Archive for June, 2011


June 28, 2011


Carl Jung
卡爾 榮格


But the negative attitude of the public at large to the Church seems to be less the result of religious convictions than one symptom of the general mental sloth and ignorance of religion.


We can wax indignant over man’s notorious lack of spirituality, but when one is a doctor one does not invariably think that the disease is intractable or the patient morally inferior; instead, one supposes that the negative results may possibly
be due to the remedy applied. Although it may reasonably be doubted whether man has made any marked or even perceptible progress in morality during the known five thousand years of human civilization, it cannot be denied that there has been
a notable development in consciousness and its functions.


Above all, there has been a tremendous extension of consciousness in the form of knowledge. Not only have the individual functions become differentiated, but to a large extent they have been brought under the control of the ego in other words,
man’s will has developed. This is particularly striking when we compare our mentality with that of primitives.


The security of our ego has, in comparison with earlier times, greatly increased and has even taken such a dangerous leap forward that, although we sometimes speak of “God’s will,” we no longer know what we are saying, for in the same breath we assert, “Where there’s a will there’s a way.” And who would ever think of appealing to God’s help rather than to the goodwill, the sense of responsibility and duty, the reason or intelligence, of his fellow men?


Whatever we may think of these changes of outlook, we cannot alter the fact of their existence. Now when there is a marked change in the individual’s state of consciousness, the unconscious contents which are thereby constellated will also
change. And the further the conscious situation moves away from a certain point of equilibrium, the more forceful and accordingly the more dangerous become the unconscious contents that are struggling to re-establish the balance.


This leads ultimately to a dissociation: on the one hand, ego-consciousness makes convulsive efforts to shake off an invisible opponent (if it does not suspect its next-door neighbour of being the devil!), while on the other hand it increasingly falls victim to the tyrannical will of an internal “Government opposition” which displays
all the characteristics of a daemonic subman and superman combined.


When a few million people get into this state, it produces the sort of situation which has afforded us such an edifying object-lesson every day for the last ten years. These contemporary events betray their psychological background by their very


The insensate destruction and devastation are a reaction against the deflection of consciousness from the point of equilibrium. For an equilibrium does in fact exist between the psychic ego and non-ego, and that equilibrium is a religio,
a “careful consideration” of ever-present unconscious forces which we neglect at our peril. The present crisis has been brewing for centuries because of this shift in man’s conscious situation.


Have the Churches adapted themselves to this secular change? Their truth may, with more right than we realize, call itself “eternal,” but its temporal garment must pay tribute to the evanescence of all earthly things and should take account of psychic changes. Eternal truth needs a human language that alters with the spirit of the times.


The primordial images undergo ceaseless transformation and yet remain ever the same, but only in a new form can they be understood anew. Always they require a new interpretation if, as each formulation becomes obsolete, they are not to lose their spellbinding power over that fugax Mercurius and allow that useful though dangerous enemy to escape.


What is that about “new wine in old bottles”? Where are the answers to the spiritual needs and troubles of a new epoch? And where the knowledge to deal with the psychological problems raised by the development of modern consciousness? Never before has “eternal” truth been faced with such a hybris of will and power.



精神分析技术的基本原则 p143

June 28, 2011

Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique
精神分析技術的基本原則 p143

布魯斯 芬克

How to Handle Transference

He indicated, for example, that when the male analyst working with a man whom Gill called “Patient E” made an interpretation to the effect that the patient was worried that there was an intimate, homosexual component to his relationship with the analyst, the patient heard the interpretation “as a homosexual approach” or come-on (p. 1 05).


The analyst in that case had apparently been sensed for some time by the patient to be encouraging the patient to form a homoerotic 同性戀 bond with him, and the analyst’s interpretation was taken by the patient as confirmation of his preexisting sense.


Another analysand, whom Gill referred to as “Patient G,” had obviously felt for some time that he was in competition with his analyst and perpetually losing the contest. When his analyst commented at length on this, the patient “experience[d] every interpretation as an enactment 扮演 of the competition. Even interpretations that [were] about that very thing” for example, the analyst proffered, “My saying that you have experienced it as a competition in which I am besting you is yet another move in this game of besting you”–were “experienced as aloof, one-upmanship” on the analyst’s part (p. 1 70).


When his analyst told him he seemed to be seeking the analyst’s
approval, the patient concluded that this was just one more way he was messed up and failing. When the analyst commented that the patient felt the analyst was putting him down, the patient took the comment as another put-down (pp. 1 62-1 64).


The analyst’s speech is heard as coming from the person the analysand imputes the analyst to be, not as coming from the person the analyst
thinks he is or would like to be, or as coming from some objective outside
observer. In this sense, interpretation of the transference, which is allegedly engaged in so as to “resolve” or “liquidate” the transference, ends up merely feeding the transference, making it still more intense and unwieldy. 19


This is one of the reasons why Lacanians will often proffer very short interpretations that omit the subject of the statement (avoiding, for example, “[ think”) and that consist essentially of the analysand’s own words–perhaps strung together in a slightly different order–such that it is not entirely clear to the analysand who authored them. This makes it more difficult for such interpretations (see Chapter 5) to be experienced and rejected “as coming from the transferential Other.”


