Logic of Phantasy 43 Jacques Lacan

Logic of Phantasy 43
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14:
The Logic of Fantasy 11
幻见的逻辑
Seminar 11: Wednesday, February 15, 1967

The Other as such – I am saying, this locus of the Other, in so far as the need for the assuring of a truth evokes it – the Other as such is, as I might say, if you will permit this word that I have improvised: fractured. In the same way as we grasp it in the subject itself – very precisely in the way in which the double topological loop of repetition marks it – the Other also finds itself under the impact of this finiteness.

大它者的本身，我是说，大它者的轨迹，为了确定一项真理，必须召唤它。我不妨这样说，大它者的本身，恕我临时编撰这个字眼，骨折断裂。就像我们在生命的主体身上，掌握到它，的确，就像重复的双重的地形的圈套所标示，大它者也发现它自己处与这个有限性的影响。

(8) Thus division is found to be posited at the heart of the conditions of truth. A complication, let us say, brought to any exigency, of the Leibnizian type – of reservation of the aforesaid, I mean, of the truth. The salva veritate, essential to any order of philosophical thinking, is for us – and not simply because of psychoanalysis – manifest at all points of this development which is carried out at the level of mathematical logic – is for us a little bit more complicated. It completely excludes in any case, any form of intuitive absoluteness; the attribution, for example, to the field of the Other, of the dimension – described in as Spinozian a way as you wish – of the Eternal, for example.

（第八）因此，在真理的状况的核心，分裂的情况被发现。容我们这样说，一种莱布尼斯哲学的併发症，一种前述的真理「保存状态」，成为一种紧急状态。这个「保存真相」，对於哲学的思想的条理非常重要，不仅是因为精神分析学，对於我们，它显现在数学逻辑发展的每一个时段，对於我们，显得更加复杂。无论如何，它完全排除任何直觉绝对化的形式，例如，它被归属於大它者的领域，像史宾诺莎哲学有关「永恒」的向度。

This permanent downfall of the Other is ineradicable from the given of subjective experience. It is what puts at the heart of this experience the phenomenon of belief in its ambiguity, constituted by the fact that it is not by accident, by ignorance, that the truth is presented in the dimension of the contestable. A phenomenon, then, which is not to be considered as a happening due to a defect, but as a fact of structure, and that here, for us, is the point of prudence. The point that we are solicited to advance towards with the most discrete steps, I mean in the most discerning way, to designate the substantial point of this structure, in order not to lend to the confusion into which people precipitate themselves, not innocently no doubt, by suggesting here a renewed form of positivism.

大它者永久的墜落，无法从生命主体的经验的符号里抹除掉。它将信仰自身的模糊不清的现象，摆置在这个经验的核心。这种模糊不清的构成，在於真理的呈现在具有争议性的向度，並非是偶然，或无知。这一个现象因此不应该被认为是因为有缺陷而发生，而是作为一种结构的事实，我们必须谨慎从事。为了要指明这个结构的实质的内涵，我们被要求要多管齐下，我的意思，要步步为营，以免增加人们猛然遭遇的困扰，但是带着无可置疑的纯真，我们建议，这里存在者一种实证主义的复兴。

We should much more rather find our motels in what remains so misunderstood and nevertheless so alive in the fragmentary things tradition has bequeathed us in terms of exercises of scepticism, in so far as they are not simply these brilliant jugglings between opposed doctrines, but on the contrary veritable spiritual exercises, which corresponded certainly to an ethical praxis, which gives its veritable density to the theory that remains to us under this heading and under this rubric.

相反地，我们应该从如此受到误解，可是又充满传统遗留给我们的断简残篇，书名为「怀疑主义的沉思」，找到我们的棲息之所。因为他们不仅仅在互相对立的主义信条之间，也在各自主张的真实精神思维里，来回穿梭。这些信条及精神思维，确实相当等於是一个伦理学的本体，它们强而有力地验证我们目前要讨论的这个标题的理论。

Let us say that it is now a question for us of accounting, in terms of our logic, for the necessary emergence of this locus of the Other in so far as it is thus divided. Because, for us, it is here that we are asked to situate not simply this locus of the Other, the perfect correspondent of the fact that the truth is not deceitful, but much more precisely, at the different levels of subjective experience that the clinic imposes on us, how it is possible for there to be inserted into it – into this experience – agencies which cannot be articulated other than as demands of the Other – and this is neurosis …

让我们说，这个问题是要我们使用我们的逻辑，解释大它者的轨迹，既然如此分歧，为何必然会出现。因为，我们被要求不仅仅要找到大它者的轨迹的位置，完善地对应真理不会是欺骗这个事实，而且更加确实地，要在精神分析诊所带给我们主观性的经验的不同的层次找到。我们如何可能在这种经验之间，插入无法表达的代理，除了就是大它者的代理？那就是精神病患。

And here we cannot fail to denounce how excessive is the use of such terms that we have introduced,
highlighted, like for example that of demand, when we see it taken up under the pen of some novice or other exercising himself on the plane of analytic theory and marking the degree to which it is essential (the youngster shows his perspicacity here) to put at the centre and at the start of the adventure a demand – he says – a “current requirement”. This is what has always been put forward, by making (9) analysis turn around “frustration and gratification”. The use here of the term of demand, which is borrowed from me, is only there to put us off the track of what is essential in it, which is that the subject comes to analysis not to demand anything whatsoever in terms of a current requirement, but in order to know what he is demanding. Which leads him, very precisely, to this path of demanding that the Other should demand something of him.

