Archive for December, 2009

拉岡講座219

December 21, 2009

拉岡講座219

The Presence of analysts
精神分析師的在現場

Obscurantism in Ablata
對於目標消失的蒙昧無知

2
The aim of this introduction is to remind you that if we are to approach the fundamentals of psycho-analysis we must introduce a certain coherence into the major concepts on which it is based. Such a coherence is already to be found in the way I have approached the concept of the unconscious— which, you will remember, I was unable to separate from the presence of the analyst.

這次介紹的目的是要提醒你們,假如我們想要理解精神分析學的基本原理,我們必須先介紹作為它的基礎的主要觀念,是具有一貫性。這個一貫性已經能夠被找到,在我介紹無意識的觀念的方式上。你們還記得,我無法將無意識跟分析師的在現場分開。

Presence of the analyst—a fine phrase that should not be reduced to the tear-jerking sermonizing, the serous inflation, the rather sticky caress to be found in a book that has appeared under this title.

精神分析師在現場,好個漂亮的詞語,不應該只是被解釋為分析師說頭頭是道,讓人感動涕泣,躊躇滿志,或溫情地撫慰,如一本書名「精神師在現場」所描述的。

The presence of the analyst is itself a manifestation of the unconscious, so that when it is manifested nowadays in certain encounters, as a refusal of the unconscious—this is a tendency, readily admitted, in some people’s thinking—this very fact must be integrated into the concept of the unconscious. You
have rapid access here to the formulation, which I have placed in the forefront, of a movement of the subject that opens up only to close again in a certain temporal pulsation—a pulsation I regard as being more radical than the insertion in the signifier that no doubt motivates it, but is not primary to it at the level of essence, since I have been driven to speak of essence.

分析師的在現場本身就是證明無意識存在,可是我們不得馬上不承認有個趨勢,有些人竟然認為,今天某些互動的邂逅,精神師在現場被證明是無意識受到拒絕。這個事實必須要合併到無意識的觀念來談。你們在此可以迅速獲得說明,因為我開門見山所談的就是,主體的動作是在顯示某一個心靈的悸動瞬間展開,結果又關閉。這個心靈的悸動,我認為比意符的介入更加激烈,但是意符雖然激發心靈的悸動,在本質的層次,還不算是它最根本的所在。說到這裡,我不得不談一下本質的問題。

I have shown, in a maieutic, eristic way, that one should see in the unconscious the effects of speech on the subject—in so far as these effects are so radically primary that they are properly what determine the status of the subject as subject. This proposition was intended to restore the Freudian unconscious to its true place. Certainly, the unconscious has always been present, it existed and acted before Freud, but it is important to stress that all the acceptations given, before Freud, to this function of the unconscious have absolutely nothing to do with the Freudian unconscious.

我已經用問答及闡釋的方式,說明我們應該在無意識的領域看到主體有話要說產生的影響。這些影響是主體最根本的底層,決定主體的地位所在。我這樣建議,是要將佛洛伊德的無意識恢復到它真實的位置。的確,無意識始終是存在的,它在佛洛伊德之前就已經存在,而且活躍。但是我們必須強調一點,在佛洛伊德之前,所有對於無意識的這個功用的認識跟接納,跟佛洛伊德的無意識絲毫沒有關係。

The primal unconscious, the unconscious as archaic function, the unconscious as veiled presence of a thought to be placed at the level of being before it is revealed, the metaphysical unconscious of Edward von Hartmann —whatever reference Freud makes to it in an ad hominem argument—above all the
unconscious as instinct—all this has nothing to do with the Freudian unconscious, nothing at all, whatever its analytic vocabulary, its inflections, its deviations may be—nothing at all to do with our experience. I will ask analysts a straight question: have you ever, for a single moment, the feeling that you are handling the clay of instinct?

原初的無意識,是范、哈特門的形上學的無意識,雖然是過時的說法。他認為無意識的功用是作為思想的遮蔽,在顯示之前,被定位在生命存在的層次。尤其是,他認為無意識是本能,這跟佛洛伊德的無意識真是風馬牛不相及,被佛洛伊德嗤之以鼻。這種無意識無論是分析辭彙、推論變化,或衍生運用,都跟精神分析學沒有絲毫關係。我乾脆直接問分析師一個問題:你們什麼時候曾感覺到你們是在處理人的本能問題?

In my Rome report,l I proceeded to a new alliance with the meaning of the Freudian discovery. The unconscious is the sum of the effects of speech on a subject, at the level at which the subject constitutes himself out of the effects of the signifier.

我在羅馬演講時,我繼續將我的學說跟佛洛伊德發現無意識的意義合為一談。這個無意識是主體作為有話要說產生的影響的總合。在這個層次上,主體使用意符的影響,組成自己的本質。

This makes it clear that, in the term subject—this is why I referred it back to its origin—I am not designating the living substratum needed by this phenomenon of the subject, nor any sort of substance, nor any being possessing knowledge in his pathos, his suffering, whether primal or secondary, nor even
some incarnated logos, but the Cartesian subject, who appears at the moment when doubt is recognized as certainty—except that, through my approach, the bases of this subject prove to be wider, but, at the same time much more amenable to the certainty that eludes it. This is what the unconscious is.

我不妨說個清楚。我之所以一再回頭談到主體這個術語,是因為我指明的,不是主體現象學所需要的那種基層生命,也不是任何物質,或任何擁有或多或少的知識、情懷、及痛苦的生命主體,甚至不是一些具體表現的理性主體,而是笛卡爾的我思故我在的主體。這個主體出現在以懷疑自己的存在當作是確定性的時刻,差別的只是我探討的主體的基礎還要更廣泛,更加閃爍地捉摸不定。這就是無意識所在。

There is a link between this field and the moment, Freud’s moment, when it is revealed. It is this link I express when I compare it with the approach of a Newton, an Einstein, a Planck, an a-cosmological approach, in the sense that all these fields are characterized by tracing in the real a new furrow in
relation to the knowledge that might from all eternity be attributed to God.

這個無意識識領域跟佛洛伊德所顯示的啟悟時刻有關。我表達這個關聯時,我是將它比喻為牛頓、愛因斯坦、布蘭克,或超驗宇宙論的研究。所有這些領域的特徵是以新的視野,探討自古以來被歸屬為上帝轄域的知識。

Paradoxically, the difference which will most surely guarantee the survival of Freud’s field, is that the Freudian field is a field which, of its nature, is lost. It is here that the presence of the psycho-analyst as witness of this loss, is irreducible.

矛盾的是,確定佛洛伊德領域能夠自成一家之言的差異,在佛洛伊德的領域是一個本質上損失的領域。就在這裡,精神分析師的在現場,作為損失的見証人,這是無可置疑的。

At this level, we can get nothing more out of it—for it is a dead loss, with no gain to show, except perhaps its resumption in the function of pulsation. The loss is necessarily produced in a shaded area—which is designated by the oblique stroke with which I divide the formulae which unfold, in linear form, opposite each of the terms, unconscious, repetition, transference.

在這個層次,我們一無所獲,因為這是個平白的損失,沒有利益可得,可能除了一再重現的心靈的悸動的功用外。這個損失必然是在一個陰影的地區產生。這個陰影的地區,可用一道歪斜的橫槓標示。我用這道橫槓來區隔直線展開的常規,相對於其它的每個術語,如無意識、重復、移情。

This area of loss even involves, as far as these facts of analytic practice are concerned, a certain deepening of obscurantism, very characteristic of the condition of man in our times of supposed information—obscurantism which, without really knowing why, I can well believe will be regarded as incredible in the future. What I mean by obscurantism is, in particular, the function assumed by psycho-analysis in the propagation of a style that calls itself the American way of in so far as it is
characterized by the revival of notions long since refuted in the field of psycho-analysis, such as the predominance of the functions of the ego.

這個損失的地區,就精神分析的行業而言,甚至牽涉到對於生命更深層的蒙昧無知。在我們認為是資訊蓬勃的時代,作為人的狀況的特徵恰恰就是這種蒙昧無知。至於將來,我也不知為什麼會深信,這種蒙昧無知只會有過之而無不及。我所謂的蒙昧無知,特別是指精神分析學所擔負的功用,在宣揚自己的風格為美國式思維。這個風格的特色,其實是精神分析學原先排斥的舊觀念的復活,例如,過份彰顯自我的功用。

In this sense, then, the presence of the psycho-analyst, seen in the very same perspective in which the vanity of his discourse appears, must be included in the concept of the unconscious. Psycho-analysts of today, we must take account of this slag in our operations, as we must of the caput mortuum of the discovery of the unconscious. It justifies the maintenance, within analysis, of a conflict situation, necessary to the very existence of analysis.

因此,從這個意義來看,精神分析師在現場,必須要被包括為無意識的觀念的部份,因為精神分析師論述真理時的躊躇滿志,不也是棋局中人觀棋局?作為這個時代的精神分析師,我們必須將自身的運作的立場考量進去,如同我們必須考量到無意識的發現時,自身的頭顱何在?在精神分析的內部,必然會維持某種衝突的情況,這對於精神分析的存在是不可或缺的。

If it is true that psycho-analysis rests on a fundamental conflict, on an initial, radical drama as far as everything that might be included under the heading psychical is concerned, the innovation to which I refer, and which is called recall of the field and function of speech and language in psychoanalytic experience, does not claim to exhaust the possibilities of the unconscious, since it is, itself, an intervention in the conflict.

就精神分析學的領域概括一切而言,假如精神分析學確實是依賴某件基本的衝突,某個原初激烈的戲劇,我所提到的這種創新,被稱為「精神分析經驗:言說及語言的領域與功用的撤銷」並沒有宣稱可以窮盡無意識的一切可能性,因為它自身就是這種衝突的介入。

This recall has an immediate implication in that it has itself a transferential effect. In any case, this is recognized by the fact that my seminar has been criticized precisely for playing, in relation to my audience, a function regarded by the orthodoxy of the psycho-analytic association as dangerous, for intervening in the transference. Now, far from denying it, I would regard this effect as radical, as constituting, indeed, this renewal of the alliance with Freud’s discovery. This indicates that the cause of the unconscious—and you see that the word cause is to be taken here in its ambiguity, a cause to be sustained, but also a function of the cause at the level of the unconscious—this cause must be conceived as, fundamentally, a lost cause. And it is the only chance one has of winning it.

這個撤銷有當下的意涵,因為它本身具有移情的影響。無論如何,從現實狀況就可看得出來:我的講座一直受到批評,因為它跟觀眾扮演一種正統精神分析師協會認為是危險的功用,也就是對於移情的介入。現在,我絲毫不否認,我認為這種影響是激烈的,是在建構回歸佛洛伊德發現無意識的復興。這意味著,無意識的目標,你們知道,目標這個字讓我們聚集在這裡,雖然它的語意模稜兩可。這個目標不但是一個值得維護的目標,而且是處於無意識層次的目標。這個目標基本上必須被構想為是一個損失的目標。我們唯一的機會就是將它贏取回來。

That is why, in the misunderstood concept of repetition, I stress the importance of the ever avoided encounter, of the missed opportunity. The function of missing lies at the centre of analytic repetition. The appointment is always missed—this is what constitutes, in comparison with tuche, the vanity of
repetition, its constitutive occultation.

