Aion 永恒纪元

Aion
永恒纪元
By Carl Jung
卡尔、荣格

Chapter I
第一章

THE EGO
自我
Investigation of the psychology of the unconscious confronted
me with facts which required the formulation of new
concepts. One of these concepts is the self. The entity so denoted
is not meant to take the place of the one that has always been
known as the ego, but includes it in a supraordinate concept.

对于无意识心理学的研究让我面对要求新观念的诠释的这些事实。其中一个观念就是自性。如此被指明的实体，并不是被用来取代总是众所周知，作为自我的这个实体。而是包括它在一个早先于安置的观念。

We understand the ego as the complex factor to which all conscious
contents are related. It forms, as it were, the centre of the
field of consciousness; and, in so far as this comprises the empirical
personality, the ego is the subject of all personal acts of
consciousness. The relation of a psychic content to the ego forms
the criterion of its consciousness, for no content can be conscious
unless it is represented to a subject.

我们理解自我，作为是跟所有的意识内容息息相关的这个因素。它形成所谓的意识的领域的中心。因为它组成这个经验的人格，自我就是一切的意识的行动的主体。心灵跟自我的关系形成它的意识的标准。因为没有内容能够具有意识，除非它作为针对一位主体的代表。

With this definition we have described and delimited the
scope of the subject. Theoretically, no limits can be set to the
field of consciousness, since it is capable of indefinite extension.
Empirically, however, it always finds its limit when it comes up
against the unknown. This consists of everything we do not
know, which, therefore, is not related to the ego as the centre
of the field of consciousness. The unknown falls into two groups
of objects: those which are outside and can be experienced by
the senses, and those which are inside and are experienced immediately.
The first group comprises the unknown in the outer
world; the second the unknown in the inner world. We call this
latter territory the unconscious.

用这个定义，我们已经描述主体的范围，并且除掉主体的范围的限制。理论上，对于意识的领域，并无法竖立任何的限制。因为意识能够从事扩散的延伸。可是，经验上，意识总是发现它的限制，当它遭遇到未知的领域。这个未知的领域包括我们并没有全部知道的一切。因此，这个我们并没有全部知道的一切，作为意识的领域的中心，跟自己并不相关。这个未知的领域可分成两类的客体：在外部，而且被各种感官经验到的客体，与在内部，而且当下被经验的客体。第一类的客体组成外部世界的未知的领域；第二类则是组成在内部世界的未知的领域。我们称后者的这个领域为无意识。

The ego, as a specific content of consciousness, is not a simple
or elementary factor but a complex one which, as such,
cannot be described exhaustively. Experience shows that it rests
on two seemingly different bases: the somatic and the psychic.
The somatic basis is inferred from the totality of endosomatic
perceptions, which for their part are already of a psychic nature
and are associated with the ego, and are therefore conscious.

这个自我，作为意识到明确的内容，并不是单纯，或是基本的因素，而是复杂的因素。作为如此复杂的因素，自我无法全面性地被描述。我们从经验得知，自我依靠两个表面上不同的基础：身体的基础与心灵的基础。身体的基础根据身体内部知觉的整体性，就它们而言，这些身体内部的知觉已经是属于心灵的特质，而且跟自我息息相关，因此是意识。

They are produced by endosomatic stimuli, only some of which
cross the threshold of consciousness. A considerable proportion
of these stimuli occur unconsciously, that is, subliminally. The
fact that they are subliminal does not necessarily mean that their
status is merely physiological, any more than this would be true
of a psychic content. Sometimes they are capable of crossing the
threshold, that is, of becoming perceptions.

这些知觉由身体内部的刺激所产生。这些身体内部的刺激，仅有一些跨越过意识的门槛。这些刺激，有大多数是无意识地发生，也就是，升华地发生。这些刺激作为升华的这个事实，未必就是意味着，它们的地位仅是生理层面，正如就心灵的内容而言，这也并非真实。有时候，它们能够跨越这个门槛，也就是，跨越成为知觉的门槛。

But there is no
doubt that a large proportion of these endosomatic stimuli are
simply incapable of consciousness and are so elementary that
there is no reason to assign them a psychic nature—unless of
course one favours the philosophical view that all life-processes
are psychic anyway. The chief objection to this hardly demonstrable
hypothesis is that it enlarges the concept of the psyche
beyond all bounds and interprets the life-process in a way not
absolutely warranted by the facts.

无可置疑，大多数的这些身体内部的刺激偏偏就是无法成为意识。它们是如此基本，以致于没有理由将它们指定一个心灵的特质。当然，除非我们偏爱这个哲学的观点：无论如何，所有的生命-过程都是心灵的生命-过程。对于这个几乎无法被证明的假设的主要的反对理由是，它将心灵的观念扩大到超越所有的限制，并且解释生命-过程，所用的方式，并没有受到事实的绝对保证。

Concepts that are too broad
usually prove to be unsuitable instruments because they are too
vague and nebulous. I have therefore suggested that the term
“psychic” be used only where there is evidence of a will capable
of modifying reflex or instinctual processes. Here I must refer
the reader to my paper “On the Nature of the Psyche,” * where
I have discussed this definition of the “psychic” at somewhat
greater length.

太过于广泛的观念，通常证明并不是合宜的工具。因为它们太过模糊与朦胧。我因此建议，「心灵」这个术语仅是应该被使用在有证据证明，意志能够匡正反射或本能的过程。在此，我必须推荐读者阅读我的论文「论心灵的特性」。在那篇论文里，我已经相当详细地讨论「心灵」的这个定义。

The somatic basis of the ego consists, then, of conscious and
unconscious factors. The same is true of the psychic basis: on
the one hand the ego rests on the total field of consciousness,
and on the other, on the sum total of unconscious contents.

因此，自我的身体的基础是由意识与无意识的因素组成。就心灵的基础而言，情况也是同样真实。一方面，自我依靠意识的完整的领域；另一方面，自我依靠无意识内容的总数。

These fall into three groups: first, temporarily subliminal contents
that can be reproduced voluntarily (memory); second,
unconscious contents that cannot be reproduced voluntarily;
third, contents that are not capable of becoming conscious at all.
Group two can be inferred from the spontaneous irruption of
subliminal contents into consciousness. Group three is hypothetical;
it is a logical inference from the facts underlying group
two. It contains contents which have not yet irrupted into consciousness,
or which never will.

这些无意识内容分成三类：第一类是暂时升华的内容，这些内容能够自愿地被复制（记忆）；第二类，无意识的内容，它们无法自愿地被复制。第三类，根本就无法成为意识的内容。第二类能够被推论出来，根据升华的内容自动自发地爆发成为意识。第三类则是假设；这个假设是逻辑的推论，根据作为第二类的基础那些事实。它包括那些还没有被爆发成为意识的那些内容，或是永远不会爆发成为意识的内容。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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Linguisteries 11

Linguisteries 11

雅克慎论拉康
Jacobsen on Jacques Lacan

What is Called a Subject？
何谓主体

Now let us take things a bit more slowly. We have already seen that language, for Lacan, does not represent reality but rather the subject. We must now take the matter farther and explain why: because the subject is negativity (separation from himself, separation from what is), and he manifests himself in language only by negating reality, reducing it to nothing. This, precisely, was Kojeve’s lesson as he commented in his own way on Hegel. “Discourse”— identified with the “Subject” (“Discourse = Subject”54)—reveals the “Real,”55 but only on condition of “nihilating” it, causing to be what is not by negating what is: the man who “through his discourse. . .succeeds in preserving error in the very heart of reality. . . is a Nothingness that nihilates in Being, or an ‘ideal’ that is present in the Real.”56

现在，让我们稍微更加缓慢地看待事情。我们已经看出，对于拉康，语言并没有代表现实。相反地，语言代表主体。我们现在必须更加深入地看待事情，并且解释为什么：因为主体是否定（跟它自己分开，跟生命本质分开）。主体仅有否定现实，将现身化减成为空无，他才能在语言里展示」。被认同是「主体」的辞说（辞说=主体），显示这个「实在界」。但是只要辞说将实在界化为空无，凭借否定它的本质，来促成它的本质：通过辞说成功地保存错误，在现实的核心的这个人，是指生命实存里化为空无的空无，或是一个出现于「实在界」的理想。

Indeed, the Real is “being” as it is, being without alterity, “given,” “identical to itself,” “omnipresent and dense,”57 mired in its “hie et nunc”5*—and both Sartre59 and Lacan faithfully repeat this lesson: the real, Lacan says, is “pure and simple,” “undifferentiated,” “non-human” (1988a, 68-69/81-83), “without fissure” (1988b, 97/122), “always in the same place” (1988b, 238/278, 297/342; 1977b, 49/49). Discourse (or the Subject), on the contrary, is “being” as it is not, being that differs from itself because it relates to itself. More precisely, it is “being” separating from itself in order to promote itself to the status of an ideality— that is, to the status of a subjective representation: “Thus the concept ‘this dog’ does not differ at all from the real, concrete dog to which it ‘refers’ except that the dog is here and now, whereas its concept is everywhere and nowhere, always and never”60—an idealizing abstraction, which obviously entails a radical negation of the empirical Real.

的确，实在界是本质是生命实存，它没有它者，「被给予」，「认同于它自己」，「无所不在与精炼」，深陷于它的「纯粹与简单」。拉康忠实地重复这个教学：拉康说，实在界是「纯粹与简单」，「没有差别法」，「非人」(1988a, 68-69/81-83)，「没有罅隙」(1988b, 97/122), 「总是处于相同位置」(1988b, 238/278, 297/342; 1977b, 49/49)。 相反地，辞说或是主体，是处于非本质的「生命实存」，不同于它自己的生命实存，因为它它跟它自己的关联。更加贴切地说，就是这个跟它自己区隔的「生命实存」，为了提升它自己到理想的地位—换句话说，提升到主体的再现代表的地位：「因此，「这条狗」的这个观念，跟它提到的真实，具体的狗，根本就没有差别。除了这条狗处于此地此刻。而它的观念是无所不在，无所在，总是存在，永未存在。」这些理想化的抽象，显而易见地涵盖强烈地否定试验性地实在界。

Just as the Cartesian subject reaches the certitude of subjective representation only at the price of a radical suspension of all reality (his own included), so Discourse and/or the Subject can only emerge at the price of what Kojeve and Lacan call a “murder of the thing” (1977a, 104/319; 1988a, 174/196): “When the Meaning (Essence) ‘dog’ passes into the word ‘dog’—that is, becomes an abstract Concept which is different from the sensible reality that it reveals by its Meaning—the Meaning (Essence) dies: the word ‘dog’ does not run, drink, and eat. … the conceptual understanding of empirical reality is equivalent to a murder”‘1 Lacan translates this as follows: “Through that which becomes embodied only by being the trace of a nothingness and whose support cannot thereafter be impaired [since it is an ideality], the concept, saving the duration of what passes by, engenders the thing” (1977a, 65/276),

正如笛卡尔的主体，仅有付出这个代价：激进地悬置所有的现实（包括他自己），它才能够到达主体再现代表的确定性。辞说与（或）主体只有付出这个代价：以科耶夫与拉康所谓的「物象」的谋杀，作为代价，它才会出现(1977a, 104/319; 1988a, 174/196)：「当「狗」的意义与本质转换成为「狗」这个字词—换句话说，成为这个「抽象」的观念，这个抽象的观念不同于它凭借它的意义显示的可理解的现实，意义（本质）才会死亡：「狗」这个字词并没有跑，喝，与吃、、、试验的现实的观念的理解，相等于是一种谋杀」。拉康将它翻译如下：「仅有凭借成为空无的痕迹，通过成为具体化身，它的支撑因此无法被损坏（因为它是个理念），观念产生物象，拯救通过之物的这个期间。」(1977a, 65/276),

Indeed, this is what Hegel also said, Hegel for whom the sign’s “arbitrariness” (Willkiir) was a manifestation of the free negativity of intelligence disengaging itself from the immediacy of intuition. Say the word “lion,” he writes, and you create the lion ex nihilo, by abolishing it as a tangible thing.62 Say the word “dog,” Kojeve comments, and you kill the real dog that barks and wags its tail.63 Pronounce the word “cat,” Blanchot continues, and “death speaks.”64 Say the word “elephants,” Lacan concludes, and here comes a herd of elephants, present in its absence and filling up the room (1975b, 201, 244, 267).

