者的論述的間隔,孩童經驗到某種明顯可找得出來的東西,換言之,「他正在跟我這樣說,但是他到底要我怎麼做?」

In this interval intersecting the signifiers, which forms part of the very structure of the signifier, is the locus of what, in other registers of my exposition, I have called metonymy. It is there that what we call desire crawls, slips, escapes, like the ferret. The desire of the Other is apprehended by the subject
in that which does not work, in the lacks of the discourse of the Other, and all the child’s why’s reveal not so much an avidity for the reason of things, as a testing of the adult, a Why are you telling me this? ever-resuscitated from its base, which is the enigma of the adult’s desire.

這個意符的交會的間隔,組成意符結構的部份,也是我所謂意符轉喻的軌跡,用我在其它表述的說法。就在那裡,我們所謂的欲望,像雪貂一樣,潛行、溜走、又逃脫。大它者的欲望,看似不著運作痕跡,卻是在大它者的論述的兩個欠缺處,被主體所理解。小孩發出種種「為什麼」,顯示著,他不是熱切地想尋問各種理由,而是對大人的一種探問:「你為什麼跟我說這些?」這個問句,從它的根源處,週而復始地冒出來,是大人欲望的謎團。

Now, to reply to this hold, the subject, like Gribouille, brings the answer of the previous lack, of his own disappearance, which he situates here at the point of lack perceived in the Other. The first object he proposes for this parental desire whose object is unknown is his own loss—Can he lose me? The phantasy of one’s death, of one’s disappearance, is the first object that the subject has to bring into play in this dialectic, and he does indeed bring it into play—as we know from innumerable cases, such as in anorexia nervosa. We also know that the phantasy of one’s death is usually manipulated by the child in his love relations with his parents.

現在,為了回答這糾纏的問句,像「格瑞波利」影片中主角一樣,主體以自己的消失,及先前的欠缺,作為回答。主體自己的位置,在大它者的領域,所感受的是欠缺。這個父母親的期望的目標,主體不甚瞭然,他替自己豎立的第一個目標,是讓自己消失:「他能夠失去我嗎?」幻想自己的死亡,幻想自己的消失,就是主體在這個意符辯證法,必須運作的第一個目標。他確實讓這個目標運作,如同我們從無數神經性厭食症的例子所獲知。我們也知道,小孩在處理自己跟父母親的關係時,常幻想自己的死亡。

One lack is superimposed upon the other. The dialectic of the objects of desire, in so far as it creates the link between the desire of the subject and the desire of the Other—I have been telling you for a long time now that it is one and the same—this dialectic now passes through the fact that the desire is not replied to directly. It is a lack engendered from the previous time that serves to reply to the lack raised by the following time.

一個欠缺重疊著另一個欠缺。欲望的各種目標的辯證法,創造主體的欲望,跟大它者的欲望之間的關係,我長久以來一直告訴過你們,兩者常是混為一談。這個欲望目標的辯證法,所經歷的現實是,欲望並沒有得到直接的回應。欲望是先前欲望所產生的欠缺,而先前的欲望,卻又充當後來欲望提出的欠缺的回應。

I think I have sufficiently stressed the two elements that I have tried to present today, in this new and fundamental logical argument—non-reciprocity and the twist in the return.

我想我已經反覆再三地強調,在這個新的根本的邏輯辯證裡,我今天設法提出的這兩種因素:非互惠的特性及回轉時的演變。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡241

January 19, 2010

拉岡講座141

THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: ALIENATION
主體與大它者:疏離

Your money, or your life
要錢?還是要命?
3
The rim process, the circular process, the relation in question is to be supported by the small losange that I used as algorithm in my graph precisely because it is necessary in integrating some of the finished products of this dialectic.

邊緣的過程,循環的過程,我在圖形的軌跡中,使用一個小小的郵戳般的方形符號,來表示它們之間的關係,因為這種循環的辯證法,需要將產生的結果合併來看。

It is impossible not to integrate it, for example, in phantasy itself—it is $ a [barred S, punch, petita]. It is impossible not to integrate it also in that radical node in which are conjoined demand and drive, designated by the $GD [barred S, punch, capital D], which might be called the cry.

例如,我們不得不採用幻想模式,將它合併,因為它的過程是被禁制的主體,經由這個方形符號箭頭方向迴旋,到小客體,然後再迴旋到被禁制的主體。我們也不得不將它合併在需求與驅力互相結合的那個點,符號的表示是:被禁制的主體,經由這個方形符號箭頭方向的那個點,到大寫字母的欲望,然後再迴旋到被禁制的主體。那個點可稱為呼喚點。

Let us keep with this little losange. It is a rim, a functioning rim. One has only to provide it with a vectorial direction, here anti-clockwise—this is governed by the fact that, at least in our writing, you read things from left to right.

讓我們繼續談這個小小的方形符號。這是一個邊緣,一個運作的邊緣。我們只需要供應它一個向量的方向,在這裡,以逆時鐘方向。支配它的運轉的方向是從左到右,至少,在我們精神分析的寫作中是這個方向。

Be careful! They are supports for your thought that are not without artifice, but there is no topology that does not have to be supported by some artifice—it is precisely the result of the fact that the subject depends on the signifier, in other words, on a certain impotence in your thinking.

小心!若是要將它運用到你的思維時,還需要有一些奧妙技巧。凡是地形學的變化,都需要有一些奧妙技巧,才能施展得開。主要的原因是,主體依靠意符的結果,換言之,主體依靠你的思維會有某些意符無法彰顯精神的地方。

The small V of the lower half of the losange, let us say here that it is the vel constituted by the first operation, where I wish to leave you for a moment.

這個方形符號的下半部,是個小小的V字形。容我們在此說,這就是欲望驅力第一回合的運作,我希望讓你們思索一下子。

Indeed, you may find that these things are all rather silly. But logic always is a bit silly. If one does not go to the root of the childish, one is inevitably precipitated into stupidity, as can be shown by innumerable examples, such as the supposed antinomies of reason, for example, the catalogue of all the
catalogues that do not include themselves, and one arrives at an impasse, which, I can’t think why, gives logicians vertigo.

的確,你可能發現,這些事情有點弄巧成拙。但是,邏輯就是有點弄巧成拙。假如我們童心未泯的話,我們最後一定會落得弄巧成拙,如無數例子證明的,例如,理性的白馬非馬的詭論,我正在說謊這句話證明是真話,最後總是陷入進退兩難的僵局,使得邏輯專家都頭昏腦脹,真是匪夷所思。

Yet the solution is very simple, it is that the signifier with which one designates the same signifier is evidently not the same signifier as the one with which one designates the other—this is obvious enough. The word obsolete, in so far as it may signify that the word obsolete is itself an obsolete word, is not the same word obsolete in each case. This ought to encourage us to develop this vel that I have introduced to you.