這就是為什麼,談到重複的觀念飽受誤解時,我強調這個失落機會的千載難逢,因為我們一直逃避心靈的邂逅。這個失落的功用就在於精神分析的重複的核心。相約總是未能相逢,跟邂逅比較起來,這就構成渴望重複的虛榮心,本質上的奧秘。

The concept of repetition brings me to the following dilemma—either I assume quite simply my implication as analyst in the eristic character of the discord of any description of my experience,
or I polish up the concept at the level of something that would be impossible to objectify, if not at the level of a transcendental analysis of cause.

重複的觀念使我們陷入以下的困境:一方面,我就是實踐我在描述精神分析經驗的衝突的辯証特色時,我作為分析師必然要扮演的角色。另一方面,我對於重複這個觀念閃爍其辭,當我遇到我作為生命主體必然要介入的時刻,姑且不談精神分析學的目標必須要我超越的時刻。

Cause might be formulated on the basis of the classical formula of the ablata causa tollitur effectus—I would have only to stress the singular of the protasis, ablata causa, by putting the terms of the apodosis in the plural tolluntur would mean that the effects are successful only in the absence of cause. All the effects are subjected to the pressure of a transfactual, causal order which demands to join in their dance, but, if they held their hands tightly, as in the song, they would prevent the cause intruding in their round.

目標可能要用「原因消除就是結果消除」這個古典的公理的基礎來說明。我要強調的是,原因消除的條件是單數主詞,而消除卻是複數動詞。這意味著:只有在目標消失的時刻,結果才會成功。所有的結果都必須承受轉移的因果律的壓力,而因果律卻要求加入牽手共舞。問題是,假如因果之手牽得太緊,如同歌詞所說的,因緣的成果反而受阻。

At this point, I should define unconscious cause, neither as an existent, nor as a a non-existent—as, I believe Henri Ey does, a non-existent of possibility. It is a of the prohibition that brings to being an existent in spite of its non-advent, it is a function of the impossible on which a certainty is based.

此時此刻,我應該將無意識的目標定義為:既不是已經存在,也不是不虛無飄渺,而是看似虛無飄渺,卻是有其存在的可能,如法國精神分析師亨利、艾所深信的。這是禁制的效應:越是禁止的東西,越是有人要。正因為其不可能實現,我們確定有一天會實現。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座218

December 20, 2009

拉岡講座218

I0
PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST
精神分析師的存在

Problems of the transference.
移情的問題

So that I would not always have to be looking for a box of matches, someone gave me a very large box, as you can see. On it is written the following motto: the art of listening is almost as
important as that of saying the right thing. This apportions our tasks. Let us hope that we will measure up to them.

我並不需要隨身攜帶火柴,你們知道,總是有人遞給我一大盒。在火柴盒上寫著以下的座右銘:傾聽的藝術總是跟說話適宜同樣重要。這可適用到我精神分析的行業。讓我們希望,我們不要辜負我們的行業。

Today I shall be dealing with the transference, or rather I shall approach the question, in the hope of giving you some idea of the concept, as I promised I would do in my second talk.

今天,我將處理移情的問題。換言之,我接觸這個問題,希望你們對於移情的觀念有一些認識,這是我以下我打算要談論的內容。

I
The transference is usually represented as an affect. A rather vague distinction is then made between a positive and a negative transference. It is generally assumed, not without some foundation, that the positive transference is love—though it must be said that, in the way it is used here, this term is employed in a very approximate way.

移情通常被認同是一種情感,只是在正面的移情跟負面的移情之間略有區別。一般都將正面的移情認為是愛,不是沒有根據的。儘管如此,我們還是必須說,在精神分析師使用的方式,移情這個術語並不完全是愛情。

At a very early stage, Freud posed the question of the authenticity of love as it occurs in the transference. To come to the point, it is usually maintained that in these circumstances it Is a sort of false love, a shadow of love. But Freud himself did not weigh down the scales in this direction—far from it. Not least among the consequences of the experience of the transference
was that it led Freud to take the question of what is ailed true love, eine echte Lisbe, further perhaps than it had ever been taken.

在早期的階段,佛洛伊德提出發生在移情的愛有多麼真誠問題。我們就不拐彎抹角了,在這些情況當中,移情通常被認為是一種假的愛情,一種愛的陰影。但是佛洛伊德對於這一方面並沒有如此妄自菲薄。絲毫沒有!對於移情經驗產生的後果,他頗為看重,因為這促使佛洛伊德去探討什麼是令人痛苦的真愛的問題,他探討得比前人深入。

In the case of the negative transference, commentators are more prudent, more restrained, in the way they refer to it, and it is never identified with hate. They usually employ the term
ambivalence, a term which, even more than the first, conceals things very well, confused things that are not always handled in a satisfactory way.

在負面的移情方面,評論者則較為謹慎,較為慎重其事,因為他們提到負面的移情,並不將它認同是恨。他們通常使用的術語是愛恨交加。因為愛恨交加這個術語比起前一個術語恨,定義更加模稜兩可,而且混淆不清,所以處理的情況未必能令人滿意。

It would be truer to say that the positive transference is when you have a soft spot for the individual concerned, the analyst in this instance, and the negative transference is when you have to keep your eye on him.

這樣說也許會更真實,正面的移情是當你對你關懷的人有軟心腸的時刻,例如精神分析師。負面的移情是當你對你關懷的人有警戒提防的時刻。

There is another use of the term transference that is worth pointing out, as when one says that it structures all the particular relations with that other who is the analyst, and that the value of all the thoughts that gravitate around this relation must be connoted by a sign of particular reserve. Hence the
expression—which is always added as a kind of after-thought or parenthesis, as if to convey some kind of suspicion, when used about the behaviour of a subject—he is in full transference. This presupposes that his entire mode of apperception has been restructured around the dominant centre of the transference.

移情這個術語還有另一個用法值得一提。換言之,移情架構跟作為他者的分析師,彼此之間的特殊關係,以及環繞著那個關係運轉的所有思想的價值,必須要以特別含蓄的符號來表現內涵。因此,這個「他完全是移情」這個表達,總是被增加當著是一種恍然大悟或括弧內的說明,好像是在傳達某種的難以置信,用來描述主體的行為。這等於是預先假設,人的整個感覺的重新建構,一直是以移情作為支配的中心。

I will not go any further because this double semantic mapping seems to me to be adequate for the moment. We cannot, of course, remain satisfied with this, since our aim is to approach the concept of the transference. This concept is determined by the function it has in a particular praxis. This concept directs the way in which patients are treated. Conversely, the way in which they are treated governs the concept.

這一點我就不必再多所贅言,因為我認為移情語意的內涵目前就已經不言而喻。當然,我們不是這樣就心滿意足,因為我們的目標是要處理移情這個觀念。這個觀念由它在特殊的對象所具有的功能來決定。這個觀念引導我們如何治療病人的方式。在另一方面,病人被治療的方式,又影響到這個觀念的內容。

It might seem to settle the question at the outset if we could decide whether or not the transference is bound up with analytic practice, whether it is a product, not to say an artefact, of analytic practice. Ida Macalpine, one of the many authors who have been led to express their opinions on the transference,
has carried as far as possible the attempt to articulate the transference in this direction. Whatever her very stubborn person—let me say at once that I cannot, in any sense, accept this extreme position.

假如我們能夠決定,移情是否跟精神分析的做法有密切關係,不論是精神分析的情境產物,或是情不自禁,那麼這個問題從一開頭就可看出端倪。很多作者曾經在某些情境下不得不表達對於移情的意見,艾達、瑪卡賓就是其中一位。她斬釘截鐵以這樣的方式清楚表達。不管她是如何擇情固執,我要馬上說,無論如何,我無法接受她這種極端的立場。

In any case, approaching the question in this way does not settle it. Even if we must regard the transference as a product of the analytic situation, we may say that this situation cannot create the phenomenon in its entirety, and that, in order to produce it, there must be, outside the analytic situation,
possibilities already present to which it will give their perhaps unique composition.

無論如何,以這種方式處理移情的問題,並沒有完全解決。即使我們必須將移情視為一種精神分析情境的產物,我們還是要說,這種情境並不必然會產生這種現象。而且,為了產生移情,除了精神分析情境外,還必須要有已經先存在的可能性,移情才可能水到渠成。

This in no way excludes the possibility, where no analyst is in view, that there may be, properly speaking, transference effects that may be structured exactly like the gamut of transference phenomena in analysis. It is simply that, in discovering these effects, analysis will make it possible to give them an experimental model that need not necessarily be at all different from the model I shall call the natural one. So to bring out the transference in analysis, where it acquires its structural foundations, may very well be the only way of introducing the universality of the application of this concept. It should be enough, then, to open up this package in the sphere of analysis and, more especially, of the doxa that goes with it.

這種說法絲毫沒有排除,在沒有精神分析師在現場的地方,移情印象,貼切地說,仍然有存在的可能。移情印象的架構可能確實就像是精神分析的全部移情現象。只是在發現這些移情印象時,精神分析讓它們有試探接近的機會。這跟我們所謂的自然移情的模式,絲毫沒有什麼兩樣。所以,探討出精神分析的移情,在它要求有結構基礎的地方,很可能是唯一的方法,來介紹移情這個觀念的適用是普遍存在的。因此,我們只要打開精神分析領域的這個包裹內容及附帶的價值理念,移情的觀念就應該真相大白。

This, after all, is a truism. Nevertheless, it is a rough indication worth making as a start.

畢竟,這是老生常談。可是,凡事起頭難,值得我們一窺究竟。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座217

December 19, 2009

,拉岡講座217

What is a picture?
圖畫是什麼?
3
We now come back to the little blues, little whites, little browns of Cezanne, or again to the delightful example that Maurice Merleau-Ponty gives in passing in his Signes, namely, that strange slow-motion film in which one sees Matisse painting.

我們現在回到塞尚的藍色斑點、白色斑點、棕色斑點,然後再回到梅洛、龐蒂在西革尼偶爾所舉的有趣的例子,換言之,在一部慢動作的奇異影片,我們看見馬蒂斯在畫圖。

The important point is that Matisse himself was overwhelmed by the film. Maurice Merleau-Ponty draws attention to the paradox of this gesture which, enlarged by the distension of time, enables us to imagine the most perfect deliberation in each of these brush strokes. This is an illusion, he says. What
occurs as these strokes, which go to make up the miracle of the picture, fall like rain from the painter’s brush is not choice, but something else. Can we not try to formulate what this something else is?

重點是,馬蒂斯自己也對影片大吃一驚。梅洛、龐蒂提醒我們注意這個畫圖動作的矛盾,由於時間拉長的緩慢動作,我們能夠想像這些畫筆的每道揮毫的匠心獨具。這就是人的幻見,他說。當這些揮毫像雨點般從畫家的畫筆降落,構成圖畫的奇蹟,呈現的畫面不是選擇,而是某件別的東西。我們能夠不設法說明這個某件別的東西是什麼嗎?

