Archive for November, 2015

爱的知识与客体

November 29, 2015

KNOWLEDGE OF LOVE AND THE OBJECT a
爱与客体的知识

Thus far I have only examined the role of the analysand as a lover within
the transference. But what about the position of the analyst as a loved
object? Elaborating Socrates’ response to Alcibiades’ declaration of love
in the Symposium, Lacan stressed in Seminar VIII (1991b[1960–61]:185)
that the analyst ought to avoid entering the metaphor of love. Like
Socrates the analyst is approached as a loved object, invested with the
supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, yet she is not meant to
return the analysand’s love if the psychoanalytic process is to continue.
Needless to say that this guideline is but a reformulation of Freud’s
warning in ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]:165–166)
that the analyst who considers entering a love relationship with the
analysand is inevitably drawn into something else than psychoanalysis.

迄今,我仅是解释分析及作为爱人的角色,在移情里面,。但是关于分析家作为被爱的客体的立场又如何?建构苏格拉底的回应阿西比底斯的宣告爱,在“会饮篇”里,在第八研讨,拉康强调,分析家应该避免进入爱的隐喻。就像苏格拉底,分析家被接近,作为是被爱的客体,被投注作为应该知道的主体,这位阿加马。可是,分析家并没有被用来回因分析者的爱,假如精神分析的过程想要继续。自不待言,这个引导仅是重新阐释弗洛伊德的警告,在“论移情与爱的观察”:分析家若是考虑跟分析者进入爱的关系,他无可避免地会被扯进并非是精神分析的其他东西。

Even more important than the analyst’s avoidance of the metaphor of
love is her refusal to identify with the supposed subject of knowing.
When handling the transference the analyst should again follow Socrates’
example inasmuch as he incessantly impressed on his acolytes that he
knew nothing at all, his only objective in life being the ongoing evaluation
of what they themselves purportedly knew.

比起避免爱的隐喻更加重要的事情,就是分析家拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。当分析家处理移情时,他应该再次遵循苏格拉底的榜样。因为他不断地给予他的侍从这个印象:他根本什么都不知道,他一生的唯一的目标,就是正在进行的评估,他们自己被认为知道的事情。

When Lacan claimed that
analysts are supposed subjects of knowing in the transference, it is
therefore crucial to understand that this may be representative of how
analysands perceive their analysts, but not of how analysts should present
themselves vis-a-vis their patients. On numerous occasions Lacan
declared that analysts should refrain from incarnating the supposed
subject of knowing.

当拉康宣称,分析家是被认为知道的主体,在移情里。因此这是很重要的,要理解,这可能的这个代表,分析者如何感知他们的分析家,但是并不是代表分析家应该如何呈现他们自己,跟病人面对时。在无数的场合,拉康宣称:分析家应该自我节制,不要具体表现作为被认为是知道的主体。

As such, he warned in Seminar IX: ‘We need to
learn how to rid ourselves of this supposed subject of knowing at every
moment. We can never have recourse to it; that is excluded’ (Lacan 1961–
62: session of 22 November 1961). Six years later, in Seminar XIV, he
contended that analysts ought to know that they are not subjects endowed
with knowledge, and that one of the analyst’s main tasks consists in the
rectification of the effects of the analysand’s supposition (Lacan 1966–
67: session of 21 June 1967).

作为一位应该知道的主体,拉康在第九研讨班提出警告:「我们需要学习如何替我们自己摆脱这个随时被认为是知道的主体。我们永远无法诉诸于它。那是被排除的。」六年以后,在第14研讨班,拉康主张,分析家应该知道,他们并不是被禀赋具有知识的主体。分析家的主要工作之余,就是矫正分析者的假设的影响。

Taking this precept one step further, one could say that the analyst’s
identification with the supposed subject of knowing is as much a recipe
for the termination of psychoanalytic treatment as engaging in the metaphor
of love, with the caveat that in this case the relation between the analyst
and the analysand will be governed by objectification, suggestion and the
therapeutic abuse of power rather than the mutual sharing of losses and
gains. Not offering themselves as reservoirs of knowledge and not satisfying
the analysand’s demands—a venture in which they engage automatically
when they identify with the supposed subject of knowing— analysts are
expected to bring about a psychic transformation from demand to desire
in the analysand (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:430; 1977i[1958]:269). In
Seminar XI Lacan put it as follows:

当我们讲这个教导更加深入探讨,我们能够说,分析的认同是应该知道的主体,同样是一个食谱,对于精神分析治疗的终止,作为是参与爱的隐喻。带着这个旦书:在这个情况,分析家与分析者之间的关系将会受到客体化,暗示,与治疗的濫用权力的统辖。而不是互相的分享损失与获益。分析家并没有提供他们自己,作为是知识的贮存所,也没有满足分析者的要求—分析者自动地参与这样的事业,当他们认同应该知道的主体。分析家被期望导致心灵的转变,从要求转变成为分析者身上的欲望。在第11研讨班,拉康表达它如下:

In so far as the analyst is supposed to know [according to the
analysand], he is also supposed [according to the ethics of
psychoanalysis] to set out in search of unconscious desire. This is
why I say …that desire is the axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer,
by which is applied the force-element to the inertia that lies behind
what is formulated at first, in the discourse of the patient, as demand,
namely the transference.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:235, translation modified)53

因为分析家应该知道,(依照分析者的想法),也被认为应该出发寻找无意识的欲望(依照精神分析伦理学)。这就是我说的东西。欲望是轴心,枢纽,手把,铁锤。凭借它们,力量的元素比运用到惯性,隐藏在起初被阐释背后的惯性,在病人的辞说里,作为要求,换句话说,作为移情。
At the end of Seminar XI he reconstructed this mandatory analytic
transition from demand to desire—the only way out of the clinical impasse
of transference—in the so-called ‘schema of the interior eight’ (ibid.:
271):

在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重新建构这个义务的精神分析的转移,从要求转移到欲望—这是唯一的方式脱离移情的临床的僵局。这个所谓的“内部的8字形的基模”。

Figure 2 The interior eight
Source: J.Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, p. 271.

In this figure the outer line symbolizes the demands (D) verbalized by the
analysand during the initial stages of the analytic process. Through these
demands the analysand inevitably arrives at a point of transference (T),
notably when he bears witness to a belief in the supposed subject of
knowing. If this moment does not prompt the analysand to withdraw from
the treatment, it constitutes a nodal point where the trajectory of demand
bifurcates, continuing either via the line of identification or via desire.
On the one hand analysts can take advantage of their analysands’
transference to present themselves as ego ideals, proving to their patients
that they honestly care about them (thus fulfilling their demands), cultivating
a mutual working alliance, and facilitating processes of social and
behavioural modelling.

在这个图形里,外面的那条线象征要求(D),由分析者文词表达的要求,在精神分析的过程的最初的阶段。通过这些要求,分析者无可避免地到达移情的点(T).特别是当他见证一个信仰:分析家作为是应该知道的主体。假如这个时刻并没有激发分析者从治疗撤退,它会形成一个节点。在那里,要求的投射分叉出去,要就是经由认同的脉络,要不就是经由欲望的脉络。一方面,分析家能够利用他们的分析者的移情,来呈现他们自己,作为自我理想,对他们的病人证明:他们诚实地关心他们(因此,实践他们的要求),培养互相的工作的联盟,并且让社会与行为的模拟过程更加方便。

This is the approach Lacan situated on the
intersecting line of identification, and which he had designated earlier as
the hallmark of suggestion and the analytic abuse of power (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:423–438; 1977i[1958]:270).54 When analysts opt for this
strategy of transference handling, analysands identify with their analysts
and enter an endless cycle of identical demands.55

拉康将这个方法定位在移情的脉络的互相交会。他早先曾经指明这个方法,作为是暗示与精神分析的滥用权力的标记。当分析家选择处理移情的策略,分析者认同他们的分析家,并且进入认同的要求的无穷尽的迴圈。

On the other hand,
however, the analyst can also halt before the pathway of identification and
direct the analysand towards the realm of desire (d), which Lacan depicted
as an interrupted line piercing the plane of demand at the point of
transference, thus circumventing the line of identification before rejoining
that of demand.56 To open this sequence, the analyst should neither satisfy
nor frustrate the analysand’s demands (Lacan 1977i[1958]:255), but use
them as launch pads for eliciting a series of questions in the analysand:
‘What do you (analyst) want (from me)?’, ‘What do others want (from
me)?’, ‘What is it that I want (others to want from me)?’, and ‘How is
what I want influenced by what others want (from me)?’.

可是,在另一方面,分析家也能够停止,在认同的途径面前,并且引导分析者朝向欲望(d)的领域。拉康描述欲望的领域,作为是被中断的线,贯穿要求的层面,在移情的点,因此绕过认同的线,在重新加入要求的线之前。为了打开这个系列,分析家既不应该满足,也不应该挫败分析者的要求。而是要使用分析者的要求,作为发达的垫板,召唤分析者的一系列的问题:「你作为分析家想要从我这里获得什么?」,「别人想要从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要别人从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要的东西,如何受到别人从我这里想要的东西的影响?」

Again the analyst
is not supposed to answer these questions, because that would only imply
his renewed identification with the supposed subject of knowing. Rather
he is expected to enable analysands to voice their own answers, which
normally leads to the (re)construction of their fantasies and, eventually, to
their realization that it is impossible to know for once and for all what it is
they want since they are human beings endowed with an unconscious. For
analysts the linchpin of this entire procedure is their constant refusal to
identify with the supposed subject of knowing.

而且,分析家并不认为应该回答这些问题。因为那将仅是暗示他的重新的认同作为应该知道的主体。相反地,分析家被期望让分析者能够表达他们自己的回答。分析者自己的回答正常来说,会导致他们的幻见的重新建构。最后,会导致他们的体会:这个不可能的,要一劳永逸地知道他们想要什么,因为他们是禀赋著无意识的人类。对于分析家,这整个过程的支撑就是他们固定地拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。

Does this mean that Lacanian analysts are entitled to ensconce
themselves in their comfortable seats without bothering too much about
the acquisition of psychoanalytic knowledge? Not at all. In his ‘Proposition
of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, Lacan proclaimed:
‘It is clear that of the supposed knowledge he [the analyst] knows nothing
…This in no way authorises the psychoanalyst to be satisfied in the
knowledge that he knows nothing, for what is at issue is what he has to
come to know’ (Lacan 1995b[1967]:6).

这难道意味著,分析家有资格牢固他自己,于他们的舒适的座位,不必太过费心于精神分析知识的获得?绝非如此。在他的1967年的“建议”,论学院派的精神分析家,拉康宣称:「显而易见,关于这个被认为的知识,分析家一无所知。这让分析家根本就没有被授权,要满意于知识。分析家一无所知。因为受到争议的东西,是分析家必须逐渐知道。」

And in a contemporaneous
intervention on the relation between psychoanalysis and reality he declared:
‘Psychoanalysts are the wiseacres of a knowledge about which they cannot
converse with each other. This is something else than the mystagogy of
non-knowledge’ (Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). But what is this functional
knowledge analysts are asked to acquire and which is seemingly powerful
enough to guarantee their ignoring what they know?

在精神分析与现实之间的关系的当代的介入,拉康宣称:「精神分析师知识的嘲讽者。关于这个知识,他们彼此无法对谈。这是某件其他的东西,并非是非-知识的神秘学。」但是,分析家被要求去获得这个功能性的知识是什么?表面上似乎拥有足够力量保证他们忽略他们所知道的东西?

During the early 1950s
Lacan believed it was sufficient for analysts to know that their knowledge
is but a symptom of their ignorance, and that the success of their
interventions crucially depends on their ability to ignore what they know
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:349, 358). Yet from Seminar VIII he underscored
that analysts succeed in ‘knowing that they have to ignore what they know’
only if they know something about love (Lacan 1991b [1960–61]:135).

在1950年代的早期,拉康相信,这样是足够的,精神分析家只要知道,他们的知识仅是他们的无知的症状。他们的介入的成功主要依靠他们的能力,忽略他们所知道的东西。可是,从第八研讨班,拉康强调,精神分析家成功于“知道他们必须忽略他们所知道的东西”。只要他们知道有关爱的某件东西。

In
other words, knowing something about transference is a prerequisite for
suspending the knowledge one has accumulated from training sessions,
books and previous experience.

换句话说,知道关于移情的某件东西,是悬置这个知识的先决条件。我们曾开;累积这个知识,从训练的节数,书籍与先前的经验。

Once again Lacan referred to Socrates who, in spite of his incessant
confession of ignorance, did admit that he knew something about love.
Of course, when Socrates transmitted his knowledge about love he did
not speak in his own name, but through the mouth of a mysterious woman
named Diotima. Lacan interpreted this singularity of the Socratic
discourse as a move necessitated by the antagonism between Socrates’
dialectical method of inquiry and the epistemological status of the
knowledge in question.

再一次,拉康提到苏格拉底。尽管苏格拉底经常坦诚他的无知,他确实承认,他知道某件东西,关于爱。当然,当苏格拉底将他的关于爱的知识传递时,他并没有用他自己的名字谈论。而是通过一位名叫狄奥提玛的神秘的女人。拉康解释苏格拉底的辞说的独异性,作为是这个敌意必然需要的动作,苏格拉底的研究的辩证法,与受到置疑的知识的认识论的地位之间的敌意。

To Lacan knowledge of love escaped Socrates’
dialectical method, forcing him to rely on what he had learnt from the
common-sense opinions of Diotima (ibid.: 142–148). Socrates’
knowledge of love did not belong to the established realm of episteme, a
series of hard and fast scientific facts, but merely to the ethereal sphere
of doxa, the shared ideas of popular wisdom.

对于拉康,爱的知识是苏格拉底的辩证方法无法理解的。爱的这个知识强迫苏格拉底依靠他从狄奥提玛的常识的意见里学习来的东西。苏格拉底的爱的知识并没有属于认识论的已经建立的领域,那一系列的艰涩与快速的科学的事实。代替地,爱的知识仅是属于“共享观念”的空中的领域,那是通俗智慧的共享观念。

Analysts need to possess knowledge of love to be capable of ignoring
what they know and to ensure the maintenance of analytic standards, but
the knowledge of love itself constitutes a limit. This is the problem Lacan
set out to investigate in Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]), not so much
with the brief of enhancing our understanding of love, but more with the
aim of clarifying the rationale behind this limit of love and knowledge.
From the start of the seminar he informed his audience: ‘[W]hat I say of
love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it…I spoke of the love
letter, of the declaration of love—not the same thing as the word of love’
(ibid.: 12). Operating beyond the signifier, Lacan defined love as a sign,
and more specifically as a sign that one changes reason or discourse.

分析家需要拥有爱的知识,这样他才能够忽略他们所知道的东西,并且保证维持精神分析的标准。但是爱的这个知识本身形成一个限制。这就是拉康出发要研究的难题,在第20研讨班。他并没有带著强化我们对爱的理解的主题,而是目的在于澄清爱与知识的这个限制的背后的理性。从研讨班一开始,他告诉他的听众:「我所谈论的关于爱,确实就是,我们无法谈论它的东西。我谈论爱的信息,爱的宣告—这跟爱的话语,并不相同。拉康超越这个能指运作,他定义爱作为是一个讯息。更加明确底,作为我们改变理性或辞说的信息。

Unlike the signifier, love is unequivocal to the extent that it can always
be taken as indicating a transition from one discourse to another (ibid.:
16). However, love is at once the most awkward sign to recognize: neither
the jouissance of the Other, the sexual characters appearing on the surface
of the partner’s body, nor the receipt of love letters, nor the awareness
that the Other knows you so well that he can predict your whereabouts
offer reliable criteria for ascertaining the Other’s love.57 Lacan’s entire
Seminar XX hovered around an amazing paradox: love always constitutes
a sign, but nothing ever constitutes a sign of love. When love takes over,
it inevitably alters the course of human action, yet testimonies of love
are impossible to confirm by established facts.

不像能指,爱并非模棱两可,甚至爱总是能够被认为啥指示一个传递,从一个辞说传递到另一个辞说。可是,爱既是最笨拙的信息,要体认出来:爱既非是大他者的欢爽,性爱的人物出现在伴侣的身体的表面,也非是爱的信息的接收者,也非是这个知道:大他者对你甚为熟稔,以致他能够预测你的下落,提供可靠的标准,作为确的大他者的爱。拉康的整个的第20研讨班,萦绕一个令人惊奇的悖论:爱总是形成一个信息,但是没有任何东西,形成爱的一个信息。当爱接管时,爱一成不变地改变人类行动的途径,可1,爱的测试基石是不可能证实,凭借已经建立的事实。

A woman might be
convinced of her own love and the ravages it provokes, without ever
being able to prove her love to her partner and without ever being
successful in ratifying his own love for her. The crucial implication for
the analyst is that she must never take ostensible signs of love
(transference) in the analysand at face value, whilst acknowledging that
love dramatically changes the analytic picture. In addition, analysts ought
to realize that knowing everything about love is an illusion, and that
what knowledge they have must be subject to continuous revision.

女人可能相信她自己的爱与爱引起的破坏,但是女人从来就不能够证明她的爱,对她的伴侣,女人从来没没有成功地批准他对于她的爱。对于分析家的重要的暗示是,女人一定不要按照分析者身上的表面价值,接受爱的夸张的信息时。另一方面,女人必须承认,爱戏剧性地改变精神分析的画面。除外,分析家应该体会:知道有关爱的一切是一种幻觉。分析家所拥有的知识必须隶属于继续的修正。

Not complying with the metaphor of love and ignoring what he knows
on the basis of a (necessarily limited) knowledge of love, the analyst’s
task also consists in dismantling the ideals which the analysand has
conferred onto him. Whilst supporting the functions of the supposed subject
of knowing and the agalma in order to elicit the analysand’s fantasy, the
analyst needs to ensure that the transference can be analysed. Indeed, for
all his scepticism about the so-called ‘liquidation’ of the transference—
one of the pillars of mainstream French psychoanalysis during the 1950s—
Lacan never disputed the analyst’s duty of bringing about the fall (chute)
or the reduction (reduction) of the analysand’s transference (Lacan 1967–
68: session of 10 January 1968).58

分析家的工作并不是同意爱的隐喻,然后忽略他知道的东西,以爱的必然是有限的知识作基础。分析家的工作也是在于拆解这些理想,分析者给予他的这些理想。分析家一方面支持被认为是应该知道的主体与阿加马的功能,为了召唤分析者的幻见。另一方面,分析家也需要保证,这个移情能够被分析。的确,尽管分析家的怀疑主义,关于移情的所谓的“终止”–在1950年代期间,主流的法国精神分析的支柱之一。拉康从来没有争议分析家的责任,关于分析者的移情的化简的掉落。

Inducing the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing means that the analyst ought to lay bare its illusory character
after having exploited (but not identified with) its value for the construction
of the analysand’s fantasy. An elimination of the deceptive aspect of the
transference is the only meaning Lacan was willing to grant to the practice
of transference-liquidation (Lacan 1977b[1964]: 267). As such, the
Lacanian clinic does not dislodge the transference, the analyst cannot
prevent the unconscious from being re-enacted or closing up, yet the
analytic process does contribute to dissolving the dissimulation which the
supposed subject of knowing sustains.

化简被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,意味着,分析家应该揭露这种化简具有幻见的特性,当它已经利用(但并不是认同)它的价值,对于建设分析者的幻见。移情的欺骗的层面的减少,是拉康愿意给予的唯一的意义,给移情-终止的实践。作为这样的实践,拉康派的琳床并没有移除移情,分析家无法阻止无意识,不要被重新扮演,或封闭。可是,精神分析的过程确实促成这个欺骗,被认为应该知道的主体维持的欺骗。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, working towards the destabilization
of deceit equalled progressing towards the realization of truth. By contrast
with the established schools of psychoanalysis he did not flaunt the essential
replacement of (the analysand’s) transference with (the analyst’s) reality, even
less the slow maturation of the transference to the level of genital objectrelations,
defending instead the gradual substitution of truth for knowledge.59

用拉康的治疗的观念,朝向将欺骗的除掉稳定的工作,相等于是朝向体现真理的进展。跟精神分析的现存的学派对照起来,拉康并没有炫耀用基本上是分析家的现实,取代分析者的移情。甚至没有炫耀移情的缓慢地成熟到性器官的客体化的层次。代替的,拉康防卫真理逐渐被知识替换。

Saying that the analyst should act in the name of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session
of 21 June 1967) or that his feigning the position of supposed subject of knowing
is the only access to truth (Lacan 1967–68: session of 22 November 1967)
seemed even more conceited and presumptuous than proposing a
transformation of the ‘hysterical misery into common unhappiness’ (Freud
and Breuer 1895d:305) or staging a confrontation between the analysands’
pleasurable fantasies and the standard requirements of reality. Although
supported by Freud’s professed love of truth (Wahrhaftigkeit, Wahrheitsliebe)
(1915a[1914]:164; 1937c: 248), Lacan was vilified for his uncompromising
espousal of veracity as the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis, the more so after
launching statements such as ‘I, the truth, am speaking’ (Lacan
1977f[1955]:120–123; 1989b[1965]:15) and ‘I always speak the truth’ (Lacan
1990d[1973]:3).

说分析家应该行动,以真理之名,或是说,分析家伪装具有被认为是应该知道的主体,是接近真理的唯一的途径。这种说法是更加地自负与冒昧,比起建议将癔症的悲惨,转化成为共同的不快乐。或是展示一种冲突,在分析者的令人快乐的幻想,与现实的标准的要求之间。虽然受到弗洛伊德的宣称的真理之爱的支持,拉康被抨击,因为他毫不妥协地主张真理,作为是精神分析的最终的目标。他更加受的抨击,当他发动这些陈述,诸如,“我,作为真理,正在言说”,“我总是言说真理”。

But against the expectations Lacan’s notion of truth did not
signal the perfect match between reason and reality, the scientific
‘correspondence criterion’ of truth embedded in the medieval adage of
adaequatio rei et intellectus (an intellect that is in line with the thing).60 Neither
did it advance the traditional psychoanalytic goal of the analysand’s discovery
of a repressed unconscious representation, and its reintegration into a conscious
series of thoughts. The Lacanian truth emblematized no more no less than the
very absence of definitive truths within human existence, owing to the fact
that not all knowledge can be subjectified, that the enjoyment of fullness is
forever excluded, that the symbolic law of castration compels (neurotic) subjects
to desire until the end of their days.

但是对抗这些期望,拉康的真理的观念并没有指示理性与现实的完美的匹配。真理的科学的对应的标准,被镶嵌于中世纪的箴言:跟物象若合一契的知识。拉康的真理的观念也没有提升传统的精神分析的目标:分析者的发现被压抑的无意识的再现表象,以及这个被压抑的无意识的再现表象,被融化进入意识的思想的系列。拉康派的真理的具体标志,实实在在就是在人类的存在内部,明确的真理的欠缺。由于这个事实:并非所有的知识都能够被成为主体,充实的享受,。永远地被排除。阉割的象征的法则逼迫神经症的主体去欲望,直到他们的有生之年的结束。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ Lacan
decanted this truth (of an irreducible absence or lack) into the aphorism
‘There is no Other of the Other’, and its algebraical equivalent S(O),
carefully delineating its implications for analytic practice:
The lack referred to here is indeed that which I have already
formulated: that there is no Other of the Other.

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法1”,拉康倾注“无可化简的缺席或欠缺”的这个真理,成为这个警语:“没有大他者的大他者“。这句警语用代数公式等于:S(O) 。拉康仔细地描述这个警语对于精神分析的实践的重要性。在此被提到的欠缺确实就是我已经阐释的东西:大他者没有大他者。

But is this mark
made by the Unbeliever of the truth really the last word that is
worth giving in reply to the question, ‘What does the Other want
of me?’, when we, the analysts, are its mouthpiece? Surely not,
and precisely because there is nothing doctrinal about our office.
We are answerable to no ultimate truth; we are neither for nor
against any particular religion.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:316)

但是真理的不信仰者发表的这句谈论,难道确实就是最后的断言,它值得给予这个回答吗?针对这个问题:“大他者想要我什么?”。当我们作为分析家,就是真理的代言人?当然不是,确实是因为关于我们提供的服务,并没有任何信条的东西。我们并不对任何最终的真理负责。我们既不赞同,也不反对任何特殊的宗教。

The impossibility to unearth the final truth about oneself should not
embolden the analyst to answer the analysand’s question—once the
fantasy has been constructed—of ‘What does the Other want from me?’
with stock expressions such as ‘You will never know’ or ‘This is
impossible to find out’. For these statements are as much tributary to a
definitive truth as their vexed counterparts (‘This is what the Other wants’,
‘I possess the solution to your problem’). Pontificating that it is impossible
to know for once and for all what the Other wants becomes a definitive
truth in its own right, which contradicts the principle that there is no
such thing as a final truth. It is therefore sufficient for analysands to
relativize their own time-honoured answers to what the Other wants from
them, that is to say to question the trust they had put in their fantasies.

不可能挖掘关于自己的最后的真理, 不应该因此让分析家大胆地回答分析者的问题: “大他者想要从我这里获得什么?”,一旦这个幻见已经被建构, 带着现存的表达,譬如, “你永远不会知道”, 或”这是不可能发现的” . 因为这些陈述同样都是归属于明确的真理,作为他们的感到懊恼的类同之物.(“这就是大他者所想要的是东西”, “ 我拥有你的难题的解答”) .武断地说, 我们不可能一劳永逸地知道大他者想要的东西, 这句话本身就形成一个明确的真理 .这句话抵触这个原则: 没有最后的真理的这样的东西存在 . 因此,分析者有充分理由将他们自己的自古以来的回答, 作为相对的价值, 回答大他者想要从他们获得什么.换句话说, 要质疑他们给予他们的幻见的信任.

Analysts should not (and cannot) prevent analysands from formulating
new answers and creating new fantasies, their only hope being that the
distrust they have developed towards the old ones affects their attitudes
towards the new versions. In his 1967 ‘Proposition’ Lacan described
this process, which coincides with the end of the transference relation,
as a subjective destitution (destitution subjective), issuing it as the
analysand’s entry ticket to the analytic profession (Lacan 1995b[1967]:8).

分析不应该(与不能够)阻止分析者不宜阐释新的回答与创造新的幻见。他们仅有希望,他们发展的不信任,朝向旧的答案的不信任,会影响他们朝向新的版本的态度。在他的1957年的“建议”,拉康描述这个过程,巧合于移情的关系的结束。作为是主体的匮乏,发表它,作为是分析者进入精神分析的专业的入场门票。

Lacan was adamant that the fall of the supposed subject of knowing
and its concurrent effect of subjective destitution on the side of the analysand
cannot be realized through an array of transference-interpretations, that is
to say interpretations whose object is the nature of transference itself. As
he had explained in Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:428) and ‘The Direction
of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:231), the analyst cannot construct a ‘neutral’
platform outside the analysand’s transference from which to operate on
this transference. If the analysand accepts the analyst’s interpretation of
the transference, this acceptance needs to be interpreted in its own right
because the analysand is bound to hear the interpretation as coming from
the supposed subject of knowing and thus from within the transference.
Giving meta-interpretations after the transference has been interpreted does
not make a difference, since these metainterpretations would also require
interpretation, ad infinitum. As Lacan put it in his 1969 summary of Seminar
XV: ‘

拉康坚决主张,被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,与分析者这边的主体的匮乏的同时对影响,无法通过移情与独立的安排来体会。换句话说,解释的目标就是移情的特性本身。依照他在第四研讨班解释的,分析家无法建构一个“中立”的平台,。在分析者的移情的外面,来运转这个移情。假如分析者接受分析家的解释移情,这个接受需要在它自身之内被解释。因为分析者一定会听见这个解释,作为来自被认为是应该知道的主体。因此是来自移情。在移情被解释之后,给予形上的解释,并没有什么差别。因为这些形上的解释也要求解释,直到永远。如同拉康在他的1969年的“第14研讨班”的总结这样表达;

There is no transference of the transference’ (Lacan 1984[1969]:25).
Lacan’s solution to this deadlock lay in the deployment of a tactics of
interpretation which points towards the analysand’s desire rather than
the demands (for love) within the transference. The analyst makes clear
that she knows nothing about the analysand, that whatever knowledge
the analysand has assembled is futile, and that additional knowledge
(whether practical know-how or deep wisdom) is not what the analysand
can expect from the experience. On the contrary, if knowledge is at all
involved at the end of the psychoanalytic process it will appear as an
acknowledgement of the limit of the imperative to ‘Know Thyself!’
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 13 March 1968).

拉康对于这个僵局的解答在于运用解释的策略。这个解释的策略指向分析者的欲望,而不是移情之内的对爱的要求。分析家澄清,她对于分析者一无所知。无论分析者装配怎样的知识,都是徒劳的。那个额外的知识(无论是实践的技术手册,或深刻的智慧),都不是分析者能够从精神分析所期望的。相反地,假如知识在精神分析过程的结束时被牵涉进入,它将看起来像是承认“认识你自己”的命令的极限。

This tactics of interpretation
evidently challenges the meaning of analytic interpretation as such,
because the analyst neither explains the analysand’ s symptoms, nor
makes sense of what the analysand says, nor translates the analysand’s
actions into new significant units, etc. Vacillating between silence, the
punctuation of the analysand’s discourse and the formulation of oracular
sentences, the analyst cultivates the atopia of the Socratic position (Lacan
1991b [1960–61]:126–127). I will discuss the underlying principles of
these Lacanian tactics of interpretation at length in the following chapter
of this book.