的确，这是黑格尔也说过的话。对于黑格尔，符号的「任意性」展示智慧的自由否定，当智慧解开它自己，跟直觉的当下分开。他写到，假如你说出「狮子」这个字，你就能够从空无中创造这个「狮子」，凭借废除它，作为一个「具体」的东西。布朗肖则是继续说：「假如你发音「猫」这个字，死亡就言说。」拉康的结论是：「假如你说出「象群」这个字，就会有一大群大象出现，在它的缺席里出现，并且填满房间(1975b, 201, 244, 267)。

What is left at the end of this interesting hecatomb? Nothing but words, words, words—that is, a subject. Thus language, the manifestation of the negativity of the subject who posits himself by negating (himself as) the Real, works the miracle of manifesting what is(not: the tearing apart, the ek-sistence, and the perpetual self-overtaking that “is” the subject, the subject who speaks himself in everything by negating everything. Language, as Kojeve says of Desire, presents “the absence of a reality,”65 and thus, Lacan continues, it manifests the disappearing “nothing” that is the subject.

这个有趣的牺牲献祭之后，剩下的东西是什么？实实在在就是字词，字词，字词，也就是说，主体。因此，语言，作为主体的否定的展示，主体提出他自己，凭借否定他自己作为实在界。主体运作这个奇迹：展示生命本质（非本质）：作为主体的生命实存的撕裂，脱离存在，与永久的自我追赶。主体凭借否定一切，在一切里言说他自己。如同科耶夫谈论欲望，语言呈现「现实的缺席」。因此，拉康继续说，主体展示这个逐渐消失的「空无」，作为主体的「空无」。

It is probably easier to see now the way in which structural linguistics, at a certain point, came to be grafted onto the Lacanian theory of language, progressively supplanting the problematic of “full speech.” After all, the distance from the Hegelian-Kojevian thesis concerning the “murder of the thing” to the thesis of the sign’s “arbitrariness” was only a small step, which Lacan was quick to take; on this point, see the end of the first seminar, where Lacan abruptly passes from the theme of “creative speech,” formulated in Hegelian terms (1988a, 242—243/267), to that of the “arbitrariness” of the Saussurian sign (1988a, 248/272).

现在，或许比较容易看出，结构语言学在某个时刻，如何被接枝到拉康的语言的理论，如何逐渐地替换「充实言说」的难题。毕竟，从黑格尔-科耶夫关于「物象的谋杀」的命题，到符号的「任意性」的命题的这个距离，仅是一小步。拉康很快地採取的一小步。针对这一点，请你们参照第一研讨班的结束时，拉康突然从「创造性的言说」的主题，用黑格尔的术语诠释(1988a, 242—243/267), 通过到索绪尔的符号的「任意性」的主题(1988a, 248/272)。

From there, it was also easy and tempting to glide imperceptibly from the conception of discourse as “the presence of the absence of a reality” to the linguistic theory of value, where each signifying unity is defined by opposition to all the other unities which it is not, and which it thus presents in their absence (on this point, see the passage in the third seminar where the opposition of the “signifiers” “night/day” is described as a “symbolic nihilation” of reality; 1981,168). But we see also that these borrowings from structural linguistics take place in the shadow of a philosophy of the subject and of language, which predates them, and to which they bring nothing more than a sort of compelling scientific “guarantee.”

从那里，我们很容易，也忍不住不知不觉地从辞说的观念，作为是「现实的缺席的出席」，滑动到价值的语言学的理论。在这里，每个能指意涵的一致性被定义，根据所有的其他的一致性作为对立。每个能指意涵的一致性，并非是所有其他的一致性；前者因此出席于后者它们的缺席里。（针对这点，请参照第三研讨班的这个段落。在那里，「各种能指」的对立：「日与夜」被描述为「象征地将现实化为空无，1981,168」。但是我们也看出：这些借用结构语言学，发生在主体与语言的哲学的阴影里。这个哲学早先于结构语言学的借用。这些借用仅是带来强制的科学的「保证」给主体与语言的哲学。）

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

语言的奥秘 10

语言的奥秘 10
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
Jacobsen on Jacques Lacan

What is Called a Subject？
何谓主体

Will this reminder help us solve the problem of the relationship between subject and signifier? It will to a certain extent, since all of this explains very well why Lacan would later come to claim that “the signifier represents the subject,” although it does not explain why he added “for another signifier.” The precise meaning of this thesis is that the subject cannot speak himself except by dividing himself and endlessly escaping from himself into the signifier. He is undoubtedly the “signified” of all signifiers, but “the S and the $ of the Saussurian algorithm are not on the same level, and man only deludes himself when he believes his true place is at their axis, which is nowhere” (1977a, 166/518). Therefore, the subject of the enunciation cannot be the same as the subject of the statement (1977b, 138-139/127): this “man” will always be other than (what) he says, which is also the reason for Lacan’s explicit rewriting of the cogito: “I think where I am not, therefore I am where I do not think” (1977b, 166/517).

这个提醒的话将会帮助我们解决主体与能指之间的关系吗？它有某个程度会有帮助，因为所有这一切清楚解释，为什么拉康后来逐渐宣称，「能指代表主体」，虽然它并没有解释，为什么他补充说「针对另外一个能指」。这个命题的确是意义是，主体并无法言说他自己，除了凭借区分他自己，并且无止尽地从他自己那里，逃避到能指。他无可置疑地是所有的能指的所指，但是索绪尔演算式的这个S与s并不是处于相同的层面。当人相信他的真实的位置处于它们的轴心时，他仅是欺骗他自己。因为那是乌何有之乡。(1977a, 166/518)。因此，表述的主体跟陈述的主体不可能是相同的。(1977b, 138-139/127): 这个「人」将总是非他所说的那个人。这就是为什么拉康明确地重新书写这个「我思故我在」：「我在我不在的地方思维，因此我在我没有思维的地方存在」(1977b, 166/517)。

The one who says, “I think, I am” (or “I/represent/myself”) is not identical to the one who says, “I think, I am” (or “I/represent/myself”): “Of course, every representation requires a subject, but this subject is never a pure subject. . .. There is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the subject” (1977b, 221/2,01). In other words, the subject of the enunciation is not the subject of the statement—or, to reprise Sartre’s famous para-Hegelian formula, the two are the same only “in the mode of not being so.” Like the ungraspable Sartrean “for-itself”—with which, in many ways, this subject is comparable51—he is not what he is (the “signifier,” or the statement that claims to fix him in his being “in-himself”), and he is what he is not (a perpetual nihilation, a perpetual overtaking of the signifiers/statements that objectify him). In a word, he “is” a permanent self-negation.

说「我思想，我存在」（或，我代表我自己）的这个人，跟说「我思想，我存在」（或我/代表/我自己）的这个人，并不相同：「当然，每个代表都需要一个主体，但是这个主体从来就不是纯粹的主体、、、主体的存在必然会有主体在某个地方消失。(1977b, 221/2,01)。换句话说，表述的主体并不是陈述的主体—或者说，重复萨特的著名的类似-黑格尔的公式，仅有当这两者「处于并不是这样的的模式时」，它们才是相等的。就像这个无法被掌握的萨特的「为了它自己」—很多方面，主体可跟它相提并论。主体并不在他存在的地方（主体并不在这个「能指」或这个陈述里，这个陈述宣称将他固定在他存在于「他自己的内部」）。主体在他并不存在的地方（永久的虚无主义，永久的被接管，被将他化为客体的能指/陈述）。总之，主体的「生命实存」是一种永恒的自我-否定。

No doubt the reader has already seen what we are driving at with these insidious comparisons: if the subject, in the signifier, cannot speak himself as he is, it is because he speaks himself in it as he is not—in short, because (in accord with the Kojevian lesson reprised by Sartre) he is the radical negativity of a subject who can pose himself “for-himself” only by ceaselessly negating himself as he is “in-himself”; he is pure Desire, pure difference from himself as the condition of relationship with himself, pure transcendence, through which he can rejoin himself only at infinity, since when he rejoins himself as he is in-himself, he is no longer for-himself (he is a corpse, an inert thing).

无可置疑，读者已经看出，对于这些潜在的比较，我们的用意所在：假如主体在能指里无法言谈他自己，依照他的生命实存，那是因为他在那里言谈他自己，是依照他并没有生命实存的样子。总之，因为（为了符合萨特重复的科耶夫的教学），他是主体的强烈的否定，这个主体摆出姿态，仅是凭借无止境地否定他自己，当他「在他自己内部」获得生命实存。他是纯粹的欲望，纯粹地跟他自己差异，作为跟他自己的关系，纯粹的超越，通过这个超越，仅有在永恒，他才能够重新结合他自己。因为当他重新结合他自己，依照他「在他自己内部」，他不再是「为了-他自己」（他是一个尸体，一个惯性的东西）。

This subject is the subject of Kojevian “error-truth” or (what amounts to the same thing) Sartrean “bad faith,” a subject who cannot speak himself (as “for-himself”) except by negating himselftas “in-himself”), without ever being identical to himself.52 Under these conditions, we understand why the subject of the enunciation can no longer speak himself as he is in his statements—not because he is no longer the subject of the cogito, the subject of representation, but, on the contrary, because he has become this subject so well that he is now reduced to the cogito’s pure relationship with self as structure of representation (that is, as structure of the transcendence by which he leaves himself in order to be able to pose himself “facing” himself).