Should not the question be brought closer to what I called the rain of the brush? If a bird were to paint would it not be by letting fall its feathers, a snake by casting off its scales, a tree by letting fall its leaves? What it amounts to is the first act in the laying down of the gaze. A sovereign act, no doubt, since it passes into something that is materialized and which, from this sovereignty, will render obsolete, excluded, inoperant, whatever, coming from elsewhere, will be presented before this product.

這個問題難道不是更靠近我所稱為的下雨般的揮毫?假如鳥想要畫圖,它難道不是要先掉落它的羽毛,蛇難道不是先要蛻落它的皮鱗,樹難道不是要先掉落它的樹葉?那相當等於是說,放下凝視的第一個動作。無可置疑,那是個命令的舉動,因為它進入到某件實質化的東西,跟這個東西的命令之下,來自它方可以呈現在藝術作品前的任何東西,都會變成疏離無用,動彈不得。

Let us not forget that the painter’s brushstroke is something in which a movement is terminated. We are faced here with something that gives a new and different meaning to the term regression—we are faced with the element of motive in the sense of response, in so far as it produces, behind it, its own stimulus.

我們不要忘記,畫家的揮毫是動作被終止的某件東西。我們在此面臨的是逆轉這個術語,因此具有了新的意涵的東西。我們面臨的是,動機的因素在反應上的意涵是什麼,因為動機在背後產生它自己的刺激反應。

There, that by which the original temporality in which the relation to the other is situated as distinct is here, in the scopic dimension, that of the terminal moment. That which in the identificatory dialectic of the signifier and the spoken will be projected forward as haste, is here, on the contrary, the end, that which, at the outset of any new intelligence, will be called the moment of seeing.

在那裡,跟其它某件東西甚為明顯的關係,其原初的時間性就在此,在視覺的向度,揮毫終止時刻的向度。在意符與意旨的可辨識的辨證法中,被投射出來當著是倏忽的東西就在此,在此相反的地方,在終結的地方,在所謂覺悟的時刻,在新的智慧光開始的時刻。

This terminal moment is that which enables us to distinguish between a gesture and an act. It is by means of the gesture that the brushstroke is applied to the canvas. And so true is it that the gesture is always present there that there can be no doubt that the picture is first felt by us, as the terms impression or impressionism imply, as having more affinity with the gesture than with any other type of movement. All action represented in a picture appears to us as a battle scene, that is to say, as
something theatrical, necessarily created for the gesture. And, again, it is this insertion in the gesture that means that one cannot turn it upside down—whether or not it is figurative. If you turn a transparency around, you realize at once if it is being shown to you with the left in the place of the right. The direction of the gesture of the hand indicates sufficiently this lateral symmetry.

在那終止的時刻,我們能夠區別姿態跟舉動的差別。憑藉姿態,揮毫被運用到畫布上。那是千真萬確,姿態總是被呈現在那裡,因此無可置疑地,我們首先感受到圖畫當著是跟姿態有更多的親密性,勝於任何其它的動作,如同印象或印象主義這個術語所暗示的。在圖畫中的所有舉動給我們的印象是戰鬥的場景,換言之,是某件戲劇化的東西,必然是為了擺姿態而創造。而且,就是這種姿態的介入,意味著我們不能翻轉它,不論是實質或比喻。假如你將一張透明片翻轉,你立刻體會到,你所看到的透明片的右邊變成左邊。手的姿勢的方向足夠跟你指明這種顛到的對稱。

What we see here, then, is that the gaze operates in a certain descent, a descent of desire, no doubt. But how can we express this? The subject is not completely aware of it— he operates by remote control. Modifying the formula I have of desire as unconscious—man’s desire is the desire of the Other—I would say that it is a question of a sort of desire on the part of the Other, at the end of which is the showing (Ic donner.d-voir).

因此,我們在此所看到的是,凝視以某種俯瞰運作,無可置疑的,某種欲望的俯瞰。但是,我們要如何表達這一點?主體自己並不完全知道,因為他以搖控運作。我現在修正的公式是以欲望來代替無意識:人的欲望是大它者的欲望。我認為那是在大它者方面的某種欲望的問題,欲望的結束就是覺悟顯現。

How could this showing satisfy something, if there is not some appetite of the eye on the part of the person looking? This appetite of the eye that must be fed produces the hypnotic value of painting. For me, this value is to be sought on a much less elevated plane than might be supposed, namely, in that which is the true function of the organ of the eye, the eye filled with voracity, the evil eye.

若非在觀看的人這邊,眼神中有某種欲望,這個覺悟顯現如何能滿足某件東西?必須被滿足的眼神的欲望,產生圖畫的催眠的價值。對我而言,這個價值的尋找位置,應該是在我們以為不甚崇高的層面,換言之,應該是在眼睛這個器官的真實功用,充滿貪婪的眼睛,邪惡之眼。

It is striking, when one thinks of the universality of the function of the evil eye, that there is no trace anywhere of a good eye, of an eye that blesses. What can this mean, except that the eye carries with it the fatal function of being in itself endowed—if you will allow me to play on several registers at once—with a power to separate. But this power to separate goes much further than distinct vision.

耐人尋味的是,我們都以為邪惡之眼無所不在,難道就沒有良善之眼,祝福之眼存在的蹤跡?這意味著什麼?難道不就是:眼睛的決定性功用是本身稟賦有分離的力量,容我這樣牽扯地說。不過,這個分離的力量還不僅僅是視覺的分明而已。

The powers that are attributed to it, of drying up the milk of an animal on which it falls—a belief as widespread in our time as in any other, and in the most civilized countries—of bringing with it disease or misfortune— where can we better picture this power than in invidia? Invidia comes from videre. The most exemplary invidia, for us analysts, is the one I found long ago in Augustine, in which he sums up his entire fate, namely, that of the little child seeing his brother at his mother’s breast, looking at him amare conspectu, with a bitter look, which seems to tear him to pieces and has on himself the effect of a poison.

眼睛稟賦有力量,例如,怒目相向會動物不寒而慄,這是古今中外普遍的信念。可是,這種力量也會帶來疾病或災難。還有什麼能比妒嫉的眼神更咄咄逼人?妒忌的字源是看見。我們精神分析師最愛舉的例子是,我很久以前在奧古斯丁的懺悔錄找到的。他回顧他一生的命運,換言之,他小時候觀看到他的小弟弟在母親胸膛上吃奶,眼神痛苦萬分,恨不得將他粉身碎骨,那種眼神跟毒藥的效果差不多。

In order to understand what invidia is in its function as gaze it must not be confused with jealousy. What the small child, or whoever, envies is not at all necessarily what he might want—avoir envia, as one improperly puts it. Who can say that the child who looks at his younger brother still needs to be at the breast? Everyone knows that envy is usually aroused by the possession of goods which would be of no use to the person who is envious of them, and about the true nature of which he does
not have the least idea.

為了了解妒嫉作為凝視的功用,我們切不可將它跟羨慕混為一談。小孩所羨慕,或任何小孩羨慕,未必都是他所想要的,「不見不愛」,有人不很貼切地說。誰能夠這樣說,看到小弟弟吃跟母親吃奶,是表示他也想吃?大家都知道,羨慕通常是被東西的擁有所引起,可是這個東西對於羨慕它的人並沒有什麼用途,甚至對東西是什麼性質他都不甚瞭然。

Such is true envy—the envy that makes the subject pale before the image of a completeness closed upon itself; before the idea that the petit a, the separated a from which he is hanging, may be for another the possession that gives satisfaction, Befriedigung.

真正的羨慕就是這樣:羨慕使人作為主體相形見絀,因為他面對著一個完滿的形象,自己卻被隔離在外。他的想法是:這個小客體,這個作為跟他唇亡齒寒的小它者,對於另一個人,可能是心滿意足的所有物。

It is to this register of the eye as made desperate by the gaze that we must go if we are to grasp the taming, civilizing and fascinating power of the function of the picture. The profound relation between the a and desire will serve as an example when I introduce the subject of the transference.

假如我們想要了解,圖畫的功能具有馴化、薰陶、及迷惑的力量,我們必須要先了解這個領域:凝視會使眼睛充滿渴望焦慮。當我介紹到移情的主體時,小它者跟欲望之間的深刻關係還可以充當一個例子。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座216

December 17, 2009

拉岡講座 216

What is a picture?
圖畫是什麼?

2
In the scopic field, everything is articulated between two terms that act in an antimonic way—on the side of things, there is the gaze, that is to say, things look at me, and yet I see them.

在視覺的領域,一切事情都以兩個術語矛盾演出的方式表達,事情的這一邊,總是存在著凝視,換言之,事情凝視我,而我看到他們。

This is how one should understand those words, so strongly stressed, in the Gospel, They have eyes that they might not see. That they might not see what? Precisely, that things are looking at them.

這就是我們應該了解這些字詞的方式,他們在基督教福音書中一再被強調。人擁有眼睛,為了不要看見。為了不要看見什麼?準確地說,為了不要看見事情正在觀看他們。

This is why I have introduced painting into our field of exploration by the narrow door offered by us by Roger Caillois —everyone noticed last time that I made a slip of the tongue in calling him René, heaven knows why—in observing that mimicry is no doubt the equivalent of the function which, in
man, is exercised in painting.

這就是為什麼我經由羅傑、凱洛思,提供給我們的這道窄門 (上一次,每個人都注意到,我不知為什麼一時口誤,把他的名字說錯為雷諾),我經由他介紹圖畫到我們探索的領域,因為他觀察到,模擬無可置疑是相等於在圖畫中所運用的功用。

This is not the occasion to begin a psycho-analysis of the painter, which is always such a tricky matter, and which always produces a shocked reaction on the part of the listener. Nor is it a question of art criticism, and yet someone who is close to me, and whose views count for a great deal with me, told me that he was very troubled when I embarked on something very like art criticism. Of course, that is the danger, and I shall try to avoid any such confusion.

我現在並不是要開始替畫家作精神分析,這可是茲事體大,而且會在聽眾方面引起震撼的反應。我也不是要從事藝術批評的問題,可是我有一位密友,我很在乎他的觀點,他告訴我,我從事談論有關藝術批評的事情,使他頗感困窘。當然,這是危險所在,我應該避免這樣的混淆。

If one considers all the modulations imposed on painting by the variations of the subjectifijing structure that have occurred in history, it is clear that no formula can possibly embrace those aims, those ruses, those infinitely varied tricks. Indeed, you saw clearly enough last time that after declaring that there is in painting a certain dompte-regard, a taming of the gaze, that is to say, that he who looks is always led by the painting to lay down his gaze, I immediately introduced the corrective that it is nevertheless in a quite direct appeal to the gaze that expressionism is situated.