解释的策略明显地挑战精神分析解释作为这种极限的意义。因为分析家既不解释分析者的症状,也没有理解分析者说的内容,也不是翻译分析者的行动,成为新的重要的单位,等等。分析家摇摆于沉默,分析者的辞说的标点,与侃侃而谈的阐述之间,分析家培养苏格拉底的立场的无边界国土。我将在这本书的下一个章节,详细讨论这些拉康学派的解释的策略的基本原则。

From the mid-1960s Lacan associated the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing with the analyst’s functioning as an object a, his disbeing
(desetre) the analysand’s cause of desire. For example, in Seminar XV
he stated:

从1969年代代中业,拉康将被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,跟分析家作为小客体a的功能,这个“非存在物”是分析者的欲望的原因。譬如,在第14研讨班,拉康陈述:

The end of analysis consists in the fall of the supposed subject of
knowing and its reduction to the accession of this object a, the
cause of the division of the subject, which replaces it. The only
thing the analyst, who fantasmatically plays the game with the
analysand as regards the supposed subject of knowing, supports at
the end of analysis is this rest of the known thing which is called
the object a.
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January 1967)

精神分析的目的,在于被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,以及它被化减到这个小客体a的让位,主体的分裂的原因。这个小客体a取代了主体。分析家幻见地跟分析者扮演这个游戏,关于被认为是应该知道的主体,分析家支持的唯一的东西,在精神分析的结束,就是这个已知之物的其余部分,被称为小客体a。

To understand the meaning of this proposition it suffices to look back at
what Lacan concluded at the end of Seminar VIII:

为了理解这个建议的意义,我们回顾一下,就足够理解拉康作为结论的东西,在第八研讨班的结束:

What Socrates knows, and what the analyst at least has to see, is
that on the level of the small a [the object a], the issue is completely
different from that of the access to an ideal. Love can only grasp
the field of being. And the analyst can only think that any object
can fulfil it. This is where we analysts are brought to balance, on
this limit where the question is raised of the value of any object
that enters the field of desire.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:459–460)

苏格拉底知道的东西,分析家至少必须看见的东西,就是,在小客体a的层次,这个问题并没有完全不同于接近理想的问题。爱仅能理解生命实存的领域。分析家仅能够认为,任何客体都能够满足它。这就是我们作为分析家被迫要平衡的东西,在这个限制。在那里,问题被提出,针对任何客体的价值,在进入欲望的领域时。

Disbeing the object a involves encouraging analysands to realize that
the supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, whose brilliance once
reassured them in their love, are but replaceable objects a, semblances
of being whose power does not outmatch that of other potential objects
and whose promise of enjoyment is doomed to remain inadequate.61 The
result of this operation, which the analyst effectuates by reducing himself
to nothing but a gaze or a voice (Lacan 1995b[1967]:10; 1967–68: session
of 7 February 1968), is that the analysand can undertake a ‘crossing’
(traversee) (Lacan 1977b[1964]:273) or succeeds in dropping out (decoir)
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:8) of his fantasy.62 Again, this result correlates with
a moment of subjective destitution which, as mentioned on p. 136, Lacan
promoted as the precondition for entering the practice of psychoanalysis.

“非存在”这个小客体a,牵涉到鼓楼分析者体会到,被认为应该知道的主体与阿加马,他们的辉煌曾有一度让他们相信他们的爱。现在仅剩可被替换的小客体a,生命实存的类似物。它的力量并没有击败其他的潜在的客体的力量。它对于欢爽的许诺,注定始终不足够。这个运作的结果,分析家让它实现,凭借将他自己化减成为仅是凝视或声音。这个运作的结果是,分析者能够理解一个“跨越”,或是成功地抛掉他的幻见。而且,这个结果跟主体的匮乏的时刻息息相关。拉康
将它提升为进入精神分析的先决条件。

As I have indicated at the end of the previous chapter, during the early
1970s Lacan opened yet another new perspective on the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, combining Freud’s idea that psychoanalysis
operates via the pathways of love (McGuire 1974:12–13) and his own
assertion that love is always a sign of changing discourses (Lacan
1998a[1972–73]: 16).

如同我曾经指示,在早先的章节的结束,在1970年代,拉康打开另外一个观点,针对精神分析治疗的目标。他将弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析经由爱的途径运作,跟他自己的主张:爱总是正在改变的辞说的讯号。

The theoretical framework for this new perspective
can be derived from a juxtaposition of two of Lacan’s numerous aphorisms
in Seminar XX and Television, statements produced in 1973 with an interval
of a mere six months. In the final pages of Seminar XX Lacan posited:
I incarnated contingency in the expression ‘stops not being written.’
For here there is nothing but encounter…

对于这个新观点的理论的架构,能够被获得,从拉康的无数的警语的其中两个警语的并列,在第20研讨班与“电视访谈“,在1973年产生的陈述,中间区隔仅六个月,在第20研讨班的最后几页,拉康提出:「我具体表现偶然性,在这个表达”停止不被书写“。因为在此,仅是存在着遭遇。

The displacement of the
negation from the ‘stops not being written’ to the ‘doesn’t stop
being written’, in other words, from contingency to necessity—
there lies the point of suspension to which all love is attached. All
love, subsisting only on the basis of the ‘stops not being written’,
tends to make the negation shift to the ‘doesn’t stop being
written’…Such is the substitute that…constitutes the destiny as
well as the drama of love.
(ibid.: 145)

从“听止不被书写“的否定,更换到”不要停止被书写“,换句话说,从偶然性替换到必然性—那里存在着悬置的点,所有的爱被连系到那个悬置的点。所有的爱,维持的基础仅是”停止不被书写“,它倾向于让这个否定转移到”不要停止被书写“。形成命运与爱的戏剧的替换就是如此。

This fragment loses much of its mysterious character if one exchanges
the notion of love for that of transference. For then it becomes clear that
Lacan hinted at the inauspicious transference situation Freud had held
responsible, in the letter to Flies from April 1900 quoted on p. 107, for
‘the apparent endlessness’ and the ‘asymptotic conclusion of the
treatment’ (Masson 1985:409): an accidental encounter (contingency)
which develops into an indispensable compulsive relationship (necessity).
The tenor of Lacan’s words at the end of Seminar XX chimed with his
oration on love in Television, although the latter concerned itself more
explicitly with the analyst’s coordination of its labours.

这个碎片丧失许多它的神秘的特性,假如我们交换爱的观念,跟移情的观念。因为那时,显而易见地,拉康暗示这个不吉祥的移情的情境,弗洛伊德要负责的移情的情境。在他写给弗利斯的信件,从1900年四月,“因为明显的没有终止“与”治疗的非症状的结论“:一个意外的遭遇(偶然性)发展成为无可免除的强迫的关系(必然性)。拉康的话语的主调,在第20研讨班的结束,跟他在”电视访谈“的侃侃而谈爱,互相共鸣。虽然后者更加明确地关注到分析家对于爱的劳苦的调和。

After having
expounded that the analytic discourse promises to introduce something
new within the field of love (Lacan 1990d[1973]:28), an arena marked
by the impasse (closure) of the unconscious, he contended that this novelty
requires only that somewhere the sexual relation stops not being
written, that contingency be established (what it comes down to),
so as to make headway on that which will later be completed by
demonstrating such a relation to be impossible, that is by instituting
it in the real.
(ibid.: 39, translation modified)

拉康解释,精神分析辞说承诺要介绍某件新的东西,在爱的领域里面。这一个斗技场被标识是无意识的僵局(封闭)。拉康主张,这个新奇仅是要求,某个地方,性的关系停止不被书写,偶然性应该被建立(它的总结),为了向前推进,后来将会被完成对东西,凭借证明这样的关系是不可能。也就是,凭借在实在界建立它。

This sentence contains first of all an argument to bring the necessity of the
analysand’s transference back to its underlying contingency. Chosen in an
unexpected, yet fortunate encounter and gradually transformed into a
standard feature of the analysand’ s life, the analyst tries to re-establish
her original position as an accidental, replaceable find. This restoration of
contingency is a prerequisite for the analysand’s discovery that everything
will fall short of the ‘perfect match’ or, to use Lacan’s words in the second
part of the above sentence, that the sexual relation is impossible.

这个句子首先包含一个论点:要将分析者的移情的必要性,带回到它作为基础的偶然性。当分析家被选中,在出乎意外,可是有幸运的遭遇里,然后逐渐被转化成为分析者的生活的标准的特征,分析家尝试重新建立她的原初的立场,作为是偶然,可被替换的发现。偶然性的恢复是分析者的发现的先决条件:每件事情都无法符合“完美的匹配“,或是,用拉康的话语说,在以上的句子的第二部分:性的关系是不可能的。

If the analyst moves from contingency to necessity and back, then the
same could be said of the entire analytic process. Lacan’s words in
Television could indeed be read as also comprising an argument for
calibrating psychoanalytic practice around surprise, revelation, sudden
discovery, etc. Conceiving psychoanalytic treatment as a discipline of
contingencies could also solve the question as to how the discourse of
the analyst can subsist if it is predicated upon love and if love is the sign
of changing discourses.

假如分析家从偶然性移动到必然性,然后回转,然后相同的道路,对于完整的精神分析的过程而言,也是真实的。拉康在“电视访谈“的话语,确实能够被阅读为,也是包含一个论点,作为订定精神分析实践的标准,环绕着惊奇,启示,突然发现,等等。将精神分析的治疗构想为偶然性的专业,也能够解决这个问题,关于分析家的辞说如何能够存在,假如它是以爱作为陈述,假如爱是正在改变的辞说的讯息。

As I have mentioned before (see p. 134), Lacan
stipulated at the beginning of Seminar XX that the sign of love strikes
whenever a subject is moving from one discourse to another. But if
psychoanalysis is indeed effected by love, how is it possible to
institutionalize a discourse that is no more no less than the transition
from one discourse to another? One answer could be that the entire period
between the analysand’s entry into and departure from analysis represents
a transition from one discourse, say a deeply ingrained life-style, to
another. A second answer could be that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place every time an analysand has a session with the
analyst.

如同我以前曾经提到,拉康在第20研讨班的开始提出但书:爱的讯息打击,每当主体正在移动,从一个辞说到另外一个辞说。但是,假如精神分析确实是由爱造成结果,这如何是可能的?要将辞说形成体制?这个辞说实实在在就是从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说?其中一个答案可能是:整个时期,在分析家的进入,与从精神分析的出发之间的整个的时期,代表从一个辞说的转移,譬如,根深蒂固的生活-形态,转移到另外一个辞说。第二个答案可能是:从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说会发生,每当分析者跟分析家进行咨商时。

Each of these answers is valid only if one forgets that analysands do
not immediately change their ways when entering psychoanalysis, neither
during individual nor over consecutive sessions. Despite the rule of free
association, analysands commonly fall back on their usual, current
discourse. Some analysands even believe that the day they will be able
to engage in free association will also constitute the end of their analysis.

这些回答的每一个都是正确的,只要我们忘记,分析者并没有立即改变他们的方式,当他们进入精神分析时,既不是在个人的咨商,也不是在连续性的咨商。尽管自由联想到规则,分析者通常依靠他们的寻常的目前的辞说。有些分析者甚至相信,他们将会从事自由联想到那一天,将也是形成精神分析结束。

My answer to the above problem is that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place at irregular moments, both during the course of
psychoanalytic treatment and outside a psychoanalytic setting. The only
difference between the emergence of these transitions is that within the
treatment they are consciously provoked by the analyst, whereas outside
they occur more or less haphazardly. When Lacan stated in Television
that conceiving something new requires contingency (what stops not
being written), this applies directly to how the analytic discourse affects
the analysand who is subjugated to the necessities of other discourses:
not the regular pattern of analytic sessions, but the unexpected appearance
of a new signifier governs the process of change.

针对以上的难题,我的回答是:从一个辞说转换到另外一个辞说发生在不规律的时刻。两者都在精神分析的治疗的过程,与外在于精神分析的背景。唯一的差异,在这些转换的出现之间的唯一的差异是,在治疗内部,他们意识方面受到分析家的激发。而在外面,他们相当偶然地发生。 当拉康在“电视访谈”陈述:构想某件新的东西,要求偶然性(停止不被书写的东西),这直接运用到精神分析的辞说如何影响分析者,隶属于其他的辞说的必然性的分析者:这并不是精神分析咨商的规律模式,而是新的能指的意外的出现,统辖改变的过程。

Since the destiny and drama of love hinges on a shift from contingency
to necessity, as Lacan put it in Seminar XX, the ultimate psychoanalytic
effect can only involve a reduction of the established necessity of the
analytic effects themselves to the status of simple contingency. This
process requires an analysis of the analytic experience, in which the
analysand can come to realize that it was no more than an accident on
his particular journey through life. The ultimate analytic effect thus
coincides with the termination of psychoanalysis, after which the
analysand will hopefully understand, at least if the treatment was
Lacanian, not the true signification but the nonsensicality of the entire
experience, not the necessity but the impossibility of finding definitive
answers to the questions of life.

既然命运与爱的戏剧都依附从偶然性的转变成为必然性。如同拉康在第20研讨班表达它。最后的精神分析的影响仅会牵涉到将精神分析的影响本身的已经建立的必要性,化减成为单纯的偶然性的地位。在那里,分析者能够逐渐体会到,那仅是一件意外,在他经历的人生的特殊的旅途。最后的精神分析的影响,因此巧合于精神分析的终止。在精神分析终止之后,分析家将会希望地了解,至少假如治疗是拉康学派的话,不是了解这个必然性,而是了解这个不可能:提人生的问题找到明确的答案的不可能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:超验的功能

November 27, 2015

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION 1
超验的功能
Prefatory Note
This essay was written in 1916. Recently it was discovered by stu¬dents of the C. G . .lung Institute, Zurich, and was brought out in a private edition in its first, provisional form, in an ‘English transla¬tion. In order to prepare it for publication, I have worked over the manuscript, while preserving the main trend of thought and the un¬avoidable limitedness of its horizon. After forty-two years, the prob¬lem has lost nothing of its topicality, though its presentation is still in need of extensive improvement, as anyone can see who knows the material.
这篇论文在1916年被写成。最近,苏黎世,荣格研究所的学生发现它。以私人的版本被出版,照它的第一次的暂时的形式,作为英译本。为了准备让它出版。我曾经修正原稿。虽然我保存它思想的倾向与它的视阔的无法避免的有限性。经过42年,这个难题并没有丧失它的主题。虽然它的呈现依旧还需要广泛的修正。如同任何人都会看出,是谁知道这个材料。

The essay may therefore stand, with all its imperfections, as an historical document. It may give the reader some idea of the efforts of understanding which were needed for the first attempts at a syn¬thetic view of the psychic process in analytical treatment. As its basic argument is still valid today, it may stimulate the reader to a broader and deeper understanding of the problem. This problem is identical with the universal question: How does one come to terms in practice with the unconscious?

尽管它的不完美,这篇论文因此充当是历史的文件。它可能给予读者努力要理解的观念。这些理解的努力是需要的,因为这是首次的企图,要综合地理解心灵的过程,在精神分析的治疗里。因为它的基本的论点今天依旧有效。它可能激发读者更加广泛,更加深入地理解这个难题。这个难题认同普世的问题:我们如何跟无意识达成妥协?

1 [Written in 1916 under the title “Die Transzendente Funktion,” the ms. lay in Professor Jung’s files until 1953. First published in 1957 by the Students Associa¬tion, C. G. Jung Institute, Zurich, in an English translation by A. R. Pope. The German original. considerably revised by the author. was published in Geist lJnd Werk … %Urn 75. Geburtstag van Dr. Daniel Brady (Zurich, 1958), together with a prefatory note of more general import specially written for that volume. The author has partially rewritten the note for publication here. The present transla¬tion is based on the revised German version, and Mr. Pope’s translation has been consulted.-EDlTORS.]
67

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE
This is the question posed by the philosophy of India, and par¬ticularly by Buddhism and Zen. Indirectly, it is the fundamental question, in practice, of all religions and all philosophies. For the unconscious is not this thing or that; it is the Unknown as it immedi¬ately affects us.

这是印度哲学提出的这个问题,特别是佛教与禅宗。间接地,这是所有的宗教与所有的哲学,实践时的基本的问题。因为无意识并不是这个东西,或那个东西。无意识是未知者,因为它立即影响我们。

The method of “active imagination,” hereinafter described, is the most important auxiliary for the production of those contents of the unconscious which lie, as it were, immediately below the thres¬hold of consciousness and, when intensified, are the most likely to irrupt spontaneously into the conscious mind. The method, there¬fore, is not without its dangers and should, if possible, not be em¬ployed except under expert supervision.

因此而被描述的“积极想像”的方法,是最重要的辅助,对于无意识的那些内容的产生。也就是说,立即隐藏在意识的门槛底下的的无意识。当它被强化时,是最有可能自动自发地爆发进入意识的心灵。因此,这个方法,并不是没有它的危险。假如可能的话,这个方法不应该被使用,除了在专家的监督之下。

One of the lesser dangers is that the procedure may not lead to any positive result, since it easily passes over into the so-called “free association” of Freud, whereupon the patient gets caught in the sterile circle of his own complexes, from which he is .in any case unable to escape. A further danger, in itself harmless, is that, though authentic contents may be produced, the patient evinces an exclusively aesthetic interest in them and con¬sequently remains stuck in an all-enveloping phantasmagoria, so that once more nothing is gained. The meaning and value of these fan¬tasies are revealed only through their integration into the personality as a whole-that is to say, at the moment when one is confronted not only with what they mean but also with their moral demands.

其中一个次要的危险是,这个程序可能不会导致任何的积极的结果。因为它很容易被传递成为弗洛伊德的所谓的“自由联想”。在“自由联想”里,病人被套陷于他自己的各种情结的贫瘠的圈子里。更加深入的危险,本身是无害的。虽然它的真诚的内容可能被产生,病人逃避对于它们的专属美学的興趣,并且结果,始终被卡陷在涵盖一切的巨大幻影里。所以,再一次,并没有任何东西被获得。这些幻见的意义与价值,被显示出来,仅是凭借体它们的融合进入整体的人格里。换句话说,就在当我们不但面临它们的意义,而且面临它们的道德的要求。

Finally, a third danger-and this may in certain circumstances be a very serious matter-is that the subliminal contents already possess such a high energy charge that, when afforded an outlet by active imagination, they may overpower the conscious mind and take pos¬session of the personality. This. gives rise to a condition which¬temporarily, at least-cannot easily be distinguished from schizo¬phrenia, and may even lead to a genuine “psychotic interval.” The method of active imagination, therefore, is not a plaything for chil¬dren. The prevailing undervaluation of the unconscious adds con¬siderably to the dangers of this method. On the other hand, there can be no doubt that it is an invaluable auxiliary for the psycho¬therapist.

最后,第三个危险。在某些的情况,这可能是一个非常严肃的事情。第三个危险是,升华的内容已经形成如此高的能源负荷量。当它被积极想像给予一个出口,它们可能压倒意识的心灵,并且拥有人格。这会产生一个情况。这个情况暂时,至少不容易跟精神分裂症区别出来。甚至可能导致真诚的“精神病的间隔期间”。因此,积极想像的方法,并不是儿戏之物。目前流行对于无意识的低估,对这个方法的危险,更是雪上加霜。在另一方面,无可置疑地,对于精神病的治疗师,这是个宝贵的辅助之物。

C. G. J.
KiisnachtJ July I958 / September I959
68

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
1111 There is nothing mysterious or metaphysical about the term
“transcendent function.” It means a psychological function com-parable in its way to a mathematical function of the same name, which is a function of real and imaginary numbers. The psy-chological “transcendent function” arises from the union of conscious and unconscious contents.

关于“超验的功能”,没有什么神秘或形上学之处。“超验的功能”意味著心理的功能,它的方式可类比相同名称的数学的功能。这个数学的功能是实在而想像的数字的功能。心理学的“超验的功能”起源于意识与无意识的内容的统合。

132 Experience in analytical psychology has amply shown that
the conscious and the unconscious seldom agree as to their con¬tents and their tendencies. This lack of parallelism is not just accidental or purposeless, but is due to the fact that the uncon¬scious behaves in a compensatory or complementary manner towards the conscious. We can also put it the other way round and say that the conscious behaves in a complementary manner towards the unconscious. The reasons for this relationship are:

分析心理学的经验充分显示,意识与无意识很少同意一致,关于他们的内容与它们的倾向。相提并论的这个欠缺并不仅是偶然,或没有目的。而是由于这个事实:无意识的行为,是以补偿或辅助的方式,朝向意识。我们也能够将它倒转过来,并且说,意识的行为,是以辅助的方式,朝向无意识。这个关系的理由是:

(1) Consciousness possesses a threshold intensity which its contents must have attained, so that all elements that are too weak remain in the unconscious.

意识拥有一个门槛的张力,意识的内容一定已经获得这个门槛的张力。这样,所有太过于微弱的元素,始终留在无意识里。

(2) Consciousness, because of its directed functions, exercises an inhibition (which Freud calls censorship) on all incompatible material, with the result that it sinks into the unconscious.

因为它的被引导的功能,意识运用一种压抑(弗洛伊德称之为审查),施加在所有不和谐的材料。结果是:意识沉落进入无意识。

(3) Consciousness constitutes the momentary,process of ad-aptation; .•. •whereas the unconscious contains not only all the forgotten material of the individual’s own past, but all the in¬herited behaviour traces constituting the structure of the mind.

意识构成适应的暂时的过程。而无意识包含不但是所有被个人自己的过去遗忘的材料,而且包含所有的被遗传的行为的痕迹,它们组成心灵的结构。

(4) The unconscious contains all the fantasy combinations which have not yet attained the threshold intensity, but which in the course of time and under suitable conditions will enter the light of consciousness.

无意识包含所有的幻见的组合,这些组合还没有获得门槛的张力。但是随著时间过去,在合适的情况之下。所有的幻想的组合将会进入意识的光辉里。

133 This readily explains the complementary attitude of the
unconscious towards the conscious.

这迅速地解释无意识朝向意识的辅助的态度。

134 The definiteness and directedness of the conscious mind are
qualities that have been acquired relatively late in the history of the human race, and are for instance largely lacking among primitives today. These qualities are often impaired in the neurotic patient, who differs from the normal person in that his threshold of consciousness gets shifted more easily; in other words, the partition between conscious and unconscious is much more permeable. The psychotic, on the other hand; is under the direct influence of the unconscious.

意识心灵的明确性与方向感,是已经被获得的特质,在人类种族的历史的比较晚晴。譬如,在今天的原始种族,主要是欠缺明确性与方向感。这些特质经常受到伤害,在神经症的病人身上。神经症病人遭受正常人的痛苦,因为他的意识的门槛更加容易被转移。换句话说,在意识与无意识之间的间隔,更加被渗透。另一方面,精神病者则是在无意识的直接的影响之下。

135
69

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE

The definiteness and directedness of the conscious mind are extremely important acquisitions which humanity has bought at a very heavy sacrifice, and which in turn have rendered hu¬manity the highest service. Without them science, technology, and civilization would be impossible, for they all presuppose the reliable continuity and directedness of the conscious process. For the statesman, doctor, and engineer as well as for the simplest labourer, these qualities are absolutely indispensable. We may say in general that social worthlessness increases to the degree that these qualities are impaired by the unconscious. Great artists and others distinguished by creative gifts are, of course, exceptions to this rule. The very advantage that such individuals enjoy consists precisely in the permeability of the partition separating the conscious and the unconscious. But, for those professions and social activities which require just this continuity and reliability, these exceptional human beings are as a rule of little value.

意识心灵的明确性与方向感是极端重要的获得之物。人类曾经耗费重大的牺性,才买到的重要的获得之物。然后轮到它们提供人类最崇高的服务。假如没有它们,科学,科技,与文明将是不可能的。因为它们都预先假设意识的过程,具有这个可靠的连续性与方向感。对于政治家,医生,与工程师,以及对于纯朴的劳工,这些特质绝对是无可避免的。我们通常说,社会的没有价值感,随着这些特质的受到无意识的伤害而增加。伟大的艺术家与其他凭借创造的天赋而显著的人们,当然是这个常规的例外。这些个人享受的利益,确实主要是在于分开意识与无意识的间隔的可渗透性。但是,对于那些专业与社会的活动,它们仅是要求这个连续性与可靠性。这些特别的人类,通常并没有多大的价值。

136 It is therefore understandable, and even necessary, that in
each individual the psychic process should be as stable and definite as possible, since the exigencies of life demand it. But this im’olves a certain disadvantage: the quality of directedness makes for the inhibition or exclusion of all those psychic ele¬ments which appear to be, or really are, incompatible with it, ie., likely to bias the intended direction to suit their purpose and so lead to an undesired goal. But how do we know that the concurrent psychic material is “incompatible”? We know it by an act of judgment which determines the direction of the path that is chosen and desired.
因此,这是可以理解的,甚至是必要的。在每个个人身上,心灵的过程应该尽可能地稳的与明确。因为生命的迫切性要求它。但是这牵涉到某个不利:方向感的品质朝向压抑或排除所有那些心灵的元素。表面上,或实际上跟它格格不入的心灵的元素。譬如,很可能让这个意图的方向产生偏见,以适应他们的目的,因此,导致一个并不被欲望的目标。但是,我们如何知道,这个同时发生的心灵的材料是“不相和谐”?我们知道它,凭借判断的行动。这个判断的行动决定被选择,被欲望的途径的方向。

This judgment is partial and preju¬diced, since it chooses one particular possibility at the cost of all the others. The judgment in its turn is always based on experience, i.e., on what is already known. As a rule it is never based on what is new, what is still unknown, and what under certain conditions might considerably enrich the directed proc¬ess. It is evident that it cannot be, for the very reason that the unconscious contents are excluded from consciousness.

这个判断是部分,而且具有偏见。因为它选择一个特殊的可能,牺牲所有其他的可能。然后轮到这个判断总是以经验作为基础。譬如,以已经被知道的东西作为基础。通常,它从来没有以新的东西作为基础,以依旧未被知道的东西,以在某些的情况里,可能会丰富被引导方向的过程作为基础。显而易见地,它不可能是这样。理由是,无意识的内容从意识里被排除出来。

137 Through such acts of judgment the directed process neces-
sarily becomes one-sided, even though the rational judgment may appear many-sided and unprejudiced. The very rationality of the judgment may even be the worst prejudice, since we call reasonable what appears reasonable to us. What appears to us unreasonable is therefore doomed to be excluded because of its
70

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
irrational character. It may really be irrational, but may equally well merely appear irrational without actually being so when seen from another standpoint.

凭借判断的这些行动,被引导方向的过程必然会成为是单边,即使理性的判断可能看起来是许多边与没有偏见。判断的理性化甚至可能是最糟糕的偏见。因为我们称我们看起来是合理的东西,为合理。我们看起来是不合理的东西,因此注定会被排除,因为它的非理性的特性。它可能确实是非理性的,但是它同样很有理由仅是外表是非理性。但是实际上,从另外一个观点来看,它实际上并没有非理性。

138 One-sidedness is an unavoidable and necessary characteristic
of the directed process, for direction implies one-sidedness. It is an advantage and a drawback at the same time. Even when no outwardly visible drawback seems to be present, there is always an equally pronounced counter-position in the unconscious, unless it happens to be the ideal case where all the psychic components are tending in one and the same direction. This possibility cannot be disputed in theory, but in practice it very rarely happens. The counter-position in the unconscious is not dangerous so long as it .does not possess any high energy-value. But if the tension increases as a result of too great one-sidedness, the counter-tendency breaks through into consciousness, usually just at the moment when it is most important to maintain the conscious direction. Thus the speaker makes a slip of the tongue just when he particularly wishes not to say anything stupid. This moment is critical because it possesses a high energy ten¬sion which, when the unconscious is already charged, may easily “spark” and release the unconscious content.

单边性是被引导的过程的一个无可避免而且必要的特性。因为方向感暗示单边性。它既是利用,又是挫折。甚至,当没有外在的可看见的挫折似乎存在时,还是总是有一个同被宣告的反对-立场,在无意识里。除非,它恰好就是理想的情况。当所有的心灵的成分倾向于朝相同的方向。这个可能性无法用理论来争辩。但是实际上,它很少发生。无意识的反对-立场并不危险,只要它没有拥有高度的能源的价值。但是,假如这个紧张增加,由于太过强烈的单边性的结果。反对的倾向会突破进入意识,通常就是这个时刻,要维持意识的方向是非常重要的时刻。因此,言说者会有口误,正当他特别愿望不要说出任何愚蠢的事情。这个时刻是非常重要的,因为它拥有高度能源的紧张。当无意识已经被负荷,它可能“触发”并且释放无意识的内容。

139 Civilized life today demands concentrated, directed con-
scious functioning, and this entails the risk of a considerable dissociation from the unconscious. The further we are able to remove ourselves from the unconscious through directed func¬tioning, the more readily a powerful counter-position can build up in the unconscious, and when this breaks out it may have disagreeable consequences.

今天的文明生活要求专注的被引导的意识的功能。这涵盖这个冒险:跟无意识解离的冒险。我们越是能够将自己从无意识移除越远,通过被引导的功能,一个反动的离场越是迅速地累积起来。当发生这样的状况时,那可能拥有不和谐的结果。

14° Analysis has given us a profound insight into the importance
of unconscious influences, and we have learnt so much from this for our practical life that we deem it unwise to expect an elimination or standstill of the unconscious after the so-called completion of the treatment. Many patients, obscurely recogniz¬ing this state of affairs, have great difficulty in deciding to give up the analysis, although both they and the analyst find the feeling of dependency irksome. Often they are afraid to risk standing on their own feet, because they know from experience that the unconscious can intervene again and again in their lives in a disturbing and apparently unpredictable manner.

精神分析给予我们深刻的内省,洞察到无意识的影响的重要性。我们从这里学习众多,作为我们的生活,以致我们认人这是不明智的,期望无意识的减少或停滞,经过所谓的知疗的完成。许多病人,模糊地体认事情的这个状态,他们遭遇许多困难,当他们要决的放弃精神分析。虽然他们与分析家发现依靠的感觉是乏味的。经常,他们是害怕独立行事的冒险。因为他们根据经验知道,无意识能够一再地介入他们的生活,用一个令人困扰与明显无法被预测的方式。

141
71

THE STRUCTURE AND DYNAMICS OF THE PSYCHE

It was formerly assumed that patients were ready to copewith normal life as soon as they had acquired enough practical self-knowledge to understand their own dreams. Experience has shown, however, that even professional analysts, who might be expected to have mastered the art of dream interpretation, often capitulate before their own dreams and have to call in the help of a colleague. If even one who purports to be an expert in the method proves unable to interpret his own dre~ms satis-factorily, how much less can this be expected of the patient. Freud’s hope that the unconscious could be “exhausted” has not be’en fulfilled. Dream-life and intrusions from the unconscious continue-m utatis m utan dis-unim peded.

先前,我们假定,病人准备要处理正常的生活,当他们已经获得足够的实践的自性-知识,为了理解他们自己的梦想。可是,我们根据经验知道,即使是专业的精神分析家,他们被期望已经掌控梦的解释的技艺,他们经常束手无策于他们自己的梦,并且必须召唤同事的帮忙。假如被认为是这个方法的专家,都没有能力令人满意地解释他自己的梦,对于病人,那就更没有什么奢望。 弗洛伊德的希望,无意识能够被“穷尽理解”,并没有被实现。梦与无意识的闯入继续排山倒海而来。

142 There is a widespread prejudice that analysis is something
like a “cure,” to which one submits for a time and is then dis¬charged healed. That is a layman’s error left over from the early days of psychoanalysis. Analytical treatment could be described as a readjustment of psychological attitude achieved with the help of the doctor. Naturally this newly won attitude, which is better suited to the inner and outer conditions, can last a con¬siderable time, but there are very few cases where a single “cure” is permanently successful

有一个广泛的偏见;精神分析是某件像是治疗的东西。我们有一阵子,接受这种治疗,因此被疗愈出院。那是外行人的错误,从精神分析的早期遗留下来。精神分析的治疗能够被描述,作为重新调整心理的态度,凭借医生而获得。当然,这个刚刚被赢得的态度,比较能够适合内在与外在的情况。能够维持相当长久的时间。但是,单一的“治疗”是永久的成功,这样的个案是很少的。

It is true that medical optimism has never stinted itself of publicity and has always been able to report definitive cures. We must, however, not let ourselves be deceived by the all-t0
o-human attitude of the practitioner. but should always remember that the life of the unconscious goes on and continually produces problematical situations. There is no need for pessimism; we have seen too many excellent results achieved with good luck and honest work for that. But this need not prevent us from recognizing that analysis is no once¬and-for-all “cure”; it is no more, at first, than a more or less thorough readjustment. There is no change that is uncondi¬tionally valid over a long period of time. Life has always to be tackled anew.