这个主体就是科耶夫的「错误-真理」的主体，或（相等于是相同的东西）。萨特的「不好的真理」，主体无法言谈他自己，（依照「为了-他自己」），除了凭借否定他自己「在他自己内部」）。每当这个主体言谈他自己时，他总是认同他自己。」在这些情况下，我们理解为什么表述的主体不再能够言谈他自己，依照他在他的陈述里—倒不是因为他不再是我思故我在的主体，再现代表的的主体。相反地，而是因为他已经如此清楚地变成这个主体，以致于他现在被迫进入我思故我在的纯粹关系，跟自性作为再现代表的结构（也就是说，作为超验的结构；凭借这个超验结构，他离开他自己，为了能够「面对」他自己，摆出自己的姿态。

At present, this subject can no longer speak himself except on condition of speaking himself, and the “spoken” (dit) is able to manifest the “speaking” (dire)y through which he relates himself to himself, only by absenting the self: “The fact that one is speaking is forgotten behind what is spoken within what is given to be understood…. Thus the spoken does not go without saying (le dit ne va pas sans dire). But if the spoken is always posited in truth,… the speaking is joined to it only through ek-sisting to it—that is, by not belonging to the spoken dimension (dit-mension)53 of truth” (1973a, 5, 8). The subject “ek-sists to language,” Lacan says again and again, because he has no other essence than his ek-sistence, than his perpetual ek-stasis beyond what he is: Lacanism is an existentialism.

目前，这个主体不再能够言说他自己，除了作为言说他自己的条件。这个「被言说」者能够展示这个「言说」。通过这个言说，他让他自己，跟他自己扯上关系，凭借让自性缺席：一个人正在言说的这个事实被忘记，隐藏在被言说的内容背后，在被给予作为能够被理解的东西里。因此，这个被言说者必须言说，才能进行。但是被言说者总是在真理里被提出、、、仅有凭借被言说者的外部-存在，言说者才跟被言说者连接一块。换句话说，凭借不归属于真理的被言说的维度）(1973a, 5, 8)。拉康反复地强调，主体「在语言外部获得生命实存」，因为主体没有其他的本质，除了他的「外部的生命实存」，除了他的永恒的「绽放-生命实存」，超越他的本质：拉康的思想是存在主义。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

语言的奥秘 9

语言的奥秘 9
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康

What is called a Subject？
何谓主体？

“Meaning,” in other words, is not to be sought in what language says (in the statement) but in the fact of its being said (in the enunciation, in speech). And this meaning, constituted in interlocutive speech and nowhere else, this “signified = x” is the subject insofar as he “wants to speak” (veut dire), insofar as he ex-presses himself to the intention of another. Language is first of all speech, and thus it says nothing—nothing but the subject, to the extent that he wants to speak (himself) (veut [se] dire).

换句话说，意义不应该在语言言说（在陈述）的东西里寻找，而是要在语言正在被言说（在表述，在话说）的这个事实里寻找。在对谈的话语里构成的这个意义，而不是别的地方，这个等于x未知数的「所指」，它就是主体。因为他「想要言说」，因为他表达（逼迫）他自己，针对另外一个所指的意图。语言首先就是话语，因此它什么都没说—除了就是主体。甚至他想要言说（他自己）。

We see what these (still very phenomenological48) early formulations of Lacan already presuppose: the whole critique of the “language-sign” that will be carried out under the auspices of “full speech” and, later, of the “signifier.” In this passage, we are witnessing an actual bracketing off (or “reduction”) of every realist reference, for the sake of an entirely autoenunciative and self-referential (because “subjective”) model of language. This language is essentially speech that speaks itself, in the very precise sense of a subject’s intentionally expressing himself within it, manifesting himself in exteriority by passing through the mediation of the other—in short, in the sense of the subject’s speaking himself, performing an autorepresentation.

我们看出，拉康的这些（依旧非常现象学）的早期的诠释，已经预先假定：对于「语言-符号」的整个的批判，将会在「充实言说」的吉兆之下被执行。在这个过程，我们正见证到，他将每个现实主义的指称，实际地放进括弧（或化简），为了让语言的模式可以自动-表述与自我-指涉（因为这是「主体的」模式）。这个语言基本上是言说它自己的话语，确实的意义就是，主体意图在它里面表达他自己，在外在性里展示他自己，凭借经历他者的中介—总之，以主体言说他自己的意义，履行一个自动再现表象。

This is why speech, for Lacan, is not a question of reality but, as we have been confirming, of truth. We must understand by this that the subject grasps himself through a subjective certitude, which is what Lacan says again in this passage from the first seminar, which we have already cited: “What is at stake [in psychoanalysis] is the realization of the truth of the subject, like a dimension peculiar to it which must be detached in its distinctiveness [originalite] in relation to the very notion of reality” (1988a, 21/29).

这就是为什么对于拉康而言，话语并不是现实的问题，而是真理的问题，如同我们已经证实的。我们必须根据这个理解，主体通过主观的确定性来掌握他自己。这是拉康再次所说的东西，从第一个研讨班的这个段落，我们已经引述过：「精神分析岌岌可危的地方，就是主体的真理的实现。就像一个对于主体是特殊的维度，这个维度必须在它清晰的状不保持隔离，相关于现实的这个观念」(1988a, 21/29)。

And we certainly recognize this “peculiar dimension”: it is that of the Cartesian cogito, here reformulated by Lacan in terms of “speech.” The subject of speech, like the subject of the cogito, grasps himself in his truth by negating (“reducing,” questioning) objective reality, for the sake of an autorepresentation by which he poses himself “before” himself through a Vor-stellung:49 his objects (or, what amount to the same thing in this context, his representations) are henceforth his own. In this sense, the progress of an analysis follows the course of the first two Cartesian meditations. It proceeds from language, which says “something” or represents objects, to speech, in which the subject (of the enunciation) speaks himself in everything that he says (in all his statements): dico, sum. Lacan later makes this very dear: “Let us say that it is by taking its place at the level of the enunciation that the cogito acquires its certainty” (1977b, 140/129). In other words, it would be impossible that, saying something (no matter how nonsensical), I would not “be” at the very moment when I spoke (made the statement).

我们确实体认出这个「特殊的维度」：那就是笛卡尔的「我思故我在」。在此由拉康用「话语」重新诠释。话语的主体，就像我思故我在的主体，凭借否定（化简，询问）客观的现实，在他的真理里掌握他自己。为了这个自动再现表象，他凭借来在他自己面前，通过一种「表象」，摆弄姿态：他的客体（也就是，相等于是这个内文的相同东西，体的再现表象），因此就是他自己的客体。从这个意义，精神分析的进展遵循笛卡尔的前两个沉思录的途径。它从语言开始前进，语言对话语言说「某件东西」，或是代表各种客体。在话语里，这个表述的主体言说他自己，在每样他说的东西里（在他所有的陈述里）：拉康后来清楚地表达这一点：「让我们说，我思故我在获得它的确定性，就是在表述的层面，取代它的位置」(1977b, 140/129)。换句话说，当我说出某件事情时（不管是多么的没有意义），就在当我言说的这个时刻（表达这个陈述时），我不可能没有「获得生命实存」。

This reformulation of the cogito presupposes, of course, the assimilation of the “I think” to an “I speak (myself)”50 and, therefore, in accord with Heidegger’s interpretation, to an “I represent (myself),” which already implies all the distance between the subject of the enunciation and the statement that represents him: this subject, in the act of enunciation, is related to himself only on condition of projecting himself “outside” himself in the utterance of the statement where he (re)presents himself. Let us pause here a moment, for this point is extremely important: if the subject of speech and/or of the signifier is none other than the Cartesian subject, as Lacan asserts later (1977b, 36/36; 1966, 856, 858), it is only as a subject of representation (and not of an immediate certitude—that of affect, for example).

这个重新诠释「我思故我在」，当然是预先假设：这个「我思」被吸收成为「我言说我自己」。因此，为了跟海德格的诠释一致，它被吸收成为「我代表我自己」。这已经暗示着所有的这个距离，处于表述的主体，与代表主体的陈述之间的距离：在表述的行动里，这个主体跟他自己息息相关，仅是根据这个条件：在他代表（呈现）他自己的陈述的表达里，他投射他自己，在他自己的「外面」。让我们在此稍微停顿一下，因为这一点极端重要：假如话语的主体，与（或）能指的主体，实实在在就是笛卡尔的主体，如同拉康后来主张的(1977b, 36/36; 1966, 856, 858)，那仅是作为再现表象的主体（而不是作为当下确定性的主体—譬如，情感的主体。）

Confirmation, if any were needed, could be found in the Hegelianism of Lacan’s first formulations on language and speech. Whereas one could say that the cogito is a monologue, Lacan describes a dialogue, but only because he was reformulating, in the i94o’s and i95o’s, the cogito in Hegelian terms: only by speaking to the other, by alienating/exteriorizing himself in a communal language, can the subject represent himself “in front of” himself and thus arrive at self-consciousness. In other words, he can manifest himself in his truth only by passing through the mediation of the other, by making himself recognized by the other. Thus the Lacanian cogito is from the very start a linguistic, social, and intersubjective cogito, a cogito in the first person plural (1977a, 86/299).

从拉康第一次对于黑格尔思想探讨语言与话语的诠释，我们能够获得证实（假如需要证实的话）。虽然我们说，「我思故我在」是个独白，拉康描述的是对话。但是那仅是因为在1940与1950年代，拉康重新诠释黑格尔术语的「我思故我在」：仅是凭借对他者言说，凭借异化他自己，让他自己处于外在，在共通社区的语言里，主体才能代表他自己，在他自己「面前」，因此获得自我意识。换句话说，他能够展示他自己，在他的真理里，仅是凭借通过他者的中介，仅是凭借让他自己被他者体认。因此，拉康的我思故我在，从一开始，就是一个语言，社会，与互为主体性的我思故我在，以第一人称复数的「我们思故我们在」(1977a, 86/299)。

But this changes nothing of its structure as cogito, understood as the structure of the subject of representation. The subject of speech, for the Hegelian who was the young Lacan, continues to speak himself’in the other to whom he speaks, for the good reason that the subject makes himself recognized by the other only by recognizing himself simultaneously in that alter ego. Thus, as we have seen, unfolds the efficacy of the analytic cure, as Lacan conceived of it until the end of the 1940’s: here, the subject speaks to an alienated image of himself until the analyst, that image’s specular prop, returns it to the subject, who finally recognizes himself in it. This accords, obviously, with the structure of the cogito, since now there is an identity (a dialectical one this time) between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the statement: the “subject” who speaks is the same as the “ego” of whom, with whom, he speaks.