可是,解決的方法很簡單。我們使用來指明的相同意符的意符,顯而易見,跟使用來指明它者的意符,並非是相同的意符。這是顯而易見的。過時的字詞,已經被使用成陳腔濫調,在每一種情況下,所指明的意涵並不相同。我跟你們介面的欲望驅力這個字詞,我們不妨也如此索解發揮。

The subject is grounded in the vel of the first essential operation. To be sure, it is not at all without interest to develop it here, before so vast an audience, since it is a question of nothing less than that operation that we call alienation.

主體的基礎在於第一輪迴的基本運作。的確,在如此眾多聽眾面前,我將它發揮一下,相信也還能引起大家的興趣,因為這個問題道道地地就是我們所謂的疏離的運作。

One has to admit that there is a lot of this alienation about nowadays. Whatever one does, one is always a bit more alienated, whether in economics, politics, psycho-pathology, aesthetics, and so on. It may be no bad thing to see what the root of this celebrated alienation really is. Does it mean, as I seem to be saying, that the subject is condemned to seeing himself emerge, in initio, only in the field of the Other? Could it be that? Well, it isn’t. Not at all—not at all—not at all.

我們必須承認,今天的世界有許多這種疏離的現象。不管我們如何選擇,我們總是會有一些的疏離感覺,無論是在經濟、政治心理病因學、美學,等等。這也不無小補,假如我們觀看到這惡名昭彰的疏離現象是根源是什麼。這難道不是如我所說,意味著,主體被判定觀看自己的出現,最初只是在大它者所在的領域?可能是這樣嗎?嗯,未必是這樣。根本不是這樣。根本不是。

Alienation consists in this vet, which—if you do not object to the word condemned, I will use it— condemns the subject to appearing only in that division which, it seems to me, I have just articulated sufficiently by saying that, if it appears on one side as meaning, produced by the signifier, it appears on the other as aphanisis.

疏離的現象在於欲望驅力判定主體,容我使用判定這個字眼,判定主體只能出現在我剛剛一再表達的那個區隔,在那個由意符產生的意義那一邊,出現在大它者的那一邊,作為「失蹤者」。

There is a vel that is worth illustrating, in order to differentiate it from the other uses of the vet, of the or. There are two of them. You know, from your earliest lessons in logic, that there is the exclusive vet—I go either there or there—if I go there, I do not go there, I have to choose. There is another way
of using vet—I go to one side or the other, I don’t care, one’s as good as the other. These two vets are not alike. Well, there is a third, and in order not to mislead you, I will tell you straight away what it is intended for.

有一個欲望驅力值得詳加說明,為了區別它跟這個驅力,這個二者選一的驅力的其它用途,有所不同。有兩種欲望驅力的模式。你們從初級的邏輯課程知道,這是一個具有排除性的欲望驅力:我去那裡,或留在這裡。假如我去那裡,我就不會留在這裡,我必須二者選擇一個。欲望驅力還有另外一種選擇:我去那一邊,或留在這一邊,我都無所謂,反正這一邊跟那一邊都一樣好。這兩種欲望驅力並不相同。嗯,還有第三種選擇模式。為了不要誤導你們,我就開門見山,立刻說出它的意圖。

Symbolic logic, which is very useful in bringing a little light into so tricky a domain, teaches us to distinguish the implications of the operation that we call joining. To speak as one speaks when it is a question of sets, adding two collections together is not identical to joining them. If in this circle, that
on the left, there are five objects, and if, in the other, there are also five—adding them together makes ten. But some of them may belong to both circles. If there are two that belong to each of the two circles, joining them together will in this instance consist not in doubling their number—there will be in all only eight objects. I apologize if I am being naive in reminding you of this, but it is in order to give you the notion that this vel that I will try to articulate for you is supported only on the logical form of joining.

當我們在表明如此詭譎的領域,符號的邏輯會有一些幫助,教導我們表明我們所謂的聯合的運作有何意義。當我們在談數學的集合論時,將兩個集合聯接在一起,並不相等於聯合它們。假如在這個圓圈,左邊的這個圓圈,有五樣東西,假如在另一個圓圈,也有五樣東西,將它們添加在一起,總數是十樣東西。但是有幾樣東西共同屬於兩個圓圈。假如有兩樣東西分屬於個別的兩個圓圈,那麼在這種情況,總加起來的數目並不是原先數目的兩倍,總數將是只有八樣東西。恕我使用如此幼稚的集合邏輯提醒你們。我只是想要讓你們明白這個觀念,我設法讓你們了解的欲望驅力,其運作方式就是根據這種集合的邏輯模式。

The vet of alienation is defined by a choice whose properties depend on this, that there is, in the joining, one element that, whatever the choice operating may be, has as its consequence a neither one, nor the other. The choice, then, is a matter of knowing whether one wishes to preserve one of the parts, the other disappearing in any case.

疏離的欲望驅力的定義,就是它的選擇的特性依靠這個邏輯模式。在聯合時,有一個要素,不管你如何運作選擇,它的結果既不包括其中一樣,也不包括另外一樣。因此,這種選擇就是要知道,雖然我們希望保存其中一個部份,但是不管是那一種情況,另外一個部份總是會消失。

Let us illustrate this with what we are dealing with here, namely, the being of the subject, that which is there beneath the meaning. If we choose being, the subject disappears, it eludes us, it falls into non-meaning. If we choose meaning, the meaning survives only deprived of that part of non-meaning that is, strictly speaking, that which constitutes in the realization of the subject, the unconscious. In other words, it is of the nature of this meaning, as it emerges in the field of the Other, to be in
a large part of its field, eclipsed by the disappearance of being, induced by the very function of the signifier.

讓我們使用我們正在處理的問題,主體的生存問題,換言之,人生有何意義的問題,作為說明。假如我選擇身體的生存,主體會消失,會逃避我們、會陷入無意義的部份。假如我選擇人生的意義,意義只有在被剝奪無意義的那個部份,才可能存在。嚴格來說,就是被剝奪無意識作為人的主體,可以實現自我的部份。換言之,這個意義的特性,當它出現在大它者的領域,佔據大它者領域的一大部份,根據意符的功用產生,會隨著身體的存在的消失,意義因而隱遁。

This, as I have said, has a quite direct implication that passes all too often unperceived—when I tell you what it is, you will see that it is obvious, but for all that it is not usually noticed. One of the consequences is that interpretation is not limited to providing us with the significations of the way taken by the psyche that we have before us. This implication is no more than a prelude. Interpretation is directed not so much at the meaning as towards reducing the non-meaning of the signifiers, so that we may rediscover the determinants of the subject’s entire behavior.