假如我們考慮到,在繪畫史上,曾發生過不同層次的主體化結構,賦予圖畫的所有調適,我們就清楚知道,沒有一個公式能夠涵蓋那些目的、那些策略,那些千變萬化的技巧。的確,你們上一次很清楚看到,在圖畫中有一種的欺眼法,一種凝視的馴化,換言之,觀看的人總是被圖畫引導放下他的凝視。我現在馬上做個補充,它的方法可是完全直接訴諸於表達主義所在的凝視。

For those who remain unconvinced, I will explain what I mean. I am thinking of the work of such painters as Munch, James Ensor, Kubin, or even of that painting which, curiously enough, one might situate in a geographical way as laying siege to that which in our time is concentrated in painting in Paris. When will we see the limits of this siege lifted?

若有人還不相信,我再解釋一下我的意思。我是想到諸如孟克、詹姆斯、安索、古賓等畫家的作品,甚至於聯想到那幅圖畫,耐人尋味地,在地理上,我們可能都將它定位在我們的時代巴黎畫廊所展示的圖畫當中。

That, if I am to believe the painter André Masson, with whom I was talking recently, is the most immediate question. Well! To point out references like these, is not to enter into the shifting, historical game of criticism, which tries to grasp what is the function of painting at a particular moment, for a particular author at a particular time. For me, it is at the radical principle of the function of this fine art that I am trying to place myself.

那是最迫切的問題,假如畫家安德烈、馬森的話可信的話,我最近跟他談論過。嗯!我指出諸如其事,並不是要進入藝術批評的歷史的變化脈絡,去了解繪畫在某個特別的時代、對於某個畫家在某個特別時刻的功用。對於我而言,我將把我自己定位在討論這個高雅藝術的功用的根本的原理。

To begin with, I would stress that it is in setting out from painting that Maurice Merleau-Ponty was particularly led to overthrow the relation, which has always been made by thought, between the eye and the mind. What he has shown in a quite admirable way, beginning with what he calls, with Cezanne himself, those little blues, those little browns, those little whites, those touches that fall like rain from the painter’s brush, is that the function of the painter is something quite different from the
organization of the field of representation in which the philosopher held us in our status as subjects.

首先,我要強調,梅洛、龐帝先從繪畫開始,然後才特別被引導去顛覆眼睛跟心靈的關係,因為那個關係總是由思想所形成。令人讚賞地,他先從他自己開始,從塞尚本人,那些藍色斑點,那些棕色斑點,那些白色斑點,那些從畫家畫筆像是雨水般掉落的色調,他顯示出,畫家的功用完全不同於符號領域的組織,因為哲學家將我們人定位為主體。

And what is that? Where does that get us? It already gives form and embodiment to the field in which the psycho-analyst has advanced since Freud, with what, in Freud, is crazy daring, and what, in those who follow him, soon becomes imprudence.

那是什麼?我們人被定位為主體是那裡?那個主體已經替自從佛洛伊德以來,精神分析學所主張的領域,界定了形式跟內容。佛洛伊德大膽首開風氣,那些跟隨他繼續研究的人,也同樣冒險挺進。

Freud always stressed with infinite respect that he did not intend to settle the question of what it was in artistic creation that gave it its true value. When he is dealing with painters and poets, there is a point at which his appreciation stops. He cannot say, he does not know, what, for everybody, for those who look or hear, is the value of artistic creation. Nevertheless, when he studies Leonardo, let us say, roughly speaking, that he tries to find the function that the artist’s original phantasy played in his creation—his relation to those two mothers Freud sees represented in the painting in the Louvre or in the cartoon in London, by that double body, branching at the level of the waist, which seems to blossom from the entwined legs at the base. Is it in this direction that we must look?

佛洛伊德總是莊重其事地強調,他並沒有意圖要解決藝術創作及其藝術價值所牽涉到的問題。當他正在處理畫家跟詩人的問題時,他的專注總是在某一點適可而止。他無法說明白,他也不知道,對於所有人,對於那些觀看或聆聽的人,藝術創作的價值是什麼。可是,當他研究李奧納多、達文西時,容我們坦率以道,他設法找到達文西作為藝術家的原初幻想在創作時扮演的功用,以及佛洛伊德在羅浮宮看到的那幅圖畫,或在倫敦的那幅卡通畫,所呈現出來的達文西跟兩位母親的關係,因為圖畫中有雙重身體在腰部的地方分叉,而腰部似乎是從基座的交纏的雙腿開展出來。這難道不就是我們精神分析必須要探索的方向?

Or should we see the principle of artistic creation in the fact that it seems to extract—remember how I translated Vorstellungsreprasentanz— that something that stands for representation? Was it to this that I was leading you when I made a distinction between the picture and representation? Certainly not— except in very rare works, except in a painting that sometimes emerges, a dream painting, so rare that it
can scarcely be situated in the function of painting. Indeed, perhaps this is the limit at which we would have to designate what is called psychopathological art.

從它似乎抽取出來的事實,有某件代表符號的東西,我們應該看出藝術創作的原理嗎?當我區別圖畫跟符號的差異時,我當時有引導你們到達這裡嗎?當然沒有,除了在非常罕見的作品,除了在偶爾出現的一幅圖畫,一幅夢的圖畫,如此罕見,以致於它幾乎無法在圖畫的功用找到定位。的確,可能這就是我們所謂的精神分析及病理的藝術,要發揚光大受到限制的地方。

That which is the creation of the painter is structured in a quite different way. Precisely to the extent that we restore the point of view of structure in the libidinal relation, perhaps the time has come when we may question to advantage—because our new algorithms allow us to articulate the answer better
—what is involved in artistic creation. For me, it is a question of creation as Freud designated it, that is to say, as sublimation, and of the value it assumes in a social field.

畫家的創作所架構的方式迴然不同。假如我們將結構的觀點恢復到力比多的關係,可能時機已經來到,讓我們發出有益的質問:藝術創作牽涉到什麼?因為新的知識使我們能夠更清楚地表達這個回答。對我而言,創造的問題正如佛洛伊德所指明的,換言之,是昇華的問題,它具有社會領域的價值。

In a way that is at once vague and precise, and which concerns only the success of the work, Freud declares that if a creation of desire, which is pure at the level of the painter, takes on commercial value—a gratification that may, all the same, be termed secondary—it is because its effect has something profitable for society, for that part of society that comes under its influence.

為了使發現能讓大眾接受,佛洛伊德以模糊及準確兼具的方式宣稱,假如在畫家層次純粹是欲望的創作,具有商業的價值,那畫家的滿足感可能會便淪為次要,因為圖畫的結果對於社會,對於受到它的影響的部份社會有利可圖。

Broadly speaking, one can say that the work calms people, comforts them, by showing them that at
least some of them can live from the exploitation of their desire. But for this to satisfy them so much, there must also be that other effect, namely, that their desire to contemplate finds some satisfaction in it. It elevates the mind, as one says, that is to say, it encourages renunciation. Don’t you see that there is something here that indicates the function I called dompte-regard?

廣義地說,我們能夠說,作品使人心情平靜,撫慰人們的力量,在於顯示有些人能夠生活於免除欲望的蹂躪。但是要讓藝術品能更這樣滿足人心,還必須要有另外一個效果,換言之,人們沉思的欲望能夠在藝術品裡找到滿足。如某位藝評家說的,它提昇心靈,換言之,它鼓勵捨棄。你們難道沒有看出來?這不就是我所說的欺眼法或凝視的馴化在發揮功用?

As I said last time, dompte-regard is also presented in the form of trompe-l’ail. In this sense, I appear to be opposite direction from tradition, which situates its function as being very distinct from that of painting. Yet I did not hesitate to end my last talk by observing, in the opposition of the works of Zeuxis and Parrhasios, the ambiguity of two levels, that of the natural function of the lure and that of trompe-l’ail.

如我上一次所說的,凝視的馴化也以錯視法的方式呈現。在這個意義上,我似乎採取跟傳統相反立場,傳統將錯視法的功用定義為跟畫圖迴然不同。可是,我上一次結束講座時,卻是斬釘截鐵地觀察到宙西思與巴哈西斯兩位畫家作品的對照,兩種層次的模稜兩可,一是誘惑的自然功能,另一是錯視法的功能。

If the birds rushed to the surface on which Zeuxis had deposited his dabs of colour, taking the picture for edible grapes, let us observe that the success of such an undertaking does not imply in the least that the grapes were admirably reproduced, like those we can see in the basket held by Caravaggio’s
Bacchus in the Uffizi. If the grapes had been painted in this way, it is not very likely that the birds would have been deceived, for why should the birds see grapes portrayed with such extraordinary verisimilitude? There would have to be something more reduced, something closer to the sign, in something representing grapes for the birds. But the opposite example of Parrhasios makes it clear that if one wishes to deceive a man, what one presents to him is the painting of a veil, that is to say, something that incites him to ask what is behind it.

假如鳥衝向宙西思描繪的色彩的表面,誤將圖畫當著是可吃的葡萄,我們觀察到,這種畫作的成功絲毫並不意味著,葡萄已經被複製得盡善盡美,就像是我們在卡拉凡吉奧的「布加丘在烏菲基」那幅圖畫中看到的籃子裡的葡萄。假如葡萄以這種方式繪畫,鳥被欺騙的可能性不高,因為鳥憑什麼會看到描繪得如此逼真的葡萄?對於鳥而言,還必須要有某件更背後的東西,某件更靠近符號的東西,某件代表葡萄的東西。但是巴哈西斯的相反例子就顯而易見,假如我們希望欺騙一個人,我們提供給他的是一個面紗的圖畫,換言之,某件激發他去詢問圖畫背後是什麼。

It is here that this little story becomes useful in showing us why Plato protests against the illusion of painting. The point is not that painting gives an illusory equivalence to the object, even if Plato seems to be saying this. The point is that the trompe-l’ail of painting pretends to be something other than
what it is.

在此這個小故事就有了意義,因為它顯示出為什麼柏拉圖不贊同圖畫產生的幻覺。重點並不是圖畫產生一種客體的幻覺的相等物。重點是圖畫的錯視法假裝它道道地地就是客體的本身。

What is it that attracts and satisfies us in trompe-l’ail ? When is it that it captures our attention and delights us? At the moment when, by a mere shift of our gaze, we are able to realize that the representation does not move with the gaze and that it is merely a trompe-l’ail. For it appears at that moment as something other than it seemed, or rather it now seems to be that something else. The picture does not compete with appearance, it competes with what Plato designates for us beyond appearance as being the Idea. It is because the picture is the appearance that says it is that which gives the appearance that Plato attacks painting, as if it were an activity competing with his own.

以這種錯視法,是什麼在吸引滿足我們?什麼時候它捕捉我們的注意力,愉悅我們?就在我們凝視稍微一轉,我們就能體會到,符號並沒有隨著凝視轉移的那個時刻,那僅僅是錯視法的欺騙。因為在那個時刻,它出現成為某件不同於當時或現在的別的東西。圖畫並沒有跟表象競爭,圖畫的競爭對象是柏拉圖為我們所指明的超越表象的理念。因為圖畫是道出表象內容的表象,柏拉圖處理畫圖時的態度,好像是畫圖是一個跟他自己的理念競爭的活動。

This other thing is the petit a, around which there revolves a combat of which trompe-l’ril is the soul.

