Archive for April, 2010

雄伯手記980428

April 29, 2010

雄伯手記990428

星期日早上的讀書會,選的是雅克、拉岡的「繩之環」Ring of Strings。拉岡將真實界、想像界、及象徵符號界,各以一個圓環表示,互相套在一起作為一個人的主體。然後推而廣之,跟其它類似的主體環環相扣,而形成人倫關係的世界。這個波羅密金剛結Borromean knot 的特色是,環環之間,只是互相掛勾,並未套牢,只要源頭的一個結點鬆開,整個金剛結就會全部鬆開。

這作為人倫關係的比喻,意味深長。人作為一個生命的主體,必須要跟其它的生命的主體,在象徵符號界、想像界、及真實界發生關聯,然後才能創造生命的意義,煥發人生的光輝。然而,看起來輕而易舉的事情,事實上,往往徒勞枉費,最後面臨生命的大限時,仍然免不了是空虛、孤獨、與疏離。討論到這裡,我不期而然地引述起詩人徐志摩的那首名詩「偶然」:

你我相逢在黑夜的海上,
你記得也好,
最好你忘記,
在這星光交會,互放光亮的時光。

我不過引述個幾行,聰慧過人的A,卻當下興奮地把根據原詩改編的整首歌曲,從「我是天空裏的一天雲,偶然投影在你的波心」開始,低聲詠唱起來,眼神裡漾溢的不知是淚水還是陶醉的光輝。

晚上,我觀看從大陸下載的「雪域天路」的影片,內心的無意識被青康藏高原的遼闊跟蒼茫撩撥得蠢蠢欲動。只是我近七旬的年紀,西藏單車行的幻想純是痴人說夢般的「不可能的任務」mission impossible。不過,台灣的幾天行,總該還行罷?

於是,第二天起來,八點多,拎起簡單的行囊繫放在腳踏車後面,就這樣出發了。

從花蓮到崇德是平坦的路段,我慢慢騎行,沒有什麼困難。過崇德後就是一些山洞的隧道,空氣比較污濁,還好出來後,馬上就面臨汪洋大海的蔚藍清爽。就這樣,不知不覺就到達和平,在港式餐點店進食時,抬頭一望時鐘,哇!十二點多了!

從和平到南澳的路段是登山與下山。彎延上昇的爬坡路段,我自知力有不逮,認份地下來牽著走,等於是健行的速度。對於退休階段的我,悠閒的時間很充裕,不妨就以時間換取空間的方式,慢慢前進。只要車輪一直在轉,腳步一直往前踩,目標總有到達的時刻。何況,山澗斷崖下的沙灘及岩石的形狀之奇美,也只有如此慢行,才有心思細細品味。

到達南澳的山海教室時,已經是下午四點多。我先繞到市區購買一些內衣褲、盥洗用品、及晚餐。回去時,在隱藏處找出鑰匙,逕自開門進入,卻發現電源總開關及電燈開關,無論往下按或板上,都絲毫沒有任何反應。猜想大概是剛才從小徑路口轉進來時,看到原有的廢棄碉堡正在被怪手拆除,矗立旁邊的電線桿的電線源頭被切斷,要不然就是沒繳電費,被斷電。

無論如何,這都不是我能處理的事情。我所能做的事是找出蠟燭及打火機,免得要摸黑過夜。天空下著毛毛雨,要不然就去點亮門前的營火。

一夜好眠醒來,窗外卻還是毛毛細雨的天氣。一方面是年老以後的體力無法像往常一樣馬上就恢復,另一方面,穿著雨衣的腳踏車行,無論是生理或是心理層面,確實也不是怎麼舒適的感覺。於是,決定放棄遠征北橫到桃園的打算,再躺到床上休息充份一些再說。

中午醒來,細雨已經停了。我的體能仍然羸弱,就先騎腳踏車到附近的小吃店,將午餐跟晚餐的炒麵及竹筍一併買回來,外加兩瓶特級紅露酒。

正在屋裡邊酌酒、邊吃麵之時,門外忽然有人敲門,喊「有人在嗎?」原來是被譽為世外桃源的武塔的圓圓農場夫妻,用小貨車送來柴火用的木頭。

再過一段時辰,我酒足飯飽地走到戶外,卻看到一輛越野車停在小徑的半途,因為那裡有一條鐵鏈懸掛在那裡。

我趕緊去跟這一對來自桃園的電機系講師及當護士的妻子,打開鐵鏈的大鎖。

「對不起!這裡雖然是荒郊野外,可是作為所有權人的阿不,畢竟被台北的文明制約太久,一心一意雖然想回歸鄉野,卻還是無法擺脫資產階級的財產所有權的意識形態。就像狗狗,無論走到哪裡,總要環繞一圈,泡泡尿,宣告說This is my kingdom.這是我的王國。」

他們不置可否地笑一笑。於是我仗著幾分的酒意,再意氣風發地發揮:「I am not drunk enough!我要是足夠的醉,剛才圓圓農場的夫妻送柴火木頭來時,我應該請他們一起喝紅露,我當時還有一點小菜嘛!說不一定我們會談到很投機,說不一定他們還會邀請我到他們的農場去玩,說不一定我們因此會有一段星光交會、互放光亮的交情或友誼!」

他們微笑地看著我,不知是出於禮貌的應對,還是他們從繁華的都市,來到這樣的荒郊野外,為了就是避開理性語言的鉗制,尤其是那位甜美可人的妻子,還頗感好奇或興趣般地全神貫注傾聽。於是,我受到鼓勵般,越來越不善矜持地醉言醉語起來,從昆德拉的「生命中不可承受之輕」,一直蓋到佛洛伊德的伊底普斯情結,再胡扯到雅克、拉岡的精神分析學的「沒有性關係There is no sexual relation,因為男女的性關係,不能只是性器官的接觸,而必須是作為生命主體的真實界的靈魂的星光交會!」

我引導他們參觀後面的原先興建鐵路隧道的寬敞的廢棄工寮。我跟他們強調:「阿不的山海教室,原先是營舍,兩邊有水泥牆,是個封閉的空間。但是你們來看這個廢棄工寮,四周的景色是開放的。從樓上的窗口看出去,跟在地面看,山景的感覺就是不一樣。」

從工寮回到山海教室,我引導他們走另一邊的荒草小徑。由於早上下過毛毛細雨,跟人等高的芒草,在我們經過時露水四濺。我非但沒有跟他們禮貌及理性地表示歉意,反而大言不慚地跟他們賣弄詩詞:「你們讀過陶淵明的詩嗎?衣沾不足惜,但使願無違!」

送走電機系講師夫妻後,我的酒意也清醒了一大半,想去拜訪圓圓農場,尋求星光交會互放光亮的那份激情,也消失得一乾二淨。「幸好沒去!」我喃喃自語:「要不然真會給人家笑話說,這位退休老師,怎麼那麼不懂禮貌!」

晚間,我將晚餐搬到門口的營火處來吃。我用一個燭火小盤充當火種,上面稀疏置放一些紙板、細枝、及乾草,點燃起來後,再添加粗大的木頭。營火終於熾烈地發出熱能跟火光。

天空還是陰雲密佈,沒有明月可以讓我跟它對影成三人,也沒有星光交會,讓我可以跟它們互放光亮。不過這都沒有關係,火!你的激情不就是你充沛生命力的燃燒?儘管燃亮的也只是你一己的虛妄!

「已矣乎!寓形宇內復幾時?曷不委心任去留?」我望著逐漸暗淡下來的火光,喃喃自語陶淵明的「歸去辭」。營火熄滅時,我酩酊酣暢地回到床上,在黑暗中沉沉入睡。

A love letter 03

April 29, 2010

A love letter 03

After that, to calm you back down, I need back speak to you of love—which I will do in a moment. But what does it mean that I have come to such a pass as to speak to you of love, whereas it is not very compatible with the direction from which analytic discourse can provide a semblance of something that would be science?

亢奮之後,要讓諸位平靜下來,我還需要回頭來談愛,等一下我會談到愛。問題是,精神分析學研究的是一種類似科學的東西,而我卻要侃侃而談愛的問題,這跟科學的研究方向,並不是很相容的。我這樣的窘境意味著什麼?

You are barely aware of this “ would-be science.” Of course, you know, because I have made you take notice of it, that there was a time when one could, not without reason, assure oneself that scientific discourse was grounded in the Galilean turning point. I have stressed that enough to assume that, at the very least, some of you have gone back to the sources, I mean to Koyre work.