我曾經說,這是一個相當直接的暗示,卻往往被大家視而不見。當我告訴你們那是什麼時,你們會恍然大悟,那是那麼明顯。但是儘管顯而易見,它通常就是被大家忽略。其中一個結果是,解釋提供的意義,並不限制於要跟我們心理一廂情願所期盼的意義相符合。這個暗示只是一個序曲。解釋的目標不是朝向尋找意義,而是朝向於將各種意符的意義幻滅為空。這樣,我們才可能重新發現,主體的舉止行為曾受到怎樣的影響。

I would ask you to refer to what my pupil Leclaire contributed, at the Congrês de Bonneval, by way of an application of my theses. You will see in his contribution that he isolated the sequence of the unicorn, not, as was thought in the discussion, in its significatory dependence, but precisely in its irreducible and senseless character qua chain of signifiers.

我想要推薦你們參照一下,我的學生列克烈,在波尼凡的學術研討會,運用我的主張所呈現的論文。你們將在他的論文看到,他分析獨角獸存在的意義,不是根據討論的大綱,分門別類,而是將獨角獸的特性,作為意符的鎖鏈,一一瓦解到無意義的程度。

One cannot emphasize too strongly the importance of some such thing as I have just described for you here. This alienating or is not an arbitrary invention, nor is it a matter of how one sees things. It is a part of language itself. This or exists. It is so much a part of language that one should distinguish it when one is dealing with linguistics. I will give you an example at once..

對於我剛剛所描繪的這些事情,他們的重要性不言而喻。這個疏離的「二者選一」,並不是我心血來潮地獨創,也不是我們觀看事情的問題。它是語言本身的一部份。人生無處不存在著「二者選一」的問題。它是語言的一部份,所以我們應該用語言學的處理方式,來區別它。我現在馬上給你們一個例子。

Your money or your life! If I choose the money, I lose both. If I choose life, I have life without the money, namely, a life deprived of something. I think I have made myself clear.

「要錢?還是要命?」假如我選擇要錢,我失去的不僅是生命,錢也沒用了。我可以沒有錢,但是生命還存在,換言之,生命沒有外物,還能存在。我想我說夠清楚了。

It is in Hegel that I have found a legitimate justification for the term alienating vel. What does Hegel mean by it? To cut a long story short, it concerns the production of the primary alienation, that by which man enters into the way of slavery. Your freedom or your life ! If he chooses freedom, he loses both immediately—if he chooses life, he has life deprived of freedom.

在黑格爾的精神現象學,我們替「二者選一」這個疏離的驅力,找到自圓其說的正當理由。黑格爾的「二者選一」是什麼意思?長話短說,它牽涉到人作為主體,如何成為奴隸,因而產生最原初的疏離現象。「你要自由?還是要生命?」假如它選擇要自由,他馬上兩樣都失去。但是他假如選擇要生命,他擁有生命,但是被剝奪掉自由。

There must be something special about this. This something special we shall call the lethal factor. This factor is present in certain divisions shown us by the play of signiflers that we sometimes see at play at the heart of life itself—these are called chromosomes, and it sometimes happens that there is one among them that has a lethal function. We shall find a parallel to this function in a rather peculiar statement, by introducing death itself into one of these fields. For example, freedom or death! There, because death comes into play, there occurs an effect with a rather different structure.

關於這一點,有件特別要注意的東西。這個某件特別要注意的東西,我們將稱為決定性的因素。這個因素存在於我們生命核心的某些區分領域,根據意符的運作顯示出來。這些意符的運作,我們有時候在生命本身的核心會看到。這些意符,被稱為遺傳染色體,有些染色體會發揮決定性的功用。這個染色體的功用發生在這些領域,無物可以類比,也不是我喜歡危言聳聽,就是死亡的功用。例如,你要自由?還是要生命?在這個地方,只要死亡開始運作,它產生的效果是完全不同的結構。

This is because, in both cases, I will have both. Freedom, after all, as you know, is like the celebrated freedom to work, for which the French Revolution, it seems, was fought. It can also be the freedom to die of hunger—in fact, that’s what it amounted to throughout the nineteenth century, which is why,
since then, certain principles have had to be revised. You choose freedom. Well! You’ve got freedom to die. Curiously enough, in the conditions in which someone says to you, freedom or death!, the only proof of freedom that you can have in the conditions laid out before you is precisely to choose death, for there, you show that you have freedom of choice.

這是因為在這兩種情況,我兩者都想擁有。你們都知道,在法國大革命「不自由、毋寧死」的時代,自由的光輝,畢竟是多麼地耀武揚威。它也可以被解釋為,選擇寧可死於饑餓的自由!事實上,在整個十九世紀,人性的光輝就是自由的選擇。這就是為什麼,迄今的某些原則,必須受到某些的修正。「你要選擇的自由嗎?成全你!你得到選擇死亡的自由!」令人諷刺的是,在某個人跟你說「不自由、毋寧死」的情況中,攤開在你面前的情境,你擁有自由的唯一的證據,就是選擇死亡。因為只有在死亡那裡,你顯示你擁有選擇的自由。

At this moment, which is also a Hegeian moment, for it is what is called the Terror, this quite different division is intended to make clear for you what is, in this field, the essence of the alienating vel, the lethal factor.

這個時刻,也是一個黑格爾精神勝利的時刻,因為它就是我們所謂的恐怖份子的時刻。在這個時刻,這個自由與死亡截然不同的區分,跟你表達得一清二楚:在這個領域,這個疏離的欲望驅力,這個決定性的因素,它的本質是什麼?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座240

January 16, 2010

拉岡講座240

Aphanisis.
失蹤
The Piagetic error •
皮亞傑的錯誤
2
Everything emerges from the structure of the signifier. This structure is based on what I first called the function of the cut and which is now articulated, in the development of my discourse, as the topological function of the rim.

一切事情的出現,都來自意符的結構。這個結構的基礎,我起初稱之為切割的功用。隨著我課程的發展,我現在名之為邊緣的地形功用。

The relation of the subject to the Other is entirely produced in a process of gap. Without this, anything could be there. The relations between beings in the real, including all of you animated beings out there, might be produced in terms of inversely reciprocal relations. This is what psychology, and a whole area of sociology, is trying to do, and may succeed in doing as far as the mere animal kingdom is concerned, for the capture of the imaginary is enough to motivate all sorts of behavior in the living being.

主體跟大它者的關係,完全是由分裂的過程所產生。若非如此,任何事情都可能在那裡。真實界的主體,包括一切有情眾生,都可能以互惠互利的關係來生存。這是心理學,及所有社會學的領域,正在從事的。就動物界的生物而言,它們會有所進展,因為非真實界的捕捉足以啟動生物的各種行為。

Psycho-analysis reminds us that human psychology belongs to another dimension. To maintain this dimension, philosophical analysis might have sufficed, but it has proved itself to be inadequate, for lack of any adequate definition of the unconscious. Psycho-analysis, then, reminds us that the facts of human psychology cannot be conceived in the absence of the function of the subject defined as
the effect of the signifier.

