Logic of Phantasy 29 Jacques Lacan

Logic of Phantasy 29

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

Lacan Seminar 14:
The Logic of Fantasy 8
幻见的逻辑
Seminar 8: Wednesday, January 18, 1967

It is from what follows as a consequence of this, in so far as it is a decisive step forward, that it is a matter … I mean that it is in a thinking determined by this first step that Freud’s discovery is inscribed.
i spoke about the Other … it is clear that at the level of the Cartesian cogito, there is a remitting to the charge of the Other of the consequences of this step. If the cogito ergo sum does not imply what Descartes wrote quite literally in his Regulae – where there can be so clearly read all the conditions which determined it as thinking – if the cogito is not completed by a, sum, ergo Deus est (which assuredly makes things much easier), it is not tenable. And nevertheless, if it is not tenable as an articulation – I mean a philosophical one – it nonetheless remains that the benefit has been won. That the procedure which reduces to this narrow margin of the thinking being, in so far as he thinks he is able to ground himself as I am, simply on this thinking, it remains that (4) something has been won whose consequences can be read very quickly, moreover, in a series of contradictions.

这是从随后的结果，因为那是前进的决定性的一步，这个一件事情，我的意思是，这个第一步，决定了佛洛伊德的发现所铭记的一个思想。我谈到了大它者。显而易见的，笛卡尔的「我思故我在」的层次，这一步的结果，移交给大它者来负责。假如「我思故我在」並没有涵盖笛卡尔在「音乐美学」，实质上所书写的，在那里，所有决定它作为思想的条件，可以清楚地被阅读，假如「我思故我在」后面，没有补充上「我在，因此上帝存在」，（那确实是使事情好办多了），那是难於自圆其说的。可是，即使它作为一种表达，难於自圆其说，「我思故我在」的利益，确实始终存在，我指的是哲学方面。这个程序，将它简化到思想作为生命实存的狭窄边缘，他认为他能够将他自己的基础，将「我存在」仅仅建立在这个思想上。而且，在一系列的矛盾当中，结果能够很快地被阅读出来，这已经是一个很大的利益。

For this indeed is the place to mark, for example, that the supposed foundation of simple intuition, which would see the extended thing being radically distinguished from the thinking thing, (the first being founded on the exteriority one from another of its parts, from the foundation of partes extra partes, as characteristic of extension) is very soon annihilated by the Newtonian discovery, in extension, is precisely that in each one of its points, as I might say, no mass is unaware of what is happening at that very instant in all the other points. An obvious paradox certainly and one which gave contemporaries, and very specially Cartesians, a lot of difficulty in admitting.

因为确实是这个标示的位置，例如，它被认为是简单直觉的基础，我们可以看出，这个延伸的「真实之物」，截然不同於「思想的真实之物」，（第一个生命的实存，建立在外在性的基础上，从自身以外的另一部分，从「一部分作为另一部分的外在之物」，作为延伸的特色）。这个被认为是简单的直觉的基础，在延伸中，不久就被牛顿的发现给毁灭了，在它的每一个点，我不妨这样说，没有一个质量不知道正在发生的事情，就在所有其它点的那个瞬间。这当然是一个显而易见的矛盾，这个矛盾使得当代人，特别是笛卡尔学派，很难去承认。

This reticence has not dried up and it demonstrates something which, for us is certainly completed by the fact that the thinking thing imposes itself on us, precisely, from Freudian experience, as being – for its part – no longer this thing always marked by an indefectible unification, but, quite the contrary, as marked, as characterised by being fragmented, indeed fragmenting – carrying in itself the same mark which is developed and in a way is demonstrated in the whole development of modern logic; namely, that what we call the machine, in its essential functioning, is what is closest to a combinatorial of notations and that this combinatorial of notations is for us the most precious, the most indicative fruit of the development of thinking.

这种碍於啟口去承认，並没有因此终结，它证明某件事情，从佛洛伊德的精神分析经验开始，这个「思想作为真实之物」，自己赋加在我们身上，作为生命的实存。就它本身而言，这个思想作为真实之物，不再总是标示着一种没有瑕疵的结合。相反的，它被标示的特色是片片断断，确实是片片断断，本身展现的标示，在某方面，可以用现代逻辑的全部发展来证明。换句话说，我们所谓的机器，在其基本的运作，相当接近於一些标记的组合。这种标记的组合，对我们而言，是思想的发展，最珍贵，最具有指标性的成果。

Freud, here, makes his contribution by demonstrating what results from the effective functioning of this aspect of thinking. I mean, from its relation, not to the subject of mathematical proof, whose essence we are going to recall right away, but to the subject that Kant would call the pathological subject, namely, to the subject in so far as he may suffer from this sort of thinking. The subject suffers from thinking, in so far, says Freud, as he represses it.

在此，佛洛伊德做了他的贡献。他证明，思想这一方面的有效率的运作，结果会是什麽。我的意思是，从它的关系，不是跟数学证明的生命的主体的关系，有关它的本质，我们立刻将会撤销，而是跟康德所谓的「病理状态的生命的主体」的关系，换句话说，跟遭受到这种思想方式的痛苦的生命的主体的关系。如佛洛伊德所说，生命的主体遭受到思想的痛苦，因为他压抑它。

The fragmented and fragmenting character of this repressed thinking is what our experience teaches us every day, in psychoanalysis.