這個別的東西就是小客體,環繞小客體是一場搏鬥,搏鬥的靈魂是錯視法。

If one tries to represent the position of the painter concretely in history, one realizes that he is the source of something that may pass into the real and on which, at all times, one might say, one takes a lease. The painter, it is said, no longer depends on aristocratic patrons. But the situation is not fundamentally changed with the advent of the picture dealer. He, too, is a patron, and a patron of the same stamp.

假如我們設法具體地代表畫家在歷史中的立場,我們會體會到,透過畫家,某件東西可能進入真實界領域,我們可以說,有始以來,這個某件東西是我們渴望以求的。據說,畫家現在不再需要貴族當贊助人。但是隨著圖畫經紀人的時代來臨,情況基本上並沒有改變。經紀人也是一位贊助人,相同類型的贊助人。

Before the aristocratic patron, it was the religious institution, with the holy image, that gave artists a living. The artist always has some financial body behind him and it is always a question of the objet a, or rather a question of reducing it—which may, at a certain level, strike you as being rather mythical—to an a with which—this is true in the last resort—it is the painter as creator who sets up a dialogue.

在貴族當贊助人之前,那是擁有神聖意象的宗教的機構給予藝術家謀生的機會。藝術家背後總是有某個財團支持,總是會有一個小客體的問題,換言之,在某個層次上,你可能會覺得相當神秘,這個問題可以簡化成為一個小它者,畫家作為一位創造者,跟小它者建立一個對話。追根究底,情況確實是如此。

But it is much more instructive to see how the a functions in its social repercussions.

更加具有啟發性的,是要明白這個小它者如何在它的社會環境中發揮功用。

Icons—the Christ in triumph in the vault at Daphnis or the admirable Byzantine mosaics—undoubtedly have the effect of holding us under their gaze. We might stop there, but were we to do so we would not really grasp the motive that made the painter set about making this icon, or the motive it satisfies in being presented to us. It is something to do with the gaze, of course, but there is more to it than that.

無可置疑,神像擁有將我們置身於它們的凝視之下的效果,例如,在達佛尼斯神殿的拱頂睥睨萬物的耶穌像,或是拜占庭那些令人贊賞的馬賽克壁畫。我們可以在那裡駐足觀看,但是假如我們光是駐足觀看,我們將無法了解,是什麼動機促使畫家從事畫這幅神像,換言之,當圖畫被呈現給我們觀看時,它滿足我們什麼動機。當然,這個動機跟凝視有些關係,但是不僅是如此而已。

What makes the value of the icon is that the god it represents is also looking at it. It is intended to please God. At this level, the artist is operating on the sacrificial plane—he is playing with those things, in this case, images, that may arouse the desire of God.

神像畫的價值是,它所代表的上帝也正在觀看我們。神像畫是被用來取悅上帝。在這個層次,藝術家正在運用的是犧牲獻祭的層次,他所正在運用那些東西,在神像畫而言,是撩撥我們渴望上帝救贖的意象。

Indeed, God is the creator of certain images—we see this in Genesis, with the Zelem Elohim. And iconoclastic thought itself still preserves this when it declares there is a god that does not care for this. He is certainly alone in this. But I do not want to go too far today in a direction that would take us right to the heart of one of the most essential elements of the province of the Names-of-the-Father: a certain pact may be signed beyond every image. Where we are, the image remains a go-between with the divinity—if Javeh forbids the Jews to make idols, it is because they give pleasure to the other gods. In a certain register it is not God who is not anthropomorphic, it is man who is begged not to be so. But that’s enough of that.

的確,上帝是某些意象的創造者。我們在約羅希的創世紀的圖畫中看出這一點。即使是詆毀神像的無神論思想本身也肯定這一點,因為這種思想宣稱,有某個神不喜歡上帝的神像。在這一點,上帝並不孤單。不過,我今天並不想進一步談論這一點,那會帶我們進入到「以天父之名」最基本要素的核心:每幅神像之外,有著人跟上帝所簽的盟約。無論我們身置何處,這個意象始終是跟聖靈交往的媒介:即使耶和華上帝禁止猶太人崇拜偶像,那是因為他們崇拜的是其它的眾神。依照某個記載,並不是上帝不以人類的形象出現,而是人被請求不要將上帝想像成這樣。但是今天先談到這裡。

Let us pass now to the next stage, which I shall call communal. Let us go to the great hall of the Doges’ Palace in which are painted all kinds of battles, such as the battle of Lepanto, etc. The social function, which was already emerging at the religious level, is now becoming clear. Who comes here? Those who form what Retz calls ‘lespeuples’, the audiences. And what do the audiences see in these vast compositions? They see the gaze of those persons who, when the audience are not there, deliberate in this hall. Behind the picture, it is their gaze that is there.

我們現在先進入下一次段落,我所稱為的社區。我們先到羅傑的圖畫「宮殿」的大廳。在那裡畫有各種的戰役,例如,列巴圖戰役,等等。原先是以宗教層次出現的社會的功能,現在就顯而易見。誰來這裡?來的是那些組成雷茲所稱呼的「觀眾」。那些觀眾在這寬敞的大構圖中看到什麼?他們看到當時那些在大廳全神貫注的人們的凝視,雖然現在的觀眾並不在當時現場。在這幅圖畫背後,觀眾的凝視總是在那裡。

You see, one can say that there are always lots of gazes behind. Nothing new is introduced in this respect by the epoch that Andre Malraux distinguishes as the modern, that which comes to be dominated by what he calls ‘the incomparable monster’, namely, the gaze of the painter, which claims to impose itself as being the only gaze. There always was a gaze behind. But—this is the most subtle point—where does this gaze come from?

你們瞧,我們可以說,總是有許多的凝視在背後。安德烈、莫洛曾將這個時代劃分為現代,這個時代被他所稱為的「史無前例的怪物」所統治,換言之,這個怪物是畫家的凝視。這個凝視宣稱自己登基,當著是唯一無二的凝視。這種時代所介紹的凝視統治的這種說法,其實並不是什麼新潁的東西。自古以來,總是有凝視在背後。但是,最微妙的一點是:這個凝視來自哪裡?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座215

December 16, 2009

拉岡講座205
9
WHAT IS A PICTURE?
圖畫是什麼?

Being and its semblance•
存在及其類似

Today, then, I must keep to the wager to which I committed myself in choosing the terrain in which the objet a is most evanescent in its function of symbolizing the central lack of desire, which I have always indicated in a univocal way by the algorithm I don’t know whether you can see the blackboard, but as
usual I have marked out a few reference-points. The objet a in the field of the visible is the gaze. After which, enclosed in a chain bracket, I have written: f in nature 1. as=(—#)

今天,我必須遵守我選擇這個領域時所做的承諾,因為在這個領域,小客體作為欲望中央欠缺的象徵功用逐漸消失,儘管我曾經始終如一地指出它的軌跡。我不知道你們是否能看到這塊黑板,但是像平常一樣,我畫出幾個指標點。在可見物的這個領域,小客體就是凝視。包括在方括弧裡,我將公式寫在後面: F in nature 1. as=(—#)

We can grasp in effect something which, already in nature, appropriates the gaze to the function to which it may be put in the symbolic relation in man. Below this, I have drawn the two triangular systems that I have already introduced—the first is that which, in the geometral field, puts in our place the subject of the representation, and the second is that which turns me into a picture.

事實上,我們能夠了解到,在大自然中,已經有某件東西挪用凝視的功能,這個東西可以適用於人跟符號的關係。在底下,我畫了我曾經介紹過的兩個三角形的系統。第一個三角形是在幾何學的領域,以符號的主體代替我們;第二個三角形是將我轉換成圖畫。

On the right-hand line is situated, then, the apex of the first triangle, the point of the geometral subject, and it is on that line that I, too, turn myself into a picture under the gaze, which is inscribed at the apex of the second triangle. The two triangles are here superimposed, as in fact they are in the functioning of the scopic register.

右邊線位置所在是第一個三角形的頂端,幾何學主體的點,我也將我自己轉變成凝視下的圖畫,被鐫刻在第二個三角形的頂端。這兩個三角形在此是互相交插,如同他們在視覺的領域。
1
I must, to begin with, insist on the following: in the scopic field, the gaze is outside, I am looked at, that is to say, I am a picture. This is the function that is found at the heart of the institution of the subject in the visible. What determines me, at the most profound level, in the visible, is the gaze that is outside. It is through the gaze that I enter light and it is from the gaze that I receive its effects. Hence it comes about that the gaze .is the instrument through which light is embodied and through which—if you will allow me to use a word, as I often do, in a fragmented form— I am photo-graphed.

首先,我必須堅持下列的觀點:在視覺的領域,凝視在外面,我被觀看,換言之,我是一幅圖畫。這就是在可見物方面主體形成的核心,被發現的功用。在可見物的最深層,決定我是誰的就是外在的這個凝視。透過這個凝視,我進入光。從這個凝視,我接收到光的效果。因此,就發生凝視成為工具的現象,透過這個工具,光被具體展現,透過這個工具,我被照相,恕我使用這個字眼,如同我在閒談時經常使用。

What is at issue here is not the philosophical problem of representation. From that point of view, when I am presented with a representation, I assure myself that I know quite a lot about it, I assure myself as a consciousness that knows that it is only representation, and that there is, beyond, the thing, the thing itself. Behind the phenomenon, there is the noumenon, for example. I may not be able to do anything about it, because my transcendental categories, as Kant would say, do just as they please and force me to take the thing in their way. But, then, that’s all right, really—everything works out for the best.

在此受到爭議的不是哲學符號的問題。從那個觀點,當我面對一個符號,我告訴自己說,我對這個符號知之甚詳。我告訴自己作為一種意識,我知道那只是個符號,符號之外尚有物自體。例如,在這個現象背後,有物體的本尊。對於它,我無可奈何,因為如同哲學家康德常說,我超驗的範疇自行其是,我不得不遵循他們的方式行事。然後一切順利,樣樣事情否極泰來。

In my opinion, it is not in this dialectic between the surface and that which is beyond that things are suspended. For my part, I set out from the fact that there is something that establishes a fracture, a bi-partition, a splitting of the being to which the being accommodates itself, even in the natural
world.

依我之見,物自體被懸置,不是在表面跟超驗之間的辯證法。就我而言,我的出發點是:某件東西形成一個斷裂,一個雙邊的分隔,一種存在的分裂內蘊於存在本身,即使在大自然的世界也是如此。

This fact is observable in the variously modulated scale of what may be included, ultimately, under the general heading of mimicry. It is this that comes into play, quite obviously, both in sexual union and in the struggle to the death. In both situations, the being breaks up, in an extraordinary way, between its being and its semblance, between itself and that paper tiger it shows to the other.