但是，这并没有改变任何它的结构，作为「我思故我在」。它被理解作为再现表象的主体的结构。年轻时的拉康是黑格尔主义者，话语的这个主体，继续言说他自己，针对他言说对象的他者。理由非常充分：主体让他自己被他者体认，仅是凭借同时体认他自己，在那个他者-自我。因此，我们已经看出，精神分析治疗的有效性就此展开，如同拉康构想它，直到1940年代的末期：在此，主体跟他自己的异化的形象言说，直到精神分析家，作为那个形象的魅影理想的支撑，将它还给主体。主体最后才在它里面体认出他自己。显而易见地，这符合「我思故我在」的结构。因为现在，在表述的主体与陈述的主体之间，已经有一个认同（这次是辩证法的认同）：言说的「主体」，跟他谈论的这个「自我」，与之谈论的这个「自我」，是相同的。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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雅克慎论拉康 8

雅克慎论拉康
Lacan TheAbsolute Master
拉康，绝对主人

What Is Called a Subject?
何谓主体？

It is an entirely different story if we examine the other thesis that, for Lacan, completes the thesis of the signifier’s autonomy: “The signifier represents a subject… (not a signified)—and for another signifier (which means: not for another subject)” (1970, 65). Indeed, it is one thing to say that the sign does not represent reality and that the signifier in turn does not represent but produces the signified; it is quite another to say that the signifier represents the subject for another signifier. As for structural linguistics, it never says anything of the kind, methodically excluding the subject in order to constitute itself as a science,45 and only reintroducing it as one of the purely formal markers of subjectivity (personal pronouns, tenses, and so on) that “shift” the statement (enonce) onto the subjective point of enunciation (enonciation) that supports it. As Benveniste bluntly puts it, “‘Ego* is he who says ‘ego,'”46 and that is as far as linguists permit themselves to go. Again, the ideal langue constructed by linguists is spoken by no one. It cannot, a fortiori, “represent” any given subject.

假如我们检视另外一个命题，那是完全不同的鼓声。对于拉康，另外一个命题完成能指的自主权的命题：「能指代表一位主体–（不是一个所指）–针对另外一个能指（这意味着：并不是针对另外一个主体）(1970, 65)。的确，说符号并没有代表现实，能指反过来没有代表，而是产生所指，这是一码事。另外一码事是说：能指代表主体，针对另外一个能指。至于结构语言学，它从来没有说任何这类的事情，方法上它排除这个主体，为了建构它自己，作为一门科学。仅有重新建造它，作为主体性的其中一个纯粹正式的标记（人称代名词，时态，等等）。它们「转换」这个陈述，进入支持它的表述的主体点。如同本温尼斯特坦率地表达它，「自我就是说自我的那个人」。那是就语言学家容许他们自己的程度而言。而且，语言学家建构的理想的语言，并没有任何人能说。更强烈的理由是，它无法「代表任何一个特定的主体」。

This, however, is precisely what Lacan maintains, just when he is insisting on language’s “preexistence” for the subject and the subject’s preinscription in discourse (1977a, 148/495). Admittedly, the Lacanian subject is the subject subjected to the signifier, the subject dispossessed of any meaning (vouloir-dire) or mastery of language, which speaks him more than he speaks it; but, inversely, the signifier represents nothing but the subject, by means of which it is reinvested with that function of representation that Lacan so stringently denies elsewhere—which, by the same token, helps us understand why Lacan felt the need to separate signifier and signified by a “bar that resists signification.”

可是，这确实是拉康的主张。正当他坚持语言的「先前存在」，对于主体，与在辞说里主体的重新铭记(1977a, 148/495)。尽管如此，拉康的主体是隶属于能指的的主体，被剥除掉任何意义的主体，或剥除语言的掌控的主体。语言言谈他，胜过于他言谈语言。但是反过来说，能指代表空无，但是主体帮忙我们理解，为什么拉康感觉这个需要，凭借抗拒意义的一条横杠，区隔能指与所指的需要。凭借着空无，主体重新被投注符号再现的功能。这是拉康在其他地方如此严峻地否认。

On one side of the question (the side we have just investigated), this thesis says the same thing as linguistics: the signifier represents nothing but another signifier. But on the other side (the one that really interests Lacan), this thesis can also be read as saying that the signifier represents nothing, and that the signifier (re)presents the nothing that the subject of desire “is.” Signifies do not mean to say anything (ne veulent rien dire\ by which Lacan understands that they all say the same thing—that is, the subject as nothing—and this is why they are perfectly equivalent in their very difference. Since they say anything at all (n’importe quoi)y they all say not what is identical but what is the same—the same “eclipse” of the subject as a “being of non-being” (etre de non-etant; 1977a, 300/801), the same “disappearing appearance” (1973b, 33) of that fxri ov . . . that brings to being an existent in spite of its non-advent” (1977b, 1×8-1×9/117).

在问题的一边（我们刚刚调查过的这边），这个命题说跟语言学相同的事情：能指仅仅代表另外一个能指。但是在另外一边（确实让拉康感到興趣的这边），这个命题也能够被阅读作为说：能指代表空无，能指（呈现）代表欲望的主体所在的空无。能指并没有意图要说任何事情。拉康根据这个理解到：能指所说相同的事情。换句话说，主体作为空无。这就是为什么它们尽管有差异，却又完全相等。因为它们说出任何事情，它们都说的，并不是一致性的事情，而是相同的事情—主体的相同的被遮蔽，作为「非存在的存在」（1977a, 300/801)，相同的「逐渐消失的出现」(1973b, 33) ，尽管主体的没有来临，它让生命实存出现(1977b, 1×8-1×9/117)。

In this way, we finally see that the “signifier” inherits the function previously assigned to “full speech” (that of saying nothing), and that the subject, for his part, inherits the disappearing “place” of the signified. Just as the linguists’ signified arises only from the reference of one signifier to another, so the Lacanian subject appears/disappears only by making himself represented, through a signifier, to another signifier. Lacan himself is very clear about it: “This whole signifier can only operate, it may be said, if it is present in the subject. It is this objection that I answer by supposing that it has passed over to the level of the signified” (1977a, 155/504). And a bit later, with respect to the “crossing” of the S/s bar, he says, “This crossing expresses the condition of passage of the signifier into the signified that I [have already] pointed out, although provisionally confusing it with the place of the subject” (1977a, 164/516). Why does Lacan say “provisionally”? Because the signified is only a momentary and provisional “effect.”

以这种方式，我们最后看见，这个「能指」继承先前指定给「充实言说」的功能（什么都没说的功能）。主体就本身而言，继承所指定这个逐渐消失的「位置」。正如语言学家的所指，仅是从一个能指针对另外一个能指的关系而产生，拉康的主体出现/消失，也仅是凭借让他自己被代表，通过一个能指，针对另外一个能指。对于这点，拉康自己是如此地清楚：「整个的能指仅能运作，它可能被说，假如它出现在主体那里。我回答这个反对，凭借假设，它已经通过到所指定层面」(1977a, 155/504)。后来，关于S/s的这条横杠的「跨越」，拉康说：「这个跨越表达能指通过进入所指的情况，我已经指出这个所指，虽然暂时将它跟主体的位置混淆」(1977a, 164/516)。为什么拉康说「暂时」？因为所指仅是瞬间与暂时的「效应」。

If the signifier, as Lacan says, “represents a subject,” and “not a signified,” it is not because the subject has nothing to do with the signified but only because the subject is distinguished from the traditional “fixed” signified: the subject is now the elusive signified of all signifiers, what they all represent in his absence; but he is none the less their signified, to which their references refer. As Lyotard aptly remarks, “When he says ‘signified* Lacan thinks ‘subject.’ Lacan’s whole theory of the metaphor is a theory of the metaphor of the subject [indeed, this is the title of a text reproduced in the appendix to Ecrits; 1966,889-892]: this subject can grasp himself only through metaphor—that is to say, by missing himself—precisely because he is signified by a signifier.”4* As for the metonymy that is forever putting the signified off till doomsday, it too is a metonymy of desire—that is, once again, a metonymy of the subject.

如同拉康所说，假如能指「代表主体」，而不是「所指」。那并不是因为主体跟所指毫无关系。而是因为主体跟传统的「固定」的所指，有所区别：主体现在是所有能指的闪躲的所指，在他缺席的状态，他们所代表的东西。但是他仍然是他们的所指。他们的指称提到的他们的所指。如同李欧塔贴切地评论：「当他说「所指」时，拉康想的是「主体」。拉康的隐喻的整个理论，是主体的隐喻的理论（的确，这就是精神分析论文集（1966,889-892）附录的复制到文章的标题）：主体仅有凭借隐喻，才能理解他自己—换句话说，凭借让他自己迷失—这确实是因为他的能指的所指」。至于永远将所指拖延到死亡之日的换喻，那也是一种欲望的换喻—也就是说，它再次是主体的换喻。

And so we must ask what this abrupt reintroduction of the subject—and its inevitable correlative, representation—can mean in a discourse that, in principle, should be absolutely inhospitable to it. The hypothesis here (and it will certainly come as no surprise to any reader with the laudable courage to have persevered this far) is that the subject’s reintroduction corresponds to the linguistic model’s massive overdetermination by the philosophical problematic of the subject of representation, a problematic Cartesian in origin, of which Lacan provides an ultramodern version inspired by Kojeve’s commentary on Hegel.

所以，我们必须询问，突然重新介绍这个主体，以及跟它无可避免相关的再现表象，在辞说里，能够意味着什么？原则上，这个辞说对于主体，绝对不怀好意。在此的假设是（这确实没有什么好大惊小怪，对于足够勇敢一直坚持到现在的读者），主体的重新介绍，对应于语言学的模式的巨大过分决定，受到再现表象的主体的哲学的难题所过分决定，起源上是笛卡尔的我思故我在的难题。拉康供应给它一个超现代的版本，受到科耶夫对于黑格尔的评注所启发。

In this respect, we recall that Lacan, almost from the beginning, links the problem of language to the problem of the subject. For example, let us reread what he has to say in “Beyond the Reality Principle”:

在这方面，我们回想到，拉康，几乎从业开始，将将语言的难题，跟主体的难题联接一块。譬如，让我们重新阅读他必须说的东西，在「超现实原则」：

Language, before signifying something, signifies for someone. By the single fact that he [the analyst] is present and is listening, the man who speaks [the patient] addresses himself to him, and since he imposes upon his discourse a not wanting to say anything (de ne rien vouloir dire)9 what remains is that he wants to speak to him (veut lui dire). What he says may indeed make no sense; what he says to him receives a meaning [1966, 82-83].