對於這個「未來的科學」,你們可能知道不多。當然,因為我曾提醒你們注意,你們會知道,有一陣子,你們曾心安理得地相信,科學的真理論述是以伽利略的地球繞日轉學說,作為基礎的轉捩點。我曾一再強調,認為你們至少有些人會回頭去探討這些理倫的來源,我指的是柯伊爾的著作。

Regarding scientific discourse, it is very difficult to maintain equally present two terms that I will mention to you.

關於科學的真理論述,我將會跟你們提到兩個術語,但是很難同時並重地進行。

On the one hand, scientific discourse has engendered all sorts of instruments that we must, from our vantage point here, qualify as gadgets. You are now, infinitely more than you think, subjects of instruments that, from the microscope right down to the radio television, are becoming the elements of your existence. You cannot currently even gauge the import of this, but it is nonetheless part of what I am calling scientific discourse, insofar as a discourse is what determines a form of social link.

一方面,科學的真理論述產生各種必需的工具,我們人類之所以凌駕萬物,這些機械技術是不可或缺的。你們現在自己渾然不覺下,就已經成為這些科技的對象。這些科技,從顯微鏡,一直到收音機及電視,已經漸漸成為你們日常生活的一部份。你們目前甚至無法評估你們所受到的影響。但這是我現在所謂的科學的真理論述的一部份,因為我們社會的人倫關係也是受到真理論述的影響。

On the other hand—and here there is no linkup—there is a subversion of knowledge. Prior to that, no knowledge was conceived that did not participate in the fantasy of an inscription of the sexual link. One cannot even say that the subjects of antiquity’s theory of knowledge did not realize that.

在另一方面,人倫關係並沒有被套牢,因為真理的知識會受到顛覆。在以前,每一種知識的構想,都會牽涉到跟性愛有關的各種銘記的幻見。我們甚至不能說,古人的知識的理論,會沒有體會到這一點。

Let us simply consider the terms “ active” and “ passive,” for example, that dominate everything that was cogitated regarding the relationship between form and matter, a relationship that was so fundamental, and to which each of Plato’s steps refers, and then Aristotle’s, concerning the nature of things. It is visible and palpable that their statements are based only on a fantasy by which they tried to make up for what can in no way be said, namely, the sexual relationship.

例如,讓我們考慮到,在形式與物質之間的關係,一舉一動都會牽涉到「主動」與「被動」這兩個術語。這個關係是如此的根本,先是柏拉圖,然後是亞力斯多德,他們研究事物的本質時,每一個步驟,都提到這個主動與被動的關係。顯而易見,他們陳述的基礎是一種幻見,他們設法憑藉這種幻見,來彌補無法言說的東西,換句話說,性愛的關係。

The strange thing is that in this crude polarity that makes matter passive and form the agent that animates it, something, albeit, something ambiguous, nevertheless got through, namely, that this animation is nothing other than the a with which the agent animates what? He animates nothing—he takes the other as his soul.

奇怪的是,這個簡陋的二分法,將物質視為被動,將形式視為激發物質運作的主動的仲介。然後就有某件東西,某件混沌不清的東西流露出來。換句話說,這個激發出來的物質,其實只是另一個主動仲介的小客體,他們彼此激發出什麼?形式並沒激發任何物質,形式將另外一個形式,當著是他自己的靈魂。

Consider what progresses over the course of the ages regarding the idea of a God that is not the God of Christian faith, but that of Aristotle—the unmoved mover, the supreme sphere. The idea that there is a being such that all other beings with less being than it can have no other aim than being the most being they can be, is the whole foundation of the idea of the Good in Aristotle’s ethics, which I encouraged you to look at in order to grasp the impasse therein. If I base myself now on the inscrptons on the blackboard, it is assured revealed that it is in the opaque place of jouissance of the other, of the Other insofar as woman, if she existed, could be it, that the supreme Being is situated—this Supreme Being that is manifestly mythical in Aristotle’s work, this unmoving sphere from which all movements stem, whatever they may be: changes, generations, motions, translations, increases , etc.

思考一下,過去幾個世紀來,關於神的觀念,有怎樣的進展。不是基督教信仰的那個上帝,而是亞力斯多德的上帝。本身如如不動的操控者,最崇高的上天之神。有一位這樣的上天之神存在,然後其它渺小的芸芸眾生的存在,沒有其它目的,就是要盡其可能成為這位上天之神的垂眷。這就是亞力斯多德倫理學的善的觀念的基礎。我鼓勵你們去思考一下,這樣你們才能理解到這裡的僵局。假如我將自己的基礎放在黑板上的這個圖形的銘記,你們一定會看得出來,我最崇高的生命的存在,就位在大它者歡爽的矇矓不清的那個位置,那個以女人(假若是有這麼一個女人)作為我生命大它者的位置。亞力斯多德的理論,有一個如如不動的中心,一切動作都從那個中心發出,無論是改變、繁延下一代、舉動、翻譯、增產等等。那個最崇高的存在顯而易見是奧秘難測的。

It is insofar as her jouissance is radically Other that woman has more of a relationship to God than anything that could have been said in speculation in antiquity following the pathway of that which is manifestly articulated only as the good of man.

就女人的歡爽就是大它者而言,女人跟上帝的關係可以說是更加密切,既然自古來,人類的善的表達顯然都跟大它者有密切關係。

The aim of my teaching, insofar as it pursues what can be said and enunciated on the basis of analytic discourse, is to dissociate a and A by reducing the first to what is related to the imaginary and the other to what is related to the symbolic. It is indubitable that the symbolic is the basis of what was made into god. It is certain that the imaginary is based on the reflection of one semblable in another. And yet, a has lent itself to be confused with S(A), below which it is written on the blackboard, and it has done so by means of the function of being. It is here that a scission or detachment remains to be effectuated. It is in this respect that psychoanalysis is something other than a psychology. For psychology is this uneffectuated scission.

因為我的教學是以精神分析學的真理論述為基礎,探討可能的內涵與表達,我教學的目的,就是分析這個作為主動仲介的小客體跟大它者,將前者視為跟想像界有關,後者則是與象徵符號界有關。無可置疑的,象徵符號界是我們創造上帝作為大它者的基礎。而想像界的基礎則確定是模擬象徵符號界的一種反映。可是,小客體往往會冒充為大它者隱身在後的主體,這就是黑板上被寫在底下的S(A),這樣它能發揮存在的功用。就在這裡,一種斷裂或疏離始終會若隱若現。從這個角度來說,精神分析學與心理學並不相同。因為心理學認為可以將這個斷裂或疏離縫合。

雄伯:
大它者隱身在後的主體S( A),原來的A上面有一斜槓,我的電腦如法輸入,請參照底下圖形的銘記符號。法文它者的字首是A,打一斜槓,表示人作為主體,一進入象徵符號界,就受大它者的象徵符號的制約及操控,括弧起來,表是大它者隱身在後,但無時無刻,不在制約及操控我們。

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com

A love letter 02

April 24, 2010

Encore by Lacan

P.79
A love letter

We’ll start with the four propositional formulas at the top of the table, two of which lies to the left, the other two to the right. Every speaking being situations itself on one side or the other. On the left, the lower line—ΑxΦx—indicates that it is through the phallic function that man as whole acquires his inscription, with the proviso that this function is limited due to the existence of an x by which the function Φx is negated : ΣxΦx. That is what is known as the father function—whereby we find, vie negation, the proposition Φx, which grounds the operativity of what makes up for the sexual relationship with castration, insofar as that relationship is in no way inscribable. The whole here is thus based on the exception posited as the end-point, that is on that which altogether negates Φx.

我們先從表格上方的四個命題公式開始。其中有兩個靠左邊,其它兩個靠右邊。每一個說話的主體都將自己的位置放在一邊或另外一邊。在左邊,底下那一欄—ΑxΦx—指示著,透過陽具的功用,男人作為一個整體需要他的銘記,及一個附帶條件:由於x的存在,陽具的功用受到限制。由於這個x的存在,Φx的功用被否決掉ΣxΦx。那就是眾所皆知的父親的功能。藉由這個功能,我們透過否決,找到Φx這個命題。它作為以閹割彌補性關係的運作的基礎,因為那個性關係根本就無法辨認出來。在此男人作為一個整體的基礎,被假定是一個終點的「切除」,換句話說,完全否決Φx的地方。

雄伯:
標記符號請參照圖表的標記,因為A、E 字母的倒轉,及Φx的上方畫一條槓,我的電腦打不出來。不知道哪一位電腦輸入的高手可以教教我?或者主編直接幫我在網頁上修正?