Despite an entire volume of theoretical considerations on the interpretation of transference and a second volume of transcriptions of sessions purporting to show the reader how to detect and interpret transference, Gill provided little if any evidence that the interpretation of transference led to enduring change in the analysands he presented.


The possible sources and evolution of Patient E’s fear of intimacy and homophobia were never even broached, nor were the probable causes of Patient G’s competition with authority figures. Both of these
patients made it quite clear that fear and competition characterized many of their relationships with others, yet the reader was never given so much as a glimpse of their connection with the patients’ histories.


As important as it may be for analysts to be attuned to “allusions to the transference” (Gill, 1 982, p. 2 1 ) in stories analysands recount during their sessions, and as important as it may be to get analysands to elaborate on such allusions in detail, virtually every direct interpretation of the transference in the sessions Gill and Hoffman collected led to a quandary, a messy soup that the analysts whose cases they presented extracted themselves from only with the greatest of difficulty.


Unwittingly, Gill and Hoffman appear to have provided ample evidence that it is ‘ counterproductive to interpret the transference.


Although one cannot see any great benefit accruing to the patients they
presented, one can see that the attempt on the part of some of the analysts
whose sessions were included in the volume to find allusions to the transference everywhere and to systematically interpret the transference led them to overlook the most basic facets of psychoanalytic technique:


• They overlooked slips of the tongue (Patient G said, “my being angry with me” instead of “my being angry with him,” implying something very
different, indeed;


• They failed to notice mixed metaphors (Patient G said, referring to the upcoming end of the’ therapy, ”Time is running out. The crystal ball
with the sand ends July 2 1 st,” obviously meaning “hourglass” instead of “crystal ball,” and thus referring quite transparently to his view that his analyst was, or at least believed he was, clairvoyant-if not a fortune
teller; p. 1 56).



可能不是類似 14

June 27, 2011

可能不是類似 14

雅克 拉康研討班


On a discourse that might not be a semblance

(18) In any case, the statement of our title this year, On a discourse that is not a semblance, concerns something that deals with an economy. Here we will hide (nous tairons) the a semblance from itself, it is not a semblance of something else, it is to be taken in the sense of the objective genitive, what is at stake is the semblance as
proper object by which there is ruled the economy of discourse.


Are we going to say that it is also a subjective genitive? Does du semblant concern also what gives the discourse? The word subjective is the only one to be rejected here for the simple reason that the subject only appears once there has been established
somewhere this liaison of signifiers. A subject can only be the product of signifying articulation. A subject as such never masters in any case this articulation but is properly speaking determined by it.


A discourse, by its nature, appears (fait semblant) as one might say to be a success, or to be light, or to be chic. If what is stated in words is precisely true by always being very authentically what it is, at the level we are at, of the objective and of articulation, it is then very precisely as object of what is only produced in this aforesaid discourse that the semblance is posited.


Hence the properly senseless character of what is articulated and it must be said that it is here indeed that there is revealed what is involved in the richness of language, namely, that it contains a logic that surpasses by far everything that we succeed in crystallising of it, in detaching from it.


I employed the hypothetical form of a discourse which might not be (ne serait pas) a semblance. Everyone knows the developments that logic took on after Aristotle, by putting the emphasis on the hypothetical function. Everything that is articulated by giving the value


True of False to the articulation of the hypothesis, and combining what results from the implication of a term within this hypothesis, as being signalled as true. This is the inauguration of what is called the modus ponens, and of still many other modes and
everyone knows what was made of them. It is striking, at least as far as I know, that no one has ever formalised the resource involved in the use of this hypothetical in the negative.


A striking thing, if one refers for example to what is collected about it in my Ecrits, when someone at the epoch, a heroic epoch at which I began to clear up the terrain of analysis, when someone came to contribute to the deciphering of the Verneinung.


Even though in commenting Freud letter by letter, he noticed very clearly – because
Freud says it quite literally – that the Bejahung only involves a judgement of attribution, which means that Freud … shows a finesse (19) and a competence that are quite exceptional at the time he wrote this – because only some logician who is not widely known was able at that time to underline it – the judgement of attribution, in no way prejudges existence.


The simple positing of a Verneinung, implies the existence of something which is very precisely what is denied. A discourse which might not be a semblance posits that the discourse, as I have just stated, is a semblance.


The great advantage in putting it like that is that one does not say a semblance of what. Now, it is here of course, it is around this that I propose to advance our statements, namely, to get to know what is involved where it might not be a semblance. Naturally, the terrain is prepared by a singular even though timid step, which is the one that
Freud took in Beyond the pleasure principle.