的确,医学的乐观主义从来没有不引起大众注意,并且总是能够报导明确的治疗。可是,我们一定不要让自己被欺骗,被执业医师的太过于人性的态度欺骗。相反地,我们应该总是记住:无意识的生活继续下去,并且继续产生问题重重的情况。没有悲观主义的需要。我们曾经看见太多的优秀的结果,非常幸运地,而且诚实工作地被获得。但是,这并不需要阻止我们不去体会出,精神分析并没有一劳永逸地被“治疗”。起初,它仅是相当彻地被调整。没有任何改变是无条件地有效漫长的时间。生命总是必须重新被克服。

There are, of course, extremely durable collec¬tive attitudes which permit the solution of typical conflicts. A collective attitude enables the individual to fit into society without friction, since it acts upon him like any other condition of life. But the patient’s difficulty consists precisely in the fact that his individual problem cannot be fitted without friction into a collective norm; it requires the solution of an individual conflict if the whole of his personality is to remain viable. No rational solution can do justice to this task, and there is abso-
72

THE TRANSCENDENT FUNCTION
lutelyno collective norm that could replace an individual solu¬tion without loss.
当然,会有极端耐久度集体的态度容许典型的冲突的解决。集体的态度让个人能够适应进入社会,而没有冲突。因为它依靠他来行动,就像任何其他的生活的情况。但是,病人的困难确实是在于这个事实:个人的难题无法没有冲突地被调适成为集体的名称。它要求个人的冲突的解决,假如他的人格的整体想要保持行得通。对于这项工作,任何理性的解决都无法彻底。绝对没有一个集体名称能够取代个人的解决,而没有丧失。

143 The new attitude gained in the course of analysis tends
sooner or later to become inadequate in one way or another, and necessarily so, because the constant flow of life again and again demands fresh adaptation. Adaptation is never achieved once and for all. One might certainly demand of analysis that it should enable the patient to gain new orientations in later life, too, without undue difficulty. And expe’rience shows that this is true up to a point. We often find that patients who have gone through a thorough analysis have considerably less difficulty with new adjustments later on.

在精神分析的过程被获得的这个新的态度,倾向于迟早会变成不足够,用某种的方式,而且必然是不足够。因为生命的经常的流动一再地要求新鲜的调适。 调适从来没有一劳永逸地被获得。我们确实可能要求精神分析应该让病人能够获得新的方向,在以后的生活,而没有过分的困难。经验告诉我们,这到达某个时刻是真实的。我们经常发现,曾经经历彻底的精神分析的病人,遭遇较少的困难,对于后来的调适。

Nevertheless, these difficulties prove to be fairly frequent and may at times be really trouble¬some. That is why even patients who have had a thorough analy¬sis often turn to their old analyst for help at some later period. In the light of medical practice in general there is nothing very unusual about this, but it does contradict a certain misplaced enthusiasm on the part of the therapist as well as the view that analysis constitutes a unique “cure.” In the last resort it is highly improbable that there could ever be a therapy that got rid of all difficulties. Man needs difficulties; they are necessary for health. What concerns us here is only an excessive amount of them.

可是,这些困难证明是相当频繁,有时,可能确实引起麻烦。那就是为什么即使是曾经做过彻底的精神分析的病人,经常求助于他们的有经验的分析家帮忙,在某个后来的时期。从一般的医学实践的观点,关于这点,并没有任何不寻常之处。但是,它确实抵触某个误置位置的热忱,在治疗师方面,以及这个观念:精神分析组成一个独特的“治疗”。最后,这会变得非常不可能,要找到一个排除一切困难的治疗方法。人需要困难,困难对于健康是必要的。我们在此关心的事情是,仅是困难的数量过于庞大。

144 The basic question for the therapist is not how to get rid of
the momentary difficulty, but how future difficulties may be successfully countered. The question is: what kind of menta] and moral attitude is it necessary to have towards the disturbing influences of the unconscious, and how can it be conveyed to the patient?

对于治疗师,基本的问题并不是如何排除暂时的困难,而是未来的困难可能如何成功地被应付。这个问题是:必须要拥有什么种类的精神与道德的态度,对待无意识的这个令人困扰的影响?以及它如何被传达给病人?

拉康:知识之爱与爱的标记

November 21, 2015

LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE AGALMA
知识之爱与爱的标记

The intersubjective relationship between the analysand and the analyst,
and the analyst’s ineluctable involvement in the analysand’s transference
indicate that Lacan’s original outlook of transference singled out the
analytic situation as a constructive dialogue on the symbolic plane of
full speech or, better still, as an interaction between two subjective desires.

分析者与分析家之间的互为主体性关系,以及分析家的难以避免的牵涉分析者的移情,指示著,拉康对于移情的原初的观点,突显出精神分析的情境,作为是建设性的对话,在充分言说的象征的层面。或者,更好的是,作为两个主体的欲望之间的互动。

Many of Lacan’s glosses on transference from the 1950s could be
mustered to corroborate this picture and many of Lacan’s attacks on the
techniques of transference handling within ego-psychology could be read
as implicit arguments for the revival of psychoanalytic treatment as a
symbolic interaction between two subjects.36

从1950年开始,拉康对于移情的许多铨释能够被聚集来形成这个画面。拉康对于自我-心理学之内,处理移情的技术的许多攻击,能够被阅读作为是暗示的论点,赞同精神分析的治疗的复興,作为是象征的互动,处于两个主体之间。

Lacan’s post-1960 contributions cleared the way for a completely
different view. To see how radically his ideas on transference changed
over the course of a decade, it suffices to contrast a statement from his
1957 ‘The Agency of the Letter’ (1977g[1957]) with a passage from his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
(1995b[1967]).

拉康在1960后的贡献,替一个完全不同的观点,清理途径。假如我们看见,拉康在十年的过程当中,他对于移情的观念如何强烈地改变。这就足够将一个陈述,从1957年的“信息的代理者”,跟1967年10月的建议,针对学院派的精神分析家的一个段落,作为对照。

Referring again to Freud’s explanation of transference
in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Lacan reported in the former
text that ‘transference…gave its name to the mainspring of the
intersubjective link between analyst and analysand’ (Lacan
1977g[1957]:170). Ten years later he shattered any remaining faith in
the value of this name, stating with undisguised disdain:
I am astounded that no-one has ever thought of objecting to me,
given certain of the terms of my doctrine, that the transference
alone is an objection to intersubjectivity. I even regret it, seeing
that nothing is more true: it refutes it, it is its stumbling block.
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:4)

拉康再次提的弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在“梦的解析”里。拉康在先前的文本报导,移情给予它的名字,给分析家与分析者之间的互为主体的联接的动力。十年以后,他粉碎任何剩余的信仰,对于移情这个名字的价值。他带着毫不伪装的藐视陈述:「我大为吃惊,竟然从来没有人反对我。假如考虑到,我的信条的某些术语。光是移情就是互为主体间性的反对。我深知对它感到遗憾。因为没有一样东西比它更加真实,移情反驳互为主体间隙。移情是互为主体间性的绊脚石。」

Prepared in the course of his Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:357–358) and
advanced more emphatically in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i
[1958]:229–230) and the ‘Remark on the Report by Daniel Lagache’
(1966e[1960]:655–656), Lacan’s self-criticism of intersubjectivity had
reached a first peak in Seminar VIII, On Transference (1991b[1960–
61]), which initiated a less homogeneous, more conflict-ridden version
of the analytic relationship.37

拉康对于互为主体间性的批评,在第四研讨班的过程已经准备。然后在“治疗的方向”,以及“拉噶奇的报告的谈论”,更加强调地提出。在第八研讨班,“论移情”,拉康对于互为主体间性的自我批评首次达到颠峰。第八研讨班,“论移情”开启一个比较没有那么同质性,更加充满冲突的说法,对于精神分析的关系。

Seminar VIII was strewn with references to the insuperable inequity
which the transference instates between the analysand and the analyst.
Sometimes Lacan designated this inequity as a ‘subjective disparity’
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233), at other times he qualified it as a
fundamental discordance or dissymmetry (ibid.: 53, 68). As I have pointed
out in the previous chapter (pp. 72–73), Lacan’s self-criticism had grown
out of the observation that intersubjectivity does not exclude the perils
of a reciprocal, imaginary ‘therapeutic alliance’ between the analysand
and the analyst.38

第八研讨班的内容散布著无法克服的不平等,移情安置的不平等,在分析者与分析家之间。有时,拉康指明这个不平等,作为是“主体性的差异”。还有些时刻,他将这个不平等赋予基本的不协调或不均称的特质。如同我曾经指出,在先前的章节,拉康的自我-批评是产生于这个观察:互为主体性并没有排除互惠的,想像的联盟的危险,在分析者与分析家之间。

In Seminar VIII he argued that intersubjectivity is an
altogether erroneous description of what takes place within the analytic
setting, quite simply because this setting is governed by transference,
which is in turn pervaded by love. To demonstrate that transference runs
counter to intersubjectivity Lacan thus rejuvenated his Freudian
equivalence of transference and love, initially adumbrated in Seminar I
(1988b[1953–54]:90), now showing that love entails everything but a
harmonious interaction between two complementary subjects.

在第八研讨班,拉康主张,互为主体性是一个完全错误的描述,对于发生在分析家的背景内部。这完全是因为这个背景受到移情的统辖,然后移情被爱所弥漫。为了证明,移情跟互为主体性并行不悖,拉康因此重新提醒他对弗洛伊德将移情与爱相提并论。在第一研讨班,首次被描绘轮廓。他现在则是显示,爱涵盖每样东西,除了在两个互补的主体之间的和谐的互动。

The conflict-ridden undertow of the psychoanalytic process also emboldened
him to criticize mainstream descriptions of the treatment as an analytic
‘situation’, a term which he preferred to replace by ‘pseudo-situation’
because ‘the position of the two subjects present is by no means
equivalent’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233).39

精神分析过程的充满冲突的暗流,也让拉康大胆地批评治疗的主流的描述,作为是精神分析的“情境”。他比较喜欢用“人为-情境”来取代“情境”这个术语。因为“两个主体的立场绝非是相等的。”

Taking his lead from the Symposium (Plato 1951), which he presented
as the minutes of a series of psychoanalytic sessions (Lacan 1991b [1960–
61]:38), Lacan identified the analysand with the lover, the analyst with
the beloved, and the resulting strategies of transference with the dynamics
of love. What characterizes the lover is an immanent feeling of lack.40
Although the lover is hardly aware of this lack, much less of its exact
nature, he none the less believes that the loved object possesses the means
to neutralize it, thus restoring a sense of completeness.41

拉康从探讨柏拉图的“会饮篇”作为开始,他呈现“会饮篇”的探讨,作为精神分析节数的系列的细节。拉康将分析者认同为情人,分析家认同是被爱者。移情的造成结果的策略,具有爱的动力结构。表现情人的特征的东西是欠缺的内在感觉。虽然情人自己几乎不知道这个欠缺,更不用说是欠缺的确实的特性。他仍然相信,这个爱的客体拥有这个工具,让这个欠缺保持中立,因此恢复一种完整的感觉。

To Lacan, the
fact that the lover lacks knowledge about the existence and the status of
this lack was sufficient proof to claim that the lack is unconscious.42
When the beloved recognizes the other’s love, the beloved reckons that
she must have something which provokes the other’s interest, yet she
does not have a clue as to what it is (ibid.: 52–53). Hence both the lover
and the beloved are in a position of partial ignorance, but their ignorance
is not the same.

对于拉康,情人欠缺这个知识,关于这个欠缺的存在与地位,就是充分的证据用来宣称,这个欠缺是无意识的欠缺。当被爱的人体认筹他者的爱,被爱的人认为,她一定拥有某件东西,引起他者的興趣。可是,她并没有线索,关于那是什么。因此,情人与被爱的人都处于部分无知的立场。但是他们的无知并不相等。

The lover does not know much about the immanent lack,
but does know the beloved can annihilate it; the beloved does not know
what he has, yet does know the lover wants it. The lover’s ignorance is
more related to an absence (what the lover misses), whereas the beloved’s
ignorance is more associated with a presence (what the beloved owns).
Relying on Ancient Greek mythology, Lacan stated that love reaches
its highest degree of expression when the beloved becomes a lover in
turn and starts returning the lover’s love. When this occurs the positions
within the relationship are no longer distributed according to who lacks
(the lover) and who possesses something (the beloved), since each partner
wants something from the other and also has something to offer.

情人对于这个内在性的欠缺,所知不多。但是,她确实知道这位被爱的人能够毁灭这个欠缺。被爱的人并不知道他拥有什么。可是他确实知道情人想要它。情人的无知,跟一个缺席(情人所错过的东西)更加息息相关。而被爱的人的无知则是跟一个存在(被爱的人拥有的东西),更加地联想一块。依靠古代的希腊文化,拉康陈述:爱到达它的最高的表达,当轮到被爱的人成为情人,然后开始回报情人的爱。当这样的事情发生,在关系之内的立场不再被分配,依照谁欠钱(情人),与谁拥有某件东西(被爱的人)。因为每一个伴侣都想要某件东西,从他者那里,并且也拥有某件给予东西。

Lacan designated the moment when the beloved becomes a lover as ‘the
metaphor of love’, and in accordance with his own definition of metaphor
he drew attention to its potential for revealing a new signification, notably
the genuine, true signification of love (ibid.: 49–64).43

拉康指明这个时刻,被爱的人成为爱人的时刻,作为是“爱的隐喻”。为了符合他自己对隐喻的定义,他提醒注意隐喻的潜力,作为显示新的意义。特别是真诚,真实的爱的意义。

For all its ostensible rosiness, the portrait of love Lacan painted in Seminar
VIII was of course predicated upon a tragic misunderstanding between the
partners. What the lover discovers in the beloved is no more no less than the
object of the lover’s own fantasy, and has nothing to do with what the beloved
really has to offer. Conversely, what the beloved believes she possesses as an
object for the lover, without knowing for sure what it is, equally relates to
the beloved’s fantasy and has no bearing whatsoever on what the lover really
lacks. Each of the partners mistakes fantasy for reality, adding error to error
when entering the metaphor of love.

拉康在第八研讨班描绘的爱的肖像,尽管过于绚丽灿烂,当然对于它的描绘是依靠一个悲剧的误解,在伴侣之间。爱人在被爱的人身上发现的东西,实实在在就是爱人自己的幻想的客体。跟被爱的人确实必须提供的东西,没有丝毫关系。相反地,被爱的人相信她拥有的东西,作为是爱的的客体,而没有确实知道那是什么东西,那同样是跟被爱的人的幻想息息相关。跟爱人确实欠缺的东西,根本没有丝毫关系。每一位伴侣都将幻见误认为是现实,将错误增加到错误,当他进入爱的隐喻。

Applying this picture to the analytic ‘pseudo-situation’, Lacan
compared the analysand to a lover because analysands generally expect
their analysts to possess the key to their difficulties—inhibitions,
symptoms and anxieties which they cannot understand, let alone solve.

拉康将这个画面运用到精神分析的”人为的情境“,并将分析者比喻为分析家,因为分析者通透期望她们的分析家拥有解决他们的困难的解答—压抑,症状,与焦虑的的困难的解答。那是分析者无法理解的,遑论解答。

In Seminar VIII Lacan described this key, as seen through the eyes of the
analysand, in two different ways. In the opening stages of the Seminar,
he cut the analyst’s key from the substance of knowledge:
The psychoanalyst is a human being one comes to see in order to
find the knowledge [science] of what is most intimate to oneself—
this is the state of mind in which one usually approaches him—
and thus of what we must assume to be initially most alien to him.
None-the-less, this is what we encounter at the start of
psychoanalysis; this knowledge [science] is what he is supposed
to have.
(ibid.: 81–82)

在第八研讨班,拉康描述这个解答,通过分析者的眼光可以看出,用两个不同的方式。在研讨班的开始的阶段,,拉康将分析家的解答,从知识的物质切割下来。我们逐渐将精神分析家看着是一个人,为了找到这个知识,跟我们自己最亲密的东西的知识。那就是心灵的状态,我们通常接近他的心灵的状态。因此,也是我们必须假定是对于他是最异化的的东西的状态。尽管如此,这就是我们遭遇的东西,在精神分析的开始。这个知识就是他被认为拥有的东西。

Lacan’s observation that analysands commonly regard their analysts as
experts of the human psyche whose specialized knowledge will dissolve
the symptoms ultimately crystallized into his concept of the ‘supposed
subject of knowing’, which continued to undergird his ideas on
transference until the end of his career.44

拉康观察到,分析者通常将他的分析家视为是人类心灵的专家。这位心灵的专家精通的知识将会化解症状。拉康的观察最后具体成为他的观念:“被认为是知道的主体“。这个观念继续作为他探讨移情的观念的的支撑,直到拉康的事业的结束。

Yet as his work progressed he underscored that this function of the
‘supposed subject of knowing’, the constitutive element of the
transference, does not imply that the analysand automatically perceives
the analyst as somebody who knows (Lacan 1977b[1964]:233; 1967–
68: session of 22 November 1967; 1971–72: session of 2 December 1971).
In his ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
he even went so far as to state:

可是,随着他的研究的进展,拉康强调,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个功能,移情的形成的元素,并没有暗示,分析者自动地感知这位分析家,作为是知道的某个人。在他的”1967年11月的建议“,针对学院派的精神分析家,拉康甚至过分地陈述:

We shall have to see what qualifies the psychoanalyst to respond
to this situation [of the supposed subject of knowing] which one
can see does not envelop his person. Not only is the supposed
subject of knowing not real in effect, but it is in no way necessary
that the subject who is active in the conjuncture, the
psychoanalysand (the only one who speaks initially), impose it
upon him. Not only is it not necessary, it is not usually true: which
is demonstrated in the initial stages of the discourse by a way of
assuring oneself that the suit does not fit the psychoanalyst—an
assurance against the fear that he will put, if I may say so, his
creases in it too soon.

(Lacan 1995b[1967]:5, translation modified)
我们将必须看出,为了回应这个情境,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个情境,我们能够看出,这个情境并没有涵盖精神分析家这个人的人格,他的特质。被认为是知道的主体不但实际上并非真实,而且活跃于这个关键联接的主体,也就是最初作为言说的唯一的人,分析者,根本也没有这个必要,将它赋加在他身上。这非但并非必要,它通常也并非是真实:在辞说的最初的阶段,被证明的东西,凭借让自己确信,这套西装并不适合精神分析家。他用这种确实来对抗这个恐惧:很快地,他将会让这套西装起皱纹,容我这样说。

Without devaluing the importance of the supposed subject of knowing
for the transference, Lacan relativized its impact as a truthful and honest
expectation with which most analysands approach their analysts, considering
the spurious relationship they have with knowledge professed by somebody
else. As I have explained in Chapter 1, it is not because people do not know
what is wrong with them, and, following their wish to know the truth, urge
professionals to tell them what they know, that they will be willing to accept
the professionals’ knowledge.

拉康并没有贬低被认为是知道的主体对于移情的重要性,他将它的影响相对化,作为忠实而诚实的期望。大部分的分析者都带着这个期望,接近他们的分析家,认为分析家具有跟某个人其他的人宣称的知识的似是而非的关系。如同我在第一章解释过程,这并不是因为人们不知道他们的问题出在哪里,当他们遵循他们的愿望要知道真理时,他们要求专业人员告诉他们他们所知道的事情,他们将会愿意接受专业人员的知识。

An analysand’s investment of her analyst with
the supposed subject of knowing is always relative: on the one hand she
wants her analyst to be wildly knowledgeable, whereas on the other she
already knows in advance that from the moment he will start professing his
knowledge, it will prove fatally flawed. Or, if the analysand has been
sufficiently hystericized, he will simultaneously expect his analyst to be
knowledgeable, to convey this knowledge, to admit it is inadequate, to seek
more knowledge, to allow him to find knowledge elsewhere, etc.45
None the less Lacan remained convinced that the supposed subject of
knowing constitutes ‘the pivot on which everything to do with the
transference is hinged’ (ibid.: 5).

分析者对于她的分析家投注被认为是知道的主体。这种投注总是相对的:一方面,她想要她的分析家成为知识广博。另一方面,她已经事先知道,从那个时刻开始,他将会开始宣称他的知识。那个知识将会证明致命地具有瑕疵。或者,假如分析者已经充分地成为癔症者,他将会同时期望他的分析家成为知识广博。传达这个知识,承认这个知识是不足够的,寻求更多的知识,让他能够在别的地方找到知识,等等。尽管如此,拉康始终相信,被认为是知道的主体形成“ 这个枢纽,依靠这个枢纽里,每件事情都跟移情有关联。

Even when analysands refuse to accept
their analysts as paragons of absolute knowledge, the supposed subject
of knowing (and transference) will continue to operate if only the
analysands believe that one day they will become masters in their own
house. In this sense Lacan’s supposed subject of knowing conveys nothing
more than the analysand’s opinion that all knowledge can be endowed
with a subject, i.e. that there is no such thing as a knowledge which has
to remain fundamentally subject-less. In more psychological terms, the
supposed subject of knowing refers to the individual’s belief that it is
possible to attain the climax of full self-realization, a status characterized
by the definitive cancellation of all nonsense, the complete understanding
of oneself and the discovery of the true signification of life.46

即使当分析者拒绝接受他们的分析家,作为是绝对知识的典范,被认为是知道的主体(与移情),将继续运转,只要分析者相信,有一天,他们将会成为大师,在他们自己的房屋里。从这个意义而言,拉康的被认为的知道的主体,传达的东西,仅仅是分析者的意见:所有的知识都能够被禀赋一个主体。譬如,并不存在着这种知识的东西,必须始终基本上是没有主体的知识。用更加是心理学的术语,被认为是知道的主体,提到个人的信仰:获得充分的自性的实现的高潮是可能的。这一种状态的特征是明确地取消一切的无稽之谈,完全理解自己,并且发现生命的真实的意义。

The supposed subject of knowing is evidently at odds with the divided subject
() of the unconscious, because it glorifies the transparency of all
knowledge and aims for the restoration of a psychic economy without
loss. The supposed subject of knowing ‘is the postulate of which it is the
case that it abolishes the unconscious’ (Lacan 1968c[1967]:46).
In his 1967 ‘Proposition’, Lacan formalized the installation of the
supposed subject of knowing in a new algorithm of transference (Lacan

1995b[1967]:5):被认为是知道的主体,跟无意识的分裂的主体,显而易见是互相抵触。因为它推崇所有的知识的透明化,并且目标朝着恢复心灵的活力,没有任何损失。被认为是知道的主体,就是这个假设,就在这个假设的情况里,它废除无意识。在他的1967年的“建议”,拉康正式将被认为是知道的主体,安置在移情的新的轨迹里。

The sequence under the bar represents the analysand’s assumption of an
agency controlling the signification of all knowledge (the undivided
subject of the unconscious, the thinker behind the unconscious thoughts),
whereby 5 stands for (undivided, present) subject and (S1, S2,…Sn) for
the unconscious thoughts (the symbolic network of signifiers). The S
above the bar is the so-called ‘transference-signifier’ (signifiant du
transfert) which, in its relation to any old signifier (Sa), makes the
supposition possible. The link between S and Sa is the connection between
two signifiers without which the supposed subject of knowing would
remain without signification for the analysand.47 Indeed the assumption
that all knowledge can be subjectified only becomes significant for the
analysand because he has ‘transferred’ one of the signifiers (ideas,
representations) in his psyche to a particular signifier belonging to another
subject, the analyst for that matter.48

在这个横杠底下的系列代表分析者的假设一个代理,控制一切知识的意义的代理(无意识的没有被分裂的主体,无意识的思想背后的思想家),S代表(没有被分裂,存在的)主体。(S1,、、、Sn)代表无意识的思想 (能指的象征的网络)。横杠以上的这个S 就是所谓的“移情-能指”。由于它跟任何旧的能指(Sa)的关系,这个“移情-能指”让这个假设成为可能。在S与Sa 之间的联接,就是两个能指之间的联接。假如没有这两个能指,被认为是知道的主体将始终保持是咩有意义,对于分析者。的确,所有的知识能够被形成主体,这个假设变得重要,对于分析者。因为他已经转移他的心灵里的其中一个能指(观念,再现表象),转移到一个特殊的能指,属于另外一个主体的能指,就这件事情而言,那就是分析家。

In Seminar XX Lacan translated this craving for complete knowledge
within the transference in the terminology of love, proclaiming that ‘love
is the desire to be One’, and that love proceeds from the belief ‘we are
but One’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:6, 47).49 Love (and transference) equals
believing that the other is not an Other affected by an irreducible lack,
but the incarnation of the perfect One, and it cherishes the hope that this
One will spill over onto one-self. Since the entrapment of love is part
and parcel of the neurotic’s psychic economy, it is by no means restricted
to the psychoanalytic setting, which again explains why transference
can easily exist outside the walls of the psychoanalytic cabinet.

在第20研讨班,拉康翻译对于完整知识的渴望,在移情之内,用爱的术语。拉康宣称,“爱是想要成为”一“的欲望。爱继续前进,凭借这个信仰:我们仅是“一”。爱(与移情)等于是相信:他者并不是受的无法还原的欠缺的影响的大他者,而是完美的“一”的具体化身。爱怀抱这个希望:这个“一”将会分撒在“作为自性的一”。因为爱的陷阱是神经症的心灵的活力的部分与包裹。爱绝非是被限制在精神分析的背景里。这再次解释为什么移情很容易存在于精神分析的咨商室的墙壁之外。

If the unconscious is a knowledge without a knowing agency (a
headless body so to speak) and the supposed subject of knowing correlates
with the complete mastery over knowledge, it is clear why Lacan
contended in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:130–133) that transference
involves a closure of the unconscious. In its striving for unity love favours
the redemption of the absent subject of the unconscious or, to use Lacan’s
terms in Encore, it aims at being, to be understood here as self-fulfilment
(Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:40). Once again this point repeated a feature
Freud had noted in his paper on transference-love and which he had
attributed to the influence of resistance:

假如无意识是没有知道的代理者的知识(也就是,没有头的身体),被认为是知道的主体,跟完整的掌控知识息息相关。显而易见地,拉康为什么在第11研讨班主张,移情牵涉到无意识的封闭。当无意识奋斗获得统一时,爱偏爱无意识的欠缺的主体的救赎。或者,用拉康在“再来”研讨班的术语说,爱的目标是生命实存,在此应该被理解为实践-自性。再次,这一点重复弗洛伊德没有注意到的一个特征,当他探讨移情与爱。弗洛伊德将这个特征归属于坚持的影响。

At a first glance it certainly does not look as if the patient’s falling
in love in the transference could result in any advantage to the
treatment. No matter how amenable she has been up till then, she
suddenly loses all understanding of the treatment and all interest
in it, and will not speak or hear about anything but her love, which
she demands to have returned. She gives up her symptoms or pays
no attention to them; indeed, she declares that she is well.
(Freud 1915a[1914]:162)

乍然一瞥,移情与爱看起来确实不像是:在移情里恋爱的病人能够造成任何的利益,对于治疗。无论她直到那时是多么的可被修正,她突然丧失所有的理解,对于治疗与治疗里的所有的興趣。她所言说,或所停到的事情,无非就是她的爱。她要求回到她的爱。她放弃她的症状,或并没有注意那些症状。的确,她宣称,她是健康的。

Alienated to the transference-signifier, analysands deceive themselves and
their analysts when supposing the subject of knowing, not only in their
sudden extirpation of the debilitating effects of the symptoms, but also in
the special demands they put upon their analysts. In the former case the
analyst runs the risk of losing his patient because she declares herself healthy
and cannot think of any good reason to continue the treatment.

当分析者针对移情的能指,表现异化时,分析者欺骗他们自己与分析家。当他们认为知道的主体,不但在他们的突然的移除症状的令人衰弱的影响,而且在他们对于分析家提出的特别的要求。在前者的情况,分析家冒着丧失他的分析者的危险。因为她宣称她自己是健康,并且无法想出任何好的理由,来继续这个治疗。

In the latter
case, a patient may consider breaking off the treatment because he feels
that the analyst is not paying enough attention to him, does not give enough
of her time, tends to run shorter sessions with him than with other
analysands, does not appreciate the (financial) effort he has put into the
whole enterprise, in short does not love him enough. Of course, the analyst
needs to ensure that the analysis does not come to a halt because the
analysand’s transference makes him feel ‘cured by magic’ or ‘just treated
like everybody else’. To solve this clinical problem, Lacan advised that
the analyst overturn the dead weight of the analysand’s demands within
the transference with the lever of desire, a recommendation to which I will
return in the following section of this chapter.

在后者的情况,病人可能考虑中断治疗,因为他觉得,分析家并没有给予他充分的注意,没有给予她充分的时间。分析家倾向于将她的咨商时数减短,比起他给予其他的分析者。分析家并没有赏识他付出的财政的努力,付给整个的企业。总之,分析家并没有充分地爱他。当然,分析家需要保证,精神分析并没有中止,因为分析者的移情让他感觉“被魔法治疗”。或“仅是像每一位其他的人一样被治疗”。为了解决这个临床的难题,拉康劝告,分析家应该推翻分析者的要求的僵化的重量,在移情之内,用欲望的杠杆。在这个章节的以下部分,我将回头谈论这一个建议。

As mentioned earlier, the analysand’s perception of the analyst as a
character equipped with knowledge of his most intimate experiences is
not the only factor Lacan distinguished in Seminar VIII to explain the
eruption of love. After having cut the analyst’s key to the analysand’s
problems, as seen through the latter’s own eyes, from the material of
knowledge, Lacan used the sparring match between Socrates and
Alcibiades at the end of the Symposium to delineate the function of the
agalma within the transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:163–195).