On the other side, you have the inscription of the woman portion of speaking beings. Any speaking whatsoever, as is expressly formulated in Freudian theory, whether provided with the attributes of masculinity—attributes that remains to be determined—or not, is allowed to inscribe itself in this part. If it inscribes itself there, it will not allow for any universality—it will be a not-whole, insofar as it has the choice of positing itself in Φx or of not being there.

在另一方面,還有一個說話的主體,在女性部份的銘記。如同佛洛伊德理論所生動描繪的,無論是否稟賦有陽剛的屬性,或屬性尚未決定,任何作為說話的主體,都被允許將自己銘記在這個部份。即使它將自己銘記在這裡,它並沒有考慮到是否合乎通俗標準的問題。它將是一個的「非整體」,因為它能夠選擇將自己定位在Φx的位置,或是不在那個位置。

Those are the only possible definitions of the so-called man or woman portion for that which finds itself in the position of inhabiting language.

那些是所謂的男人或女人的唯一可能的定義,因為主體作為男人或女人,不完全看性器官,而是看它將自己駐紮在語言系統的哪一個位置。

Underneath—that is, below the horizontal bar where the vertical bar is crossed over, that division of what is improperly called humanity insofar as humanity is divided into sexual identifications—you have a scanded indication of what is in question. On the side of man, I have inscribed $, certainly not to privilege him in any way, and the Φ that props him up as signifier and is also incarnated in S1, which, of all the signifiers, is the signifier for which there is no signified, and which, with respect to meaning, symbolizes the failure thereof. It is “ half-sense,” “ inde-sense” par excellence, or if you will allow me again, “ reti-sense.’

在底下部份,換句話說,在水平橫槓底下,垂直線被越過的地方,也就是俗稱男女被區隔的地方,因為主體總是要被區別為性別的認同,你們可以看出爭議的問題出在哪理。在男人這一邊,我銘記為被禁制的主體$,確實是為了不要讓他有任何特權,然後再銘記為隱藏在後面的大它者Φ,來支撐它作為意符,並且在第一主體那裡具體表現出來。在所有的意符當中,第一主體是沒有意旨作為依據的意符,因此就意義的尋求而言,象徵著它的功敗垂成。它是標準的「半個意義」「片面意義」,或者容我再換句話說,「瘖啞的意義」。

This $, thus doubled by that signifier on which, in the end, it does not even depend, this $ never deals with anything by way of a partner but object a inscribed on the other side of the bar. He is unable to attain his sexual partner, who is the Other, except inasmuch as his partner is the cause of his desire. In this respect, as is indicated elsewhere in my graphs by the oriented conjunction of $ and a, this is nothing other than fantasy. This fantasy, in which the subject is caught up, is as such the basis of what is expressly called the “ reality principle” in Freudian theory.

這個被禁制的主體,由於有了大它者充當意符,而成為雙重主體,可是,主體臨終時,他甚至獨立於大它者這個意符之外。這個被禁制的主體處理任何事情,從來不是藉由大它者的夥伴,而是藉由被鐫刻在橫槓的另一邊的「小客體」。問題是,他無法得到他的性的夥伴,因為那是「大它者」,只好將他的性的夥伴,當成是他的性欲望的原因。在這一方面,我曾經用圖形來表示被禁制的主體跟小客體互動的定位,那道道地地就是主體的「幻見」。這個被主體沉迷不悟的「幻見」,在佛洛伊德的理論,生動地表達為「現實原則」。

Now for the other side. What I am working on this year is what Freud expressly left aside: Was will das Weib? “ What does woman want?” Freud claims that there is only masculine libido. What does that mean if not that a field that certainly is not gegligible is thus ignored. That field is the one of all beings that take on the staus of woman—assuming that being takes on anything whatsoever of her destiny. Moreover, it is improper to call her Woman ( la femme), because, as I stressed last time, as soon as Woman is enunciated by way of a not-whole, the We cannot be written. There is only barred Woman here. Woman is related to the signifier of A insofar as it is barred. I will illustrate that for you today.

現在再談另外一邊。今年,我研究的問題是佛洛伊德刻意避開的問題:「女人到底要什麼?」佛洛伊德宣稱,只有男性的力比多生命力存在。那句話的意思,難道不就是:有一個確實不應該被忽略的領域,因此受到忽略?那個領域是所有扮演女性角色的存在主體的領域,假如她能夠扮演起她自己命運的角色的話。而且,我上次強調過,稱呼她為「女人」,並不是很恰當,因為「女人」是藉由作為一個「非整體」來表達自己,這個「女人」,無法充當讓人書寫生命文本的客體。女人作為生命主體,是被禁制的。這個被禁制的主體,跟大它者的意符有關,因為她受到他的禁制。今天,我要跟你們詳加說明。

The Other is not simply the locus in which truth stammers. It deserves to represent that to which woman is fundamentally related. Assuredly, we have but sporadic testimonies of this, and that is why I took them up last time in their metaphorical function. Being the Other, in the most radical sense, in the sexual relationship to the Other. That is what I would like to articulate a little more precisely today.

大它者不僅是真理若隱若現的軌跡。大它者所代表的,應該跟女人息息相關的軌跡。的確,我們所獲得的證據,只是片斷零落,這就是為什麼我上一次談論到這些證據,只能拐彎抹角地隱喻。從性的關係,從無意識界的關係,存在意義作為大它者,跟女人息息相關,並讓女人念茲在茲。今天,我想要說個清楚,講個明白。

Woman has a relation to the signifier of that Other, insofar as, qua Other, it can but remain forever other. I can only assume here that you will recall my statement that there is no Other of the Other. The other, that is, the locus in which everything that can be articulated on the basis of the signifier comes to be inscribed, is,, in its foundation, the other in the most radical sense. That is why the signifier, with this open parenthesis, marks the other as barred: $ (A)

女人跟那個大它者的意符脫離不了關係,因為它大者既然被尊為大它者,只好永遠保持在高高在上那一邊。我在此,不妨假定你們都還記得我說過的陳述:「大它者之外,別無大它者。」換句話說,大它者是意符表達、意符鐫刻的軌跡。意符的種種動作,追根究底,都是以大它者當它們的基礎。這就是為什麼意符用開放的括弧,將大它者標記為被禁制:S( A)。

雄伯:
法文的大它者字首是A,隱藏在括弧中的大它者A,應該有畫一斜槓的標記,我的電腦無法輸入,讀者自己畫罷。

How can we conceive of the fact that the Other can be, in some sense, that to which half—since that it also roughly the biological proportion—half of all speaking beings refer? That is nevertheless less what is written on the blackboard with the arrow that begins from Woman. Woman cannot be said. Nothing can be said of woman. Woman has a relation with S (A), and it is already in that respect that she is doubled, that she is not-whole, since she can also have a relation with Φ.

我們如何構想這個事實?從某種意義來說,大它者是所有作為說話的主體的另一半,因為從作為生物的生理構造來看,人只是一半的主體。可是,那就是我在黑板上用一個箭頭方向所書寫的,從被禁制的女人開始。被禁制的女人無法被敘說。關於女人,我們無話可說。女人跟隱藏的大它者有密切關係。在這一方面,女人是大它者的雙重人,女人本身是一個「非整體」,因為她跟被閹割陽具的主體,也能夠有關係。

I designate Φas the phallus insofar as I indicate that it is the signifier that has no signified, the one that is based, in the case of man, on phallic jouissance. What is the latter if not the following, which the importance of masturbation in our practice highlights sufficiently—the jouissance of the idiot?

我指明被畫橫槓的標記Φ是陽具,當我提到,那個標記是沒有意旨作基礎的意符,就男人而言,就是純為陽具爽快的歡樂意符。這個歡樂意符的重要性,從男人手淫的自得其樂,難道不是彰顯得一清二楚?男人手淫的自得其樂,難道不是像白痴一般的自摸自爽?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com

A Love Letter

April 24, 2010

Encore by Lacan
拉岡:再來一次

P. 79
A love letter 一封情書

After what I just put on the board, you may think you know everything. Don’t.
我在黑板上畫出這個圖表的標記,你以為你一目瞭然。請不要這樣認為。

Today I am going to try to speak about knowledge, about that knowledge which, in the inscription of the four discourses—on which the social linked is based, as I thought I could show you—I symbolized by writing S 2. Perhaps I will manage to day to make you see why this 2 goes further than a secondariness in relation to the pure signifier that is written S 1.