Here I do not want, because I cannot do any more than indicate the knot formed in this statement, by repetition and enjoyment. It is in function of this that repetition goes against the pleasure principle which, I would say, does not recover from it. Hedonism, in the light of analytic experience, can only go back to what it is, namely, a
philosophical myth. I mean, a myth of a perfectly defined (and clear) class.


And I stated last year the help that they have given to a certain process of the master, by permitting the discourse of the master as such to build up a knowledge. This knowledge is the knowledge of the master. This knowledge has supposed, since the philosophical discourse still carries its trace, the existence over against the master
of another knowledge and, thank God, philosophical discourse did not disappear without first pinpointing that there ought to be at the origin a relationship between this knowledge and enjoyment.


The one who thus closed philosophical discourse, Hegel to give him his name, naturally only sees the way in which, through work, slavery comes to accomplish what? Nothing other than the knowledge of the master.




June 27, 2011

Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique
精神分析技術的基本原則 p141

布魯斯 芬克

How to Handle Transference

Nevertheless, the majority 大多數 of analysts seem to have fallen in with Freud’s ( 19 1 3/ 1 958) point of view that we must interpret the transference whenever it begins to lead to resistance 阻抗:


So long as the patients communications 溝通 and ideas run on 進行 without any obstruction 阻礙, the theme of transference should be left untouched 沒有碰觸. One must wait until the transference, [the handling of] which is the most delicate of all procedures 程式, has become a resistance 阻抗. (p. 1 39)


They seem not to have realized that an interpretation 解釋of the transference that comes from the transferential object herself, the analyst, is not a way out of the transference but simply reproduces 複製 the transference; for, as Lacan (2006, p. 59 1 ) said, ‘The analyst’s speech is [always] heard as coming from the transferential Other.”


If, for example, the analyst has become associated 聯想 with a critical重要的 parental figure, her interpretation will be heard as critical 重要; if she has become associated with a seductive誘拐 maternal 母親figure, her interpretation will be heard as seductive. We do not achieve some sort ‘of metaposition 形上位置 outside of the transference by interpreting it (the claims of therapists like Levenson, 1 995, p. 88, that we can “metacommunicate” 形上溝通 notwithstanding雖然).


We remain up to our ears 忙碌於 in the transference. As Lacan ( 1967-1968, November 29, 1 967) said, there is “no transference of the transference,” meaning that–just as there is no position outside o f language that allows us to discuss language as a whole without having to rely on language itself in our discussion-there is no way in which we can step completely outside the transference situation in order to discuss what is happening in the transference itself (see also Lacan, 1 998b, p. 428).


The interpretation of transference is a vicious cycle 惡性循環! Analysts have tried to get around this vicious cycle by dividing the analysand into two parts: the “experiencing ego” and the “observing 觀察 ego” (Sterba, 1 934).


The trick 竅訣, in their view, is to invite the observing ego, which they consider to be “rational 理性,” to step outside of the transference (which is presumably 假定 engaged in by the experiencing ego alone) into some kind of metaspace 形上空間 , a space outside of the transference where analyst and analysand can meet as “reasonable” observing egos and agree upon what is happening between the irrational, unreasonable, experiencing egos who are caught up in 忙於 the transference/countertransference. 16


It may sound like I am being ironic 反諷here, but many authors 作者speak in precisely 確實these terms, as if “rational 理性,” “irrational,” “reasonable,” and “unreasonable” were simple, serviceable服務 categories1 範疇7 that could be unproblematically associated with one or another of the psychical agencies 代理, and as if–even if an agreement as to what is going on could be reached between reasonable, “dispassionate 冷靜,” observing egos taking a “time out” from the hothouse 溫室 of the transference relationship–it would change anything when they return to the hothouse (apart from encouraging the analysand to suppress 壓抑 any and all transference reactions 反動 in the future) .


The analysand is likely to remain just as hypersensitive 過度敏感 to criticism as he was before, for example, but he may begin to “talk himself down” from his high dudgeon 生氣 when he remembers his discussion with the analyst to the effect that he constantly 不斷地felt criticized批評 by his father as a child, which is the origin 起源of his hypersensitivity to criticism today.


The upshot 結局 is that he will still get very angry but will learn how to suppress 壓抑 his anger after the fact instead of acting on it. Or he will still experience women’s comments to him as invariably 一成不變 seductive 誘拐 but will learn how to “reason with himself,” reminding himself on each occasion that he experiences their comments that way because of things that occurred with his mother. Such is the usefulness (or uselessness, as the case may be) of enlisting 徵召 the aid of the analysand’s observing ego!


Gill ( 1 982) is one of the foremost proponents 提議者, in the non-Kleinian analytic world (I will discuss Klein later in this chapter), of the systematic interpretation of transference, yet he acknowledged something (which he appeared to view as a simple anomaly or curiosity, even though he repeated it numerous times in the course of his book) that seems to corroborate Lacan’s view that it is generally pointless to interpret the transference.


