Chapter 1
第一章
Jung’s epistemology and
Methodology
榮格的認識論與方法論
Renos K. Papadopoulos
雷諾、帕帕鬥博洛斯
To begin with, it is important to address the very inclusion of a chapter of
this nature in this Handbook. This clarification is necessary because Jung is
not particularly known for his contribution either to epistemology or to
methodology. Jung is widely known mainly for a number of innovations
which do not include his epistemological expertise; mostly, these contributions
are connected with the content of his theories (i.e., he introduced
new theoretical ideas e.g., about the collective unconscious and the archetypes,
etc.), his particular approach to psychotherapy (e.g., he advocated
not to reject the symptom but to endeavour to find meaning and value in
it), and the implications of his ideas to wider existential and cultural
considerations. Epistemology and methodology are not areas that are
usually associated with Jung. Yet, this chapter will argue that if one were to
read Jung in a certain way, one would find important epistemological and
methodological insights; moreover, it will be further argued that these
insights are of relevance today and they can enrich substantially current
debates in these fields.
首先，重要的是要處理，榮格手冊屬於這種性質的章節。這種澄清是必要的，因為榮格的成名，並非特別是由於他對認識論或方法論的貢獻。榮格的名聲遠播，主要是因為許多的創新。這並不包括他對認識論的精湛。大體來說，這些貢獻跟他的理論內容息息相關（諸如，他介紹新的理論的觀念，譬如，關於集體無意識與原型，等等）。他對於心理治療學的特別研究方法（譬如，它主張不要排斥病症，而要企圖在病徵裡找出意義與價值）。以及他的觀念的暗示，要擴大到更廣泛的生命實存與文化的考慮）。認識論與方法論，通常並不是跟榮格密切相關的領域。可是，這個章節將會主張，假如我們想要用某種方式閱讀榮格，我們將會發現重要的認識論與方法論的洞察。而且，還會更進一步主張：這些洞察跟今天是息息相關。它們能夠充實，在這些領域實質上正在進行的各種爭論。
Difficulties
重重困難
Several difficulties could be identified in the undertaking of the task of
discerning Jung’s epistemological contribution. The first has to do with
the basic fact that Jung did not write clearly and specifically about epistemology
and methodology; whenever he addressed these issues he did so in
passing, in the context of writing about something else. This means that his
insights on epistemological and methodological matters were interwoven
into the very fabric of his theories and his overall psychology and, therefore,
would require a special extraction procedure to be brought to light in order
to he examined in their own right. Related to this difficulty is another
consideration, i.e., by formulating his insights in his usual idiosyncratic
language (which was tightly interconnected within his theories), Jung’s
implications for epistemology are not easily noticeable either by the specialist epistemologists or by the majority of Jungian psychologists; the former
would not even look in Jung’s writings for this kind of information, and
the focus of the latter has been mainly on his innovative contributions
to the theory and practice of psychotherapy.
好幾個困難能夠被辨認出來，當我們從事這項工作：審視榮格對認識論的貢獻。首先必須牽涉到這個事實：榮格並沒有清楚而明確地寫到認識論與方法論。每當他處理這些議題時，他僅是順便為之，夾雜在有關某件其它議題裡面。這意味著，他對於認識論與方法論事情的洞察，是跟他的理論與全面性的心理學的結構，交織糾纏在一塊。因此，需要一道特別的抽離的程式，才能將它們澄清，這樣才能依據它們的本質檢視它們。另外一個考慮，跟這個困難息息相關，那就是憑藉他通常的怪癖語言，來闡釋他的洞察（這種怪癖語言在他的理論裡密切關聯）。榮格對於認識論的暗示，並沒有受到認識論的專家學者，或是大多數的榮格心理學家注意到。前者甚至不會在榮格的著作裡，尋找這種資訊，後者的焦點主要是集中在他的創新的貢獻，對於心理治療學的理論與實踐。
Another difficulty in developing Jung’s contribution to epistemology and
methodology is that such an activity would seemingly contradict Jung’s
own strong views about the very essence of his work. Jung is known for
being adverse to any suggestion that his theoretical formulation could be
separated from his overall psychology. More specifically, he detested the
idea that his work could be considered as constituting any `free-standing’
philosophical statement, abstracted, distinct and independent from its
clinical-therapeutic context: ‘I have set up neither a system nor a general
theory, but have merely formulated auxiliary concepts to serve me as tools
as is customary in every branch of science’ (Jung 1952a: par. 1507).
當我們正在發展榮格對於認識論與方法論的貢獻，另外一個困難是，這樣一種活動表面上互相牴從，跟榮格自己的強烈觀點，關於他研究的本質。眾所周知，榮格非常抗拒任何暗示：他的理論的闡釋能夠跟他的整體的心理學分開。更加明確地，他嚴惡這種想法： 他的研究能夠被認為是構成任何的「獨立自主」的哲學的陳述，跟它的臨床與治療的內涵抽離，分開，與獨立：「我並不是建立一個系統，或一般的理論，而僅是詮釋輔助的觀念，來替我充當工具，如同科學的每個專科的慣例。
Evidently, Jung perceived a sharp distinction between two possible ways
that his work could be understood: according to the first one, his work was
`empirical’ and grounded on solid clinical observations; and, according to
the second one, his work was a collection of philosophical speculations and
abstractions unrelated to the clinical realities. Throughout his life and in his
writings, Jung struggled to gain legitimacy for his work and endeavoured to
condemn strongly the latter position and did everything he could to convince
others to espouse the former position. However, this sharp distinction
presents two difficulties: first, according to the latter view, any philosophical
relevance that Jung’s work could have possible had was dismissed
as being `philosophical speculation’; this means that this sharp distinction
does not allow for any positive appreciation of anything that could be
considered even remotely connected with philosophy. Consequently, all
possible epistemological and methodological insights were tainted as being
philosophical and were, thus, rejected by Jung. Second, surely, this sharp
distinction cannot be definitive, regardless of how it is understood. In other
words, any comprehension and (more so) any presentation of ’empirical’
`facts’ inevitably involves theoretical and philosophical assumptions that
need to be taken on board.
顯而易見，榮格感覺到一種強烈地區別兩種方式，來理解他的研究。依照第一種方式，他的研究是「試驗性」，以具體的臨床的觀察作為基礎。依照第二種方式，他的研究是哲學沉思與抽象思維的彙集，跟臨床的現實並不相關。終其一生，及在他的著作裡，榮格奮鬥為了替他的研究自圓其說，並且企圖強烈地譴責後者的立場，並盡其一切可能，來說服別人來遵循前者的立場。可是，這種強烈的區別，呈現兩種困難：首先，依照後者的觀點，榮格的研究可能擁有的任何的哲學的相關性，都會被排斥為是「哲學的沉思」。這意味著，這種強烈的區別並沒有考慮到：即使某件東西跟哲學稍微瓜葛，也可以正面地賞識。結果，所有可能的認識論與方法論的洞察，都被污染成為是帶有哲學思維，因此會被榮格排斥。其次，當然，這種強烈的區別無法很明確，無論它如何受人瞭解。換句話說，任何的理解，與「試驗性」「事實」的任何呈現，都牽涉到需要被接納的理論與哲學的假設。
This means that Jung’s very perception of his work (in terms of this
sharp distinction) prevented him (and others after him) from appreciating
any contribution he made which could have been construed as being
`philosophical’. More specifically, throughout, Jung was particularly concerned
not to venture into anything that he considered that could dilute the
validity of his psychological work and in doing so, in effect, he minimised
the importance of the epistemological implications of his work. Moreover,
it seems that, even when he was aware of the epistemological impact of his
formulations, somehow, Jung perceived them as an integral part of his
overall theoretical approach (which, indeed, they were) and, consequently,
he did not flag out their importance, in their own right.
這意味著，榮格的對於他研究的感覺(用這個強烈的區別的術語來說)，阻止他（跟追隨他的人們），無法賞識他所做的任何貢獻，只因為那些貢獻可能會被解釋當作是「哲學思維」。更加明確地，終其一生，榮格特別關心的，他認為對於心理學研究的正確性，會有稍微減損的東西，他都適可而止。實際上，當他這樣做時，他漠視了他的研究具有認識論的暗示的重要性。而且，即使當他知道他的闡釋具有認識論的影響，不知為何，榮格還是認為它們，僅是他完整的理論研究方法的其中一部分（確實也是如此）。結果，他並沒有張揚它們的應有的實質上的重要性。
Accordingly, the main objectives of this chapter are to attempt, first, to
argue that Jung indeed had a remarkable epistemological sensitivity and
vigilance, second, to delineate those parts of his work that could convey
his epistemological awareness and to develop them into a more coherent
formulation, third, to trace his epistemological development through the
different phases of his career and the way this development interacted with
his wider theoretical formulations and with his own life, and finally to
examine the present-day relevance of his epistemological contribution in the
light of wider developments and current debates in this field. Needless to
say, these objectives will have to be scaled down considerably in scope in
order to fit within the space limitations of a single chapter.
因此，這個章節的主要目標，首先是要企圖主張：榮格確實擁有顯著的認識論的敏感度與警覺性。其次，清楚地描述他的研究能夠傳遞他的認識論覺察的那些部分，並且將它們發展成為一個更加一貫性的闡釋。第三，要追蹤他的認識論的發展，經歷他的生平的不同階段，以及這個發展的互動，跟他的更廣泛的理論的闡釋，以及跟他自己的一生。最後，要檢視他的認識論的貢獻，跟當前時代的相關性，根據這個領域的更廣泛的發展與目前的爭論的觀點。無庸置疑，這些目標將範圍必須大幅度縮小，為了要在一個有限空間的章節裡相容並蓄。
About epistemology and methodology
關於認識論與方法論
Before going any further, it will be important to develop a working
understanding of what is meant by epistemology and methodology. As their
respective fields are vast and there are many technical definitions of both of
them, it will be useful to limit our understanding to a working conception
of them, for the purposes of this chapter.
在深入探討之前，重要的是要發展可適用的理解，對於認識論與方法論的意涵。因為它們各別的領域是廣泛的，它們兩種都有許多專業的定義，我們最後將我們的理解，限制於對它們可適用的觀念，為了這個章節的目的。
Epistemology is the logos of episteme. The Greek logos is often translated
as study, science, discipline, systematic investigation and discourse. In
Greek, episteme means knowledge but, not surprisingly, it has an interesting
history and a wide range of meanings; the Latin equivalent, scientia, does
not seem to share this rich philosophical past.
認識論是「認識的邏可斯logos of episteme」。希臘文的「邏可斯logos」經常被翻譯成為研究，科學，學科，系統的研究與辭說。在希臘文，「認識episteme」意味著知識，但是不足為奇的是，它具有有趣的歷史，與廣泛範圍的意義。拉丁文的同義字 scientia，則似乎並沒有分享這種豐富的哲學的過往歷史。
Etymologically, episteme is related to the verbs ephistemi and epistamai
which mean `to set or place upon’ and ‘to know how’, respectively. Both
verbs refer to standing over or upon (epi) implying some king of `overseeing’
activity. Whereas in English to understand is signified by ‘standing
under’, in Greek it is by standing over, above. The noun epistema is
‘anything set up, e.g., a monument over a grave’ (Liddell and Scott 1869:
575). Therefore, episteme could be understood as the act of marking a territory that was observed and comprehended.
從詞源學來說，認識episteme 跟動詞ephistemi 與epistamai 有關聯。它們的意思分別是「放置上面」與「知道如何做」。兩個動詞都提到居高臨下，暗示某種的「監視」活動的國王。雖然在英文，理解的意義是「居於下位」，在希臘文，理解是居高臨下的上位。名詞epistema 就是「任何被建立的東西，譬如，墳墓上的紀念碑」（李德爾與史考特，1869年：575頁）。因此，episteme 能夠被理解，作為是標示能夠被觀察與理解的領土的行動。
There is long debate about the meaning of episteme in ancient Greek
philosophy (mainly in Plato and Aristotle). This is mainly in connection to
its opposition to techne (which is often translated as art, craft or practice).
In short, the general trend has been to attribute episteme to knowledge of
pure theory and techne to the know-how connected with practice and
application. In other words, the predominant tradition has been to equate
episteme to theoretical knowledge and techne to applied technology. This
is reflected somehow in the old division between a university and a polytechnic
( in Greek Pan-epistemeion and Poly-techneion). However, this sharp
distinction is not always valid. For example, Plato has Socrates clarifying
that the knowledge (epistolic) of health is the medical craft (techne) of
the physician (Charmides, 165c). In other words, according to Socrates, applied and theoretical knowledge are not in a mutually excluding and oppositional relationship.
在古代希臘哲學，關於認識episteme的意義，有過一段漫長的爭論（主要是在柏拉圖與亞裡斯多德）。這主要是關於它跟技藝techne的對立（techne 往往被翻譯成為藝術，技巧，或實踐）。總之，一般的傾向是將peisteme 歸屬於純粹理論的知識，而techne則是被歸屬於知道如何做，跟實踐與應用息息相關。換句話說，盛行的傳統始終是將episteme 相等於是理論的知識，而techne則是相等於的科技。以某種方式，這被反映在大學與技術學院的這個古老的區分（在希臘文則是Pan-epistemeion 與 Poly-techneion）。可是，這種強烈的區別未必總是成立。譬如，柏拉圖曾要求蘇格拉底澄清，健康的知識（epistolic） 是醫生的醫學技藝（techne）（章密地思，165c）。換句話說，依照蘇格拉底，實用與理論的知識，並沒有處於互相排除與對立的關係。
This debate is not unrelated to Jung’s own understanding of knowledge
and craft in psychology and psychotherapy. For example, Michael Whan
(1987) suggests that Jung’s approach transcends the opposition between
episteme and techne and proposes the term phronesis as the most appropriate
term that characterises the Jungian approach. Thus, for Whan,
Jungian therapeutic practice is not based either on ‘theoretical knowledge’
or on ‘technical knowledge’ but on an awareness which he terms ‘ethical
consciousness’. In fact, the ethical consideration has been proposed as a
dominant epistemological drive in mental health care, in general (and not
only in relation to the Jungian approach) and as superseding the perceived
dichotomy between techne and episteme (Crowden 2003). Needless to say,
Jung would have strongly agreed that an ethical stance cannot be divorced
from epistemological and technical considerations; indeed, on numerous
occasions he emphasised this very point (e.g., Jung 1949: par. 1412, 1934a:
par. 315; McFarland Solomon and Twyman 2003; von Franz 1975).
這場爭論跟榮格自己對於心理學與心理知療學的知識與技藝的理解，並非沒有關聯。麥克、懷恩（1987年）建議，榮格的研究方法超越知識與技藝的對立，並且建議phronesis這個術語，作為是最適當的術語，表現榮格學派的研究方法的特色。因此，懷恩認為，榮格學派的治療的實踐的基礎，既不是「理論的知識」，也不是「技藝的知識」，而是基於他用「倫理的意識」這個術語的覺察。事實上，這個倫理的考慮曾經被提出，在精神健康照顧，作為是一種支配的認識論的衝動，這是就一般而言（不但是跟榮格學派的研究方法的關係）。以及作為取代技藝與知識之間被感受到的這種區隔（ 柯洛頓，2003年）。無庸置疑，榮格本來會強烈同意，倫理的態度無法跟認識與技藝的考慮分道揚鑣。的確，在許多的場合，他強調這一點（譬如，榮格，1949年，1412，段，1934a年，315段，索羅門與特懷曼，2003年，梵、法蘭茲，1975年）。
The reference to episteme vs techne in the context of the Jungian approach
is indicative of the complexities involved in delineating boundaries between
the various disciplines; these debates, of course, are not limited only to the
therapeutic realm. Indeed, the problematic acceptance of knowledge outside
the framework of ethical perspectives is universal and it affects most areas
of human activity. Characteristically, Levinas proposed the primacy of
ethics and maintained that no knowledge was possible without reference to
ethical considerations (e.g., Bernasconi and Critchley 1989; Cohen 1986;
Levinas 1984). This strong and close relationship between knowledge and
ethics makes it imperative to investigate judiciously their boundaries so that
their interrelationships can be understood better. Indeed, without this
specific understanding, many dangerous confusions and epistemological
errors can be committed. For example, this is particularly evident when
attempts are made
在榮格學派方法的內涵裡，認識與技藝相提並論指示著這種複雜性，牽涉到要明確描繪這些邊界，處於各種學科之間的邊界。當然，這些爭辯並不僅限制於治療的領域。的確，在倫理的觀點的框架外面的知識，接受有其重重困難是普遍性的，它影響到人類活動的大部分領域。具有特色的是，列維納斯建議，倫理學應該具有優先性，並且主張，假如沒有提到倫理的考慮，任何知識都是不可能的（諸如，柏納康尼與科瑞奇立，1989年，科罕，1986年，列維納斯，1984年）。在知識與倫理之間的這個強烈而密切的關係，使得明智地研究它們的邊界成為必要。這樣它們之間的相互關係，才能夠更加被理解。的確，假如沒有這個明確的理解，將會犯上許多危險的混淆與認識論的錯誤。譬如，特別顯而易見的是，當企圖要
to understand and deal with the effects of political violence from
exclusively psychological and psychopathological perspectives [without
considering] intrapsychic, interpersonal and external dimensions . . .
[and without appreciating] the wider political, historical, social, economic,ethical, spiritual and moral perspectives.
(Papadopoulos 2005: 46)
理解與處理政治暴力的影響，專門從心理學與心理治療學的觀點（而沒有考慮到）心靈內部，人際之間，與外在的維度 （沒有賞識到）更加寬廣的政治，歷史，社會，經濟，倫理，精神與道德的觀點。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯，2005年，46頁）
Then, often we tend to become ‘prone to get confused and commit methodological
and epistemological errors, ending up psychologising the political
realm and pathologising human suffering’ (Papadopoulos 2005: 46).
因此，我們時常傾向於變得「易於混淆與犯下方法論與認識論的錯誤，結果將政治的領域心理學化，將人類的痛苦病理化」（帕帕鬥博洛斯，2005年，46頁）
Returning to the developing of a working meaning of epistemology, the
majority of definitions in non-specialist dictionaries refer to epistemology as
‘the theory of knowledge, especially with regard to its methods and validity’
(Oxford English Dictionary). Other, more technical texts define epistemology
as ‘the philosophical inquiry into the nature, conditions, and extent
of human knowledge’ (Sosa and Kim 2000b: ix). Essentially, epistemology
is the study of how we know that we know, of what constitutes a valid
understanding/explanation/knowledge. A more general definition that
would offer a working framework for this chapter would be that epistemology
is the systematic investigation of what makes us accept (think/feel)
that we know something, of what makes us mark a certain territory as
observed and comprehended. This means that epistemology addresses not
only the conditions that make the knower know but also the interaction
between the knower and the known, as well as the circumstances within
which this interrelationship takes place.
回到認識論可應用的意義的發展。在非專業性的字典，大多數定義提到認識論，作為「知識的理論，特別是關你它的方法與正確性」（牛津英文字典）。其它比較技術性的文本定義認識論，作為是「哲學的研究人類知識的性質，情況與程度」（索薩與金姆，2000b：ix）。基本上，認識論上研究我們如何知道，研究什麼組成正確的理解，解釋，與知識。更加一般性的定義，將會提供可應用的框架給這個章節，那就是：認識論上系統化的研究是什麼讓我們接受（思想與感覺）我們知道某件東西，是什麼讓我們標示某個領域，作為被觀察與理解。這意味著，認識論處理的，不僅是這些情況，讓認知者知道，而且是認知者與被認知者之間的互動，以及在相互關係發生的情境。
Continuing with the etymological approach to definition, methodology is
the logos of methodos. The Greek word methodos is a composite of meta
and odos. Meta means after (implying development), and odos is the road,
the route. Therefore, methodos literally means ‘a following after’ (Liddell
and Scott 1869), following a road, adhering to a set way. The Oxford
English Dictionary (OED) defines method as ‘a particular procedure for
accomplishing or approaching something’, and also ‘orderliness of thought
or behaviour’; hence, methodology (according to OED) is ‘a system of
methods used in a particular field’. This means that methodology refers to
the application of the epistemological premises that a person holds at a
given time.
繼續詞源學探討定義的方法，方法論就是「方法學methodos」的邏可斯。希臘字詞 methodos 是meta 與odos 的組合字。Meta 意味著（暗示的發展）之後，而odos 則是道路，路途。因此，methodos 實質上意味著，「跟隨在後面」（李德爾與史考特1，1869年），跟隨在道路之後，堅持一條固定的途徑。牛津英文字典（OED）定義方法，作為是「特別的程式，來完成或接近某件東西」，以及「思想與行為的秩序」；因此，方法論（依照牛津英文字典）是「在特殊領域被使用的方法的系統」。這意味著，方法論提到某個人在特定時間持有的認識論假設的應用，
In this chapter, methodology will be used to refer to the specific ways
that Jung used to apply his epistemology, i.e., the ways he followed which
were guided (consciously or unconsciously) by his particular epistemology
(cf. also Dieckmann 1991; Penna 2004). In other words, whereas epistemology
would be related to his assumptions about sources of knowledge and
evidence, methodology would be related to the manner in which Jung
applied these insights in the ways he developed his theory and practice.
在這個章節，方法論將會被使用來提到這些明確的方式，榮格應用他的認識論的方式，譬如，他遵循的方法，受到他特別的認識論的引導（無論是意識地，或無意識地）（請參照迪克曼，1991年，扁那，2004年）。換句話說，雖然認識論將會跟他關於知識與證據的來源的假設相關，而方法論則是將跟這個方法相關，榮格應用這些洞察的方法，用來發展他的理論與實踐。
Jung’s epistemological sensitivity
榮格的認識論的敏感度
Before investigating Jung’s specific epistemological positions and development,
it will be appropriate to first establish and emphasise the fact that he
had a particularly acute epistemological sensitivity.
在研究榮格的明確認識論的立場與發展之前，我們最後首先證實並強調這個事實：他擁有一個特別敏銳的認識論的敏感度。
An excellent example of this sensitivity and resulting methodology is
olThred in Jung’s essay on Ulysses (Jung 1932a). The full title of the essay is
“‘Ulysses”: a monologue’ and it is, indeed, Jung’s own monologue, recording
his own reactions to James Joyce’s novel. Jung first writes about his
views on the novel and gradually becomes irritated by it. Then, all of a
sudden he t urns his attention to his own irritation and writes: ‘Joyce has
aroused my ill will. One should never rub the reader’s nose into his own stupidity, but this is just what Ulysses does’ (Jung 1932a: par. 167). Jung, at
this point, stops writing about his subject matter and instead begins to
observe himself and his own very reaction;’ he continues: ‘A therapist like
myself is always practising therapy — even on himself. Irritation means:
You haven’t yet seen what’s behind it. Consequently we should follow up
our irritation and examine whatever it is we discover in our ill temper’
(Jung 1932a: par. 168).