如同早先提到,分析者对于分析家的感觉,作为是装备他最亲近的经验的知识的人物。分析家的感觉并不是唯一的因素,拉康在第八研讨班区别出来。为了解释爱的发作。当拉康将分析家对于分析者的解答,跟知识的材料切割开始,依照从分析家自己的眼光来观看。拉康使用苏格拉底与阿西比底斯之间的拳击表演赛,在“会饮篇”的结尾,为了描述阿加马的功能,在移情之内。

Agalma is the term Alcibiades used to grasp the hidden, yet fascinating
object he believed to be enclosed in the depths of Socrates’ hideous body.
A mysterious gem whose preciousness he had savoured as a young man
during a privileged moment of revelation, the agalma had sparked
Alcibiades’ infatuation with Socrates and served to justify his eulogy of
Socrates’ attractiveness.

阿加马是阿西比底斯使用的术语,用来理解这个隐藏,可是令人著迷的客体。他相信这个客体被封闭在苏格拉底的令人厌憎的身体的深处。阿加马是一个神秘的珍宝,他年轻时曾经喜爱的珍宝的珍贵。当他处于接受启蒙的特权的时期,这个阿加马珍宝激发阿西底比斯对于苏格拉底的著迷。阿加马珍宝充当是对于苏格拉底的迷人的颂扬的理由。

In Seminar VIII Lacan surmised that the part played by the agalma in
the emergence of transference must be at least as important as that of the
supposed knowledge, yet his subsequent invocations of the topic were
rather disappointing. Apart from a small, yet valuable gloss in his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’ (1995b
[1967]:7), references were often limited to simple mentions of the term. It
is tempting to argue that Lacan gradually replaced the agalma with his
own concept of the object a, so that each passage on the function of the
object a in the transference would contain an implicit reference to the
agalma.

在第八研讨班,拉康推测,在移情出现时,阿加马的珍宝扮演的角色,至少是同样地重要,跟被认为的知识的出现扮演的角色。可是,拉康随后召唤的议题相当令人失望。除了将他在1967年,针对学院派的精神分析家的“建议”,稍作修改装饰外,拉康的指称经常被限制在简单地提到那个术语。我们忍不住地要争辩:拉康逐渐用他自己的小客体a的观念,取代阿加马。所以,在移情里的小客体a的功能的每个段落,都包含含暗示地提到阿加马。


I wish to challenge this idea, not so much because it is difficult to
entertain on the basis of Lacan’s own works, but mainly because the
equation of the agalma and the object a makes it extremely difficult to
comprehend some of Lacan’s later statements on the position of the analyst
in the treatment.50 For example, when Lacan argued in Encore that analysts
are ‘in the best position to do what should rightfully be done, namely to
investigate the status of the truth as knowledge’, when they put the object
a in the place of semblance, does this mean that the analyst is supposed to
sustain the analysand’s love in order to realize the analytic goals? For if
agalma (as the mysterious object triggering love) equals the object a and
the analyst is held to occupy the position of object a in the analytic discourse,
how can the transference ever be analysed?

我希望交换这个观念,倒不是因为很困难根据拉康自己的著作来怀抱这个观念。而是因为将阿加马跟小客体a相等,让某些拉康晚期的陈述的理解成为极端困难,当他探讨治疗时的分析家的立场。譬如,当拉康在“再来”研讨班主张,分析家“处于最佳立场,去做有权利应该被做的事情,也就是说,去研究真理作为知识的位置”,当他将小客体a 取代类似物。这难道是意味著:分析家应该维持分析者的爱,为了实践精神分析的目标?因为假如阿加马(作为触动爱的神秘的客体),相等于是小客体a,而分析家被认为是占据小客体a的位置,在精神分析的辞说里,移情如何能够被分析?

The conflation of the agalma and the object a also gives rise to a
confusion of love and desire in Lacan’s work, since the object a is
traditionally defined as the object cause of desire. Lacan himself to some
degree contributed to this confusion by using love and desire as
interchangeable terms in Seminar VIII, and by elucidating the metaphor
of love in his two subsequent Seminars as a substitution of the desiring
(le desirant) for the desirable (le desire).51 However, from the mid-1960s
he charted love and desire as two separate experiences on whose
distinction the entire progress of psychoanalytic treatment depends.

阿加马与小客体a的混合,也产生爱与欲望的混淆,在拉康的著作里。因为小客体a传统上被定义为欲望的客体的原因。拉康他自己有某个程度促成这种混淆。在第八研讨班,拉康使用爱与欲望,作为是可以交换的术语。他阐述爱的隐喻,在他随后的研讨班,作为是欲望者的替换被欲望者。可是,从1960的中叶开始,他描绘爱与欲望,作为两个分开的经验。精神分析的治疗的整个的进展,就依靠这个区别。

The
promotion of desire as the analyst’s lever to overturn the analysand’s
love in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:235) can exemplify this. Hence the
agalma of love does not equal the object a of desire, because like the
supposed subject of knowing the agalma relates to the analysand’s
perception of the Other as a perfect being, containing the precious jewels
of happiness and salvation, whereas the object a is strictly situated within
the dimension of semblance. Whereas the agalma represents the ideal
stone of wisdom, the object a is but a partial, replaceable commodity.52

欲望的提倡,作为分析家的杠杆,推翻分析者的爱,在第11研讨班,能够作为这个的典范。 因此,爱的阿加马并没有相等于欲望的小客体a,因为就像被认为是知道的主体,这个阿加马跟分析者对于大他者作为是完美的人的感觉息息相关。它包含快乐与救赎的这个珍贵的珠宝。而小客体a 则是严格地被定位在类似物的维度里面。虽然阿加马代表理想的智慧的宝石,小客体a 仅是部分,无法取代的货物。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

人格面具3

November 17, 2015

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
b. Identification with the Collective Psyche
认同集体无意识
The second way leads to identification with the collective
psyche. This would amount to an acceptance of inflation, but now exalted into a system. That is to say, one would be the for¬tunate possessor of the great truth which was only waiting to be discovered, of the eschatological knowledge which spells the healing of the nations. This attitude is not necessarily megalo¬mania in direct form, but in the milder and more familiar form of prophetic inspiration and desire for martyrdom. For weak¬minded persons, who as often as not possess more than their fair share of ambition, vanity, and misplaced naivete, the danger of yielding to this temptation is very great.

第二个方法导致认同集体心灵。这将是等于接受自我膨胀。但是现在,被提升成为系统。换句话说,我们将是这个伟大真理的拥有者,仅是等待被发现的伟大的真理,属于天启的知识,暗示着各个国家的治疗。这个态度并未必是自大狂的直接的形式。而是以温和,而且更加熟悉的预言的启发以及作为烈士的欲望的形式。对人心灵软弱的人们,他们经常拥有的仅是份内的企图心,虚荣心,与摆错位置的天真,屈服于这个诱惑的危险非常大。

Access to the collective psyche means a renewal of life for the individual, no matter whether this renewal is felt as pleasant or unpleasant. Everybody would like to hold fast to this renewal: one man because it en¬hances his life-feeling, another because it promises a rich harvest of knowledge, a third because he has discovered the key that will transform his whole life. Therefore all those who do not wish to deprive themselves of the great treasures that lie buried in the collective psyche will strive by every means possible to maintain their newly won connection with the primal source of life.7 Identification would seem to be the shortest road to this, for the dissolution of the persona in the collective psyche positively in¬vites one to wed oneself with the abyss and blot out all memory in its embrace. This piece of mysticism is innate in all better men as the “longing for the mother,” the nostalgia for the Source from which we came.

接近集体心灵意味著生命的新生,对于个人而言。无论这个新生被感觉是愉快或是不愉快。每个人都想要紧紧掌握这个新生:某个人是因为新生强化他的生命的感觉,另外一个人是因为它承诺给予丰富的知识的收获,第三者则是因为他发现将会转化他的整个的生命的钥匙。因此,所有那些并没有希望剥夺自己的伟大的财宝的人们,那些财宝被埋藏在集体心灵里。他们将会奋斗,凭借一切可能的方法,为了维持他们刚刚获得的关联,跟生命的原初的来源。认同似乎就是最短的捷径,到达这里。因为人格面具的瓦解,在集体心灵里,正面地邀请我们跟这个深渊结合,然后抹除掉深渊所掌握的一切记忆。这个神秘主义与生俱有地存在于所有较佳的人们,作为是“对母亲的渴望”,对于他们来自的来源的怀旧。

261 As I have shown in my book on libido, there lie at the root of
the regressive longing, which Freud conceives as “infantile fixa¬tion” or the “incest wish,” a specific value and a specific need which are made explicit in myths. It is precisely the strongest and best among men, the heroes, who give way to their regressive longing and purposely expose themselves to the danger of being devoured by the monster of the maternal abyss.

如同我在探讨力比多的书里所显示,在退行的渴望的根源里隐藏著力比多。弗洛伊德构想这个退行的渴望,作为是“婴孩的固著”,或是“乱伦的愿望”。这一个明确的价值与明确的需要,在神话里明确被表达。确实就是这个最强壮,最优秀的人们,英雄人物,他们屈服于他们的退行的渴望。然后刻意地暴露他们自己,于被吞没的危险当中,被母亲深夜的怪物吞没。

169

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
But if a man is a hero, he is a hero because, in the final reckoning, he did not let the monster devour him, but subdued it, not once but many times. Victory over the collective psyche alone yields the true value-the capture of the hoard, the invincible weapon, the magic talisman, or whatever it be that the myth deems most de¬sirable. Anyone who identifies with the collective psyche-or, in mythological terms, lets himself be devoured by the monster-and vanishes in it, attains the treasure that the dragon guards, but he does so in spite of himself and to his own greatest harm.
但是假如一个人是位英雄,他是一位英雄,因为在他最后的估算,他并没有让他的怪物吞没他,而是征服他的怪物。不仅一次,而且是好几次。光是战胜集体心灵的胜利,就产生真实的价值。或是任何神话认为是最被欲望的东西。任何认同于集体心灵的人,用神话的术语来说,他会让他自己被怪物吞没,然后消失在怪物里面。获得这个财宝,龙守卫著的财宝。但是,他这样做,奋不顾身,结果造成自己受伤惨重。

262 Probably no one who was conscious of the absurdity of this
identification would have the courage to make a principle of it. But the danger is that very many people lack the necessary hu¬mour, or else it fails them at this particular juncture; they are seized by a sort of pathos, everything seems pregnant with mean¬ing, and all effective self-criticism is checked. I would not deny in general the existence of genuine prophets, but in the name of caution I would begin by doubting each individual case; for it is far too serious a matter for us lightly to accept a man as a genu¬ine prophet. Every respectable prophet strives manfully against the unconscious pretensions of his role. When therefore a prophet” appears at a moment’s notice, we would be better ad¬vised to contemplate a possible psychic disequilibrium.

可能,知道这种认同的人们,没有一位会有勇气将它定为原则。但是危险是,很多的人们欠缺这个必要的性情,或者,这个性情在这个特殊的时刻,让他们功败垂成。他们被笼罩于一股哀怜之情。每一样东西都孕育着意义,所有的有效的自我-批评都被审查。我将不否认,通常会有真诚的预言家的存在。但是以谨慎的名义,我将开始,凭借怀疑每一个个人的案例。因为这是太过严肃的一件事,我们无法轻易地接受一个人,作为是真诚的预言家。每一位可尊敬的预言家,勇敢地奋斗,反抗他的角色,作为无意识的伪装。假如我们沉思可能的心灵的不平衡,可能较为明智之举。

263 But besides the possibility of becoming a prophet, there is
another alluring joy, subtler and apparently more legitimate: the joy of becoming a prophet’s disciple. This, for the vast ma¬jority of people, is an altogether ideal technique. Its advantages are: the odium dignitatis) the superhuman responsibility of the prophet, turns into the so much sweeter otium indignitatis. The disciple is unworthy; modestly he sits at the Master’s feet and guards against having ideas of his own. Mental laziness becomes a virtue; one can at least bask in the sun of a semidivine being. He can enjoy the archaism and infantilism of his unconscious fantasies without loss to himself, for all responsibility is laid at the Master’s door. Through his deification of the Master, the disciple, apparently without noticing it, waxes in stature; more¬over, does he not possess the great truth-not his own discovery, of course, but received straight from the Master’s hands? Natu¬rally the disciples always stick together, not out of love, but for the very understandable purpose of effortlessly confirming their own convictions by engendering an air of collective agreement.

但是,除了成为预言家的可能性之外,还有另外一个诱人的享乐,比较微妙,但是明显地更加合理:成为预言家的门徒。对于大多数的人们而言,这是一个完全理性的技术。它的利益是:预言家的超人的责任,转变成为如此更加甜蜜的退休的休闲。门徒是无足轻重,谦虚地,他端坐在大师的脚边,并且警卫著不要有属于自己的观念。精神的懒散成为是一种品德。我们至少能够沐浴于半神性的阳光里。他能够享受属于他的无意识的幻想的旧时回忆与婴孩主义。但是他并没有迷失自己。因为所有的责任都被放置在大师的门边。凭借将大师奉为神性,门徒很明显并没有注意到这件事,他的身形消隐。而且,他难道没有拥有他自己的伟大的真理吗?当然,并不是他自己发现的真理,而是直接从大师的手中获得的真理?当然,门徒总是聚集一块,不是由于爱,而是为了这个可以理解的目的,不费力气地证实他们自己的信念,凭借产生集体一致1气氛。

17°

NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
264 Now this is an identification with the collective psyche that
seems altogether more commendable: somebody else has the honour of being a prophet, but also the dangerous responsibil¬ity. For one’s own part, one is a mere disciple, but nonetheless a joint guardian of the great treasure which the Master has found. One feels the full dignity and burden of such a position, deem¬ing it a solemn duty and a moral necessity to revile others not of a like mind, to enrol proselytes and to hold up a light to the Gentiles, exactly as though one were the prophet oneself. And these people, who creep about behind an apparently modest persona, are the very ones who, when inflated by identification with the collective psyche, suddenly burst upon the world scene. For, just as the prophet is a primordial image from the collective psyche, so also is the disciple of the prophet.

现在,这个认同于集体心灵,似乎完全更加可被赞赏:某个其他的人拥有这个荣幸,成为预言家。但是也有危险的责任。就我们自己而言,我们仅是一位门徒,但是仍然是大师发现的伟大的财宝的共同守护者。我们感觉这个充分的尊严,与如此的地位的负担。他认为这是一个严肃的责任与道德的必要性,要抨击没有具有相同心灵的别人,登记为改变信仰者,然后举起灯光,照亮非犹太人。确实好像我们自己就是预言家。这些人们,在谦虚的人格面具背后鬼鬼祟祟。当他们由于认同集体心灵而自我膨胀,他们突然闯进世界的场景。因为,正如预言家是从集体心灵的原初的意象,预言家的门徒,也是心灵的原初的意象。

265 In both cases inflation is brought about by the collective un-
conscious, and the independence of the individuality suffers in¬jury. But since by no means all individualities have the strength to be independent, the disciple-fantasy is perhaps the best they can accomplish. The gratifications of the accompanying infla¬tion at least do something to make up for the loss of spiritual freedom. Nor should we underestimate the fact that the life of a real or imagined prophet is full of sorrows, disappointments, and privations, so that the hosanna-shouting band of disciples has the value of a compensation. All this is so humanly under¬standable that it would be a matter for astonishment if it led to any further destination whatever.

在这两个情况,自我膨胀被集体无意识导致。个体性的独立遭受伤害的痛苦。但是,因为所有的个体性决非拥有独立的力量,门徒-幻想或许就是他能够完成的最佳表现。伴随而来的自我膨胀的满足,至少有助于补偿精神自由的丧失。我们也不应该低估这个事实:一位真实或被想像的预言家的生活,充满了悲伤,失望,与被剥夺。所以,门徒的欢呼崇拜具有补偿的价值。所有这一切,在人性方面是可以理解的。假如它导致任何更进一步的目标,那将会令人大吃一惊。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从重复到诉诸行动

November 17, 2015

FROM REPETITION TO ENACTMENT
从重复到诉诸行动

In 1954–55 Lacan devoted a substantial part of his Seminar II to a
theoretical analysis of Freud’s concept of the compulsion to repeat
(Wiederholungszwang). As he explained on at least two occasions
during this Seminar (1988c[1954–55]:118, 123), this was a logical
step to take after having dissected the phenomenology of transference,
taking account of the amalgamation of transference and repetition in
Freud’s works.28 It was also an occasion for Lacan to address a
Freudian dilemma Lagache had rehashed in his numerous
contributions to the topic of transference: does transference conform
to the repetition of a need, or to a need for repetition? (Lagache
1952:94–95; 1953[1951]:4–5; 1993[1954]:137).

在1954-55年,拉康专注他的第二研讨班上很充实的部分,探讨弗洛伊德的强迫的观念的理论的分析,为了要重复。他在这个研讨班期间,至少在两个场合,他继续解释。这是一个必要採取的逻辑的步骤,当他已经解剖移情的现象学,描述移情与重复的合并,在弗洛伊德的著作里。那也是一个场合,让拉康能够处理弗洛伊德的困境。拉佳奇曾经在他许多的贡献,探讨移情的主题,曾经复述弗洛伊德的困境:移情符合需求的重复吗?或是符合重复的需求?

In presenting this
dilemma, Lagache had opposed Freud’s description of transference
as the repetition of an unfulfilled need for love (Freud 1912b:100),
following the pleasure principle, to his subsequent account of
transference as a derivative of the compulsion to repeat, and thus of
what functions beyond the pleasure principle (Freud 1920g:20–21).
Hence, the apparently futile question raised by Lagache opened up
onto a cardinal issue: does transference operate in keeping with the
pleasure principle, or does it work against it?29

当拉佳奇呈现这个困境时,他将弗洛伊德对于移情的描述,跟没有被满足的爱的需求的重复,相提并论。他遵循快乐原则,到弗洛伊德随后的描述移情,作为是重复的强迫的衍生物。因此,是超越快乐原则的功能的东西的衍生物。因此,拉佳奇提出的这个表面上说徒劳的问题,展开进入一个主要的议题:移情的运作,符合快乐原则吗?或者抵触快乐原则吗?

Lacan’s trajectory in Seminar II sparked a new interpretation of
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (Freud 1920g), in which Freud had
conceptualized the repetition compulsion as an infernal cycle compelling
people to re-experience unpleasurable events time and again. By analogy
with the notion of resistance, Lacan dubbed the repetition compulsion
an insistence, linking its compulsive nature to the continuous return of
the signifiers within the symbolic order.

拉康在第二研讨班的探讨引发对于“超越快乐原则”的新的铨释。在” 超越快乐原则“的文章,弗洛伊德曾经建构重复的强迫的观念,作为是内部的迴圈,强迫人们一再地重新经验令人不愉快的事件。拉康则是将它跟抗拒的观念类比,称重复的强迫是一种抗拒。拉康将重复强迫的特性,跟象征秩序内部,能指的继续回落联接一块。

Again minimizing the explanatory
value of the Zeigarnik effect, he attributed the repetition compulsion to
the incessant intrusion of the symbolic machinery which governs all
human life forms, similar to the ongoing exchange of messages within
an isolated, closed circuit (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:87–90). Hence, if
transference follows the repetition compulsion and the latter equals the
insistence of the signifiers within the symbolic order, then transference
must be characterized by that same symbolic insistence and not, for that
matter, by the power of resistance.

再次,当拉康淡化哲噶米克的解释的价值,他将重复的强迫归属于象征的机器的不断的闯入。这个象征的机器统辖所有的人类的生命的形式。类似于正在进行的讯息的交换,在一个孤立的,封闭的迴圈里。因此,假如移情遵循重复的强迫,而重复的强迫相等于是能指的坚持,在象征的秩序里,那么,移情必然是有相同的象征的坚持表现特征。就那件事情而言,移情并不是由抗拒的力量表现特征。

This conclusion urged Lacan to decide
in favour of the analysand’s transference as an unconscious, symbolic
need for repetition functioning beyond the pleasure principle, and it
bolstered his critique of clinicians advocating the analysis of the
transference as a resistance.30 This is not to say that Lacan completely
rejected the resistance side of transference, but he considered it an
unproductive, deceitful departure from its bona fide repetition side—a
deterioration for whose emergence the analyst is as much responsible as
for that of the symbolic insistence.

这个结论催促拉康作决定赞同分析者的移情,作为是无意识,象征的需求重复,发挥功能,超越快乐原则。这个结论支撑临床医生的批判。这些临床医生主张移情的精神分析,作为抗拒。这并不是说,拉康完全排斥移情具有抗拒的一面。代替的,他认为移情是一个没有生产的欺骗的出发,从它的真诚的重复的那一面出发—这是一种恶化。对于这个恶化,分析家同样要负责,如同负责象征的坚持的出现。

Armed with this new distinction between transference insistence
(symbolic repetition) and transference resistance (imaginary projection),
Lacan returned to the case-studies of Dora and the young homosexual
woman, putting Freud’s technical errors into a different light. Following
a juxtaposition of the two cases in Seminar IV, he argued that whereas in
the Dora case Freud had radically ignored the imaginary element of deceit
within Dora’s transference, in the case of the young homosexual woman
he had made exactly the opposite mistake, concentrating exclusively on
the deceitfulness of her dream (to be a happily married woman) without
acknowledging its truthful symbolic articulation (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:
135–136).

拉康装备著这个新的区别,处于移情的坚持(象征的重复),与移情的抗拒(想像的投射)之间的区别,他回转到朵拉与这位年轻同性恋的女人的个案研究,他将弗洛伊德的技术的错误,从不同的观点观看。拉康在第四研讨班,将这两个个案相提并论。他主张说,在朵拉的个案,弗洛伊德强烈地忽略欺骗的想像的元素,在朵拉的移情的内部。而在年轻的同性恋的女人,弗洛伊德犯了确实是相反的错误,他专注地集中于梦的欺骗性(成为婚姻快乐的女人),而没有承认欺骗性是真实的象征的表达。

In his treatment of Dora Freud was led astray by his
unshakeable belief that his patient was unconsciously, yet honestly
reliving her love for Mr K in her relationship with her analyst, whilst in
his analysis of the young homosexual girl he was mistaken in excluding
the possibility that her dream of a happily married life transpired a deeply
felt, though unconscious wish.

在他治疗朵拉时,弗洛伊德的导致迷失,是由于他的没有动摇的信念:他的病人无意识地,可是有诚实地重新经历她对K先生的爱,在她跟她的分析家的关系。弗洛伊德对这位年轻的同性恋者从事精神分析时,他犯错误地排除这个可能性:她对于快乐婚姻的生活的梦想散发出一股深深被感觉,虽然是无意识的愿望。

At the end of the 1950s, with Seminar VII (1992[1959–60]), a radical
shift of perspective took place. Although the entire seminar was intended
as a revaluation of the aims and objectives of psychoanalytic treatment,
Lacan entered into a digression concerning the relation between the
pleasure and reality principles in Freud’s oeuvre to redefine the status of
the signifier.

在1950年代的结束,在第七研讨班,拉康的观点发生强烈的改变。虽然整个的研讨班被意图充当重新评估精神分析治疗的目标与目的。拉康从事离题讨论,关于弗洛伊德的著作里,快乐原则与现实原则之间的关系的离题讨论。为了重新定义能指的地位。

Contrary to what he had proffered in previous seminars, he
now located the signifier, or what Freud had called Vorstellung
(representation), firmly within the realm of the pleasure principle (ibid.:
134). Relying on Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’
(1950a[1895]), Lacan intimated that the pleasure principle, the primary
unconscious process regulating the distribution of libidinal energy
between representations, cannot operate without these representations.
Rather than being an agency functioning beyond the pleasure principle,
the signifier thus became part and parcel of the primary process.

跟在前几个研讨班,他提供的东西恰恰相反,拉康现在定位这个能指,或弗洛伊德所谓的“再现表象”,牢固地定位在快乐原则的领域内部。拉康依靠弗洛伊德的“科学心理学的计划”主张说:快乐原则是最初的无意识的过程,规范力比多的精力的分配,在再现表象之间。假如没有这些再现表象,快乐原则无法运作。能指并非是超越快乐原则发挥功能的代理者,能指因此变成是原初的过程的部分与领域。

This new conception of the signifier evidently challenged the
connection between transference and repetition. Initially, Lacan had
correlated transference with the repetition compulsion and the latter with
the insistence of the signifier beyond the pleasure principle. Now, with
the new alliance between the signifier and the pleasure principle,
transference could no longer be associated with the repetition compulsion,
unless the symbolic mechanism of transference itself was entirely revised.
In addition, the proposed congruence of transference, the signifier and
the pleasure principle seemed to topple Lacan’s original take on Lagache’s
polarization (need for repetition vs. repetition of need) into the opposite
direction, transference appearing quite conspicuously as the repetition
of a need.

能指的这个新的观念明显地挑战移情与重复之间的连接。最初,拉康曾经将移情跟重复的强迫连接一块,将重复的强迫跟能指的坚持超越快乐原则连接一块。现在,随着这个新的联盟,处于能指与快乐之家的新的联盟,移情不再能够跟重复的强迫连想一块。除非移情本身的象征的机制完全被修订。除外,移情,能指与快乐原则的被建议的调和似乎坍塌拉康的原先的接纳拉噶奇的两极化(重复的需求,对抗需求的重复),坍塌成为相反的方向,移情相当显著地出现,作为是需求的重复。

Avoiding this inconsistency in Seminar VII, Lacan devoted his next
seminar entirely to the topic of transference, which incited him to ponder
the two sides of Lagache’s opposition again and to offer the following
provisional solution:

拉康避免在第七研讨班的这个不一贯,他专注他的下一个研讨班,专注探讨移情的主题。移情的主题激发他再次沉思拉噶奇的对立的两面,并且提供以下的暂时的解决:

[I]t seems impossible to me to eliminate from the phenomenon of
transference the fact that it manifests itself in relation to somebody
spoken to. This is a constitutive fact. It constitutes a frontier and it
simultaneously indicates to us that we should not drown the
phenomenon of transference in the general possibility of repetition
constituted by the existence of the unconscious. In analysis, there
are of course repetitions linked to the constancy of the signifying
chain in the subject. These repetitions need to be distinguished
strictly from what we call transference, even when in some cases
they may have homologous effects.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:208)

我似乎不可能从移情的现象里,减少这个事实:移情展示它自己,相关于某个被对谈的人。这是一个具有形成本质的事实。它形成一个边界,它同时跟我们指示,我们不应该将移情的这个现象,淹没于重复的一般可能里,无意识的存在形成的重复的可能里。在精神分析,当然会有重复跟主体里的成为能指的锁链的固定常数连接一块。这些重复需要严格地被区别,跟我们所谓的移情,即使当在某些的情况,他们可能会有同质性的影响。

It would be erroneous to infer from this passage that Lacan took issue
with his own previous equivalence of transference and the need for
repetition, now realigning the occurrence of transference with the
repetition of a need. As a matter of fact, he was making a rudimentary
case for the radical separation of transference and repetition on the basis
of an evaluation of the inherently creative dimension in the transference
phenomenon.

这将是错误的,假如我们从这个段落推论,拉康争议他自己先前将移情与重复的需求的相等。现在则是将移情的发生,跟需求的重复重新等同。事实上,拉康正在建构一个基本的个案,朝向将移情跟重复强烈地分开,基础是评估移情的现象的本质上创造的维度。

On the one hand, Freud’s definition of transference as the
analysand’s reproduction in acts of a repressed historical event within
the presence of the analytic situation (Freud 1914g:150) encouraged
Lacan to loosen the knot between transference and the compulsion to
repeat.

一方面,弗洛伊德的定义移情,作为是分析者的复制,在被压抑的历史的事件的行动里,在分析的情况的存在里面。这鼓励拉康松开这个环结,处于移情于重复的强迫之间的环结。

The element of acting and the incessant implication of the present
within the transference prompted him to approach transference as
something more than the emergence of the compulsion to repeat. On the
other hand, he questioned the view of transference as the repetition of an
ancient unfulfilled need from the vantage point that the analysand never
simply succumbs to this need, but always recreates it within the novel
context of the analytic experience (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:206–207).

在移情内部,行动的元素与目前的不断的暗示,激发拉康探讨移情,作为是某件不仅是重复的强迫的出现。在另一方面,他质问移情的观点,作为旧时没有被满足的需求的重复,从分析者从来没有仅是屈从这个需求的观看点。而是总是重新创造这个需要,在精神分析经验的新奇的内文里。

The vexed issue of the relationship between transference and repetition
was reopened in 1962–63, when Lacan spent a whole year investigating
the topic of anxiety. Broaching yet again the conjunction of transference
and the compulsion to repeat, he underscored that transference cannot
be reduced to the reproduction of an anterior, unresolved conflict. If the
analysand’s transference is marked by love, this affect is always already
related to an object in the present, which Lacan (1991b[1960–61]: 179–
195) illustrated with Socrates’ interpretation of Alcibiades’ love in Plato’s
Symposium (Plato 1951).31

移情与重复之间的关系的恼人的问题重新被展开,当拉康花费一整年的时间,研究焦虑的议题。拉康再次将移情与重复的强迫分开,他强调,移情无法被化简成为前期,没有被解救的冲突的复制。假如分析者的移情被标记著爱,这个情感总是已经恩目前的客体相关。拉康举例说明目前这个客体,用苏格拉底的解释阿西比底斯的爱,这柏拉图的“会饮篇”里。

Concurrently, he insisted that the reduction
of transference to repetition obfuscates the importance of the analyst’s
own part in the entire affair. For if the transference always integrates an
object in the present, analysts cannot escape their being made into the
object of their analy sands’ transference, through which they not only
elicit but also crucially shape their patients’ reactions. Down-playing
the repetitive component of transference and upgrading the analyst’s
creative part in it, Lacan also replaced his previous definition of
countertransference as the sum of the analyst’s prejudices, insufficient
information, passions and difficulties, by the analyst’s essential
implication in the analysand’s transference, whose cautious management
must proceed from the purified desire of the analyst (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]: 221; 1962–63: session of 27 February 1963).32

同时,拉康坚持,移情化简成为重复,抹除分析家扮演的角色的重要性,在整个的情事里。因此,假如移情总是合并目前的客体,分析家无法逃避他们的存在,被填加到他们的分析者的移情的客体里。通过分析者的移情,他们不但召唤,而且关键地塑造他们的病人的反应。贬抑移情的重复的成分,并且提升分析者在移情的重复里扮演创造性的角色,拉康也更换他的先前的反-移情的定义,作为是分析家的各种偏见,不充分的资讯,激情与困难的总和。由于分析家的基本的暗示,在分析者的移情里。对于分析者的谨慎的管理必须前进,从分析家的被纯净化的欲望里。

Lacan’s most distinguished view on the nature of transference
appeared in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]), in which he designated
transference and repetition as two distinct fundamental concepts of
psychoanalysis.33 Disregarding his own previous assertions and criticizing
Freud for presenting a confused account, Lacan proclaimed that repetition
has nothing in common with transference (ibid.: 33, 69).