這個事實可被觀察出來,涵蓋在模擬的總標題下,有各種不同規模的調適。這個分裂顯而易見地在運作,不論是性的結合,或是在跟死亡的搏鬥。在這兩種情況中,主體分裂,以特別的方式,主體的存在與主體的類似分裂,主體本身跟它顯示給別人觀看的紙老虎分裂。

In the case of display, usually on the part of the male animal, or in the case of grimacing swelling by which the animal enters the play of combat in the form of intimidation, the being gives of himself; or receives from the other, something that is like a mask, a double, an envelope, a thrown-off skin, thrown off in order to cover the frame of a shield.

在顯示出來的案例,通常是在雄性動物,或在扮鬼臉壯膽的案例,動物以虛張聲勢的方式進行搏鬥,主體自己或從對方展示某種像是面具、替身、外殼、或是拋開的獸皮,拋開是為了要掩蓋自衛的架構。

It is through this separated form of himself that the being comes into play in his effects of life and death, and it might be said that it is with the help of this doubling of the other, or of oneself, that is realized the conjunction from which proceeds the renewal of beings in reproduction.

透過跟自己分開的形式,主體扮演生存或死亡的互動。我們可以說,就是憑藉著這種對方或自己的替身的幫助,主體以繁殖方式更新,薪火相傳下去。

The lure plays an essential function therefore. It is not something else that seizes us at the very level of clinical experience, when, in relation to what one might imagine of the attraction to the other pole as conjoining masculine and feminine, we apprehend the prevalence of that which is presented as
travesty. It is no doubt through the mediation of masks that the masculine and the feminine meet in the most acute, most intense way.

因此,陷阱扮演重要的功用。在精神分析的診所,引起我們注意的不是別的,就是這個普遍呈現的滑稽的模仿,男人跟女人的結合,就是這種吸引對方及被對方吸引的想像跟理解。無可置疑的,透過這種面具的媒介,男人跟女人心有靈犀般地邂逅。

Only the subject—the human subject, the subject of the desire that is the essence of man—is not, unlike the animal, entirely caught up in this imaginary capture. He maps himself in it. How? In so far as he isolates the function of the screen and plays with it. Man, in effect, knows how to play with the mask as that beyond which there is the gaze. The screen is here the locus of mediation.

只是人作為主體,不像動物那樣完全陷入這種非真實的陷阱,因為人的本質是欲望的主體。人會在非真實的陷阱描繪自己。用什麼方法?人將螢幕的功用隔開,然後遊戲其間。事實上,人懂得如何玩弄面具,好似有個凝視正在觀看。螢幕在此就是媒介的場所。

Last time, I alluded to the reference given by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in La Phénoménologie de la perception in which, from well-chosen examples based on the experiments of Gelb and Goldstein, one can already see, simply at the perceptual level, how the screen re-establishes things, in their status as
real. If, by being isolated, an effect of lighting dominates us, if, for example, a beam of light directing our gaze so captivates us that it appears as a milky cone and prevents us from seeing what it illuminates, the mere fact of introducing into this field a small screen, which cuts into that which is illuminated without being seen, makes the milky light retreat, as it were, into the shadow, and allows the object it concealed to emerge.

上一次,我提到梅洛、龐蒂在「感官現象學」所舉的例子,根據蓋博跟郭史坦的試驗的精選例子,我們已經能夠看出,僅就在感官的層次,螢幕如何重新建立事情,讓事情本身的立場充當真實界。假如孤立來看,光線的效果會支配我們,例如,一道引導我們凝視的光線會如此吸引我們,以致於它會形成乳狀的圓錐形,使我們看不見它所照亮的東西。也就是形成小螢幕的這個場域,會介入所被照亮的東西,而沒有被觀看到,乳狀的光線會隱退到所謂的陰影地帶,而使它所隱藏的客體顯現出來。

At the perceptual level, this is the phenomenon of a relation that is to be taken in a more essential function, namely, that in its relation to desire, reality appears only as marginal.

在感官的層次,這個關係會有更重要的功用,換言之,在它跟欲望的關係,真實界出現只是作為邊緣的現象。

This is certainly one of the features that scarcely seems to have been noticed in pictorial creation. Yet rediscovering in the picture what is, strictly speaking, composition, the lines dividing the surfaces created by the painter, vanishing traces, lines of force, frames in which the image finds its status is a fascinating game—but I am astonished that in one very remarkable book they are called frameworks (charpentes). For this term eliminates their principal effect. By a sort of irony, on the
back of this book, there nevertheless figures, as being more exemplary than any other, a picture by Rouault on which is traced a circular line to enable us to grasp the main point.

的確,這個特徵在創造圖畫時,似乎很少被注意到。可是,最引人入勝的遊戲,不就是要在圖畫中重新它的構圖?嚴謹地說,就是光線隔開畫家所創造的表面,消失的痕跡,用力的線條,而形成意象賴於存在的內涵。但是在一本非常著名的書中,這些竟然被稱之為「構圖」,真是令人吃驚。因為「構圖」這個術語使圖畫主要的效果蕩然無存。令人諷刺的是,在這本書的後面,一幅羅奧特的人像畫,有一道圓形的痕跡,使我們理解到畫中有畫的要點,最足以作為典範。

Indeed, there is something whose absence can always be observed in a picture—which is not the case in perception. This is the central field, where the separating power of the eye is exercised to the maximum in vision. In every picture, this central field cannot but be absent, and replaced by a hole—a
reflection, in short, of the pupil behind which is situated the gaze. Consequently,-and in as much as the picture enters into a relation to desire, the place of a central screen is always marked, which is precisely that by which, in front of the picture, I am elided as subject of the geometral plane.

的確,在一幅圖畫中,我們總是能夠觀察到某件欠缺的東西,這在感官的情形是罕見的。這就是中央的領域,眼睛的分開的力量在視覺方面被運用到最高點。在每幅圖畫,中央的領域必然是欠缺,而以洞口來代替。簡而言之,這個洞口就是凝視位置所在的瞳孔的反映。結果,當圖畫進入跟欲望有關的領域,中央螢幕的位置總是被顯現出來,而在圖畫的前面,我作為幾何平面的主體總是消失不見。

This is why the picture does not come into play in the field of representation. Its end and effect are elsewhere.

這就是為什麼在符號的領域,圖畫並沒有發揮功用。圖畫的目的跟圖畫的影響在別處。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記981212

December 14, 2009

雄伯手記981212

讀書會的C送我一張蔡明亮導演的新片「臉」的門票。星期六下午放映完後,蔡導演還在現場跟觀眾互動。

針對影片內容過多的象徵隱喻,使許多人看不懂在表達些什麼的問題,蔡導演引用淨空法師的禪話:「不懂沒關係。今天不懂,明天就會懂,明天不懂,你終究有一天會懂。

影片以拍攝法國羅浮宮的達文西名畫「莎樂美」的故事為主軸,隱喻電影意象作為觀眾跟生命真實之間的媒介,卻遭遇導演的母喪,轉而拍攝母子告別的實際場景跟子女的心理調適,湧入大量跟死亡陰影有關的潛意識欲望及夢的象徵。

羅浮宮是堂皇的藝術殿堂,但蔡導演卻讓演員走入暗黑的地下水溝道,拍攝莎樂美詠唱對於先知約翰裸露肉身的渴望與愛慕,象徵著藝術之美對於真誠生命的嚮往。最後演員皮耶、李奧從「莎樂美吻先知約翰的斷頭」畫像下的地道爬出來,象徵著人生陰暗面的昂揚生命力,只能透過藝術作品的轉化及昇華,始能被語言符號的理性社會所接納。

星期一早上在G校有一場蔡導演跟高中學生的座談會,我原只打算去當個觀眾,卻不料主持人C指定我提問題,只好臨時發揮:「導演剛才說,觀眾需要藝術,只說對了一半。更準確地說,是觀眾更需要藝術背後的人生真理。問題是需要到什麼程度?影片中,希律王要求莎樂美跳舞,撫慰沮喪的心情,願意給她再多的金銀珠寶,甚至是王國的一半。但是莎樂美跳完後要求的卻是先知約翰的頭顱,作為渴望人生真理的象徵。影片中你讓李康生導演躺在盒子裡扮演被砍頭的先知約翰,但是在現實人生裡,你蔡明亮導演扮演的卻是更像莎樂美的角色,能否請你就這一點說明?」

自己覺得說得語無倫次,還好蔡明亮不愧是國際級的導演,一開口回答就接上了頭:「在現實人生裡,我們每個人都是莎樂美!」

拉岡講座214

December 11, 2009

拉岡講座 214
THE LINE AND LIGHT
線條與光線

The screen Mimicry•
螢幕的摹擬

3
In this direction, a remark of Caillois’ should guide us. Caillois assures us that the facts of mimicry are similar, at the animal level, to what, in the human being is manifested as art, or painting. The only objection one might make to this is that it seems to indicate, for René Caillois, that the notion of painting is itself so clear that one can refer to it in order to explain something else.

在這方面,凱洛斯有句話可以引導我們。凱洛斯告訴我們,動物層次的模擬的這些事實,類似於人類在藝術或繪畫所展現的。唯一我們可能會提出的異議是,對於凱洛斯而言,這似乎指示著,繪畫的觀念本身顯而易見,我們可以先提到它,用來解釋別的事情。

What is painting? It is obviously not for nothing that we have referred to as picture the function in which the subject has to map himself as such. But when a human subject is engaged in making a picture of himself; in putting into operation that something that has as its centre the gaze, what is taking place? In the picture, the artist, we are told by some, wishes to be a subject, and the art of painting is to be distinguished from all others in that, in the work, it is as subject, as gaze, that the artist intends to impose himself on us. To this, others reply by stressing the object-like side of the art product. In both
these directions, something more or less appropriate is manifested, which certainly does not exhaust the question.

繪畫是什麼?我們曾經提到主體必須將自己定位為繪畫,我們將這種功能認為就是圖畫,不是毫無意義。但是當人的主體從事於將自己描繪成圖畫,發揮將凝視作為圖畫中心的功用,會發生什麼事?有人告訴我們說,在圖畫中,藝術家希望成為主體,繪畫的藝術就是要跟其它主體區別出來,因為在作品中,藝術家所要將自己賦加在我們身上的,就是作為主體,作為凝視。對於這一點,還有些人以強調藝術作品具有客體的一面作為回應。在這兩個方向,或多或少顯示某些中肯的東西,但是並沒有詳盡這個問題。

I shall advance the following thesis—certainly, in the picture, something of the gaze is always manifested. The painter knows this very well—his morality, his search, his quest, his practice
is that he should sustain and vary the selection of a certain kind of gaze. Looking at pictures, even those most lacking in what is usually called the gaze, and which is constituted by a pair of eyes, pictures in which any representation of the human figure is absent, like a landscape by a Dutch or a Flemish
painter, you will see in the end, as in filigree, something so specific to each of the painters that you will feel the presence of the gaze. But this is merely an object of research, and perhaps merely illusion.