關於這種敏感度與因此形成的方法論，有一個最佳的例子被提供，在榮格探究「尤利西斯」的論文（榮格，1932年a）。這篇論文的整個標題上「尤利西斯：獨白」。這確實是榮格自己的獨白，記錄他自己對於詹姆斯、喬伊絲的小說的反應。榮格首先書寫關於他對小說的觀點，然後逐漸地被它激怒起來。然後，突然地，他將他的注意力轉向他自己的憤怒，並且寫道：「喬伊絲引起我的惡意。我們永遠不應該提醒讀者有關他自己的愚蠢，但是這確實是尤利西斯這部小說所做的。( 榮格，1932年a：167段)。在這個時候，榮格停止書寫關於他的主題的東西。代替的，他開始觀察他自己，以及他自己的強烈反應」。他繼續寫道：「像我這樣的治療師，總是在從事治療實踐—甚至是對他自己。憤怒意味著：你甚至沒有看見治療實踐背後的東西。結果，我們應該遵循我們的憤怒，並且檢視，在我們壞脾氣發作之際，我們究竟發現什麼」（榮格，1932a年：168段）。
Although the analyst reader of Jung’s essay will accept this incident as an
ordinary example of Jung’s awareness of his own countertransference to
Joyce’s novel, in effect, this is also a clear illustration of Jung’s epistemological
awareness in so far as Jung attempts to trace back the source of his
own assumptions, knowledge and feelings. In fact, the process of countertransference
is nothing but an example of an epistemological procedure
in action, during psychotherapy. When the analyst tries to catch himself or
herself and observes where certain feelings, thoughts or even words said to
the analysand come from, to all intents and purposes, the analyst is performing
an epistemological tracking (in addition, of course, to attending to
a whole lot of other parameters). The attempt to trace back the origin and
context of one’s own assumptions is the essence of the epistemological
procedure and this is what countertransference is about.
雖然閱讀榮格論文的分析家將會接受這件意外，作為是尋常的例子，榮格知道他自己對於喬伊絲小說的反移情。實際上，這也是清楚的例子說明榮格知道認識論，因為榮格企圖追蹤他自己的假設，知識與感覺的來源。事實上，反移情的過程，僅是運作中的認識論過程的例子，在心理治療的過程當中。當精神分析家嘗試理解他或她自己，並且觀察他對分析者所說的某些的感覺，思想，或甚至字詞，從何而來，有何意圖與目的，分析家正在執行一種認識論的追蹤（當然，除了注意一整套的其他參數之外）。這種企圖追蹤他自己的假設的起源與內容，是認識論過程的本質。這是反移情的關注所在。
In this context, it is worth noting that although it was Freud who first
`discovered’ the phenomenon of countertransference (Freud 1910), it was
Jung who emphasised its positive contribution to the therapeutic process
(e.g., Jung 1916/1948). Freud, for most of his life, considered countertransference
as an obnoxious interference of the analyst’s pure position as
observer of the analysand. On the contrary, Jung appreciated that countertransference
is an essential tool through which analysts can trace the source
of their own thoughts, feelings and even actions (verbal and otherwise) in
relation to their analysands, and it is for these reasons that he recommended
that ‘the sine qua non is the analysis of the analyst, what is called the training
analysis’ (Jung: Memories, Dreams, Reflections (MDR), p. 154). Jung proposed
the institution of personal analysis (training analysis) for analysts-intraining
not so that they become perfect and pure but in order to learn how
to learn from their own reactions during the course of their analytical work;
in other words, Jung wanted future analysts to know how to know what
makes them know.
在這個內容，值得注意的是，雖然是弗洛依德首先「發現」反移情的現象(弗洛依德，1910年)，榮格則是強調它的正面的貢獻，對於治療的過程（譬如，榮格，1916與1948年）。終其一生，弗洛依德大都認為反移情，是精神分析家充當分析者的觀察者的單純立場的惡俗的干涉。相反地，榮格則是賞識：反移情是一種基本的工具，憑藉這種工具，分析家能夠追蹤他自己的思想，感覺，甚至是行動的來源（文辭的或其他），跟他們的分析者的關係。因為這些理由，他推薦：「先決條件是，分析家的精神分析。所謂的訓練性精神分析」（榮格：回憶、夢與省思，154 頁）。榮格建議要有個人分析的機構（訓練性精神分析），培訓精神分析家，不是要讓他們變成完美與純潔，而是為了學習如何從他們自己的反應學習，在他的們精神分析工作的過程。換句話說，榮格想要未來的精神分析家知道，如何知道是什麼讓他們知道。
This example testifies to Jung’s epistemological awareness. Moreover, it
also shows how Jung put into practice this awareness, i.e., it illustrates his
resulting methodology.
這個例子證實榮格知道認識論。而且，它也顯示，榮格實踐這種知道。譬如，它舉例說明他因此形成的方法論。
In the ‘Ulysses’ essay, Jung follows up his epistemological awareness with
a systematic investigation of the sources of his ‘knowledge’. Not only does
he catch himself being irritated but also he tries to find out what is the
meaning of this irritation. ‘Irritation means: You haven’t yet seen what’s
behind it. Consequently we should follow up our irritation and examine
whatever it is we discover in our ill temper’ (Jung 1932a: par. 168). Once he
becomes conscious of the presence of a certain way of reacting (i.e.,
irritation) he begins to observe himself, by ‘practicing therapy even on
himself’. In this way, therapy becomes almost synonymous with the very
epistemological tracking of one’s sources of knowledge.
在探討「尤利西斯」的論文，榮格遵循他的認識論的知道，用他的「知識」的來源的系統的研究。他不但發現他自己被激怒起來，而且他嘗試找出這種激怒的意義是什麼。激怒意味著：你還沒有看出它背後的意涵是什麼。結果，我們應該追蹤我們的激怒，並且檢視在我們的壞脾氣發作裡，我們究竟發現什麼。（榮格1932a年：168段）。一旦他變得知道某種反應的方式的存在，（譬如，激怒），他開始觀察他自己，憑藉「實踐心理治療，甚至是對他自己」。以這種方式，心理治療變成跟認識論的追蹤我們自己的知識的來源，幾乎是同義詞。
Another example of Jung’s epistemological vigilance is to be found in his
views about the uses and abuses of case histories. With incisive perceptiveness,
he warned that
榮格警覺到認識論的另外一個例子，在他對於個案歷史的使用與爛用的觀點裡，能夠被找到。用銳利的感知，他警告說：
The empirical intellect, occupying itself with the minutiae of case histories,
involuntarily imports its own philosophical premises not only
into the arrangement but also into the judgement of the material and
even into the apparently objective presentation of data.
(Jung 1935a: par. 548)
試驗性的智識，專注它自己於個案歷史的微末細節，不由自主地將它自己的哲學的假設，不但輸入於安排，而且輸入於對材料的判斷，甚至輸入於對資料的外表是客觀的呈現。
This quotation is very important because it demonstrates the degree of Jung’s
awareness of the complexities of how the knower knows. Philosophy here is
not an abstraction or a school of thought one chooses consciously to adhere
to. By `philosophical premises’, Jung here refers to the cognitive process that
inevitably orders and structures our perception according to various ways
that create `involuntarily’ certain premises, assumptions that colour our
understanding and make us accept that we have a certain knowledge about
something — a patient, in this example. Jung stresses that this structuring
process happens at least at three levels — at the very `presentation’ of the
(case-) material, at the `arrangement’ and at the `judgement’ of it. Whereas it
is evident that our judgements are influenced by certain `premises’ of ours, it
is not easily acceptable that there is a certain degree of ‘involuntary’ interference
by some `philosophical premises’ even in the `apparently objective
presentation of data’. Usually, people believe that a `fact’ is a ‘fact’ and when
a therapist presents the `facts’ of the case, it is usually believed that no
epistemological colouring (of a substantial degree) is involved in influencing
the presentation. The whole tradition of case-history is based on this
‘objectivity’. It is remarkable that Jung, at that time, was concerned about
the `objectivity’ of such innocuous presentations. This awareness leads Jung
to generalise this epistemological process: `What is the use of even the most
accurate and punctilious work if it is prejudiced by an unavowed assumption?
Any science worthy of the name must criticize its own assumptions’
(Jung 1935a: par. 548). This statement shows that Jung extends his epistemological
awareness, as it applies to the analytical situation, to address scientific
method in general, thus anticipating current epistemological approaches
(cf. Bit teson 1979; de Shaser 1982; Keeney 1983; Neil and Kniskern 1982;
Selvini-Palazzoli et al. 1978; Watzlawick et al. 1974).
這個問題非常重要，因為它證明榮格對於認知者如何認知的複雜性，知覺到什麼程度。在此的哲學，並不是我們意識地選擇來堅持的抽象思維或是思想學派。所謂的「哲學的假設」，榮格在此提到認知的過程，無可避免地會依照各種的方式，來規範與架構我們的感知。這些方式會「不由自主地」創造某些的假設，扭曲我們的理解的假設，並且讓我們接受，我們對於某件東西擁有某些的知識。譬如，這個個案裡的病人。榮格強調，這種架構的過程的發生，至少有三個層次：在個案材料的「呈現」，與對它的「安排」與「判斷」。雖然這是顯而易見，我們的判斷會受到屬於我們自己的某些「假設」影響，我們並不容易接受，某些的「哲學假設」，會有某種程度的「不由自主」的干涉，即使在「外表是客觀的資料的呈現」。通常，人們相信，「事實」就是「事實」。當一位心理治療師呈現這個個案的「事實」，人們通常相信，這會牽涉到（有任何程度）的認識論的扭曲，影響他們的呈現。個案歷史的整個傳統，就是以這個「客觀性」作為基礎。值得注意的是，榮格在當時關注到如此持平呈現的這種「客觀性」。這種知覺引導榮格總述這個認識論的過程：「即使是這種正確而一絲不苟的研究，有什麼用途？假如它受到隱而不宣的假設，而有偏見。任何值得名聲的科學，必須批評它自己的假設」（榮格 1935a年：548段）。這個陳述顯示，榮格延伸他的認識論的知覺，當它應用到精神分析的情境，為了處理科學的一般方法，因此預期目前的認識論的方法（巴特森 1979；薩色爾 1982；金恩尼1983；內爾與科尼斯肯 1982；色維尼與帕拉左利 1978；瓦拉維克 1974）。
These two examples show Jung’s sharp sensitivity to the importance of
epistemological considerations, not only in psychotherapy but also in the wider scientific enquiry. Without using the word ‘epistemology’, Jung
demonstrates his epistemological acumen. This can be epitomised by his
statement, in 1947, that ‘all knowledge is the result of imposing some kind
of order upon the reactions of the psychic system as they flow into our
consciousness’ (Jung 1947: par. 362). Throughout his life and work, Jung
displayed a remarkable awareness of these epistemological processes.
這兩個例子顯示，榮格對於認識論的考慮的重要性，有強烈的敏銳性，不但在心理治療學，而且在更加寬廣的科學的研究。雖然並沒有使用「認識論」這個字眼，榮格證明他的認識論的洞察力。從1947年，他的陳述就看出端倪：「所有的知識都是賦加某種的秩序的結果，賦加在心靈系統的反應之上，當它們流入我們的意識」（榮格 1947：362段）。終其一生與研究，榮格展示一種傑出的知覺，對於這些認識論的過程。
Jung: an outline of his epistemological development
榮格：他的認識論發展的輪廓
Early writings and work
早期著作與研究
In a letter to Freud, very early in their professional relationship (on 29
December 1906), Jung felt the need to delineate their differences and
identified five points on which ‘we do not see eye to eye’ (McGuire 1974:
14). The first was about the different clinical ‘material’ Jung was working
with (I am working . . . with uneducated insane patients . . . with Dementia
praecox’, as opposed to Freud’s educated elite of Vienna which Jung did
not mention in the letter, but it is implicit); the third was about their
differences in experience (Jung was nineteen years younger than Freud),
and the fourth was about the ‘psychoanalytic talent’ that Jung felt that
Freud had more ‘both in quantity and quality’. As fifth, Jung cited the
`defect’ of having not received direct training from Freud and for the lack
of contact with his older master. But it is the second one that needs our
attention. Jung put it simply, epigrammatically and strongly: ‘my upbringing,
my milieu, and my scientific premises are in any case utterly different
from your own’ (McGuire 1974: 14).
在一封給弗洛依德的信，早期在他們專業的關係（1906年12月29日），榮格感覺有這個必要描述他們的差異，並且辨認出五點，「我們見解不同的地方」（麥克蓋爾 1974年：14頁）。第一點是關於榮格正在研究的不同的臨床的「材料」（「我正在研究那些未受過教育的瘋狂病人，他們患精神疾病」。這跟弗洛依德在維也納的受過教育的精英病人恰恰相反。榮格在信裡沒有提到，僅是暗示）。第三點是關於他們在經驗上的差異（榮格比弗洛依德年輕十九歲）。第四點是關於「精神分析的天份」，榮格感覺弗洛依德擁有更多，「無論是數量與品質」。第五點，榮格引述這個「缺點」：他並沒有直接弗洛依德的訓練，及欠缺跟他的年長老師接觸。但是需要我們注意的是第二點。榮格僅是表達它，簡明而強烈地：「我的教養，我們的環境，與我的科學的假設，無論如何，完全不同於你自己」（麥克蓋爾 1974年：14頁）。
Jung did not elaborate on any of the issues he stated in his second point
(either in the same letter or subsequently in other letters) and Freud,
responding on the New Years day (1 January 1907), did not address at all
the differences that Jung identified but, instead, implored him, ‘I beg of
you, … don’t deviate too far from me when you are really so close to me’
(McGuire 1974: 18). In other words, Freud was not prepared to consider
their differences, especially at a time when he was too keen to strengthen
their closeness both at a professional and at a personal level. Above all, that
was a critical time and both were needed to work together to establish and
legitimise psychoanalysis. As a result, these differences, so clearly outlined
by Jung, were not followed up either by him or Freud again.
榮格並沒有構想他的第二點陳述的這些議題（無論是在他的相同的信裡，或隨後在其他的信裡）。在新年那天（1907年 1月1日），弗洛依德回信，根本就沒有處理榮格辨認的這些差異。代替地，他懇求榮格，「我請求你不要偏離我太遠，當你實際上是跟我非常接近」（麥克蓋爾 1974年：18頁）。換句話說，弗洛依德並沒有準備考慮到他們的差異，特別是在他非常渴望加強他們的密切性，無論是在專業或是私人的層次。尤其重要的是，那是一個危機的時刻，兩人都一起合作，為了建立精神分析，並讓它合法化。結果，榮格如此清楚描繪的這些差異，不管是他或是弗洛依德，隨後都沒有再提起。
What did Jung mean by these differences? Why was he so definitive,
writing that he was ‘utterly different’, not just ‘different’? Ultimately, what
does he mean by ‘scientific premises’, here?
榮格談到這些差異是什麼用意？為什麼他如此明確地寫說，他是「完全不同」，而不僅僅「不同」？最後，他在此提到「科學的假設」是什麼意思？
In order to address these questions, it is important to be reminded of
Jung’s life and work until that point. In terms of employment, he was still
working at the BurghOlzli hospital in Zurich and in terms of writing, the
major works he had completed were his doctoral dissertation and his earlier
Zofingia lectures; by that time, he had also completed most of his writing on
traditional psychiatric issues and had published his first psychoanalytic
paper (in support of Freud’s theory of hysteria). At the BurghOlzli hospital,
in addition to his psychiatric work, Jung was conducting pioneering
research in schizophrenia using mainly the Word Association Test.
In so far as he emphasised his differences from Freud (before they even
met), Jung showed how strongly he felt about his own identity, not only as
a professional but also in terms of his established position with reference to
scientific investigation. What was this position and in what way was it
related to his epistemological sensitivity?
為了要處理這些問題，重要的是要回想起榮格直到當時的生平與研究。用職業的術語來說，他依舊是在慕尼克洞博奧茲利醫院工作。從寫作的術語而言，他完成的主要著作，就是他的博士論文與他早期的佐分吉亞的演講。在那時之前，他也完成大部分他探討傳統精神病議題的寫作，並且出版他最早的精神分析的論文（用來支持弗洛依德的歇斯底里症的理論）。在博奧茲利醫院，除了他的精神分裂症的研究，榮格正在從事在精神分裂症開先鋒的研究，主要是用字詞聯想測驗。因為他強調跟弗洛依德的差異（在他們會面之前）。榮格顯示，他對他自己的認同是多麼的強烈，不僅作為一位專業人員，而且相關於科學研究，他已經建立的立場。這個立場是什麼？它跟他的認識論的敏感度有什麼關係？
Zofingia lectures
佐分吉亞的演講
While he was still a student, Jung gave five lectures (1896-1899) at the
Zofingia student society of which he was a member. In these lectures, he
addressed issues such as the nature of science, psychology, religion and the
nature of scientific enquiry, all from a thoughtful and philosophical perspective.
These lectures show the depth of his understanding of epistemological
and methodological issues and provide the researcher with a unique
opportunity to trace Jung’s early philosophical and scientific premises. The
positions he developed here were remarkably similar to the ones he held as
a mature thinker in his later life, so much so that some authors went as far
as claiming that Jung’s ‘philosophical attitude’ revealed in these lectures
remained unaltered till the end of his life (Nagy 1991: 12). Such a claim
would be rather far fetched because it ignores some important differentiations
Jung made during the course of developing his thought; nevertheless,
it would be fairly accurate to accept that, with regard to his overall philosophical
position, these lectures laid the foundation of most of his subsequent
work. Here are some of the basic premises (relevant to this chapter)
that he developed in these lectures.
當他還是學生時代，榮格就發表五場演講（1896-1899年），在佐分吉亞的學生社團，他是其中成員。在這些演講，他處理一些議題，諸如科學的特性，心理學，宗教，與科學研究的特性。這一切都是從思想與哲學的觀點出發。這些演講顯示他對於認識論與方法論議題的理解的深度，並且提供研究者一個獨特的機會，來追蹤榮格早期的哲學與科學的假設。他在此發展的立場，非常類似于他晚年作為一位成熟思想家具有的立場。如此的類似，以致有些作者甚至宣稱：在這些演講所顯示的榮格的「哲學的態度」，直到他生平的晚年，始終沒有改變。（納吉 1991年：12頁）。如此一種宣稱非常牽強附會，因為它忽略有些重要的區分，榮格在他發展他的思想的過程所做的區分。可是，我們可以非常正確地接受，關於他完整的哲學的立場，這些演講奠定他大部分隨後的研究的這個基礎。在此，有些基本的假設（跟這個章節有關），他在這些演講中發展。
First, in tracing the ‘Border Zones of Exact Science’, Jung rejects the
positions of both ‘contemporary sceptical materialist opinion’ (1896-1899:
par. 63) and metaphysics arguing for the need of a third position in between.
At that time he found vitalism to be that third possibility. According to
vitalism, life is a vital principle which is distinct from the material realm
of physics and chemistry, although connected with it. Throughout, Jung
retained this tendency to reject both the mechanistic approach to science as
well as the blindly religious approach and always strove to develop a third
principle. His early espousal of vitalism was to be replaced successively by
other formulas which were never that dissimilar to this initial formulation;
however, all of them included a stance which was introduced in these
lectures for the first time a strong emphasis on the primacy of the
psychological as an independent realm, not as a product either of mechanistic
materialism or of abstract metaphysics.
首先，榮格探索「精確科學的邊界地區」，拒絕「當代懷疑主義唯物論意見」與形上學的立場（1896-1899：63段）。他主張贊同處於中間的第三個立場。在當時，他發現生命哲學是那個第三個可能性。依照生命哲學，生命是一個重要的原理，不同於物理與化學的物質領域。雖然跟它有所關聯。從頭到尾，榮格保留這個傾向，拒絕科學的機械式的方法，以及盲目的宗教的方法。他並且總是努力要發展第三個原理。他早期對於生命哲學的闡釋後來應該由其他的公式來取代。這些公式跟這個最初的闡述從來沒有太大的差異。可是，所有這一切都包括第一次在這些演講的一種態度，一種激烈地強調哲學的優先地位，作為一個獨立的領域。而不是作為機械的物質主義或抽象的形上學的產品。
The physical phenomena have been studied and threshed out down to
the last detail. Metaphysical phenomena are virtually a closed book.
Surely it would be valuable to inquire into properties other than those
with which we have long been familiar.
(Jung 1896-1899: par. 65)
物理的現象曾經被研究，而且被追根究底。形上學的現象幾乎就是一本封閉的書。的確，假如我們研究一些屬性，不同于長久以來我們耳熟能詳的那些屬性，那是非常有價值的。
Second, related to the above, was Jung’s emphasis on the personal experience
as opposed to ‘inductive scientific method’ (par. 175).
其次，跟以上相關的是，榮格的強調私人的經驗，對立於「演繹的科學的方法」
（175段）
The only true basis for philosophy is what we experience ourselves and,
through ourselves, of our world around us. Every a priori structure
that converts our experience into an abstraction must inevitably lead us
to erroneous conclusions [and again] Our philosophy should consist in
drawing inferences about the unknown . . . on the basis of real experience,
and not in drawing inferences about the inner world on the basis
of the outer, or denying external reality by affirming only the inner
world.
(par. 175)
哲學的唯一的真實的基礎，是我們自己經驗的東西。經由我們自己，我們周遭的世界。每一個先驗理論的結構，將我們的經驗轉變成為一種抽象，它一定會一再地引導我們到達錯誤的結論。我們的哲學應該是在於獲得有關未知事物的推理，根據真實的經驗的基礎。而不是獲得有關內在世界的推論，根據外在世界的基礎，或是否認外在的現實，憑藉僅是肯定內在的世界。
（175段）
These quotations demonstrate Jung’s sharp epistemological clarity in
rejecting either psychologising the world or imposing meaning from exclusively
external parameters. This fine delineation was another characteristic
in his subsequent epistemology.
這些引述語證明榮格的敏銳的認識論的清晰，當他拒絕將這個世界心理學化，或是賦家意義，專門從外在的參數。這個精闢的描繪是他隨後的認識論的另外一個特殊。
Third, it is in the context of the second argument that Jung insisted in
emphasising his ’empirical’ approach, which was another hallmark of his
later methodology. ‘All philosophy must have an empirical foundation’
(par. 175). His avowal for both the empirical nature of his enquiry as well
as the primacy of the psychological created much perplexity. Yet, for Jung
these positions were not contradictory. ‘The primary concern of empirical
psychology is to supply factual documentation supporting the theories of
rational psychology’ (par. 114).
第三，在第二爭論的內文，榮格堅持強調他的「試驗性」方法。那是他晚期的方法論的另外一個標誌。「所有的哲學都必須以試驗作為基礎」（175段）。他宣稱他的研究的試驗性特性與心理學具有優先性，引起相當的困惑。可是，對於榮格，這些立場並沒有互相牴觸。「試驗性心理學原初的關注是要供應事實的檔，來支持理性心理學的理論」（114段）。
The new empirical psychology furnishes us with data ideally designed
to expand our knowledge of organic life and to deepen our views of the
world . . . Our body formed of matter, our soul gazing toward the
heights, are joined into a single living organism … Man lives at the
boundary between two worlds.