拉康探讨移情的特性的最明显的观点,出现在第11研讨班。在那里,他指明移情与重复,作为精神分析的两个不同的基本的观念。拉康忽视他自己先前的主张,并且批评弗洛伊德,因为呈现一个感到困惑的描述。拉康宣称,重复跟移情根本没有任何共通的地方。

Whereas
repetition occurs when a missed, traumatic encounter (beyond the
pleasure principle) is integrated within the network of signifiers (following
the pleasure principle), transference ‘is the enactment of the reality of
the unconscious’ (ibid.: 146, 149).34 Gradually disclosing the meaning
of this new, highly aphoristic description of transference, Lacan specified
that the reality of the unconscious is always sexual and that this
unconscious sexual reality underpins all the analysand’s demands within
the transference.

重复发生,当一个被错过的,创伤的遭遇(超越快乐原则)被合并到能指的网络内部(遵循快乐原则),移情就是“无意识的现实的诉诸行动”。拉康逐渐揭露这个新的,高度警语的描述移情的意义。他并且指明,无意识的现实总是性化,这个无意识的性的现实,作为是所有分析者在移情内部的要求。

For example, if an analysand demands that the analyst
say something because she has the impression that the latter does not
seem to be interested in her associations, this demand represents an avatar
of the analysand’s unconscious sexual reality, notably that she derives
excitement from awakening people’s interest and that she cannot tolerate
the idea that somebody might not be attracted to her.

譬如,假如分析者要求:分析家应该说出某件东西。因为她拥有这个印象,分析家似乎对她的联想,没有感到興趣。这个要求代表分析者的无意识的性的现实的具体表现,特别是,分析者获得興奋,从唤醒人们的興趣,她无法容忍这个观念:某个人没有被她吸引。

If the analyst remains
mute, the analysand is bound to interpret his silence as an indication of
the analyst’s lack of interest or, more commonly, as evidence of his lack
of professionalism, and she is likely to employ this interpretation as an
explanation for her own lack of analytic progress. More specifically, she
will attribute the fact that the analyst is not giving her enough (nice
interpretations, kind words, love) to his being a bad practitioner, and she
will try to change his habits by intermittently threatening him with her
imminent departure.

假如分析家始终沉默不语,分析者一定要解释他的沉默,作为是指示分析家的欠缺興趣,或是,更加普遍地,作为证明分析家欠缺专业精神。分析者很可能运用这个解释,作为解释她自己的欠缺精神分析的进步。更加明确地,分析者将个事实:分析家并没有给予她充分的(解释,仁慈的话语,爱),归咎于分析家是差劲的执业者。她将尝试改变分析家的态度,凭借间歇地威胁他,用她的快要来临的离去。

Conversely, when an analysand requests that the
analyst remain silent so that he can devote himself fully to the exploration
of his thoughts, this demand too harbours an unconscious sexual reality,
inasmuch as the analysand might enjoy destroying whatever interest
people may show in him so that he can devote himself quietly to the
narcissistic enjoyment of his own isolated condition.

相反地,当分析者要求:分析家应该始终保持沉默,这样,他才能够充分地专注他自己,探索他的思想。这个要求也怀抱著一个无意识的性的现实。因为分析者可能喜欢恢灭任何让人们在他身上显示的任何興趣。这样,他才会安静地专注他自己,于他自己的孤立的情况的自恋的享受。

Substantiating earlier statements on the analyst’s responsibility,
Lacan added that this enactment of the sexual reality of the unconscious
should not be understood as a mere effect of the analysand’s psychic
structure:

拉康将他早期对于分析家的责任的陈述具体表现,然后补充说,无意识里的性的现实的这个诉诸行动,不应该被理解,作为仅是分析者的心灵的结构的结果。

The transference is a phenomenon in which subject and
psychoanalyst are both included. To divide it in terms of
transference and countertransference—however bold, however
confident what is said on this theme may be—is never more than a
way of avoiding the essence of the matter.
(ibid.: 231)

移情是主体与精神分析家两种都包含在内的现象。用移情与反移情来区分,从来就是逃避问题的本质的方式。无论针对这个主题所说出的话语是多么勇敢,多么自信。

Apropos of the aforementioned examples, this means that the analysand
in the first case will not regard the analyst as a passive figure who lacks
all interest and commitment, expressly formulating the demand that he
start working and acting as a proper analyst, if the latter did not cultivate
an attitude of prolonged silence. Mutatis mutandis, the analysand in the
second case will not vilify the analyst for intervening, impressing on
him the idea that good analysts are supposed to listen and not talk, if the
analyst himself did not engage regularly in asking questions and launching
interpretations.

关于前面所述的例子,这意味着,在第一个个案里的分析者,将不会视分析家,作为一个被动的人物。他欠缺所有的興趣与奉献。他生动地阐述这个要求:他应该开始工作与形动,作为一位恰如分的分析家。假如后者并没有培养延长的沉默的态度。比照起来,在第二个个案的分析者将不会抨击分析家,因为介入,让他接受这个观念:好的分析家被认为是倾听,而不是谈话。假如分析家自己并没有规律地参与询问问题,并发动解释。

The analyst’s conduct in these two cases is crucial for
the emergence of the analysand’s transference as the enactment of the
sexual reality of the unconscious and it simultaneously gives form to it.

在这两个个案里,分析家的行为是重要的,对于分析者的移情的出现,作为是无意识的性的现实的诉诸行动。分析家的行为同时也给予它形式。

Needless to say that the analyst’s conduct in these matters reflects a
particular desire and rests upon an appreciation of the psychic structure of
the analysand before and during analytic sessions. In the first case, the
analyst’s sustained silence will normally proceed from a diagnosis of the
analysand as a hysteric, whereas in the second case the analyst’s nagging
interventions will be based on a diagnosis of obsessional neurosis. Since
hysteria revolves around an ardent desire to elicit the desire of the Other,
the analyst’s silence encompasses a refusal to enter the hysterical dynamics
and is well suited to trigger the hysteric’s fantasy within the transference.

自不待言的是,分析家的行为,在这些事情里,反映出特殊的欲望,并依靠分析者的心灵的结构的赏识,在精神分析节数之前与期间。在第一个个案,分析家的持续的沉默,正常地前进,从诊断分析者,作为癔症。在第二个个案,分析家的唠叨的介入,将会以妄想症的神经症作为基础。因为癔症环绕热切的欲望旋转,为了召唤大他者的欲望。分析家的沉默涵盖拒绝进入癔症的动力结构,并且非常合适地触发癔症的幻见,在移情的内部。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire’ Lacan wrote:
[A] calculated vacillation of the analyst’s ‘neutrality’ may be more
valuable for a hysteric than any amount of interpretation, despite
the frenzy which may result from it. That is to say, so that this
frenzy does not entail a rupture and the sequel convinces the subject
that the desire of the analyst was by no means involved.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:321–322, translation modified)

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”,拉康书写到:「比起任何数量的解释,分析家保持“中立”的审慎评估的摇摆,可能更加有价值。尽管从这个摇摆可能造成的狂热。换句话说,这个狂热并没有涵盖中断。这个过程让主体相信,分析家的欲望根本就没有被牵涉在内。

Vice versa, since obsessional neurosis hinges on a desire to neutralize
the desire of the Other, the analyst’s interventions confront the analysand
with a living presence by which the analyst guards himself against the
tentacles of the obsessional apparatus and conjures up the obsessional
fantasy.35 In these two cases, the analyst’s attitude is complementary, yet
in each case it is based on what Lacan called the desire of the analyst, i.e.
a desire that analysands reach the point where they avow their own desire.
Strategies of transference 123

反过来说,因为妄想症的神经症依靠大他者的欲望的保持中立。分析家的介入,让分析者面临一个活生生的存在。凭借这个活生的存在,分析家警戒他自己,对抗妄想症的工具的碰触,并且召唤妄想症者的幻想。在这两个个案里,分析家的态度是互补的。可是,在每个个案,它的基础上是拉康所谓的分析家的欲望。譬如,分析者的欲望到达这一点,在那里,他们宣称他们自己的欲望。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

人格面具 2

November 15, 2015

IV
第四章
NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
负面的企图,想要替个体性,从集体无意识解放
a. Regressive Restoration of the Persona
人格面具的退行的恢复
254 A collapse of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It
always feels like the end of the world, as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos. One feels delivered up, disori¬ented, like a rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. So at least it seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective unconscious, which now takes over the leadership. We could multiply examples of cases where, at the critical moment, a “saving” thought, a vision, an “inner voice,” came with an irresistible power of conviction and gave life a new direction.

意识态度的崩塌可不是小事情。它让人总是感觉像是世界的末日。好像每样东西都崩塌成为原初的混乱。我们感觉被解脱,被解离,就像是一只没有舵的船只,任由自然元素的播弄。所以,至少,看起来是这个样子。可是,现实上,我们跌回到集体无意识。现在,集体无意识接管领导权。我们能够举出许多个案的例子。在那里,在关键的时刻,一个“拯救”的思想,一个“内部”的声音,带着无法抗拒的信念的力量前来,给予生命新的方向。

Probably we could mention just as many cases where the collapse meant a catastrophe that destroyed life, for at such moments morbid ideas are also liable to take root, or ideals wither away, which is no less disastrous. In the one case some psychic oddity develops, or a psychosis; in the other, a state of disorientation and demoralization. But once the unconscious contents break through into consciousness, filling it with their uncanny power of conviction, the question arises of how the in¬dividual will react. Will he be overpowered by these contents? Will he credulously accept them? Or will he reject them? (I am disregarding the ideal reaction, namely critical understanding.)

可能,我们能够提到同样多的个案。在那里,崩塌意味著毁灭生命的灾难。因为在这一样的时刻,病态的观念也容易生根。或是理想枯萎掉。这也是同样是灾难。在前者的个案,心灵的古怪性发展,或是在另外一个个案,精神病发作,那是迷失方向与士气瓦解的状态。但是一旦无意识的内容,突破进入无意识,充满对于无意识的信念的奥秘的力量,就产生这个问题:个人要如何反应?他将会被这些内容压倒吗?他将会轻信地接纳它们吗?或是,他将排斥它们?(我正在忽略理想的反应,也就是,批判的理解)。

The first case signifies paranoia or schizophrenia; the second may either become an eccentric with a taste for prophecy, or he may revert to an infantile attitude and be cut off from human society; the third signifies the regressive restoration of the per¬sona. This formulation sounds very technical, and the reader may justifiably suppose that it has something to do with a complicated psychic reaction such as can be observed in the course of analytical treatment. It would, however, be a mistake to think that cases of this kind make their appearance only in analytical treatment.

第一个个案意味着偏执狂,或精神分裂症。第二个个案可能要就是变成怪癖者,具有预言的喜好,要不就是他可能转向婴孩的态度,然后跟人类的社会隔离。第三个个案意味着“人格面具的退行的恢复”。这种说明听起来非常专业术语,读者可能很有理由认为,它跟复杂的心灵的反应有某些的关系。譬如,在精神分析的治疗的过程,能够被观察到的东西。可是,这将是个错误,假如我们认为,这种的个案仅是在精神分析的治疗里出现它们的面貌。

163

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The process can be observed just as well, and often better, in other situations of life, namely “in all those careers where there has been some violent and destructive intervention of fate. Everyone, presumably, has suffered adverse turns of for¬tune, but mostly they are wounds that heal and leave no crip¬pling mark. But here we are concerned with experiences that are destructive, that can smash a man completely or at least crip¬ple him for good. Let us take as an example a businessman who takes too great a risk and consequently becomes bankrupt.

这个过程同样能够被观察,经常更加清楚地被观察,在生活的其他情况。也就是,“在所有那些生涯里,在那里,命运相当猛烈而且摧毁性地介入”。每个人都认为是曾经遭受命运的逆向的翻转。但是大部分,它们都是痊愈而且没有留下瘫痪标记的伤痕。但是在此,我们关注的是那些具有毁灭性的经验。这些经验会完全摧毁一个人,或是至少永远地瘫痪他。让我们以一位生意人作例子。他做生意过分冒险,结果终告破产。

If he does not allow himself to be discouraged by this depressing ex-perience, but, un dismayed, keeps his former daring, perhaps with a little salutary caution added, his wound will be healed without permanent injury. But if, on the other hand, he goes to pieces, abjures all further risks, and laboriously tries to patch up his social reputation within the confines of a much more limited personality, doing inferior work with the mentality of a scared child, in a post far below him, then, technically speaking, he will have restored his persona in a regressive way. He will as a result of his fright have slipped back to an earlier phase of his person¬ality; he will have demeaned himself, pretending that he is as he was before the crucial experience, though utterly unable even to think of repeating such a risk. Formerly perhaps he wanted more than he could accomplish; now he does not even dare to attempt what he has it in him to do.

假如他没有让他自己被这个令人沮丧的经验丧失勇气。代替的,他不要心灰意冷,他保持他先前的大胆,或许稍微补充一点令人尊敬的谨慎,他的创伤将会痊愈,没有留下永久的伤害。但是,假如另一方面,他尝试弥补他的社会的名声,在更加有限的人格的范围里面,做劣等的工作,用受的惊吓的小孩的精神,处于有降他身份的职位。那么专业术语来说,他将会恢复他的人格面具,以一个退行的方式。由于他害怕的结果,他将会重新滑落回到他的人格的早先的时期。他将会贬低他自己,伪装他的生命本质,如同在危机时刻之前的模样。虽然他完全不能够去思维到重复这样的冒险。先前,他或许会想要完成超过自己能力的工作;现在,他甚至不敢企图要做他能力所及的工作。

55 Such experiences occur in every walk of life and in every
possible form, hence in psychological treatment also. Here again it is a question of widening the personality, of taking a risk on one’s circumstances or on one’s nature. What the critical experi¬ence is in actual treatment can be seen from the case of our phi¬losophy student: it is the transference. As I have already indi¬cated, it is possible for the patient to slip over the reef of the transference unconsciously, in which case it does not become an experience and nothing fundamental happens.

这样的经验发生在各行各业,以各种可能的方式。因此,也发生在心理学的治疗里。而且,问题是要扩宽人格,针对自己的环境,或自己的天性,採取冒险。在实际治疗时的危机经验的本质,能够被看出来,根据我们哲学系学生的个案,那就是移情。如同我曾经指示过,病人很有可能无意识地滑越过移情的礁岩。在那个情况,移情并没有成为经验,而且也没有任何基本的事情会发生。

The doctor, for the sake of mere convenience, might well wish for such patients. But if they are intelligent, the patients soon discover the exist¬ence of this problem for themselves. If then the doctor, as in the above case, is exalted into the father-lover and consequently has a flood of demands let loose against him, he must perforce think out ways and means of parrying the onslaught, without himself getting drawn into the maelstrom and without injury to the pa¬tient. A violent rupture of the transference may bring on a com¬plete relapse, or worse; so the problem must be handled with great tact and foresight. Another possibility is the pious hope that “in time” the “nonsense” will stop of its own accord. Cer¬tainly everything stops in time, but it may be an unconscionably long time, and the difficulties may be so unbearable for both sides that one might as well give up the idea of time as a healing factor at once.

为了仅是方便缘故,医生很有理由愿望这样的病人。但是,假如病人足够聪明,他们自己不久就发现这个难题的存在。假如医生,如同在以上的个案里,被提升到父亲-情人的地位,随后涌出的许多要求对他处处不利,他必然会想出各种方法与工具,避开这样的攻击,不要让他自己被捲人这个大的漩涡,不要让病人遭受伤害。移情的猛烈的断裂可能会导致完全的重新发作,或者,更加恶化。所以,这个难题必须异常技巧而又有先见之明地处理。另外一个可能是这个虔诚的希望:“时间到时”,这些“无聊的的事情”将会自动自发地停止。的确,每件事情时间到时都会停止,但是,那个时间可能是无意识地漫长。对于两边,这些困难可能如此无法忍受,以致我们很有理由放弃这个想法:让时间同时充当治疗的因素。

256 A far better instrument for “combatting” the transference
would seem to be offered by the Freudian theory of neurosis. The dependence of the patient is explained as an infantile sex¬ual demand that takes the place of a rational application of sex-
. uality. Similar advantages are offered by the Adlerian theory,1 which explains the transference as an infantile power-aim, and as a “security measure.” Both theories fit the neurotic mentality so neatly that every case of neurosis can be explained by both theories at once.2 This highly remarkable fact, which any un¬prejudiced observer is bound to corroborate, can only rest on the circumstance that Freud’s “infantile eroticism” and Adler’s “power drive” are one and the same thing, regardless of the clash of opinions between the two schools. It is simply a frag¬ment of uncontrolled, and at first uncontrollable, primordial in¬stinct that comes to light in the phenomenon of transference. The archaic fantasy-forms that gradually reach the surface of consciousness are only a further proof of this.

弗洛伊德对于神经症的理论,似乎提供一个更好的工具,来“博斗”移情。病人的依赖性被解释作为是婴孩的性的要求,取代性的理性的运用。类似的利益被阿德勒的理论提供。阿德勒理论解释移情,作为是婴孩的权力的目标,譬如“安全措施”。两种理论都如此清楚地适合神经症的精神状态,所以,神经症的每个个案都能够被解释,同时用两个解释。这个高度引人注意的事情,任何没有偏见的观察者一定都会建构,它仅能依靠这个情况:弗洛伊德的婴孩的性爱主义,与阿德勒的“权力冲动”,都是同样的东西,无论这两派之间,意见的冲突是多么大。那仅是无法控制的原始的本能的片断,起初无法被控制。在移情的现象里,这个无法控制的原始的本能真相大白。逐渐到达意识的表面的旧时的幻想与形式,仅是更进一步证明这个、、、

257 We can try both theories to make the patient see how infan-
tile, impossible, and absurd his demands are, and perhaps in the end he will actually come to his senses again. My patient, how¬ever, was not the only one who did not do this. True enough, the doctor can always save his face with these theories and extri¬cate himself from a painful situation more or less humanely.

我们尝试两个理论,为了让病人看出,他的要求是多么的幼稚,不可能,与荒谬。或许,最后,他将会实际上再次恢复他的理智。可是,我的病人并不是第一位没有恢复他的理智的人。的确,医生总是拯救他的面子,使用这些理论,然后让他自己挣脱一个令人痛苦的情况,相当合乎人性地。

There are indeed patients with whom it is, or seems to be, unre¬warding to go to greater lengths; but there are also cases where these procedures cause senseless psychic injury. In the case of my student I dimly felt something of the sort, and I therefore abandoned my rationalistic attempts in order-with ill-concealed mistrust-to give nature a chance to correct what seemed to me to be her own foolishness. As already mentioned, this taught me something extraordinarily important, namely the existence of an unconscious self-regulation.

的确,有些个案不值得,或似乎不值得,如此详细探讨。但是,也有些个案,这些程序引起没有意义的心灵的伤害。在我的学生的个案,我模糊地感觉到某件类似的东西。我因此放弃我的理性的企图—不信任溢于言表—为了给予自然一个机会来改正我觉得是她自己的愚蠢。如同已经被提到的,这教导我某件特殊重要的东西。换句话说,无意识的自我-规范的存在。

2 Cf. supra, pars. 44ff., for an example of such a case.
165

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
Not only can the unconscious “wish,” it can also cancel its own wishes. This realization, of such immense importance for the integrity of the personality, must remain sealed to anyone who cannot get over the idea that it is simply a question of infantilism. He will turn round on the threshold of this realization and tell himself: “It was all non¬sense of course. I am a crazy visionary! The best thing to do would be to bury the unconscious or throw it overboard with all its works.”

无意识不但能够“愿望”,无意识也能够取消它自己的愿望。这个体会,对于人格的尊严具有如此巨大的重要性。这个体会必须保持不让任何人知道,假如他无法理解这个观念:那仅是婴孩主义的问题。他将会在这个体会的门槛转身,然后告诉他自己:「当然,那都是无稽之谈。我是一位多么疯狂的幻想家!最好的事情就是将无意识埋葬,或是将无意识的一切运作,随着抛下大海。“
The meaning and purpose he so eagerly desired he will see only as infantile maunderings. He will understand that his longing was absurd; he learns to be tolerant with himself, resigned. What can he do? Rather than face the conflict he will turn back and, as best he can, regressively restore his shattered persona, discounting all those hopes and expectations that had blossomed under the transference. He will become smaller, more limited, more rationalistic than he was before. One could not say that this result would be an unqualified misfortune in all cases, for there are all too many who, on account of their notori¬ous ineptitude, thrive better in a rationalistic system than in freedom. Freedom is one of the more difficult things. Those who can stomach this way out can say with Faust:

这个意义与目标,他如此地渴望,以致于他仅是看见,作为是婴孩的无目的漫游。他将理解,他的渴望是荒谬的,他学会对他自己包容,顺服。他能够怎么做呢?他非但没有面对这个冲突,他将会转过头,尽他可能地,退行地恢复他被摧毁的人格面具,贬低所有那些希望与期望,在移情之下曾经盛放的希望与期望。他将会变得更加渺小,更加受到限制,更加理性化,比起他以前的样子。我们无法说,无论什么情况,这个结果将是不应该遭遇的不幸。因为有太多的人们,因为他们恶名昭彰的无能为力,他们在理性的系统里较能张罗,比起在自由里。自由是一件更加困难的事情。那些能够承受这个解脱之道的人们,能够跟随浮士德这样说:

This earthly circle I know well enough. Towards the Beyond the view has been cut off; Fool-who directs that way his dazzled eye, Contrives himself a double in the sky!
Let him look round him here, not stray beyond; To a sound man this world must needs respond. To roam into eternity is vain!
What he perceives, he can attain.
Thus let him walk along his earthlong day; Though phantoms haunt him, let him go his way.3

这个大地的圈子,我甚为熟稔。
朝向超验的景象已经被阻隔;
傻瓜—他用那个方式引导他目眩的眼光,
构想他自己在天上有一个本尊!
让他环顾这里周遭,不要迷失于超验世界
对于一位健全的人,这个世界必要回应,
漫游进入永恒是徒劳!
他所感觉的东西,他能够获得。
因此,让他沿着他的世间的日子前行,
虽然萦绕他的魅影重重,任他前行。

258 Such a solution would be perfect if a man were really able to
shake off the unconscious, drain it of its energy and render it inactive. But experience shows that the unconscious can be de
prived of its energy only in part: it remains continually active, for it not only contains but is itself the source of the libido from which the psychic elements flow.

这样的解决将是完美的,假如一个人确实能够摆脱掉无意识,耗尽无意识的能源,并且让无意识动弹不得。但是,我们根据经验知道,无意识仅有部分能够被解除它的能源;无意识始终继续的保存活跃。因为无意识不但包含力比多的来源,无意识本身就是力比多。心灵的元素就是从力比多流露出来。

¬3 Faust, trans. by Louis MacNeice, p. 283 (Part 11, Act V).
166

NEGATIVE ATTEMpTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
It is therefore a delusion to think that by some kind of magical theory or method the uncon¬scious can be finally emptied of libido and thus, as it were, elim¬inated. One may for a while play with this delusion, but the day comes when one is forced to say with Faust:

因此,这是一个幻觉,假如我们认为,凭借某种的魔法的理论或方法,无意识最后能够被掏空力比多,因此,所谓的能够被减少。我们有一阵子,都在玩弄这个幻觉,但是这个日子会来临,当我们被迫跟随浮士德这样说:

But now such spectredom so throngs the air
That none knows how to dodge it, none knows where. Though one day greet us with a rational gleam,
The night entangles us in webs of dream.
We come back happy from the fields of spring¬
And a bird croaks. Croaks what? Some evil thing. Enmeshed in superstition night and morn,
It forms and shows itself and comes to warn.
And we, so scared, stand without friend or kin,
And the door creaks-and nobody comes in.4

但是现在,这样的魅影,如此充塞空中,
以致无人知道如何逃避它,无人知道何方,
虽然白天以理性的光辉欢迎我们
在夜晚,我们被纠缠于梦的网络,
我们从春天的原野,快乐地回来—
乌鸦哀鸣,哀鸣什么?某件不祥之事,
纠缠于迷信里,夜晚或清晨,
它现身,并显示自己,前来警告,
我们如此惊恐,没有朋友或亲属伴随
门吱吱响,没有人进入。

Nobody, of his own free will, can strip the unconscious of its effective power. At best, one can merely deceive oneself on this point. For, as Goethe says:

没有人,出之于他自己的自由意志,能够替无意识剥除掉它的有效的力量。针对这一点,充其量,我们仅能够欺骗自己。因为,如同歌德所说:

Unheard by the outward ear
In the heart I whisper fear;
Changing shape from hour to hour
I employ my savage power.5

没有让外倾的耳朵听见,
在内心,我窃窃私语恐惧;
每个时刻,形状都在改变
我运用我的野性的力量。

Only one thing is effective against the unconscious, and that is hard outer necessity. (Those with rather more knowledge of the unconscious will see behind the outer necessity the same fac~ which once gazed at them from within.) An inner necessity can change into an outer one, and so long as the outer necessity is real, and not just faked, psychic problems remain more or less ineffective. This is why Mephisto offers Faust, who is sick of the “madness of magic,” the following advice:
对抗无意识,仅有一件东西是有效的。那就是坚强外表的必要性。(对于无意识的知识更加丰富的人们,将会看见在坚强的外在必要性背后的那个相同的脸孔,曾经从内在凝视他的相同的脸孔。)内在的必要性能够改变成为外在的必要性。只要外在的必要性是真实的,不仅仅是虚构,心灵的难题始终是非常没有效果。这就是为什么浮士德厌倦于“魔法的疯狂“时,魔鬼梅非斯特提供给浮士德以下的劝告。

4 Ibid., p. 281 (Part 11, Act V).
5 Ibid., p. 282 (Part 11, Act V), modified.
167

260
THE RE:LATIONS BE:TW~E:N THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS Pack

Right. There is one way that needs
No money, no physician, and no witch.
Pack up your things and get back to the land
And there begin to dig and ditch;
Keep to the narrow round, confine your mind, And live on fodder of the simplest kind,
A beast among the beasts; and don’t forget
To use your own dung on the crops you set! 6

没错。有一个方法不需要
金钱,医生,或巫师。
打包你的行囊,回到故土
就在那里挖掘犁沟
保持在狭窄的周围,限制你的心灵,
然后依靠朴实的那些草料维生
如同野兽一般。但是不要忘记
使用你自己的粪便,滋养你播种的穀物

It is a well-known fact that the “simple life” cannot be faked, and therefore the unproblematical existence of a poor man, who really is delivered over to fate, cannot be bought by such cheap imitations. Only the man who lives such a life not as a mere possibility, but is actually driven to it by the necessity of his own nature, will blindly pass over the problem of his soul, since he lacks the capacity to grasp it. But once he has seen the Faustian problem, the escape into the “simple life” is closed for ever. There is of course nothing to stop him from taking a two-room cottage in the country, or from pottering about in a garden and eating raw turnips. But his soul laughs at the deception. Only what is really oneself has the power to heal.

这是众所周知的事实。这种“淡泊的生活“无法被虚构。因此,贫穷的人的没有难题的生存。贫穷的人确实被递交给命运,他无法被便宜的模仿所购买。这样的人过著淡泊生活,不是作为是可能,而且实际上受到他自己的天性的驱使来过这样的生活。仅有这样的人才会盲目地忽略他的灵魂的难题。因为他欠缺理解它的这个能力。但是当他一旦看见弗洛伊德的难题,逃避进入“淡泊”的生活,就永远被关闭了。当然,并没有任何东西阻止他驻居在乡下的两个房间的茅屋里。或是阻止他不能在花园里弄东弄西,与吃野生的郁金香花。但是,他的灵魂会嘲笑这个欺骗。仅有确实是属于自己的人,才具有治疗的力量。

!59 The regressive restoration of the persona is a possible course
only for the man who owes the critical failure of his life to his own inflatedness. With diminished personality, he turns back to the measure he can fill. But in every other case resignation and self-belittlement are an evasion, which in the long run can be kept up only at the cost of neurotic sickliness. From the con¬scious point of view of the person concerned, his condition does not 109k like an evasion at all, but seems to be due to the impos¬sibility of coping with the problem. Usually he is a lonely figure, with little or nothing to help him in our present-day culture. Even psychology has only purely reductive interpretations to offer, since it inevitably underlines the archaic and infantile character of these transitional states and makes them unaccept¬able to him. The fact that a medical theory may also serve the purpose of enabling the doctor to pull his own head more or less elegantly out of the noose does not occur to him. That is pre¬cisely why these reductive theories fit the essence of neurosis so beautifully-because they are of such great service to the doctor.

人格面具的退行的恢复,仅有针对这样的人,才是可能的途径。他将他生活的严重的失败,归咎于他自己的自我膨胀。带着被减少的人格,他回转到他能够填补的程度。但是在每一个其他的个案,顺服与自我-贬抑是一种讨避。追根究底,仅有耗费神经症的疾病作为代价,这个自我膨胀才能够被维持。从相关的这个人的意识的观点,他的情况根本就不像是逃避。而是似乎由于不可能处理这个难题。通常,他是一位孤独的人物,在我们当前时代的文化,几乎没有什么东西可以帮助他。即使是心理学也仅能提供纯粹的还原的解释。因为心理学无可避免会强调这些转移的状态的旧时与婴孩的特性。并且让这些转移的状态无法被他接受。医学的理论也可能充当这个目的:让医生能够相当优雅地从这个牛角尖挣脱出来。医生并没有想到这个事实。那确实是为什么这些还原的理论,如此漂亮地配合神经症者的本质。因为他们对于医生的贡献是如此巨大。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从移情到互为主体性

November 14, 2015

FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY
从心理学到互为主体性

Lacan’s first extensive protocol on the topic of transference, his 1951
‘Intervention on Transference’, took off from yet another trenchant
critique of mainstream psychoanalysis. Now the unfortunate bugbear
was called Daniel Lagache, an analyst who unlike many of Lacan’s future
adversaries was more drawn to the scientific ideals of academic
psychology than the therapeutic ambitions of ego-psychology.15

拉康的首次的广泛的模式,探讨移情的主题,他在1961年的“论移情的介入’, 出发点是从另外一个猛烈的批判主流的精神分析。现在,这位不幸的怪物被称为丹尼尔 拉噶奇。这位精神分析家不像许多拉康的未来的敌人,他被吸引到学院派的科学的理想,而不是自我-心理学的治疗的企图心。

Echoing a criticism by Maurice Benassy on the encyclopaedic position
paper on transference Lagache had prepared for a 1951 conference, Lacan
developed a vehement rebuttal of Lagache’s explanation of the repetitive
nature of transference via the so-called Zeigarnik effect.16

拉康回应本拿西从百科全书的立场探讨移情的批评,那是拉噶奇替1951年准备的论文。拉康发展猛烈的反驳,针对拉噶奇的解释移情的重复的特性,经由所谓的哲噶米克的效应。

According to
this effect, originally described in 1927 by Bela Zeigarnik, an associate of
the cognitive learning theorist Kurt Lewin, incomplete tasks are more likely
to stay in people’s minds than properly resolved ones.17

依照这个效应,哲噶米克在1927年最初描述的效应。他哲噶米克斯认知学习的理论家科克 列文的助理:没有完成的工作,更加有可能保持在人们的心里,比起合适被解决的工作。

Taking his lead
from a book by Maslow and Mittelmann (1951[1941]:66), Lagache had
claimed that it is easy to put Zeigarnik’s incomplete tasks on a par with the
unresolved infantile conflicts and the thwarted wishes in the mental life of
neurotics, which could elucidate the spring of Freud’s unconscious
repetition compulsion and its ruling over the analysand’s transference.18

拉噶奇从马斯洛与米腾曼的书作为开始,他宣称:我们很容易将哲噶米克的“没有完成的工作,能够相提并论,跟没有被解决的婴孩的冲突,以及遭受挫折的愿望,在神经者的精神生活里。这个宣称可以用来阐释弗洛伊德的无意识的重复的冲动的泉源,以及无意识的重复的冲动对于分析者的移情的统辖。

In his reply, Lacan followed Benassy’s argument that instead of
repetition and transference being determined by the Zeigarnik effect,
matters might very well be the other way round, the Zeigarnik effect
depending on the nature of the transference between the experimenter
and the participants.

