Logic of phantasy 11 JACQUES LACAN

Logic of phantasy 11

JACQUES LACAN
雅克 拉岡

SEMINAR 14: THE LOGIC OF FANTASY
The Logic of Fantasy 4
幻见的逻辑

What relation is there between this and the point from which I started earlier? Does it mean that by bringing you onto this field of the most formal logic, I forgot the one on which there is played out, as I said earlier, the fate of logic?

在这一点，跟我早先开始的那一点之间，有什麽关系？难道它意味着，当我带你们进入最光明正大的逻辑的这个领域，我就忘记原先我说过的正在运作的那个领域，逻辑注定的领域？

It is quite clear that Mr Bertrand Russell is more interested than M Jacques Maritain in what is happening in Vietnam. This just by itself may be an indication for us. Besides, in invoking here Le Paysan de la Garonne – it is has latest outfit – I am not taking as a target … (you did not know that Le Paysan de la Garonne has been published? Well then, go and get it …) (laughter). It is the last book of J Maritain, an author who has occupied himself a lot with the scholastic authors in so far as there is developed in them the influence of the philosophy of St Thomas who, after all, has no reason not to be evoked here, in the measure that a certain way of posing the principles of being is, all the same, not without some incidence on what one makes of logic.

显而易见的，波兰、罗素先生对於越南所正在发生的事情，比雅克、玛瑞滕更感到興趣。对於我们而言，这样的事本身就是一个指示。除外，我在此说起Le Paysan de la Garonne 这本书，它是最新出版的东西，我不是拿它当一个目标、、、（你们不知道，Le Paysan de la Garonne 刚刚出版？那就去买来读看看、、、）这是玛瑞藤的最后一本书，这位作者曾经专注於研究那些学术界的学者，因为他们表现聖、汤姆士的哲学的影响。畢竟，我们若是要提出生命实存的原则，或偶尔还要谈论到如何说明逻辑的问题，我们没有理由不引述到他。

One cannot say that this prevents the handling of logic, but it can at certain moments be an obstacle to it. In any case I wanted to specify – I apologise for this parenthesis – that if I evoke Jacques Maritain here and if then, as a consequence, implicitly, I urge You to discover, not that the reading of it is contemptible, but that it is far from being uninteresting.

我们不能说，这样会阻碍到罗辑的处理，但是在某些时刻，它可能是一种障碍。无论如何，我想要指明，我很抱歉必须再插一句，假如我引述雅克、玛瑞藤，假如我因此暗示地建议，你们去看看，那不是暗讽这本书胡说八道，而是因为它里面妙趣叢生。

I would ask you all the same to consult it in this spirit of paradox which is demonstrated in it, of the maintenance in this author, having arrived at his great age (as he underlines himself), of this sort of rigour which allows there to be seen in it, there being pushed really to a caricatural impasse, in a very exact mapping out of the whole relief of the modern development of thought, the maintenance of the most unthinkable hopes about what ought to develop either in its place, or in its margin, and in order that there should be maintained what is his central attachment, namely, what he calls: “the intuition of Being”.

我仍然要求你们参阅它时，不妨带着书中处处可见的矛盾交加的精神，作者极力维护的精神，到达这个伟大的时代（这是他自己强调的），带着里面显现的这种旺盛的精力，结果被逼迫到自作自受的僵局。这确实描绘出思想的现代发展的浮雕：无论在思想的本位，或思想的边缘，顺理成章地发展，匪夷所思地极力维护希望，为了维护中心的联系，换句话说，为了维护他所谓「生命实存的直觉」。

He speaks in this connection of “philosophical Eros”, and in truth I do not have to repudiate – with what I put forward before you about desire – the use of such a term. But its use on this occasion – namely, in order, in the name of the philosophy of Being, to hope for the renaissance, correlatively with the development of modern science, of a philosophy of nature – is part of an Eros it seems to me that can only be situated in the register of Italian comedy! … (laughter).

