Lacan: The Absolute Master 9

Lacan: The Absolute Master 9
拉康:绝对的主人

By Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen
雅克慎论拉康

This is the moment described in Section A of Chapter 4, and thus we understand why Kojeve found it so interesting: this moment is that of “man,” of the “human I” in its opposition to natural life. For Hegel, however, this opposition was an autoopposition of Life becoming conscious of itself through the experience of death, whereas Kojeve for his part conceived of it as a radical opposition of man to the same “natural” and “immediate” life that man negates and, therefore, is not. Man, Kojeve never tires of explaining, “is essentially different from animals”44 in that he confronts death and so “goes beyond the given reality,”45 “transcending the given that is given to [him] and that [he him]self is”46 as a natural being. Strictly “human reality” is the reality that differs from itself, that perpetually negates itself as reality.

这就是在第四章的A部分被描述的时刻。因此,我们理解为什么科耶夫发现它如此有趣:这个时刻是「人」的时刻,这个「人性的我」的时刻,它跟自然的生命对立。可是,对于黑格尔,这个对立是生命通过死亡的经验,意识到它自己的自动对立。而科耶夫就他自己而言,构想它,作为人与相同的「自然」与「当下」的生命的强烈的对立。因为人否定,并且并不是这个相同的「自然的」与「当下的「生命。科耶夫不厌其烦地解释,人基本上是不同于动物。因为人面对死亡,并且因此「超越特定的现实」。超与给予人的这个特定物,人的自性是一个自然的生命。严格「人的现实」就是不同于它自己的现实,永久地否定它自己作为现实的现实。

At the same time, this no longer has anything to do with dialectic (at least in the Hegelian sense), since here we stumble rudely upon an irreducible duality, which Kojeve obligingly describes as “dualistic ontology.”47 Indeed, on one side we would have the natural, substantial, “thingish” being, always identical to itself—whether it were what Kojeve called “Being pure and simple” or, to use a term that Lacan would later take up, the “Real.” On the other side we would have the non-natural being that “nihilates in Being”48 by negating, surpassing, transcending everything Real—whether it were what Kojeve indiscriminately called “Man,” “Subject,” “Desire,” or “Discourse” (for example, “Spirit is the Real revealed by Discourse.

同时,这个现实更辩证法不再有任何关系(至少从黑格尔的意义来说),因为在此我们粗略地碰触到无法还原的双重性。科耶夫生动地描绘这种双重性为「双重的本体论」。的确,一方面,我们将拥有这个自然,实质,「物化」的生命,总是跟它自己一致—无论是科耶夫所谓的「纯粹而单纯的生命」,或是,用拉康后来从事的术语,所谓的「实在界」。在另一方面,我们将拥有这个非-自然的生命,在「生命实存里消灭」,凭借否定,跨越,超越每样实在界的东西。无论它是科耶夫没有区别地称为「人」,「主体」,「欲望」,或是「辞说」(譬如,精神就是辞说显示的实在界)。

Discourse is born in Man who opposes himself to Nature.. .. From this ‘rending’ [dechirement] of the Real into Man and Nature are born Understanding and its Discourse, which reveal the Real and thus transform it into Spirit”).49 We can certainly recognize this “rending” duality (the duality of the “symbolic” and the “real,” as Lacan will say later)—it is simply that of Heidegger’s Dasein and Vorhandensein, here rebaptized for the occasion as “human reality” and “given reality”—just as in Kojeve’s “dualistic ontology” we recognize Heidegger’s famous “difference” between Being and being, simply (and roughly) reinterpreted in terms of the difference between two regions of being.50

辞说诞生于人将他自己跟自然对立的人身上。从实在界被撕裂成为人与自然,理解与理解的辞说被诞生。它们显示实在界,因此将实在界转变成为精神)。我们确实体认这个「撕裂」的双重性(如同拉康后来所说的,「象征界」与「实在界」的双重性)。那仅是海德格的「存有」与「存在」的双重性,在此重新命名,作为「人类现实」与「特定现实」的场合。正如科耶夫的「双重本体论」,我们体认出海德格的著名的「差异」在「存有」与「存在」之间,粗略地被重新解释为生命存在的两个地区。