Inscription 標記 symbolize用符號象徵 secondariness 次級主體 signifier意符

Four discourses 拉岡指的是主人的真理論述Master’s discourse、大學的真理論述university’s discourse、歇斯底里症患者的真理論述the hysteric’s discourse ,及精神分析師的真理論述the analyst’s discourse。

今天我要跟你們談到真理的認識。我自認已經盡力,用「第二主體」的象徵符號表達對於真理的認識,因為我們社會的結構就是建立在四個真理論述所標記的基礎上。也許,我今天還可以設法讓你們感受到,這「第二主體」跟銘記在「第一主體」的純淨意符的關係,不僅僅是第一跟第二的關係。

Since I decided to give you this inscription as a prop on the blackboard, I am going to comment on it, briefly I hope. I did not, I must admit, write it down or prepare it anywhere. It doesn’t strike me as exemplary, if not, as usual, in producing misunderstanding.

inscription 題詞、標記 prop 支撐 comment on 評論 exemplary 典範
strike…as—give an particular impression…as 給予一特別的印象
The inscription doesn’t strike me as exemplary.
個標記並沒有給我當著是典範的特別印象。

If not 若非
It doesn’t strike me as exemplary, if not, as usual, in producing misunderstanding.
平常,這個標記若非因為引起誤解,我不會特別注意。
I would not have escaped the danger, if not for their help.
= I would not have escaped the danger, if it had not been for their help.
當時,若非他們的幫忙,我本來無法逃離危險。

既然我決定在黑板上畫出這個圖表的標記,當著支持的理由,容我稍微評論一下。我必需承認,我在別的地方,並沒有寫過或說明過這個圖表的標記。通常,若不是因為它會引起的誤解太大,我也不會特別拿它來當示範。

In effect, a discourse like analytic discourse aims at meaning. By way of meaning, it is clear that I can only deliver to you, to each of you, what you are already on the verge of absorbing. That has a limit, a limit provided by the meaning in which you live. I wouldn’t be exaggerating if I said that that doesn’t go very far. What analytic discourse brings out is precisely the idea that that meaning is based on semblance.

In effect 事實上 aim at 目標是要 by way of 藉由 on the verge of 即將 go far 很大進展 bring out 顯示 exaggerate 誇張 precisely 確實是 semblance 、偽裝、類同 analytic discourse 精神分析學的論述

事實上,像精神分析學這樣的真理論述,目標是要尋求意義。顯而易見,藉由意義的尋求,我才能夠對你們每個人傳達,你們自己已經呼之欲出的意義。可是,假如我說,受到這樣的限制,受到你們的生活方式所具有的意義的限制,使得我的表達很難更進一步的突破進展,我並非誇大其辭。精神分析學所要顯示的,確實就是那個觀念:意義的基礎是偽裝的類同。

If analytic discourse indicates that that meaning is sexual, that can only be by explaining its limit. There is nowhere any kind of a last word if not in the sense in which “ word” is “ not a word”(mos,e’est motus)—I have already stressed that. “ No answer, not a word”( Pas de reponse, mot), Lafontaine says somewhere. Meaning indicates the direction toward which it fails( echoue).

Indicate 指示 sexual 性 stress 強調
the last word—最新式的東西、最後的定論
These apartments are the last word in luxury.
這些公寓是最豪華的公寓。
This is the last word in fire-proof construction.
這是最現代化的防火建築。
This book will surely be the last word on the subject.
這本書對於該問題,確實將是個定論。
Under our system the civilians have the last word in everything.
在我們的制度之下,人民有最後的決定權。

nowhere….if not
You can find a better product nowhere, if not here.
你在別的地方,找不到比這裡更好的產品。( 這裡的產品最好不過。)
There is nowhere any kind of a last word if not in the sense in which “ word” is “not a word”.
「言即非言」這個弔詭的意涵,在此是最為貼切的定論。

nothing…if not—非常
He’s nothing, if not careful.他這個人非常細心。
H.e is nothing, if not matter-of-fact他非常實事求是。

即使精神分析學的論述指明,那個意義就是性,我們要先說明那個意義所受到的限制是什麼,那個的陳述才能成立。「話說了,但是話的原意沒有透露出來」這個弔詭的意涵,在此表達是最為貼切不過,我曾經一再強調這一點。范添音在「驢子與狗」的寓言,也曾經表達過:「不予回答的一語不發,就是回答」。意義所指的方向,往往是語詞不能到達的地方。

雄伯:
“ Word” is “ not a word”「話是說了,但是話的原意沒有透露出來」的說法,有一點類似老子在道德經的「道可道、非常道。名可名、非常名」,以及禪宗的「言行道斷」。

Le Fontaine在「驢子與狗」的寓言,描述一位主人帶驢子與狗遠行。途中主人在樹下小盹,驢子乘機吃路邊草,唯恐不及,對於狗要求它蹲下,讓它可以吃驢背上食物,置之不理No answer, not a word 。後來野狼來到,驢子驚恐,要求狗幫忙它對抗,狗卻高談闊論,驢子應該如逃避野狼的大道理,本身卻沒有幫助的動作。結果,驢子為野狼所噬。

Having posited that, which should make you beware understanding too quickly, having taken all these precautions dictated by mere prudence—ψρβνησνεζ as it is expressed in Greek in which so many things were said, but which remained far from what analytic discourse allows us to articulate—here is more or less what is inscribed on the blackboard.

Posit 假定 precautions 預防 dictate 支配 by mere prudence 謹慎 far from 絲毫不是 articulate 清楚表達 inscribe 銘記、標記

Having posited that , here is more or less what is inscribed on the blackboard.
提出以上的「話語不能盡意」及「沉默就是一種回答」的假設命題之後,這差不多就是我在黑板上畫的這個圖表標記的內涵。

Having taken all these precautions which are dictated by mere prudence, here is more or less what is inscribed on the blackboard.
顧全大局要求我謹言慎行,差不多就是我在黑板上畫的這個圖表標記的內涵。

What I posit should make you beware understanding too quickly.
我提出「言不盡意」及「沉默就是一種回答」的命題,應該會使你小心,凡事不要望文生義,妄加定論。

It is expressed in Greek in which so many things were said, but which remained far from what analytic discourse allows us to articulate.
如同那個希臘字所表達的,我們談論過那麼多的事情,但是絲毫沒有表達到,精神分析學所允許我們表達的真理。

雄伯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com
springheroshiung@hotmail.com

雄伯手記990423

April 22, 2010

雄伯手記990423
Zizek:
But with Lacan, we have quite another notion of the subject. To put it in a simple way: if we abstract, if we subtract all the richness of the different modes of subjectivization, all the fullness of experience present in the way individuals “live” their subject-positions, what remains is an empty place which was filled out with this richness; and this original void, this lack of the symbolic structure is the subject, the subject of the signifier. The subject is therefore to be strictly opposed to the effect of subjectivation: what the subjectivation masks is not a pre- or trans-subjective process of writing but a lack in the structure, a lack which is the subject.

紀傑克:
但是关于拉康,我们完全有着另一 种主体的观念。以一种简单的方式来说:如果我们抽象化存在于个体“经历”其主体位置的方式中的所有经验的丰富,如果我们减去主体化 (subjectivization)不同模式的所有丰富性,剩余的东西就是由这个丰富性所填补的一个空的位置,而这个原始的空(void)、这个象征结 构的缺失(lack)就是主体、能指的主体(subject of the signifier)。主体因此应是与主体化严格相反的:主体化所掩饰的并非关于书写的一个前主体或超主体作用(pre-subjective or trans-subjective process),而是结构中的一个缺失,这个缺失就是主体。

雄伯:
以上是中國大陸「實踐與文本」網站的一篇譯文。Zizek的這一段英文拖泥帶水,夾雜一些後位修飾語的同位語、形容詞片語、及形容詞子句。直譯的話很考驗讀者的理解力。我建議先將片語與句子分別拆開詮釋。

If we abstract, if we subtract all the richness of the different modes of subjectivization,
假如我們將各式各樣主體化模式所具有豐富內容,予以抽離,或扣減,
If we abstract, if we subtract all the fullness present in the way
假如我們將所有存在的充實內容予以抽離,或扣減,
What remains is an empty.
剩下的主體就是一個空虛。

All the fullness is present the way individuals “ live” their subject-positions.
所有這些意符的充實內容,都存在於主體如何「經歷」他們的主體的立場。

(主體的立場,指後結構主義所謂的人的主體化subjectivation,也就是說,個人作為一個主體,需要屈從或服膺家庭、種族、社會、國家、或文化的意識形態,而將自己的寫作或欲望的表達,視為它們欲望或期望的工具及媒體。內容無論多麼豐富,多麼充實,均不是內心無意識界的意旨或所指signified的欲望。然而,真正的自我,就位於無意識界的欲望那裡,所以真正的自我是意符或能指的欠缺,或狀態是空虛或空無。)