Gill indicated that in the transcripts of complete sessions he provided in volume 2 of his work, one can see “how regularly the analysis of the transference has its own repercussions on the transference–often repercussions which result in an enactment of the very patterns of interactions to which the interpretations refer”



精神分析的倫理學 09

June 27, 2011

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析的倫理學 09

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康


The paradoxes of ethics
or Have you acted in conformity with your desire?


Religion, Science and Desire

And now a word in conclusion.


The field that is ours by reason of the fact that we are exploring it is going to be in one way or another the object of a science. And, you are going to ask me, will this science of desire belong to the field of the human sciences?


Before leaving you this year, I would like to make my position on the subject very clear. I do not think, given the way that field is being laid out, and I assure you it is being done carefully, that it will amount to anything else but a systematic and fundamental misunderstanding of everything that has to do with the whole affair that I have been discussing here.


The fields of inquiry that are being outlined as necessarily belonging to the human sciences have in my eyes no other function than to form a branch of the service of
goods, which is no doubt advantageous though of limited value.


Those fields are in other words a branch of the service of those powers that are more than a little precarious. In any case, implied here is a no less systematic misunderstanding of all the violent phenomena that reveal that the path of the triumph of goods in our world is not likely to be a smooth one.


In other words, in the phrase of one of the exceptional politicians who has functioned as a leader of France, Mazarin, politics is politics, but love always remains love.



As for the kind of science that might be situated in that place I have designated
the place of desire, what can it be? Well, you don’t have to look very far.


As far as science is concerned, the kind that is presently occupying the place of desire is quite simply what we commonly call science, the kind that you see cantering gaily along and accomplishing all kinds of so-called physical conquests.


I think that throughout this historical period the desire of man, which has been felt, anesthetized, put to sleep by moralists, domesticated by educators, betrayed by the academies, has quite simply taken refuge or been repressed in that most subtle and blindest of passions, as the story of Oedipus shows, the passion for knowledge. That’s the passion that is currently going great guns and is far from having said its last word.



One of the most amusing features of the history of science is to be found in the propaganda scientists and alchemists have addressed to the powers that be at a time when they were beginning to run out of steam. It went as follows: “Give us money; you don’t realize that if you gave us a little money, we would be able to put all kinds of machines, gadgets and contraptions at your service.”


How could the powers let themselves be taken in? The answer to the question is to be found in a certain breakdown of wisdom. It’s a fact that they did let themselves be taken in, that science got its money, as a consequence of which we are left with this vengeance. It’s a fascinating thing, but as far as those who are at the forefront of science are concerned, they are not without a keen consciousness of the fact that they have their backs against a wall of hate.



They are themselves capsized by the turbulent swell of a heavy sense of guilt. But that isn’t very important because it’s not in truth an adventure that Mr. Oppenheimer’s remorse can put an end to overnight. It is moreover there where the problem of desire will lie in the future.


The universal order has to deal with the problem of what it should do with that science in which something is going on whose nature escapes it. Science, which occupies the place of desire, can only be a science of desire in the form of an enormous question mark; and this is doubtless not without a structural cause. In other words, science is animated by some mysterious desire, but it doesn’t know, any more than anything in the unconscious itself, what that desire means.


The future will reveal it to us, and perhaps among those who by the grace of God have most recently eaten the book –- I mean those who have written with their labors, indeed with their blood, the book of Western science. It, too, is an edible book.


I spoke about Mencius earlier. After having made the statements that you would be wrong to consider optimistic about the goodness of man, he explains very well that what we are most ignorant about is the laws that come to us from heaven, the same laws as Antigone’s. His proof is absolutely rigorous, but it is too late for me to repeat it here. The laws of heaven in question are the laws of desire.


Of him who ate the book and the mystery within it, one can, in effect, ask
the question: “Is he good, is he bad?” That question now seems unimportant.
The important thing is not knowing whether man is good or bad in the beginning;
the important thing is what will transpire once the book has been eaten.



孟子曰:“魚,我所欲也,熊掌亦我所欲也;二者不可得兼 舍魚而取熊掌者也。生亦我所欲也,義亦我所欲也;二者不可得 兼,舍生而取義者也。生亦我所欲,所欲有甚於生者,故不為苟 得也;死亦我所惡,所惡有甚于死者,故患有所不辟 也。如使人 之所欲莫甚於生,則幾可以得生者,何不用也?使人之所惡莫甚 于死者,則凡可以辟患者,何不為也?由是則生而有不用也,由 是則可以辟患而有不為也。是故所欲有甚於生者,所惡有甚於死 者。非獨賢者有是心也,人皆有之,賢者能勿喪耳。一簞食,一 豆羹,得之則生,弗得則死,呼爾而與之,行道之人弗受;蹴 爾而與之,乞人不屑也。萬鐘則不辨禮義而受之。萬鐘于我何加 焉?為宮室之美、妻妾之奉、所識窮乏者得我與?鄉為身死而 不受,今為宮室之美為之;鄉為身死而不受,今為妻妾之奉為之; 鄉為身死而不受,今為所識窮乏者得我而為之,是亦不可以已乎? 此之謂失其本心。”


可能不是類似 13

June 27, 2011

可能不是類似 13

雅克 拉康研討班


On a discourse that might not be a semblance

If the signifier „your right arm‟ enters the territory of your neighbour to pick up something – these are things that happen all the time – naturally your neighbour grasps your signifier „right arm‟ and throws it back over the dividing wall. This is what you very curiously call projection, do you not, it is the way of understanding one another! It is from a phenomenon like that that we have to start.