精神分析學提醒我們,人類的心理學屬於另外一個領域。為了維持這個領域,哲學的分析本來可能也綽綽有餘,但事實證明,它還是力有不逮,因為它對於無意識的領域缺乏足夠的了解。因此,精神分析學提醒我們,主體的功用不僅僅是在意符的影響,而是在意符的欠缺。人類的心理學必需從這個欠缺的領域著手,始有效用。

Here the processes are to be articulated, of course, as circular between the subject and the Other—from the subject called to the Other, to the subject of that which he has himself seen appear in the field of the Other, from the Other coming back. This process is circular, but, of its nature, without reciprocity.
Because it is circular, it is disymmetrical.

在此,過程當然應該被表達為主體與大它者之間的循環,從所謂的主體到大它者,到他已經看見自己出現在大它者領域的主體,從大它者那裡再回轉過來。這個過程是循環,但是它的屬性,卻是沒有互利互惠。因為它是循環狀態,它並不對稱。

You will realize that today I am taking you on to the terrain of a logic whose essential importance I hope to stress. The whole ambiguity of the sign derives from the fact that it represents something for someone. This someone may be many things, it may be the entire universe, in as much as we have
known for some time that information circulates in it, as a negative of entropy. Any node in which signs are concentrated, in so far as they represent something, may be taken for a someone.

你們將體會到,今天我要引導你們到達一個邏輯的平台,我希望強調這個平台的基本的重要性。符號之所以會模稜兩可,原因是它對於某個人,代表的常是有特殊的意義。所謂某個人,各人的解讀各有不同。對於某個人,他可能是他自己的整個宇宙,有他自己一套的自我認知在運作,直到生命的終止。就符號代表某件東西而言,某個人就是符號所匯聚的代表。

What must be stressed at the outset is that a signifier is that which represents a subject for another signifier. The signifier, producing itself in the field of the Other, makes manifest the subject of its signification. But it functions as a signifier only to reduce the subject in question to being no more
than a signifier, to the subject in the same movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as subject. There, strictly speaking, is the temporal pulsation in which is established that which is the characteristic of the departure of the unconscious as such—the closing.

一開始我們必須強調的是,一個意符,是一個主體對於另外一個主體的代表。意符在大它者的領域,產生自己的意符,然後使具有意義的主體顯現出來。但是主體若只充當意符的功用,結果會使潛力無窮的主體,淪落為僅是一個意符,換言之,淪落為僅是接受意符的功用所播弄的主體。嚴格來說,無意識本身具有開啟與封閉的特性,人作為主體,在其間,會形成一陣瞬間的悸動。

One analyst felt this at another level and tried to signify it in a term that was new, and which has never been exploited since in the field of analysis—aphanisis, disappearance. Ernest Jones, who invented it, mistook it for something rather absurd, the fear of seeing desire disappear. Now, aphanisis is to be
situated in a more radical way at the level at which the subject manifests himself in this movement of disappearance that I have described as lethal. In a quite different way, I have called this movement the fading of the subject.

有一位精神分析師從另外一個層次領會到這一點。他設法用一個新潁的術語表達。「失蹤」這個術語,是精神分析領域以前從未曾使用過的。恩尼士、江尼思鑄造這個術語,但是將它誤解為某件相當荒謬的東西,當著是看到欲望失蹤的恐懼。現在,我們能夠以更激進的方式,找到「失蹤」的位置,因為就在我曾描繪為危險萬分的失蹤的動作中,主體顯現了自己。換言之,我稱呼這個動作,為主體的的隱退。

I wish to dwell on this for a moment in order to convey to you to what extent it is always possible to find oneself again in concrete experience, and even in observation, on condition that this key is used to lift the veil of blindness. I will show you this by means of an example.

我希望對於這一點詳述一下,為了讓你們明瞭,我們如何在實際的經驗中,甚至是觀察中,重新找回自己。這個關鍵是要讓我們揭開使我們目盲的面紗。我用一個例子讓你們明白。

The Piagetic error—for those who might think that this is a neologism, I would stress that I am referring to Monsieur Piaget—is an error that lies in the notion of what is called the egocentric discourse of the child, defined as the stage at which he lacks what this Alpine psychology calls reciprocity. Reciprocity is very far from the horizon of what we mean at that particular moment, and the notion of egocentric discourse is a misunderstanding.

皮亞傑的錯誤,對於那些以為我在鑄造新術語的人,我要強調,我指的是教育哲學家皮亞傑。他的錯誤在於所謂孩童的自我中心論述的觀念。他將這個孩童階段的這個觀念,定義為欠缺阿爾邦學派的心理學所謂人際互惠。人際互惠根本不是我們在孩童那個特別時刻,所要討論的範圍。而且,他的孩童自我中心論述的觀念也是一種誤導。

The child, in this discourse, which may be tape-recorded, does not speak for himself, as one says. No doubt, he does not address the other, if one uses here the theoretical distinction derived from the function of the l and the you. But there must be others there—it is while all these little fellows are there, indulging all together, for example, in little games of operations, as they are provided with in certain methods of so-called active education, it is there that they speak—they don’t speak to a particular person, they just speak, if you’ll pardon the expression, a la cantonade.1

在這個論述中,孩童雖然可以被錄音下來,但是他並沒有替自己發言,如某孩童所說。無可置疑的,他並沒有跟大它者對話。容我們理論上區別一下,這個「我」的大它者,跟這個「你」的大它者的功用並不一樣。但是一定還有其它的人在那裡。那些小孩在那裡,聚集在那裡,例如正在玩某種遊戲,如同在某些所謂的主動的教育方法創導的,就在那裡的時刻,孩童發言,但是他們不是針對某個特別的人發言。他們只是發言,可不是針對拉岡,容我往我自己臉上貼金。

This egocentric discourse is a case of hail to the good listener! What we find once again here is the constitution of the subject in the field of the Other, as I have designated it for you in this little arrow on the blackboard. If he is apprehended at his birth in the field of the Other, the characteristic of the subject of the unconscious is that of being, beneath the signifier that develops its networks, its chains and its history, at an indeterminate place.

自我中心的論述,聽起來令聽眾悅耳。我們在此再一次發現的是,主體在大它者領域的形成,如同我在黑板上這個小箭頭所指明的。假如主體一出生,就在大它者的領域被理解,那麼無意識的主體的特色,就是存在的主體的特色,架構在意符之下,發展自己的網絡、自己的鎖鏈、及自己的歷史,在一個不明確的地方。

More than one dream element, indeed almost all, may be the point at which we will variously situate him in interpretation. If one thinks that one may make him say whatever one wishes, one has understood nothing—but one must admit that psycho-analysts do not explain themselves very well. Interpretation cannot be bent to any meaning. It designates only a single series of signifiers. But the subject may in effect occupy various places, depending on whether one places him under one or
other of these signifiers.