An empty was filled out with this richness.
這個空虛在意識的意符界,被那些意符或能指的豐富的內容所盤據。
This original void is the subject
真正的主體是那個原先的空虛,而不是意符或能指的豐富內容。
The lack of the symbolic structure is the subject, the subject of the signifier,
真正的主體是符號結構底下的那個空虛或欠缺,換言之,意符或能指的真正主體是空虛或欠缺,不是意符的豐富或充實的內容。

The subject is therefore to be strictly opposed to the effect of subjectivation:
因此,這個真正的主體,應該是跟個人在意符界的主體化,完全背道而馳。

What the subjectivation masks is not a pre- or trans-subjective process of writing
主體化所遮蔽的,不是身為生命本文寫作的主體,對於如何屈從或服膺於家庭、種族、社會、國家、文化,或政治等意識形態的狀況,視若無睹。

What the subjectivatiion masks is a lack in the structure, a lack which is the subject.
主體化所遮蔽的,是身為生命本文寫作的主體,對於自己真正的主體,在無意識界的語言結構裡是一個欠缺、一個空虛或空無,懵懂無知。

Our predominant idea of the subject is, in Lacanian terms, that of the “subject of the signified,” the active agent, the bearer of some signification who is trying to express himself in the language. The starting point of Lacan is, of course, that the symbolic representation represents the subject always in a distorted way, that it is always a displacement, a failure, i.e., that the subject cannot find a signifier which would be “his own,” that he is always saying less or too much, in short: something other than what he wanted, intended to say. The usual conclusion from this would be that the subject is some kind of interior richness of meaning which always exceeds its symbolic articulation: “language cannot express fully what I’m trying to say…” The Lacanian thesis is its exact opposite: this surplus of signification masks a fundamental lack. The subject of the signifier is precisely this lack, this impossibility to find a signifier which would be “his own”: the failure of his representation is a positive condition. The subject tries to articulate himself in a signifying representation, and the representation fails; instead of a richness we have a lack, and this void opened by the failure is the subject of the signifier. To put it in a paradoxical way: the subject of the signifier is a retroactive effect of the failure of his own representation; that’s why the failure of representation is the only way to represent him adequately.

用拉康的话说,我们关于主体的主要思想就是那个“所指的主体”(subject of the signified)、那个主动的媒介、那个试图在语言中表达自身的某些意指(signification)的携带者(bearer)。当然,拉康的出发 点是象征的表象(symbolic representation)总是以一种扭曲的方式代表着主体,它总是一个移置(displacement)、一个失败,即,主体无法找到可能是“他自 己”的一个能指,他总是说得太少或太多,简而言之:不同于他所想要、意欲去说的事情的某种东西。由此得出的通常结论将会是,主体是始终超过其象征性链接 (symbolic articulation)的某种意义的内部丰富性:“语言无法充分地表达我试图去说的东西……”拉康的论题是其严格的对立面:这个意指的剩余掩盖了一本 基本的缺失。能指的主体正是这个缺失,是找到可能是“他自己”的一个能指的这个不可能性:他的表象的失败是一个肯定的条件。主体试图在一个能指的表象中链 接他自己,而这个表象失败了;我们有了一个缺失而不是一个丰富性,而这个由失败打开的空就是能指的主体。以一种悖论的方式来说:能指的主体是他自身的表象 的失败的一个回溯性效果;这就是为什么表象的失败是充分代表他的唯一方式。

雄伯:
Our predominant idea of the subject is, in Lacanian terms, that of the “subject of the signified.”
用拉岡的術語來說,主體最主要的觀念是,它是無意識界「意指或所指的主體」。

“ The subject of the signified” is the active agent, the bearer of some signification who is trying to express himself in the language.
這個無意識界「意指或所指的主體」是意符的主動操弄者,是意義表達的始作俑者。他設法以語言表達他自己。

The starting point of Lacan is, of course, that the symbolic representation represents the subject always in a distorted way, that it is always a displacement, a failure, i.e., that the subject cannot find a signifier which would be “his own,” that he is always saying less or too much, in short: something other than what he wanted, intended to say.

拉岡的意圖不言而喻:象徵性的符號,作為主體的代表,總是會有所扭曲。換句話說,象徵性的符號作為主體的一種替代,總是功敗垂成,因為主體無法找到一個能完全讓他稱心如意的意符,他總是言不由衷,或言過其實。總之,他內心打算要說的話沒說出來,說出來的儘是一些內心根本不想說的話。

The usual conclusion from this would be that the subject is some kind of interior richness of meaning which always exceeds its symbolic articulation: “language cannot express fully what I’m trying to say…”
通常我們的結論是,主體內心的情感澎湃洶湧,總是非象徵符號的表達能夠盡意。「我總是詞不達意、、、」

The Lacanian thesis is its exact opposite: this surplus of signification masks a fundamental lack. The subject of the signifier is precisely this lack, this impossibility to find a signifier which would be “his own”: the failure of his representation is a positive condition. The subject tries to articulate himself in a signifying representation, and the representation fails; instead of a richness we have a lack, and this void opened by the failure is the subject of the signifier.

拉岡的主張恰恰相反。洋洋灑灑的浮夸言辭,遮蔽了無意識界的基本的欠缺。意符的真正主體確實就是這個欠缺,因為它無法找到歸屬於自己的意符。因此,象徵符號的功敗垂成,正是確證了「欠缺作為真正主體」的存在。主體設法用意符的象徵符號表達自己,但是功敗垂成。所以,我們在無意識發現的真我,是一個「欠缺」,而不是豐富充實。象徵符號功敗垂成而發現的這個空虛或空無,就是意符在真實界的真正自我。

To put it in a paradoxical way: the subject of the signifier is a retroactive effect of the failure of his own representation; that’s why the failure of representation is the only way to represent him adequately.

容我們以子之矛,攻子之盾地說:意符的主體,是他自己的象徵符號功敗垂成後,
引起的反響。那就是為什麼象徵符號的功敗垂成,是唯一的途徑,可以充當他全權的代理。

雄伯:
拉岡主張人作為文本寫作或欲望的真正的主體,是無意識界的「欠缺」或「空無」,有點像是古希臘哲學家巴門尼底斯所說的:與「存有」being 相並列的「非存有」non-being,並非是一種「空無」nothing,而是一種值得我們去追求的「實有」something。也有一點像佛教講的「空」,並非是死亡以後什麼都沒有的「斷滅空」,而是可以因空即色的「真空妙有」。或者,如哲學家尼采在「道德系譜學」所說的「人寧可以空無為目標,也不能沒有目標。」Man would rather have the void for purpose than devoid of purpose.)

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雄伯手記990421

April 21, 2010

雄伯手記990421

Zizek:
Here, however, we must carefully distinguish between this Lacanian notion of the divided subject and the “post-structuralist” notion of the subject-positions. In “post-structuralism,” the subject is usually reduced to subjection. He is conceived as an effect of a fundamentally non-subjective process: the subject is always caught in, traversed by, the pre-subjective process (of “writing,” of “desire,” etc.), and the accent is put on die different modes of how individuals “experience,” “live,” their positions as “subjects,” “actors,” “agents” of the historical process. For example, it is only at a certain point in European history that the author of works of art, a painter or a writer, began to see himself as a creative individual who, in his work, is giving expression to his interior subjective richness. The great master of such analysis was, of course, Foucault: one might say that the main point of his late work was to articulate the different modes of how individuals assume their subject-positions.

紀傑克:
然而,在这里我们必须谨 慎地区分被分割的主体(the divided subject)这个拉康的观念与主体位置(subject-position)的“后结构主义”观念。在“后结构主义”中,主体通常被缩减为臣服 (subjection)。他被设想成一个基本的非主体作用(non-subjective process)的结果:主体总是被捕获于(关于“书写”、“欲望”等等的)前主体作用(pre-subjective process)并由它所穿过,重音放在了个体是如何“体验”、“经历”其作为历史过程的“主体”、“行动者”、“媒介”的位置的不同模式上。例如,只有 在欧洲历史的某一时期,艺术作品的作者,画家或作家才开始将他自己看作是在其著作中表达出其内部主观丰富性的一个创造性个体。当然,这种分析的大师就是福 柯(Foucault):人们可以说他晚期著作的重点就是要链接个体如何假定其主体位置的不同模式。

雄伯:
以上是中國大陸「實踐與文本」網站的一篇譯文。紀傑克詮釋拉岡對於人作為「分裂的主體」的觀念,並引述後結構主義的「主體的立場」的觀念,作為對照。

「主體的立場」被定義為「主体通常被淪落成为臣服 (subjection)。」臣服一詞,語義不甚明朗,我在其它版本看到的英譯是主體化 (subjectivation )」。

He is conceived as an effect of a fundamentally non-subjective process: the subject is always caught in, traversed by, the pre-subjective process (of “writing,” of “desire,” etc.), and the accent is put on die different modes of how individuals “experience,” “live,” their positions as “subjects,” “actors,” “agents” of the historical process.