在此，我们一定会抨击，我们所介绍及强调的这些术语，例如，需求的术语，多麽遭到滥用。当我们看到它们引述发挥，在一些新手或从事精神分析的理论家。他们必须（特别是一位年轻学者表现他的颖慧聪明）他将一种需求，社会「现状的需求」，摆置在精神分析探讨的中心跟开始。这个观点时常被提出，使得精神分析所遭遇的「挫折跟满足」，为之逆转。「需求」这个术语，原先是从我这里借用，被使用在那里，只是使大家脱离重要的途径。那就是，主体前来精神分析，不是要求任何符合社会的「现状的需求」，而是为了要「知道」他自己正在需求什麽。的确，这样的需求会导致最后会要求：「大它者应该对於他，有所需求」。

The problem of the demand is situated at the level of the Other. The desire of the neurotic turns around the demand of the Other and the logical problem is to know how we can situate this function of the demand of the Other, on this support: that the Other pure and simple, as such, is the O barred.

需求的问题，被定位在大它者的层次。精神官能症患的欲望，倒转大它者的需求。逻辑的问题是要先知道，我们如何定位大它者的需求的功用，这样我们才能支持：纯净而单纯的大它者的本身，是被禁制的大它者。

Many other terms are also to be evoked as having to find their place in the Other. The anxiety of the Other is the true root of the position of the subject as a masochistic position. Let us say again how we ought to conceive of the fact that a point of jouissance is essentially locatable as jouissance of the Other; a point without which it is impossible to understand what is at stake in perversion. A point, nevertheless, which is the only structural referent that can account for what in the tradition is grasped as Selbstbewusstsein. Nothing else in the subject really traverses itself, perforates itself, as I might say, as such – I will try to sketch out for you, one day, some childish model of it – nothing else, except this point which makes of jouissance, the jouissance of the Other.

还有许多其它的术语也必须被引用，这样我们才能在大它者那里找到它们的位置。大它者的「焦虑」，是主体的立场，处於受虐狂的立场的真实的根源。让我们再说一遍，我们应该如何构想这个事实：「大欢爽」点的位置，基本上，被发现是「大它者的大欢爽」。假如缺乏这一点，我们不可能了解，偏执狂岌岌可危的地方在哪里。可是，这一点是唯一的结构指称，能够用来说明传统上我们所理解的「自我意识」。主体身上没有别的东西，能如此来回穿梭，如此出入自如，我不妨这样说。有朝一日，我将会跟你们描述这个大欢爽的大略模式。除了这个点，没有别的东西，能够解释「大欢爽」，大它者的大欢爽。

We are not going to go into these problems immediately. We have today to trace the consequences to be drawn from the relationship of this graph of repetition, to what we have punctuated as the fundamental choice of alienation.

我们马上就探讨这个问题。今天我们必须追踪，从「重复的图表」的的关系，所能够获得的结论。我们必须追踪到我们所强调的「疏离」的基本选择

It is easy to see, from this double loop, that the more it sticks to itself, the more it will tend to be divided. By supposing that here (figure 1) the distance from one edge to the other is reduced, it is easy to see that it will be two rings (rondelles) that will come to be isolated.

从这个双重圈套，我们很容易看出，它越是坚持它自己，它就越会倾向於被分裂。我们假定，在此（图表一），从一个边缘到另一个边缘的距离，我们很容易看出，有两个圈套将会渐渐被孤立出来。

What relationship is there between this passage a l’acte of alienation and repetition itself? Well then, very
precisely, what can and what ought to be called: the act.

疏离的这个「付诸行动」跟「重复」的本身之间，有怎样的关系？确实地，我们能够或应该怎麽称呼这个「行动」？

Today, I want to put forward the premises of a logical situation of the act as such.

今天，我要提这个「行动」本身的逻辑状况，会有哪些的假设。

If this double loop of the drawing of repetition imposes a topology on us, it is because it cannot have its function as edge on just any surface whatsoever. Try to draw it on the surface of a sphere I showed it a long time ago – you can tell me how you get on! – (Figure 2). Bring it back here and try to close it in such a way that it is an edge, namely, that it does not cut itself. This is impossible. These things are not possible – I (11) already pointed out a long time ago – except on a certain type of surface (those which are drawn here, for example) such as the torus that I called on at one time, the cross-cap or the projective plane, or again the third (tierce) Klein bottle which you know, I think, if you still remember, the little drawing in which it can be imaged (it being clearly understood that the Klein bottle has nothing which especially links it to this particular representation.) The important thing is to know what, in each one of these surfaces, results from the cut constituted by the double loop.

假如「重复」赋加在我们身上，画出这个双重的圈套，那是因为「它不可能仅仅就在任何的表面，充当边缘的功用」。假如你们设法在我不久以前给你们看的一个球形物的表面，画出这个双重的圈套，你们能否告诉我，你们对於身处圈套里的感受如何？假如你们将它带回到这里，设法封闭它，让它成为一个边缘，让它不要切割到自己。那时不可能的事。不可能有这样的事，我在不久以前就已经告诉过你们，除了在某种的表面（例如，我在这里所画的那些表面），例如有一次我跟你们提过的「突出形状」，这个投射平面的「交叉帽盖」，或是你们知道的第三个内外两个向度交织的「克来因瓶形」。假如你们依旧记得，那个我们想像出来的小图形（显而易见的，克来因瓶形，没有东西可以特别连接到这个特别的符号）。重要的是要知道，在每一个这些表面，这个双重圈套所造成的切割，结果会是如何？

On the torus, this cut will give a surface with two edges. On the cross-cap, it will give a cut with a single edge.

在这突出形状，这个切割造成一个表面，拥有两个边缘。在交叉帽盖那里，它造成一个切割，只有一个边缘。

雄伯译
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