在他的回应里,拉康遵循本拿西的论点:重复与移情并没有受的哲噶米克的效应所决定。事情很有可能恰恰相反。哲噶米克的效应依靠处于试验者与参与者之间的移情的特性。

Whereas Benassy had illustrated his point in
reference to the conditions of psychometric testing, Lacan applied it
directly to the psychoanalytic setting, saying that ‘it proceeds entirely in
this relationship of subject to subject, which means that it preserves a
dimension which is irreducible to all psychology considered as the
objectification of certain properties of the individual’ (Lacan
1982a[1951]:62). All individual reactions, Lacan posited, are governed
by the primacy of an intersubjective relationship, which implies that
transference can only be explained through the dialectical process
between the analysand and the analyst.19

虽然本拿西说明他的观的,提的心理量尺的测试的条件。拉康则是将它直接运用到精神分析的背景。拉康并且说,「心理量尺的测试的进行,完全是在主体与主体之间的关系里。这意味着,它保存一个无法被化简的维度,无法被化简成为是被认为是客体化的所有的心理学,个人的某些属性被客体化。拉康提出,所有的个人的反应动作,受到互为主体性的关系的原初地位所统辖。这暗示着,移情能够被解释,仅是凭借分析者与分析家之间的辩证的过程。

So how does the analyst play a part in the emergence of the analysand’s
transference? Three years before his ‘Intervention on Transference’, in
‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis’, Lacan had implicitly espoused Freud’s
recommendation that the analyst ‘should be opaque to his patients and,
like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him’ (Freud
1912e:118). Lacan emphasized that the analyst’s attitude of general
impassibility is exactly what facilitates the beneficial reactivation of
unconscious ‘archaic images’ in the analysand (Lacan 1977d[1948]: 13–
15).

所以,分析家如何扮演一个角色,在分析者的移情的出现?在“论移情的介入”的前三年,在“精神分析的侵凌性”,拉康曾经含蓄地说明弗洛伊德的建议:「分析家应该对他的病人保持模糊。就像是一面镜子,分析家应该跟病人显示,仅是被显示给他的东西。」拉康强调,分析家对于通常无法跨越的态度,确实就是让分析者身上,无意识的“旧时的意象”,方便从事有利的重新触动的因素。

He even embraced Melanie Klein’s theory of the paranoiac’s projection
of bad internal objects onto the outside world, in order to argue that the
opaque psychoanalyst induces a state of controlled paranoia in the
analysand (ibid.: 15).

他甚至接受米兰 克来恩的理论:妄想症者的投射坏的内部的客体,到外在的世界。为了主张,模糊嗳昧的精神分析家在分析者身上,引导出受控制的妄想症的状态。

Whilst Lacan’s account of transference in this early
paper did not attain the high level of sophistication characteristic of his
later work, its central message that the analyst’s controlled inertia within
the treatment determines the analysand’s transference would resound for
years to come.20 Furthermore, Lacan maintained that when the analysand’s
transference turns into an unmanageable aggressive tension, the analyst is
as much responsible for these deleterious developments as for the initial
emergence of transference.

在这篇早期的论文,拉康描述移情,并没有获得他晚期著作的精致的特性。它的主心的讯息是:在治疗内部,分析家的受控制的惰性,分析者的移情将会迴响在未来的好几年。而且,拉康主张,当分析者的移情转变成为一个无法管理的侵凌性的紧张,分析家负同样的责任,对于这个巧妙的发展,如同负责移情的惰性的出现。

These negative reactions only occur when an
analyst exchanges his ‘pure mirror of an unruffled surface’ (ibid.: 15) for
admonitions curtailing the analysand’s wishes or interventions saturated
with good advice (presumably with the best of philanthropic intentions).
In his ‘Intervention on Transference’, Lacan took advantage of Freud’s
trouble with Dora to illustrate how the girl’s negative transference had
indeed taken shape in accordance with Freud’s own clinical conduct,
confirming the assertion that transference follows a dialectics of
intersubjectivity:

这些负面的反应动作会发生,仅是当分析家用他的“纯粹的反映安详的表面”,交换这些预警,缩短分析者的愿望的预警•或是充满善意劝告的介入(被假定是带着最善意的慈善的意图)。在他的“论移情的介入“,拉康利用弗洛伊德的朵拉个案的困扰,来阐述这位女孩的负面的移情,确实是遵照弗洛伊德的自己的临床的行为而成形。拉康证实这个主张:移情遵循互为主体性的辩证法。

[T]he case of Dora, because of what it stands for in the experience
of transference when this experience was still new…[was] the first
case in which Freud recognised that the analyst played his part…
I will be attempting to define in terms of pure dialectics the
transference, which we call negative on the part of the subject as
being the operation of the analyst who interprets it.
(Lacan 1982a[1951]:64–65)

因为朵拉的个案所代表的东西,在移情的经验里,当这个经验当时还是新出现。它是第一个个案,弗洛伊德在那里体认:分析家扮演他的角色、、、我将企图用纯粹的辩证法的术语,来定义移情。我们称为负面的移情,在主体这方面,作为是解释它的分析及的运作。

Restructuring Freud’s entire case around a series of dialectical reversals
and subsequent developments of subjective truth, Lacan ascribed Dora’s
negative transference, which triggered her departure, to Freud’s failure
to implement one crucial reversal. Freud had refrained from showing to
Dora that she was not interested in Mrs K because the woman was her
closest rival, but because she incarnated the mystery of femininity.21 Put
differently, Lacan could only see one reason behind Freud’s downfall:
Mr K must have inspired in the young girl that he could not understand
her love for Mrs K. At the time, Lacan designated Freud’s fixation as
countertransference, ‘the sum total of the prejudices, passions and
difficulties of the analyst, or even of his insufficient information, at any
given moment of the dialectical process’ (ibid.: 71).22
the father of psychoanalysis had been so fixated on the love he believed

当拉康重新建构弗洛伊德的整个的个案,环绕一系列的辩证法的逆转,与主体的真理的随后的发展,他将朵拉的负面的移情归咎于弗洛伊德没有运作一个关键的逆转,因为这个负面的移情触发朵拉的离去。弗洛伊德自我节制,没有对朵拉显露:她对K夫人感到興趣,不是因为那个女人是她最靠近的情敌,而且因为她具体表现女性的神秘。换句话说,拉康仅是看见弗洛伊德的掉落情网的一个理由:K先生当时一定曾经在这位女孩身上启发,他无法理解她对K夫人的爱。在当时,拉康指明弗洛伊德的固著,作为是反-移情,「分析家的各种偏见,激情与困难的总数,或甚至是分析家的不充足的资讯的总数,在这个辩证法的过程的任何特定的时刻」。弗洛伊德作为精神分析之父对于他相信的爱,曾经是如此固著。

He concluded accordingly that ‘transference does not arise from any mysterious property
of affectivity’, but always reflects the analyst’s own position (ibid.: 71).
Having situated transference firmly within psychoanalytic
intersubjectivity, Lacan probed deeper into the phenomenology of
transference with the goal of formulating a more fundamental set of
alternatives than the classic Freudian opposition between an
advantageous, mild positive transference and its infelicitous (erotic or
aggressive) counterpart. The upshot was a clear theoretical distinction
between imaginary and symbolic transference, each incorporating all
possible shades of the entire affective spectrum.

拉康因此下结论:「移情并非产生于情感的任何的神秘的属性。代替的,移情总是反映出分析者自己的立场」。当拉康将移情坚固地定位在精神分析的互为主体性的内部,他更加深入地探索移情的现象,目标朝着阐述一个更加基本的替代选择,比起古典的弗洛伊德的对立,处于有利的,温和的,正面的移情,与不利的侵凌性的负面移情。结局是清楚的理论的区别,想像与象征的移情。每一种都合并整个的情感的光谱的一切可能的色度。

In Seminar I Lacan tabulated symbolic transference as the efficacious
side of the coin, identifying it quite simply with the act of full speech:
‘Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner,
there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference—something
takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:109).

在第一研讨班,拉康塑造象征的移情,作为是硬币的有效的一面,将它仅是认同于充分言说的行为。「每次一个人跟另外一个人言说,以真诚而充实的方式,就真实的意义而言,就存在着移情,象征的移情—某件东西发生,改变这俩个在场的人物的天性」。

On this symbolic plane, transference operates as
the motor of analysis and it can take either the form of love or hate, and
quite possibly a mixture of both.23 To corroborate the idea that transference
is inextricably linked with the symbolic structure of language, he referred
to Freud’s description of ‘the fact of transference’ in the final chapter of
The Interpretation of Dreams, where he had associated it with the
transmission of energy from an unconscious representation to a
preconscious day’s residue (Freud 1900a:562–563).24 Here, Lacan
stipulated, Freud had explained how transference takes place when a
forbidden unconscious discourse takes hold of a more accessible,
preconscious discourse in order to express itself (Lacan 1988b[1953–
54]:247).

在象征的层面,移情运作,作为精力分析的马达。它要就是採用爱的形式,要不就是採用恨的形式。相当可能的是,採有爱与恨两这混合。为了建构这个观念:移情无法挣脱地跟语言的象征结构息息相关,拉康参照弗洛伊德的描述“移情的事实”,在“梦的解释的最后的章节”。在那里,弗洛伊德将移情跟精力的传递联想一块,从无意识的再现,到前意识的白天的残渣。在此,拉康提出旦书:无意识的辞说掌控更加可以靠近,前意识的辞说,为了表达它自己。

What Lacan dubbed ‘imaginary transference’ coincides with the type
of transference Freud had encountered as an obstacle to the treatment,
with the proviso that Lacan put its dialectical rather than its affective
qualities centre stage. Analysands who are under the spell of an imaginary
transference only approach their analyst as an alter ego, an other who
presents a mirror image of themselves.

拉康所谓的“想像的移情”,巧合于弗洛伊德曾经遭遇的移情的类型,作为是治疗的阻碍。有一个旦书是:拉康将移情的辩证的移情,而不是想像的移情,作为中心的舞台。受到想像的移情的影响之下的分析者,接近分析家,仅是作为他我,一位他者,呈现他们自己的镜子影像。

The love analysands experience
on this plane is strictly narcissistic. Not tolerating the other’s difference,
they only bring into relief those features which the other has in common
with themselves. Likewise, imaginary hate is not oriented towards
breaking a mutually agreed contract, but towards continuous rivalry,
competition and jealousy. Lacan contemplated the analysand’s projection
of archaic infantile images onto the analyst as a standard example of this
imaginary transference.

在这个层面,分析家经验到的爱严格来说是自恋的。他们并没有容忍他者的差异,他们仅是突显他者拥有跟他们自己共同的那些特征。同样地,想像的恨并没有被定向朝向违背互相被同意的契约,而是朝向继续的敌意,競争与妒忌。拉康沉思分析者的投射旧时的婴孩的意象,到分析家身上。作为是想像的移情的标准的例子。
And for all its prevalence within ego-psychology,
he considered it detrimental to the continuation of psychoanalysis:
To bring into play the illusory projection of any one of the subject’s
fundamental relations with the analytic partner, or again the object
relation, the relation between transference and counter-transference,
all this, remaining as it does within a two body psychology, is
inadequate.
(ibid.: 261)25

尽管在自我-心理学的内部,移情的胜行,拉康则是将移情认为是有伤害的,对于精神分析的继续。光是这样运作是不足够的:运作主体跟分析家作为伴侣的基本的关系的任何关系的幻想的投射,移情与反移情之间的关系,所有这一切关系,因为它始终保持在两个身体的心理学。

This claim is of course quite remarkable in light of Lacan’s previous
assessment of the transference in ‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis’. For
what had originally appeared as the essence of transference, namely the
reactualization of archaic images, now emerged as its evil underside—a
clinical avenue to be avoided rather than cleared.

这个宣称当然相当引人注意,从拉康的先前的评估移情,在“精神分析的侵凌性”。因为原先出现作为移情的本质,也就是,旧时的意象的重新触动,现在出现,作为它的邪恶的底层—这一个临床的途径应该被避免,而不是被清除。

The second nuance Lacan added to his initial picture of transference
relates to the power of analytic intersubjectivity for eliciting the
analysand’s reactions.

拉康增加第二次细微差别,到移情的这个最初的画面。他将移情跟精神分析的互为主体性的力量牵扯一块,作为召唤分析者的反应动作。

To the extent that transference operates according
to the criteria of full and empty speech, it is difficult to see how analysts,
simply by virtue of their acting as dark mirrors, would actually evoke
these responses. Lacan was forced to conclude from his own restructuring
of the transference phenomenon that ‘the dimension of transference exists
from the start, implicitly, well before analysis begins, before this
concubinage, which analysis is, triggers it’ (ibid.: 271). This perspective
was of course in keeping with Freud’s explanation of transference in the
Dora case—an inevitable necessity brought to light by the circumstances
of psychoanalytic treatment (Freud 1905e[1901]:116–117) —but it also
revived the spectre of the neurotic’s predisposition and the spontaneous
appearance of transference.

随着移情的运作,依照充分言说与空洞言说的标准,我们很困难看出,分析家如何实际上召唤这些反应,仅是凭借他们的行动,作为黑暗的镜子。拉康被迫下结论,根据他自己的重新架构移情现象:移情的维度从开始就存在,含蓄地存在,就在精神分析开始之前,就在这个非婚交媾之前,这就是精神分析的本质,精神分析触发它。这个观点当然符合弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在朵拉的个案。一个无可避免的必要性,由精神分析的治疗的环境启明。但是它也重新复活神经症者的性情的魅影,与移情自动自发地出现。

Therefore Lacan hastened to specify that if
there is a ‘readiness to the transference’ in the patient ‘it is solely by
virtue of his placing himself in the position of acknowledging himself in
speech, and searching out his truth to the end, the end which is there, in
the analyst’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:277–278).26 Although not
diminished, the analyst’s responsibility was consequently restricted to
the emergence of the analysand’s transference along one of the axes of
the symbolic-imaginary divide.27

因此,拉康匆匆指明:假如在病人身上,移情准备出现,那仅是凭借他将他自己放置在这个立场:用言说承认自己,并且彻底地寻找出他的真理,在分析家身上,存在在那里的目标。分析家的责任虽然没有被减少,结果却是被限制于分析者的移情的出现,沿着象征与想像的分界线的其中一个枢纽。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康:移情的策略

November 13, 2015

Chapter 3
第三章
Strategies of transference
移情的策略
THE MANY FACES OF TRANSFERENCE
移情的众多面向

In a small, seemingly futile passage on the termination of analysis in
‘On Beginning the Treatment’, Freud confessed that since the start of his
psychoanalytic career he had noticed a remarkable change in his patients’
attitudes towards the progression of their analysis:

在“治疗的开始”,针对精神分析的终止的这篇简短,表现没有效用的段落里,弗洛伊德坦白承认,自从他的精神分析的事业的开始,他已经注意到一个明显的改变,在他的病人的态度,朝向精神分析的进展。

In the early years of my psychoanalytic practice I used to have the
greatest difficulty in prevailing on my patients to continue their
analysis. This difficulty has long since been shifted, and I now
have to take the greatest pains to induce them to give up.
(Freud 1913c:130)

在我精神分析实践的早年岁月,我常常遭遇极大的困难,要劝告我的病人继续他们的精神分析。这个困难长久以来已经改变。我现在必须花费巨大努力,才能劝导病人放弃。

Freud did not clarify the mainspring of this problem, but numerous
examples can be adduced to demonstrate that the entire issue was
dominated by the vicissitudes of transference.

弗洛伊德并没有澄清这个难题的主要的动力。但是,无数的例子可以作为补充,用来证明整个的问题受到移情的起伏的支配。

For instance, shortly before publishing ‘On Beginning the Treatment’,
Freud had informed Sandor Ferenczi about his ticklish experience with
Elma Palos, whom he had agreed to treat for a short period of about
three months, until Easter 1912:

譬如,就在出版“治疗的开始”不久之前,弗洛伊德曾经告知费伦奇,关于他跟爱玛 帕洛思的神经质的经验。弗洛伊德曾经同意治疗帕洛思,经过大约三个月的简短时期。

With Elma things continue to go gloomily. She has brought out
several quite surprisingly intelligent insights, but she doesn’t want
to get into the experience with you and doesn’t seem to want to
finish with me; i.e., because of the transference she wishes to extend
her stay past Easter, which I don’t want to do. So I am cooling off
noticeably again.
(Brabant et al. 1993:362)

对于爱玛,事情继续阴暗地进行。她已经显露好几个相当令人惊奇的智慧的洞察力。但是,她并不想要跟你一起进入这个经验。并且似乎并不想要跟我一块完成这个经验。换句话说,因为移情,她希望延伸她的停留,超越复活节。我并不想要这样做。所以,我再次明显地冷却下来。

This was neither Freud’s first encounter with a patient reluctant to leave,
nor was it the first time he attributed the phenomenon to the power of
transference. In April 1900, at a moment when he was still groping his
way as to the nature and function of the transference, Freud had already
told Wilhelm Flies about its effect on the duration of his analysis of a
certain Mr E:

这既不是弗洛伊德的第一次遭遇病人不愿意离开,也不是他第一次将这个现象归属于移情的力量。在1900年4月,在这个时刻,他依旧正在模索他的途径,关于移情的特性与功能。弗洛伊德曾经告诉弗利兹,关于移情的影响,对于他对某位E先生的精神分析。

I am beginning to understand that the apparent endlessness of the
treatment is something that occurs regularly and is connected with
the transference…The asymptotic conclusion of the treatment
basically makes no difference to me, but is yet one more
disappointment to outsiders…Since he had to suffer through all
my technical and theoretical errors, I actually think that a future
case could be solved in half the time.
(Masson 1985:409)

我正在理解,治疗的明显的没有终止是某件规律发生的事情,并且跟移情息息相关。治疗的非症状的结论,对我而言,基本上没有任何差异。可是,对于外面的人而言,却是又一次的令人失望。
因为他必须承受痛苦,经历我的技术与理论的错误。我实际上认为,未来的个案,用一半的时间,就能够被解决。

Freud did not have to wait long to test the value of his assertion, for
some six months later an eighteen-year-old hysterical girl suffering from
a welter of psychic and somatic symptoms was referred to him by her
father (ibid.: 427). Compared to Mr E’s treatment, which lasted for more
than a year, Freud’s analysis of Dora (Freud 1905e[1901]) took a mere
three months. This could be seen as an even better result than that which
Freud had anticipated in his letter to Flies, were it not for the fact that
the girl herself decided to break off her analysis before reaching a
satisfactory solution of her problems.1

弗洛伊德并没有等待很久,他就测试他的主张的价值。经过大约六根月之后,一位十八岁的癔症的女孩,遭受心灵与肉体的症状的翻滚。她的父亲带她去就诊弗洛伊德。跟E 先生延续一年多的治疗比较起来,弗洛伊德对于朵拉的精神分析,仅是花费三个月。这能够被视为是具有更佳的结果,比起弗洛伊德曾经写信给弗利兹所预期的结果。假如不是因为这个事实:女孩自己决的要中断她的精神分析,这样,她才能获得她的难题的令人满意的解决。

Again Freud felt that he had made
a technical and theoretical error, and again he regarded his patient’s
behaviour as the corollary of her ‘transferences’ [sic], clinical phenomena
encompassing ‘new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies
which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of analysis’
whereby the patient replaces ‘some earlier person by the person of the
physician’ (ibid.: 116). On the one hand Freud conceded that he must
have been blinded by Dora’s diligence, not seeing that her identification
of him with the dreaded Mr K fuelled her desire to take revenge. On the
other hand he ventured the hypothesis that his technical mistake must
have been rooted in a failure to direct Dora’s attention to her unconscious
homosexual love for Mrs K.2 Whatever the nature of Freud’s mistake,
Dora’s transference did not catalyse an interminable analytic process,
but prompted her to finish the treatment prematurely.

而且,弗洛伊德感觉,他曾经犯了一个技术与理论的错误。再次,他将他的病人的行为,视为是她的 移情的必然结果。这些临床的现象涵盖冲动与幻想的新版的拷贝。在精神分析的进展期间,这些冲动与幻想被召唤出来,而且被知道。凭借精神分析,病人用医生这个人物,取代某位早先的人物。在一方面,弗洛伊德承认,他当时一定对于朵拉的勤勉视而不见,他才没有看见,她对他的认同,其实对可恨的K先生的认同。这激发起她想要报复的欲望。在另一方面,弗洛伊德冒险提出假设:他的技术性的错误当时一定是根源于他没有办法引导朵拉注意她的无意识的同性恋的爱,对于K太太。无论弗洛伊德的错误的特性是什么,朵拉的移情,并没有触发一个没有终止的精神分析的过程。而是激发她过早地结束这个治疗。

Years later, Freud applied what he had learnt from the Dora case in his
treatment of another eighteen-year-old girl (Freud 1920a). Like Dora, this
girl had expressed a desire to kill herself. Much like Dora’s, her parents
had become so upset with her demeanour that they decided to seek Freud’s
help. And in keeping with Dora’s erotic interest, albeit more overtly, this
girl’s homosexual orientation underpinned many of her symptoms. When
the girl produced a series of dreams in which she featured as a happily
married mother, Freud declared that she merely wanted to deceive him, in
line with her long-established habit of betraying her father.

几年以后,弗洛伊德运用他从朵拉的个案学习到的东西,远用到他对另外一位十八岁的女孩的治疗。就像朵拉,这位女孩曾经表达想要自杀的欲望。非常酷似朵拉,她的父母对于她的行为感到如此懊恼,所以他们决定寻求弗洛伊德的帮助。这位女孩的同性恋的定向,跟朵拉的性爱的興趣一样,虽然是更加明显,作为是许多她的症状的基础。当这位女孩产生一系列的梦。在梦里,她扮演一位快乐地结婚的母亲。弗洛伊德宣称,她仅是想要欺骗他,以符合她根深蒂固的习惯:背叛她的父亲。

Having
acknowledged the girl’s hostility towards her father and her concurrent
unconscious animosity towards himself as a father representative, Freud
subsequently ended the treatment on his own initiative, insisting that the
girl continue her analysis with a female analyst. By pinpointing the
deceitfulness of his patient’s productions and by effectively dropping his
patient before she had the opportunity to leave her analyst, Freud was
eager to avoid a retake of the Dora case. Yet once again the transference —
in this case an unconscious negative attitude towards the father—proved
decisive in light of the continuation of the analytic process.

弗洛伊德承认,这位女孩对于她的父亲具有敌意,同时对弗洛伊德自己作为父亲的代表,也无意识地具有敌意。弗洛伊德随后自己创议要结束这个治疗,他建议这位女孩应该找一位女性的分析家来继续她的精神分析。凭借有效地甩掉他的病人,在病人有机会离开她的分析家之前。弗洛伊德渴望避开朵拉个案的重演。可是,再一次,这个移情—在这个个案,对于父亲的无意识的负面的态度—证实是决定性关键,从精神分析过程的继续的观点。

A first conclusion to be drawn from Freud’s remarks on transference
is that its manifestation can lead to the analysis becoming either
unpursuable or interminable. Owing to this strong connection between
transference and the duration of psychoanalytic treatment, Lacan
proclaimed in Seminar I that ‘one can say that the transference is the
very concept of analysis, because it is the time of analysis’ (Lacan 1988b
[1953–54]:286).3

从弗洛伊德探讨移情的谈论能够被获得的最初的结论是,对于移情的展示会导致精神分析成为,要就是无法被追寻,要不就是没有终止。由于这个强烈的关联,处于移情与精神分析的治疗的期间,拉康在第一研讨班宣称:「我们能够说,移情就是精神分析的观念。因为移情就是精神分析的时间。」

Here the question emerges whether the analyst’s ‘management’ of
the transference or something in the nature of transference itself decides
over the continuation of the analytic process. Freud’s comments on his
technical mistakes in the Dora case strongly support the former option,
whereas his position in the treatment of the young homosexual woman
seems to endorse the latter. The same ambiguity pervades Freud’s
theoretical discussions of transference in his papers on technique and
the introductory lectures on psychoanalysis.

在此,这个问题出现,无论分析家的“管理移情”或某件事情,用移情本身的特性,是否决定,对于精神分析过程的继续。弗洛伊德的评论他的技术的错误,在朵拉的个案里,强烈地支持前者的选择。弗洛伊德的立场,在年轻同性恋的女人的治疗,似乎是证实后者:精神分析没有终止。相同的模糊嗳昧弥漫弗洛伊德的理论的讨论移情,在他探讨技术的论文与探讨精神分析的介绍性的演讲。

For example, in ‘The
Dynamics of Transference’ he noted: ‘Where the capacity for transference
has become essentially limited to a negative one, as is the case with
paranoiacs, there ceases to be any possibility of influence or cure’ (Freud
1912b:107). A different account, implicitly underscoring the analyst’s
power over the transference, appeared in the paper on transference-love:
‘No doctor who experiences this [the patient’s falling in love] for the
first time will find it easy to retain his grasp on the analytic situation and
to keep clear of the illusion that the treatment is really at an end’ (Freud
1915a[1914]:162, italics added).

譬如,在“移情的动力学”,他注意到:「当移情的能力已经变成基本上被限制于负面的移情。如同偏执狂的个案,那影响与治疗的任何可能性都停止存在」。一个不同的描述,暗示地强调分析家的移情的力量,出现在探讨“移情与爱”的论文:「当医生首次经验到这个移情与爱(病人的爱恋),他将会很容易保留他的理解,针对精神分析的情境,并且避开这个幻觉:治疗确实结束了」。

It seems that for Freud the clue to the entire question lay in the
differential faces of the transference. The mild positive, conscious face
of transference is beneficial for the continuation of analysis, whereas its
resistance face, epitomized by the analy sand’s unconscious negative,
hostile or intensely erotic feelings towards the analyst, is a recipe for
disaster, unless the analyst manages to explain their infantile origin to
the analysand (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:444; 1940a[1938]:174–177).

似乎,对于弗洛伊德,整个的问题的线索就在于移情具有不同的面貌。移情的温和,积极,有意识的脸孔是有利益的,对于精神分析的继续。另一方面,对于移情的抗拒的脸孔,由分析者的无意识的负面,敌意,或强烈性爱的感觉,朝向分析家,可看出轮廓。移情的抗拒的脸孔是形成灾难的要素。处非分析家成功地解释这些负面的移情起源于分析者的婴孩时期。

Because he regarded the analy sand’s feelings in the (hostile or erotic)
transference as a blueprint of a repressed unconscious pattern (Freud
1910a[1909]:50–51), Freud defined the analyst’s task accordingly as
overcoming the aspect of repetition controlling the transference and
opening the psychic avenues of remembering (Freud 1926e:226–228).4
In his re-reading of Freud’s technical papers during the early 1950s,
Lacan progressively exchanged the two constitutive axes (positive,
negative vs. conscious, unconscious) of Freud’s taxonomy of transference
for a structural classification embedded in his own distinction between
the imaginary and the symbolic (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:284).

因为分析家将分析者在敌意或性爱的移情里的感觉,作为是被压抑的无意识的模式的蓝图。弗洛伊德定义分析家的工作,因此作为是克服重复的面向,控制移情与展开记忆的心灵的管道。当拉康重新阅读弗洛伊德的技术的论文,在1950年代期间,拉康逐渐交换这两个组成的枢纽,(积极,负面,对抗意识,无意识),这是弗洛伊德的移情的术语。拉康将它转换成我结构的分类,镶嵌于他自己的区别,处于想像界与象征界之间。
In
emphasizing the imaginary and symbolic dimensions of transference
Lacan at once endeavoured to solve the Freudian riddle why transference
is simultaneously the engine of psychoanalytic treatment and the strongest
weapon of resistance (ibid.: 284). To Lacan this clinical puzzle could
not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by merely relying on the
faces of transference; it required entering into the dialectics of the
imaginary and the symbolic.

当拉康强调移情的想像与象征的维度,他立即尝试解决弗洛伊德的谜团: 为什么移情同时是精神分析治疗的引擎。而且是最强烈的抗拒的武器。对于拉康,这个临床的谜团无法被带到令人满意的结论,凭借仅是依靠移情的脸孔。它要求进入想像界与象征界的辩证法。

Consequently, whereas Freud had predicated
the continuation of analysis on the analyst’s ability to handle the
inherently detrimental faces of transference by exposing their roots in a
repressed, infantile conflict, Lacan emphasized that the analyst’s duty
consisted in guaranteeing that the transference does not disintegrate into
an imaginary relationship of jealousy, rivalry and competition. At the
same time Lacan did not discard the qualities of love and hate within the
transference. On the contrary, he argued that love and hate are the two
central constituents of both symbolic and imaginary transference, with
the caveat that they cannot operate without an additional, generally
neglected factor of ignorance

结果,弗洛伊德曾经描述精神分析的继续,根据分析家的能力,处理本质上具有伤害性的移情的脸孔,凭借揭露他们在被压抑的,婴孩的冲突里的根源。拉康强调,分析家的责任在于保证:移情没有瓦解成为想像的妒忌,敌意,与競争的关系。同时,拉康并没有抛弃在移情里,爱与恨的各种特质。相反地,他主张,爱与恨都是象征界与想像界的两个中心的组成成分。具有这个警示:每当爱与恨运作时,总是会有一个额外,通常被忽略的无知的因素。

Apart from the question as to how transference influences the
continuation of analysis (with respect to its differential form or in keeping
with the analyst’s handling of it), Freud was also intrigued by the origin
of transference. Is it a phenomenon elicited by the conditions of
psychoanalytic treatment or something proceeding from a natural
disposition in neurotic people? If it is triggered by psychoanalysis itself,
should it be attributed to the person of the analyst or to the singularity of
the analytic procedures? And if it can be explained through the analytic
procedures, which of its components are most significant?