人的主體化,被構想成為一個基本上是非主體性的過程的結果:在諸如寫作或欲望的前主體性的過程,主體當局者迷,無法超越宏觀。此時,主體念茲在茲的是,作為歷史過程的參與者、旁觀者、或仲介者,他是如何以自身的立場,來親歷其境。

雄伯:
「非主體性的過程」non-subjective process 語義很抽象,何不乾脆說「客體性的過程」?具體一點,我推想指的是時代的變遷、社會的轉型、家庭的變故等等。「寫作或欲望的前主體性過程」pre-subjective process of writing or desire,我推想指的是:家庭、社會、習俗、國家、種族、或文化,都是在主體出生之前,就已經先存在。在成長的過程,主體的言說、寫作、及欲望的表達,身不由己,無法不受它們權力的影響或制約。

For example, it is only at a certain point in European history that the author of works of art, a painter or a writer, began to see himself as a creative individual who, in his work, is giving expression to his interior subjective richness.

例如,在歐洲歷史上,只有到達某個時代,藝術作品的作者,無論是畫家或作家,才開始將自己看待是一個創作的個人。他可以在自己的作品中,表達他內在的主體的豐富內涵。

雄伯:
言下之意,在那個時代之前,身為創作者的畫家或作家,需要把自己當著是一個工具或媒體,服膺於家庭、種族、社會、國家、文化、或政治意識形態,表達它們所要求他表達的內容,而不是自己內心有所感動的昂揚充沛的生命力。

The great master of such analysis was, of course, Foucault: one might say that the main point of his late work was to articulate the different modes of how individuals assume their subject-positions.

對於體制的權力對於主體化的滲透、制約與控制,予以分析、解構、甚至顛覆,最不遺餘力的人,當然非福柯莫屬。我們可以說,他晚期著作的重點,就是要清楚表達,個人如何扮演主體的立場,如何以各種不同自力救濟的方式,突破體制權力的層層控制。

雄伯:
英文的“ assume”,在此不是「假定」 ,而是「扮演」。如He assumes an important role.= He plays an important role. =He takes on an important role. (他扮演一個重要的角色)。除外,“articulate”,作「連接」解釋,從上下文來看頗為怪異,我想作「清楚表達」解釋,較為順暢。

對於此段,我覺得直譯實在無法讓人明白,所以我擅自添加一些說明的修飾語。這樣做雖然不大合乎翻譯的規範,但至少比較能讓別人看得懂。

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雄伯手記990420

April 20, 2010

雄伯手記990420

All this is, of course, just to illustrate the alienation of the subject in the signifier as soon as he is caught in the radically exterior signifying network, he is mortified, dismembered, divided. To get an idea of what is meant by the Lacanian division of the subject, one has only to remember the well-known paradox of Lewis Carroll: “I’m so glad I don’t like asparagus,” said the small girl to a sympathetic friend. “Because, if I did, I should have to eat it – and I can’t bear it!” Here you have the whole Lacanian problem of the reflexivity of desire: desire is always a desire of a desire, i.e., the question is not immediately, “what should I desire?” but, “there are a lot of things that I desire; I have a lot of desires – which of them is worth being the object of my desire? Which desire should I desire?”

当然,这完全不过是要说明主体在能指中的异化(alienation),一旦他被捕获在根本 外在的能指网络中,他就是被克制的、被肢解的、被分割的。为了获悉拉康的主体的分割意味着什么,人们只能去回忆刘易斯•卡罗尔(Lewis Carroll)的著名悖论:“我很高兴我不像芦笋”,小女孩对一个富有同情心的朋友说道。“因为,如果我那样,我将必需吃掉它——而我无法忍受于此!” 这时你已经有了拉康关于欲望的自反性(reflexivity)的整个问题:欲望总是对于一个欲望的欲望,即,问题并不直接地是“我该欲望什么?”而是 “有许多事情是我所欲望的;我有许多欲望——它们中的哪一个才是值得我欲望的客体?哪一个欲望才是我该欲望的?”

雄伯:
以上是中國大陸「實踐與文本」網站的一篇譯文。譯者不知是一時疏忽,還是真的沒有搞清楚:英文的like當動詞用時是「喜歡」,當介系詞用時才是「像」。

除外,表目的不定詞,常與 have only to 或don’t have to 一起使用,如 In order to enter an ideal university, you have only to study hard.= In order to enter an ideal university, all you have to do is study hard. ( 為了進入理想大學,你所需要的就是用功。) 或You don’t have to be an expert to use the computer. (你並不需要是一位專家,才會使用電腦。)

因此,我將 “To get an idea of what is meant by the Lacanian division of the subject, one has only to remember the well-known paradox of Lewis Carroll.”嘗試改譯為「為了理解拉岡所謂主體的分裂是什麼意思,我們所需要的,就是回想一下,路易斯、卡洛那句膾炙人口的自我解嘲的話。」

女孩說,她很高興自己真的可以不喜歡昂貴的高級的龍須菜餚,因為她若是說喜歡它,她會被迫去盡情地吃,以滿足父母寵愛的欲望。這是每個人在成長的過程,常會有的慘痛的經驗:佯裝去喜歡父母所期望他應該喜歡的東西,或佯裝願意去達成父母期望他達成的目標,結果是,把自己最私密及最深處的感情或信念,弄得麻木困頓。到後來,變成不知道自己真正喜歡,或真正欲望的是什麼。

「欲望總是對於一個欲望的欲望」Desire is always a desire of a desire,哲學家紀傑克Zizek 將它詮釋為「有许多事情是我所欲望的;我有许多欲望——它们中間的哪一个,才是值得成為我欲望的客体?哪一个欲望才是我该欲望的?」

我則認為這句話在引述時有些脫漏。拉岡的慣常說法,應該是「人的欲望總是大它者的欲望」Man’s desire is always the desire of the other. 嬰孩從鏡像階段Mirror stage開始,觀看自己反映在鏡中的影像,而產生「理想的自我」ideal ego的魅影specular image。也就是說,人的自戀的魅影,一進入意符或能指( signifier)的世界,就受到大它者( the Other ) 的欲望所產生的期望,所禁制mortified, 割據dismembered, 及分裂divided,然後以大它者的欲望所產生的期望,充當就是自己所要滿足的欲望及期望,而且還深信不疑。然而,對照於依稀在真實界the real飄忽不定,及頻頻召喚的 「自我的理想」ego ideal,人作為生命的主體,必然是疏離或異化alienation。

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雄伯手記990416

April 18, 2010

雄伯手記990416

Lacan:
Television – let’s proceed like idiots; let’s take this title literally and ask ourselves a question, not the question, “what can we learn about TV from Lacan’s teaching?” which would get us on the wrong path of so-called applied psychoanalysis, but the inverse question, “what can we learn about Lacan’s teaching from the TV phenomenon?” At first sight, this seems as absurd as the well-known Hegelian proposition defining phrenology, “the spirit is the bone”: the equalization of the most sublime, elusive theory with the vulgar mass-cultural phenomenon. But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs – even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter – can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity.

拉康:
电视——让我们像白痴那样进行;让我们从字面上感受这个标题并问我们自己一个问题,不是“关于电视,我们能从拉康的教学中 学到什么?”的问题,而是“关于拉康的教学,我们能从电视现象中学到什么?”的相反问题。乍看上去,这似乎与黑格尔定义颅相学的著名命题“精神是骨头”一 样是荒谬的:最崇高、难懂的理论与通俗的大众文化现象的同等化。但是或许,如在黑格尔式命题中,在明显的平庸下面有着一个“思辨的真理”——或许美国电视 节目的某些怪癖允许我们来理解拉康的基本命题,即,精神分析不是一种心理学:内心最深处的信仰——甚至诸如怜悯、哭泣、悲哀、笑声这样的内心最深处的情绪 ——可以被转移、被委派给没有丧失其真诚的他者们。

雄伯:
以上是中國大陸「實踐與文本」網站的一篇譯文。最後一句的without losing their sincerity,譯者顯然把它當形容詞片語,修飾前面的others,因此their就順理成章被認為是others的所有格代名詞,而譯成「沒有喪失其真誠的他者們」。

我的解讀是,without losing their sincerity 在這裡是副詞片語,修飾動詞片語,be transferred, delegated to others,代名詞their 的sincerity 指的是前面的compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter 的sincerity。除外,英文的最高級,常帶有「即使」「雖然」的讓步意涵,如The best doctor cannot cure him.(即使是最好的醫生來,也治療不了他的病)。因此我嘗試不同的解讀:

But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs – even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter – can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity.