语言在意指某件东西之前，是针对某人从事意指。凭借这个事实：精神分析家在场，并且倾听，言说的这个人（病人），对着分析家言说他自己。因为他在他的辞说上赋加「不想要说出任何东西」。剩下来的问题是：他想要跟他言说。他所说的内容的确没有意义；他对他言说的内容，接收到意义[1966, 82-83]。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http：//springhero.wordpress.com

语言的神秘7

语言的神秘7
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
Lacan TheAbsolute Master
拉康，绝对主人

Indeed, according to Lacan, the result is the same if we turn to the other operation of speech noted by Jakobson: that of the “vertical” selection of terms from among those capable of being substituted for the signifier on the paradigmatic axis. This substitution certainly produces meaning and, Lacan writes, therefore a “crossing” (1977a, 154/503, 164/515) of the bar separating the signifier from the signified. This is what Lacan calls “metaphor,” which he successively (and just as dangerously) identifies with (1) the “one word for another” of paradigmatic selection (1977a, 157/507); (2) metaphor in the rhetorical sense (1977a, 156-157/507); (3) the Freudian mechanism of condensation (1977a, 160/511), which, however, designates in Freud less a substitution than a compression of several terms; and (4) the psychoanalytic symptom (1977a, 166/518). He notates it thus:
f(f-)s * S(+)5

的确，依照拉康，结果是相同的，假如我们回到雅克慎注意到的言说的另外一个运作：那些术语的垂直的选择的运作，在作为典范的轴心，能够被替换来充当能指的的那些术语。这个替换确实产生意义。拉康写到，因此这个替换是区隔能指与所指的这条横杠的一种「跨越」（1977a，154/503，164/515）。这就是拉康所谓的「隐喻」。隐喻连续读（也同样危险地）认同，首先认同于「典范选择的「一个字词替换另一个字词」（1977a，157/507），其次，才是认同修饰学意涵的隐喻（1977a，156-157/507）；第三，认同弗洛依德的浓缩的心理机制（1977a，160/511）。可是，在弗洛依德，它指明的不是一种替换，而是好几个术语的浓缩；第四，认同于精神分析的病征（1977a，166/518）。他因此给它弄个运算公式：
f(f-)s * S(+)5

The + manifests “the crossing of the bar—and the constitutive value of this crossing for the emergence of signification” (1977a, 164/515), But this crossing, we should add, is never anything but a transgression that maintains the prohibition implacably separating signifier from signified. That repressive bar is not suppressed, for its “crossing” only adds (+) something extra—namely, an “effect of signification .. , that is creative or poetic” (1977a, 164/515): the signified is only a “poetic spark” (1977a, 156-158/507-508) produced between signifiers on the occasion of their substitution.

这个+ 符号表示这条横杠的跨越，以及这个跨越的形成的价值，对于意义的出现(1977a, 164/515)。但是我们应该补充，这条横杠实实在在就是一种侵犯，无情地维持分开能指与所指的这个禁令。那条压抑的横杠并没有被压抑，因为它的「跨越」仅是增加（+）某件额外的东西—也就是，「意义的效应、、、具有创造力或诗意」（1977a，164/515）： 所指仅是一种「诗意的火花」(1977a, 156-158/507-508)，在能指之间被产生，在它们的替换的场合。

What is inspiring Lacan here is obviously Jakobson’s linguistic model: if I say “house,” this term makes sense only because it is substituted in the sentence for, say, “louse.” Neither /haus/ nor /laus/ makes any sense outside their commutativity. Lacan extends this strictly linguistic thesis (granted, he was encouraged in this by Jakobson himself)43 to the rhetorical and, more broadly, the psychoanalytic realms, concluding that any substitution of signifier for signifier produces meaning—for example, the phrase “his sheaf” that is substituted for the proper noun “Boaz” in this line by Victor Hugo: “His sheaf was neither miserly nor spiteful” (cf. 1981, 247-248; 1977a, 156-158/506-508).

在此启发拉康的东西，显而易见是雅克慎的语言的模式：假如我说「房屋house」，这个术语仅有因为它在句子里被替换，它才具有意义，譬如说，替换成「虱子louse」。在它们的共同点字母发音之外，/haus/ 与 /laus/ 的发音单独并没有意义。拉康延伸这个严格的语言学的命题（在这一点，他受到雅克慎的鼓励），延伸到修饰学。更广义地说，延伸到精神分析领域。然后获得这个结论：能指对能指点任何替换产生意义—譬如，他的「禾束sheaf」这个词语，被替换成为专有名词”Boaz”，在维克多-雨果的这行诗：「他的禾束既不吝啬，也不怨恨」(cf. 1981, 247-248; 1977a, 156-158/506-508)。

Lacan emphasizes that nothing predestines “sheaf” to replace “Boaz”—which is an-other way of saying that this substitution, from the perspective of code, is pure non-sense. And yet, Lacan adds, this substitution makes sense (it produces a poetic effect). Why is this? Not because the sheaf would represent Boaz (as we have seen, they have no relationship, especially none of similarity; normally, a sheaf is neither generous nor helpful). “Boaz,” therefore, is not (as classical rhetoric maintained) the hidden meaning of the signifier “sheaf,” in whose place we expected “Boaz.” On the contrary, “Boaz” arises from it. Here, Lacan proposes, there is an unexpected signification, produced by “the substitution of one signifier for another in a chain, without anything natural predestining it for this function … except the matter of two signifiers, reducible as such to a phonemic opposition” (1966, 890).

拉康强调，没有一样东西预先注意”sheaf” 用来替换”Boaz”。这是另外一种方式说：这个替换，从符码的观点，是纯粹没有意义。可是，拉康补充，这个替换具有意义（它产生一种诗意的效果）。为什么是这个？倒不是因为这个sheaf将会代表Boaz（我们已经看到，它们并没有关系，特别是并没有类同性；正常来说，禾束既无所谓慷慨或帮助）。”Boaz,” 因此并不是能指的隐藏的意义，在它的位置，我们期待”Boaz.”（如同古典修饰学所主张的）。相反地，”Boaz”是因为它而产生。拉康建议，有一个意外的意义被产生，在「在语词锁链里，一个能指替换另一个能指，却没有任何东西自然地预先注定它作为这个功能、、、除了两个能指的事件外，它的本身被简化成为语音的对立」(1966, 890)。

In short, put one signifier in place of another, and something will always emerge: meaning. A linguist would certainly call this theory completely surrealistic (even if Lacan, incidentally, criticizes Andre Breton’s theory of the metaphor; 1977a, 157/507), for where has anyone ever seen that the improbable “phonemic opposition” of “Boaz” and “sheaf” makes sense in langue？Obviously, the “signifiers” that Lacan has in mind are not those of the linguistic code, which constitutes a “filing cabinet of prefabricated representations,”44 but rather those unpredictable, uncodable signifiers of the dream and the symptom, where anything can refer to anything else. Why, then, continue to speak about “signifiers” at all, if we are no longer in the realm of langue (and probably, if we consider the dream and the symptom, not even in the realm of language)? All that these two types of “signifiers” have in common is that they have no meaning in themselves—and this, in fact, is exactly what Lacan is driving at: that point where sense arises from non-sense.

总之，假如我们将一个能指替换另一个能指，总是会有某件东西出现：意义。语言学家确实称这种理论为完全超现实的理论（即使拉康偶然会批评超现实主义者布瑞东的隐喻的理论；1977a, 157/507)。因为有什么人在什么地方看见过：”Boaz” 跟 “sheaf”的这个不可能的「音素的对立」在语意里产生意义？显而易见地，拉康心中构想的「能指」并不是语言学的符码的那些能指。它们构成「预先铸造的再现表象的填充柜」。相反地，而是梦与病征的那些无法预测，无法符码化的能指。在那里，任何东西都能够提到任何其他东西。因此，为什么继续言说关于「能指」，假如我们不再语意的这个领域？这两种「能指」共同的地方是，它们本身并没有意义—事实上，这确实是拉康的意图所在。意义起源于无意义的这一点。

In this limitless expansion of the concept of the “signifier,” what matters to him is to prove yet again that language (a term vague enough to crush out all difference among langue， speech, and the productions of the unconscious) represents nothing. The reason why the “signifier” does not represent the signified is that it creates the signified metaphorically: the “metaphor occurs at the precise point at which sense emerges from non-sense” (1977a, 158/508). And it can create this signified only on condition of abolishing it, volatilizing it in its creation: a metonymy of nothing, a nihilistic metonymy that “permits the elision in which the signifier installs the lack-of-being in the object relation, using the value of ‘reference back’ possessed by signification in order to invest it with the desire aimed at the very lack it supports” (1977a, 164/515).

「能指」的观能的这个无限的扩展，对于他，重要的是要再次证明，语言（这个术语足够模糊压垮语意，言说，于无意识的产生，中间的所有的差距）代表著空无。「能指并没有代表所指的理由是：能指隐喻地创造所指：「隐喻的发生，就是意义从无意义出现的那个时刻。」(1977a, 158/508)。能指能够创造所指，仅有在废除它的条件下，在创造所指时蒸发所指：空无的换喻，虚无主义的换喻，它容许能指在客体的关系里，安置生命实存的欠缺，在那个遗漏里。它使用意义拥有的「回溯指称」的价值，为了在它身上投注这个欲望，目标朝着它支持的欠缺的欲望」(1977a, 164/515)。

We see, then, that the signified s, which figures under the resistant bar of the Lacanian “algorithm,” is nothing that would be independent of the signifier. On the contrary, Lacan separates signified from signifier, apparently a highly classical gesture, but only the better to underline its evanescent character, its radical nonexistence outside the references among signifiers. Since this is precisely what Benveniste, Jakobson, and all of structural linguistics in general assert of their own object of study, Lacan does not diverge from the principle governing structural linguistics, even if he retains only that principle (or that philosophy) and applies it to realms where it really has no business being. Like it or not, Lacan’s thesis of the sign’s “duplicity,” so controversial, finally implies nothing more than what linguists call its “unity,” and so Lacan’s thesis is in perfect agreement, if not with the letter, at least with the spirit of Saussurianism.

我们因此看见，这个所指s，在拉康的演算式，被列在抗拒的横杠下，它并不是任何独立于所指的东西。相反地，拉康将所指与能指分开。显而易见地，这是一个高度古典的姿态。但是较好的姿态，用来强调它的蒸发的特性，它在能指之间的指称之外的强烈的非存在。因为这确实是本尼斯特，雅克慎，与所有的结构语言学家通常所主张的，作为他们研究的目标。拉康并没有偏离统辖语言学的原则，即使他保留仅是那个原则，(或哲学)，然后应用它，到它确实并没有权利介入的领域。无论喜欢与否，拉康对于符合的「双重性」的命题最后暗示着仅是语言学家称为是它的「一致性」。所以，拉康的命题是完美的一致性，即使没有跟信息一致，至少跟索绪尔的精神一致。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

语言的神秘6

语言的神秘6
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
Lacan TheAbsolute Master
拉康，绝对主人

It is well known that this schema’s purpose, in Saussure, was to illustrate the simultaneous segmentation of otherwise “amorphous*’ masses of “sounds” and “thoughts,” Thus it involves a sort of syn-chronic “cross section” intended to illustrate, in quasi-mythical form, the strictly nontemporal principle of any languex either there is discontinuity (there are “discrete” unities) or there is only an un-differentiated continuity where nothing makes sense.

众所周知，这个基模的目的，在索绪尔，就是要说明这个同时性的分隔，其他方面「无定形」的「声音」与「思想」的质量。因此，它牵涉到一种同时性的「跨越」，以类似神秘的形态，被用来说明任何语意的这个严格是非-时间的原则。要就是存在着不连续（有各种「分开的」统合），要不就是仅是存在着非-差异的连续性，没有一样东西具有意义。

Lacan, very significantly, sees in this the figuration of an uninterrupted sentence. More precisely, he connects the Saussurian schema to the linear combination of signifiers on the syntagmatic axis, which is itself surreptitiously applied to the “diachrony [of] discourse” (1981, 66; my emphasis)39—a way of putting the aforesaid “amorphous” masses into movement and introducing the idea of “an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (1977a, 154/ 502). Indeed, what happens if I add one signifier after another, to form a sentence (a “signifying chain,” in Lacan’s vocabulary, inspired here by Hjelmslev)?