除了这个问题,关于移情如何影响精神分析的继续,(关于它的差异的形式或为了符合分析家对它的处理)。弗洛伊德也被移情的起源所著迷。移情的现象是由于精神分析的治疗的情况所召唤?或是某件从神经症人们身上的自然的性情,继续下来。假如移情是受的精神分析本身的触发,它难道应该被归属于分析家这个人?或是应该被归属于精神分析的程序的独异性?假如移情能够被解释,通过精神分析的程序,那么,移情的成分里,哪一个最重要?

Freud broached these questions in many of his writings without
formulating consistent answers.5 In the Dora case he championed the
view that transference is ‘an inevitable necessity’, not created by
psychoanalysis but merely brought to light as part of the analytic
revelation of the patient’s unconscious tendencies (Freud
1905e[1901]:116–117).

弗洛伊德碰触这些•问题,在许多他的著作里,但是他没有铨释一贯的答案。在朵拉的个案,他扞卫这个观点:移情是一个“无可避免的必要性”,移情并不是被精神分析所创造。而仅是被启蒙,作为是病人的无意识的倾向的精神分析的启示部分。

He rehearsed this view in ‘The Dynamics of
Transference’, at once challenging the idea that transference is an
exclusively psychoanalytic phenomenon (Freud 1912b:101). Yet soon
after, in his essay on transference love, Freud balanced towards the other
alternative: ‘He [the analyst] must recognize that the patient’s falling in
love is induced by the analytic situation and is not to be attributed to the
charms of his own person’ (Freud 1915a[1914]: 160–161).

他排演这个观点,在“移情的动力学”,他立即挑战这个观念:移情是一个专门的精神分析的现象。可是,不久之后,在他的探讨移情的爱的论文,弗洛伊德的平衡朝向另外一个替代选择:分析家必须体认到,病人的掉入恋爱,是由于精神分析的情境所诱导,并且不能被归属于他自己的人格的魅力。

But the
explanation Freud had given in the Dora case resurfaced in his
‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’: ‘[W]e must… recognize
that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is intimately bound up
with the nature of the illness itself…[W]e do not believe that the situation
in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings’, although
‘the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment’ enables the patient to
transfer these feelings onto the analyst (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:442).

但是,弗洛伊德在朵拉的个案里,给出的这个解释,重新出现在他的“精神分析的导论“:「我们必须体认到,我们正在处理一个现象,跟疾病的本身的特性息息相关的现象。我们并没有相信,在治疗的情境能够证实这些感觉的发展的正当性。虽然精神分析治疗提供的机会,让病人能够转移这些感觉,到分析家身上。

Compared to Freud’s, Lacan’s take on the source of transference was
at the same time less ambiguous and more radical. Reassessing Freud’s
conduct in the Dora case, Lacan averred that transference—here to be
understood in its pernicious, imaginary side—‘always has the same
direction, of indicating the moments of error and orientation of the
analyst’ (Lacan 1982a[1951]:72, translation modified).

跟弗洛伊德的观点比较起来,拉康对于移情来源的看法,既是比较不那么模糊,也更加积进。拉康确信弗洛伊德在朵拉个案的行为,他主张说:移情—在此应该被理解,用它有害的想像的面向—移情总是拥有相同的方向,移情具有害的想像的面向:指示著错误的时刻与分析家的定向。

Subsequently,
he also held the analyst to play a crucial part in the emergence of the
symbolic transference, not simply by allowing the analysand to mistake
him for somebody else, nor by introducing the rule of free association,
but by embodying the function of supposed subject of knowing.

随后,拉康也认为分析家应该扮演一个重要的角色,在象征的移情的出现。不仅是凭借承认分析者将他错认为某个其他的人。也不是介质自由联想的规则的这个观念。而且凭借具体表现被认为应该知道的主体的功能。

Repudiating the idea that transference is the spontaneous outcome of a
presumed neurotic disposition, Lacan thus argued that it is evoked by
the analytic setting, notably by the analyst’s own implication.6
Since the analyst is de facto implied in the transference, whatever its
form and structure, Lacan went on to state that countertransference is not
an analytic evil, but a necessary counterpart of the analysand’s transference
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:233).

因为拉康排斥这个观念:移情是被认为是神经症的性情的自动自发的结果。拉康因此主张,移情由分析家的背景所召唤。特别是分析家自己的暗示。因为分析家实际上在移情里被暗杀,无论它的形式与结构是什么,拉康继续陈述:反-移情并不是分析家的邪恶,而是分析者的移情的必要的对应物。

On Lacan’s account, the notion of
countertransference ought not be employed as an umbrella for the analyst’s
technical failures, but as a concept conveying the unavoidable implication
of the analyst in the analysand’s transference.7 Instead of assigning the
transference to the quirks of the neurotic condition or to the artificiality of
the analytic setting, Lacan defended the analyst’s responsibility within the
entire process, eventually summarizing his point provocatively in the
formula that there is only one transference in psychoanalysis, namely that
of the analyst (Lacan 1973–74: session of 19 March 1974).

因为拉康的缘故,反-移情不应该被运用,作为是分析家的技术的失败,而是作为一个观念,传递无法分析家的避免的暗示,在分析者的移情里。拉康并没有将移情指定给神经症的情况的诡计,或是归属于精神分析的人为的背景。拉康辩护分析家的责任,在整个的过程,最后他挑衅地总结他的观点,在这个公式里:在精神分析里,仅有一个移情。换句话说,分析家的移情。

The analyst’s essential share in the analysand’s transference also
emboldened Lacan during the early 1960s to reject Freud’s frequent
alignment of transference and repetition.8 Although he himself had
supported this equivalence during the 1950s, Lacan gradually realized
that seeing transference as a pure repetition of an ancient, repressed
infantile conflict, i.e. as something completely alien to the analyst’s
position, not only reduced the analyst’s responsibility for the direction
of the treatment, but also restricted her capacity for manipulating the
transference (Lacan 1962–63: session of 9 January 1963). As I will
demonstrate in the succeeding sections of this chapter, this inevitable
implication of the analyst in the analysand’s transference was not the
only factor motivating Lacan’s separation of transference and repetition,
but it was definitely the most clinically informed one.

分析家基本上分享分享者的移情,在1960年代期间,让拉康大胆地排斥弗洛伊德的经常地将移情与重复等同一块。虽然拉康自己做1950年代,曾经支持这种等同。拉康逐渐地体会到:将移情视为是纯粹地重复的旧时的被压抑的婴孩的冲突,譬如,作为是某件完全外在于分析家的立场。这不但将分析家的责任化简成为治疗的方向,而且限制分析家的能力,作为操控移情的能力。如同我将会证实的,在这个章节的接续的部分,分析家的这个无可避免的暗示,并不是唯一的因素,引起拉康的动机,将移情与重复分开。但是,这确实是最为临床的资讯的因素。

Thus far I have presented two series of questions emanating from
Freud’s scattered glosses on transference: ‘How does transference affect
the continuation (the time) of psychoanalytic treatment?’, and ‘Where
does transference stem from?’. A third, even more contentious issue can
be added to this list, that hinges on the differentiation of transference
and suggestion.

直到现在,我已经呈现两个系列的问题,从弗洛伊德的探讨移情的散开的文章:「移情如何影响精神分析治疗的继续时间?“与“移情从何产生?”第三个议题具有争议性,能够被增加到这个名单,这个议题跟移情与暗示的差异连接一块。

If the analysand’s mild positive transference constitutes
a guarantee for psychoanalytic success (at least in Freud’s conception of
the treatment), how can the effects of psychoanalysis be distinguished
from those obtained by suggestion within traditional forms of hypnosis
and other healing practices? And if analysts are supposed to take
advantage of the analysand’s mild positive transference, curbing all its
complementary forms of expression, in order to obtain the desired results,
to what extent do they act upon a position of power and what prevents
them from abusing the power relegated to them?

假如分析者的温和的正面的移情组成精神分析成功的保障,(至少在弗洛伊德的治疗的观念),精神分析的影响如何能够被区别,跟那些凭借暗示获得的区别,在传统的催眠的形式,与其他的治疗的实践?假如分析家被认为利用分析者的温和的正面的移情,控制所有它的辅助的表达的形式,为了获得渴望的结果。他们根据权力的立场行动,到什么程度?是什么阻止他们不会滥用分配给与他们的权力?

In ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ Freud did not eschew the proposition
that ‘the results of psychoanalysis rest upon suggestion’, if suggestion
means that one person is being influenced by another (Freud 1912b:106).

在“移情的动力学”,弗洛伊德并没有避开这个命题:「精神分析的结果依靠暗示“。假如暗示意味在,一个人正在被另外一个影响。

Developing this point further in his ‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis’, he impressed on his audience that a patient’s ‘tendency to
transference’ (Ubertragungsneigung) is synonymous with Bernheim’s
notion of suggestibility if only its realm of action is extended to include
negative feelings, and provided one is prepared to acknowledge the libidinal
engine of this suggestibility (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:446).9 Faced with
the objection that this inextricable link between transference and suggestion
undermines the originality of the psychoanalytic edifice and might
contribute to its deterioration, Freud subsequently nuanced his opinion,
drawing attention to a dual gulf separating direct hypnotic and
psychoanalytic suggestion.

拉康更进一步发展这一点,在他的”论精神分析的导论“。他给予他的听众这个印象: 病人的倾向于移情,等于是同义词,跟伯罕姆的暗示的观念,只是它的行动的领域被延伸到包含负面的感觉。只要我们准备承认这个暗示的力比多的引擎。当弗洛伊德面临这个反对意见:移情与暗示之间的这个可以挣脱的联结,逐渐损坏精神分析技术的原创性,并且可能促成它的恶化。弗洛伊德随后更详细说明这个意见,提醒注意有一个双重鸿沟,将直接的催眠与精神分析的暗示区分开。

First of all he claimed that contrary to hypnotic
procedures, the analytic modus operandi is not geared towards covering
up the patient’s problems with additional layers of mental strength, even
less towards the prohibition of symptoms. Instead it seeks to rid the
analysands of their symptoms by exposing their underlying conflicts (ibid.:
450–451).10 Second, and more importantly, Freud stressed that whatever
remains of the suggestive influence of the analyst’s interventions is bound
to perish under the weight of analysis itself: ‘In every other kind of
suggestive treatment the transference is carefully preserved and left
untouched; in analysis it is itself subjected to treatment and is dissected in
all the shapes in which it appears’ (ibid.: 453).

首先,他宣称,跟催眠的程序恰恰相反,分析的运作模式被启动,并不是朝向掩盖病人的难题,用额外的精神的力量的层级。甚至不是朝着症状的禁止。代替的,精神分析的运作模式尝试替分析者废除掉他们的症状,凭借揭露他们的作为基础的冲突。其次,而且更加重要地,弗洛伊德强调:任何分析家的介入的暗示的影响,所剩的东西,被发现会在精神分析本身的压力下消灭。「在每一种其他的暗示的治疗里,移情仔细被保留,并且被保存完整。在精神分析,移情本身隶属于治疗,而且被解剖,在它出现的各种形状里。

Not convinced by Freud’s arguments, Lacan remained adamant that
transference and suggestion ought to be kept separate if the analyst is to
steer away from a surreptitious abuse of power.11 In his Seminar V he
pointed out that analysts have an ever-looming suggestive influence over
their patients by virtue of their transference, which is being abused
whenever they take advantage of it, whether to satisfy their patients’
demands, to force an interpretation, or to present themselves as reliable,
competent analysts with whom it is worth identifying (Lacan 1998b
[1957–58]:427–428).

由于拉康并不相信弗洛伊德的论点,拉康始终态度坚定:移情与暗示应该被保持分开。假如分析家想要避免权力的秘密滥用。在他的第四研讨班,拉康指出,分析家拥有越来越明显的暗示的影响,对于他们的病人,凭借病人的移情。病人的移情正在被滥用,每当他们利用它。无论是满足他们的病人的要求,强迫给予解释,或呈现他们自己作为可靠,胜任的分析家。认同这些分析家是值得的。

Of course, the upshot of Lacan’s idea was that
psychoanalytic interventions which do not encompass an element of
suggestion are extremely difficult to define, especially when taking into
account that the analysts’ mere presence could be regarded as a suggestive
fulfilment of the analysands’ demand that they be there. Lacan tried to
escape this clinical impasse for each of the three levels in his schema of
the direction of the treatment: the politics of the analyst, the strategies of
transference and the tactics of interpretation (Lacan 1977i[1958]).12

当然,拉康的观念的结果是,精神分析的介入,并没有涵盖暗示的元素。这种介入是极端难以定义。特别是当我们考虑到,光是精神分析家的存在,就能够被认为是分析者的要求的暗示的满足:分析家应该在那里。拉康尝试逃避这种临床的僵局,因为这三个层次的每一个,在他的治疗的方向的基模里:分析家的政治学,移情的策略,与解释的技术。

First, as I have explained in the previous chapter, he intimated that
the analyst’s position must be characterized both by the death of the ego
and the disbeing of the object a. Second, with respect to the contents of
an interpretation, Lacan replaced the analyst’s mandatory full speech
with the essential ambiguity and nonsensicality of his expressions.13
Finally, on the level of transference, he exposed the widespread analytic
practice of interpreting the transference, whereby its infantile sources
are revealed to the analysand, as a vicious circle:

首先,如同我曾经解释,在先前一章。拉康主张,分析家的立场的特征,必然是自我的死亡与小客体的没有生命实存。其次,关于解释的内容,拉康取代分析家的义务的充分的言说,带有基本的模糊与他的表达的非理解性质。最后,在移情的层次,拉康揭露广泛的精神分析的解释移情的实践。凭借移情,移情的婴孩的来源被揭示给分析者,反过来说,也是一样。

[T]his interpretation, if he [the analyst] gives it, will be received as
coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be. Will
he [the analyst] agree to benefit from this error concerning his person?
Analytic morals do not contradict this, on condition that the
analyst interprets this effect, otherwise the analysis will
amount to little more than a crude suggestion. An
incontestable option, except that the analyst’s words will still
be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, the
subject’s way out of the transference thus being postponed
ad infinitum.
(ibid.: 231, translation modified)

假如分析家给予这个解释,它将会被接收,作为是来自移情灌输给他要成为的那个人。关于这个人,他将会同意从这个错误里获得利益吗?精神分析的道德并没有反驳这一点,只有分析家解释这个效果。否则,精神分析将会等于是仅是粗略的暗示。这个一个无可争议的选择,除了就是,分析家的话语将依旧会被听见,当著是从移情的大他者而来。主体的避开移情的途径因此无限地被拖延。

Transcending the inappropriate, inherently suggestive interpretation of
the transference, Lacan ensuingly deployed the principles of a genuine
analysis of and interpretation within the transference, predicated on its
calculated manipulation by the analyst in light of the downfall of the
supposed subject of knowing (Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January
1968).

拉康超越这个不合适,本质上具有暗示的移情的解释。他随后运用“移情的真诚的精神分析的原则与移情之内的解释”,并且根据分析家对于移情的审慎的操控作为陈述,从作为应该知道的主体的沦落为分析者欲望的客体的原因的观点。

The above three issues, which cover the relationship between
transference and the continuation of the treatment, the origin of
transference, and the relation between transference and suggestion, arise
from three clinical problems in Freud’s oeuvre and represent three central
concerns within Lacan’s theory of transference. Although continuously
in touch with the letter of Freud’s writings, Lacan sought to advance the
founder’s theory of transference by reformulating these problems and
introducing new concepts.

以上的三个议题涵盖移情与治疗的继续之间,移情的起源,移情与暗示之间的关系。这三个议题的产生,是因为三个临床的难题,在弗洛伊德的著作里。它们代表三个中心的关注,在拉康的移情的理论。虽然拉康继续跟弗洛伊德的著作的信息保存联络,他尝试提升这位创办者的移情的理论,凭借重新阐释这些难题,并且介绍新的观念。

In the following sections of this chapter I will
detail these reformulations and new concepts, mapping the evolution of
Lacan’s own views between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, when
his exploration of transference reached its zenith.14 In this way, I hope to
show that Lacan’s theory of transference is neither ‘characterized by
obscurity and linguistic play’, nor ‘leaves one uncertain as to his actual
technical approach’ (Esman 1990:12).

在这个章节的随后的部分,我将详细列出这些重新的阐释与新的观念。并且描绘出拉康自己的观点的进化,在1950年代早期跟1960年代晚期。当时,拉康的对于移情的探索登峰造极。用这个方式,我希望显示:拉康的移情的理论,既不是以模糊嗳昧与语言的游戏作为特征,也不是让我们狐疑不定,关于他实际的技术的方法。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:人格面具

November 12, 2015

III
THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
人格面具作为集体无意识的部分
243 In this chapter we come to a problem which, if overlooked, is
liable to cause the greatest confusion. It will be remembered that in the analysis of the personal unconscious the first things to be added to consciousness are the personal contents, and I sug¬gested that these contents, which have been repressed but are capable of becoming conscious, should be called the personal un¬conscious. I also showed that to annex the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I have called the collective unconscious) pro¬duces an enlargement of the personality leading to the state of inflation. This state is reached by simply continuing the analyti¬cal work, as in the case of the young woman discussed above. By continuing the analysis we add to the personal consciousness cer¬tain fundamental, general, and impersonal characteristics of hu¬manity, thereby bringing about the inflation1 I have just de-
1 Th’is phenomenon, which results from the extension of consciousness, is in no sense specific to analytical treatment. It occurs whenever people are overpowered by knowledge or by some new realization. “Knowledge puffeth up,” Paul writes to the Corinthians, for the new knowledge had turned the heads of many, as in¬deed constantly happens. The inflation has nothing to do with the kind of knowledge, but simply and solely with the fact that any new knowledge can so seize hold of a weak head that he no longer sees and hears anything else. He is hypnotized by it, and instantly believes he has solved the riddle of the universe. But that is equivalent to almighty self-conceit. This process is such a general reaction that, in Genesis 2:17, eating of the tree of knowledge is represented as a deadly sin. It may not be immediately apparent why greater consciousness fol¬lowed by self-conceit should be such a dangerous thing. Genesis represents the act of becoming conscious as a taboo infringement. as though knowledge meant that a sacrosanct barrier had been impiously overstepped. I think that Genesis is right in so far as every step towards greater consciousness is a kind of Prome¬thean guilt: through knowledge, the gods are as it were robbed of their fire, that is, something that was the property of the unconscious powers is torn out of its natural context and subordinated to the whims of the conscious mind. The
156

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE scribed, which might be regarded as one of the unpleasant con¬sequences of becoming fully conscious.

在这个章节,我们面临一个难题。这个难题假如被忽略,很容易引起极大的混乱。我们将记住,在个人的无意识的分析里,首先能够被增加到意识层面的是个人的内容。我建议,这些已经被压抑,却能够被意识知道的内容,应该被称为是“个人无意识”。我也显示,合并更加深层的无意识,我所谓的集体无意识,会产生人格的扩大。这种人格的扩大会导致自我膨胀的状态。光是凭借精神分析,这个状态就会被到达。如同在上面讨论的年轻女子的个案里。凭借继续精神分析,我们将某些基本,一般,与非个人的人类的特性,增加到个人的意识里。这会导致我刚刚描述的自我膨胀。这种自我膨胀可能会被认为是完全被意识知道时的令人不愉快的结果之一。

244 From this point of view the conscious personality is a more or
less arbitrary segment of the collective psyche. It consists in a sum of psychic facts that are felt to be personal. The attribute “personal” means: pertaining exclusively to this particular per¬son. A consciousness that is purely personal stresses its proprie¬tary and original right to its contents with a certain anxiety, and in this way seeks to create a whole. But all those contents that refuse to fit into this whole are either overlooked and forgotten or repressed and denied. This is one way of educating oneself, but it is too arbitrary and too much of a violation. Far too much of our common humanity has to be sacrificed in the interests of an ideal image into which one tries to mould oneself. Hence these purely “personal” people are always very sensitive, for something may easily happen that will bring into consciousness an unwelcome portion of their real (“individual”) character.

从这个观点,意识的人格是集体无意识的相当任意的部分。它的组成是心灵事实的总和。这些心灵事实被感觉是个人的心灵事实。“个人”的这个属性意味著:专门归属于这个特殊的人。纯粹是个人的意识,强调它拥有财产与原先的权利,对于它的内容,带有某种的焦虑。以这种方式,它尝试创造一个整体。但是所有那些拒绝适应到这个整体的内容,要就是被忽略与忘记,要不就是被压抑与被否认。这是一个教育自己的方法。但是这个方法太过于任意性,太过于违背心灵事实。我们尝试替自己塑造一个理想的意象。为了这个理想的意象的利益,我们的共同人性的太多的部分必须被牺牲。因此,这些纯粹的“个人”的人们,总是非常敏感,对于这些牺性的共同人性的部分。因为很容易发生某件事情,就会让意识知道,他们具有一个并不受欢迎的部分,是他们的真实的(个人)的特性。

245 This arbitrary segment of collective psyche-often fashioned
with considerable pains-I have called the persona. The term persona is really a very appropriate expression for this, for origi¬nally it meant the mask once worn by actors to indicate the role they played. If we endeavour to draw a precise distinction be¬tween what psychic material should be considered personal, and what impersonal, we soon find ourselves in the greatest di• lemma, for by definition we have to say of the persona’s contents what we have said of the impersonal unconscious, namely, that it is collective. It is only because the persona represents a more or less arbitrary and fortuitous segment of the collective psyche that we can make the mistake of regarding it in toto as some¬thing individual. It is, as its name implies, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality) making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks.

集体心灵的任意性部分,我称之为“人格面具”,通常是费尽心力才塑造而成。“人格面具”的这个术语确实是一个非常合适的表达集体心灵的任意性部分。因为它原先的意义是演员所戴的“面具”,为了指示他们扮演的角色。假如我们尝试获得明确的区别,在应该被认为是个人的心灵的材料,与应该被认为是非个人的心灵材料之间的区别。我们不久就发现我们自己处于进退维谷当中。因为定义上,我们必须将我们曾经说到的非个人的无意识,说成就是人格面具的内容。欢句话说,人格面具是集体无意识。仅是因为人格面具代表集体心灵的相当任意性与偶然性的部分时,我们才会犯上这个错误,错误地将完整的集体心灵,视为是某件个人的东西。顾名思义,人格面具仅是集体心灵的面具。这一个人格面具伪装成为个人,让别人与自己相信:我是个人,虽然我仅是扮演一个角色。通过这个角色,集体的心灵言说。

an who has usurped the new knowledge suffers, however, a transformation or enlargement of consciousness, which no longer resembles that of his fellow men. He has raised himself above the human level of his age (“ye shall become like unto God”), but in so doing has alienated himself from humanity. The pain of this loneliness is the vengeance of the gods, for never again can he return to mankind. He is, as the myth says, chained to the lonely cliffs of the Caucasus, forsaken of God and man.
157

TH::f: RELATiONS nETWEEN TH:E EGO AND Tt-lE UNCONSCIOUS
146 When we analyse the persona we strip off the mask, and dis-
cover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask of the collec¬tive psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, exercises a function, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a compromise formation, in mak¬ing which others often have a greater share than he. The per¬sona is a semblance, a two-dimensional reality, to give it a nick¬name.

当我们分析这个人格面具时,我们剥除掉这个面具,然后发现,表面似乎是个人心灵,骨子里却是集体心灵。换句话说,人格面具仅是集体心灵的面具。基本上,人格面具并非是真实的东西:人格面具仅是个人与社会之间的一种妥协,关于一个人应该显现怎么的样子。他取一个名字,获得一个头衔,运用一个功能,他是这个,他是那个。从某个意义来说,所有这一切都是真实。可是,就相关的个人的基本的个体性而言,人格面具仅是一个次要的现实,一个妥协的形成。从事这个妥协的形成时,别的人经常比他具有更多的参与。人格面具是一个类似物,给它取一个绰号,“二维度的现实”。

!47 It would be wrong to leave the matter as it stands without
at the same time recognizing that there is, after all, something individual in the peculiar choice and delineation of the persona, and that despite the exclusive identity of the ego-consciousness with the persona the unconscious self, one’s real individuality, is always present and makes itself felt indirectly if not directly. Although the ego-consciousness is at first identical with the per-sona-that compromise role in which we parade before the community-yet the unconscious self can never be repressed to the point of extinction. Its influence is chiefly manifest in the special nature of the contrasting and compensating contents of the unconscious.

这将是错误的,假如我们将事情保持目前的状态,而没有同时体认到, 毕竟还是有某件个人的东西,在人格面具的特殊选择与描绘里。尽管自我意识专门地认同于人格面具, 无意识的自性,也就是一个人的真实的个体性,总是出现,并且让它自己间接地被感觉到,虽然并不是直接被感觉到。虽然自我意识起初认同与人格面具—那个作为妥协的角色。以那个角色,我们展示在社会的面前。可是,无意识的自性永远没有办法被压抑到销声匿迹的程度。无意识的自性的影响主要被展示在这个特别的特性:无意识具有作为对照与补偿的内容。

The purely personal attitude of the conscious mind evokes reactions on the part of the unconscious, and these, together with personal repressions, contain the seeds of individ¬ual development in the guise of collective fantasies. Through the analysis of the personal unconscious, the conscious mind be¬comes suffused with collective material which brings with it the elements of individuality. I am well aware that this conclusion must be almost unintelligible to anyone not familiar with my views and technique, and particularly so to those who habitually regard the unconscious from the standpoint of Freudian theory. But if the reader will recall my example of the philosophy stu¬dent, he can form a rough idea of what I mean. At the beginning of the treatment the patient was quite unconscious of the fact that her relation to her father was a fixation, and that she was therefore seeking a man like her father, whom she could then meet with her intellect. This in itself would not have been a mistake if her intellect had not had that peculiarly protesting character such as is unfortunately often encountered in intellec¬tual women.

意识心灵的这个纯粹个人的态度,会引起反动抗拒,在无意识的这方面。这些反动抗拒,再加上个人的压抑,就包含个人的发展的种种,以集体的幻想作为伪装。通过个人的意识的分析,意识的心灵变成充满了集体的材料。这个集体材料随之带来个体化的元素。我清楚知道,这个结论一定是匪夷所思,对于任何不熟悉我的观点与精神分析技术的人而言。特别是习惯于用弗洛伊德的理论的观点,来看待无意识的人们。但是假如读者愿意回想一下我举的哲学系学生的例子,对于我的意思,他能够建构粗略的观念。在治疗的开始,病人完全不知道这个事实:她跟她的父亲的关系是一种固著。她因此寻找一位像是她的父亲的人物。这个人物在知识能力,能够跟她匹配。这个关系的本身本来不会是错误,假如她的知识能力当时不是那么具有特殊的抗议的性质。譬如,在知识份子的女人身上,很不幸地经常遭遇到的特殊抗议的性质。
158

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
Such an intellect is always trying to point out mistakes in others; it is pre-eminently critical, with a dis¬agreeably personal undertone, yet it always wants to be consid¬ered objective. This invariably makes a man bad-tempered, par¬ticularly if, as so often happens, the criticism touches on some weak spot which, in the interests of fruitful discussion, were bet¬ter avoided. But far from wishing the discussion to be fruitful, it is the unfortunate peculiarity of this feminine intellect to seek out a man’s weak spots, fasten on them, and exasperate him. This is not usually a conscious aim, but rather has the uncon¬scious purpose of forcing a man into a superior position and thus making him an object of admiration. The man does not as a rule notice that he is having the role of the hero thrust upon him; he merely finds her taunts so odious that in future he will go a long way to avoid meeting the lady. In the end the only man who can stand her is the one who gives in at the start, and therefore has nothing wonderful about him.
这样的知识份子总是尝试指出别人身上的错误。显而易见,这是批评性质,具有令人不愉快的个人的语气,可是,它又总是想要被认为是具有客观性。这必然会让男人脾气发作,特别是,如同经常所发生的状况,这种批评触及到某的弱点。为了让讨论具有成果的利益,对于弱点的人身攻击最后避免。但是,女性知识份子根本就不想要讨论具有成果,她具有不幸的特殊性质,就像想要寻找出男人的弱点,紧盯着这些弱点,然后激怒他。这通常并不是一个意识的目的。相反地,这具有无意识的目的,就是强迫男人进入一个比较优秀的立场,然后,让他成为的崇拜的目标。这个男人通常每有注意到,他正在扮演强迫在他身上的英雄的角色。他发现她的挑衅如此令人厌恶,以致于未来,他将会刻意迴避,避免见到这位女士。最后,唯一能够忍受这位女性知识份子的男人,就是从一开始就屈服的男人。因此,这样的男人并没有什么出奇之处。

248 My patient naturally found much to reflect upon in all this,
for she had no notion of the game she was playing. Moreover she still had to gain insight into the regular romance that had been enacted between her and her father ever since childhood. It would lead us too far to describe in detail how, from her earliest years, with unconscious sympathy, she had played upon the shadow-side of her father which her mother never saw, and how, far in advance of her years, she became her mother’s rival. All this came to light in the analysis of the personal unconscious. Since, if only for professional reasons, I could not allow myself to be irritated, I inevitably became the hero and father-lover.

我的病人当然会在这一切当中发现有许多值得反思之处。因为她并不知的她正在扮演的游戏。而且,她依旧必须获得洞察力,对于曾经被扮演过的规律的浪漫情怀,在她跟她的父亲之间,自从童年以来。这将会牵扯太远,以致我们无法详细描述,她如何从她的早年开始,就带着无意识的同情,扮演她的父亲的阴影的面向。那是她的母亲从来没有看见的。以及她如何变成熟她的母亲的情敌,在她成长之前的岁月里。在个人无意识的精神分析里,所有这一切都真相大白。因为我无可避免地就成为她的英雄与父亲兼情人。仅是为了专业的理由,我不能够让我自己被她激怒。

The transference too consisted at first of contents from the personal unconscious. My role as a hero was just a sham, and so, as it turned me into the merest phantom, she was able to play her traditional role of the supremely wise, very grown-up, all-under¬standing mother-daughter-beloved-an empty role, a persona behind which her real and authentic being, her individual self, lay hidden. Indeed, to the extent that she at first completely identified herself with her role, she was altogether unconscious of her real self. She was still in her nebulous infantile world and had not yet discovered the real world at all. But as, through pro¬gressive analysis, she became conscious of the nature of her transference, the dreams I spoke of in Chapter I began to mate¬rialize.