但是,或許如黑格爾的主張:即使表面是平庸無奇的事物,底下仍然會有可供我們思辯的真理。或許美國電視節目的某些奇形怪狀的現象,也可以讓我們用來理解拉岡的基本主張:精神分析學,不是如一般應用精神分析學所謂的是一種心理學。那種心理學認為,即使是內心最深處的信念,甚至最深處的情感,諸如同情、哭泣、悲傷、歡笑,都能夠傳遞或傳送給別人,而不會喪失它們原有的真誠度。(拉岡的精神分析學則主張:信念或情感從內心無意識出發,表達出來,傳遞或傳送給別人的過程,勢必產生或多或少的虛假,不可能完全真誠。人作為生命主體,永遠會有某種程度的疏離和虛偽。)

黑格爾的「精神即骨頭」The Spirit is the bone 是一句飽受扭曲的引文。在「精神現象學」的原義是「一般來說,頭顱的骨頭確實有精神的當下顯現的意義。」The skull-bone does have in general the significance of being the immediate actuality of Spirit. 黑格爾的觀點是:整個自然及歷史的世界是精神的具體表現。精神與物質並不是分離對立,而是相同實體的一體兩面。然而,簡化成為「精神即骨頭」,把主詞「精神」的崇高,等同於述語「骨頭」的低俗,被拉岡譏諷是一種荒謬。如同他自己今天應邀到美國演說,要將最崇高、難懂的精神分析學,跟有關電視這個低俗的大眾傳播媒體文化的現象,等量齊觀地溝通,是同樣的荒謬。因此一開始,他就將聽眾原有的期待:「關於電視,拉岡的精神分析學能教導我們什麼?」改成主客易位的強勢主導權的「如何從電視現象,來看拉岡的精神分析學究竟是什麼?」

開場白「讓我們像白癡一樣繼續談電視這個話題」 let’s proceed like idiots 聽起來有點突兀。不過,晚期的拉岡確實對「白癡」這個字眼情有獨鍾,如在「病癥」Le Sinthome的講座中所說:這次美國之行的考驗,使我今天非常疲倦,但是我並不虛此行。因為我能夠用這些圖形解釋精神分析學,博得一些驚奇的關注。只是人作為具有理性精神及無意識欲望的自戀主體,其實真像一個白癡,因為主體的自戀終就會淪為一廂情願的妄想。This American ordeal, which is the reason I’m so weary today, has certainly been worthwhile, because I was able with these diagrams to create some agitation, some emotion. The sensed as mental, the senti-mental is idiotic, because always by some device reducible to the imaginary.(Le Sinthome , p10)

不過,我認為把人描繪為「白癡」,最生動的文學版本,莫過於莎士比亞的「馬克白」Macbeth。他在窮途末路時的喟嘆:

Life is but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is hear no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of fury and sound,
Signifying nothing

人僅是一個會走路的影子,一個拙劣的演員
在舞台上高視闊步,自命不凡
然後就消失無蹤。人生的故事
述說者是一位白癡,充滿聲音和喧囂,
卻毫無意義。

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
Springherohsiung@gmail.com

雄伯手記990416

April 18, 2010

雄伯手記990416

Lacan:
Television – let’s proceed like idiots; let’s take this title literally and ask ourselves a question, not the question, “what can we learn about TV from Lacan’s teaching?” which would get us on the wrong path of so-called applied psychoanalysis, but the inverse question, “what can we learn about Lacan’s teaching from the TV phenomenon?” At first sight, this seems as absurd as the well-known Hegelian proposition defining phrenology, “the spirit is the bone”: the equalization of the most sublime, elusive theory with the vulgar mass-cultural phenomenon. But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs – even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter – can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity.

拉康:
电视——让我们像白痴那样进行;让我们从字面上感受这个标题并问我们自己一个问题,不是“关于电视,我们能从拉康的教学中 学到什么?”的问题,而是“关于拉康的教学,我们能从电视现象中学到什么?”的相反问题。乍看上去,这似乎与黑格尔定义颅相学的著名命题“精神是骨头”一 样是荒谬的:最崇高、难懂的理论与通俗的大众文化现象的同等化。但是或许,如在黑格尔式命题中,在明显的平庸下面有着一个“思辨的真理”——或许美国电视 节目的某些怪癖允许我们来理解拉康的基本命题,即,精神分析不是一种心理学:内心最深处的信仰——甚至诸如怜悯、哭泣、悲哀、笑声这样的内心最深处的情绪 ——可以被转移、被委派给没有丧失其真诚的他者们。

雄伯:
以上是中國大陸「實踐與文本」網站的一篇譯文。最後一句的without losing their sincerity,譯者顯然把它當形容詞片語,修飾前面的others,因此their就順理成章被認為是others的所有格代名詞,而譯成「沒有喪失其真誠的他者們」。

我的解讀是,without losing their sincerity 在這裡是副詞片語,修飾動詞片語,be transferred, delegated to others,代名詞their 的sincerity 指的是前面的compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter 的sincerity。除外,英文的最高級,常帶有「即使」「雖然」的讓步意涵,如The best doctor cannot cure him.(即使是最好的醫生來,也治療不了他的病)。因此我嘗試不同的解讀:

But perhaps, as in the Hegelian proposition, there is a “speculative truth” beneath the obvious banality – perhaps certain peculiarities of the American TV program allow us to grasp the fundamental Lacanian proposition that psychoanalysis is not a psychology: the most intimate beliefs – even the most intimate emotions such as compassion, crying, sorrow, laughter – can be transferred, delegated to others without losing their sincerity.

但是,或許如黑格爾的主張:即使表面是平庸無奇的事物,底下仍然會有可供我們思辯的真理。或許美國電視節目的某些奇形怪狀的現象,也可以讓我們用來理解拉岡的基本主張:精神分析學,不是如一般應用精神分析學所謂的是一種心理學。那種心理學認為,即使是內心最深處的信念,甚至最深處的情感,諸如同情、哭泣、悲傷、歡笑,都能夠傳遞或傳送給別人,而不會喪失它們原有的真誠度。(拉岡的精神分析學則主張:信念或情感從內心無意識出發,表達出來,傳遞或傳送給別人的過程,勢必產生或多或少的虛假,不可能完全真誠。人作為生命主體,永遠會有某種程度的疏離和虛偽。)

黑格爾的「精神即骨頭」The Spirit is the bone 是一句飽受扭曲的引文。在「精神現象學」的原義是「一般來說,頭顱的骨頭確實有精神的當下顯現的意義。」The skull-bone does have in general the significance of being the immediate actuality of Spirit. 黑格爾的觀點是:整個自然及歷史的世界是精神的具體表現。精神與物質並不是分離對立,而是相同實體的一體兩面。然而,簡化成為「精神即骨頭」,把主詞「精神」的崇高,等同於述語「骨頭」的低俗,被拉岡譏諷是一種荒謬。如同他自己今天應邀到美國演說,要將最崇高、難懂的精神分析學,跟有關電視這個低俗的大眾傳播媒體文化的現象,等量齊觀地溝通,是同樣的荒謬。因此一開始,他就將聽眾原有的期待:「關於電視,拉岡的精神分析學能教導我們什麼?」改成主客易位的強勢主導權的「如何從電視現象,來看拉岡的精神學究竟是什麼?」

開場白「讓我們像白癡一樣繼續談電視這個話題」 let’s proceed like idiots 聽起來有點突兀。不過,晚期的拉岡確實對「白癡」這個字眼情有獨鍾,如在「病癥」Le Sinthome的講座中所說:這次美國之行的考驗,使我今天非常疲倦,但是我並不虛此行。因為我能夠用這些圖形解釋精神分析學,博得一些驚奇的關注。只是人作為具有理性精神及無意識欲望的自戀主體,其實真像一個白癡,因為主體的自戀終就會淪為一廂情願的妄想。This American ordeal, which is the reason I’m so weary today, has certainly been worthwhile, because I was able with these diagrams to create some agitation, some emotion. The sensed as mental, the senti-mental is idiotic, because always by some device reducible to the imaginary.(Le Sinthome , p10)

不過,我認為把人描繪為「白癡」,最生動的文學版本,莫過於莎士比亞的「馬克白」Macbeth。他在窮途末路時的喟嘆:

Life is but a walking shadow, a poor player
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage
And then is hear no more. It is a tale
Told by an idiot, full of fury and sound,
Signifying nothing

人僅是一個會走路的影子,一個拙劣的演員
在舞台上高視闊步,自命不凡
然後就消失無蹤。人生的故事
述說者是一位白癡,充滿聲音和喧囂,
卻毫無意義。
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
Springherohsiung@gmail.com

Lacan 501

April 12, 2010

Lacan 501
Function and field of speech and language
言說與語言的功用及其領域

The Hollow Men
空洞的人

The third paradox of the relation of language to speech is that of the subject who loses his meaning in the objectifications of discourse. However metaphysical its definition may appear, we cannot ignore its presence in the foreground of our experience. For here is the most profound alienation of the subject in our scientific civilization, and it is this alienation that we encounter first of all when the subject begins to talk to us about himself: hence, in order to resolve it entirely, analysis should be conducted to the limits of wisdom.