意味深远地，拉康在这里看出一个非中断的句子的寓意。更贴切地说，他将索绪尔的基模，跟以句法为轴心的能指的直线组合连接一块。这个句法的轴心本身被秘密地运用到「辞说的历时性」(1981,66)—这一种方式将以上所说的「不定形」的质量付诸行动，并且介绍这个观念：「所指在能指之下不断地滑动」。（1977a，154/502）。的确，假如我增加一个能指又一个能指，为了形成一个句子（用拉康的词彙，能指化的锁链，受到希姆丝列夫达启发），那会发生什么事？

According to Lacan, no signifier will have any definite signified before being combined with other signifiers, until the point where a period retroactively and provisionally seals the meaning of the sentence (1981, 303, 338; 1977a, 153-154/502-503, 304/806)—as we see if we successively consider the signifying unities that compose the present sentence (“Ac)cording/to/Lacan/… /./”/). Whence Lacan’s conclusion: “We can say… that none of [the elements of the chain of the signifier] ‘consists* in the signification of which it is at the moment capable” (1977a, 153/502).

依照拉康，在能指跟其他能指组合之前，没有能指将会有任何明确的所指。直到一个句点反顾而暂时地认可这个句子的意义，能指才会有任何明确的所指。（1981，303，338）。我们将会看出，我们是否连续地考虑到这些能指化的同合，它组成目前的句子（依照拉康说、、、）。拉康的结论是：「我们能够说，能指的锁链的元素，没有一样在于这个意义，它当下能够的意义」（1977a，153）。

The operative phrase here, certainly, is “at the moment.” Lacan means to say that there is no synchronic correspondence between signifier and signified because the meaning of a signifier is always yet to come in another punctuating signifier (baptized S2 in Lacanian “algebra”), which in turn, and so on: “The signifier, by its very nature, always anticipates meaning by unfolding its dimension before it” (1977a, 153/502; my emphasis).

在此的这个运作的词语，确实就是这个「当下」。拉康意图要说：能指与所指之间，没有同时性的对应，因为能指的意义总是有待未来，在另外一个标点的能指（被洗礼命名的S，用拉康的「代数」来说），然后轮到那个标点的能指，等等：「能指，根据其特性，总是预期意义，凭借在它面前展开它的维度。」（1977a，153/502）

We can understand this only if we concede a sort of intentionality of the signifier (or of the subject?), akin to the “signifying intention” spoken of by Merleau-Ponty: “The reason why a language finally intends to say and does say (veut dire et dit) something is not that each sign is the vehicle for a signification that allegedly belongs to it, but that all the signs together allude to a signification which is always in abeyance when they are considered singly, and which I go beyond them toward, without their ever containing it.”40

我们能够理解这个，只要我们承认一种能指的意图性（或主体的意图性），类似梅洛、庞帝谈论的「能指化的意图」：「语言最后意图要说，而且确实说出某件东西的理由，并不是每个符号都是宣称属于它的意义的媒介，而是，所有的符号一块提到的意义，总是处于悬置状态，当它们单独被考量时。我超越它们朝向这个悬置状态，因为它们从来没有包含它。

This empty intentionality, never filled, is what Lacan calls “metonymy” (inspired by Jakobson’s article on aphasia41), successively (and dangerously) identifying it with (i) the “word-to-word” of syntagmatic combination (1977a, 156/506); (2) metonymy in the rhetorical sense (1977a, 156/505); (3) the Freudian mechanism of “displacement” (1977a, 160/511), which, however, refers in Freud only to affective “emphasis”; and (4) desire as a perpetual “desire for something else” (1977a, 166/518). Hence this “formula” for metonymy: f(S . . . S’)S s S(—)s, which is read in the following way: The function of the metonymic connection of the signifier is congruent (more or less: =) with the maintenance of the bar that prevents the signifier from ever corresponding to its elusive signified except “at infinity.”

这个空洞的意图，从来没有被填满，就是拉康所谓的「换喻」（受到雅克慎探讨主体消失的启发），连续地，而且危险地，将它认同是句法组合的「字对字」的这个“我”（1977a，156/506）；在修饰学的意义的换喻。弗洛依德的「替换」的机制（1977a，160-511）。可是，在弗洛依德，它仅是提到情感的「强调」，欲望作为是「对于某件其他东西的」永恒的欲望。因此，换喻的这个公式：f(S . . . S’)S s S(—)s, 被阅读如下：能指的换喻的连接的功能，对应于（相当等于: =）这条横杠的维持，阻止能指不要对应用它的躲闪的所指，除了处于「永恒」。

In short, the more you speak, the less you know what you mean to say (or desire), for the signification retroactively produced by the “punctuation” that pins one signifier to another always runs behind the signifying production itself. In a word, the signified fluctuates and “slips” indefinitely as a function of the signifiers, insofar as none of them manages to furnish the “last word” of meaning (and when that happens, Lacan says, we are in the realm of psychosis; cf. 1981, 30-31, 219—220). We can illustrate this point with the following (algorithmic?) diagram:
Sl,S2, S3.. .Sn

总之，你言说得越多，你知道你意图要说（或欲望）的越少，因为将一个能指钉住另外一个能指的这个「标点」反弹地产生的意义，总是落后于能指的能指化产生本身的背后。总之，所指不确定地摇摆并滑动，作为能指的功能。因为它们没有一个成功于供应意义的「最后真理」（假如发生那样的事情，拉康说，我们处于精神病的领域）。我们能够说明这点，用以下的图表运算式：

Sl,S2, S3.. .Sn

Better yet, we can use a sort of eternal cascade as illustration (since Lacan also speaks of “stages” with respect to the two elements of the “algorithm,” presupposing that the signifier falls regularly to the level of the signified, in order to “toss a cobblestone into the pond of the signified”; 1970, 68):42

更好的是，我们能够使用一种永久的「瀑布图」作为说明（因为拉康也提到「阶段」，关于这个「运算式」的两个元素。它预先假设：能指规律地掉落在所指的层面之下，为了抛掷一块小石头，到所指的池塘里（1970，68）

S1
S2
S3
Sn

*******s
******s

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语言的神秘5

语言的神秘5
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
Lacan TheAbsolute Master
拉康，绝对主任

Already this means that the “signifier,” separated from the signified, is no longer the Saussurian linguists’ signifier; the latter, we should emphasize, cannot be equivocal. To concede that it could be equivocal would be to annul the very principle of the sign’s diacritical “value,” as Benveniste firmly points out with respect to the hypothesis of Abel and Freud on the “antithetical meaning of primal words”: “It is thus a priori improbable . .. that. . . languages (langues) … escape the ‘principle of contradiction.'”32 If poly-semia exists, it can only be a polysemia regulated within the lexical order of the langue.

这已经意味着，跟所指分开的这个能指，不再是索绪尔语言学家的能指。我们应该强调，后者不可能是模棱两可的。承认它可能模棱两可，将是让可辨别的「价值」的原则荡然无效。如同本温尼斯特坚定地指出，关于阿贝尔与弗洛依的的假设，对于「最初话语的反意义」：「它因此是不可能的以因推果、、、语言逃离悖论的原则」。假如一词多义存在，那仅是在语意的词彙秩序之内被规范的一词多义。

From this perspective, the langue of the linguists—which, as we too often forget, is an object constructed in theory—is farther from natural languages than from those artificial languages that Lacan regularly criticizes for their wish to get rid of signifying equivocation (“If artificial languages are stupid, it is because they are constructed on the basis of signification”; 1981, 65; see also 1975c, 22-23, an^ I973a> 4> 47-48).

从这个观点，语言学家的语意—我们经常忘记，语意是在理论里被建构的一个客体。比起那些人为的语言，它绝非是自然的语言。拉康经常批评它们，因为它们希望废除掉能指意涵的模棱两可（假如人为语言是愚昧的，那是因为它们被建构，根据意义的基础）1981，645）。

There is no linguistics of the pun (or there is only a “linguistery”), for puns, like oneiric “portmanteau” words, the neologisms of delirium, and poetic metaphors, transgress the differences coded into langue (Lacan was later to express this by creating the conceptual pun lalangue, which concept, he said, cannot be reduced to what linguistic science can know; 1975c, 126-127).33 In the eyes of linguists, all the phenomena of equivocality which Lacan alleges as support for his theory of the “duplicity” of signifier and signified, have nothing to do with linguistics but rather with (as Benveniste once more observes) a stylistics (or a rhetoric) of discourse.34 Indeed, only at this level, that of spoken language,35 can the “signifier” (if it still is one) “float” freely enough to create a new meaning.

并不存在著双关语的语言学（或仅存在着一个「语言的神秘」），因为双关语，就像梦的「新词」的文字，谵妄动新词，诗的隐喻，「逾越」被记入语意的符码的差异（拉康后来将表达这个，凭借创造观念的双关语lalague。他说，观念无法被化简成为语言的科学能够知道的东西；1975c，126-127）。在语言学家的眼中，所有的模棱两可的现象，拉康宣称作为他的能指与所指的双重性的理论的支持。这些现象跟语言学没有丝毫关系。相反地，它们辞说的风格学有关（如同本温尼斯特再次观察到）。的确，仅有在这个层次，被言说的语言的层次，这个「能指」（假如它依旧是能指的话），才能够充分自由地漂浮，来创造新的意义。

As for Lacan’s citing the fact that “under the same signifier there are, down the ages, slippages of signification, proving that we cannot establish a one-to-one correspondence between the two systems” (1981, 135), this does not at all “prove” that the signified slides under the signifier in the order of synchrony. That the adjective atterre first meant “set upon the earth” (mis a terre) and then, through progressive homophonic contamination, came to mean “struck with terror” (“frappede terreur”) (SV, 13 November 1957) may afford a glimpse into how langue evolves diachronically.

至于拉康引述这个事实：「在相同的能指之下，几世纪来，就存在着意义的滑动，证明我们无法建立一个一对一的对应，在这两个系统之间」（1981，135）。这根本就不是证明，所指在能指之下滑动，在共时性的秩序。Atterre的这个形容词，首先意味着，「攻击大地」，然后，经历逐渐的同音的污染，才逐渐地意味着「受到恐惧侵袭」（1957，11，13）。这才让我们能够瞥见语意如何历时性地进化。

Nevertheless, the linguists would say, only through a retrospective illusion can we conclude, as Lacan does, that the signifier is separated from the signified by “a bar that resists signification.” According to the era considered, atterre signifies either “set upon the earth” or “struck with terror,” and this is all that structural linguistics can and wants to know. Again, for linguists, the fact that the signified is an effect of the signifier does not at all mean that the signifier could signify any old thing (or, what amounts to the same thing, nothing at all); on the contrary, it means that they adhere so closely that they can be separated only through an abstraction.