不僅僅是一次的夢境,甚至幾乎所有的夢境,都可以讓我們用各種各樣的方式,解釋主體所在的位置。即使我們認為,我們可以讓主體說出他願望中的話,我們也無法了解那是什麼意思。但是我們必須承認,精神分析師解釋自己,也不見得多高明。解釋無法產生任何意義。它只是指明一系列的意符運作。但是主體實際上佔據各種各樣的位置,端賴我們是否將他擺置在一個或多個意符的運作之中。

I now come to the two operations that I intend to articulate today in the relation between the subject and the Other.

我現在講完我今天打算要表達的兩個命題,處理主體跟大它者的關係。那就是失蹤與皮亞傑的錯誤。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記990115

January 15, 2010

雄伯手記990115

一位教授帶著一群學生,在懸崖邊說法講道。他一邊口沫橫飛,頭頭是道地說,一邊用手指著懸崖下方的急湍水流說:

「最珍貴的象徵真理的魚,就潛藏在那急湍的水流裡!」
「老師!」有一位學生發問:「你曾經躍下那急湍水流,捕獲到那真理的魚沒有?」
「我是還沒有躍下過那急湍水流,」老師遲疑了一下,「不過,我相信,我已經捕獲到這隻真理的魚。」
「那你是怎麼捕獲到的?」
「我是從書本上捕獲到的。」
「那書本的作者躍下過那急湍水流沒有?」
「作者現在是在那急湍水流裡,不過,書是在躍下以前寫的。因為躍下去後,他就不可能在回來寫書。正如假如我躍下急湍水流,我還可能在這裡跟你們上課嗎?」
「假如他的書,是在躍下急湍水流以前寫的,他怎能預先知道那裡面有真理的魚,又怎能證實真理的魚確實存在?」另一位學生問。
「用想像呀!用推理呀!用修行呀!用體驗呀!用閱讀呀!方法多的是,問題是你們有沒有追求真理的魚的渴望?或者,你們所要的只是一張將來可以幫忙自己尋找工作的文憑而已?」

眾生啞口無言,教授繼續口沫橫飛。

拉岡講座239

January 13, 2010

拉岡講座239
i6
THE SUBJECT AND THE OTHER: ALIENATION
主體與大它者:疏離

Sexual dynamics.
性的動力學

If psycho-analysis is to be constituted as the science of the unconscious, one must set out from the notion that the unconscious is structured like a language. From this I have deduced a topology intended to account for the constitution of the subject.

精神分析學若是要成為無意識的科學,我們出發的觀念必須是:無意識的結構像是一種語言。從這裡,我曾演繹出一種地形學,用來解釋主體的形成。

At a time that I hope we have now put behind us, it was objected that in giving dominance to structure I was neglecting the dynamics so evident in our experience. It was even said that I went so far as to ignore the principle affirmed in Freudian doctrine that this dynamics is, in its essence, through and
through, sexual. I hope my seminar for this year, especially at the point at which it reached its culmen last time, has shown you that this dynamics is far from being ignored in my thinking.

有一陣子,我希望我們的進度已經超前,有人反對說,我過於重視結構,而忽略了我們精神分析經驗頗為顯著的動力學。甚至有人說,我過於忽視佛洛伊德學說所肯定的原理,換言之,這個動力學,在本質上,道道地地就是性。我希望,我今年的講座,特別是上一次己經到達一個段落,已經讓你們了解,我的學說絲毫沒有忽略這個動力學。

I
I would remind you, for the benefit of those who were absent last time, that I added a quite new element to this dynamics, the use of which will become apparent later.

我將提醒你們,顧慮到上一次有人缺席,我替這個動力學添增一個相當新的元素,這個元素的使用等一下會很明顯。

First, I stressed the division that I make by opposing, in relation to the entrance of the unconscious, the two fields of the subject and the Other. The Other is the locus in which is situated the chain of the signifier that governs whatever may be made present of the subject—it is the field of that living being in which the subject has to appear. And I said that it was on the side of this living being, called to subjectivity, that the drive is essentially manifested.

首先,我強調我所做的這個區分:當我們進入無意識時,會有主體跟大它者兩個領域的對立。大它者是意符的鎖鏈位置所在的軌跡,統轄主體身上出現的任何東西。它是主體出現時,必須要依存的活動領域。我說,欲望驅力基本上就是展現就在這個活動領域,被稱為是主觀性的領域。

Every drive being, by its essence as drive, a partial drive, no drive represents—a notion that Freud raises for a moment when he asks himself whether it is love that realizes it—the totality of the Sexualsirebung, of the sexual tendency, as it might be conceived as making present in the psyche the function of Fortpftancung, of reproduction, if this function entered the psyche at all.

因為每個驅力就其本質而言,都是部份的驅力,所以沒有任何單一驅力代表性慾望的整體。
佛洛伊德曾有一陣子提起過這個觀念,他問自己,實踐性慾望的整體,是否就是愛。若是,我們就可以認為是愛將繁殖的功用顯現在心理層面,假如這個功用牽扯到心理的層面。

Who would not accept this function on the biological plane? What I am saying, following Freud, who provides abundant evidence of it, is that this function is not represented as such in the psyche. In the psyche, there is nothing by which the subject may situate himself as a male or female being. In his psyche, the subject situates only equivalents of the function of reproduction—activity and passivity, which by no means represent it in an exhaustive way. Freud even adds a touch of irony to this by stressing that this representation is not as constricting or as exhaustive as that—durchgreifend aussch-
Iieblich—the polarity of the male and the female being is represented only by the polarity of activity, which is manifested through the Triebe, and of passivity, which is passivity only in relation to the exterior, gegen die dusseren

有誰能否認這個在生物層面上的功用呢?佛洛伊德提供充份的證據,我追隨他,所要補充的是:這個繁殖的功用在心理層面,並沒有具體的代表。在心理層面,沒有一樣東西可以讓主體將自己定位為男性或女性的生物。在各人的心理層面,主體只找到繁殖的功用的類同物的位置,例如主動跟被動。可是,主動跟被動並沒有全面性的代表繁殖的功用。佛洛伊德甚至自我解嘲地強調,這個代表的局限跟涵蓋範圍,不如說是,代表男性跟女性的兩極的主動,是透過欲望驅力顯現,而被動則是跟外在有關時,才顯現出來。

Only this division—and it is here that I left off last time— makes necessary what was first revealed by analytic experience, namely, that the ways of what one must do as man or as woman are entirely abandoned to the drama, to the scenario, which is placed in the field of the Other—which, strictly speaking, is the Oedipus complex. –

我上次只談到這樣的區分。這樣的區分使精神分析經驗首先顯露的內容,具有意義。換言之,身為男人或身為女人,我們所必須要有的行為舉止,完全屈從於大它者領域所編寫的戲碼或劇本的支配。嚴格來說,就是伊底普斯情結。

I stressed this last time, when I told you that the human being has always to learn from scratch from the Other what he has to do, as man or as woman. I referred to the old woman in the story of Daphnis and Chloe, which shows us that there is an ultimate field, the field of sexual fulfilment, in which, in the
last resort, the innocent does not know the way.