移情首先也是由个人无意识的内容组成。我作为英雄的角色仅是一种伪装。所以,当移情将我转变成为仅是一个魅影人物。她能够扮演她的传统的角色,超级聪明,成熟稳重,通情达理的母亲兼女儿兼情人的角色,一个空洞的角色,一个人格面具。在这个人格面具背后,她的真实与真诚的生命实存,她的个人的自性,隐藏起来。的确,当她起初完全将她自己完全认同她的角色,她完全不知道她的真实的自性。她依旧是处于朦胧的婴孩的世界,她根本就还没有发现真实的世界。但是,经历过逐渐进步的精神分析,她逐渐知道她的移情的特性,我在第一节谈论到的那些梦,开始具体成形。

159

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
They brought up bits of the collective unconscious, and that was the end of her infantile world and of all the heroics. She came to herself and to her own real potentialities. This is roughly the way things go in most cases, if the analysis is carried far enough. That the consciousness of her individuality should coincide exactly with the reactivation of an archaic god-image is not just an isolated coincidence, but a very frequent occurrence which, in my view, corresponds to an unconscious law.

这些梦显露集体无意识的片断。那就是她的婴孩的世界与所有的英雄行为的结束。她苏醒过来,恢复她自己的真实的潜力。在大部分的个案,这大约就是事情进行的方式,假如精神分析被充分贯彻。她的个体性的意识竟然确实巧合于旧时的神性-意象的重新触动。这不仅是孤立的巧合,而且是经常发生的事情。依照我的观的,经常的发生的事情符合无意识的法则。

19 After this digression, let us turn back to our earlier reflec-
tions.
)0 Once the personal repressions are lifted, the individuality
and the collective psyche begin to emerge in a coalescent state, thus releasing the hitherto repressed personal fantasies. The fan¬tasies and dreams which now appear assume a somewhat differ¬ent aspect. An infallible sign of collective images seems to be the appearance of the “cosmic” element, i.e., the images in the dream or fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, “astrological” associations, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, changes in the proportions of the body, etc. The obvi¬ous occurrence of mythological and religious motifs in a dream also points to the activity of the collective unconscious. The col¬lective element is very often announced by peculiar symptoms,2 as for example by dreams where the dreamer is flying through space like a comet, or feels that he is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. Similarly, feelings of disorientation, of dizziness and the like, may appear along with symptoms of inflation.

经过这场离题。让我们回到我们早先的反思。一旦个人的压抑被撤除,个体性与集体心灵开始出现在融合的状态。因此释放出迄今被压抑的个人的幻想。现在出现的这些幻想与梦,扮演一个相当不同的面向。集体的各种意象的无误的讯号,似乎就是“宇宙”的元素的出现。换句话说,在梦里或幻想里的各种意象,跟宇宙的特质息息相关。譬如,时间与空间的无限,运动的强烈快速与范围。“天文学的联想”,大地电流,月亮与太阳的类比,身体的比例的变化,等等。在梦里,神话与宗教的母题的明显的出现,也指向集体无意识的活动。集体的因素经常由特殊的症状宣告出来。譬如,有这些梦宣告出来:在这个梦里,作梦者正在飞行,像是彗星,穿越过太空。或是,作梦者感觉他就是地球,或是太阳,或是星星。要不然就是,他的体积特别巨大,或是特别矮小。或是他死亡,在一个陌生的地方,他自己陌生的地方,迷惘,疯狂,等等。同样地,失序的感觉,晕眩的感觉,等等,可能会伴随自我膨胀的症状出现。

)l The forces that burst out of the collective psyche have a con-
fusing and blinding effect. One result of the dissolution of the persona is a release of involuntary fantasy, which is apparently nothing else than the specific activity of the collective psyche. This activity throws up contents whose existence one had never suspected before. But as the influence of the collective unconscious increases, so the conscious mind loses its power of leader¬ship. Imperceptibly it becomes the led, while an unconscious and impersonal process gradually takes control. Thus, without noticing it, the conscious personality is pushed about like a fig¬ure on a chess-board by an invisible player. It is this player who decides the game of fate, not the conscious mind and its plans. This is how the resolution of the transference, apparently so im¬possible to the conscious mind, was brought about in my earlier example.

从集体心灵突然爆发的各种力量,具有令人混乱,令人目眩的效果。人格面具的瓦解的结果是释放非自愿的幻想。这些非自愿的幻想,显而易见不是别的,实实在在就是集体心灵的明确的活动。这个活动产生我们以前从来没有怀疑是存在的内容。但是,随着集体无意识的影响的增加,意识的心灵逐渐丧失它的领导的力量。不知不觉地,意识的心灵变成是被引导者,而无意识与非个人的过程逐渐掌控一切。因此,意识的人格并没有注意到这个转变。就像祺盘上的祺子,意识的人格被推来推去,被一位隐形的下祺者。这位隐形的下祺者决定命运的祺戏,而不是意识的心灵与其计划。在我早先的例子,这就是移情的解决被达成的方式。虽然对于意识的心灵,这显而易见是非常的不可能。

2 It may not be superfluous to note that collective elements in dreams are not restricted to this stage of the analytical treatment. There are many psychological situations in which the activity of the collective unconscious can come to the surface. But this is not the place to enlarge upon these conditions.
160

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE scious

252 The plunge into this process becomes unavoidable whenever
the necessity arises of overcoming an apparently insuperable difficulty. It goes without saying that this necessity does not oc¬cur in every case of neurosis, since perhaps in the majority the prime consideration is only the removal of temporary difficulties of adaptation. Certainly severe cases cannot be cured without a far-reaching change of character or of attitude. In by far the greater number, adaptation to external reality demands so much work that inner adaptation to the collective unconscious cannot be considered for a very long time. But when this inner adapta¬tion becomes a problem, a strange, irresistible attraction pro¬ceeds from the unconscious and exerts a powerful influence on the conscious direction of life.

投掷进入这个过程变成是无可避免,每当产生这个必要性:要克服明显是无法克服的困难。自不待言的是,这个必要性并没有发生在神经症者的每个个案里。因为或许在大多数的个案,主要的考虑仅是要移除暂时的适应的困难。的确,严重的个案被治疗时,总是会有深远的人格的改变或态度的改变。就大多数的神经症这的个案而言,对于外在现实的适应要求费尽心力,以致有很漫长的时间,对于集体无意识的适应无法被考虑到。但是当内心的适应成为难题时,一个奇异,无法抗拒的吸引力就从无意识前进,从事强烈的影响,对于意识的生命的方向。

The predominance of uncon¬scious influences, together with the associated disintegration of the persona and the deposition of the conscious mind from power, constitute a state of psychic disequilibrium which, in analytical treatment, is artificially induced for the therapeutic purpose of resolving a difficulty that might block further devel¬opment. There are of course innumerable obstacles that can be overcome with good advice and a little moral support, aided by goodwill and understanding on the part of the patient. Excel¬lent curative results can be obtained in this way.

无意识的影响的占优势,跟人格面具的联想的瓦解,与拥有权力的意识心灵的性情,形成心灵的不平衡的状态。在精神分析的治疗里,这个心灵的不平衡,人为地被减少。为了治疗的目的:解决可能阻碍更进一步的发展的困难。这些能够用良好劝告与一些道德支持来克服的障碍,当然然数量无限。在病人方面,它们也受的善意与理解的帮助。用这种方式,能够获得治疗的效果。

Cases are not uncommon where there is no need to breathe a word about the unconscious. But again, there are difficulties for which one can foresee no satisfactory solution. If in these cases the psychic equi¬librium is not already disturbed before treatment begins, it will certainly be upset during the analysis, and sometimes without any interference by the doctor. It often seems as though these patients had only been waiting to find a trustworthy person in order to give up and collapse. Such a loss of balance is similar in prinCIple to a psychotic disturbance; that is, it differs from the initial stages of mental illness only by the fact that it leads in the end to greater health, while the latter leads to yet greater destruction.

寻常见到的一些个案,根本就没有必要谈论到无意识。但是,仍然存在著一些困难,我们无法预见有任何令人满意的解决。假如在这些个案,心灵的平衡,并没有已经受到扰乱,在治疗开始之前。心灵的平衡确实将会被扰乱,在精神分析期间,并且有时没有医生的任何的干扰。它们经常看起来像是这些病人仅是正在等待找到一位可信任的人,为了放弃并崩溃。平衡的这种丧失,原则上,类似精神疾病。换句话说,它跟精神疾病的最初的阶段的差异,仅是根据这个事实: 平衡的丧失最后导致更大的健康。而精神疾病则是导致更大的毁灭。

161

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

It is a condition of panic, a letting go in face of appar¬ently hopeless complications.Mostly it was preceded by desper¬ate efforts to master the difficulty by force of will; then came the collapse, and the once guiding will crumbles completely. The energy thus freed disappears from consciousness and falls into the unconscious. As a matter of fact, it is at these moments that the first signs of unconscious activity appear. (I am thinking of the example of that young man who was weak in the head.) Obviously the energy that fell away from consciousness has acti¬vated the unconscious. The immediate result is a change of atti¬tude. One can easily imagine that a stronger head would have taken that vision of the stars as a healing apparition, and would have looked upon human suffering sub specie aeternitatis, in which case his senses would have been restored.3

这是惊慌的情况,面临明显无助的併发症,束手无策。大部分的情况,前导存在着绝望的努力,想要掌控这个困难,凭借意志的力量,然后逐渐崩溃。这个曾经作为引导的意志,完全崩溃了。因此被解放出来的能源,从意识消失,然后掉落到无意识。事实上,就在这些时刻,无意识的活动的最初的迹象出现。(我正想到那位头脑薄弱的年轻人的例子。显而易见地,从意识掉落的能源已经触动无意识。当下的结果是态度的转变。我们很容易想像,假如他当时是一位头脑更加强壮的人,他本来会将那些星星的幻景,视为是治疗的魅影。他本来会俯瞰人类的痛苦,从永恒的观照之下。在永恒的观照之下的情况,他的各种感觉本来会被恢复的。

53 Had this happened, an apparently insurmountable obstacle
would have been removed. Hence I regard the loss of balance as purposive, since it replaces a defective consciousness by the automatic and instinctive activity of the unconscious, which is aiming all the time at the creation of a new balance and will moreover achieve this aim, provided that the conscious mind is capable of assimilating the contents produced by the uncon¬scious, i.e., of understanding and digesting them. If the uncon¬scious simply rides roughshod over the conscious mind, a psy¬chotic condition develops. If it can neither completely prevail nor yet be understood, the result is a conflict that cripples all further advance. But with this question, namely the understand¬ing of the collective unconscious, we come to a formidable diffi¬culty which I have made the theme of my next chapter.

假如发生这种状况,无法被克服的阻碍本来会被移除的。因此,我将平衡的丧失视为是具有目的的。因为平衡的丧失取代具有缺点的意识,被无意识的自动与本能的活动取代。无意识的自动与本能的活动目标始终是朝向创造新的平衡。而且,将会获得这个目标,只要意识的心灵能够吸收无意识产生的内容。譬如,理解与消化它们的内容。假如无意识仅是霸凌意识的心灵,那将会显示精神病的状况。假如无意识既不是完全地占优势,也无法被理解,结果将是一场冲突,瘫痪所有的前进的发展。但是,就这个问题而言,也就是,对于集体无意识的理解,我们逐渐遭遇巨大的困难。我已经订好我下次的章节的主题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:精神病内容

November 7, 2015

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
精神病的内容
Carl Jung 卡尔 荣格
320 Psychiatry is a stepchild of medicine. All the other branches
of medicine have one great advantage: the scientific method. In all other branches there are things that can be seen and touched, physical and chemical methods of investigation to be followed. The microscope reveals the dreaded bacillus, the surgeon’s knife halts at no anatomical difficulty and gives us glimpses into the most vital and inaccessible organs. Psychiatry, the art of healing the soul, still stands at the door, seeking in vain to weigh and measure as in the other departments of science. We have long known that we have to do with a definite organ, the brain; but only beyond the brain, beyond the anatomical substrate, do we reach what is important for us-the psyche, as indefinable as ever, still eluding all explanation, no matter how ingenious.

精神病是医学的继子。医学的所有的其他分科都拥有一个很大的优点:科学的方法。在所有其他的分科,有些东西能够被看见,被碰触到,生理或化学的研究方法能够被遵循。显微镜显示可怕的杆菌,外科医生的手术刀面对解剖,并无任何困难,并且让我们瞥见最具有生命力与无法接近的器官。精神病学,治疗灵魂的艺术,则是依旧站在门边,白费力气地尝试衡量与测量,如同在科学的其他部门。我们长久以来就知道,我们必须处理明确的器官,脑。但是仅有在超越脑之外,超越解剖的次级层面之外,我们才获得对于我们是重要的东西—心灵,像以往一样无法被定义,依旧逃避所有的解释,无论是多么聪明的解释。

321 Former ages, endowing the soul with substance and personi-
fying every incomprehensible occurrence in nature, regarded mental illness as the work of evil spirits; the patient was looked upon as one possessed, and the methods of treatment were such as befitted this conception. It is not unknown for this medieval view to find credence and expression even today. A classic example is the expulsion of the devil which was successfully per¬formed by the elder Pastor Blumhardt in the famous case of the Dittus sisters. 1 To the honour of the Middle Ages be it said that there were also early evidences of a sound rationalism.

以前的时代,赋予灵魂具有物质,并且让每一个无法被理解的自然的事件具有人格化。以前的时代将精神疾病视为是邪恶精灵的运作:病人被看待作为是被鬼魂著魔。治疗的方法是如此合适于这个观念。中世纪的观点并非不知道如何找到即使在今天的可信度与表达。古典的例子就是将恶魔驱除出去。这个驱魔出去由年长的牧师布伦哈特执行。在著名的狄塔斯姐妹的个案。中世纪的令人推崇之处,我们不妨说,它也具有健全的理性主义的证据。

Thus, in the sixteenth century at the Julius Hospital in Wiirzburg, mental patients were already being treated side by side with the physically sick, and the treatment seems to have been really humane. With the opening of the modern era and the dawn of the first scientific ideas, the original barbaric personification of unknown powers gradually disappeared; a change arose in the conception of mental disease in favour of a more philosophic moral attitude. The ancient view that every misfortune was the vengeance of offended gods returned in a new guise to suit the times. Just as physical diseases can, in many cases, be traced back to some frivolous self-injury, so mental diseases were believed to be due to some moral injury, or sin. Behind this conception, too, lurks the angry deity.

因此,在十六世纪,在维兹伯格的朱利斯医院,精神病人已经被治疗,跟生理疾病的病人并排一块。这种治疗在当时似乎确实合乎人性。随着现代的时代的开始,与科学的观念的开始,原先的野蛮的将未知的力量予以拟人化,逐渐就消失。精神疾病的观念产生改变,以赞同更加具有哲学的道德的态度。古代的观念认为,每个不幸都是众神受到冒犯产生的报复。这个古老的观点回转过来,具有新的伪装,以符合新的时代。正如在许的的个案里,生理的疾病能够被追踪,回到某个任意的自我的伤害。精神疾病也被相信是由于某个道德的伤害,或原罪。在这个观念的背后,也潜藏著愤怒的神祗。

1 Bresler, “Kulturhistorischer Beitrag zur Hysterie” (1897); Zlindel, Pfan’er J. C. Blumhardt (1880). [Also Cal”ter, Pastor Blumhardt.-EDIToRs.]
158

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
322 Such views played a great role right up to the beginning of
the last century, especially in German psychiatry. In France, however, at about the same time, a new idea was appearing, des¬tined to sway psychiatry for a hundred years. Pinel, whose statue fittingly stands at the gateway of the Salpetriere in Paris, re¬moved the chains from the insane and thus freed them from the stigma of the criminal. In this way he gave the most effective expression to the humane and scientific conceptions of modern times. A little later Esquirol and Bayle made the discovery that certain forms of insanity ended in death after a relatively short time, and that regular changes in the brain could be demon¬strated post mortem.2 Esquirol had discovered general paralysis of the insane (or, as it was popularly called, “softening of the brain”), a disease which is always accompanied by chronic in¬flammatory shrinkage of the cerebral tissue. Thus was laid the foundation of the dogma which you will find repeated in every text-book of psychiatry: “Mental diseases are diseases of the brain.”

这些观点扮演重要的角色,一直到上个世纪的开始,特别是在德国的精神病学。可是,在法国,大约在同时,一个新的观念正在出现,注定会影响精神病学,有百年之久。皮内尔的雕像恰如其分地站立在巴黎的萨培瑞尔医院的大门。他将锁链从疯狂者身上移开开,因此解放他们,免疫罪犯的标志。用这个方式,他给予最有效的表达,对于现代的人性与科学的观念。后来,耶斯奎洛与巴尔发现到:某些疯狂的形式结果造成死亡,经过比较短暂的时期。根据死后解剖,脑部的规律的改变能够被证明。耶斯奎洛曾经发现到疯狂者的通常的麻痹)或者,如它通俗被称为是“脑部的软化”),这一个疾病总是伴随着脑细胞组织的慢性的发炎的萎缩。因此,这个信条的基础被奠定下来。你将会发现这个信条被重复,在精神病的每一本教科书上:「精神疾病就是脑的疾病」。

323 Further confirmation of this view was furnished about the
same time by the discoveries of Gall, who traced partial or com¬plete loss of the power of speech-a psychic faculty-to a lesion in the region of the lower left frontal convolution. Later this view proved to be exceedingly fruitful. Innumerable cases of extreme idiocy and other serious mental disorders were found to be caused by tumours of the brain. Towards the end of the nine¬teenth century Wernicke (recently deceased) localized the speech-centre in the left temporal lobe. This epoch-making dis¬covery raised hopes to the highest pitch. It was expected that the time was not far off when every characteristic and every psychic activity would be assigned its place in the cortical grey matter. Gradually, more and more attempts were made to trace the primary mental changes in the psychoses back to parallel changes in the brain.

这个观点的更进一步的被证实,大约同时间,由嘉尔的发现所提供。嘉尔追踪心灵的能力,也就是,言说的力量的部分或完全的丧失,回溯到左下方的前面迴旋的地区的病变。后来,这个观点证明是极端有成果的。无数的极端白痴与其他严重的精神疾病的个案,被发现是脑的肿瘤所引起。将近十九世纪的末期,温米克(最近生病了)找出言说中心的位置,在左边的脑的颞页。这个创世纪的发现,将希望提升到最高度。大家期望,在这个表皮的灰色的物质,每个具有特效,每个心灵的活动,将会被指明它的位置,这个时机为时不远了。逐渐地,越来越多的企图被从事,为了追踪精神病这的原初的精神的改变,回归到脑部的并行的改变。
2 [For these and other historic medical personages mentioned in this volume, cf. ZiIboorg and Hemy, History of Medical Psychology, index, S.V.-EDITORS.]
159

327
328
324
325
326

THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF MENTAL DISEASE

Meynert, the famous Viennese psychiatrist, pro¬pounded a regular system in which the alteration of the blood-supply to certain areas of the cortex was to play the chief role in the origin of the psychoses. Wernicke made a similar but far more ingenious attempt at an anatomical explanation of psychic’ disturbances. One visible result of this tendency can be seen in the fact that nowadays even the smallest and most out of the way asylum has its anatomical laboratory, where cerebral sections are cut, stained, and examined under the microscope. Our numerous psychiatric journals are full of morphological con¬tributions, investigations on the path of the fibres in the brain and spinal cord, on the structure and distribution of cells in the cerebral cortex, and the various ways they are destroyed in dif-ferent mental diseases.

梅内特,这位著名的维也纳精神科医生,提出一个规律的系统。在这个系统里,血液供应给脑部的某些地区的轮替,扮演主要的角色,在精神病的起源。温米克从事类似,但是更加聪明的企图,要对心灵的疾病,用解剖学来解释。这个倾向的可看见的结果,能够被看见,根据这个事实:今天,即使是最小规模或即使是最偏远的精神病院,都拥有它的解剖的实验室。在那里,脑皮层的部分被切开,被灌上药水,被检查,在显微镜下。我们的无数的精神病学的杂志充满了形态学的投稿与研究,针对脑的组织与脊椎的途径,针对大皮质心的细胞的结构与分布,以及它们被毁灭的各种的方式,在不同的精神疾病里。

Psychiatry has been charged with gross materialism. And quite rightly, for it is on the road to putting the organ, the instrument, above the function-or rather, it has long been doing so. Function has become the appendage of its organ, the psyche an appendage of the brain. In modern psychiatry the psyche has come off very badly. While immense progress has been made in cerebral anatomy, we know practically nothing about the psyche, or even less than we did before. Modern psychiatry behaves like someone who thinks he can decipher the meaning and purpose of a building by a mineralogical analysis of its stones. Let us try to form a statistical picture of the number and types of mental patients who show any clear lesions of the brain.

精神病学已经被赋予笼统的物质主义。这是相当正确的,因为精神病学正朝着前进,将器官,工具,放置在功能之上。或者说,精神病学长久以来就是这样做。功能已经变成是它的器官的附属品,心灵就是脑的附属品。在现代的精神病学,心灵已经遭受痛苦的结果。虽然在脑的解剖,已经有了重大的进展,对于心灵,我们几乎一无所知。甚至比起以前,还更加不如。现代的精神病学行为好像某个人认为他能够解释一栋建筑物的意义与目的,凭借对于建筑物的石头,从事矿物学的分析。让我们尝试形成统计学的画面,对于精神病人的人数与种类,他们显示任何的脑的病变。

In the last four years we have admitted 1,325 mental patients to Burgholzli Mental Hospital-some 331 a year-of whom 9% suffer from constitutional psychic anomalies. By this I mean an inborn defect of the psyche. Of the 9%, about a quarter are imbeciles, congenitally feeble-minded. In them we find definite cerebral changes such as congenital microcephalus, pronounced hydrocephalus, and malformation of certain parts of the brain. The remaining three quarters of the psychopathically inferior show no trace of typical findings in the brain.

在过去四年来,我们已经收容1,325位病人,到博格尔利精神病院—平均一年331位病人。他们百分之9遭受身体体质的心灵的异常症状。我说这个的意思是,心灵的天生的缺陷。在这百分之9的病人当中,大约有四方之一是低能儿,天生的心智低落。在他们身上,我们发现明确的脑的改变,譬如,天生的畸形小头,又被称为是脑水肿病,脑的某些部分的形成不良。这个低劣的畸形小头的剩余的三个部分,并没有显示任何脑的典型发现的痕迹。

Three per cent of our patients suffer from epileptic mental disturbances. In the course of epilepsy a typical degeneration of the brain gradually sets in, which I cannot describe more closely 160

329
33°

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
here. The degeneration is demonstrable only in severe cases and after the illness has lasted a long time. If the attacks have been present for a relatively short time only, not more than a few

years, as a rule nothing can be discovered in the brain.

我们的病人的百分之三遭受癫痫的精神疾病的痛苦。在癫痫的过程,一个典型的脑的恶化逐渐开始。我在此要最为详细描述这个脑的典型的恶化。这个恶化仅有在严重的案例里,才能够被展示,当疾病已经延续一段漫长的时间后。假如疾病的侵袭仅是出现比较短的时间,则是仅有少数的恶化。

Seventeen per cent of our patients suffer from progressive
paralysis and senile deterioration. Both diseases present char-acteristic cerebral findings. In progressive paralysis there is regu¬larly an extensive shrinkage of the brain, so that the cerebral cortex in particular is often reduced by one half. Especially the frontal portions of the brain may be reduced to a third of the normal weight. A similar destruction occurs in senile deteriora¬tion ..

我们病人的百分之十七,遭受逐渐的麻痹与衰老的恶化。两种的疾病呈现特征的脑的发现。在逐渐的脑性麻痹,脑会规律地广泛的委缩。所以,特别是脑皮质经常被减缩到一半。特别是脑的前叶的部分,可能被减缩到正常的重量的一半。同样的毁灭发生在衰老的恶化。

Fourteen per cent of the patients admitted annually suffer from poisoning, at least 13% of the cases being due to alcohol. As a rule, in milder cases nothing can be found in the brain; only in relatively few of the more severe cases is there a slight shrinkage of the cortex. The number of these severe cases amounts to less than 1 % of the yearly cases of alcoholism.

百分之十四的病人承认每年会遭受中毒的痛苦。至少百分之十三的病人是由于酒精中毒。通常,在温和的案例,在脑部,并没有发现任何东西。仅有在比较少数的严重的案例,才有脑皮质的轻微的委缩。这些严重的案例的数目总数不到百分之一,在每年的酒精中毒的案例里。

Six per cent of the patients suffer from so-called manic-de-pressive insanity, which comprises the manias and the melan¬cholias. The essence of this disease can be understood even by the layman. Melancholia is a condition of abnormal sadness with no disturbance of intelligence and memory. Mania is the opposite, the rule being an abnormally excited state with great restlessness, but without any deeper disturbance of intelligence and memory. In this disease no morphological lesions of the brain can be demonstrated.

百分之六的病人遭受所谓的躁郁与具沮丧的疯狂。这个疯狂包括躁郁症者与忧郁症者。这个疾病的本质能够被理解,即使是外行人。忧郁症是一种不正常的悲伤的情况,并没有智力与记忆的疾病。躁郁症则是恰恰相反,通常是不正常地興奋的状态,具有强烈的不安。但是并没有任何智力与记忆的更加严重的疾病。在这个疾病,并没有脑的形态学的病变能够被展示。

Forty-five per cent of the patients suffer from the authentic and common disease known as dementia praecox. The name is a very unhappy one, for the dementia is not always precocious, nor in all cases is there dementia. Unfortunately the disease is too often incurable; even in the best cases, in recoveries where the layman would notice no abnormality, one always finds some defect in the patient’s emotional life. The clinical picture is incredibly varied; usually there is some disturbance of feeling, very often there are delusions and hallucinations. As a rule there is nothing to be found in the brain. Even in cases of the most severe type, lasting for years, an intact brain is not infrequently found post mortem. Only in a few cases are slight changes to be found, which cannot yet, however, be proved to be regular.

百分之四十五的这些病人遭受真诚而普遍的疾病,众所周知的精神分裂症。这个名称是一个很不快乐的名称。因为精神分析并不总是早发性质的。在各个案例里,也没有精神分裂。不幸地,这个疾病通常是无法被治疗。即使是在最佳的案例,在外行人并没有发现异常状况的复发里。我们总是找的某个缺陷,在病人的情感的生活里。临床的画面是难以置信地各式各样。通常会有感觉的某个困扰。经常会有幻觉与幻象。通常,在脑部,并没有发析现什么。即使在最严重的种类的个案,延续两年,死后解剖后,一个完整的脑还是经常被找到。
161

335
331
332
333
334

THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF MENTAL DISEASE
To sum up: in round figures about a quarter of our patients show more or less extensive alterations and lesions of the brain, while three-fourths have a brain which seems to be generally unimpaired or at most exhibits changes such as afford abso-lutely no explanation of the psychological disturbance.

总而言之,在园形的图形里,大约四分之一的我们的病人显示或多或少的脑的广泛轮替与病变。四分之三的我们的病人则是拥有一个似乎通常没有受到损伤的脑。或是至多,他们展示一些改变,譬如,这些改变绝的不容许用心灵的疾病来解释。

These figures offer the best possible proof that the purely anatomical approach of modern psychiatry leads-to put it mildly-only very indirectly to the goal, which is the under-standing of the psychic disturbance. In addition, it must be remembered that the mental patients who show the most strik-ing lesions of the brain die after a relatively short time: conse-quently, the chronic inmates of the asylum, who form its real population, consist of up to 70 or 80% cases of dementia prae¬cox, that is, of patients in whom anatomical changes are prac¬tically non-existent. The way to a psychiatry of the future, which is to come to grips with the essence of the matter, is therefore clearly marked out: it can only be by way of psychology. For this reason we have entirely abandoned the anatomical approach in our Zurich Clinic and have turned to the psychological in-vestigation of mental disease. Since most of our patients suffer from dementia praecox, this disease is naturally our chief prob¬lem.

这些图形提供最佳的证据:现代的精神病学的解剖的方法,温和地说,仅是间接地导致目标。这个目标就是要理解心灵的疾病。除外,我们必须记住,显示脑的明星的病变的精神病这,在比较短的时间内死亡。结果,精神病院的这些慢性的病人,形成是精神病院的主要人口。精神分裂症的个案占据百分之70到80。 换句话说,在这些病人身上,解剖的改变几乎是不存在的。到达未来的精神分裂症的途径,是要处理这个物质的本质,这个途径因此清楚地被标示出来;那就是凭借心理学的途径。因为这个理由,我们完全地放弃解剖学的途径,在我们的苏黎世的诊所,并且诉诸于精神病的心理的研究。因为大部分的我们的病人遭受精神分裂症的痛苦,这个疾病当然是我们主要的难题。

The older clinicians paid great attention to the psycho¬logical precursors of insanity, just as the lay public still does, following a true instinct. We took up this trail and care-fully investigated the previous psychological history whenever possible. Our efforts were richly rewarded, for we found sur¬prisingly often that the illness broke out at a moment of some great emotion which, in its turn, had arisen in a more or less normal manner. We also found that in the mental disease which ensued there were a number of symptoms that could not be understood at all from the anatomical standpoint. These symp-toms immediately became comprehensible when considered from the standpoint of the individual’s previous history. Freud’s pioneering investigations into the psychology of hysteria and dreams afforded us the greatest stimulus and help in our work.

老经验的临床医生会专注注意疯狂的心理的先兆,如同外行的大众现在依旧这样做。他们遵循真实的本能。我们从事这个途径,并且尽可能小心地研究先前的心理的历史。我们的努力收获非常丰盛。因为我们经常感到惊奇地发现到,这个疾病发作在强烈情感的时刻。反过来,这个强烈的情感会以相当正常的方式产生。我们也发现到,在随之而来的精神的疾病,会有许多的症状,从解剖的观点,根本就无法被理解。当它们从个人的先前的历史的观点来考虑,这些症状立即变得可以被理解。弗洛伊德的开先锋的研究癔症与梦的心理学,供应我们的工作最强大的刺激与帮助。

A few examples of the most recent departures in psychiatry will, I think, make the subject clearer than any amount of dry theory. In order to bring home to you the difference in our con-ception I shall, in each case, first describe the medical history in the older fashion, and then give the solution characteristic of the new approach.

精神分裂症最近的研究发展的几个例子,让这个主题更加清楚,比起再多的枯燥的理论的数目。为了让你们清楚明白我们的观念的差异。我将在每个个案里,首先描述古老的方式的医学的历史。然后,给予具有新的途径的特征的解决。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

162