(par. 142)
這種新的試驗性心理學供應我們資料，它們理想地被設計要擴充我們對於器官的生命的知識，並且深化我們對於世界的觀點、、、我們的身體由物質組成，我們的靈魂仰望高處凝視。他們被聯接成為一個有生命的有機體、、、人生活於兩個世界的邊界。
In later years, this dual emphasis of seemingly opposing methods was to
take the form of seeing himself both as an ’empiricist’ as well as a ‘phenomenologist’
(cf. Brooke 1991).
在晚年，表面上對立的方法的這個雙重的強調，將會採取這個形式：看待他自己，既是作為一位「實證論者」，又是一位「現象學家」（請參照布魯克 1991年）
Fourth, another epistemological concept that Jung first introduced in the
Zofingia lectures was teleology. This is one of Jung’s most important
methodological approaches and during these lectures (paradoxically) he
connected it with causality. Jung understood this connection as follows: he
believed that humans are driven to enquire after the cause of things, so
much so that he even spoke about a ‘causal instinct’. Inevitably, this
instinct ‘leads us, a priori, away from all externality to the inwardness of
transcendent causes’ (par. 224); this is so because ‘the chain of cause and
effect is infinite’ (par. 197) and once one keeps on enquiring after the cause
of things one will eventually begin to look for patterns beyond the visible
and external. But this kind of enquiry, in effect, is about not just the origin
of things but also about their order, their purpose and ultimately their
meaning (von Franz 1983: xx). ‘The gratification of the need for causal
thinking is truth’ (par. 171). Behind causality there was an objective
purpose:
第四，榮格在佐分吉亞的演講介紹的另外一個認識論的觀念，是目的論。這是榮格最重要的方法論的其中一個方法。在些些演講（悖論地）他將目的論跟因果律連接一塊。榮格理解如下：他相信人類被驅使探究事情的原因，如此強烈，以致他甚至言說關於「因果的本能」。無可避免的，這種本能「引導我們，以演繹的方式，遠離所有的外在性，到超驗的原因」（224段）。會這樣，是因為「原因與結果的鎖鏈是無限的（197段）。一旦我們繼續探究事情的這個原因，我們最後將會開始尋找超越可見與外在的模式。但是這種探究，事實上，關注的不僅是事情的起源，而且是它們的秩序，它們的目的，最後是它們的意義（梵、法蘭茲 1983年：xx）。「對於因果的思維的需要的滿足就是真理」（171段）。在因果律背後，有一個客觀的目的：
Radical subjectivists, i.e., those who regard the world as illusion, and
multiplicity as a show of glittering nothingness, deny any objective
purpose. That is, they do not acknowledge the existence of any
teleology external to man, and instead claim that we ourselves have
projected onto the world, out of our own heads, the idea of the purposefulness of nature.
(par. 175)
激進的主觀主義者，譬如，有些人將世界視為是幻覺，並將多重化視為是閃爍空無的展示，否認任何客觀性的目的。換句話說，他們並不承認任何外在於人的目的論的存在。代替的，他們宣稱，我們自己已經將自然的目的的觀念，從我們自己的腦海，投射到這個世界。
This means that Jung, even at this beginning stage of his scientific career,
held the centrality of teleology not only in relation to human motivation
and enquiry but also as a general principle in nature, at large.
這意味著，榮格，即使在他的科學的生涯的這個開始，就以目的論作為中心，
不但跟人類的動機與探究息息相關，而且作為一般的自然的一般原則。
The final point that needs to be identified from the Zofingia lectures is
Jung’s privileging of morality. Following Kant’s primacy of morality, Jung
criticised science and materialism for ‘poisoning morality’ (par. 137) and
declared that `no truth obtained by unethical means has the moral right to
exist’ (par. 138). Jung’s strong feelings are reflected in the emphatic language
he used in order to press his point; he went as far as advocating ‘a
“revolution from above” by forcing morality on science . . . for after all
scientists have not hesitated to impose their scepticism and moral rootlessness
on the world’ (par. 138). The strong moral foundation of epistemology
that Jung established in these lectures was to remain with him till the end of
his life. Throughout, he was passionate that no production of knowledge
should be placed above ethical considerations. This relates to the earlier
discussion of the ethical dimensions of epistemology.
從佐分吉亞的演講，需要被辨認出來的最後一點，是榮格給予道德的特權。榮格遵循康得將道德視為具有優先性，並且批判科學與唯物論，因為「毒害到道德」（137段），並且宣稱，「憑藉非倫理的方法獲得的真理，沒有一樣擁有道德的權利來存在」（138段）。榮格使用強調的語言，反映他強烈的感覺，為了強化他的觀點。他甚至過分到主張「從天庭的革命」，憑藉將道德強加在科學之上。因為畢竟，科學家從不猶豫將他們的懷疑主義與道德的無根性，賦加在世界之上」（138段）。在這些演講，榮格建立以認識論作為強烈的道德的基礎，始終保持到他生命的結束。終其一生，他激情洋溢，知識的產物，沒有一樣會被放置超越倫理的考慮之上。這跟早期討論的認識論的倫理的維度息息相關。
Doctoral dissertation
博士論文
As it is known, for this dissertation, Jung wrote an account and analysis of
his observations of a I 5-year-old girl (whom he gave the false initials S.W.)
who, as a medium, held spiritualistic seances. In fact, this girl was Helene
Preiswerk, who was a relative of Jung’s mother. Over a long period
of time, Jung investigated, as a participant observer, not only the content of
the seances but also Helene’s overall progress from an insecure little girl to
a self-assertive mature woman. From an epistemological point of view, the
main features of his doctoral dissertation were the following four.
如眾所周知，為了這篇論文，榮格寫了一篇對於他觀察一位十五歲女孩的描述與精神分析（他給她這個虛擬的名字字首S.W）。作為靈媒，這位女孩擁有精神的通靈能力。事實上，這位女孩是海倫尼、普瑞窩科，她是榮格母親的親戚。有長久一段時間，作為一位參與的觀察者，榮格不但研究這些通靈能力的內容，而且研究海論尼的全面的進展，從一位欠缺安全感的小女孩，到自信主張的成熟的女人。從認識論的觀點，他的博士論文的主要特徵是以下四點：
First, this was one of the first times that Jung, in a professional context,
attempted to look for the meaning behind the external formulations of
verbalisations — the focus of his enquiry (in his dissertation) was beyond the
expressed language of the medium and on the meaning this language had
for her, in her own specific circumstances and context. He did not accept
her alleged communications with spirits at face value, but tried to seek the
meaning they had for Helene in the context of her own development. For
example, he noted that she communicated with certain spirits that were
frivolous and superficial and Jung understood this as Helene’s need to get
in touch with her own childish part which did not have much opportunity
to be actualised. Later, he noted that Helene’s main ‘guide spirit’ became
another one who was a serious, mature and devout person; Jung understood
this as Helene’s need to connect with the ideal personality in her
which was in the making. All this shows how Jung was keen not to get
trapped in the expressed language of the phenomena but to seek the
meaning that language had for the person.
第一，這是首次榮格以專業的內容，企圖尋找意義，在文辭形式的外在闡釋背後。他的研究的焦點（在他的論文裡）是超越這位元靈媒的表達語言，並且集中在這個語言對她的意義，在她自己明確的情境與內涵。他並沒有按照表明說法接受她宣稱的跟靈魂溝通。而是嘗試尋求它們具有的意義，對於海倫尼在她自己成長發展的內涵理。譬如，他注意到，她跟某些任性而浮淺的靈魂溝通。榮格理論這個溝通，作為是海倫尼需要跟她自己的童年的部分保持聯繫，因為那部分並沒有多大機會可以實現。後來，他注意到，海倫尼的主要的引導的靈魂，變成另外一種嚴肅，成熟，及虔誠的人的靈魂。榮格理解這個作為是海倫尼需要跟她自己身上正在形成的人格理想聯繫。所有這一切顯示，榮格渴望不要被套陷在現象的表達語言裡，而是要尋求語言對於那個人的意義。
Second, and closely connected with the above, is Jung’s expressed
primacy of the psychological. To put it simply, Jung was not interested in
whether the spirits existed or not but he was interested in the psychological
meaning and implications of the fact that Helene herself believed that she
was communicating with spirits. This approach was going to become a
characteristic of Jung’s epistemology. Throughout, he emphasised his right
to examine the psychological meaning of the phenomena he was investigating,
regardless of the nature of the phenomena, always believing that he
was not violating the phenomena themselves. By clearly delineating the
psychological angle and meaning of these phenomena, Jung gave himself
the licence to move into any field and examine their psychological implications;
later in his career he was going to follow the same epistemological
approach to investigate phenomena that could come under various other
headings, e.g., ‘insanity’, ‘religion’, ‘politics’, ‘art’, etc. Here, in his doctoral
dissertation, Jung respecting the nature of the phenomena he was investigating
(i.e., spiritualistic), all he was interested in was the psychological
impact they had on Helene.
其次，跟以上密切相關的是榮格的心理學表達的優先性。簡言之，榮格感到興趣的，並不是神靈是否存在，而是這個事實給予的心理的意義與暗示。海倫尼自己相信，她正在跟神靈溝通。這個方法將會變成是榮格認識論的一種特性。從頭到尾，他強調他有權利檢視他正在研究的這些現象的心理的意義。儘管這些現象的性質是什麼，他相信他並沒有違背這些現象的本身。憑藉清楚地描述這些現象的心理角度與意義，榮格給予他自己這個特權，前進到任何領域，並且檢視它們的心理的暗示。在他生涯晚期，他將會遵循相同的認識論的方法，為了研究能夠被放置在各種其它標題之下的現象。譬如，「瘋狂」，「宗教」，「政治」、「藝術」等等。在此，在他的博士論文，榮格關於他正在研究的各種現象的特性（譬如，神靈現象），他所感的興趣的是它們對於海倫尼的心理的影響。
Third, perhaps Jung’s most important theoretical innovation, which was
also of great epistemological value, was his understanding that Helene’s
communications with `spirits’ had a teleological function (Haule 1984;
Papadopoulos 1980). During her mediumistic career, Helene was contacting
different `spirits’ and one of the most important `spirits’ she connected with
was that of a person she called `Ivenes’. It was about Ivenes that Jung said
that she was a `serious’ and `mature person’. Jung observed that by
connecting with Ivenes, Helene `anticipates her own future and embodies in
Ivenes what she wishes to be in twenty years’ time — the assured, wise,
gracious, pious lady’ (Jung 1902: par. 116). This means that Ivenes was for
Helene what Papadopoulos (1980, 1984) called an ‘Anticipated Whole
Other’, in other words, an other personality in her which anticipated her
own wholeness. The important point here is that Jung did not see and
understand psychological phenomena in terms of their pathological meaning
only, he also appreciated that psychological functioning (including even
pathological symptoms) have a certain teleological function, they point to
the purpose and goal of one’s development. Teleology was to remain one of
Jung’s most characteristic elements of his epistemological approach.
第三，或許榮格最重要的理論的創新，也是頗具重大的認識論的價值。那就是他的理解：海倫尼跟「神靈」的溝通，擁有目的論的功用（豪樂 1984年，帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980年）。在她的充當靈媒的生涯，海倫尼跟不同的「神靈」保持聯繫，她保持聯繫的其中一個最重於的「神靈」，是一位被稱為「艾文尼斯」的人的神靈。關於這位艾文尼斯，榮格說：她是一位「嚴肅」而「成熟的人」。榮格觀察到，憑藉跟艾文尼斯聯繫，海倫尼「預期她自己的未來，並將她二十年內，她所希望成為的理想，具體表現在艾文尼斯身上，這位自信，聰明，高雅，虔誠的女士」（榮格1902a年：116段）。這意味著艾文尼斯，對於海倫尼而言，就是帕帕鬥博洛斯（1980，1984）所謂的「被預期的完整他者」。換句話說，一個在她身上的他者的人格，預期她自己的完整性。在此的重點是，榮格並沒有看見與理解心理的現象，僅是用他們病理的意義。他也賞識：心理的功用（甚至包括病理的病徵）具有某種的目的論的功用。它們指向我們自己發展的目的與目標。目的論將始終是榮格最具有特色的因素，對於他的認識論的方法。
Finally, in his research for his doctoral dissertation Jung introduced his
specific method of participant observation which was to become his characteristic
approach to methodology. In the same way that Jung sat in the
spiritualistic seances of Helene’s both as a participant as well as an observer,
so did he continue with the same method in his psychotherapeutic practice
as well as in other scientific investigations. This means that he always valued
that knowledge was produced by experience and in the context of interaction
with others — what modern systemic epistemologists would call ‘coconstruction’
of knowledge (e.g., Coulter 1995; Fulford et al. 2003; Gergen
and Davis 1985; Gergen and Gergen 2003; Glaser and Strauss 1967;
Hermans and Hermans-Jansen 1995; Sarbin 1986; Young 1997).
最後，在他博士論文的研究，榮格介紹參加者觀察到明確的方法。那就是要成為他具有特色的方法論方法。以同樣的方式，在海倫尼的跟神靈的通靈中，榮格既是充當參加者，也是觀察者。如同他繼續相同的方法，在他的心理治療的實踐，以及其他科學的研究。這意味著，他總是重視：知識是由經驗產生，並且是在跟別人互動的情境裡。現代的系統認識論將會稱之為知識的「共同建構」（譬如，考爾特 1995年；弗福德 2003年；喬金1967年；大維斯1985年，喬金與喬金 2003年；格拉色與史特勞斯1967年；赫曼與赫曼、詹森1995年，薩賓1986年，楊格1997年）。
Burgholzli
柏格茲利
During Jung’s period of work at the BurghOlzli psychiatric hospital
(between 1900 and 1909), this famous institution was the centre of pioneering
research. Under the directorship of Professor Eugen Bleuler, the
originator of the term `schizophrenia’, a talented team of international
clinicians and researchers studied psychotic conditions both from academic
research as well as clinical perspectives. First, we will examine the key
epistemological features of Jung’s psychiatric-therapeutic work of this
period and then of his research work.
榮格在柏格茲利精神病院工作的時期（大約1900到1909年），這個著名的機構是開前鋒的研究的中心。在尤金、布魯樂教授的領導下，他是「精神分裂」這個術語的創造者。這是彙集國際臨床醫生與研究人員的智庫團隊。他們研究精神病的情況，從學術的研究以及從臨床的觀點。首先，我們將會檢視關鍵的認識論的特徵，那是榮格在這個時期，從事精神病治療的工作，以及他的研究工作。
Continuing on from his doctoral dissertation, one of Jung’s main concerns
became the search for the meaning of his patients’ verbalisations.
Again, he did not accept that what his patients said was meaningless
because they came from insane people; he did not want to dismiss what they
said as just insane talk. Instead, Jung endeavoured to seek the uniqueness of
their meaning. Even with chronic patients who were `completely demented
and given to saying the craziest things which made no sense at all’ (MDR, p.
147), Jung found meaning in what they were saying, ‘which ‘had hitherto
been regarded as meaningless’ (MI)R, p. 147). For example, one patient
used to wail ‘I am Socrates’ deputy’ and Jung found out (by investigating closely her personality and circumstances) that she ‘was intended to mean:
“I am unjustly accused like Socrates”‘ (MDR, p. 147). Sometimes, by
working actively towards developing an understanding of their language
Jung was able to produce remarkably positive changes, even ‘curing’ them,
like with the schizophrenic old woman that was hearing a voice whom she
called ‘God’s voice’ and Jung told her that “`We must rely on that voice”‘
(MDR, p. 148). By relating to her in a way that was offering not only
validation but also bestowing a certain meaning to the meaninglessness of
her ‘insane’ voices, Jung was able to achieve an ‘unexpected success’ in her
treatment (MDR, p. 148).
從他的博士論文繼續下去，其中榮格的主要關注，變成研究他的病人的文辭表達的意義。除外，他並沒有接受：他病人所說的內容是無意義，只因為它們來自瘋狂的人們。他並不想要排斥他們所說的內容，作為僅是瘋狂的談話。代替的，榮格企圖尋求他們的話語意義的獨特性。甚至對於慢性病人，他們「完全精神散亂」，並且耽溺于胡說八道，根本就不具任何意義（MDR，147頁）。榮格發現意義，在他們所正在說的話裡，「那些話語迄今始終被認為是無意義」（MDR，147頁）。譬如，有一位病人過去經常哀叫「我是蘇格拉底的控訴官」。榮格發現（憑藉仔細研究她的人格與情境），她的本來意思是：「我像蘇格拉底那樣受到不公正的控訴」（MDR，147頁）。有時，憑藉積極的研究，朝向發展對於他們的語言的理解。榮格能夠產生非常傑出的積極改變，甚至是「治療」他們。如同對那位精神分裂的老婦人，她聽到一種聲音，她稱之為善「上帝的聲音」。榮格告訴她，「我們必須依賴那個聲音」（MDR，148頁）。憑藉對於病人的「瘋狂」聲音的無意義，不但證實而且賦予意義，而跟病人產生關聯。榮格能夠對於她的治療，獲得一種「意料之外的成功」（MDR，148頁）。
It is important to acknowledge that the emphasis on meaning was not an
invention of Jung’s, but it was part of the overall ethos and approach
developed by Bleuler. Characteristically, A.A. Brill (the American psychoanalyst
who was also part of that research group at the BurghOlzli) wrote
that the psychiatrists at that institution at the time ‘were not interested in
what the patients said, but in what they meant’ (Brill 1946: 12). This does
not invalidate Jung’s contribution but it provides its context; he was able to
connect this philosophy to his own approach and, most importantly, to
develop it further and reach his unique epistemological positions.
重要的是要承認，對於意義的強調並不是榮格的獨創，而是布魯樂發展的全面性的同情與方法。具有特色地，布瑞爾（美國精神分析家，也是柏格茲利醫院的研究團隊成員）寫道：「當時的那個機構的精神病醫生，「感到興趣的並不是病人說話的內容，而是那些話語的意義」（布瑞爾 1946年，12頁）。這並沒有否定榮格的貢獻，而是提供它的內容。他能夠將這個哲學，跟他自己的方法聯接一塊。最重要的是，更深入地發展它，並且到達他的獨特的認識論的地位。
Word association experiment
字詞聯想的試驗
Many important innovations were introduced at the Burghblzli by the work
with and applications of the word association experiment; although the
concept of ‘complex’ is considered to be the most important one, nevertheless,
there are some significant epistemological elements that also emerged
from this work and which contributed to the formation of Jung’s definition
of a knowing person.
榮格在柏格茲利精神病院介紹許多重要的創新，當他研究及運用字詞聯想的試驗。雖然「情結」的觀念被認為是最重要的觀念。可是，有一些重要的認識論的因素，也從這個研究出現，它們促成榮格形成對「認知的人」這個定義。
To begin with, the actual Word Association Test (WAT) was based on
the psychological school of ‘Associationism’ which, it could said, was a
theory of knowledge, i.e., an epistemology. More specifically, the essence of
Associationism was that our mental activity is based on associations; i.e.,
our knowledge and awareness of things is a product of various combinations
of associations which we have of elements derived from sense
experiences. Philosophers throughout the ages developed and updated
different theories and laws of association — from Plato and Aristotle to
more modern thinkers and psychologists. In psychology, associationism
entered via Harvey (1705-1757), Galton (1822-1911) and Wundt (1832-
1920). Although Galton and Wundt examined word association as part of
their investigations into the field of cognitive functioning, it was Kraepelin
(1856-1926), an earlier superintendent at the BurghEilzli hospital, who
developed the actual WAT and Jung eventually was appointed (by Bleuler)
in charge of the programme using this research tool. The Burghblzli preoccupation
with the WAT was not theoretical but applied to abnormal
psychology; they were interested in understanding the mechanisms involved
in the ‘schizophrenic’ mind. Bleuler’s main contribution in renaming
`dementia praecox’ by introducing a new term (`schizophrenia’) meant that
this condition does not create a ‘premature deterioration’ but it involves an
actual split within the patient’s personality and functioning. The WAT was
used, in effect, to study the way the schizophrenic patients developed their
perception and knowledge in order to trace the way the ‘split personality’
functions. Their responses to the stimulus words were analysed according
to various categories (semantic, phonetic, syntactical and grammatical) and,
experimentally, it was possible to identify that inner split. This was found in
terms of discerning various themes that formed coherent wholes in the body
of their responses. More specifically, Jung found in the responses that
certain clusters of ideas and thoughts with a degree of emotional charge
formed distinct entities which he termed ‘complexes’. Jung did not invent
this term but he gave it this specific research definition: ‘An emotionally
charged complex of ideas becomes so predominant in an individual and has
such a profound influence that it forms a large number of constellations .. .
all referring to this complex of ideas’ (Jung and Riklin 1904: 82). But such a
nucleus, a centre in oneself that generated an independent perception and
knowledge of things, in effect, represented another ‘mind’ within an
individual. As Jung put it later,
首先，實際的「字詞聯想測驗」（WAT），是以「聯想主義」的心理學派作為基礎。這個學派能夠被說是一種知識的理論，譬如，認識論。更明確地說，聯想主義的本質就是：我們的精神活動以聯想作為基礎。譬如，我們對事情的知識與知覺，就是各種聯想的組合，我們從感官經驗獲得的各種因素的聯想。自古以來，哲學家發展並且提升聯想到不同的理論與法則—從柏拉圖與亞裡斯多德，到更現代的思想家與心理學家。在心理學，聯想主義進入，是憑藉哈威（1705-1757年），噶爾頓（1822-1911年），與溫得特（1832-1920年）。雖然噶爾頓與溫得特檢視字詞聯想，作為是他們在柏格茲利精神醫院，研究認知功能的領域的部分，科瑞皮林（1856-1926年），是在柏格茲利精神醫院的早期主管，他發展這實際的字詞聯想測驗。榮格最後受到布魯樂任命來負責使用這個工具的這個計畫。柏格茲利醫院專注研究字詞聯想測驗，並非是理論性質，而是要應用到異常心理學。他們感到興趣的，是要理解跟「精神分裂」的心靈有關的機制。布魯樂的主要的貢獻，在於重新命名「精神散亂症」（dementia praecox），憑藉介紹一個新的術語「精神分裂症」（schizophrenia）。這個術語的意思是這種情況並沒有創造「早熟的惡化」，但是它牽涉到一種實際的分裂，在病人的人格與功能。「字詞聯想測驗」實際上被使用來研究，精神分裂病人發展他們的感知與知識的這個方式，為了要追蹤「分裂人格」運作的方式。他們對於刺激字詞的回應被分析，依照各種的範疇（語意、語音、句法與文法）。然後試驗性地，他們可能辨認出那種內部的分裂。這種內部分裂被發現，使用各種主題的辨識。這些主題在他們回應的身體形成一貫的整體。更加明確地說，榮格在這些回應裡發現，某些觀念與思想的彙集，帶有某種程度的情感的負荷，會形成清楚的實體，他給予它「情結」這個術語。榮格並沒有發明這個術語，而是給予它這個明確的研究的定義：「觀念帶有情感負荷的情結，在個人身上變得是如此的支配性，並且擁有如此深刻的影響，以致于它形成許多的心理情意叢、、一切都提到觀念的這個情結」榮格與李克林 1904：82頁）。但是這樣一種核心，在它本身的中心產生事情的一種獨立的感知與知識。實際上，它代表在個人內部的另外一種「心靈」。如同榮格後來表達它，
We are, therefore, justified in regarding the complex as somewhat a small
secondary mind, which deliberately (though unknown to consciousness)
drives at certain intentions which are contrary to the conscious intentions
of the individual.