That this amalgam of Hegel and Heidegger is philosophically untenable is quite obvious. Indeed, it is hard to see how Hegel could tolerate an Absolute split in two—that is, a dialectic frozen indefinitely at the moment of finite “reflection.” As for Heidegger, we know that he explicitly refuses to turn Being into a power of nihilation that human being could purely and simply appropriate (this will be the substance of his “Letter on Humanism,” fundamentally as much a response to Kojeve as to his philosophical heir, Jean-Paul Sartre). And yet it is just this philosophical incongruity that Kojeve brought to life with all the authority of his word, under the magical names of “negativity,” “historicity,” “dialectic,” and, to come straight to the point, “Desire.”

黑格尔与海德格的混合在哲学上难以自圆其说,是相当明显的。的确,我们很难看出,黑格尔如何能够忍受两者里面的绝对的分裂—换句话说,辩证法的不明确的冰冻,在最后的「悟道」的时刻。至于海德格,我们知道,他明确地拒绝将「存有」转变成为空无的力量,那是人类纯粹能够据有点(这将是他的「论人文主义的信函」的物质,基本上作为对科耶夫的回应,关于他的哲学的继承人,保罗、萨特)。可是,科耶夫用他的文字的权威恢复生命力量的,不仅是这个哲学的不协调,在这些具有魔力的名称:「否定性」,「历史性」,「辩证法」,然后直达要点,「欲望」。

In fact, let us return to the Phenomenology of Spirit, grasped through Kojeve’s interpretation. Hegelian desire, we have seen, desires itself in its object (it determines itself by negating the object, and so on). When does this desire become properly “human,” “non-natural,” “non-animal”? Kojeve’s response: when it addresses itself to a non-natural object, since desire itself then becomes the object abolished through its own appropriation of itself. But where are we to find such an “object,” if not precisely in desire? “The only thing that goes beyond the given reality is Desire itself.”51 Note the capital letter: here there is no question of desire for this or that (which could be only an empirical need, as Lacan will say more than once), but rather of Desire in its essence of Desire. And what is Desire as Desire? It is an empty desire: “Desire taken as Desire— i.e., before its satisfaction—is but a revealed nothingness, an unreal emptiness. Desire, being the revelation of an emptiness, the presence of the absence of a reality, is something essentially different from the desired thing, something other than a thing, than a static and given real being that stays eternally identical to itself.”52 Will Lacan ever say anything different?

事实上,让我们回到「精神现象学」,通过科耶夫的解释来理解。我们已经看出,黑格尔的欲望,在它的客体里欲望它自己(它决定它自己,凭借否定客体,等等)。这个欲望何时成为合宜的「人文」,「非自然」,「非动物」?科耶夫的回达是:当它针对一个非-自然的客体,言说它自己时,因为欲望的自身因此成为客体,通过它自己据有它自己而被废除的客体。但是,我们应该到哪里找的这样的一个「客体」,难道不确实就在欲望里?「唯一超越特定现实的东西,就是欲望自身」。请注意「欲望」这个字的大写字母:在此,这并不是欲望这个或是那个的问题(如同拉康不仅一次强调,那仅是一种经验的需要)。相反地,是欲望处于「欲望」的本质的问题。什么是欲望作为「欲望」?那就是空无的欲望:「被视为「欲望」的欲望,等等,在它的满足之前,仅是一个被启示的空无,一个非实在的空无。欲望,作为空无的启示,是现实的缺席的出席,是某件基本上不同于被欲望的东西,某件非物象的东西,除了就是静止及特定的真实存在,它永久保持跟它自己一致。」拉康将会说出任何不同的东西吗?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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