If your right arm, in your neighbour‟s property, was not entirely occupied in
picking apples, for example, if it had stayed quiet, it is fairly probable that your neighbour would have adored it, it is the origin of the master signifier, a right arm, the sceptre. The master signifier only needs to begin like that, right at the beginning.

13.1.71 I 30
Unfortunately it requires a little bit more, it is an unsatisfactory schema. Going a little further, that gives you the sceptre, right away you see the thing materialising as signifier. The process of history shows itself according to every testimony, in the ones that we have, a little more complicated.


It is certain that the little parable, the one with which I first began, the arm that is thrown back from one territory into another, it is not necessarily your arm that comes back to you, because signifiers are not individual, one does not know who owns which.


So there you see, here we enter into a different kind of original operation as regards the function of chance and that of myths. You construct a world, on this occasion let us say a schema, a support divided like that into a certain number of territorial cells.


This happens at a certain level, the one at which it is a matter of putting forward, where it is a matter of understanding a little what has happened.


After all, not alone can one get an arm that is not one‟s own, in the process of expulsion that you have called, I do not know why, projection, if it is only that, you are projected, of course, not simply an arm which is not yours, but several other arms, so then from that moment on, it is no longer important whether it is yours or whether it (17) is not yours. But anyway, since after all, inside a territory, one only knows one‟s own frontiers, one does not have to know that on this frontier there are six other territories.


You throw it a little bit as you wish, so then it can happen that there is a whole shower of territories. The idea of the relationship that may exist between the rejection of something and the birth of what I earlier called the master signifier, is certainly an idea to remember.


But for it to have its whole value, it is certainly necessary that there should have been, by a process of chance, at certain points, an accumulation of signifiers.


Starting from there it is possible to conceive something that might be the birth of a language. What we see properly speaking being built up as a first way of supporting in writing what serves as language, gives in any case a certain idea. Everyone knows that the letter A is a bull‟s head turned upside down, and that a certain number of
elements like this, movable, still leave their trace.


What is important, is not to go too fast and to see where holes continue to remain. For
example, it is quite obvious that the start of this outline was already linked to something marking the body with a possibility of ectopia and of excursion (d‟ectopie et de balade) that obviously remains problematic. After all here again, everything is still there.


We have finally, this is a very sensitive point, that we can still test every day.


Not too long ago, again this week, something, very pretty photos in the newspaper, that everyone was delighted with, the possibilities of the practice of cutting up a human being on another human being are quite impressive. It is from there that everything started.


There remains another hole. As you know, people have tormented themselves about it, people have noted that Hegel is all very well, but there is all the same something that he did not explain. He explains the dialectic of the master and the slave, he does not explain how there can be a society of masters.


It is quite clear that what I have just explained to you is certainly interesting in that, by the simple operation of projection, of retort (rétorsion), it is clear that at the end of a certain number of throws, there will certainly be, I would say, a greater average of signifiers in certain territories than in others.


Anyway, it still remains to be seen how the signifier is going to be able to construct a society of signifiers in this territory. One should never leave in the shadows what one does not explain, under the pretext that one has succeeded in giving some little beginning of explanation.



巴岱伊論尼采 33

June 26, 2011

Bataille 33

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 33
Summit and Decline
You are not eagles. Which is why you haven’t comprehended the blissfulness of terror in your minds. Not being birds, how do you propose to nest on an abyss?
 Zarathustra, “On Illustrious Sages”


RAISING THE question like this, I said what I had to say–I have no answers. In working this out, I put aside desires for autonomy and longings for freedom–though these longings seem a human passion and certainly are mine. I’m thinking less of the freedom wrested by individuals from public powers and more of the human autonomy at the heart of a hostile, silent nature. True, the bias that depends on given facts as little as possible implies indifference to the time to come. But it also opposes the satisfying of desire. Still, I regard the summit about which I’ve spoken as freedom.


In an effort to clarify this connection, let me take a detour.

No matter how much care we exercise, our thinking is exhausted without ever embracing the possibilities of totality. At each moment we feel an enigmatic night, in its infinitely great depths, stealing away with the very object of our reflections. The smallest thought should be worked out infinitely. When the desire to grasp the truth takes hold of me–and here I mean the desire to know and to reach out to the light–I am gripped by feelings of desperation. And immediately, I am (forever) lost in a world in which I have no more power than a small child (except there aren’t any adults helping me). In all truthfulness, the more I attempt to reflect on this, the more the outcome I anticipate fails to turn out to be a situation where light is produced, and becomes one where it is extinguished.