(Jung 1911: par. 1352)
我們因此能夠自圓其說，將情結視為是一種相當微小的次要心靈。這個次要心靈刻意地（雖然意識並不知道）驅使朝向某些的意圖。這些意圖跟個人的意識的意圖恰恰相反。
Therefore, from an epistemological perspective, Jung’s theory of complexes
enabled him to appreciate that the knowing subject is not a unified entity
but it is divided by the various complexes that grip the person. Thus,
the complexes created a divided knowing subject according to the various
thematical divisions that the complexes formed. This means that by grasping
the essential nature of psyche’s dissociability (Papadopoulos 1980), Jung
was able to increase substantially the complexity of his epistemological
grasp of human nature.
因此，從認識論的觀點，榮格的情結的理論讓他能夠賞識：認知的主體並不是一位元統一的實體，而是受到掌控這個人的各種情結分裂。因此，這些情結創造出一位分裂的認知的主體，依照這些情結形成的各種的主題的分裂。這意味著，憑藉理解心靈的分離的基本特性（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980年），榮格能夠實質上增加認識論對於人類天性理解的複雜性。
‘my scientific premises ..
「我的科學的假設、、、」
It is now possible to return to the questions asked above, in connection with
Jung’s identification of his differences from Freud. To be reminded, in
his letter to his older colleague at the end of 1906, Jung identified three
differences: their ‘upbringing’, ‘milieu’ and ‘scientific premises’. By ‘scientific
premises’, in the context of their respective work, Jung must have meant the specific ways each one of them defined their subject matter and went about
investigating it, i.e., their epistemology and methodology. More specifically,
by ‘scientific premises’ Jung must have referred to the way they answered
questions such as: what constituted evidence for their investigations? How
did they know that they had arrived at knowing something? How did they
construe their knowing subjects?
現在，我們可能回到以上所問的問題，關於榮格辨認他跟弗洛依德的差異。讓我提醒一下，在1906年，寫給他年長的同事的信，榮格辨認出三個差異：他們的「教養」，「環境」與「科學的假設」。所謂的「科學的假設」，在他們各別的研究的內涵裡，榮格當時一定意味著，他們每個人定義他們的主體事物的方式，並且從事研究它。譬如，他們的認識論與方法論。更明確地說，所謂「科學的假設」，榮格當時一定提到他們回答問題的方式，譬如，是什麼組成他們研究的證據？他們如何知道，他們已經到達知道某件東西？他們如何解釋他們認知的主體？
Initially, the reader would be puzzled to read that Jung even before he
had developed a close relationship and collaboration with Freud (by the
end of 1906), he wrote about his ‘scientific premises’ in a way that conveyed
a certain conviction that he had already formed such ‘scientific premises’
and, moreover, stating that they were different from those of Freud’s.
However, the same reader would not be puzzled anymore after reading
the outline of Jung’s achievements and established epistemological and
methodological positions which he had already reached by the end of 1906.
Although the correspondence between the two men started only that year
(1906) and they did not meet in person until a couple of months later
(February 1907), Jung’s letter (of December 1906) conveys with clarity his
firm belief that their ‘scientific premises’ were different. In short, Jung’s
assertion about their differences suggests the following:
起初，讀者將會感到困惑，當他們閱讀到，榮格甚至在他發展跟弗洛依德的密切關係與合作之前（在1906年底），他寫到關於他的「科學的假設」，傳遞某種的信念：他已經形成如此「科學的假設」。而且，陳述它們不同於弗洛依德的科學的假設。可是，相同的讀者將不再會感到困惑，當他已經閱讀榮格的成就的輪廓之後，並且已經建立認識論與方法論的立場，在1906年結束之前，他已經到達這樣的立場。雖然兩人之間的通信僅是那年（1906年）開始。直到兩三個月後（1907年2月），他們才當面會見。榮格的信（1906年12月）清楚地傳遞他的堅定的信念：他們的「科學的假設」是不同的。總之，榮格關於他們的差異的主張暗示如下：
1 Jung was aware of the relevance of epistemological and methodological
principles (i.e., ‘scientific premises’) in analytical theory and
practice.
2 This awareness was developed well before he met with Freud and,
therefore, it was not connected directly with Freudian psychoanalysis.
3 The usual version of their professional relationship, which both
Jung and Freud originated and perpetuated, i.e., that Jung started
as a mere disciple of Freud’s is not accurate as it is not supported by
the evidence that these observations in this chapter provide. This
means that their version of events must have been developed for
other, possibly psychological reasons, related to the dynamics of
their personal relationship.
(Papadopoulos 1980, 1984)
一、 榮格知道認識論與方法論原則的息息相關（譬如，「科學的假設」），在精神分析理論與實踐。
二、 就在他跟弗洛依德會面之前，這個知覺已經充分發展。因此，它跟弗洛依德的精神分析，並沒有直接的關係。
三、 他們的專業的關係的通常說法，榮格與弗洛依德兩人都開始並延續他們的專業的關係。榮格開始僅是作為弗洛依德的學生，這種說法並不正確，因為這個章節的觀察提供的證據並沒有支援這點。這意味著，這些事件的說法會被流傳，是因為另外，可能是心理的理由，跟他們私人的關係的動態有關係。
Therefore, in the light of this analysis of these observations, it would be
difficult to accept the accuracy of Jung’s dramatic assessment which he
wrote in his autobiography, referring to his break with Freud:
因此，從這些觀察的這個分析的觀點，我們將會很難接受榮格戲劇性地評估的正確性。他在他的自傳寫到的戲劇性評估，提到他跟弗洛依德的決裂。
When I parted from Freud, I knew that I was plunging into the
unknown. Beyond Freud, after all, I knew nothing; but I had taken the
step into darkness.
(MDR, p. 225)
當我跟弗洛依德的分道揚鑣時，我知道我正在投入未知。畢竟，除了弗洛依德之外，我茫然不知所從。但是，我已經踩上這一步，走入黑暗。
These strong words ‘unknown’, ‘nothing’ and ‘darkness’ do not correspond
with the evidence that Jung, even before meeting Freud, had established
clear epistemological positions, and, moreover, they contradict his own
position that was conveyed succinctly in his letter of December 1906. Thus,
these words can be puzzling, especially if we take into consideration that his
subsequent work (after 1906) did not produce substantial deviations from
these epistemological positions; in the following years, Jung introduced,
indeed, many important theoretical developments, but in terms of his basic
epistemology and methodology, he did not deviate much from the foundations
that he had laid by 1906. Why, then, did Jung keep to this false
version of events, still writing about them in such a categorical tone nearly
half a century later? Why did he keep on perpetuating this myth? In
addition to the psychological reasons (which can be extremely powerful and
with long-lasting effects), it is possible that Jung retained this conviction
because it was based on some partial truth, or at least on something
paradoxical.
這些強烈的文字「未知」「茫然不知所從」「黑暗」並沒有對應這個證據：即使在跟弗洛依德會面之前，榮格已經建立清楚的認識論的立場。而且，他們互相牴觸，跟1906年12月的信，他自己簡明傳遞的立場。因此，這些文字有時是令人困惑的，特別是，假如我們考慮到，他隨後的研究（在1906年之後），並沒有產生實質上的偏離，跟這些認識論的立場。在隨後的幾年，榮格確實產生許多重要的理論的發展，但是用他的基本的認識論與方法論的術語，他並沒有過分偏離這些基礎，在1906年之前，他已經奠定的基礎。那麼，為什麼榮格保持事件的這種虛假的說法呢？他依舊寫到關於他們，在半個世紀之後，用如此毫無保留的語調？為什麼他繼續延續這種神話？除了心理的理由（有時是極端強烈，而且持續很久的影響）。這是可能的，榮格保留這個信念，因為它以某個部分的真理作基礎，或至少，以某件悖論的事情作基礎。
One way of understanding this puzzle is to accept that Jung’s strong
words about his (alleged) total ignorance after his break with Freud may
refer to another perspective from which Jung saw his own work: it was
argued elsewhere (Papadopoulos 1980, 1984) that during the period of his
association with Freud (Jung’s ‘psychoanalytic period’) and after his break
with Freud (in 1913) there was a disjuncture between Jung’s epistemology
and his own actual theories; it was only later that Jung was able to develop
theories which fitted more appropriately to his already established epistemology.
This means that Jung’s epistemology preceded his theories. More
specifically, during his association with Freud, by and large, Jung went
overboard to accept and adopt the Freudian version of psychoanalysis as
his own, despite the fact that he did not feel satisfied with it; the fit between
his epistemology and the Freudian psychoanalysis was not a good one.
Jung felt uncomfortable about this and eventually parted ways from Freud
and gradually developed his own language that corresponded better with
his already set ‘inclinations’ and epistemological positions.
理解這個謎團的一個方法，就是接受：關於在跟弗洛依德的決裂之後，榮格宣稱的完全無知，他強烈的措辭是提到另外一個觀點。榮格從這個觀點來看待他自己的研究。別的地方，有人主張（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980年，1984年），在他跟弗洛依德來往的期間（榮格的精神分析的時期），以及他跟弗洛德的決裂之後（在1913年），在榮格的認識論與他自己的實際的理論之間，有一個中斷。僅是在後來，榮格才能夠發展更加貼切地適合他自己建立的認識論的理論。這意味著，榮格的認識論早於他的理論存在。更加明確地說，在他跟弗洛依德的來往期間，大體上，榮格積極地接受並且採用弗洛依德的精神分析的說法，作為他自己的說法。儘管這個事實：他對它並沒有感到滿意。在他的認識論與弗洛依德的精神分析之間的調和並不是很順暢。關於這點，榮格感覺很不自在。最後，他跟弗洛依德分道揚鑣，並且逐漸發展他自己的語言。這種語言更加順暢地對應他已經建立的「傾向」於認識論的立場。
Therefore, this version of accounting for the discrepancy between Jung’s
letter of December 1906 and his categorical assessment (in his autobiography)
about the ‘darkness’ he had stepped into after he left Freud, is
based on a distinction between Jung’s epistemology (which was the sum of
his ‘scientific assumptions’, which formed the foundations of his approach,
and which were, in fact, his `natural’ `inclination’ as to how he approached
his work both theoretically and practically) and his ‘official’ theoretical
positions (which referred to the theories that he espoused and identified
prokssionally with). Once such a distinction is made, it is then possible to
understand the contradiction between his letter of 1906 (claiming that he
had clear positions, and they were different from those of Freud’s) and his
writing in his autobiography (that after Freud he knew nothing). In other words, Jung was not telling a truth in his autobiography — he was
referring to his explicit theoretical formulations which could identify his
professional positions, whereas in his 1906 letter he was referring to his
epistemology.
因此，在1906年榮格的信，與他在自傳毫無保留地評估，當他離開弗洛依德之後，他步入的黑暗，解釋兩者之間的差異的說法，是以這個區別作為基礎。榮格的認識論與他的「官方的」理論的立場之間的區別。榮格的認識論上他的「科學的假設」的總和，形成他的研究的基礎，事實上，是他「天性的」傾向，關於他如何在理論與實踐接近他的研究。他的「官方的」立場，則是提到他闡釋並且在專業上認同的理論。一旦這個區別弄清楚，我們才有可能理解這個悖論，在1906年的信與他自傳的書寫他離開弗洛依德後茫然不知所從的悖論。這封信宣稱他擁有清楚的立場，這些立場跟弗洛依德的立場不同。換句話說，榮格在他的自傳，有點過分渲染—他提到他的明確的理論的闡釋，能夠辨認他的專業的立場。而在他1906年的信，他提到他的認識論。
A comparable distinction between Jung’s ‘official theoretical language’
and his own personal ‘inclination’ was made elsewhere (Papadopoulos 1980,
1984, 2002), where Jung’s ‘inclination’ was articulated in more detail. More
specifically, in those studies, Jung’s official language was understood to be
the result of his professional ‘persona’, which he felt it was important for
him to maintain; in addition (and in contrast), Jung had another perspective
on his work which was his epistemological inclination and which was
informed by another problematic that was driving his theoretical and
professional development. That perspective (his epistemology) was identified
as his ‘problematic of the other’ which referred to his intense interest in
the dissociability of the psyche, i.e., in the way various forms of ‘othernesses’
were active in one’s personality and the ways these ‘others’ interrelated
among themselves and also related to the main body of the
personality, to the outside world and to wider collective structures
(Papadopoulos 1980, 1984, 2002). In effect, the first two studies
(Papadopoulos 1980, 1984)
在榮格的「官方的理論的語言」，與他的私人的「傾向」之間，有一個可比較的區別，在其他地方被區別（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980，1984，2002年）。在那裡，榮格的「傾向」更加詳細地被表達。更加明確地，在那些研究，榮格的官方的語言被理解作為是他的專業的「人格面具」的結果。他感覺到他維持這個人格面具是重要的。除外，（作為對比），榮格對於他的工作還有另外一個觀點，那就是他的認識論的傾向於專業的發展。那個觀點，也就是他的認識論，被辨認當著是「他者的難題」。那是提到他對於心靈的解離的強烈的興趣。「他者」的各種形式，在一個人的人格裡活動的方式，這些「他者」彼此互相牽扯到方式，而且息息相關，跟人格的主體，跟外在的世界，跟更加寬廣的結構（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980，1984，2002年）。實際上，前面兩種研究（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980，1984年）。
proposed a new reading of Jung which was based on the hypothesis
that the Jungian opus could be appreciated more fully if it were to be
seen as a series of progressive reformulations of his understanding of
the Other.
(Papadopoulos 2002: 170)
建議對榮格的新式閱讀，以這個假設作為基礎：榮格的全部著作能夠更加完整地被賞識，假如我們想要將它視為是一系列的進展過程，闡釋他對他者的理解。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 2002：170頁）
It was argued that Jung’s theoretical development was based on these
progressive reformulations of the Other
from animistic external Other objects [of his childhood, e.g., his ‘own’
fire, his ‘own’ stone, his ‘own’ pebble and carved manikin] to a rather
unsophisticated, global internal Other (No. 2 personality), and then
from intrapsychic individual functions (complexes) to more collective
forms of structuring principles (symbols). The Other-as-archetype
represents the pinnacle of Jung’s theoretical endeavours as it offers a
structuring principle which is also connected with broader cultural and
societal perspectives. This reformulation represented a dialectic between
the internal and external, specific/individual and general/collective,
personal/intrapsychic and societal/symbolic.
(Papadopoulos 2002: 170)
有人主張，榮格的理論的發展的基礎，就是對於他者的這些進展過程的重新闡釋。
從生動的外在的他者客體（有關他的童年，譬如，他自己的火，他自己的石頭，他自己的小石子與雕刻的木偶），到相當粗糙的全球性的內在的他者（二號人格）。然後，從心靈內部的個人的功能（情結），到更加集體的架構原則（象徵）的形式。他者作為原型，代表榮格的理論的企圖的登峰造極。因為它提供一個架構的原則，跟更加廣泛的文化與社會的觀點，也息息相關。這種闡釋呈現一種辯證法：內在與外在之間，明確或個人，與一般或集體之間，個人或心靈內部，與社會或象徵之間。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 2002：170頁）
Not only did that approach offer a new ‘reading’ of Jung which combined
almost seamlessly his personal life and preoccupations along with his
professional curiosity and career in the context of wider intellectual debates
at his time, but also it laid the foundations for an understanding of Jung
based on his epistemological astuteness. In other words, the best possible
way of understanding the nature of his ‘problematic of the other’ is in terms
of it forming a basis for comprehending the dynamics of the knowing
subject, i.e., in terms of epistemology. By endeavouring to dissect the
various structures and discourses that inform a person to reach a knowing
position, Jung was, in fact, developing an epistemological stance. This
means that when Jung was referring to his ‘scientific premises’ he was
referring to his epistemological ‘inclination’ and his ‘problematic of the
other’ both of which were developed to a considerable degree before even
he had met Freud, and before he was exposed to Freud’s psychoanalytic
theories. Moreover, it was argued that Jung’s initial attraction to Freud was
based on his assumption that Freud shared the same problematic with him,
i.e., had similar epistemological premises. Epistemologically speaking, that
was the reason why Jung joined the psychoanalytic movement, hoping to
find a more appropriate theoretical language for his own epistemological
inclinations. However, when he realised that this was not happening, he left
Freud and endeavoured to develop his own psychology which would be
more congruent with his already well-developed epistemology.
那種方法不但提供對於榮格的新的閱讀方式。這種方式幾乎天衣無縫地聯接他的私人的生活與專注，跟他的專業的好奇心與事業，在他當代的更寬廣的爭論的內涵。而且，這種方式也奠定理解榮格的這個基礎，以他的認識論的洞察力作為基礎。換句話說，理解榮格的「他者的難題」的特性的最佳方式，是使用它的術語來形成基礎，用以理解認知的主體的活動力。譬如，用認識論的術語。憑藉企圖來解剖各種的結構與告知人的辭說，為了到達一個認知的立場。事實上，榮格正在發展一種認識論的態度。這意味著，當榮格正提到他的「科學的假設」，他是提到他的認識論的「傾向」與「對他者的難題」。這兩者被發展到相當的程度，甚至在他會見弗洛依德之前，在他接受弗洛依德的精神分析的理論之前。而且，有人主張，榮格最初受到弗洛依德的吸引，是以他的假設作為基礎：弗洛依德跟他共有相同的難題。譬如，他擁有相同等認識論假設。從認識論而言，那就是那個理由，為什麼榮格加入精神分析的運動，他希望找到一個更加適當的理論的語言，給他自己的認識論的傾向。可是，當他體會到，這樣的事情並沒有發生，他離開弗洛依德，並且企圖發展他自己的心理學。那跟他已經充分發展的認識論，會更加調和。
This reading of Jung’s differentiation between his epistemology (which
was more basic) and his theoretical formulations (which developed later in
his life) offers the means to understand the phrase ‘Jung before Freud’
which was introduced later (cf. Taylor 1998; Shamdasani 2003).
這種閱讀榮格的區分他的認識論（更加基本），與他的理論的闡釋（在他後來的發展）。這種閱讀提供工具來理解後來被介紹的這個詞語：「弗洛依德之前的榮格」（請參照泰勒 1998年；薩達撒尼 2003年）
Although this distinction (between his epistemology and the main body
of his theories) resolves the puzzle of the discrepancy between Jung’s letter
of 1906 and his statements in his autobiography, it still leaves something
unclear. Why was Jung not fully aware of this distinction? On the one hand,
he had a remarkable clarity about the importance of his epistemology and
on the other hand, he seemed to be ambivalent about it. This was perhaps
due to his fear that if he was to emphasise too much the epistemological
nature of his theories he could have been considered as a philosopher and
thus dismissed for not being a serious `scientist’—psychologist which he
wanted to be seen as, in order to gain respectability for his work. Another
possibility is that Jung may have taken his epistemology for granted, almost
as his ‘inclination’ and, therefore, as different from (and of lesser importance
than) the main body of his theoretical work; according to this perspective,
Jung did not consider his epistemology of great importance in its
own right, as a free-standing contribution. Certainly, at that time, there was
no explicit field of epistemology of psychotherapy to assist him in appreciating
the significance of his positions.
雖然這種區別（處於他的認識論與他的主要理論體系之間）解決這個謎團，處於榮格1906年的信，與他在自傳遞陳述之間的差異的謎團。它依舊留下某件沒有澄清的東西。榮格難道並不知道這種區別？在一方面，他對於認識論的重要性，清澈明白。另一方面，他對它似乎又是模棱曖昧。這或許是由於他的恐懼：假如他想要過分強調他的理論的認識論特性，他本來會被認為是一位哲學家，因此會被排斥，因為作為「科學家」不夠嚴謹。他是想要被看待是一位心理學家，為了讓他的研究獲得尊敬。另外一個可能性是，榮格當時可能是將他的認識論視為是理所當然，幾乎是作為他的「傾向」。因此，作為不同于或次要於，他的理論研究的主要體系。依照這個觀點，榮格並沒有認為，他的認識論本身就是非常重要，作為是一種獨立自主的貢獻。的確，在當時，並沒有心理治療學的認識論的明確領域，可以幫忙他賞識他的立場的重要性。
Finally, returning to the December 1906 letter, it is also important to
appreciate that by grouping all the three differences together ‘upbringing’,
‘milieu’ and ‘scientific premises’, Jung demonstrated that, even at that
early time, he was aware that the ‘scientific premises’ are not unrelated to
one’s own personal history (upbringing’) as well as to the wider, collective
contexts (milieu). This is another important insight that he retained
throughout: one’s epistemology is not an abstract theoretical construct but
is embedded in one’s individual and collective realities.
最後，回到1906年12月的信，我們也應該賞識到：榮格憑藉將「教養」「環境」與「科學的假設」的這三種差異聚攏一塊，他證明，即使在那個早年時期，他就知道，「科學的假設」並非沒有關聯，跟他自己的私人的歷史（教養），以及更加廣泛的集體的內涵（環境）。這是另外一種他始終保持的重要的洞察力：我們的認識論並不是一個抽象的理論的建構，而是被鑲嵌在一個人的私人與集體的現實裡。
Later writings and work
晚期的著作與研究
Although Jung’s basic epistemological positions were established by 1906,
nevertheless there are some additional insights that contributed to the
development of the final epistemological model of his psychology. These
include the following:
雖然榮格基本的認識論的立場，在1906年建立，可是還有一些額外的洞察，促成他的心理學的最後認識論模式的發展。這些模式包括底下：
• the collective dimension of knowledge
• teleology: knowledge in the making
• an epistemology of archetypal teleology.
集體的知識維度
目的論：正在進行中的知識
原型目的論的認識論
The collective dimension of knowledge
集體的知識維度
During his lecturing visit to the United States with Freud in September
1909, in one of his presentations at Clark University (in Worcester,
Massachusetts), Jung returned to a piece of research he had conducted with
his student Dr Emma Furst. He had already published a paper on the
subject two years earlier (Jung 1907) and, again, he included material from
the same study in his Tavistock Lectures more than a quarter of a century
later (Jung 1935b). That study offers a clue to the development of Jung’s
understanding of one of his most significant epistemological insights.
1909年，榮格跟隨弗洛依德到美國，從事演講訪問。在科拉克大學的一場演講中（在麻薩諸塞州的窩色特），榮格回溯他曾經主導的一場研究，跟他的學生艾瑪、福斯特。早先兩年（榮格1907年），他已經出版一篇論文探討這個主題。而且，超過二十五年後，他包括相同的他的研究的材料，在他於塔維投克的演講（榮格 1935b年）。這個研究提供線索，對於榮格理解的發展，理解他的最重要的其中一個認識論的洞察。
The study, included in Jung’s Collected Works as ‘The family constellation’
(1909), addresses one application of the WAT. Jung and Fiirst
administered the WAT to all members of twenty-four families. The two
researchers analysed the obtained responses according to the existing
logical-linguistic criteria’ (Jung 1909: par. 1000) which Jung had developed
from previous modifications (Jung and Riklin 1904). The findings showed
that the differences between and among the response patterns of individual
members of a family were not random but occurred in a regular and
predictable fashion; they showed that statistically, there were remarkable
similarities between the patterns of responses among certain subgroupings
within families. More specifically, the results showed that children’s
responses were more similar to their mothers’ rather than to their fathers’
associations, and that mothers’ associations were more similar to their
daughters’ rather than to their sons’ associations.