語言與言說的關係的第三個矛盾是,主體在論述真理形成客觀化之時,失去了他自身的意義。這個定義無論如何形上抽象,我們不能忽視它存在於我們精神分析的現場,因為這裡所發生的是,主體在我們科學文明所形成的最深刻的疏離。當主體開始跟我們談到他自己,我們首先遭遇到就是這個疏離。因此,為了要徹底解決這個疏離,精神分析的運用,應該將智慧發揮到極限。

To give an exemplary formulation of this, I could not find a more pertinent terrain than the usage of common speech—pointing out that the ‘ ce suis-je’ of the time of villon has become reversed in the ‘ e’est moi’ of modern man.

要為這個說明舉個例子,最貼切的場域莫過於日常共同言說的使用:法蘭科斯、維隆對於聖經開始的時間的描述:「我就是這個樣子」,在現代人身上,被倒轉成「這個樣子就是我」。

The moi, the ego, of modern man, as I have indicated elsewhere, has taken on its form in the dicalectical impasse of the belle ame who does not recognize his very own raison d’etre in the disorder that he denounces in the world.

現代人的自我,我在別的地方說過,在「迷失的旋律」抒情曲歌詞中,所形成的辯證的僵局的處境:作者一邊抨擊世界的混亂,一邊在世界的混亂中,他無法認出真正自我。

But a way out is offered to the subject for the resolution of that impasse when his discourse is delusional. Communication can be validly established for him in the common task of science and the posts that it commands in our universal civilization; this communication will be effective within the enormous objectification constituted by that science, and it will enable him to forget his subjectivity. He will make an effective contribution to the common task in his daily work and will be able to furnish his leisure time with all the pleasures of profuse culture which, from detective novels to historical memoirs, from educational lectures to the orthopaedics of group relations, will give him the wherewithal to forget his own existence and his death, at the same time to misconstrue the particular meaning of his life in false communication.

但是有一個方法可供給主體解決這個僵局,那就是將他的真理論述當成是海市蜃樓般的幻覺。在科學的共同工作,及在我們環球的文明,它要求的職位上,他能夠有效地建立溝通。在那個科學所組成的巨大客觀化範圍之內,這個溝通將會是有效。這將會使他能夠忘掉自己的主觀性。對於他的日常工作中有關共同的部份,他將會有效地貢獻,並且將能夠以大量的通俗文化,打發他的空閒時間,從偵探小說,到傳記回憶錄,從有關教育的演講,到群體關係的彌補。這些將會給他必要的資源,渾然忘記他自己的存在,甚至忘記他有朝一日終將死亡的事實。同時,他會用虛假的溝通,曲解他的生命的特別的意義。

If the subject did not rediscover in a regression—often pushed right back to the ‘mirror stage’—the enclosure of a stage in which his ego contains its imaginary exploits, there would hardly any assignable limits to the credulity to which he must succumb in that situation. And this is what makes our responsibility so formidable when, along with the mythical manipulations of our doctrine, we bring him one more opportunity to alienate himself, in the decomposed trinity of the ego, the supergo, and the id, for example.

人作為生命的主體,時常被逼迫退轉到孩童的「鏡中影像階段」,顧影自憐。但是在這種的退轉中,主體並沒有重新醒悟到,他的自我馳騁於想像界的那個舞台,已經被封閉。在那種情境當中,假如主體還念念不忘那個舞台,執迷於自戀的完美形象,那麼他的自戀內容的可信度,就會跟時代及現實完全脫節。這就是為什麼我們精神分析的責任會變得如此重大。除了要發揮精神分析奧秘的信條,我們還要帶給他再一次的機會,讓他疏離他自己,例如,將他的自我、超我、本我的三位一體,予以解離。

Hence there is a language-barrier opposed to speech, and the precautions against verbalism that are a theme of the discourse of the ‘ normal’ man in our culture merely serve to reinforce its thickness.

因此,有一個語言的障礙,將主體的言說阻隔在對面。我們要預防,如何避免只是坐而言,卻沒有起而行,在我們的文化中,便成為一個「正常人」的真理論述的一個主題。問題是,我們越是小心翼翼,這個阻隔障礙的厚度越是被強化。

There might be some paint in measuring its thickness by the statistically determined total of pounds of printed paper, miles of record grooves, and hours of radio broadcasting that the said culture produces per head of population in the sectors A, B, And C of its domain. This would be a fine research project for our cultural organizations, and it would be seen that the question of language does not remain entirely within the domain of the convolutions in which its use is reflected in the individual .

我們將這個障礙的厚度測量一下,可能不無意義。例如用著作出版的印刷紙張的總數量,演講發表的數英哩長的錄音帶,以及上電台及電視廣播節目的時數,這些都可充當統計的數據。因為在上述的這個文化氛圍,它們會因此使每個人在自己專業領域,被區分為甲等、乙等、或丙等考績的等級。假如我們的文化單位願意,這將是一個很好的研究計畫。我們將會看到,語言的問題始終沒有完全保持在這個範圍之內,因為語言的使用需要反映到個人身上

We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw, Alas!
And so on.

我們是空洞的人
我們是填塞的人
依偎在一起
腦袋填滿的是稻草,
哀哉!
等等。

The resemblance between this situation and the alienation of madness, in so far as the formula given above is authentic—that is, that here the subject is spoken rather than speaking—obviously derives from the demand, presupposed by psychoanalysis, for ‘ true’ speech. If this consequence, which pushes the constituent paradoxes of what I am saying here to their limit, were to be turned against the good sense of the psychoanalytic perspective, I would readily accept the pertinence of this objection, but only to find my own position confirmed in it—and this by a dialectical return in which there would be no shortage of authorized go-fathers, beginning with Hegel’s denunciation of ‘ the philosophy of the cranium’, and stopping only at Pascal’s warning, at the dawn of the historical era of the ‘ego’ echoing in these terms: ‘Men are not necessarily mad that it would be being mad by another kind of madness not to be mad’.

假如以上詩句的陳述是真誠的話,這個情境跟瘋狂時的疏離有幾分類似。換句話說,作為「空洞的人」的主體,在這個時候,是被別人言說出來,而不是自己在言說。顯而易見,若是自己在言說,那先決要件是要存有「真正」的言說。這是精神分析學預設的一個命題:陳述語句要跟表達內容一致。自相矛盾的結果,若是發揮到極點,被倒轉過來,反諷我們精神分析學的自以為的明智通達,何嘗不是如此自相矛盾,我將會立刻接受,因為這個以其子之矛,攻子之盾的反駁是一針見血地貼切:我自己的立場,也難逃這個矛盾的驗證。當然,這個邏輯若是要往前輩先哲類推的話,不乏有無數的先例充當我們權威的教父,從黑格爾的抨擊「頭蓋骨的哲學家」,到「自我」開始響徹雲霄的那個時代的初期,巴斯卡的警告,依舊迴響在耳際:「人有需要如此的瘋狂,以致於我們需要另外一種瘋狂的對照,才能避免於瘋狂嗎?」

This is not to say, however, that our culture pursues its course in the shadowy regions beyond creative subjectivity. On the contrary, creative subjectivity has not ceased in its struggle to renew the never-exhausted power of symbols in the human exchange that brings them to the light of the day.

可是,這並不是說,我們的文化追求它的途徑,是在客觀性的陰影的領域,超越了創造的主觀性。相反的,創造的主觀性並沒有停止它的奮鬥,它要復興象徵符號生生不息的力量,讓人類得以流通使用,帶來啟明的曙光。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
springherohsiung@gmail.com