And once again I am in the night like a sick child, like someone dying.

If you sincerely longed for the truth, you wouldn’t share this indifference of mine. Your job each time would be to exhaust the infinite working out of possibilities. I’m not against attempts like these which demand youthful boldness.


Still, if, when I have to act, it’s not required of me that I consider objects in the infinite working out of their aspects (I manipulate them–the efficaciousness of my movements corresponding to the value of my ideas), then similarly, when I have to question, naturally I have to go the limit, though “going the limit” means “doing my best”–while if I desired Truth, I’d be called upon to satisfy absolute demands.

The reason for this is that while I can’t get along without acting or questioning, on the other hand I am able to live–to act or question–without knowing. Perhaps the desire to know has just one meaning–as a motivation for the desire to question. Naturally, knowing is necessary for human autonomy procured through action by which the world is transformed. But beyond any conditions for doing or making, knowledge finally appears as a deception in relation to the questioning that impels it.


When questioning fails, we laugh. Ecstatic raptures and the ardors of love are so many questions–without answers–to which nature and our nature are subjected. If I had the ability to respond to moral questions like the ones I’ve indicated, to be honest, I’d be putting the summit at a distance from myself. By leaving open such questions in me like a wound, I keep my chance, I keep luck, and I maintain a possible access to these questions.


If I speak as I do now, it’s basically to recline like a sick man or, to be precise, to recline and die. But this doesn’t mean that I’m not calling for the doctor. I have to apologize for excess irony. The truth is, I never wanted to make fun of anyone. I only wanted to make fun of the world–meaning the incomprehensible nature from which I arose.


We’re not used to taking this into account if we reflect and speak–but death will interrupt us. I won’t always be required to continue the servile search for the true. Every question will remain finally unanswered. And I’ll slip off in such a way so as to impose silence. If others begin the job anew, they won’t get any further–and death will cut off their words just as it does mine. Will human existence ever have a more authentic autonomy? Speaking like this, it seems to me that existence breathes the free air of the summit.


Existence can’t, at one and the same time, be both autonomous and viable.



精神分析技术的基本原则 p139

June 26, 2011

Fundamentals of Psychoanalytic Technique

布魯斯 芬克

How to Handle Transference

As Freud ( 1 9 1 6- 1 9 1 7/1 963, p. 443) said, we “need not bother about [the transference] so long as it operates in favour of the joint work of analysis.” According to Gill ( 1 982, p. 8 1 ), Ferenczi, Rank, and Reich all maintained that “a strong positive transference, especially near the beginning of analysis, is only a symptom 病徵of resistance 阻抗which requires unmasking 揭發 ” hence they would presumably 假定argue that it is necessary to intervene 介入 in such a way as to temper 緩和 the analysand’s enthusiasm 熱心. Reich, in fact, believed that positive transference always hides a more fundamental, primordial 原初, negative transference.


Recall that psychoanalysis began with a love story: Anna O. (whose real
name was Bertha Pappenheim) came up with 想出 the “talking cure” out of love for Joseph Breuer, the attentive young doctor who made house calls morning and night to work with her for hours at a time. He was the only person whose presence she would notice and the only person she would speak with during certain phases 時期 of her treatment (Freud & Breuer, 1 893-1 895/1955, pp. 2 1-47).


In the beginning (of psychoanalysis) was love. And her love was inspired 啟發 by a man who, whether she found him good-looking or not, was a well-respected physician whom she could assume 假定 knew something about her condition and how to heal 治療 her (even though, as history shows, she was the one who had virtually all the knowledge and he was simply smart enough to follow her lead ).


Even though the parties to the love story from which psychoanalysis was born did not live happily ever after together, the fact remains that love, inspired by a belief that the other party possesses 擁有 knowledge, was the mainspring 主要動機 of the treatment Anna O. invented.


Many of the graduate students in clinical psychology whom I supervise 督導 are quick to try to dispel 驅散 a patient’s belief that they have considerable 相當 knowledge of what ails 苦惱 him. They often do so in the interest 利益, so they say, of honesty and to assure the patient that he has as much power in the relationship as the clinician 臨床醫生.


As laudable 讚賞 as their goals may be-and it is indeed the patient who has the lion’s share of the knowledge, the practitioner having very little, especially at the outset of the treatment-they often end up undermining 損壞 the patient’s faith in their ability to help him. Rather than “empowering” him, they end up disempowering 解除力量 him, making him feel dejected 沮喪 and despondent 沮喪. He feels that he has no knowledge that is of any use in this domain; if he did, he would not be in the predicament 困境 in which he finds himself in the first place.


It is often very important for him to believe that someone else has the knowledge that can help him; dispelling 驅散 that belief is to take away his last shred 一點 of hope.


Hence, this attempt to intervene 介入in the patient’s transference of knowledge onto the analyst can lead to despair 絕望.