這個研究，被收入「榮格全集」，作為是「家庭的情意叢」（1909年），它處理「字詞聯想測驗」的應用。榮格與福斯特將「字詞聯想測驗」運用到二十四個家庭的所有的成員。這兩位研究員分析所獲得的反應，依照現存的「邏輯與語言的標準」（榮格1909年：1000段）。榮格曾經從先前的修正發展過來（榮格與李克林 1904年）。這些發現顯示，家庭的各別成員的反應模式之間的差異，並不是隨便發生，而是以規律並且可預測的方式。它們顯示，從統計數字而言，會有明顯的類同，在家庭中的次級團體的模式。更加明確地說，這些結果顯示，小孩的反應更加類同他們的母親的反應，而不是類同他們父親的聯想。母親的聯想更加類同她們的女兒的聯想，而不是類同她們兒子的聯想。
The significance of these results is even greater if one appreciates that
this did not happen as a result of] simple repetition of similar words by
different members of the family, due to the given habits or family
culture within each family.
(Papadopoulos 1996: 131)
這些結果的重要性甚至更大，假如我們賞識到，發生這種情況，並不是由於家庭的不同成員，對相同字詞的簡單地重複，而是由於在每個家庭之內的特定習慣或家庭習慣。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：131頁）
As Jung put it, ‘the daughter shares her mother’s way of thinking, not only
in her ideas but also in her form of expression’ (1909: par. 1005); in fact,
what is of more relevance is not the shared ‘form of expression’, which can
be a product of learning, but the fact that certain members of the same
family share the same ‘way of thinking’. This means that these research
findings require a closer examination.
如同榮格所說，「女兒分享她的母親的思維方式，不但在她的觀念，而且在她表達的形式」（1909年：1005頁）。事實上，更加息息相關的，並不是這個分享的「表達的形式」，那有時是學習的產物。而是這個事實：相同的家庭的某些成員分享相同的「思維方式」。這意味著，這些研究的發現要求更加仔細的檢查。
The categories of logical-linguistic criteria’ into which the responses were
grouped included ‘relations of the verb to the subject’, ‘definition’, ‘contrast’,
‘simple predicate’, ‘predicate expressing a personal judgment’, etc.
In other words, these criteria were not addressing superficial similarities;
the results were showing how frequently each subject offered a response
to the stimulus word that defined it, or was its contrast, etc. This means
that the results were showing the pattern of each person’s tendency to
perceive and structure external stimuli and how they construed logically
and linguistically their perceptions. These are not ways that one can copy
from another person; these are deeply ingrained mechanisms that convey
one’s unique ways of cognitive structuring. In effect, this research indicated
that within families there must be certain formations that are ‘organising
structures which are collectively shared’ (Papadopoulos 1996: 130). These
`shared unconscious structures’ affect the ways that family members structure
their perceptions, knowledge, relationships and overall psychological
realities. These formations ‘could be termed the Collective Structures of
Meaning (CSM). This meaning, of course, is not given but is immanent and
potential’ (Papadopoulos 1996: 136).
這些反應被聚攏成為「邏輯與語言的標準」的範疇，包括「動詞跟主詞的關係」、「定義」、「對比」、「簡單述詞」、「表達個人判斷的述詞」、等等。換句話說，這些標準並不是在處理浮面的各種類同。這些結果正在顯示，每位元主體經常地提供對於刺激字詞的反應，這個刺激字詞定義它，或是它的對照，等等。這意味著，這些結果正在顯示這個模式：每個人的感知與架構外在刺激的傾向的模式。以及他們如何從邏輯與語言來詮釋他們的感知。這些並不是我們能夠從另外一個人模仿的方式。這些是根深蒂固的機制，傳遞為民獨特的認知架構。事實上，這個研究指示，在家庭之內，一定會有某些的形成正在「組織集體分享的結構」（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：130頁）。這些「分享的無意識結構」影響到這些方式，家庭成員架構他們的感知，知識，人際關係，與全面性的心理的現實。這些形成「能夠稱之為意義的集體結構（CSM）。當然，這個意義並沒有給予，而是內在本質與潛在」（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：136頁）。
Jung was at pains to interpret their research findings. In his 1909 paper,
evidently puzzled by their findings, he
榮格相當費心來解釋這個研究的發現。在他1909年的論文，當他顯而易見是對這些發現感到困惑，他說：
was unable to offer any plausible explanation for these phenomena.
Instead, he struggled to fit them within the context of a psychoanalytic
language and attributed them to the ‘determining influence’ of the
’emotional environment constellated during infancy’ (Jung 1909: par.
1009).
（Papadopoulos 1996：131）
他不能夠對於這些現象，提供任何合理的解釋。代替的，他費力地將它們套置在精神分析語言的內涵裡面，並且將它們歸屬於這個「決定性的影響」：在嬰孩時期集結而成的情感的環境」（榮格1909年：1009段）。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：1009頁）
On the basis of that research, Jung felt justified to acknowledge ‘the
determining influence of the family background on [the children’s] destiny’
(1909: par. 1009), but at that time, confined within his psychoanalytic
theoretical framework, he understood that ‘background’ only in terms of
‘the emotional environment constellated during infancy’ (Jung 1909: par.
1009). In other words, Jung was able to identify only those elements of
these research findings which titled within his existing psychoanalytic
theory, but he must have felt at odds with the underlying ‘causal-reductive’
epistemology of this piece of psychoanalytic interpretation. As it has been
shown, Jung had already a well-developed teleological epistemology.
根據那個研究的基礎，榮格感覺自圓其說地承認「家庭背景對於孩童的命運的決定性影響」（1909年：1009頁），但是在當時，由於被限制於他的精神分析的理論的框架，他理解到那個背景，僅是憑藉「嬰孩時期集結而成的情感的環境」（榮格1909年：1009段）。換句話說，榮格僅能夠辨認這些研究發現的那些因素，被列在他現有的精神分析理論的標題裡。但是他當時一定曾經感覺到格格不入，跟這篇精神分析解釋，作為基礎的「因果還原法」的認識論，如同眾所周知，榮格已經擁有一個成熟發展的目的論的認識論。
This means that the family WAT research must have exposed the implications
of Jung’s distinction between his underlying epistemology and his
`official’ theoretical positions; the latter were confined within the Freudian
psychoanalytic model and, therefore, were unable to render fully intelligible
these findings. More specifically, according to Freudian psychoanalysis,
unconscious interactions between people had to be based on projections of
one’s unconscious material onto another’s; there was no room for ‘shared’
unconscious structures, as this research suggested. Still, evidently unconvinced
by the causal-reductive interpretation of his findings, at the end of
the paper Jung admits the limitations of his theory (i.e., psychoanalytic
theory) and writes: ‘We are as yet a long way from general precepts and
rules’ and, most uncharacteristically, he resorts to extolling the virtues of
psychoanalysis like a naive and fervent neophyte: ‘Only psychoanalyses like
the one published by Professor Freud in our Jahrbuch, 1909, will help us
out of this difficulty’ (Jung 1909: par. 1014).
這意味著，這個家庭的「字詞聯想測驗」當時一定曾經揭露這個暗示：榮格區別他作為基礎的認識論，與他「官方的」理論的立場。後者被限制在弗洛依德學派的精神分析的模式，因此不能夠將這些發現完整地讓人明白。更加明確地說，依照弗洛依德學派的精神分析，處於人際之間的無意識的互動，必須要以自己的無意識的材料，投射到另一個人的無意識材料作為基礎。並沒有「共同分享」的無意識結構的空間，如同這個研究顯示。可是，榮格顯然並沒有深信他的發現的因果還原法的解釋，在論文的結尾，他承認他的理論的限制（譬如，精神分析理論）並且寫道：「我們距離一般的信條與規則，還很遙遠」。而且違背他的特性，榮格訴諸於稱讚精神分析，就像是一位天真而狂熱的改變信仰者：「只有像弗洛依德教授于1909年，在我們的年監雜誌出版的這個精神分析，才會幫助我們脫離這個困難（榮格1909年：1014段）。
These findings are of tremendous importance because ‘By discovering the
. . . patterns of logico-linguistic structuring within pairs in families, Jung, de
facto, had discovered the intrapsychic interconnection within families as well
as the various subgroupings or subsystems’ within families (Papadopoulos
1996: 131). From an epistemological point of view, Jung’s accidental discoveries
in the family WAT research, in effect, indicate that the knowing
subject is not just an independent being arriving at knowledge exclusively on
the basis of his or her own independent experience. In addition, there are
at least two more sources of potential knowledge: first, the interactional and
relational patterns of experience; these include the family interactions
and transactions as well as the network of inter-projections of unconscious
material between members of the same family as well as with the wider sociocultural
environment (including what Jung termed ’emotional environment’),
and second, the ‘shared unconscious structures’; these are structures
that are not projected by one person onto another but, nevertheless, are
affecting certain subgroups within families. These must be structures of a
‘collective’ nature that contribute to one’s creation of sense and the formation
of knowledge
這些發現非常重要，因為「憑藉發現在家庭裡的配對的邏輯與語言架構的模式，榮格事實上曾經發現這個心靈內部的互相關聯，在家庭之內，以及在家庭之內的各種次級團體或次級系統」（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：131頁）。從認識論的觀點，榮格在「家庭的字詞聯想測驗」的意外地發現，實際上指示著：認知的主體並不僅是一位獨立的個體，完全憑藉他或她自己獨立的經驗，來獲得知識。除外，至少還有另外兩個潛在知識的來源：第一、經驗的互動與相關的模式。這些包括家庭的互動與運作，以及無意識材料的內部投射的網路，在相同家庭的成員與更加寬廣的社會與文化的環境（包括榮格所謂的「情感的環境」）。第二、「共同分享的無意識的結構」。這些結構並不是由一個人投射到另外一個人。可是，它們正在影響家庭之內的某些次級團體。這些結構一定是屬於「集體的」性質，促成一個人對於知識的理解與形成。
This paper (of 1909) shows how Jung almost accidentally stumbled
across the phenomena of ‘shared unconscious structures’ which, subsequently,
he was to name as ‘collective unconscious’. At that time, these
phenomena exposed the limitations of his theory and the gap between his
epistemology and his theories. Nevertheless, as it was noted, although
1909年的這篇論文顯示，榮格幾乎是意外地遭遇「共同分享無意識結構」的這些現象。隨後，他將命名它們，當作「集體無意識」。在當時，這些現象揭露他的理論的限制，以及他的認識論與他的理論之間的差距。可是，如同大家注意到，雖然
Jung did not pursue this research, and did not work with families again
[either clinically or in research] one could argue that the phenomena he
encountered at this stage of his life never left him, instead, they [must
have] set him a task to find more appropriate ways of comprehending
them. His subsequent development followed that very direction and
enabled him to formulate a perspective within which the intrapsychic
and collective realms interrelate meaningfully.
(Papadopoulos 1996: 131-132)
榮格並沒有追尋這個研究，也沒有再研究家庭（無論是臨床或是在研究），我們能夠主張，他在他生命的這個階段遭遇的這些現象，從來沒有離開他。代替的，它們當時一定曾經給予他一項工作，要找到更加適當的方式來理解它們。他隨後的發展就是遵循那個方向，並且讓他能夠詮釋一個觀點。在這個觀點裡，心靈內部與集體的這些領域，有意義地互相關聯
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：131-132年）
The implications of these findings are not limited only to Jung’s epistemology;
by identifying unconscious shared structures within families, Jung
could also be considered as a pioneer of modern family therapy (Garnett
1993; Papadopoulos 1996; Papadopoulos and Saayman 1989).
這些發現的這些暗示並不僅僅限制于榮格的認識論。憑藉辨認在家庭之內無意識的共同分享結構，榮格也能夠被認為是現代家庭心理治療的開先鋒者（噶內特 1993年；帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年；帕帕鬥博洛斯與薩亞曼 1989年）。
Teleology: knowledge in the making
目的論：正在進行中的知識
Like most of the elements of his epistemological position, by no means, did
Jung invent teleology, which has a long tradition in philosophy across
cultures and time. Jung’s contribution was that he located teleology within
a specific context along with the other elements of his epistemology and
psychological theories.
就像他的認識論的立場的大部分因素，榮格根本沒有發明目的論。目的論在各地的文化與歷史，有其漫長的傳統。榮格的貢獻是，他找出目的論的位置，在明確的內涵，以及認識論與心理學的理論的其他因素裡。
Teleology refers to the approach that considers phenomena in terms of
their telos; telos, being the goal, end, purpose and fulfilment. As was
mentioned above, Jung espoused a teleological approach as early as his
Zofingia lectures. At that time, he discerned teleology not only as a method
of enquiry but also as a process ‘external to man’ (Jung 1896-1899: par.
175), as a wider principle in life. Later, in his doctoral dissertation, Jung
again employed a teleological approach to understand the spiritualistic
phenomena he had observed. He felt that Helene’s spiritualistic experiences
had a teleological function in that they assisted her psychological
development and maturity.
目的論提到這個方法，用它們的「目的」來考慮各種現象。Telos 的意思是目的物，目標，目的與實現。如以上提到，早在佐分吉亞的演講，榮格就詮釋過目的論的方法。在當時，他覺察出目的論，不但作為研究方法，而且作為「外在於人」的過程（榮格1896-1899年：175段），作為是生命的更加寬廣的原則。後來，在他的博士論文，榮格再次運用目的論的方法，來理解他曾經觀察到的這個神靈的現象。他感覺，海倫尼的神靈的經驗具有目的論的功能，因為它們幫助她的心理的發展與成熟。
Jung distinguished between two basic methods in approaching psychological
phenomena: a ‘constructive’ or ‘synthetic’ method and a ‘reductive’
(`causal-reductive’) method. He identified with the former and he considered
the latter to be the hallmark of the Freudian approach. Adopting
Maeder’s understanding of the ‘prospective function of the unconscious’
(Maeder 1913) and Adler’s ‘anticipatory function of the unconscious’
(Adler 1912), Jung emphasised the ‘purposive significance’ of the unconscious:
‘We conceive the product of the unconscious . . . as an expression
oriented to a goal or purpose’; accordingly, he understood that ‘the aim of
the constructive method . . . is to elicit from the unconscious product a
meaning that relates to the subject’s future attitude’ (Jung 1921: par. 701).
In contrast, he considered that ‘The reductive method is oriented backwards
. . . whether in the purely historical sense or in the figurative sense of
tracing complex, differentiated factors hack to something more general and
more elementary’ (Jung 1921: par. 788). Moreover, he understood that
榮格區別兩個基本點方法，來接近心理的現象：一個是「建設」或「綜合」的方法，另外一個是「還原」（因果還原）的方法。他認同前者，並且將後者認為弗洛依德的方法的標誌。榮格採用馬德爾對於「無意識的未來功能」的理解（馬德爾 1913年）與阿德勒的「無意識的預期功能」（阿德勒1912年）。榮格強調無意識句有「目的的意義」：「我們構想無意識的產物、、、作為是一種取向於目的物與目標的表達」。因此，他理解到，「建設性的方法的這個目標、、、是要從無意識的產物，召喚出一種意義，跟主體的未來的態度息息相關」（榮格1921年：701段）。相較起來，他認為，「還原的方法被定向回溯、、、無論是在純粹歷史的意義，或是在追蹤的情結的比喻意義，區分化的因素回溯到更加一般性，更加基本的東西」（榮格1921年：788段）。而且，他理解到
Reduction has a disintegrative effect on the real significance of the
unconscious product, since this is either traced back to its historical
antecedents and thereby annihilated, or integrated once again with the
same elementary process from which it arose.
(Jung 1921: par. 788)
還原擁有一個瓦解的效果，對於無意識產物的真實意義。因為它要就是被追蹤回到它的歷史的先例，因此被消滅。要不就是再次被合併，跟它起源的相同的基本的過程。
（榮格 1921年：788段）
This means that in approaching psychological phenomena, one can either
trace them back to their ‘origin’ into one’s own history (reductive method)
or endeavour to relate to the purpose and meaning they have in terms of
the person’s goals and future orientation (constructive method). The constructive
method is based on teleology, or according to the Aristotelian
terminology – the ‘final causality’. We can understand phenomena not only
in terms of them being effects to previous causes (this would be the
Aristotelian ‘efficient causality’) but also in terms of their purpose and ‘final
cause’ – their goal. Jung’s famous dicta – neurosis ‘must be understood,
ultimately, as the suffering of a soul which has not discovered its meaning’
(Jung 1932b: par. 497) and ‘Neurosis is teleologically oriented’ (Jung 1943:
par. 54) testify to his committed teleological orientation. But Jung did not
limit his teleological understanding to his clinical work. He maintained that
science at large was adopting teleological principles in approaching its
subject matters. For example, he argued that —function” as conceived by
modern science is by no means exclusively a causal concept; it is especially a
final or “teleological” one’ (Jung 1917: par. 688). Also, he declared boldly
that ‘Life is teleology par excellence; it is a system of directed aims which
seek to fulfil themselves. The end of every process is its goal’ (Jung 1934b:
par. 798).
這意味著，當我們接近心理的現象，我們要就是，追溯它們回到它們的「起源」，進入自己的歷史（還原的方法），要不就是，企圖用這個人的目標與未來的取向的術語，跟它們擁有的目的與意義互相關聯。這種建設性的方法，以目的論為基礎，或是依照亞裡斯多德的術語，「最後的因果律」。我們能夠理解這些現象，不但用它們對於先前的原因產生結果的術語（這將是亞裡斯多德所謂的「有效的因果律」），而且用它們的目的與「最後原因」的術語，也就是它們的目的物。榮格的著名的宣稱，「最後，神經症必須被理解，作為是靈魂還沒有找到它的意義的痛苦」（榮格1932年，497段），以及「神經症是以目的論為取向（榮格1943年，54段）。這個著名的宣稱證明他致力於目的論的取向。但是榮格並沒有將他的目的論的理解，限制於他的臨床工作。他主張，一般科學正在採用目的論的原則，用來探究它的主體的東西。譬如，他主張，「由現代科學構想的功能，決非專門是因果律的觀念。它特別是一種最後或是「目的論的功能」（榮格1917年：688段）。而且，他大膽地宣稱，「人生就最優秀的目的論。它是被引導的目標的系統，尋求要滿足目標自己。每個過程的結束，就是它的目標」（榮格 1934b年：798段）。
Therefore, Jung’s use of teleology could be categorised into the following
four types:
• therapeutic teleology – referring to his approach to psychological and
psychopathological phenomena in the course of analytical therapeutic
work;
• methodological teleology – referring to the methodological use of teleology
in scientific investigations, in general;
• human teleology – referring to the purposeful direction human beings
have towards psychological development; and
• natural teleology – referring to his understanding that teleology is a law
of life.
因此，榮格的使用目的論能夠被分類成為以下四種：
治療的目的論—提到他探究心理學與心理病理學現象，在分析治療的工作過程。
方法學的目的論—提到目的論的方法學使用在一般的科學的研究。
人類的目的論—提到人類擁有的目標的方向，朝向心理的發展。
自然的目的論—提到他的理解：目的論是生命的法則。
All four types of teleological understanding have strong implications for
Jung’s epistemological approach in so far as they suggest an impossibility of
complete knowledge in a definitive way, as knowledge is related to a future
purpose and goal. This means that, in effect, Jung’s epistemological teleology
locates knowledge in the very process of generating itself. Thus, it
could be said that the production of knowledge for Jung, especially in
therapeutic contexts, involves the locating of oneself on the pathway along
which teleology is unfolding as a lived experience. Instead of focusing on a
final outcome and end product or state, Jung’s teleological epistemology
favours an approach that accepts, what could be termed, knowledge in the
making. Accordingly, it is not surprising that Jung repeatedly emphasised
the process of individuation instead of the final product of individuated
state itself. By being connected along with and within the path of teleology
one derives a certain meaning and sense which is real and substantial even if
it is not definitive and ultimate in terms articulating itself in the format of a
logical and rational explanation and definition. Aware of this finer
differentiation, Jung used the term ‘finality’ in this context:
目的論理解的所有這四種擁有強烈的暗示，對於榮格的認識論的探究，因為它們以明確的方式，暗示完整知識的不可能性。因為知識跟未來的目的與目標息息相關。這意味著，事實上，榮格的認識論的目的論將知識定位在產生自己的過程。因此，我們能夠說，對於榮格，知識的產生，特別是在心理治療的內涵，牽涉到在途中找出自己的位置。沿著這個途中，目的論展開，作為一個生活過的經驗。榮格並沒有集中焦點於一個最後的結果及結束產品或狀態，他的目的論的認識論贊同一種方法，接受可以名之為「正在進行中的知識」。因此，難怪榮格會重複地強調個體化的這個過程，而不是被個體化的狀態本身的產物。憑藉在目的論的沿途與途中息息相關，我們獲得某種既真實又實質的意義與理解，即使從表達它自己的術語來說，它並不是明確及最後，以邏輯與理性的解釋與定義的格式。因為知的這種比較細膩的差異，榮格在這個內涵裡使用「最終性」這個術語：
I use the word finality intentionally, in order to avoid confusion with
the concept of teleology. By finality, I mean merely the immanent
psychological striving for a goal. Instead of ‘striving for a goal’ one
could also say ‘sense of purpose’. All psychological phenomena have
some such sense of purpose inherent in them.
(Jung 1916/1948: par. 456)
我刻意地使用「最終性」這個字詞，為了避免跟目的論的觀念混淆。所謂「最終性」，我的意思僅是內在的心理的奮鬥追尋一個目標。我們並沒有「奮鬥追尋一個目標」，我們也能夠說是「目的感」。所有心理的現象在其本身，都有某種這樣的目的感。
Jung was evidently concerned that teleology could imply a crude expectation
of a definitive goal with an accompanying rational formulation and,
consequently, chose to introduce ‘finality’ in order to address this very idea
of knowledge in the making.
榮格顯而易見是關注到，目的論能夠暗示一種粗糙的期望一個明確的目標，它具有一個伴隨而來的理性的闡釋。結果，他選擇介紹「最終性」，為了處理「正在進行中的知識」這個觀念。
Therefore, Jung developed further his original understanding of teleology
and refined it in the context of his psychological epistemology, which
continues to receive appropriate attention (e.g., Home 2002; Jones 2002;
Nagy 1991; Rychlak 1968, 1973, 1984).