上一次我強調這一點,當我告訴你們,人類總是跟大它者從頭學習,身為男人或身為女人,要有怎樣的行為舉止。我提到達芬跟柯羅青梅竹馬的故事裡,有個媒婆當紅娘,是要顯示,在履行性行為的最後場域,純真的少男少女,還是要人指點,才知道怎麼辦。

Whether it is the drive, the partial drive, that orientates him to it, or whether the partial drive alone is the representative in the psyche of the consequences of sexuality, this is a sign that sexuality is represented in the psyche by a relation of the subject that is deduced from something other than sexuality. Sexuality is established in the field of the subject by a way that is that of lack.

是否欲望驅力,這個部份驅力,在引導他們,或是否僅僅是部份欲望驅力,就是性行為的結果在心理方面的代表,這都指示著,性在心理層面的代表,是主體的關係,而這個關係是性以外的東西演變而來。性以一種欠缺的方式,被建立在主體的領域。

Two lacks overlaps here. The first emerges from the central defect around which the dialectic of the advent of the subject to his own being in the relation to the Other turns—by the fact that the subject depends on the signifier and that the signifier is first of all in the field of the Other. This lack takes up the other lack, which is the real, earlier lack, to be situated at the advent of the living being, that is to say, at sexed reproduction.

兩個欠缺在這裡重疊。第一個欠缺出現在中央的缺陷處。繞著這個缺陷處,主體發展他跟大它者的關係,而接觸到他自己的存在,因為主體依靠意符來發展,而意符首先出現在大它者的領域。這個欠缺接替了另外一個欠缺,真實界的欠缺,更早的欠缺,位於人作為生物剛開始的地方,換言之,性的繁殖所在。

The real lack is what the living being loses, that part of himself qua living being, in reproducing himself through the way of sex. This lack is real because it relates to something real, namely,
that the living being, by being subject to sex, has fallen under the blow of individual death.

真實界的欠缺,是人作為生物所喪失的部份,是人作為生物,透過性的方式,繁殖自身的那個部份。這個欠缺是真實的,因為它跟某件真實的東西有關聯,換言之,人作為生物,隸屬於性的繁殖,終歸會遭受到個體死亡的打擊。

Aristophanes’ myth pictures the pursuit of the complement for us in a moving, and misleading, way, by articulating that it is the other, one’s sexual other half; that the living being seeks in love. To this mythical representation of the mystery of love, analytic experience substitutes the search by the subject, not of the sexual complement, but of the part of himself, lost forever, that is constituted by the fact that he is only a sexed living being, and that he is no longer immortal.

亞力斯多芬的神話,以生動而令人迷惑的方式,描繪我們人為彌補這一欠缺所從事的追尋。他清楚地表達,人作為生物在戀愛中所尋求的,就是另外一半,性的另外一半。對於愛的神秘的這種奧妙代表,精神分析經驗取而代之以另一種主體,不是性互補的主體,而是永久喪失的自身那部份的主體。因為人若僅僅是作為性的生物,他必然要面對自身個體的死亡。

You will now understand that—for the same reason that it is through the lure that the sexed living being is induced into his sexual realization—the drive, the partial drive, is profoundly a death drive and represents in itself the portion of death in the sexed living being.

你現在將會了解到,如同人作為性的生物,是透過誘惑的方式,被誘導去從事性的行為,欲望驅力,這個部份驅力,道道地地就是一個死亡的驅力。它本身代表人作為性的生物,屬於死亡的部份。

Thus defying, perhaps for the first time in history, a myth that has acquired so much prestige, and which last time l placed under the same heading as Plato places that of Aristophanes, I substituted the myth intended to embody the missing part, which I called the myth of the lamella.

我這種說法,可能是有史以來第一次,挑戰到一個已經頗具權威的神話。我上一次將這個神話,給予一個標題,類似柏拉圖給予亞力斯多芬的寓言的標題。我用一個我稱之為「薄膜」的神話,代替亞力斯多芬「男女各尋找性的另一半互補」的神話。

This is new and it is important because it designates the libido not as a field of forces, but as an organ.
The libido is the essential organ in understanding the nature of the drive. This organ is unreal. Unreal is not imaginary. The unreal is defined by articulating itself on the real in a way that eludes us, and it is precisely this that requires that its representation should be mythical, as I have made it. But the fact that it is unreal does not prevent an organ from embodying itself.

我這個新潁的說法非常重要,因為它指明力比多不是一個力量的場域,而是一個器官。要了解欲望驅力的性質,力比多是這個基本的器官。這個器官是非真實的。非真實不同於憑空想像。非真實的定義是:以我們捉摸不定的方式,在真實界表達自己。就是因為這樣,它的代表符號應該是神秘奧妙,如我所曾經表達的。但是力比多是非真實,並不意味著,它作為器官,無法具體表現自己。

I will give you its materialization at once. One of the most ancient forms in which this unreal organ is incarnated in the body, is tattooing, scarification. The tattoo certainly has the function of being for the Other, of situating the subject in it, marking his place in the field of the group’s relations, between
each individual and all the others. And, at the same time, it obviously has an erotic function, which all those who have approached it in reality have perceived.

我馬上給你看一下力比多的具體表現。這個非真實的器官,在身體上具體表現的最古老的形式,就是刺青,或是紋身。刺青確實具有充當大它者的功用,替主體找到定位,標示主體在團體關係的場域,在每個主體跟所有其它主體之間的位置。同時,它很明顯地具有宣示性欲的功用。你們若曾經看過刺青或紋身,你們就會感覺到。

I have also shown that, in the profound relation of the drive, what is essential is that the movement by which the arrow that sets out towards the target fulfills its function only by really reemerging from it, and returning on to the subject. In this sense, the pervert is he who, in short circuit, more directly than any other, succeeds in his aim, by integrating in the most profound way his function as subject with his existence as desire.