这种被压抑的思想，具有片片断断的零碎的特性，就是我们精神分析经验，每天所教导我们的。

That is why it is a crude and dishonest mythology to present, as the foundation of our experience, some nostalgia or other for a primitive unity, for a pure and simple pulsation of satisfaction, in a relation to the Other, who is here the only one who counts and who is imaged, who is represented as the Other of a feeding relation. The following step, still more scandalous – as I might say – than the first, becoming necessarily what happens, what is articulated in modern psychoanalytic theory throughout its length and breath: the confusion between this feeding Other and the sexual Other.

那就是为什麽，我们提供的，是一个粗糙而且不诚实的神话，作为我们精神分析学的基础，作为是我们怀念一种原始的和谐，怀念一种纯净而简朴的满足的悸动，跟大它者的关系。在此，大它者是唯一在精心策划，在粉墨登场，充当是一种充实人伦关系的大它者。随后的一步，比起最初的那一步，更加的令人不堪，却是必然会发生的事情。用现代的精神分析学理论，从头到尾地来表达，那就是：这个充实人伦关系的大它者，跟性爱的大它者，彼此混肴不清。

There is really no salvation – as I might say – for the thinking, no possible preservation of the truth introduced by Freud (but also indeed of technical honesty), that cannot, that ought nothing aside of this crude lure, of this scandalous abuse that it represents. A sort of contrary pedagogy, a deliberate use of a capture, by a sort of illusion especially untenable for anyone who throws an honest glance at what (5) psychoanalytic experience is.

对於这样的思想，真的没有救赎之道，我可以这样说。佛洛伊德介绍的这个真理，没有保存的可能性（以我作为专业的诚实来说），除了这个粗糙的引诱，除了它所代表的种种不堪的滥用。这是一种跟教学法背道而驰的东西，一种精心策划的捕捉策略，对於任何诚实地观照到精神分析经验的人，一种难於自圆其说的幻见。

Re-establishing the Other in the only status which is valid, which for it is that of the locus of the word, is the necessary starting point from which everything in our analytic experience can take up its correct place again.

重新建立大它者，在唯一令人信服的地位，那就是「文字的轨迹」的地位。这是必要的起始点，在我们精神分析经验的一切，都可以再一次，占据它的正确的位置。

To define the Other as the locus of the word, is to say that it s nothing other than the locus where an assertion is posited as veracious. It is to say, with the same stroke, that it has no other kind of existence. But, since to say it, is still to appeal to it in order to situate this truth, it is to make it re-emerge every time that I speak. And that is why I cannot say this expression: “that it has no kind of existence”, but I can write it. And that is why I write S signifier of capital O barred as constituting one of the nodal points of this network around which there is articulated the whole dialectic of desire, in so far as it is hollowed out from the interval between statement and stating.

将大它者定义为文字的轨迹，等於是说，它仅仅就是一个主张被提出，当着是诚实的轨迹。换句话说，它没有其它种类的存在。但是，既然说到它，就等於是诉诸於它，为了找到这个真理的位置，那就每一次我说话的时候，使它重新出现。那就是为什麽，我不能说这个表达：「它没有任何种类的存在」，但是我能够「书写」它。那就是为什麽，我书写人作为生命的意符，被大它者所禁制。这样它形成这个网络的其中一个节点，在欲望的整个辩证法中被表达。在主体的被陈述与陈述之间的这个间隔期间，它被掏空掉。

There is no insufficiency, no reduction to some careless gesture or other, in the fact of affirming that the writing, S(barred-O) plays here, for our thinking, an essential, pivotal role. For there is no other foundation for what is called mathematical truth, except in the recourse to the Other, in so far as those to whom I am speaking are asked to refer to it (I mean: qua big Other), to see inscribed there the signs of our initial conventions as regards what is involved in what I manipulate in mathematics.

这没有什麽不足够，也没有办法将它简化成为某种粗心的姿态，因为对於我们的思想，它肯定书写，作为一个被大它者禁制的主体，扮演一个基本的枢纽的角色。所谓的数学的真理，並没有其它的基础，除了诉诸於这个大它者。对于我正在跟他们演讲的那些人，我要求他们提到它（我的意思是指大它者本身），看到我们最初的传统的符号被铭记在那里，关於我运用数学来诠释，所牵涉到的东西。

Which is very exactly what Mr. Bertrand Russell, an expert in the matter, would go as far as to dare to designate in these terms: that we do not know what we are talking about, nor whether there is the slightest truth in what we are saying. And in effect, why not? Simply the recourse to the Other, in so far as corresponding in a certain field to a limited use of certain signs, it is incontestable that, having spoken, I can write and maintain what I have written. (If I cannot, at every step in mathematical reasoning, make this to and fro movement between what I articulate through my discourse and what I inscribe as being established, there is no progression possible of what it called mathematical truth and this is the whole essence of what is called, in mathematics, proof). It is precisely of the same order as what we are dealing with here – the recourse to the Other, is, in every effect of thinking, absolutely determining.

这确实是伯特兰、罗素，这位数理逻辑的专家，艺高人胆大，开宗明义地说：我们不知道，我们正在说些什麽。我们也不知道，我们所说的话，有没有丝毫的真理存在。事实上呢？为什麽不知道？我们只有诉诸於大它者，当它在某些的领域，跟某些符号的局部的使用相一致，无可置疑地，说完这样的话后，我能够书写，並且维持我曾经书写过的东西。（在数学推理的每一步骤，假如我不能够来回地运算，我透过我的真理论述所表达，与我铭记作为生命的实存的建立，彼此之间的互动，那它所谓的数学的真理，就不可能会有进展。这就是所谓的数学证明的证据的本质。）这跟我们正在处理的东西，确实是異曲同工。诉诸於大者，在每一个影响廣被的思想里，绝对是决定性的因素。

雄伯译
springherohsiung@gmail.com