因此，榮格更深入地發展他的原創性的理解目的論，並且將它在他的心理學的認識論的內涵裡精煉發揮。他的心理學的認識論繼續接受適當的關注（譬如，荷姆 2002年；鐘斯 2002年；拿基 1991年；瑞奇拉克 1968，1973，1984年）。
An epistemology of archetypal teleology
原型目的論的認識論
Having established firmly the teleological intention as the basis of his
approach, Jung needed to introduce more elements to support it and render
it more applicable, at least to his therapeutic teleology. His initial understanding
of the collective structure of knowledge formed a good beginning
but it required further elaboration. It was not until the introduction of the
archetype that Jung was able to furnish this elaboration.
當榮格已經堅定地建立目的論的意圖，作為是他的方法的基礎，他需要介紹更多的要素來支持它，並且讓它變得更加可應用，至少對於他的心理治療的目的論。他的最初的理解，對於知識的集體的結構，形成一種好的開始，但是它需要更深入的建構。直到原型的介紹，榮格才能夠供應這個建構。
From an epistemological point of view, Jung’s theory of archetypes
introduces a complexity that enriches his earlier formulations of teleology,
by offering a bridge between the personal realm and the wider collective
structures. More specifically, Jung suggests that ‘Archetypes … manifest
themselves only through their ability to organize images and ideas’ (Jung
1954: par. 440) and ‘consciousness . rests, as we know, on . . . the
archetypes’ (Jung 1958: par. 656). Thus, epistemologically speaking, one
would not be able to comprehend judiciously the sources of one’s knowledge
unless one appreciated the organising effect that archetypes have on
the knowing process, on one’s very consciousness.
從認識論的觀點，榮格的原型理論介紹一種複雜性，讓他早期的目的論的闡釋更加豐富。他憑藉提供一個橋樑，處於個人的領域，與更加寬廣的集體的結構之間。更加明確地說，榮格建議，「原型展示它們自己，僅是憑藉他們組織意象與觀念的能力」（榮格1954年：440段）而且，「如我們所知，意識依靠著原型」（榮格1958年：656段）。因此，從認識論來說，我們將不能夠持平地理解我們的知識的來源，除非我們賞識原型擁有的這個組織的影響，在認知的過程，對於我們意識的影響。
This means that, in addition to a reductive process of identifying the
various contributing elements in a knowing process i.e., relating to personal
history, interpersonal transactions and societal influences (as outlined
above), the Jungian approach includes a constructive process that would
take into account the archetypal organising influence. Diagrammatically,
this could be represented by the dotted-lined arrows that affect not only the
individuals (persons A and B in Figure 1.1) but also their interpersonal
exchanges and unconscious mutual projections (IE and UP), as well as each
person’s interaction with their own personal history (PHA and PHB), and
the socio-cultural influences (S-CI).
這意味著，除了在認知的過程，辨認各種促成的因素的還原過程，相關於私人的歷史，人際之間的運作與社會的影響（如同以上所描繪的）。榮格的方法包括一種建設性的過程，將會考慮到原型的組織的影響。從圖形來說，這能夠被代表，用虛線的箭頭。這不但影響到個人 （圖形一的A與B），而且影響到他們的人際之間的交換與無意識的互相投射（IE與UP）。以及每個人跟他們自己的私人的歷史的互動（PHA與PHB），與社會跟文化的影響（S-CI）
Figure 1.1 requires further clarification. Instead of having one single
archetype organising the network of interactions, there is a cluster of
archetypes (‘Network of Archetypal Images’) because archetypes are closely
interrelated among themselves and it is seldom that only one, single
archetype is activated without other archetypes also participating in the
relational network with other individuals (Papadopoulos 1996). Moreover,
even in the context of one individual, one archetype does not act on its own
but it triggers off related archetypes (in a compensatory or supplementary
way). This means that mostly, archetypes affect individuals and groups not
in isolation but in clusters/networks/constellations.
圖形1.1 要求更深入的澄清。並不存在著單一的原型，組織互動的網路，僅有各種原型的彙集（「原型意象的網路」），因為原型在它們自己內部互相關聯。很少見到，僅有單一的原型被激發出來，而沒有其他原型也參與其他的個人，在這個相關的網路( 帕帕鬥博絡斯 1996年)。而且，甚至在一個個人的內涵，一個原型並沒有單獨行動，它會觸發相關的原型（以一種補償性或補充方式）。這意味著，就大部分而言，原型影響個人與團體，不是處於孤立，而是處於叢集，網路與情結。
There are some additional facets of this process that Figure 1.1 depicts:
first, archetypes (or archetypal constellations/networks) can affect not only
individuals but also all the relationships and interactions individuals have;
these include their interactions with their own personal history, with other
individuals and groups, as well as the socio-cultural influences that are
exerted on them. Second, it could be argued that although Jung did not
emphasise it specifically, it follows from his theories that one’s own personal
history would not have only a one-way, causal influence on the individual
(as the causal-reductive method would dictate); instead, the relationship
individuals have with their own past would be affected by the shifting
positions and perspectives that the individuals take vis-a-vis their own past.
These changes can be the result of various factors, including, of course, the
very organising influence of the archetypal constellations which, by their
very nature, are not referring to the past but to the future, i.e., the archetypal
effect is not retrogressive but prospective, with teleological finality
(hence the dotted arrows on the figure are different from all the other
arrows, denoting that the archetypal influence is of a different nature than
the other kinds of interactions — it is an influence which moves constantly
towards a finality). In effect, this means that a Jungian approach would
imply (however paradoxical it may sound initially) that ‘it is not only the
past that shapes the present, but also the present that shapes the past’
(Papadopoulos 1996: 158) in a reciprocal manner.
圖形1.1 描繪的這個過程，還有一些額外的面向： 首先，原型（或原型的彙集與網路）不但能夠影響個人，而且影響一些個人擁有的一切關係與互動。這些包括他們跟他們自己的私人歷史的互動，跟其他個人與團體的互動，以及跟賦加在他們身上的社會與文化的影響的互動。其次，有人爭論，雖然榮格並沒有明確地強調它，我們從他的理論推論出來，我們自己的私人的歷史，將不會僅是一個單行道，對於個人的因果的影響（如同因果還原法所指示的）。代替的，個人跟他們自己的過往的關係，將會受到影響，由於轉變的立場與觀點，個人面對他們自己的過往時，採取的轉變的立場與觀點。這些轉變有時會是各種因素的結果，當然，包括原型情結的組織的影響。由於它們的特性，這些情結並不是提的它們的過往，而是提的未來。譬如，原型的影響並不是倒退，而是向前展望，具有目的論的最終性（因此，圖形上的這些虛線的箭頭，不同於所有的其他箭頭，它們指明：原型的影響是屬於不同的性質，跟其他種類的互動不同性質。這一種影響不斷地移動，朝向最終性）。實際上，這意味著，榮格的方法將會暗示（起初聽起來有點悖論），「不但是過去鑄造現在，而且是現在鑄造過去」（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年：158頁），以一種互惠的方式。
Figure 1.2
圖形 1.2
Figure 1.2 depicts the linear model of causal reductive epistemology. According to this model, A leads to B and then C which means that phenomenon B is caused by phenomenon A, and C’ is caused by B. For example, Jung characterised Freud’s understanding of neurosis as linear: one’s own childhood (A) causes the formation of one’s personality (B) which then causes the neurotic symptoms (C). The therapeutic direction that this model dictates would be the linear route in reverse: the therapist
would need to go back to find the causes of the symptom (C) by unravelling
the personality (B) which should be carried out by exploring the childhood
conflicts (A). Jung accepted the value of causal-reductive epistemology but
his argument was that this was not the only model available and certainly
not the best one for understanding complex phenomena in the context of
their purposive functions, especially when the archetypal involvement is
also taken into consideration; for those contexts, Jung felt that it was more
appropriate to employ a constructive method that would highlight the
function of ‘finality’: ‘When a psychological fact has to be explained, it
must be remembered that psychological data necessitate a twofold point of
view, namely that of causality and that of,finality’ (Jung 1916/1948: par.
456), and ‘To understand the psyche causally is to understand only one half
of it’ (Jung 1914: par. 398).
圖形1.2 描繪因果還原的認識論的直線模式，依照這個模式，A通往B，然後，通往C。這意味著，B 現象是由A現象引起，C現象是有B現象引起。譬如，榮格表現弗洛依德的理解神經症的特色，是直線式：我們自己的童年（A）引起我們自己的人格（B）的形成。這個（B）人個引起神經症的病症（C）。這個模式指明的治療的方向，將是相反的直線路線。心理治療師將需要回頭來找出病症（C）的原因，憑藉解開人格（B）。這種解開應該被執行，憑藉探索童年的衝突（A）。榮格接受因果還原法的認識論的價值，但是他的論點是，這並不是可利用的唯一的模式，它確實並不是最好的模式，作為理解複雜的現象，在它們目的的功用的內涵，特別是當原型的牽涉也被考慮在內。對於那些內涵，榮格感覺，假如我們使用一個建設性的方法，來強調「最終性」的功能，那將會更加適當。當一個心理的事實必須被解釋，我們必須記住，心理的資料讓雙重的觀點成為必要。換句話說，「因果律」的觀點與「最終性」的觀點（榮格1916/1948年：456段）。「從因果律來理解心靈，將僅是理解它的一半」（ 榮格1914： 398段）。
This means that Jung’s understanding of complex psychological phenomena
is based essentially on what could be termed an ‘epistemology of
finality’ which may also encompass a linear epistemology. This epistemology
of finality would be comparable to what modern systemic family
therapists call ‘circular’ or ‘systemic’ epistemology’ (cf. Becvar and Becvar
2002; Keeney 1983; Papadopoulos 1996, 1998). According to this epistemology,
the three positions (A, B and C in Figure 1.2) are related not
only in a linear, causal-reductive fashion but also in a way that one affects
the other in a constant interaction (as in Figure 1.3), in a circular manner.
After all, it should not be forgotten that the pattern of mutual influence is
the essence of Jung’s alchemical model, where the circle (mandala) was the
symbol par excellence of wholeness. More concretely, the three positions
(A, B and C) are in constant interaction among themselves in so far as
the symptom has a further ‘final’, i.e., purposive function that affects the
personality which then affects the way we approach our past.
這意味著，榮格的理解複雜的心理的現象，基本上是以所謂的「最終性的認識論」作為基礎。它可能也涵蓋一個直線發展的認識論。最終性的這個認識論，將可以比喻為現代系統的家庭心理治療師所謂的「迴圈」或「系統」的認識論（請參照貝克瓦與貝克瓦 2002年；金尼 1983年； 帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996，1998年）。依照這個認識論，這三個立場（在圖形1.2., 是 A，B 與C）。它們息息相關，不但以直線，因果還原法的方式，而且以一個人影響另外一個人的方式，處於不斷地互動（如同圖形1.3）,用迴圈的方式。畢竟，我們不應該忘記，互相影響的模式，是榮格的煉金術模式的本質。在那裡，圓形的曼荼羅是完整的最佳象徵。更加具體的是，這三個立場（A，B與C）處於它們中間不斷地互動。因為這個象徵具有一個更加深入的「最終」，譬如，目的的功用影響到人格，人格則是影響到我們探究我們的過往的方式。
Figure 1.3
圖形 1.3
Another important implication of this new epistemology is that all three
positions (A, B and C) do not exist in isolation but are also affected by
the activation of archetypal constellations (again, as always with the
archetypes, in a teleological rather than causal-reductive way). This means
that the interaction among the three positions is patterned by the wider
archetypal networks that affect it. The therapeutic approach in circular
epistemologies is not based on the attempt to trace ‘the cause’ or ’causes’
but to connect meaningfully with the contextual patterns within which they
are located. Jung referred to the ‘sense of purpose’ rather than clear
explanation when he was addressing these relations and clarified that one
cannot analyse, translate or interpret the archetype or its influence on the
person (in a reductive way) but one has to relate and connect with it (in a
constructive, purposive and teleological way):
這個新的認識論的另外一個重要的暗示是，所有三個立場（A，B與C）並沒有孤立存在，而是也受到原型的情結的激發影響（而且，如同原型常有的情況，以一種目的論，而非是因果還原的方式）。這意味著，這三個立場之間的互動，影響它的更加寬廣的原型網路形成模式。在迴圈的認識論的心理治療方法的基礎，並不是企圖要追蹤「這個原因」或「各種原因」，而是要有意義地跟內涵的模式聯接。在這些模式裡，它們被找出位置。榮格提到「目的的意義」，而不是清楚地解釋，當他正在處理這些關係，並且澄清，我們無法分析，翻譯或解釋原型，或它對這個人的影響（以還原的方式），但是我們必須跟它聯繫關連（以一個建設性，具有意圖的目的的方式。
Hence the ‘explanation’ should always be such that the functional
significance of the archetype remains unimpaired, so that an adequate
and meaningful connection between the conscious mind and the archetype is assured.
(Jung 1940: par. 271)
因此，這個「解釋」應該總是這樣，原型的功能的意義始終沒有受到損傷，這樣處於意識心靈與原型之間，一個充分而有意義的聯接被確立。
（榮格1940年：271頁）
This sentence is perhaps the best description that Jung offered to describe
the relationship between the knowing subject/person and the archetype.
First, he places ‘explanation’ in inverted commas, ensuring that the reader
does not confuse this type of engagement (between the subject and the
archetype) with the rational process of offering logical explanations. Referring
to this unique kind of engagement, many authors have resorted to the
traditional distinction between understanding ( Verstehen) and explanation
(Erk/nren) in social sciences (cf. Jaspers 1923/1963; von Wright 1971), i.e.,
between comprehension/understanding, and logical/rational explanation,
and opted for the former (e.g., Brooke 1991; Giiannoni 2004; Hillman 1974; B
Rauhala 1984; Shelburne 1988). Then, in the same sentence, Jung refers to
the ‘functional significance’ of the archetype which he wishes remains
`unimpaired’. One should be reminded that Jung insisted on extending the
meaning of ‘function’ beyond its usual causal connotation to include the
teleological dimension (see above); also he uses the word ‘significance’
rather than meaning, evidently, in order to avoid any confusion with logical
explanation and elaboration. Significance implies immanence, and not a
type of objective knowledge. Thus, by ‘functional significance’ Jung here
must be referring to the signification that would emerge from the
archetype’s engagement and, indeed, relationship with the network of the
interacting subject/s, as it is depicted in Figure 1.4.
這個句子或許是最佳的描述，榮格提供來描述這個關係，認知的主體/人與原型之間的關係。首先，他用引號標點放置「解釋」，確定讀者不會將這種的參與（主體與原型之間的參與），與提供邏輯的解釋的理性過程混淆。提到這個獨特種類的參與，許多作者曾經訴諸于傳統的區別，在社會科學，處於理解與解釋之間的區別（參照雅斯培 1923/1963年； 梵、萊特 1971年），譬如，處於悟解/理解，與邏輯/理性的解釋之間，並且選擇前者（譬如，布魯克 1991年，賈諾尼 2004年；希爾曼 1974年；勞哈拉 1984年； 舍邦尼 1988年）。因此，在這個相同的句子，榮格提到原型的「功能的意涵」。他希望它始終沒有受到損傷。我們應該回想到，榮格堅持延伸「功能」的意義，超越它尋常的因果的內涵，為了包括目的論的維度（參照以上）。而且，他使用「意涵」significance這個字詞，而不是「意義」meaning。顯而易見，他是要避免跟邏輯的解釋與建構有任何的混淆。意涵significance 暗示著內在性，而不是一種客觀的知識。因此，所謂「功能的意涵」，榮格在此一定是提到將會從原型的參與出現的意涵，的確，跟互動的主體的網路的關係，如同它在圖形1.4 所描述的。
Figure 1.4
圖形1.4
Although Jung, in the same sentence, addresses only the relationship
between ‘the conscious mind and the archetype’, as it has been shown, none
of these two are isolated and clearly delineated entities. In so far as both of
them involve networks of relationships, the ‘functional significance’ here
must be referring to the meaning that emerges from this engagement with
all these interrelationships. Evidently, this meaning would not be a type of
meaning that would be bestowed by means of external logical definition or
explanation (cf. Mathers 2001).
雖然榮格在這個相同的句子，僅是處理「意識與原型的關係」，如它所顯示的。這兩者沒有一樣是孤立而清楚被描繪的實體。因為它們兩者都牽涉到關係的網路，在此的「功能的意涵」一定是提到從這種參與所有這些相互關係出現的意義，顯而易見，這個意義不會是一種憑藉外在的邏輯定義或解釋所賦予的意義。
（參照馬色爾2001年）
Finally, Jung clarifies that his preferred relationship between the archetype
and the ‘conscious mind’ should be that of a ‘meaningful connection’.
The primary characteristic Jung gives to the engagement between the
knowing subject with the archetype is that of a ‘connection’, a relationship,
an interaction, a ‘meaningful’ linkage that is not momentary but endures in
time in order to deepen this association; once this ‘meaningful connection’
is established then a certain pathway is created, a new context is construed
and an active process, a living experience begins which could lead gradually
to the emergence of a new awareness, a sense of new purpose, thus, a new
knowledge. But this knowledge would not be of the usual type of knowledge
that a subject has of an object, but a sense of newness, of a shift in
position by a person who becomes aware of his/her location within the
network of interacting relationships as affected by the activation of the
archetypal clusters within their purposive direction.
最後，榮格澄清，他對原型與「意識心靈」之間的關係的偏愛，應該屬於一種「有意義的」關聯。榮格給予這種參與的原初的特性，處於認知的主體與原型之間，這是一種「關聯」的特性：一種關係，一種互動，一種「有意義的」連接。它並非是暫時，而是時間持久，為了深化這種聯想。一旦這個「有意義的聯接」被確立，那麼某種的通道會被創立，一種新的語境被解釋。一個積極的過程，一個生活的經驗開始。它會逐漸導致一種新的知覺出現，一種新的目的感，因此，是一種新知識。但是這種知識，將不會是屬於主體擁有對於客體的通常種類的知識，而是一種新穎的感覺，立場的轉變，因為這個人變得知道他或她的位置，在互動關係的網路，作為是受到原型情結的激發所影響，在它們的目的地方向裡。
By examining in detail this sentence by Jung on archetypes, it is now
possible to appreciate that what he wants to clearly convey is that the
unique engagement (between the knowing subject and the archetype) is not
a set of clearly defined logical statements but a living experience that has a
purpose and finality, beyond causal-reductive and linear epistemologies.
The grip that the archetypal constellation would have on an individual
creates a new context, a shift, a new unique pattern that shapes and, indeed,
patterns one’s understanding of oneself, one’s relationships with others and
one’s very sense of identity. This emerging pattern also connects an individual
with the wider socio-cultural ecology (which includes the ‘Collective
Structures of Meaning’ — Papadopoulos 1996) as well as with natural
ecology in a prospective manner.
憑藉詳細檢查榮格探討原型的這個句子，我們現在可能賞識：他想要清楚傳遞的是，這個獨特的參與（處於認知度主體與原型之間的參與），並不是一套清楚定義的邏輯的陳述，而是一個擁有目的與最終性的生活的經驗，超越因果還原與直線發展的認識論。原型情結對於個人的掌握創造一種新的語境，一種轉變，一種新的獨特的鑄造的「模式」。的確，鑄造理解自己的模式，自己跟別人，以及跟自己的認同的關係。這種剛出現的模式也聯接個人，跟更寬廣的社會與文化的生態（包括「意義的集體的結構」–帕帕鬥博洛斯 1996年），以及跟自然的生態，以展望的方式。
Jung used frequently the term pattern in relation to archetypes when he
was referring to them as connected to ‘patterns of behaviour’. Comparing
the psychological realm with the biological, Jung used pattern to refer to set
combinations of behaviours that are triggered off when a certain instinct is
activated. In a parallel way, he argued that the archetype acts in a similar
way as it triggers off thoughts, ideas, images, feelings etc., i.e., a series of
psychological (in parallel to the biological) elements of human functioning
(e.g., Jung 1954: par. 398). The term pattern (be it in the biological or
psychological realm) implies a network of interrelationships as opposed to
linear causality. The Oxford English Dictionary defines pattern as ‘a regular
or discernible form or order in which a series of things occur’, and it is this
cluster of interactions that these diagrams depict.
榮格經常使用跟原型有關的「模式」這個術語，當他提到它們，作為是跟「行為模式」息息相關。將這個心理的領域跟生物比較，榮格使用模式提到行為的固定組合。它們被觸發，當某種的本能被激發起來。以一個對比的方式，他主張，原型以類似的方法行動，當它觸發思想，觀念，意象，感覺，等等，人類功能的一系列的心理的因素（對比於生物的因素）（譬如，榮格1954年：398頁）。「模式」這個術語，（無論它是生物，或是心理的領域），暗示著相互關係的網路，作為跟直線的因果律相提並論。「牛津英文字典」定義「模式」作為是「一種規律或可覺察到形式或秩序，在那裡，一連串的事情發生」。這些圖形描繪的，就是這些互動的叢集。
Such archetypal patterning creates a new context within which the
individual acquires new perspectives and thinks and feels differently from
before. In this way, it could be argued that with the introduction of archetypes,
the Jungian epistemology could be considered as ‘epistemological
contextualism’. Epistemological contextualism asserts that whatever we
know is contingent on its context and therefore different contexts set
different epistemic standards and conditions (e.g., Annis 1978; Cohen 1998;
Sosa and Kim 2000a; Williams 2001).
這樣的原型的模式創造一種新的語境。在這個語境裡，個人獲得新的觀點，並且思想與感覺不同於以前。以這種方式，我們能夠主張，隨著原型的介紹，榮格的認識論能夠被認為是「認識論的語境主義」。認識論的語境主義主張，任何我們所知道的東西，在它的語境都是偶發性。因此，不同的語境建立不同的認識論的標準與情況（譬如，安妮思 1978年；科罕 1998年；索薩與金恩 2000a年；維廉斯 2001年）。
Thus, the further elaboration that Jung’s epistemology underwent by the
introduction of his archetypal theory, consisted of all these new considerations
that were outlined above and depicted in Figures 1.1 to 1.4. The
archetypal patterning pushed Jung’s previous incomplete teleological inklings
to new ways of formulating his old basic assumptions, articulating
them into a new epistemology of archetypal finality which suggests that
systemic patterns instead of isolated entities interact to create a new context
within which new epistemic conditions arise.
因此，榮格經歷更進一步的建構，憑藉他的原型的理論的介紹，由所有這些新的考慮組成。在以上所被描繪輪廓，與圖形1.1,到圖形1.4所描述的考慮。這種原型的模式，將榮格先前的不完整的目的論的稍微暗示，推向新的闡釋方式，闡釋他的舊的基本假設，表達它們成為原型最終性的新的認識論。這種原型最終性暗示著：系統的模式在互動，而不是孤立的實體，為了創造新的語境。在這個新的語境裡面，新的認識論的情況產生。
Wider considerations
Pleroma and creatura, archetypes and systems
更加寬廣的考慮
心靈與受造之物，原型與系統
Gregory Bateson (1904-1980), the English anthropologist and social
scientist (who is also one of the founders of systemic epistemology and
family therapy) relied heavily on one part of the Jungian epistemology in
order to develop his own work, and it would be important to examine the
significance of this inter-pollination in relation to Jung’s own epistemology.
The irony is that this part has been mostly neglected not only by Jungian
authors but by Jung himself.
