Lacan: The Absolute Master 11

Lacan: The Absolute Master
拉康:绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

Human Desire is thus the Desire that desires itself as unsatisfied desire: pure “negativity,” we would say in Hegelian terms, pure “transcendence” in Heideggerian terms. It remains to be understood in what sense Desire desires “itself”: as “itself” or as “other”? That, obviously, is the whole problem of this Hegelian-Heideggerian amalgam. For Hegel, it is clear that desire desires itself through the other that it denies, which is precisely why Hegel, in this connection, spoke of the “doubling” of self-consciousness: self-consciousness desires itself in another that it itself is, having first to alienate itself in another desire before being able to reappropriate it for itself as its
very own (and, thus, to arrive at the famous “satisfaction”).

人的欲望因此就算欲望它自己的欲望,作为没有被满足的欲望:我们用黑格尔的术语说,就是纯粹的「否定性」。用海德格的术语说,就是纯粹的「超验」。有待理解的是,在怎样的意义,欲望欲望「它自己」:作为「它自己」,或是作为「它者」?显而易见,那是黑格尔与海德格混合的整个难题。对于黑格尔,显而易见,欲望欲望它自己,通过它否定的它者。这确实是为什么黑格尔关于这一点,会谈论到自我-意识的「双重性」:自我-意识欲望它自己,用另外一个自我-意识。它自己就是那个另外一个自我-意识,但是首先它必须异化它自己,在另外一个欲望,这样它才能重新佔有它,为了它自己,作为属于它(因此,才能获得这个著名的「满足」)。

By contrast, if desire is defined, in para-Heideggerian terms, as transcendence toward nothing, it is none the less clear that it will desire “itself” only as nothingness—in other words, as pure negativity and absolute alterity: that Desire (capital D) will desire “itself” as Other (capital O), beyond itself and every “ego.” Therefore, in formulas ambiguous enough to admit of all readings, we shall say that Desire is “Desire of Desire,” or “Desire of the Desire of the other.”53 Human Desire, according to Kojeve, is what is brought to bear on another human Desire: it desires to be desired—that is, “recognized”—as pure desire of nothing. The only strictly human Desire is “Desire of recognition,” and the only “human reality” is “recognized reality” or “social reality”: “If . . . human reality is a social reality, society is human only as a set of Desires mutually desiring one another as Desires.”54

比较起来,假如欲望被定义,用类似-海德格的术语,作为朝向空无的超验。仍然显而易见的是,它将会欲望「它自己」,仅是作为空无。换句话说,作为纯粹的否定性与绝对的它者:欲望(大写字母D),将会欲望「它自己」,作为「大它者」(大写字母O),超越它自己与每个「自我」。因此,在足够模棱两可的公式,容下各种解读,我们将会说,欲望就是「欲望的欲望」,或是「他者的欲望的欲望」。依照科耶夫,人的欲望就是跟另外一个人的欲望产生关系的欲望:它欲望被他者欲望—换句话说,它欲望被他者承认—作为空无的纯粹欲望。这个仅有的严峻的欲望,就是「被承认的欲望」,这个唯一的「人的现实」,就是「被承认的现实」,或是「社会的现实」:「假如人的现实是社会的现实,社会仅有作为彼此互相欲望作为欲望的一组欲望时,它才是人的社会。」

The problem, however, only becomes more acute. Aside from the difficulty of seeing where this Desire for recognition comes from (in keeping with “dualistic ontology,” social-human reality arises ex abrupto from natural reality, with absolutely no transition and no mediation), there is also the difficulty of understanding how it could ever be “satisfied,” if, as Kojeve asserts, it is pure desire of nothing. For “human reality,” the only way to become recognized and desired as pure Desire would be in fact to die, to radically negate itself as animal life and “given reality”—and so to go completely unrecognized.

可是,这个难题仅是变得更加敏锐。除了有困难看出想要获得承认的欲望来自何处(为了符合「双重本体论」,社会的人的现实,起源于自然的现实,绝对没有中转与中介)。另外也有困难,要理解欲望如何能够被「满足」,如同科耶夫主张的,假如欲望就是空无的纯粹欲望。对于「人的社会」,唯一的方法,要获得承认,并且被欲望,作为纯粹欲望,事实上,那将是寻求死亡,强烈地否定它自己,作为动物的生命,与「特定的现实」–然后完全地没有被承认。