我也曾經顯示,在欲望驅力的深層關係,重要的是動作過程:射向目標的箭,要從目標再射出來,繼續回到主體,這樣才算實踐了它的功用。以這層意義來說,性變態者是這樣的人,他用抄捷徑的迴旋,比任何其它的人更直接,成功地達成他自己的目標。他用最深刻的方式,調適自己作為主體的功用,及作為欲望的生命存在。

Here the reversal of the drive is something quite different from the variation of ambivalence that makes the object oscillate from the field of hate to that of love and vice versa, depending on whether or not it benefits the well-being of the subject. It is not when the object in one’s sights is not good that one becomes a masochist. It is not because her father disappointed her that Freud’s female patient (known as ‘the homosexual’) becomes homosexual—she could have taken a lover. Whenever we are in the dialectic of the drive, something else takes charge. The dialectic of the drive is profoundly different both from that which belongs to the order of love and from that which belongs to the well-being of the subject.

在此,欲望驅力的翻轉完全不同於愛恨交加的轉變。後者是,客體從恨的場域,搖擺到愛的場域,然後再從愛的場域,搖擺到恨的場域,端賴對於主體的幸福是否有利益。人們成為性受虐待狂,並不是發生在眼前的對象,對待他們不好的時刻。眾所周知的佛洛伊德的那位同性戀女病人,並不是因為她的父親辜負她,她才變成同性戀者。她若是真的要一位異性情人,也沒有什麼困難。每當我們處於這種欲望驅力的演變時,總是會有其它的東西出來接管。欲望驅力的演變,絕對不同於愛與恨的交替,也不同於主體的幸福與否。

That is why today I wish to stress the operation of the realization of the subject in his signifying dependence in the locus of the Other.

那就是為什麼,我今天希望強調,人作為主體,要實踐自我,必然要考慮到,自己的意符受制於大它者的軌跡的支配。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座238

January 13, 2010

拉岡講座238

The myth of the lamella
薄膜的神話

4
I wish to note here the relation between the polarity of the drive cycle and something that is always at the centre. It is an organ, in the sense of an instrument, of the drive—in another sense, therefore, than that attributed to it earlier in the sphere of the induction of the Ich. We must now turn our attention to this ungraspable organ, this object that we can only circumvent, in short, this false organ.

我希望在此注意到,驅力的循環極端,跟處於中央的東西,兩者有什麼關係。就工具的意義而言,它是一個欲望驅力的器官。因此,它的意義不同於早先我們將它歸屬於自我的誘導場域。我們現在將注意力轉向這個難於理解的器官。這個器官,我們只能旁敲側擊,總而言之,這個是個虛假的器官。

The organ of the drive is situated in relation to the true organ. In order to make this clear to you and in order to show that this is the only pole that, in the domain of sexuality, is within our grasp, capable of being apprehended, I will take the liberty of setting a myth before you—and in doing so I shall take as my starting-point what is put into the mouth of Aristophanes on the subject of love in Plato’s Symposium.

欲望驅力的器官的位置,跟真正的器官有關聯。為了讓你們明白,為了顯示,在性的場域,這是唯一我們能夠理解的部份,我大膽地跟你提出一則神話。在提出神話時,我將先開始談,在柏拉圖的「嚮宴」裡,亞力斯多分對於愛的主題,是如何的表達。

This usage presupposes of course that we give ourselves permission to use, in this judo with truth, the apparatus that I have always avoided using before my audiences.

當然,使用神話來處理真理的問題,意味著我們容許我們自己採用一種工具,我跟以前的聽眾,總是避免使用的工具。

I have given my listeners ancient models, particularly those drawn from Plato, but I have merely given them the machinery to dig this field. I am not one of those who say—Children, there is treasure buried here—and leave them to get on with their digging. I have given them the plough share and the plough, namely, that the unconscious was made out of language, and at one point in time, approximately three and a half years ago, and three very good pieces of work have resulted from it. But we must now say— You can only find the treasure in the way I tell you.

我曾經對聽眾引用古代的範例,特別是從柏拉圖的對話錄,但是我引用它們只是替我們的領域開路。我不是那種人,光會說「孩子們,這裡有埋藏的寶藏」,然後就聽任他們去挖掘。我會給他們犁一起去挖,這個犁,換言之,就是無意識是由語言構成。在某個時間,大約三年半前,有三篇非常好的作品談到無意識。但是我們現在必須說,你們不妨用我告訴你的方法,去尋找這個寶藏。

There is something comical about this way. This is absolutely essential in understanding any of Plato’s dialogues, and especially when one is dealing with the Symposium. This dialogue is even, one might say, a practical joke. The starting-point, on course, is Aristophanes’ fable. This fable is a defiance to the
centuries, for it traverses them without anyone trying to do better. I shall try.

這個方法有點滑稽的樣子。可是,了解柏拉圖對話錄是絕對必要的,特別是我們在處理「嚮宴」的時候。我們甚至可以說,這個對話錄是一個惡作劇。當然,開始是亞力斯多分的寓言。這個寓言挑戰了好幾世紀,因為它經歷好幾世紀,沒有人能設法表達得比它更好。現在讓我試試看。

In an attempt to establish what was said at the Congrès de Bonneval I managed to come up with something like the following—I am going to talk to you about the lamella.

為了要証實在那個座談所談論的內容,我設法先提出以下的命題,我將先跟你們談有關薄膜的問題。

If you want to stress its joky side, you can call it l’hommelette. This hommelette, as you will see, is easier to animate than primal man, in whose head one always had to place a homunculous to get it working.

假如你們要強調這個薄膜的惡作劇的一面,你們不妨稱之為「處女膜」。你們將會看出,這個處女膜比原始人想像的還更有活力。在他們的腦海,任何東西都要有一層薄膜,才行得通。

Whenever the membranes of the egg in which the foetus emerges on its way to becoming a new-born are broken, imagine for a moment that something flies off, and that one can do it with an egg as easily as with a man, namely the hommelette, or the lamella.

蛋有一層薄膜保護,裡面的蛋卵才會慢慢形成一隻新生的胎兒。當薄膜破掉時,你可以想像某些東西會迸發出來。處理人跟處理蛋的道理,也是一樣。換言之,先要處理那層薄膜。

The lamella is something extra-flat, which moves like the amoeba. It is just a little more complicated. But it goes everywhere. And as it is something—I will tell you shortly why—that is related to what the sexed being loses in sexuality, it is, like the amoeba in relation to sexed beings, immortal—because
it survives any division, any scissiparous intervention. And it can run around.

這個薄膜是某件超薄的東西,像變形蟲那樣移動。但是稍微更複雜些。它到處亂闖。我扼要地說,它的狀況,類似有性的生物在交媾時會喪失的東西。就變形蟲跟有性的生物比較,這個東西永遠存在,因為再怎麼分割,再怎樣仔細的割開,它還會存活,還會到處亂闖。

Well! This is not very reassuring. But suppose it comes and envelopes your face while you are quietly asleep. I can’t see how we would not join battle with a being capable of these properties. But it would not be a very convenient battle. This lamella, this organ, whose characteristic is not to exist, but which is nevertheless an organ—I can give you more details as to its zoological place—is the libido.