可是，语言学家将会说，仅有经历一个回顾的幻景，我们才能够如同拉康那样，获得这个结论：能指跟所指，被抗拒意义的这条横杠隔开。依照被考虑到时代，atterre 意涵著，要就是「攻击大地」，要不就是「受到恐惧侵袭」。这就是结构语言学能够而且想要知道的一切。而且，对于语言学家，所指是能指的结果的这个事实，丝毫没有意味著，能指能够意指著任何旧的东西（或相当等于相同的东西，根本就没有）；相反地，它意味着，它们如此密切地坚持，以致于它们仅有凭借抽离，才能够分开。

Must we conclude, then (as Jean-Francois Lyotard does in Dis-cours, figure), that Lacan’s emphasis on the bar between signifier and signified surreptitiously reintroduces the problem of meaning, in its classical “thickness” or “depth,” within a theory of signification and value that specifically suspends it?36 In a way, we must, since Lacan actually does revive the mirage of a signified independent of the signifier (and we will see why in a moment). But he does this, it seems to me, the better to present the evanescence of this mirage. On this point, Lacan does not challenge the principle of structural linguistics, even if he does apply it unduly, as Lyotard justly notes, to the realm of discursive speech. In Lacan, meaning is certainly maintained apart from the signifier, but only as a void, a vanishing point, or, as Merleau-Ponty also says with respect to Saussure, as “the idea in the Kantian sense.”37 Indeed, that there is a “bar that resists signification” does not at all mean that there is some opaque signified hidden “behind” or “under” signifiers. On the contrary, it means that the signified, precisely because it is an effect of the signifies perpetually “slips” and “flows” under the signifier (1977a, 153-154/502; 1981,135, 296-297), like ungraspable water.

我们因此必须下此结论（如同詹-法兰克 李歐塔所为）：拉康对于能指与所指之间的这条横杠的强调，秘密地重新介绍意义的难题，在它的古典的「厚度」或「深度」，在意义与明确悬置意义的价值的理论里？在某方面，我们必须下此结论，因为拉康实际上复活所指独立于能指之外的幻景，（等一下，我们将会看出为什么）。但是我觉得，他这样做，最好是呈现这个幻景的逐渐消失。对于这一点，拉康并没有挑战结构语言学的原则，即使他不合宜地运用它，如同李欧塔公平地注意到，运用它到辞说的言说的领域。在拉康，意义确实被维持于能指之外，但是仅是作为一个空无，一个消失点。或如同梅洛庞帝也这样说，关于索绪尔，作为具有「康德意涵的观念」。的确，有一条抗拒意义的横杠，丝毫没有意味著，有某个模糊的所指隐藏在能指点{背后}或「底下」。相反地，它意味着，确实是因为所指是能指的结果，所指在能指之下，永久地「滑动」与「流动」，就像是无法掌握的水（1977a，153-154）。

Hence, Lacan explains, the impossibility of establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the “tide” of signifiers and the “tide” of signifieds, as the Saussurian schema of the two “floating realms”38 had suggested (1981, 135, 295-303; 1977a, 154/ 502-503):

因此，拉康解释，不可能建立一对一的对应，在能指的潮汐与所指的潮汐之间，如同索绪尔的两个「漂浮的领域」的基模曾经建议的（1981，135，295-303）。

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语言的神秘４

语言的神秘４
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
From Absolute Master

1. The signifier does not depend on the signified. Indeed, not only does “the signifier [not] answer to the function of representing the signified,” it cannot answer to “any signification whatever” (1977a, 150/498; see also 1975c, 31-32). Taken in itself (that is, separated, as if that were possible, from other signifiers), the signifier “signifies nothing” (1981, 210), and this is what Lacan tries to express by speaking of its “materiality” (1988b, 82/104—105; 1966, 24), its “localized” (1977a, 153/501) and “literal” structure: “By ‘letter’ I designate that material support that concrete discourse borrows from language” (1977a, 147/495).

能指并没有依靠所指。的确，能指不但不实践代表所指的功能，而且它无法实践「任何的意义」（1977a，150/408）。能指若是就自身来看（跟其他的能指分开，好像那是可能的），它仅是「意指著空无」。这就是拉康尝试表达的东西，凭借谈论到它的「物质性」（1988b，82/104—105；1966，24）它的「被定位」与实质的结构：我以「信息」指明那个材料的支持，具体辞说从语言借用过来的材料的支持（１９７７ａ，１４７／４９５）。

Admittedly, these are ambiguous formulations, but they do signify, at any rate, that the signifier does not incarnate a prior ideality.28 If, as Benveniste proposes in his rectification of Saussure,29 “the concept boeufis like the soul of the sound-image bof” then, according to Lacan, we must add that the literal body of the signifier contains no soul (no meaning) before the spirit comes to it from its coupling with other bodies just as stupid as itself. The signifier is truly senseless (in-sense), “stupid” (bete; 1975c, 24), and, just like a character on a typewriter keyboard, it makes sense only by effacing another signifier, taking its place on the written page, next to other signifiers (with all the other, no less stupid, “typos” that this may imply—slips of the tongue and the pen, Witz, and so on).

尽管如此，这些是模棱两可的说明。但是无论如何，它们确实表达意涵，能指并没有作为一个先前的理念的具体化身。如同本温尼斯特在他修正索绪尔时建议的，ｂｏｅｕｆ就像是ｂｏｆ这个声音－意象的灵魂。因此，依照拉康，我们必须补充说，能指的实质身体，并没有包含灵魂（没有包含意义），在精神从跟其他跟它一样愚昧的身体交配后才来到它这里之前。这个能指确实没有意义，「愚昧」，１９７５ｃ，２４）。就像打字机键盘的字，能指仅有凭借抹除另外一个能指，在书写纸上取代它的位置，跟在其他的能指后面，才能产生意义。（跟所有其他同样愚昧的字型。这可能暗示着，口误与笔误，机智语，等等）。

2. The signifier is the source of the signified. The latter is never anything but an “effect” of these couplings and encroachments of signifiers, a “signified effect” (effet de signifie; 1975c, 22-23) *n In　ｔｈｅ sense in which we speak, for example, of a “Larsen effect” or an “optical illusion” (effet d’optique). This signified is truly nothing— nothing that would in effect be caused or produced by the signifier. In accord with the theory of value, meaning is never anything but an illusion, produced “between” signifiers, which themselves have no meaning—a sort of rainbow that eludes our grasp as soon as we try to approach it. “Sense,” Lacan maintains, “emerges from nonsense” (1977a, 158/508), and here is the whole “sense” (if we may call it that) of Lacan’s rewriting of the Saussurian schema of the sign, in which
能指是所指的来源。能指实实在在就是能指的这些交配与侵占的「效应」，「所指的效应」（１９７５ｃ，２２－２３）。譬如，我们谈论到「回馈声音的效应」，或「视觉幻景」的意义。这个所指确实是空无――实际上将会被能指所引起或产生的空无。为了符合价值的理论，意义实实在在就是一个幻景，在能指「之间」被产生。而能指的本身并无任何意义。能指是我们无法掌握的一种彩虹，当我们尝试接近它。拉康主张，「意义从无意义中出现」（１９７７ａ，１５８／５０８）。这就是拉康重新改写索绪尔的符号的基模的全部「意义」。在那里，

/ Concept \
　　　　　　――――――――――
Sound- /
image /

is transformed into the “algorithm”

这个图形被转变成为「运算式」：

　　　　　　　　　　　S
　　　　　　　　　　　－
　　　　　　　　　　　ｓ

“which is read as: the signifier over the signified, ‘over’ corresponding to the bar separating the two stages” (1977a, 149/497). S, the creative and capital signifier, hereafter precedes, in all its supremacy, its passive and secondary effect: the $ of the signified.30

这个运算式阅读如下：「能指在所指之上，超越分开这两个阶段的这条横杆的对应之上」（１９７７ａ，１４９／４９７）。S是创造与大写字母的能指，它具有一切的优先，因此早先存在于它的被动与次级的效应：所指定这个ｓ。

From the Floating Signifier to the Flowing Signified
从漂浮的能指，到流动的所指

The reader will have noted already that Lacan, while suppressing the ellipse and the inverted arrows that indicate the unity of the sign in Saussure’s diagram, nevertheless maintains and even accentuates the bar separating signifier from signified. The bar, he says enigmatically, “resists signification” (1977a, 149/497) and “creates a real border . . . between the floating signifier and the flowing signified” (1970, 68; see also 1970, 55; 1975c, 22, 35). In this way, every signifier becomes a “floating” one (that is, as Levi-Strauss said of the singular “zero symbol,” “empty of meaning”), and, like Noah’s ark, it sails the floodwaters of the signified, without clinging to them.

读者将会已经注意到，拉康在压制这个椭圆形与倒转的箭头，它在索绪尔的图形，指示著符号的一致性。可是，拉康主张，甚至强调分开能指与所指的这条横杠。他谜团一般地说，这条横杠「抗拒意义」（１９７７ａ，１４９／４９７），并且「创造一条真正的边界、、、在漂浮的能指与流动的所指之间的边界」（１９７０，６８；）以这种方式，每个能指变成是一个「漂浮」的能指（如同列文、史特劳斯提到独特的「零度象征」，「掏空意义」。就像诺亚的方舟，它航行在所指的洪水之上，没有跟洪水紧连一块。

This seems to contradict not only the Saussurian formula but also its reformulation by Benveniste. Benveniste’s formula, we recall, reabsorbed the signified into the signifier only because of their union, which is also to say because of the perfect transparency that linguistic signs have for their users. Lacan, conversely, accentuates linguistic signs’ duality (he even calls it “duplicity”; 1981,136, 187) and, by the same token, their opacity, since a suitably repressive bar henceforth separates signifiers from their signified.31 Indeed, it is clear that Lacan is thinking here primarily of the incongruous products of the “dream work” or the Witz (such as ” Autodidasker” “famillionnair,” and so on), in which the one-to-one correspondence between signifier and signified is upset in favor of overdetermined and multivalent neologisms.

这似乎不但跟索绪尔的公式相牴触，而且跟本温尼斯特对它的重新说明相牴触。我们回顾一下，本温尼斯特的公式，将所指重新吸收进入能指，仅是因为它们的统合。这样就是说，因为语言符号拥有完美的透明，对于它们的使用者。相反地，拉康强调语言的符号的「双重性」，（他甚至称它为「欺骗性」１９８１，１３６，１８７）。同时具有「模糊性」，因为合宜的压抑的横杠，因此分开能指跟它们的所指。」的确，显而易见，拉康在此正在想到「梦的运作」或「机智语」（譬如，” Autodidasker” “famillionnair,”等等）的不协调的产物。在那里，能指与所指的一对一的对应被扰乱，为了迁就过分决定与多重价值的新词。

The “duplicity” of the signifier, Lacan tells us, is such that it can always still signify the most diverse things: “If the unconscious is the way that Freud describes it, a pun in itself can be the mainspring that sustains a symptom. . . . Without the fundamental duplicity of signifier and signified, no psychoanalytic determinism is conceivable” (1981,135-136).