我將提出以下的命題:的確,在繪畫中,屬於凝視的東西總是顯示出來。畫家自己心知肚明,他的德行,他的尋求,他的追尋,他的所作所為,就是要維持及變化某種凝視的選擇。當你觀看圖畫,即使是最缺乏通常所謂凝視的圖畫,也就是缺乏人的雙眼構成的圖畫,或沒有人物的符號存在的圖畫,如荷蘭或法蘭德斯的畫家的圖畫,你最後還是會看到,如同在裝飾品中,每一位畫家都有某件明確的東西,讓你感覺到凝視的存在。但是這僅僅是研究的客體,或許僅僅是幻覺。

The function of the picture—in relation to the person to whom the painter, literally, offers his picture to be seen—has a relation with the gaze. This relation is not, as it might at first seem, that of being a trap for the gaze. It might be thought that, like the actor, the painter wishes to be looked at. I do not think so. I think there is a relation with the gaze of the spectator, but that it is more complex. The painter gives something to the person who must stand in front of his painting which, in part, at least, of the painting, might be summed up like thus—Do you want to see? Well, take a look at this! He gives something for the eye to feed on, but he invites the person to whom this picture is presented to lay down his gaze there as one lays down one’s weapons. This is the Apollonian effect of painting. Something is given not so much to the gaze as to the eye, something that involves the abandonment, the laying down, of the gaze.

圖畫的功用,實質上是牽涉到畫家提供他的圖畫讓人看見,跟凝視息息相關。這個關係不是如乍看來是一個凝視的陷阱的關係。可能有人會認為,,就像演員,畫家希望自己被人觀看。我認為不是這樣。我認為跟觀眾的凝視是有關係,但是問題比較複雜。畫家提供某件訊息給站在他的圖畫前面的人,這個訊息至少就圖畫而言,可體簡述如下:你想要看嗎?好,那你就觀看罷!他提供某件東西讓人飽嚐眼福,但是他邀請觀看圖畫的人放下他的凝視,如同放下他的武器。這就是圖畫具有陽光令人目眩的效果。某件東西被發出,不是給予凝視,而是給予眼睛。某件東西牽涉到放棄或放下凝視。

The problem is that a whole side of painting—expressionism —is separated from this field. Expressionist painting, and this is its distinguishing feature, provides something by way of a
certain satisfaction—in the sense in which Freud uses the term in relation to the drive—of a certain satisfaction of what is demanded by the gaze. In other words, we must now pose the question as to the
exact status of the eye as organ. The function, it is said, creates the organ. This is quite absurd— function does not even explain the organ. Whatever appears in the organism as an organ is always presented with a large multiplicity of functions.

問題是,圖畫的整個一面是表現主義,卻是跟這個領域分開。表現主義的圖畫,提供某件東西作為某種的滿足,是它顯著的特色。猶如佛洛伊德使用跟欲望驅力有關的術語,凝視要求某種的滿足。換言之,我們現在必須提出這個問題:眼睛作為器官,其確實的地位是什麼?有人說,是功用創造器官。這是相當荒謬的說法,因為功用甚至連解釋器官都難於自圓其說。出現在有機體的器官,總是表現出多重性的功能。

In the eye, it is clear that various functions come together. The discriminatory function is isolated to the maximum degree at the level of the fovea, the chosen point of distinct vision. Something quite different occurs over the rest of the surface of the retina, incorrectly distinguished by specialists as the locus of the scotopic function. But here, too, chiasma is to be found, since it is this last field, supposedly created to perceive things in diminished lighting, which provides the maximum possibility of perceiving the effects of light. If you wish to see a star of the fifth or six size, do not look straight at it—this is known as the Arago phenomenon. You will be able to see it only if you fix your eye to one side.

顯而易見,眼睛是各種功能聚集在一起。最明顯的功用,在視網膜的中央窩處,被發揮到最高點,那就是清楚視覺的精華點。完全不同的東西發生在視網膜表面的其它各處,很多專家錯誤將它們辨認為是視覺功用的焦點。但是我們在此也發現到交錯的功用,因為這個最後的領域,據說是被創造來以減弱的光度來感覺事情,其實是供應最大量的可能性,讓眼睛感覺到光線的效果。假如你希望第五或第六顆小的星星,你不要眼睛直視。這個被稱為阿拉哥斜視現象。你只有將你的眼睛專注一邊,你才能看得到。

These functions of the eye do not exhaust the character of the organ in so far as it emerges on the couch, and in so far as the eye determines there what every organ determines, namely, duties. What is wrong about the reference to instinct, a reference that is so confused, is that one does not realize that instinct is the way in which an organism has of extricating itself in the best possible way from an organ. There are many examples, in the animal kingdom, of cases in which the organism succumbs to an excess, a hyper-development of an organ. The supposed function of instinct in the relation between organism and organ certainly seems to have been defined as a kind of morality. We are astonished by the so-called pre-adaptations of instinct. The extraordinary thing is that the organism can do anything with its organ at all.

眼睛的這些功用,展現在精神分析的躺椅時,並沒有窮盡器官的特性,因為在那裡是眼睛決定每個器官所決定的內容,換言之,器官的責任。這個責任的本能如此混淆的問題所在是,我們都沒有體會到,責任本能是有機體用以盡可能掙脫器官的極限。在動物界,有許多有機體將器官予以高度發展到過度的例子。在有機體跟器官之間的關係,我們所認為的責任本能的功用,似乎已經被定義為某種道德。我們很驚奇還有所謂的適應社會之前的本能存在。特別的事是,有機體會器官任所欲為。

In my reference to the unconscious, I am dealing with the relation to the organ. It is not a question of the relation to. sexuality, or even to the sex, if it is possible to give any specific reference to this term. It is a question rather of the relation to the phallus, in as much as it is lacking in the real that might be
attained in the sexual goal. It is in as much as, at the heart of the experience of the unconscious,
we are dealing with that organ—determined in the subject by the inadequacy organized in the castration complex —that we can grasp to what extent the eye is caught up in a similar dialectic.

我每次提到無意識,我總是免不了正在處理它跟器官的關係。這個問題不是跟性愛的關係,我不妨說得更明確,不是跟性交的關係。這個問題是跟陽具的關係,因為在性愛的目標所渴望得到的無意識的真實是欠缺的。這個問題同樣是因為我們正在處理那個器官時,在無意識的經驗核心, 主體由於受到閹割情結宰制,而力不從心,我們能夠了解,以類似的辯證法,眼睛被捕捉到什麼程度。

From the outset, we see, in the dialectic of the eye and the gaze, that there is no coincidence, but, on the contrary, a lure. When, in love, I solicit a look, what is profoundly unsatisfying and always missing is that—you never look at me from the place from which I see you.

從一開始,在眼睛跟凝視的辯證法中,我們看到,這不是巧合,相反的,這是一個刻意的陷阱。在戀愛中,我懇求一個愛的眼神。令人永不滿足,總是漏失的是:你從未從我看到你的地方來觀看我。

Conversely, what I look at is never what I wish to see. And the relation that I mentioned earlier, between the painter and the spectator, is a play, a play of trompe-l’wil, whatever one says.
There is no reference here to what is incorrectly called figurative, if by this you mean some reference or other to a subjacent reality.

反過來說,我所觀看的,從來就不是我希望看到的。我早先提到的畫家跟觀眾之間的關係,是遊戲,是視覺欺騙的遊戲,不妨這樣說。一般所謂的象徵的關係,其實風馬牛不相及,假如你的意思是作為根本的真實是象徵的話。

In the classical tale of Zeuxis and Parrhasios, Zeuxis has the advantage of having made grapes that attracted the birds. The stress is placed not on the fact that these grapes were in any way perfect grapes, but on the fact that even the eye of the birds was taken in by them. This is proved by the fact that his friend Parrhasios triumphs over him for having painted on the wall a veil, a veil so lifelike that Zeuxis, turning towards him said, Well, and now show us what you have painted behind it. By this he showed that what was at issue was certainly deceiving the eye (tromper l’ail). A triumph of the gaze over the eye.

在「宙西思與巴哈西」的古典故事中,宙西思擁有製造葡萄來吸引鳥的便利。這個強調點不是放置在,葡萄是多麼完美的葡萄,而是放置在,即使是鳥的眼睛都會被葡萄所欺騙。有個事件可以證明這一點。他的朋友巴哈西在牆壁上畫一道窗簾,讓他信以為真,因為這道窗簾如此逼真,以致宙西思轉身向他說:「現在就請你給我觀看窗簾背後你所畫的東西!」這個事件顯示,我們爭論不休的確實就是眼睛的欺騙。凝視戰勝了眼睛。

Next time, we shall return to this function of the eye and the gaze.

下一次,我們將回到眼睛與凝視的功用。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

拉岡講座213

December 9, 2009

拉岡講座213
THE LINE AND LIGHT
線條與光線

2
This is the relation of the subject with the domain of vision. The word subject must not be understood here in the usual sense of the word, in the subjective sense—this relation is not an idealist relation. This overview, which I call the subject, and which I regard as giving consistency to the picture, is not
simply a representative overview. There are many ways of being wrong about this function of
the subject in the domain of the spectacle.

這就是主體在視覺領域的關係。主體這個字在此切勿用平常的字意,用主觀的意義來瞭解,因為這個關係並不是一個很理想的關係。我稱為主體的觀點,及我認為是給予圖畫一致性的觀點,並不僅僅是符號的觀點。對於主體在景象的領域的功用有些令人誤解的地方。

Certainly, there are plenty of examples in La P/iénoménologie de la perception of what happens behind the retina. Merleau- Ponty cleverly extracts from a mass of writing some very remarkable facts, showing, for example, that simply the fact of masking, by means of a screen, part of a field functioning as a source of composite colours—produced, for example, by two wheels, two screens, which, one revolving behind the other, must compose a certain tone of light—that this intervention alone reveals in a quite different way the composition in question.

確實,在「感官現象學」有許多發生在視網膜背後的例子。梅洛、龐帝很聰明地從一大堆作品當中抽取一些非常優秀的例子,舉例顯示,僅僅憑藉螢幕的方式的遮蔽,那個領域可以充當各種顏色的來源,兩個輪子就產生兩個螢幕組成某一種光的色調,其中一個螢幕繞著另一個螢幕旋轉。我們只要一介入,就可以完全不同的方式,看出受到爭議的組成。

Indeed, here we grasp the purely subjective function, in the ordinary sense of the word, the note of central mechanism that intervenes, for the play of light arranged in the experiment, all the elements of which we know, is distinct from what is perceived by the subject.

的確,在此我們理解到純粹主觀的功用,用這個詞的平常意義來說,在試驗中被安排的光線的運作,介入我們已知的元素的中央結構的色調,跟主體所感覺的色調完全不同。

Perceiving the effects of reflection of a field or a color is quite different—it does have a subjective side to it, but one arranged quite differently. Let us, for example, place a yellow field beside a blue field—by receiving the light reflected on the yellow field, the blue field will undergo some change. But, certainly, everything that is color is merely subjective—there is no objective correlative in the spectrum to enable us to attach the quality of color to the wavelength, or to the relevant frequency at this level of light vibration.