他谈到「哲学的爱欲」，事实上，这不需要我来否认，我己经跟你们提过有关欲望，这个术语的用途。但是应用到这个场合，换句话说，以生命实存的名义，希望从事这个文艺复兴，跟现代科学，自然哲学的发展齐头並进，我认为就是一种爱欲的表现，只能定位在意大利的喜剧之类。（哄堂大笑）

This in no way prevents, of course, that in passing, while taking one’s distance and repudiating it, there being highlighted some remarks, more than one, and in truth throughout the book some sharp, and pertinent remarks, concerning what is involved, for example, in the structure of science. That effectively, our science has nothing in common with the (8) dimension of knowledge (connaissance), is something which in effect is quite correct but which does not include in itself a hope, a promise of this renaissance of knowledge, in the ancient and rejected sense that is involved in our perspective.

当然，这丝毫没有构成阻碍。我们虽然保持距离，予以否认，里面有些话语，不只一处，事实上，通篇都是尖锐而一针见血的话语，例如，关於科学的结构的内涵。那真是鞭辟入里，我们的科学跟知识的向度，没有丝毫关系，事实上，这是完全正确的事，但是它的本身，並没有推论出知识的这个文艺复兴的一个希望，就我们的观点在古时候的意涵而言。

So then, I take up again then, after this parenthesis, what it is a matter of us questioning. There is no need for us to retreat from the use of these truth tables through which the logicians introduce, for example, a certain number of fundamental functions of propositional logic.

在这段插话之后，我再开始谈我们要置疑的是什麽？我们没有需要从这些真理表格的用途中撤离，例如，透过这些真理表格，逻辑专家介绍命题逻辑的某些基本的功用。

To write that the conjunction of two propositions implies – a table, I remind you, I am not going to make all of them for you, can be seen by anyone – implies that if we put here the values of two propositions, namely, of the proposition p, the value true and the value false (namely, that it can be either true of false), and for the proposition q, the value true and the value false and that in this case, what is called conjunction, namely, that what they are, united together, will not be true unless both are true. In all the other cases, their conjunction will give a false result. Here is the type of table that is involved.
p,q | p q
T | T F
F | F F

为了书写两个命题的连接暗涵什麽，任何人都会看出，那暗涵一个表格。我只是提醒一下，我没有打算全部跟你们排列出来。那暗涵着：假如我们将两个命题的价值放置在这里，换句话说，命题是p，价值为真，价值为假（换句话说，价值可能为真，也可能为假），命题是q ，价值为真，价值为假。在这种情况下，所谓的连接，换句话说，它们两者的本身，连接在一起，将不会是真，除非两边的价值都是真。在所有其它的例子里，它们的连接的结果都是假。牵涉到表格类型如下：
p,q | p q
T | T F
F | F F

I do not have to vary it for you, because it is enough for you to open the beginning of any volume whatsoever on modern logic, in order to find how there is defined differently, for example, disjunction, or again implication, or again equivalence.

我不需要替你们做变化演算，因为你们打开任何一本现代罗辑的初阶，就会发现，有各种不同的定义，例如，中断、或涵盖、或相等。

And this can be a support for us, but it is only a support and a prop for what we have to ask ourselves, namely, is it licit – what we handle as I might say, by the word, what we say, in saying that there is truth – is it licit to rite what we say, in so far as writing it is going to be for us the foundation of our manipulation?
In effect, logic, modern logic (I must have said it and repeated it), wants to establish itself – I did not say from a convention – but from a rule of writing; which rule of (9) writing, naturally, is grounded on what? On the fact that at the time of constituting its alphabet, we have posed a certain number of rules, called axioms, about their correct manipulation and that this is, in a way, a word that we have given ourselves.

这对於我们是一种支持，但是它只是一种支持，一种支撑，对於我们必需置疑自己的东西，换句话说，
如我所说的，我们所处理的文字，我们口口声声说的真理的存在，它能自圆其说吗？我们将我们说话的内容形式化，以书写的方式，作为我们操控的基础，然后振振有词，那就是真理吗？事实上，逻辑，现代逻辑（我一定说过，而且一再重复），想要根据一套我姑且不说是传统，而是一套书写的规则，奠定自己的基础。问题当然是，哪一套规则奠定哪一套逻辑？

Do we have the right to inscribe the signifiers T and F, the true and the false, as something that can be handled logically? It is sure that – whatever may be, in a way, the introductory, preliminary (premissiel) character of these truth tables in the tiny logical treatises which may come into your hands – it is sure that the whole effort of the development of this logic, will be such as to construct propositional logic without starting from these tables, even if in fact, after having constructed differently their rules of deduction, one has to come back to them. But for our part, what interests us, is also to know, let us say, at least what was meant by the fact that use was made of them, I am saying here, very especially in Stoic logic. Earlier I alluded to the Ex falso sequitur quodlibet … It is of course something that must have appeared a long time ago, but it is clear that it was never articulated with such force, anywhere better than among the Stoics.

我们有权利铭记真跟假的这些意符，作为逻辑处理的东西吗？的确，无论如何，你们手中拿到的这些小逻辑论文，里面这些真理表格的初阶的基本特性，的确，这种逻辑的发展的全部努力，结果就是要建构命题的逻辑，但是不从这些表格开始，即使事实上，我们必须要回到表格那里，当我们已经用不同方式建构它们的推论的规则之后。但是，就我们而言，我们感到兴趣的是，我们也想要知道，容我这样说，我们至少也想要知道，使用这些表格是什麽用意？我正在说的是，特别是在斯多葛学派的禁欲逻辑。早先，我曾经提到Ex falso sequitur quodlibet 这本书。那当然是很早以前就出现的书，但是显而易见的，当中，表达得最强而有力的，莫过於斯多葛学派的禁欲逻辑。

The Stoics questioned themselves about the true and the false along this logical path. Namely, what is necessary for the true and the false to have a relation to logic in the proper sense that we put it here, namely, where the foundation of logic is not to be found elsewhere than in the articulation of language, in the signifying chain. That is why their logic is a logic of propositions and not one of classes. For there to be a logic of propositions, for that even to be able to operate, how must the propositions be linked together with respect to the true and the false?

斯多葛学派沿着这条逻辑的小径，置疑自己有关真与假。换句话说，对於真与假所需要的分辨，要有一个我们在这里所说的逻辑的关系。换句话说，除了在语言的表达中，除了在意符的锁链中，逻辑的基础不能够在别的地方找到。那就是为什麽，他们的逻辑是一种命题的逻辑，而不是分类的逻辑。关於真与假这一方面，命题要如何连接在一起，才能产生命题的逻辑，以及让它可以演算？

Either this logic has nothing to do with the true and the false, or if it has anything to do, the true ought to engender the true. This is what is called the relation of implication in the sense that it makes nothing else intervene but two propositional moments: the protasis (I am saying “protasis” in order not to say “hypothesis” which would immediately awaken in you the idea that one believes in something, it is not a matter of belief, nor of believing that it is true, it is a matter of positing: “protasis”, that is all. Namely, that what is affirmed is affirmed as true). And the second proposition: apodosis. We define implication as something in which there can be, nothing more, a true protasis and apodosis: this can only give something that we put in parenthesis and which constitutes a true liaison.

这种命题的逻辑，要就跟真实与虚假的分辨没有任何关系，要不然就是，真要有关系，那就是，真实应该产生真实。这就是所谓的涵盖的关系，用意是，它不让任何其它东西干涉进来，除了这两个命题的时刻：「先决条件」。（我说「先决条件」，而不说是「假设前提」，以免你们一下子就联想到人必须要有信仰。这不是一件信仰的问题，也不是信者恒信为真，而是提出「先决条件」的问题，仅此而已。）换句话说，我所肯定的事，被肯定为真实。第二个命题是：「结果条件」。我们将它定义为涵盖某件东西，那就是有一个真实的先决条件跟一个真实的结果条件，没有别的。这样它只会产生我们放在括弧里面的东西，这个东西形成一种联系。

雄伯译
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