拉康告诉我们，能指的这个「双重性」是如此强烈，以致它总是仍然能够意指著即使是多样性的东西：「假如无意识就是弗洛依德描述它的方式，它本身的双关语有时就是维持一个病征的原动、、、假如没有能指与所指的基本的双重性，没有精神分析的决定论能够被构想（１９８１，１３５－１３６）。

雄伯译
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语言的神秘 3

语言的神秘 3
Linguisteries

雅克慎论拉康
From Absolute Maste

In other words, the signification of a term is only the “summary” of its value19—that is, of the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relationships between it and its surrounding terms (think of the dictionary, which enumerates words vertically according to their similarity and combines them horizontally with other words to specify their uses). Hence this conclusion: “In language, there are only differences without positive terms.”10

换句话说，一个术语的意义仅是它的价值的总结。也就是说，在它与它的周围的术语之间的语素变化与句法的关系的总结。（想想看，字典垂直地列举字词，依照它们的类同，并且水平地连接它们，跟其他字词，为了指明它们的用法）。因此，获得这个结论：「在语言，仅有一些没有积极术业的差异。」

It is easy to see that these two hypotheses are ultimately incompatible. Indeed, even when we admit that the theory of arbitrariness is not simply a new form of conventionalism,21 the fact remains that to speak of an “arbitrary” relation between the signifier and the signified is the same as to admit, if only negatively, that the first represents the second. By the same token, this inevitably means reviving the idea that there is a signified independent of the signifier that represents it, just when we are asserting that they form a unity as inseparable as the two sides of a sheet of paper.22
我们很容易看出，这两个假设最后是不和谐的。的确，即使当我们承认，任意性的理论不仅是一种新的形式的传统主义。这个事实始终存在，谈论到能指与所指之间的「任意性」关系，相当等于承认，即使是否面地承认，前者代表后者。同样地，这无可避免地意味着复活这个观念：有一个所指独立于代表它的能指之外。正当我们主张，它们形成一个一致性，就像一张纸的两边一样不可分离。

It is precisely this mirage—of a signified independent of the signifier—that the hypothesis of value dispels. Indeed, it is through pure abstraction that Saussure can say that the signified “beef” is here pronounced /bi:f/, there /boef/ or /oks/, as if this “concept” had existed before Babel, independently of the dispersion of national/maternal langues. In reality, for the speakers of a given langue, as Benveniste had already noted in 1939, there is no difference between the signifier /bi:f/ and the signified “beef”: “Between the signifier and the signified, the connection is not arbitrary; on the contrary, it is necessary. The concept (the ‘signified’) bceuf [beef] is perforce identical in my [French] consciousness with the sound sequence (the ‘signifier’) bof.. .. There is such a close symbiosis between them that the concept of bceuf is like the soul of the sound image bof”23 In other words, there is strict adherence between the signifier and the signified, and if this is so, it is because, in accord with the theory of value, they vary in concert within a linguistic system with which they are in solidarity (hence the despair of translators, who know only too well that /beef/ will never have exactly the same meaning as /bi:f/, even if they both refer to the same thing).

价值的假设驱散的确实就是这个幻景—独立于能指的所指的幻景。的确，通过这个浓缩，索绪尔能够说，所指的「牛肉」在此被发音为“bif”，在那里，被发音为“boef”或“oks”，好像这个观念在巴比塔之前就存在，独立于民族母语的扩散。事实上，对于特定语言的言说者，如同本温尼斯在1939年已经注意到，在能指“bif”与所指“beef”之间，并没有差异。在能指与所指之间，这个连接并非任意性；相反地，它是必然性。这个观念（所指boeuf （beef）在我的法国的意识里，必然跟声音的系列（能指bof）相一致。它们之间并有一个如此紧密的共生关系，以致boeuf的这个观念，就像是声音意象bof的灵魂。换句话说，能指与所指之间，有严格的坚持。假如情况是这样，那是因为跟价值的理论一致，它们会有所变化，以符合它们团结一致的语言的系统。（因此，翻译者的绝望，他清楚地知道，“beef”跟“bif”将不会拥有完全相同的意义，即使它们两者都提到相同的东西。

Signification, therefore, does not reside in the representation of a signified by a signifier, even an “arbitrary” one. If we follow the hypothesis of value, the meaning of a sign is always (to use Peirce’s vocabulary, quoted by Jakobson) in another sign that “interprets” the first: “The function of such an interpretant is performed by another sign or set of signs that occur together with a given sign, or might occur instead of it.”24 Even more precisely, the signified is inseparable from the signifier, whose differential destiny it shares. As Lacan says, there is no signified “day” before the signifying opposition that places day against the background of night’s absence, and vice versa (1981,169—170), no signified “man” without the signifying polarity that differentiates him from “woman” (1981,223-224, 282—283). And so it turns out that we can never lay our hands on the signified of a signifier except in another signifier, and so on. This is illustrated, in “The Agency of the Letter,” by the incongruous rewriting (1977a, 151/499) of the Saussurian schema of the sign:

意义因此并不是在于所指被能指所代表，即使是「任意的」代表。假如我们遵照价值的假设，符号的意义总是（使用皮尔斯的字彙，雅克慎引用）「诠释」前者的在另一个符号里：这样一个诠释的功能，由另外一个符号或一组符号来履行。它们跟一个特定的符号一起发生，或可能代替它发生。」更贴切地说，所指跟能指是不可分开的，所指分享能指的差异的命运。如同拉康说，并没有「白天」的所指，在能指化的对立之前。这种对立将白天放置于夜晚的缺席的背景里。反过来说，夜晚也是如此（1981，169-170）。必然先有能指化的两极，区分「男人」与「女人」，才会有「男人」这个所指。（1981，223-224，282-283）。所以，结果是，我们永远无法掌控一个能指的所指，除了在另外一个能指，等等。在「信息的代理」一文，有一个不协调的重新书写作为举例（1077a，151/499）索绪尔的符号的基模：

LADIES 女厕所

GENTLEMEN 男厕所

The two doors, indistinguishable in reality\ receive their imponderable “meaning”—”the imperative … of urinary segregation” (1977a, 151/500)—from the pure difference in places between the two signifiers “Ladies” and “Gentlemen.”

这两个门，实际上无法区别，接收它们难以掌握的「意义」–「排泄聚会所的命令」（1977a，151/500）–从「女厕所」与「男厕所」这两个能指之间的地点的纯粹的差异。
，
By the same token, if the signified of a signifier is itself a signifier, what can the distinction between signifier and signified (advanced by the Saussurian doctrine of arbitrariness) correspond to it？ As Benveniste noted in 1939, this distinction is actually only the relic, within a theory allergic to it, of a representationalist problematic of the sign. Therefore, Benveniste amends, arbitrariness concerns only the relation of the sign to the thing designated, and not the relation of the signifier to the signified, which itself is necessary and indissoluble. The signifier is not the “arbitrary” representative of the signified, for the latter is nothing without the former, except through mirage or illusion. “Meaning” is “an internal component of linguistic form,”25 and therefore the signified is not to be sought anywhere but in the relations among signifiers.

同样地，假如能指的所指，本身是一个能指，能指与所指之间的区别（由索绪尔的任意性的信条所提出）能够对应什么？如同本温尼斯特在1939年注意到，这个区别实际上仅是符号的再现代表难题的这个遗物，在对它过敏的理论里。因此，本温尼斯特修正说，任意性仅是关系到符号与被指明的物象的关系。而不是关系到能指与所指的关系。后者本身是必要的而且不可解决。能指并不是所指的「任意性」代表。因为假如没有前者，后者是空无，除了通过幻景与幻觉。「意义」是语言形式的内在的成分，因此所指不应该在任何其他地方寻找，除了就是在能指之间的关系。

We can see what Benveniste’s rectification implies: it methodically reduces the theory of signification to a theory of value, and by the same token, as Jean-Claude Milner opportunely remarks, it justifies the notion “that in order to designate any system structured like a language [let us correct this Lacanian slippage: like a langue]y one adopts a single term—for example, ‘the signifier.’ “2*

我们能够看出，本温尼斯特的修正暗示着：它系统地将意义的理论，简化成为价值的理论。同样地，如同詹、克劳得 米纳贴切的评论，它证实这个观念：为了指明任何像语言一样结构的系统，（让我们改正拉康学派的口误：像语意一般的结构），我们採有单一的术语—譬如，「能指」。

Now, as we know, this is the side taken by Lacan, who on this point merely draws the strict conclusions of the theory of value. Indeed, if the sign represents nothing—neither the referent nor even the signified—then there is nothing to sink one’s teeth into but the signifier. Only the signifier survives the deluge (as Blanchot says) that swallows up every “signifiable” (1977, 288/692). As for the concept of the “sign,” it is totally abandoned; witness the double and significant destiny that it meets in Lacan. Either it is criticized as what the signifier is not—that is, “what represents something for someone” (1970, 65), a definition borrowed from Peirce but implicitly entailing that of the Saussurian sign—or it is simply identified with the concept of the signifier (“The signifier is a sign that refers to another sign”; 1981, 188).

现在，我们知道，这就是拉康採用的这一面。针对这点，拉康仅是获得价值的理论的严格的结论。的确，假如符号代表空无，既不是指称物，甚至也不是所指—那么，就没有什么东西我们能够掌握，除了就是能指。只有能指经历洪水之后还存活，（布朗肖的说法），洪水淹没了每个「可被能指的东西」（1977，288/692）。至于「符号」这个观念，它完全被放弃：请你们见证，符号在拉康那里遭遇的双重与能指意义的命运。符号要就是被批评，作为是能指不是的东西，换句话说，「对于某人代表某物的东西」（1970，65），从皮尔斯借用过来的定义，而且暗示地涵盖索绪尔的符号的定义。要不就是，符号仅是被认同是能指的观念（能指是提到另外一个符号的符号；1981，188）。

Therefore, the stakes are clear enough in this methodical reduction of sign to the signifier alone. For Lacan, it is a question of emptying the linguistic sign of every representative function, in order to invest it with the role previously imparted to speech: the role of producing (presenting) nothing, from nothing. There is, Lacan repeats after Levi-Strauss,27 an “autonomy” of the signifier relative to the signified (1981, 223; 1970, 55), in the sense that the signifier “does not depend on the signification . . . but is its source” (1981, 282). This formula summarizes very well the double demonstration to which Lacan yields whenever he presents his doctrine of the signifier (see, for example, the first section of “The Agency of the Letter,” which is entirely constructed on the following pattern):

因此，在系统地将符号化简成为仅是能指，赌注足够清楚。对于拉康，问题是要将语言的符号，掏空掉每个再现代表的功能。为了替它投注先前被分配给言说的角色：从空无，产生（呈现）空无的角色。拉康跟随在列文、史特劳斯之后重复，有一个能指的「自主权」，相对于所指（1081，223；1970，55）。这意味着，能指并没有依靠意义，而是能指就是意义的来源（1981，282）。这个公式非常清楚地总结拉康屈从的这个双重的展示，每当他呈现能指的信条（譬如，情参照「信息的代理」的第一部分。它完全以下面的模式作为建构：

雄伯译
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