感覺到一個領域或色彩會有反映的效果是完全不同,因為它不僅具有主觀性的一面,而且這一面被安排的方式也迴然不同。例如,我將一塊黃色的領域放置在一塊藍色的領域旁邊,接收被反映在黃色領域上的光線,藍色領域會經歷一些變化。但是,我的說法沒錯,每一樣屬於顏色的東西僅僅是主觀的,因為在光譜上並沒有客觀的相對物,可以使我們將顏色的屬性歸屬於光的波長,或歸屬於這個層次的光的振動的相關頻率。

There is something objective here, but it is situated differently. Is that all there is to it? Is that what I am talking about when I speak of the relation between the subject and what I have called the picture?
Certainly not. The relation between the subject and the picture has been approached by certain philosophers, but they have, if I may say so, missed the point. Read the book by Raymond Ruyer
called juIo-finalisme, and see how, in order to situate perception in a teleological perspective, he is forced to situate the subject in an absolute overview.

在此有某件東西是客觀的,但是位置不一樣。就是這樣而已嗎?那就是當我談到主體跟我所謂的圖畫的關係時,我正在談論的東西嗎?當然不是。主體跟圖畫的關係,某些哲學家曾經研究過,但是容我這樣說,他們錯過這一點。閱讀一下雷蒙、盧宜所說的julo-finalisme, 你就明白,為了要將感覺定位在目的論的透視法,他不得不將主體定位在絕對的觀照

There is no need, except in the most abstract way, to posit the subject in absolute overview, when,
in the example he gives, it is merely a question of getting us to grasp what the perception of a draught-board is—a draughtboard belongs essentially to that geometral optics that I was careful to distinguish at the outset. We are here in space panes extra parks, which always provides such an objection to the apprehension to the object. In this direction, the thing is irreducible.

除了在最抽象層次,其實沒有必要將主體放置在絕對的觀照,因為在他所舉的例子,他只是要我們了解到一塊西洋棋盤的感覺是什麼。西洋棋盤基本上屬於那個幾何學的視覺,我在開始時就很仔細為你們區別。我們在此處於星羅棋佈的方格空間,這提供我們對於客體的理解的阻礙。在這個方向,事情是無可置疑的。

Yet there is a phenomenal domain—infinitely more extended than the privileged points at which it appears—that enables us to apprehend, in its true nature, the subject in absolute overview. Even if we cannot give it being, it is nonetheless necessary. There are facts that can be articulated only in the
phenomenal dimension of the overview by which I situate myself in the picture as stain—these are the facts of mimicry.

可是,有一個現象的領域使我們理解到,在絕對觀照下的主體的真正屬性是什麼,這個領域的出現的特權點可以不斷地延伸。我們即使無法將這一個點認為是存在,可是這樣的存在是必須的,因為有些事實只能在絕對觀照的現象的向量來表達。憑藉絕對觀照,我將自己定位在圖畫中當著是污染之點。這些就是模擬的事實。

This is not the place to go into all the more or less complex problems posed by the question of mimicry. I would refer you to the specialized works on the subject—they are not only fascinating in themselves, but they provide ample material for reflexion. I shall content myself with stressing what has not,
perhaps, been sufficiently brought out. To begin with, I shall ask a question—how important is the function of adaptation in mimicry?

模擬的問題,我在此不適合去長篇大論其形成的複雜的難題。我推薦你們去閱讀有關這個科目的專門著作。那些著作本身不僅是令人興味盎然,而且還供應充份的令人反思的材料。我現在只強調他們未盡其詳的部份。首先,我問一個問題:模擬對適應環境的功能有多重要?

In certain phenomena of mimicry one may speak perhaps of an adaptive or adapted coloration and realize, for example—as Cuénot has shown, probably with some relevance in certain cases—that coloration, in so far as it is adapted completely, is simply a way of defending oneself against light.

在某些模擬的現象,我們可能會提到顏色的適應或調適,然後體會到如邱諾在某些相關的個案所舉例的,顏色的調適就完全的適應而言,僅僅是保護自己免於光的直射

In an environment in which, because of what is immediately around, the colour green predominates, as at the bottom of a pool containing green plants, an animalcule—there are innumerable ones that might serve as examples—becomes green for as long as the light may do it harm. It becomes green, therefore, in order to reflect the light qua green, thus protecting itself by adaptation, from its effects.

在綠色佔優勢的周遭環境,如在包含綠色植物的水池底端,水藻等微生物會形成綠色,因為光線會造成傷害,這樣的例子不勝枚舉。微生物變成綠色,因此是為了反映光線作為綠色本身,因此以適應方式保護自己,免於光的影響。

But, in mimicry, we are dealing with something quite different. Let us take an example chosen almost at random—it is not a privileged case—that of the small crustacean known as caprella, to which is added the adjective. When such a crustacean settles in the midst of those animals, scarcely animals, known as briozoaires, what does it imitate? It imitates what, in that quasi-plant animal known as the briozoaires, is a stain—at a particular phase of the briozoaires, an intestinal loop forms a stain, at another phase, there functions something like a coloured centre. It is to this stain shape that the crustacean adapts it becomes a picture, it is inscribed in the picture. This, strictly speaking, is the origin of mimicry.

但是在模擬這個議題,我們要處理的是不同東西。讓我隨便舉個例子,不算是特別的案例。被稱為小蝦的小小的甲殼綱動物,定居在那些動物之間,眾所周知的briozoaires 類動物之間,它在模擬什麼?在半是植物,半是動物的briozoaires 之間,它所模擬的是一個污點。在briozoaires的某個特別部份,有一個內臟的環套形成一個污點,在另外一個部份,有一個彩色中心充當功能。小蝦適應這個彩色中心跟污點的形狀,形成一幅畫面。嚴格說,這就是模擬的起源。

And, on this basis, the fundamental dimensions of the inscription of the subject in the picture appear infinitely more justified than a more hesitant guess might suggest at first sight. I have already referred to what Caillois says about this in his little book Méduse et compagnie, with that unquestionable
penetration that is sometimes found in the non-specialist—his very distance may enable him to grasp certain implications in what the specialist has merely stated.

根據這個基礎,主體鐫刻在畫面的基本向量,就遠比乍看來猶豫的猜測更加振振有詞。我曾經提過凱洛斯在他的小書「梅杜思在坎裴園」所說的,非專家有時也有令人信服的洞見,因為冷眼旁觀可以使他了解到某些專家所忽略的暗示。

Certain scientists claim to see in the register of coloration merely more or less successful facts of adaptation. But the facts show that practically nothing that can be called adaptation—in the sense in which the term is usually understood, that is to say, as behaviour bound up with the needs of survival—practically nothing of this is to be found in mimicry, which, in most cases, proves to be inoperant, or operating strictly in the opposite direction from that which the adaptive result might be presumed to demand. On the other hand, Caillois brings out the three headings that are in effect the major dimensions in which the mimetic activity is deployed—travesty, camouflage, intimidation.

某些科學家宣稱,顏色的調適僅是適應環境的明顯例子。但是這些事實顯示,幾乎沒有一樣能夠被稱為適應。就這個詞語的通常意涵而言,換言之,適應是跟生存的需求有密切關聯的行為。可是這樣的適應在模擬的行為上幾乎沒有一樣被找到。模擬的行為在大部份的情況證明是非功用性,或跟適應的結果所要求的方向恰恰相反。在另一方面,凱洛斯提出三個標題作為實際上模擬行為被運作的主要向度:模仿、偽裝、恫嚇。

Indeed, it is in this domain that the dimension by which the subject is to be inserted in the picture is presented. Mimicry reveals something in so far as it is distinct from what might be called an itself that is behind. The effect of mimicry is camouflage, in the strictly technical sense. It is not a question of
harmonizing with the background but, against a mottled background, of becoming mottled—exactly like the technique of camouflage practised in human warfare.

的確,就是在這個領域,主體能夠被插入這個畫面的向度被表現出來。模擬顯示有某件東西迴異於所謂物體本身所遺置的東西。就嚴格的技術意涵而言,模擬的效果是偽裝。偽裝跟環境和諧的問題無關,而是在斑駁的背景,將自己弄成斑點,如同人在戰鬥時,偽裝的技巧是欺敵。

In the case of travesty, a certain sexual finality is intended. Nature shows us that this sexual aim is produced by all kinds of effects that are essentially disguise, masquerade. A level is constituted here quite distinct from the sexual aim itself; which is found to play an essential role in it, and which must not be distinguished too hastily as being that of deception. The function of the lure, in this instance, is something else, something before which we should suspend judgement before we have properly measured its effects.

模仿的案例牽涉到某種性的目標的意圖。大自然顯示,這個性的目標被產生,是靠著基本上是偽裝及欺騙的各種效果。在此所形成的層次,完全不同於性的目標的本身,儘管後者扮演重要的角色,但是也不要太過於輕率就辨認為是欺騙的功用。在這個例子,陷阱的功用有某件其它的東西,這個東西我們在充份衡量其效果之前,我們暫時不要下斷語。

Finally, the phenomenon known as intimidation also involves this over-valuation that the subject always tries to attain in his appearance. Here too, we should not be too hasty in introducing some kind of inter-subjectivity. Whenever we are dealing with imitation, we should be very careful not to think too quickly of the other who is being imitated. To imitate is no doubt to reproduce an image. But at bottom, it is, for the subject, to be inserted in a function whose exercise grasps it. It is here that we should pause for a moment.

最後,眾所周知的恫嚇的現象,也牽涉到主體總是高估自己的外表。在此,我們也不應該就匆促地說,那就是人際的互為主體性。每次我們處理模仿,我們應該小心不要太快就想到被模仿的另一方。模仿無可置疑是複製一個形象。但是,追根究底,對於主體而言,模仿被插入於他所被掌控的功用。在此,且讓我們駐足沉思一下。

Let us now see what the unconscious function as such tells us, in so far as it is the field which, for us, offers itself to the conquest of the subject.

我們現在看得出來,無意識的功用本身所告訴我們的,因為就是這個無意識的領域,提供本身作為我們要探討主體的意義的領域。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

雄伯手記981208

December 9, 2009

雄伯手記981208

人不僅是終究有一天會死的動物,而且是這一天隨時都會來臨。明白這一點,人理應是豁達而開朗,但環目四顧,執著戀棧的人仍然居多。產生如此重大的誤識memessaince,或幻見fantasy的,不知是人的自戀或是人的無知?

人一方面是自己有欲望需要去滿足及被滿足,另一方面,也需要去滿足別人同樣的欲望的動物。這麼一串長的修飾語或倫理學要弄得明白都不容易,遑論去實踐?可以說,大部份人都是在迷迷糊糊中,還沒弄清是怎麼一回事就嗚呼哀哉了。

耶穌背著笨重十字架遊街,然後被釘在上面的鏡頭,給人的感受理應是悲慘的,但是文藝時期的聖殤圖,卻將耶穌的神情畫得那麼怡然安祥。大部份人都渴望省略人生過程的悲慘,而獲得臨終時的怡然安祥,只好一廂情願地半信半疑。

真誠的人理應勇於面對自己的誤識或幻見!