格瑞戈裡（1904-1980年），英國的人類學家與社會科學家（也是系統認識論與家庭心理治療的創辦人之一）。他主要是依靠榮格認識論的其中一部分，為了發展他自己的研究。重要的是要檢視這個人際之間播粉的意義，跟榮格自己的認識論相關。反諷的是，這部分相當受到忽略，不但是榮格學派的作者，而且榮格本人。
To begin with it is important to be reminded that one of Bateson’s many
creative and innovative projects was remarkably similar to that of Jung’s;
he explained it succinctly as follows:
首先，重要的是要回想到：巴特森的許多創造性與革新的計畫之一，跟榮格的計畫相當類似。他簡明地解釋如下：
Freudian psychology expanded the concept of mind inwards to include
the whole communication system within the body — the autonomic, the
habitual, and the vast range of unconscious process. What I am saying
expands mind outwards. And both of these changes reduce the scope of
the conscious self. A certain humility becomes appropriate, tempered
by the dignity or joy of being part of something much bigger.
(Bateson 1972: 461-462)
弗洛依德的心理學向內部擴大心靈的觀念，為了包括在身體內部的整個的溝通系統—自動自發，習慣性，與無意識過程的廣泛範圍。我正在說的內容則是將心靈往外擴充。這兩種改變將意識的自性的範圍減少。某種的謙虛變得是合宜的，由於受到尊嚴或成為更加崇高的部分，而馴服下來。
（巴特森 1972年：461-462頁）
Even on the basis of this brief statement, it is possible to see immediately the
similarities between Bateson and Jung — both looked for collective structures
that affect the ways that individuals formulate their own knowledge;
moreover, both had immense respect for that ‘something much bigger’ than
the individual (cf. Relph 1987). Bateson went about establishing his project
by observing a fundamental epistemological flaw in the Cartesian epistemology
and used Jung to redress it:
甚至根據這個簡短的陳述，我們可能立即看出巴特森與榮格之間的類同。兩人都尋找集體的結構，因為它們影響到個人闡釋他們自己的知識的方法。而且，兩位都具有崇高的尊敬，對於「某件比個人更加崇高的東西」（請參照瑞爾夫 1987年）巴特森從事建立他的計畫，憑藉觀察一個基本的認識論瑕疵，在笛卡爾的認識論，並且使用榮格來修補它：
I think that Descartes’ first epistemological steps — the separation of
`mind’ from ‘matter’ and the cogito — established bad premises, perhaps
ultimately lethal premises, for Epistemology, and I believe that Jung’s
statement of connection between Pleroma and Creatura is a much
healthier first step. Jung’s epistemology starts from comparison of
difference — not from matter.
So I will define Epistemology as the science that studies the process
of knowing — the interaction of the capacity to respond to differences,
on the one hand, with the material world in which those differences
somehow originate, on the other. We are concerned then with an
interface between Pleroma and Creatura.
(Bateson and Bateson 1987: 18)
我認為笛卡爾最初的認識論步驟—分開「心靈」與「受造之物」，然後「我思故我在」–建立不好的假設，或許最後是致命的假設，作為認識論。為相信，榮格對於心靈與受造之物關聯的陳述，是更加健康的初步。榮格的認識論從比較差異開始—而不是從物質開始。
所以，我定義認識論，作為是研究認知的過程的科學。一方面是回應差異的能力的互動；另一方面，擁有物質的世界，在那裡，那些差異以某種方式起始。我們因此關注一種處於心靈與受造之物之間的「介面」。
(巴特森與巴特森 1987年：18頁)
`Pleroma’ and `creatura’ are not part of the usual Jungian terminology.
Jung first introduced these two terms in the long poem Septem Sermones ad
Mortuos (Seven Sermons for the Dead) which he wrote between 1913 and
1916 (after he broke away from Freud) and circulated privately in 1925; it
was published for the general public only in 1967. Jung hardly used these
two terms again after this book, although it is understood that they formed
the basic building blocks on which he developed further his ideas about
archetypes and the collective unconscious (cf. Brenner 1990; Brewer 1996;
Fodor 1964; Heisig 1972; Hoeller 1982; Hubback 1966; Jaffe 1972;
Papadopoulos 1980; Segal 1992, 1995, 1998).
「心靈」與「受造之物」並不是尋常的榮格的術語的部分。榮格首先介紹這兩個術語，在那首長詩「對亡者的七次佈道」。他在1913年跟1916年間寫成（在他跟弗洛依德分道揚鑣之後），並且在1925年私下流傳。只有在1967年，這首長詩才被出版問世。在這本書之後，榮格幾乎沒有再使用這兩個術語，雖然我們理解，它們形成基本的建築磚塊。根據它們，他更加深入觀察他的觀念，關於原型與集體的無意識（請參照布棱內 1966年；布魯爾 1996年；佛鬥 1964年；黑西格 1972年； 侯勒 1982年；胡巴克 1966年；傑斐1972年； 帕帕鬥博洛斯 1980年；西格爾 1992，1995，1998年）。
In the Septem Sermones, Jung wrote that pleroma is
Nothingness [which] is the same as fullness . . . A thing that is infinite
and eternal has no qualities, since it has all qualities . . . Therein both
thinking and being cease, since the eternal and infinite possess no
qualities . . . In the pleroma there is nothing and everything.
(First Sermon)
在「給亡者的七次佈道」，榮格寫到：心靈
是跟充實相同的空無、、、無限與永恆的東西沒有質料，因為它擁有一切的質料、、、思想與生命實存都在那裡停止，因為永恆與無限並沒有擁有質料、、、在心靈，存在著空無與萬有。
（首次佈道）
This means that pleroma does not change.
what is changeable, however, is creatura . . . The pleroma has all,
distinctiveness and non-distinctiveness. Distinctiveness is creatura. Distinctiveness is its essence, and therefore it distinguishes. Therefore man
discriminates because his nature is distinctiveness.
(First Sermon)
這意味著，心靈並沒有改變。
可是，改變的東西是受造之物、、、心靈擁有一切，清楚與不清楚。清楚的是受造之物。清楚的是它的本質，因此它會區別。因此，人會區分，因為他的天性就是差別心。
（首次佈道）
Bateson commented that
The pleroma is the world in which events are caused by forces and
impacts and in which there are no ‘distinctions’. Or, as I would say, no
`differences’. In the creatura, effects are brought about precisely by
difference. In fact, this is the same old dichotomy between mind and
substance . . . I suggest that `pleroma’ and `creatura’ are words which
we could usefully adopt, and it is therefore worthwhile to look at the
bridges which exist between these two ‘worlds’. It is an oversimplification
to say that the ‘hard sciences’ deal only with the pleroma and
that the sciences of the mind deal only with the creatura. There is more
to it than that.
(Bateson 1972: 456)
巴特森評論說
心靈是這個世界，在那裡，事件被力量與影響所引起。在那裡，沒有「差別心」。或者，如我常說，「沒有差異」。在受造之物，由於差異而產 生影響。事實上，這是相同的古老的二分法：心靈與受造之物、、、為建議，「心靈」與「受造之物」是我們能夠有用地採用的字詞。因此，這是值得的，觀看存在於這兩個「世界」之間的這些橋樑。假如我們說，「硬科學」僅是處理心靈，而心靈的科學僅是處理受造之物，這是過分簡化的說法。不會僅是如此而已。
（巴特森 1972年：456頁）
What is this more about?
Bateson was interested in understanding the dimensions of mind beyond
the ordinary human conscious processes and outside the limits of the
human skin, and observed that we can understand the mind also as
除外，還有什麼呢？
巴特森感到興趣，對於理解心靈的維度，超越普通的人類的意識過程，與跨越人類的肉身的限制之外。他觀察到，我們能夠理解心靈，也充當是
it applies to a much wider range of those complex phenomena called
`systems’, including systems consisting of multiple organisms or systems
in which some of the parts are living and some are not, or even to
systems in which there are no living parts.
(Bateson and Bateson 1987: 19)
它應用到更加寬廣的範圍，對於所謂的「系統」的那些複雜的現象。包括由多重有機器官或系統組成的系統。在那裡，有些的部分器官活著，有些沒有，或甚至在有些系統，根本就沒有活著的部分器官。
His reference to ‘something bigger’ would resonate with the Jungian
archetypal world which is beyond the individual but also within the person.
But what then is ‘a mind’, asks Bateson, and adds:
if this is a useful notion, can one usefully make a plural and speak of
`minds’ which might engage in interactions which are in turn mental? ..
The definition anchors the notion of a mind firmly to the arrangement
of material parts.
(Bateson and Bateson 1987: 18)
他提到「某件更加崇高的東西」，將會跟榮格學派的原型的世界不謀而合。那個原型世界超越個人，但是也在這個個人內部。
但是那麼「心靈」是什麼呢？巴特森問道，並且補充：
假如這是一個有用的觀念，我們能夠有用地形成一個複數，並且談論「心靈」可能參與反過來又說精神的互動嗎？這個定義將心靈的觀念固定於物質部分的安排。
（巴特森與巴特森 1987年18頁）
Some of the definition criteria he offers include: ‘A mind is an aggregate of
interacting parts or components. The interaction between parts of mind is
triggered by difference . . . Mental process requires circular (or more complex)
chains of determination’ (Bateson and Bateson 1987: 18-19).
他提供的有些的定義標準包括：「心靈是各種互動部分或零件的彙集。心靈的部分零件之間的互動，受到差異性觸發、、、精神的過程要求決定的迴圈（或更加複雜）的鎖鏈（巴特森與巴特森 1987年：18-19頁）。
Using the cybernetic principles of feedback, Bateson understands a
system as created by information that is exchanged by its parts within it and
outside it, and defines information as ‘the difference which make a difference’.
Asking again and again the question ‘What do I mean by “my –
mind?’, he replies:
使用回饋的電腦原理，巴特森理解一種系統，作為由裡面與外面的零件部分交換的資訊所創造。他並且定義資訊作為「形成差異的差異」。他一再地詢問這個問題：「我所謂的心靈是什麼意思？」他的回答是
I suggest that the delimitation of an individual mind must always
depend upon what phenomena we wish to understand or explain.
Obviously there are lots of message pathways outside the skin, and
these and the messages which they carry must be included as part of the
mental system whenever they are relevant.
(Bateson 1972: 458)
我建議，個人心靈的除掉限制，必須總是依靠我們希望理解或是解釋的各種現象。顯而易見，在人的肉身之外，有很多的訊息通道。這些通道與它們扱帶動訊息，必須被包括作為是精神系統的部分，無論它們何時相關聯。
（巴特森 1972年：458頁）
Bateson gives the example of ‘a tree and a man and an axe’ to show that
these three form a system of a complete circuit within which differences
take place: ‘if you want to explain or understand anything in human
behavior, you are always dealing with total circuits’ (Bateson 1972: 459)
which could also include, of course, inanimate objects which belong to the
pleroma (e.g., the axe). ‘The elementary cybernetic system with its messages
in circuit is, in fact, the simplest unit of mind’ (p. 459). Following this
argument, Bateson writes:
巴特森給予「樹與人與斧頭」這個例子，為了顯示：這三樣形成一個完整的迴圈地系統。在這個迴圈裡，差異性發生:「假如你們想要解釋或是理解人類行為的任何東西，你們總是在處理整體的迴圈」巴特森 1972年：459頁）。當然，它也包括屬於心靈的沒有生命的客體（譬如，斧頭）。「這個基本的電腦的系統，具有它在迴圈裡的訊息，事實上，是最簡單的心靈的單位」（459頁）。遵照這個論點，巴特森寫到：
The cybernetic epistemology which I have offered you would suggest a
new approach. The individual mind is immanent but not only in the
body. It is immanent also in pathways and messages outside the body;
and there is a larger Mind of which the individual mind is only a
subsystem.
(Bateson 1972: 461)
我曾經提供給與你們的電腦的認識論，將會建議一種新的方法。個人的心靈是內在性，但是不但是在身體裡。它的內在性，也是在身體之外的通道與訊息。而且，有一個更寬大的「靈體」，個人的心靈僅是它的一個次級系統。
This ‘larger Mind’ (with capital M!) would indeed correspond to the
Jungian collective unconscious and the epistemological implication would
be that the knowing subject is part of a wider knowledge pool with which
the individual is in interaction with. So much so, that Bateson went as far
as defining a person (what he called a ‘self’ in inverted commas) ‘as a false
reification of an improperly delimited part of this much larger field of
interlocking processes’ (1972: 331). This resonates with Jung’s dictum:
`Individuation is an at-one-ment with oneself and at the same time with
humanity since oneself is part of humanity’ (Jung 1945: par. 227).
這個「更寬大的靈體」（Mind 用大寫字母!）的確對應榮格學派的集體無意識。這個認識論的暗示將會是：認知的主體是更加寬廣的知識源體，個人跟它互動。如此的互動，以致巴特森甚至定義一個人（他所謂的「自性，用引用號強調」）。「作為是將互相交織的過程的這個更大的領域，不適當地除掉部分的限制的虛假地物化」（1972年：331頁）。這種說法跟榮格的宣稱不謀而合：「個體化是自己的救贖，也同時是人類救贖，因為自己的人類的部分」榮格 1945年：227頁）。
Finally, Bateson applied his epistemological premises to comprehend
psychopathological states and in so doing, he commented on Jung’s own
mental state when he was writing the very poem Septem Sermones. Jung,
many years after the event, wrote that at the time just before writing the
poem his ‘whole house was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed
full of spirits’ (MDR, p. 216); Bateson attributed this to Jung’s epistemological
confusion.
最後，巴特森應用他的認識論的假設，來理解心理病理的狀態。當他這樣做時，他評論榮格自己的精神狀態，當他寫作這首長詩「給亡者的七次佈道」。在這個事件後許多年，榮個寫道：就在寫作這首長詩之前，他的「整棟房屋擠滿人，好像群眾聚集，各種靈魂高朋滿座」（醫療記錄：216頁）。巴特森將這個歸屬于榮格的認識論的混淆。
If you get your epistemology confused, you go psychotic, and Jung was
going through an epistemological crisis. So he sat down at his desk and
picked up a pen and started to write. When he started to write all the
ghosts disappeared and he wrote this little book [the .S’tptem Sermones].
（Bateson I972: 455)
假如你們讓認識論混淆，你們會變得精神病。榮格經歷過一場認識論的危機。所以，他端坐在他的書桌邊，拿起筆開始寫作。當他開始寫道所有的鬼魂消失，他寫作這部小書「給亡者的七次佈道」。
（巴特森 1972年：455頁）
Right at the beginning of the poem/book Jung wrote about the distinction
between pleroma and creatura and, therefore, it seems that it was that
differentiation which brought sanity to his confused ‘epistemological crisis’.
Bateson wrote that according to ‘the vulgar jargon of psychiatry’ Jung’s
`epistemological crisis’ would be called ‘psychotic’ (Bateson 1972: 455). This
means that epistemology is not just an abstract concept but, constituting
the very way one organises one’s knowledge, it can certainly also affect
one’s psychological and mental state. It should not be forgotten that
Bateson’s earlier double-bind theory of schizophrenia was also based on an
epistemological perspective (Bateson 1956).
就在這本詩集的開始，榮格寫到關於心靈與受造之物的區別。因此，似乎是那個區別帶來醒悟，給他的混淆的「認識論危機」。巴特森寫道：依照「精神病學的通俗用詞」，榮格的「認識論危機」將會被稱為是「精神病」（巴特森 1972年：455頁）。這意味著，認識論並不僅是一個抽象的觀念，而是，構成我們組織自己的知識的方式。它確實也影響自己的心理與精神的狀態。我們不應該忘記，巴特森早期主張精神分裂症的雙重約束理論，那是以認識論的觀點作為基礎（巴特森 1956年）。
Commenting on Jung’s idea that archetypes are `pleromatic’ (Jung
1952b), Bateson wrote: ‘It is surely true, however, that constellations of
ideas may seem subjectively to resemble “forces” when their ideational
character is unrecognized’ (1972: 455n). This means that confusion between
the archetypal content that interacts with the individual (creatura) and pure
archetypes (pleroma) can lead to an epistemological crisis. If an individual
appropriates pleromatic material he/she is then in danger of losing discrimination
(and difference), and of ceasing to have awareness that he/she is
only one interacting part of a wider system; such a misappropriation would
not only be illusional but could also be delusional, indeed, as one would
identify with the bigger whole, the entire system. Jung referred to this state
as psychological inflation, when the archetype takes over one’s personality.
Without the discrimination and differentiation, there is no information and
therefore no system; instead, there is the illusion/delusion that there are just
`forces’ that act on their own. Such a condition can lead an epistemological
crisis to become even an epistemological breakdown.
評論榮格的理型：原型是「心靈」（榮格1952b年），巴特森寫道：「可是，這確實是真實，理型的情結主觀上似乎類似「力量」，當它們的理型的特性並沒有被體認出來」（1972年：455注釋）。這意味著，跟個人的（受造之物）互動的原型內容，與純粹原型（心靈）之間的混淆，會導致認識論的危機。假如個人佔據心靈的材料，他或她將陷入喪失區別（與差別）的危險，以及陷入不再擁有知覺的危險，知覺他或她僅是一個更加寬廣的系統的互動的一部分。這樣的錯誤佔據將不僅是幻覺，而且也會是譫妄。的確，如同我們將會辨認更大的整體，整個的系統。榮格提到這個陳述，作為是心理的膨脹，當原型接管一個人的人格。假如沒有區別與差異，就沒有資訊，因此就沒有系統。代替的，存在這個幻覺或譫妄，以為這些「力量」是獨自運作。這樣一種情況會導致一種認識論的危險，甚至導致認識論的崩潰。
As Bateson emphasised, it is the interface between pleroma and creatura
that is of importance, it is this interface, the interaction that creates a
system that can utilise difference in order to be activated by the information
that these differences create. Any alternatives are detrimental both
epistemologically and psychologically. The individual cannot be confused
with the collective, the archetype cannot substitute the individual. Here
lies the unique clue to Jung’s use of archetypes that, on the one hand, they
can be facilitative and healing in so far as they can enrich the individual
personality by expanding its perspectives and opening it up to wider
realms, making it aware of ‘being part of something much bigger’ (Bateson
1972: 462), or, on the other hand, they can flood the personality and
take over it in a way that differences between them and the personality
become blurred; in the latter case, archetypes would have a detrimental
effect on the personality and they would create what could be called a
pathological state.
如同巴特森強調，就是心靈與受造之物之間這個介面非常重要。就是這個介苗，這個創造系統的互動，能夠利用這個差異性，為了被這些差異創造的資訊所觸動。任何的替代在認識論與心理學方面都是具有傷害性。個人無法跟集體混淆；原型無法替代個人。榮格對於原型的使用的獨特線索就在這裡。一方面，它們有時具有實用與治療，因為它們能夠豐富個人的人格，憑藉拓寬它的視野，並且展開它到更寬廣的領域，讓它知道是它某件更崇高的東西的部分」（巴特森1972年：462頁）。或是，在另一方面，它們能夠瀰漫這個人格，接管它，讓它們之間的差異與人格變得模糊。在後者的情況，原型對於人格，將會有一個傷害性的影響。它們將會創造所謂的病理的狀態。
Echoing Jung, Bateson exclaimed that ‘A certain humility becomes
appropriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being part of something
much bigger (Bateson 1972: 461 462).
跟榮格不謀而合，巴特森驚叫著：「某種的謙虛變得合宜，受到尊嚴的馴服，或成為某件更崇高的東西的部分的喜悅」（巴特森 1972：461-462頁）。
Jung’s Socratic ignorance and Gnostic knowledge
榮格的蘇格拉底式的無知與諾斯教派的知識
The last facet of Jung’s epistemology that this chapter will examine is a
duality of Jung’s own approach to epistemological openness.
It has been suggested that one could
distinguish two opposing epistemologies which Jung, wittingly or
unwittingly, actually espoused. The first of those is closer to what could
be called ‘Socratic ignorance’, while the second is essentially a ‘Gnostic
epistemology’.
(Papadopoulos 1997: 298)
這個章節將要檢視的榮格認識論的最後刻面，是榮格自己探究認識論開展的雙重性。有人建議，我們能夠
區別榮格實際闡釋兩種對立的認識論，無論是巧妙與否。這些認識論的第一個比較靠近所謂「蘇格拉底式的無知」；而第二種基本上是「諾斯教派的認識論」。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1997年：298）
According to the former,
Jung stands clearly against any oversweeping statements of the ‘nothing
but’ kind, and in the true spirit of Socratic ignorance makes such
statements as ‘Stereotyped interpretation of dream-motifs is to be
avoided . . . Even if one has great experience in these matters, one is
again and again obliged, before each dream, to admit to one’s ignorance
and, renouncing all preconceived ideas, to prepare for something
entirely unexpected’ (Jung 1948: para. 543) or `. . . clearly, dream interpretation is in the first place an experience which has immediate validity for only two persons’ (para. 539).
(Papadopoulos 1997: 298)
依照前者，
榮格清楚地反對任何橫掃一切的陳述，對於這種「僅僅」。他以蘇格拉底式的無知的真理的精神，讓這些陳述，作為是「對於夢的主題從事定型化的解釋應該被避免、、、即使我們對於這些事情經驗豐富，我們一再地被迫，在每個夢之前，必須承認自己的無知。並且放棄一切預先存有的觀念，來準備接納完全意料之外的東西（榮格1948年：543段） 或是，「顯而易見地，夢的解釋首先是一種經驗，具有當下的正確性，僅僅對於兩個人（539段）
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1997年：298頁）
These are characteristic statements of Jung’s insistence not to take anything
for granted, not to assume any previous knowledge before examining a
phenomenon in its own right, not to impose pre-packaged theoretical formulations
onto a situation but, instead, retain an openness to examine the
uniqueness of each given circumstance. In the clinical setting, this meant
that Jung wanted to expose himself to the specificity of each analysand and
endeavoured to grasp the meaning of his interaction with him/her at that
given time without importing previous biases. This is why he maintained
that the dream has meaning only in the context of the analytical interaction,
i.e., between the analyst and the analysand.
這些是具有特色的陳述，榮格堅持不要將任何事情視為當然，不要假設任何先前的知識，在檢視一個現象的本質，不要對某種情境，賦加先前包裹好的理論的闡釋。代替的，要保留一種開放性，來檢視每個特定的情境的獨特性。在臨床的背景，這意味著，榮格想要讓自己接納每位分析者的明確性，並且企圖理解他與他或她的互動的意義，在那個特定的時間，而沒有輸入先前的偏見。這就是為什麼他主張，夢具有意義，僅是在精神分析互動的語境裡。譬如，在分析家與分析者之間的語境裡。
Socratic ignorance can be understood in two ways. The first refers to
Socrates’ stance not to possess any wisdom but his only wisdom consisted
of his awareness of his own ignorance. An example of this is presented in
Plato’s Apology, where Socrates says,
蘇格拉底式的無知能夠用兩種方式來理解。第一種提到蘇格拉底的態度：不要擁有任何的智慧，而他的僅有的智慧，就是在於他知覺他自己的無知。這種無知的例子，在柏拉圖的「答辯章」，蘇格拉底說：
Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really
beautiful and good, I am better off than he is for he knows nothing,
and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this
latter particular, then, I seem to have slightly the advantage of him.