Trying to convince the patient right from the outset 開始that he has as much, if not more, knowledge than the clinician is most likely to succeed when the clinician herself is young and working in a training facility 能力 where all the therapists are either seeing their very first patients or have only a year or two of experience.


“For in such cases, patients are usually aware that they are getting
what they are paying for, so to speak–that their therapist has comparatively 比較 less “expertise” 專門知識 than other therapists they might seek out in the community who have been practicing for many years.

Nevertheless, in numerous cases the patient simply feels that the clinician “doth protest 抗議 too much” and is just being modest 謙虛 or trying to spare 省掉 his feelings of inferiority.


Socrates’s claim 宣稱to know nothing (except about love) never convinced his disciples 門徒 , who continued to believe that he was a veritable 可驗證的 fount 泉源 of knowledge. This points to an extremely important facet of psychoanalytic technique: The attempt to dissipate 驅散 or “liquidate” 消除the analysand’s transference is doomed 駐定 to failure, because the analyst’s disclaimer 拒絕–for example, “I can’t possibly know what the problem is, you’re the one who has the knowledge here”-is heard by the analysand as coming from the person whom he projects her to be: a very knowledgeable person (otherwise, he asks himself, why would she be a clinician in the first place?).

蘇格拉底宣稱什麼都不知道(除了關於愛),但是他的門徒從來不這樣認為。他們繼續相信他,他是知識的可驗證的來源。這指向精神分析技術一個極端重要的面貌:企圖驅散或「消除」受分析者的移情是註定失敗,因為分析師的拒絕承認,例如,「我不可能知道問題是什麼,你才是這裏擁有這個知識的人。」在受分析者聽起來,會當著來自他投射她在上面的這個人:一位非常有知識的人 (否則,他問他自己,為什麼是她首先當臨床醫生?)

The attempt to mitigate 緩和 some of the more cumbersome 麻煩的aspects of the transference by commenting on 評論 or interpreting 解釋it from within the transference (that is, when one is the object of the􀒡 analysand’s transference as opposed to 相對 a third party, such as a friend, colleague同事, or consulting 諮商 physician 醫生) is generally doomed to failure for the very same reason. Should, for example, the analysand have the sense that the analyst is angry at him and the analyst deny 否認 any such anger, her denial will nevertheless be heard by the analysand as coming from someone whom he presumes 假定to be angry; indeed, he may take the denial 否認itself as a sign 跡象 of anger!



精神分析的倫理學 08

June 26, 2011

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析的倫理學 08

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康


The paradoxes of ethics
or Have you acted in conformity with your desire?


Religion, Science and Desire

That’s the object, the good, that one pays for the satisfaction of one’s desire.
And that’s the point I wanted to lead you up to, so as to shed a little light on
something that is essential and that isn’t seen enough.


It is, in effect, there that the religious operation lies, something that is always interesting for us to consider. That good which is sacrificed for desire – and you will note that that means the same thing as that desire which is lost for the good – that pound of flesh is precisely the thing that religion undertakes to recuperate.


That’s the single trait which is common to all religions; it is coextensive with all religion, with the whole meaning of religion. I can’t develop this further, but I will give you two applications that are as expressive as they are brief. In a religious service the flesh that is offered to God on the altar, the animal sacrifice or whatever, is consumed by the people of the religious community and usually simply by the priest; they are the ones who stuff themselves with it.


The form is an exemplary one; but it is just as true of the saint, whose goal is, in effect, access to sublime desire and not at all his own desire, for the saint lives and pays for others. The essential element in saintliness resides in the fact that the saint consumes the price paid in the form of suffering at two extreme points: the classic point of the
worst ironies relative to religious mystification, such as the priests’ little feast behind the altar, and the point of the last frontier of religious heroism as well. There, too, we find the same phenomenon of recuperation.


It is in this respect that great religious work is distinguished from what goes on in an ethical form of catharsis, which may bring together things as apparently foreign to each other as psychoanalysis and the tragic spectacles of the Greeks.


If we found our measure there, it is not without reason. Catharsis has the sense of purification of desire. Purification cannot be accomplished, as is clear if one simply reads Aristotle’s sentence, unless one has at least established the crossing of its limits that we call fear and pity.


It is because the tragic epos doesn’t leave the spectator in ignorance as to where the pole of desire is and shows that the access to desire necessitates crossing not only all fear but all pity, because the voice of the hero trembles before nothing, and especially not before the good of the other, because all this is experienced in the temporal unfolding of the story, that the subject learns a little more about the deepest level of himself than he knew before.


For anyone who goes to the Thetre-Francaiis or the Theater of Athens, it will last as long as it lasts. But if, in the end, Aristotle’s formulations mean anything, it is that. One knows what it costs to go forward in a given direction, and if one doesn’t go that way, one knows why. One can even sense that if, in one’s accounts with one’s desire, one isn’t exactly in the clear, it is because one couldn’t do any better, for that’s not a path one can take without paying a price.