This brings us right back to the “absolute Master, death.” Kojeve, to resolve the difficulty, calls on the strictly Hegelian solution of the problem—namely, the struggle for recognition (for “pure prestige” says Kojeve, since the consciousnesses are fighting each other for nothing) and the subsequent dialectic of master and slave. According to this theory, one of the two battling consciousnesses would become frightened of death (that is, of its “own” Desire) and would prefer unilateral recognition of the other as its master, thus setting off the long process of Labor and History as the Struggle for a truly final and definitive recognition. And so not until the end of history would Man satisfy his truly human Desire—at exactly that moment when he is no longer a Man, but a Wise Man. Let us reread Kojeve’s idyllic summary: “If Desire must end in satisfaction … the interaction of Master and Slave must finally end in the ‘dialectical overcoming’ of both of them. … It is only by being ‘recognized’ by another, by many others, or—in the extreme—by all others, that a human being is really human.”55

这让我们直接回的科耶夫的「绝对的主人,死亡」,为了解决这个困难,召唤严谨的黑格尔对难题的解决—也就是要求承认的奋斗(科耶夫说是「为了纯粹的尊严」,因为意识就互相为了空无而战斗),就是随后的主人与奴隶的辩证法。依照这个理论,两个战斗中的意识的其中一个,会变得害怕死亡(也就是,害怕它自己的欲望),然后宁可要他者的单边的承认,作为它的主人,因此触发劳工与历史的漫长过程,作为获得最后与明确的承认的奋斗。就是在他不再为一个人的时刻,而是作为一位智慧的人。让我们重新阅的科耶夫的诗歌般的总结:「假如欲望必须以满足作物结束、、、主人与奴隶的互动最后必须以辩证法地克服它们两者,作为结束、、、仅有凭借被另外一个人,被许多的他者承认,推倒极点,就是要被所有的他者承认,这时,人才确实是人。」

Here, peals of laughter from Alexandre, Jacques, and Georges— for how would Desire be satisfied in the end, if it had not been satisfied at the beginning? The slave, as Bataille and Lacan have both noted, is still alive, having recoiled before the “absolute Master,” and thus the desire that, in the end, he “satisfies” is in no way the one in question at the beginning, the pure Desire of death. In reality, this Desire of death cannot possibly be satisfied, if, as Kojeve insists, it is a human desire: How could a man ever experience the pure negativity that he “himself” “is,” if not by perpetually deferring it—by perpetually desiring it?

在此,从科耶夫,拉康与巴塔耶那里响起笑声—因为欲望如何会被满足,假如它从一开头就没有被满足?如同巴塔耶与拉康两人注意到的,奴隶依旧存活,在「绝对的主人」面前退缩。因此,最后他所满足的欲望,根本就不是从一开头就受到质疑的这个欲望,死亡的这个欲望。事实上,死亡的这个欲望不可能被满足,如同科耶夫坚持的,假如死亡是人的欲望。一个人如何凭借欲望这个纯粹的否定性,而不是永久地拖延它地经验它?而他自己就是那个纯粹的否定性?

If strictly human Desire is the desire that desires itself as desire of nothing, then man can never take his proper place except as desire of himself, as impossible desire of himself. “Man” was the name of the impossible. Man is not in man, he is always beyond himself. And “the desire of man,” Lacan would conclude, following the thread of desire straight down from Kojeve, “is the desire of the Other.”

假如严谨的人都欲望,就是欲望它自己作为空无的欲望的欲望,那么人永远没有办法取代他的合宜的位置,除了就是欲望他自己,作为他自己的不可能的欲望。「人」就是不可能的这个名字。人并不是人,人总是在超越他自己。拉康的结论是:「人的欲望遵循欲望的脉络,从科耶夫一直延续到大他者的欲望。」

“What do you desire to know?” asked Valentin, shouting.
Indeed, what could she desire to know, the poor wreck? If she wanted to hear about her past, Valentin possessed all the desired documentation.
“If you are a clairvoyant,” said Miss Pantruche, leaning toward him to try to glimpse his face through the veil, “if you are a clairvoyant, you should know what I desire to know.”
And to think that this derelict dares to be skeptical, sighed Valentin, I’ll have to one-up her.
“You desire to know the future,” he vocalized.
“That’s it!” Miss Pantruche announced triumphantly.56

「你欲望知道什么?」范伦丁问,大叫地。
的确,她能够欲望知道什么,这位可怜的人?假如她想要知道她的过去,范伦丁拥有一切被欲望的文件。
「假如你是一位通灵者,」潘鲁奇小姐说,倾身向他,为了瞥见他的脸孔,通过面纱,「假如你是一位通灵者,你应该知道我欲为知道什么?」
「想想看,这位可怜的人竟然大胆地怀疑!」范论丁叹口气,「我非赢过她不可!」
「你欲为知道未来,」他发出声音。
「一针见血!」潘鲁奇小姐得意洋洋的宣佈。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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