嗯，雖然我並不認為，對於美或善，我們兩人的任何一位知道些什麼。我的情況比他好些，因為他什麼都不知道，卻認為他知道。我既不知道，也不認為我知道。在後者的特殊情況，我似乎比他稍微具有優勢。
The second way of understanding the Socratic ignorance is in terms of the
way he applied it in his conversations with others. This refers to his actual
method of making use of his ‘ignorance’. Characteristically, Socrates tells
Theaetetus: ‘You forget, my friend, that I neither know, nor profess to
know, anything of these matters; you are the person who is in labour, I am
the barren midwife’ (Plato’s Theaetetus). By asserting his own ignorance of
the subject, Socrates frees himself and his interlocutor to investigate and
explore the various underlying assumptions as well as dimensions of the
phenomena they were discussing. In other words, his task was by and large
epistemological in nature and he likened it to that of the midwife, i.e., to
draw out of a person, to facilitate the birth of the knowledge about a
certain topic, hence his method was termed `maieutic’ (maia, in Greek,
being a midwife).
第二個方式來理解蘇格拉底式的無知，以他應用這種無知在他跟別人的談話的方式。這提到他實際的方法，利用他的「無知」。具有特性地，蘇格拉底告訴希亞忒塔斯：「你忘記了，我的朋友，我既不知道，也不宣稱我知道，任何這些事情。你是懷孕知道的這個人，我是位幫你接生的產婆」（柏拉圖：希亞忒塔斯）。憑藉主張他自己對主題的無知，蘇格拉底替他自己與對談者獲得自由，來研究及探索各種潛在的假設，以及他們正在討論的現象的維度。換句話說，他的工作大體上的性質是認識論，他將它比喻為接生產婆的工作。譬如，關於某種的主題，從一個抽取出那個知識，讓那個知識的誕生更加順暢。因此，他的方法被取名為「助產士啟發式問答法」（maia 是希臘文，意思是接生產婆）。
There are striking similarities between the Socratic maieutics and the
Jungian approach which did not elude Jung (e.g., Jung 1913: par. 519, 1943:
par. 26, 1912: par. 437). In addition to adopting a ‘Socratic-ignorance’
approach in his analytical clinical work, Jung’s insistence that, above all, he
was an ’empiricist’ and ‘phenomenologist’ in his wider researches points to
the same epistemological openness. He was very proud to quote a comment
made about his empirical approach in the British Medical Journal (on 9
February 1952), ‘a source that would seem to be above suspicion. “Facts
first and theories later is the keynote of Jung’s work. He is an empiricist
first and last.” This view meets with my approval’ (Jung 1952a: par. 1502).
Also, distinguishing between an approach that follows blindly set theories
as opposed to his own approach that used theoretical reflection to bind
together his empirical findings, Jung expressed his epistemological credo as
follows:
蘇格拉底的助產士啟發問答法，與榮格的探究方法之間，有顯著的類似，榮格不會視而不見（譬如，榮格1913年：519段；1943年：26段；1912年：437段）。除了採用一種「蘇格拉底式的無知」來探究他的精神分析臨床工作外，榮格堅持，尤其重要的是，在他更加廣泛的研究，他是一位「實證論者」與「現象學家」。這個堅持指向相同的認識論的開放。他非常驕傲地引述一段評論，關於他的實證的方法，他在「英國醫學雜誌」發表的（1952年2月9日）：「這一個來源似乎是無可置疑的」。「事實在先與理論在後，是榮格研究的基本論調。他實實在在是一位實證論者。這個觀點獲得我的認同」（榮格1952a年：1502段）。而且，區別一種盲目跟隨集合理論的方法，作為跟他自己的方法對立，他使用理論的省思，將實證的發現連接一塊，榮格表達他的認識論的信條如下：
Although I have often been called a philosopher, I am an empiricist
and adhere as such to the phenomenological standpoint. I trust that it
does not conflict with the principles of scientific empiricism if one
occasionally makes certain reflections which go beyond a mere accumulation
and classification of experience. As a matter of fact I believe
that experience is not even possible without reflection, because
`experience’ is a process of assimilation without which there could be
no understanding. As this statement indicates, I approach psychological
matters from a scientific and not from a philosophical standpoint.
In as much as religion has a very important psychological
aspect, I deal with it from a purely empirical point of view, that is, I
restrict myself to the observation of phenomena and I eschew any
metaphysical or philosophical considerations. I do not deny the validity
of these other considerations but I cannot claim to be competent to
apply them correctly.
（Jung1 1938/1940:par :2）
雖然我經常被稱為是一位哲學家，我是一位實證論者，並且本身堅持現象學的觀點。我信任，它跟科學的實證主義的原則並沒有衝突，假如我們有時從事某些的省思，它們超越僅是經驗的累積與分類。事實上，我相信，假如沒有省思，經驗甚至不會有可能。因為「經驗」是一種吸收的過程。沒有這個吸收的過程，不可能有理解。如同這句陳述指示，我探究心理學的東西，是從科學，而不是從哲學的觀點。因為宗教具有一種重要的心理的層面，我處理它，從純粹是實證的觀點。換句話說，我限制我自己於對現象的觀察。我刻意避開任何的形上學或哲學的考慮。我並沒有否認這些其他考慮到有效性，但是我無法宣稱我能夠勝任正確地運用它們。
（榮格 1938/1940年：2段）
It is not difficult to identify Jung’s ‘Socratic ignorance’ as it coincides with
Jung’s own way that he characterised himself and with the way he has been
characterised by almost all Jungian authors. What has not been examined
often is Jung’s opposite epistemological stance that he also followed,
evidently without him being aware of its antithetical direction; this was
termed ‘Gnostic epistemology’ (Papadopoulos 1997). According to this
epistemology, Jung was by no means open and his researches followed his
own pre-established ideas about phenomena and, although he always
waved the empiricist ‘Socratic-ignorance’ banner, in fact, his approach also
included closed and predetermined epistemologies.
我們很困難去辨認榮格的「蘇格拉底式的無知」，當它巧合于榮格給自己定為特徵的方式，以及巧合於他曾經被幾乎所有的榮格學派的作者定為特徵的方式。往往沒有被檢視到的是榮格相反的認識論的態度，他也遵照這個態度，只是顯而易見，他並不知道這個態度的相反的方向。這個術語是「諾斯教派的認識論」（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1997）。依照這個認識論，榮格決非是開放態度，而且他的研究也遵循他預先建立的觀念，關於各種現象。雖然他總是揮動實證論者的「蘇格拉底式的無知」的旗幟。事實上，他的方法也包括封閉而預先決定的認識論。
The most striking single quotation that betrays Jung’s Gnostic epistemology
is his reply to John Freeman’s question (in the famous Face to Face
interview for BBC Television in 1959) ‘Do you now believe in God?’, to
which Jung replied: ‘Difficult to answer. I know. I don’t believe. I know’
(McGuire and Hull 1977: 414).
最引人注意的引述，洩露出榮格的諾斯教派的認識論，是他回答約翰、弗立門的問題（在1959年 BBC的著名的「面對面電視訪談」）「你現在相信上帝嗎？」對於這個問題，榮格回答：「很難回答。我知道。我不相信。我知道。」（麥克蓋爾與赫爾 1977-414頁）。
Jung ‘knew’ and no further explanation was needed. Such an approach to
knowledge was not foreign to Jung and it can be found throughout his
writings. However, in so far as he did not ever admit to it, there are no clear
quotations in which he actually stated his adherence to this type of epistemology.
Instead, his ‘Gnostic epistemology’ can be traced in his arguments.
For example, in his Foreword to Father Victor White’s book, Jung
claims that
榮格「知道」，而且沒有更進一步解釋的必要。這樣一種探究知識的方法，對於榮格並不陌生。在他的全部著作裡，我們能夠發現這點。可是，因為他當時甚至並沒有承認它，我們現在沒有清楚的引述語，證明他實際上堅持這種的認識論。代替的，他的「諾斯教派的認識論」，能夠在他的論點中被追溯。譬如，在他給維克多、懷特神父的書的序言，榮格宣稱：
Psychology, like every empirical science, cannot get along without
auxiliary concepts, hypotheses, and models. But the theologian as well
as the philosopher is apt to make the mistake of taking them for
metaphysical postulates. The atom of which the physicist speaks is not
an hypostasis, it is a model. Similarly my concept of archetype or of
psychic energy is only an auxiliary idea which can be exchanged at any
time for a better formula.
(Jung 1952c: par. 460)
心理學，就像每個實證科學，無法進展下去，假如沒有輔助的觀念，假設，與模式。但是神學家與哲學家很容易犯下這個錯誤：將它們當作是形上學的假設。物理學家談論的原子，並不是假設，它是一種模式。同樣地，我的原型的觀念，或心靈能源的觀念，僅是一種輔助的觀念，能夠在任何時間被交換成為更好的公式。
This sounds a fine expression of epistemological openness; however, as we
know, neither Jung nor any Jungian author has ever exchanged the theory
of archetypes with a ‘better formula’ and archetypes are not treaded as
models but very much as actual hypostatic entities.
這聽起來像是認識論開放性的精緻表達。可是，如同我們知道，榮格與榮格學派的作者，沒有人曾經將原型的理論，交換成為一個「更好的公式」。原型沒有被定型作為模範，而是作為實際的假設的實體。
In the very same paragraph, Jung states categorically that ‘In reality, .. .
individuation is an expression of that biological process . . . by which
every living thing becomes what it was destined to become from the
beginning’ (Jung 1952c: par. 460). There is no hypothetical openness here;
Jung declares dogmatically that ‘in reality’ this is how it is. Moreover, with
an equal self-assuredness he pronounces that This process naturally
(Jung 1938/1940: par. 2) expresses itself in man as much as psychically as somatically’ and claims that such an assertion ‘is by no means a case of mystical speculations, but of clinical observations and their interpretations through comparison with analogous phenomena in other fields’. As if he gets intoxicated by his
own words, in the next paragraph he actually goes as far as professing
that ‘I proceed from facts which everyone is at liberty to verify’ (Jung
1952c: par. 461). By boasting this kind of objectivity and external verification,
Jung unwittingly abandons his unique epistemology of psychic
reality and psychological experiential interactions, and is seduced into
adopting positivistic methodologies of the exact sciences which he criticises
elsewhere as inappropriate for understanding the uniqueness of psychological
phenomena.
就在相同的段落，榮格分類地陳述：「實際上，個體化是那種生物的過程的表達、、、憑藉生物的過程，每個具有生命的生物變成它從開始就註定要成為的樣子。（榮格1952c年：460段）。在此，並沒有假設的開放態度。榮格武斷地宣稱，「實際上」，這就是它的樣子。而且，用一種同樣的自信，他宣佈，這個過程在人身上，很自然地表達它自己，從心靈上以及肉體上（榮格1938/1940年：2段）。榮格宣稱：這樣一種主張「決非是神秘的思維的案例，而是臨床的觀察，以及對於它們的解釋，憑藉跟其他領域的類同現象的比較」。好像他對於他自己的話語興奮異常。在下一個段落，他實際上甚至是宣稱：「我繼續從這些事實前進，每個都能夠自由來驗證的事實。」（榮格1952c 年：461段）。憑藉誇耀這種的客觀性與外在的驗證，榮格很不明智地放棄他的獨特的認識論：心靈現實與心理經驗的互動的認識論。他被引誘去採用這些確實科學的實證主義的方法學，那是他在別的地方批評認為是不適當，因為他理解心理現象的獨特性。
At the same time, such categorical claims not only fall very short of their
target but also betray Jung’s closed system of beliefs. Within the space
of two paragraphs he advocates epistemological openness, accepting his
theories as working hypotheses and then, he moves to profess his definitive
`knowledge’ of phenomena which in a tautological fashion confirm his
theories. It is this kind of epistemology that was termed ‘Gnostic epistemology’
(Papadopoulos 1997); it is the epistemology that provides readymade
answers, offers proclamations and views phenomena within a closed
system of beliefs.
同時，這些毫無保留的宣稱不但沒有到達它們的目標，而且背叛榮格對於信仰的封閉系統。在這兩個段落的空間裡，他主張認識論的開放態度，接受他的理論，作為是運行中的假設，然後，他轉變來宣稱他對於現象的明確「知識」。這些現象用同義反復的方式證實他的理論。就是這種的認識論，被命名為「諾斯教派的認識論」（帕帕鬥博洛斯1997年）。這種認識論提供現成的答案，提供各種宣告，並且在一種封閉的信仰系統裡，看待各種現象。
Dehing, pointing to ‘an internal contradiction in Jung’s approach’, argues
that ‘the agnostic empiricist every now and then turns into a prophet. Most
of the time Jung’s opinions are formulated as hypotheses, but sometimes
they become hypostases’ (Dehing 1990: 393). Thus, the agnostic and epistemological
openness in Jung interchanges with Jung’s own Gnosticism
which is characterised by his unshakable belief in the correctness of his own
assertions and general theories, thus, runs in parallel to his own Socratic
ignorance. When Jung adopts this kind of epistemology he implies ‘that
certain insights are only available to the initiates’ (Papadopoulos 1997: 298).
This kind of elitism was another characteristic of the Gnostic movement
(Lee 1987).
當德興指向「榮格的方法，一個內部的悖論」時，他主張說：「不可知論的實證主義者，往往會變成一位預言家。榮格的意見往往會被闡釋作為是假設，但是有時候，它們變成位元格屬性」（德興1990年：393頁）。因此，不可知論與認識論的開放態度，在榮格跟他自己的諾斯教派思想的互相交換中，表現的特性是，他對於他自己的主張與一般理論，不可動搖的信仰。因此，與他自己的蘇格拉底式的無知，恰恰成對比。當榮格採用這種的認識論，他暗示著「某些的洞察僅屬於開創者可使用」（帕帕鬥博洛斯1997年：298頁）。這種精英主義是諾斯教派運動的另外一種特徵（菲力浦、李1987年）
It has been argued that
the detrimental aspects and implications of Jung’s gnosticism have not
yet been sufficiently appreciated; besides an elitist attitude, these
include a closed system of circular tautology: people believe something
to be true and whatever they see around them they judge according to
these beliefs, while all the time they also believe that they are open and
that their beliefs are based on real evidence. This approach cannot be
enriched by new elements and therefore it cannot develop further; the
initiates are convinced that their beliefs are absolutely true and correspond
with the reality. This closed approach not only is self-fulfilling
but it also promotes fanaticism.
(Papadopoulos 1997: 299)
曾經有人主張：
榮格的諾斯教派思想引起傷害的層面與暗示，還沒有受到充分的評估。除了精英主義的態度外，還包括一種迴圈同義反復的封閉的系統：人們相信某件東西是真實的，無論他們在周遭看見什麼，他們都依照這些信仰去判斷。同時，他們也相信：他們是開放態度。他們的信仰是以真實的證據作為基礎。這種方法無法憑藉新的因素予以充實，因此，它無法更深入地發展。這些開創者相信：他們的信仰絕對是真實的，並且對應于現實。這種封閉的方法不但是自我滿足，而且它也提倡狂熱主義。
（帕帕鬥博洛斯 1997年：299頁）
This is not surprising because as even Hans Jonas admitted, ‘In the gnostic
context . . . “knowledge” has an emphatically religious or supernatural
meaning and refers to objects which we nowadays should call those of faith
rather than of reason’ (Jonas 1963/1992: 34); further, he also clarifies that in
certain Gnostic authors, ‘the “knowledge” is not only an instrument of
salvation but itself the very form in which the goal of salvation, i.e.,
ultimate perfection, is possessed’ (p. 35). This confirms that what Jung was
after was not just an epistemologically open hypothesis but a transformative
kind of knowledge that would have far more than syllogistic functions
and characteristics.
這就不足為奇，甚至如同當漢斯、喬那思承認：「在諾斯教派的語境、、「知識」具有強烈的宗教與超自然的意義。知識提到那些物件，今天我們應該稱之為信仰的物件，而不是理性的對象」（喬那思 1963/1992年：34頁）。而且，他也澄清: 在某些的諾斯教派的作者，「知識」不但是救贖的工具，而且它本身是這個形式，在那裡，救贖的目標，也就是最終的完美，被擁有」（35頁）這證實：榮格所追求的東西，不僅僅是認識論開放態度的假設，而是轉變種類的知識。這種知識擁有的東西，不僅僅是推理的功能與特性。
The romantic idea of the Gnostic rebels who were against the establishment
is only one side of the Gnostic tradition and this is the one that
has been favoured by Jung and Jungians. Yet, there are other more
unhelpful sides to Gnosticism that have not been taken into consideration
seriously, as yet, by Jungian authors. The critiques of Gnosticism that, for
example, Eric Voegelin (1968/2005), Manfred Henningsen (1999) and Philip
J. Lee (1987) formulated are totally ignored by Jungians who seem entirely
satisfied by the Gnostic proclamations to truth that Jung issued. It may be
sobering to consider that, for example, the political philosopher Voegelin
(1968) characterised both Marx and Hitler as modern Gnostics!
諾斯教派的反叛者反對體制，他們的浪漫觀念僅是諾斯教派傳統的其中一面。就是這一面受到榮格與榮格學派的喜愛。可是，諾斯教派思想還有其他更加沒有幫助的層面，迄今還沒有被榮格學派的作者，嚴肅地考慮到。對於諾斯教派思想的批判，例如，艾瑞克、博吉林（1968/2005年），門瑞德、漢寧森（1999年），菲力浦、李（1987年）所闡釋的。榮格學派對於這些批判完全視而不見，他們似乎完全滿足于榮格發出的諾斯教派對於真理的宣告。令人驚醒的是，我們必須考慮到，譬如，政治哲學家博吉林（1968年）將馬克思與希特勒，表現作為現代諾斯教派的特徵！
In the clinical context, the opposite to Jung’s Socratic ignorance, i.e., his
Gnostic epistemology, produces the Jung that, by virtue of feeling justified
that he is in touch with the psyche, knows what is good for his clients and
prescribes specific actions for them, a practice which is totally opposite to
his Socratic openness. For example, Jung was also known to have been
quite explicitly prescriptive to his analysands, telling them what specific
actions and directions to take in their lives (e.g., Jung, MDR, pp. 156f).
在臨床的語境，跟榮格的蘇格拉底式的無知相反，譬如，他的諾斯教派的認識論，產生這樣的榮格：憑藉他跟心靈保持聯繫的這種自信，他知道什麼對於他的個案有幫助，並且為他們開出明確行動的藥方，這種實踐跟他的蘇格拉底式的開放態度恰恰背道而馳。例如，眾人也知道，榮格曾經相當明確地跟他的分析者開示藥方，告訴他們在他們的生活裡要採取怎樣的行動與方向。
Instead of conclusion
代替結論
In so far as epistemology studies the ways we formulate what and how we
know, it should be indispensable for a proper study of psychotherapeutic
approaches. Jung’s ambivalent stance towards philosophy seems to have
prevented him from acknowledging fully the implications of his own
epistemological sensitivity. This chapter has endeavoured (within a severely
restricted space) to present and discuss some of Jung’s epistemological
positions that can contribute to the deeper understanding of the theory and
practice not only of analytical psychology but also of other psychotherapeutic
approaches.
因為認識論研究我們闡釋的這些方式：我們知道什麼與如何知道。無可避免地，我們應該適當地研究心理治療的方法。榮格對待哲學的曖昧的態度，似乎使他無法充分地承認，他自己的認識論的敏感度所暗示的東西。這個章節曾經嘗試（在嚴格受到限制的空間之內），呈現並討論榮格的某些認識論個的立場。它們能夠促成更加深入的理解，不但是對於分析心理學的理論與實踐，而且對於其他的心理治療方法。
Jung has made a considerable contribution to the epistemology of psychology
of therapeutic interactions and it is important that one appreciates
his contribution in its totality (i.e., in the way the various parts of it
interrelate) and not only in terms of its isolated elements. The last argument
that this chapter developed, about Jung’s two opposing epistemological
positions, does not invalidate his significant contribution. Like all great
pioneers, Jung succumbed to the intoxication of his own discoveries and it
was only human that there was also a streak in him that wanted to stick to
his own theories and propagate them further with the fervour of a zealot. In
other words, it is important to appreciate that there are two Jungs, so to
speak — the one with an open epistemology and Socratic ignorance who was
constructionist and relational, and the other Jung who, following Gnostic
epistemology, was, in fact, essentialist and universalist.
榮格曾經做出相當的貢獻，對於治療的互動的心理學的認識論。重要的是，我們應該從它的整體性來評估他的貢獻（譬如，有關它的各個部分互相關聯的方式），而不僅僅是從它的孤立的因素的術語。這個章節發展的最後的論點，關於榮格的對立的認識論的立場，並沒有否定他的重要的貢獻。就像所有偉大的開前鋒者，榮格對自己的發現的興奮而意氣風發。這僅是人性的表現，在他身上也有一種氣質，想要堅持他自己的理論，並且更加深入地宣揚它們，帶著狂熱份子的激情。換句話說，重要的是要評估，不妨說是有兩位榮格：一位榮格具有開放態度的認識論與蘇格拉底式的無知，他是建構主義與相對主義；另外一位榮格實際上是基本教義派與普世論者，他追隨諾斯教派的認識論。
Further research in this field is much required in order to locate Jung’s
contribution in the context of other investigations in the epistemology of
psychotherapy (e.g., Barratt 1984; Christou 1963; Clark and Wright 1986;
Goldberg 1988; Grunbaum 1984; Haynal 1993; Hogenson 2004; Knorr
Cetina 1981, 1999; Mackay 1989; Mills 2004; Orange 1995; Phillips 1996;
Ricoeur 1970, 1981; Rorty 1991; Spence 1982; Strenger 1991).
我們迫切地需要對這個領域更進一步的研究，為了找出榮格的貢獻，在心理治療的認識論的其他研究的語境（譬如，巴瑞特1984年；克瑞斯陶1963年；克拉克與萊特1986年；高德柏格1981年，1999年；格蘭邦1984年；海那爾1993年；荷金森2004年；諾爾、色提那1981，1999年； 馬克凱1991年；密爾思2004年；奧蘭基1995年；菲力浦1996年；李克爾1970年；羅帝1991年；史斌斯1982年；史連基1991年）。
As Jung himself emphasised, it is important to have diversity of views
and not only to pursue one-sided perspectives: ‘No line of research which
asserted that its subject was . . . a “nothing but” has ever made any
contribution to knowledge’ (Jung 1944: par. 120).
如同榮格自己強調，重要的是要擁有觀點的多樣化，並且不僅要追尋單面向的觀點：「研究的脈絡，若是主張它的主體是「僅僅如此」，這種研究的脈絡將永遠無法對知識做出貢獻」（榮格 1944年：120段）
Note
1 This remarkable twist is also discussed, in a different context, by Professor
Gaillard in Chapter 14 of this Handbook.
注釋
1、這個引人注意的變化也被噶拉德教授討論，以不同的語境，在榮格手冊的第14章節。
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