The spectator has his eyes opened to the fact that even for him who goes to the end of his desire, all is not a bed of roses. But he also has his eyes opened – and this is essential – to the value of prudence which stands in opposition to that, to the wholly relative value of beneficial reasons, attachments or pathological interests, as Mr. Kant says, that might keep him on that risky path.


I have given you there an almost prosaic interpretation of tragedy and its effects, and however vital its peaks may be, I am not happy to have reduced it to a level that might lead you to believe that what I take to be essential in catharsis is pacificatory. It may not be pacificatory for everybody.


But it was the most direct way of reconciling what some have taken to be the moralizing face of tragedy with the fact that the lesson of tragedy in its essence is not at all moral in the ordinary sense of the word.


Of course, not every catharsis can be reduced to something as external as a topological demonstration. When it is a matter of the practices of those whom the Greeks called fiaipo/xevoty those who go crazy through a trance, through religious experience, through passion or through anything else, the value of the catharsis presupposes that, in a way that is either more-or-less directed or wild, the subject enters into the zone described here, and that his return involves some gain that will be called possession or whatever – Plato doesn’t hesitate to point this out in the cathartic procedures. There is a whole range there, a spectrum of possibilities, that it would take a whole year to catalogue.


The important thing is to know where all that is to be located in the field whose limits I have outlined for you this year.



可能不是類似 12

June 26, 2011

可能不是類似 12

雅克 拉康研討班


On a discourse that might not be a semblance

Seminar 1:Wednesday 13 January 1971

What do we know about it? Ferdinand de Saussure was like me, he did not say
everything; the proof is that people found in his papers, things that were never said in his classes. People think that the signifier is a nice little thing that has been tamed by structuralism, people think that it is the Other, qua Other, and the battery of signifiers, and everything that I explain, of course. Naturally it comes down from heaven, because from time to time I am an idealist!


Artefact, I said initially; naturally, the artefact, it is absolutely certain that it is our everyday fate that we find it at every street corner, within reach of the slightest gestures of our hands.


If there is something that is a sustainable, or at least sustained discourse, specifically that of science, it is perhaps no harm to remember that it started very specially from the consideration of semblances. The start of scientific thinking, I am talking about history, what is it? The observation of the stars, what is it if not the constellation, namely, the very type of a semblance. What do the first steps of modern physics turn around at the start?


Not, as is believed, elements, because the elements, the four and even if you wish to add a fifth essence, are already discourse, philosophical discourse, and how! They are
(15) atmospheric phenomena (météores). Descartes wrote a Traité des Météores. The decisive step, one of the decisive steps turned around the theory of the rainbow, and when I talk about a meteor, it is something that is defined by being qualified as such as a semblance.


No one has ever believed that the rainbow, even among the most primitive people, that the rainbow was something there, set up in a curve. It is questioned as an atmospheric phenomenon. The most characteristic atmospheric phenomenon, the most original one, the one that without any doubt is linked to, has the very structure of
discourse, is thunder.


If I ended my Rome discourse on the evocation of thunder, it is absolutely not like that, by fantasy, no Name of the Father is tenable without thunder, and everyone knows very well that we do not even know what thunder is the sign of. It is the very figure of the semblance.


This is why there is no semblance of discourse, everything that is discourse, can only present itself as semblance, and nothing is built on it that is not at the basis of this something that is called signifier, which, in the light in which I put it forward for you
today, is identical to this status as such of the semblance.


On a discourse that will not be a semblance; for it to be stated, it is necessary then that this a semblance can in no way be completed by reference to discourse. It is something else that is at stake, the referent no doubt!


Restrain yourselves a little bit. This referent is probably not immediately an object, because precisely what that means, is that this referent, is precisely what is walking around. The semblance in which the discourse is identical to itself, is at the level
of the term semblance, it is the semblance in nature.


It is not for nothing that I reminded you that no discourse that evokes nature ever did anything other than start from what in nature is a semblance. Because nature is full of them. I am not talking about animal nature, which quite obviously superabounds with them. This is even what ensures that there are gentle dreamers who think that the entire animal nature, from fish to birds, sings divine praises, it is self evident.


Every time they open like that, something, a mouth, an operculum, it is a manifest semblance, nothing requires there to be gaps. When we go into something whose efficacy has not been settled, for the simple reason that we do not know how it has come about that there were, as I might say, an accumulation of signifiers, because signifiers, huh, I can tell you, are scattered throughout the world, in nature, they are there by the shovelful.


For language to come to birth, it is already something to initiate that, for language to
be born, it was necessary that there should be established somewhere (16) this something that I already indicated to you in connection with the wager, it was Pascal‟s wager, we do not remember it.


In presupposing this, the trouble is that this already presupposes the functioning of language because what is at stake is the unconscious.


The unconscious and its operation, means that among the numerous signifiers that travel the world there is going to be in addition the fragmented body. There are, all the same, things from which one can start by thinking that they already exist. They already exist in a certain functioning in which we would not be forced to consider the
accumulation of the signifier. It is this business about territory.