嗯!這不太令人安心。但假如你在睡覺的時刻,它過來覆蓋你的臉孔。我不明白,跟具有這些屬性的東西,你要怎樣跟它搏鬥。這個薄膜,這個器官,它的特性無以名,但是它仍然是一個器官。關於它的動物學的位置,我可以列舉得更詳細,那就是生命的力比多。

It is the libido, qua pure life instinct, that is to say, immortal life, or irrepressible life, life that has need of no organ, simplified, indestructible life. It is precisely what is subtracted from the living being by virtue of the fact that it is subject to the cycle of sexed reproduction. And it is of this that all the forms
of the objet a that can be enumerated are the representatives, the equivalents. The objets a are merely its representatives, its figures. The breast—as equivocal, as an element characteristic of the mammiferous organization, the placenta for example —certainly represents that part of himself that the individual loses at birth, and which may serve to symbolize the most profound lost object. I could make the same kind of reference for all the other objects.

這個力比多,作為純粹的本能,換言之,永遠存在的生命,或無法壓抑的生命,不需要器官的生命,單純化,無法毀滅的生命。它隸屬於性的繁殖的循環,因為這樣,它是我們從生物的機能抽取出來的東西。能夠被列舉出來的這些小客體的各種形式,都是力比多的代表,力比多的代理。這些小客體僅僅它的代表,它的代理。例如,乳房是哺乳類生物,或有胎盤類生物的明確特徵,確實代表個體自己在出生時,喪失的那個部份,可以充當象徵那個失落已久的東西。我還可以提到相同的特色,在所有其它的小客體。

The relation between the subject and the field of the Other becomes clearer. Take a look at what I have drawn in the lower part of the table. I will explain.

主體跟大它者領域之間的關係,就變得更加清楚。請看一下,我在黑板上畫的圖表的下面部份。我解釋一下。

In the world of the Real-Ich, of the ego, of knowledge, everything may exist as now, including you and consciousness, without there being any need, whatever may be thought to the contrary, for anything in the way of a subject. If the subject is what I say it is, namely the subject determined by language
and speech, it follows that the subject, in initio, begins in the locus of the Other, in so far as it is there that the first signifier emerges.

在真實自我、自我、或知識的世界,每一樣東西可能像目前這樣存在,包括你跟你的意識,沒有需要任何東西,或是任何相反的東西,阻礙到人作為主體。假如這個主體,就是我所謂的由語言與言說決定的主體,我們可以推論,這個主體最初是從大它者的軌跡開始,因為語言的第一個意符出現在那裡。

Now, what is a signifier? I have been drumming it into you long enough not to have to articulate it once again here. A signifier is that which represents a subject. For whom ?—not for another subject, but for another signifier. In order to illustrate this axiom, suppose that in the desert you find a stone covered with hieroglyphics. You do not doubt for a moment that, behind them, there was a subject who wrote them. But it is an error to believe that each signifier is addressed to you—this is proved by the fact that you cannot understand any of it. On the other hand you define them as signifiers, by the fact that you
are sure that each of these signifiers is related to each of the others. And it is this that is at issue with the relation between the subject and the field of the Other.

現在,什麼是意符?我已經反覆再三說過,現在就不需要再詳述一遍。意符就是主體的代表。對誰的代表?不是對另外一個主體的代表,而是對另外一個意符的代表。為了要舉例說明這個原理,你們不妨假設,你們在沙漠裡找到一塊石頭,上面刻有象形文字。你絲毫不會懷疑,在它們背後,曾有一個人的主體寫下它們。但是不要以為,每一個意符都是為你們而寫,因為你們無法看懂它們,不就已經證明。在另一方面,你們認定象形文字認是一種意符,因為你們確定,每一個意符與其它的意符,都有關聯。就是這一點,主體跟大它者的領域的關係,值得我們注意。

The subject is born in so far as the signifier emerges in the field of the Other. But, by this very fact, this subject—which, was previously nothing if not a subject coming into being —solidifies into a signifier.

主體出生在大它者的領域,意符出現的地方。因為這個事實,主體原先只是一個存在物,凝聚成為一個意符。

The relation to the Other is precisely that which, for us, brings out what is represented by the lamella—not sexed polarity, the relation between masculine and feminine, but the relation between the living subject and that which he loses by having to pass, for his reproduction, through the sexual cycle.
In this way I explain the essential affinity of every drive with the zone of death, and reconcile the two sides of the drive—which, at one and the same time, makes present sexuality in the unconscious and represents, in its essence, death.

跟大它者的關係,確實就是薄膜所代表的東西顯露出來的部份,不是兩性的關係,或男性跟女性之間的關係,而是具有生命的主體,跟主體透過性的繁殖下一代,他所喪失的東西,兩者之間的關係。以這種方式,我解釋每一個欲望驅力,與死亡的領域,會有很重要的關聯。我會調合欲望驅力的兩邊,一方面,欲望驅力使性存在於無意識這一邊,另一方面,欲望驅力本質上又代表死亡。

You will also understand that, If I have spoken to you of the unconscious as of something that opens and closes, it is because its essence is to mark that time by which, from the fact of being born with the signifier, the subject is born divided. The subject is this emergence which, just before, as subject, was nothing, but which, having scarcely appeared, solidifies into a signifier.

你們也要了解到,我跟你們提到的無意識,具有剛一開啟,旋又封閉的特性,那是因為它的本質是要標示,主體一出生就處於分裂狀態的那個時間,因為人做為主體,一誕生,就進入意符的世界。主體僅僅就是剛一出現,就凝聚成為一個意符。

On this conjunction between the subject in the field of the drive and the subject as he appears in the field of the Other, on this effort to join oneself together, depends the fact that there is a support for the ganze Sexualsirebung. There is no other. Only there is the relation of the sexes represented at the level of the unconscious.

性的欲望的凝視,有一個支撐的東西。那就是有賴於,在欲望驅力的這個主體,跟出現在大它者領域的那個主體,彼此之間有一個關聯。除此之外,凝視沒有其它支撐。兩性之間的關係,只有在無意識的層次,才表現得出來。

As for the rest, the sexual relation is handed over to the hazards of the Other. It is handed over to the explanations that are given of it. It is handed over to the old woman of whom—it is not a pointless fable—Daphnis must learn what one must do to make love.

至於其餘,諸如性的關係,可以移送到主體所面對的大它者的情況來處理。由大它者所提供的解釋,視狀況處理。或移轉給媒婆紅娘來指導。我剛才所提到的薄膜或處女膜的寓言,並不是毫無意義:青梅竹馬的男女,自然會學習到如何去做愛。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw