Logic of phantasy 11 JACQUES LACAN

Logic of phantasy 11

雅克 拉岡

The Logic of Fantasy 4

What relation is there between this and the point from which I started earlier? Does it mean that by bringing you onto this field of the most formal logic, I forgot the one on which there is played out, as I said earlier, the fate of logic?


It is quite clear that Mr Bertrand Russell is more interested than M Jacques Maritain in what is happening in Vietnam. This just by itself may be an indication for us. Besides, in invoking here Le Paysan de la Garonne – it is has latest outfit – I am not taking as a target … (you did not know that Le Paysan de la Garonne has been published? Well then, go and get it …) (laughter). It is the last book of J Maritain, an author who has occupied himself a lot with the scholastic authors in so far as there is developed in them the influence of the philosophy of St Thomas who, after all, has no reason not to be evoked here, in the measure that a certain way of posing the principles of being is, all the same, not without some incidence on what one makes of logic.

显而易见的,波兰、罗素先生对於越南所正在发生的事情,比雅克、玛瑞滕更感到興趣。对於我们而言,这样的事本身就是一个指示。除外,我在此说起Le Paysan de la Garonne 这本书,它是最新出版的东西,我不是拿它当一个目标、、、(你们不知道,Le Paysan de la Garonne 刚刚出版?那就去买来读看看、、、)这是玛瑞藤的最后一本书,这位作者曾经专注於研究那些学术界的学者,因为他们表现聖、汤姆士的哲学的影响。畢竟,我们若是要提出生命实存的原则,或偶尔还要谈论到如何说明逻辑的问题,我们没有理由不引述到他。

One cannot say that this prevents the handling of logic, but it can at certain moments be an obstacle to it. In any case I wanted to specify – I apologise for this parenthesis – that if I evoke Jacques Maritain here and if then, as a consequence, implicitly, I urge You to discover, not that the reading of it is contemptible, but that it is far from being uninteresting.


I would ask you all the same to consult it in this spirit of paradox which is demonstrated in it, of the maintenance in this author, having arrived at his great age (as he underlines himself), of this sort of rigour which allows there to be seen in it, there being pushed really to a caricatural impasse, in a very exact mapping out of the whole relief of the modern development of thought, the maintenance of the most unthinkable hopes about what ought to develop either in its place, or in its margin, and in order that there should be maintained what is his central attachment, namely, what he calls: “the intuition of Being”.


He speaks in this connection of “philosophical Eros”, and in truth I do not have to repudiate – with what I put forward before you about desire – the use of such a term. But its use on this occasion – namely, in order, in the name of the philosophy of Being, to hope for the renaissance, correlatively with the development of modern science, of a philosophy of nature – is part of an Eros it seems to me that can only be situated in the register of Italian comedy! … (laughter).


This in no way prevents, of course, that in passing, while taking one’s distance and repudiating it, there being highlighted some remarks, more than one, and in truth throughout the book some sharp, and pertinent remarks, concerning what is involved, for example, in the structure of science. That effectively, our science has nothing in common with the (8) dimension of knowledge (connaissance), is something which in effect is quite correct but which does not include in itself a hope, a promise of this renaissance of knowledge, in the ancient and rejected sense that is involved in our perspective.


So then, I take up again then, after this parenthesis, what it is a matter of us questioning. There is no need for us to retreat from the use of these truth tables through which the logicians introduce, for example, a certain number of fundamental functions of propositional logic.


To write that the conjunction of two propositions implies – a table, I remind you, I am not going to make all of them for you, can be seen by anyone – implies that if we put here the values of two propositions, namely, of the proposition p, the value true and the value false (namely, that it can be either true of false), and for the proposition q, the value true and the value false and that in this case, what is called conjunction, namely, that what they are, united together, will not be true unless both are true. In all the other cases, their conjunction will give a false result. Here is the type of table that is involved.
p,q | p q
T | T F
F | F F

为了书写两个命题的连接暗涵什麽,任何人都会看出,那暗涵一个表格。我只是提醒一下,我没有打算全部跟你们排列出来。那暗涵着:假如我们将两个命题的价值放置在这里,换句话说,命题是p,价值为真,价值为假(换句话说,价值可能为真,也可能为假),命题是q ,价值为真,价值为假。在这种情况下,所谓的连接,换句话说,它们两者的本身,连接在一起,将不会是真,除非两边的价值都是真。在所有其它的例子里,它们的连接的结果都是假。牵涉到表格类型如下:
p,q | p q
T | T F
F | F F

I do not have to vary it for you, because it is enough for you to open the beginning of any volume whatsoever on modern logic, in order to find how there is defined differently, for example, disjunction, or again implication, or again equivalence.


And this can be a support for us, but it is only a support and a prop for what we have to ask ourselves, namely, is it licit – what we handle as I might say, by the word, what we say, in saying that there is truth – is it licit to rite what we say, in so far as writing it is going to be for us the foundation of our manipulation?
In effect, logic, modern logic (I must have said it and repeated it), wants to establish itself – I did not say from a convention – but from a rule of writing; which rule of (9) writing, naturally, is grounded on what? On the fact that at the time of constituting its alphabet, we have posed a certain number of rules, called axioms, about their correct manipulation and that this is, in a way, a word that we have given ourselves.


Do we have the right to inscribe the signifiers T and F, the true and the false, as something that can be handled logically? It is sure that – whatever may be, in a way, the introductory, preliminary (premissiel) character of these truth tables in the tiny logical treatises which may come into your hands – it is sure that the whole effort of the development of this logic, will be such as to construct propositional logic without starting from these tables, even if in fact, after having constructed differently their rules of deduction, one has to come back to them. But for our part, what interests us, is also to know, let us say, at least what was meant by the fact that use was made of them, I am saying here, very especially in Stoic logic. Earlier I alluded to the Ex falso sequitur quodlibet … It is of course something that must have appeared a long time ago, but it is clear that it was never articulated with such force, anywhere better than among the Stoics.

我们有权利铭记真跟假的这些意符,作为逻辑处理的东西吗?的确,无论如何,你们手中拿到的这些小逻辑论文,里面这些真理表格的初阶的基本特性,的确,这种逻辑的发展的全部努力,结果就是要建构命题的逻辑,但是不从这些表格开始,即使事实上,我们必须要回到表格那里,当我们已经用不同方式建构它们的推论的规则之后。但是,就我们而言,我们感到兴趣的是,我们也想要知道,容我这样说,我们至少也想要知道,使用这些表格是什麽用意?我正在说的是,特别是在斯多葛学派的禁欲逻辑。早先,我曾经提到Ex falso sequitur quodlibet 这本书。那当然是很早以前就出现的书,但是显而易见的,当中,表达得最强而有力的,莫过於斯多葛学派的禁欲逻辑。

The Stoics questioned themselves about the true and the false along this logical path. Namely, what is necessary for the true and the false to have a relation to logic in the proper sense that we put it here, namely, where the foundation of logic is not to be found elsewhere than in the articulation of language, in the signifying chain. That is why their logic is a logic of propositions and not one of classes. For there to be a logic of propositions, for that even to be able to operate, how must the propositions be linked together with respect to the true and the false?


Either this logic has nothing to do with the true and the false, or if it has anything to do, the true ought to engender the true. This is what is called the relation of implication in the sense that it makes nothing else intervene but two propositional moments: the protasis (I am saying “protasis” in order not to say “hypothesis” which would immediately awaken in you the idea that one believes in something, it is not a matter of belief, nor of believing that it is true, it is a matter of positing: “protasis”, that is all. Namely, that what is affirmed is affirmed as true). And the second proposition: apodosis. We define implication as something in which there can be, nothing more, a true protasis and apodosis: this can only give something that we put in parenthesis and which constitutes a true liaison.



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