Ethics 43 das ding

Ethics 43
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康
IV Das Ding
第四章：物象
SACHE UND WORT
物表象与词表象
NIEDERSCHRIFTEN
记录
NEBENMENSCH
沉默他者的物象
FREMDE
陌生感

I am going to try to speak to you about the thing – das Ding.
If I introduce this term, it is because there are certain ambiguities, certain
insufficiencies, in relation to the true meaning in Freud of the opposition
between reality principle and pleasure principle; that is to say in relation to
the material which I am trying to explore with you this year, so as to make
you understand its importance for our practice as an ethics. And these ambiguities
have to do with something that is of the order of the signifier and even
of the order of language. What we need here is a concrete, positive and particular
signifier. And I don’t find anything in the French language – I would
be grateful to those who might be sufficiently stimulated by these remarks to
suggest a solution – anything that could correspond to the subtle opposition
in German, which it is not easy to bring out, between the two terms mat
mean “thing” – das Ding and the Sache.

我将要尝试跟你们谈论关于这个物象the thing—das Ding.
假如我介绍这个术语，那是因为有某些的模糊暧昧，某些的不够充分，关于它的真实的意义，弗洛依的将它放置于现实原则与快乐原则的对立。换句话说，关于今年我将要跟你们探索的这个材料，为了让你们了解它的重要性，对于我们精神分析的实践，作为伦理学。这些模糊暧昧跟能指秩序的某件东西有关，甚至在语言的秩序。我们在此所需要的，是一个具体，积极而特别的能指。我在法国语言没有找到任何东西—我将会非常感激，对于那些人，他们对于这些谈论充分感动，以致于建议要有一个解决。我们找到任何东西能够对应在德文里这个微妙的对立。要显示这个对立，并不太容易，在意味着「物象」之间的这两个术语：das Ding 与die Sache。

1
We have only one word in French, the word “la chose” (thing), which derives
from the Latin word “causa.” Its etymological connection to the law suggests
to us something that presents itself as the wrapping and designation of the
concrete. There is no doubt mat in German, too, “thing” in its original sense
concerns the notion of a proceeding, deliberation, or legal debate. Das Ding
may imply not so much a legal proceeding itself as the assembly which makes
it possible, the Volksversammlung.

1
在法文，我们仅有一个字词，“la chose”物象这个字词，它从拉丁文“causal”衍化而来。它的字源跟法律的关联跟我们建议著某件呈现它自己作为具体物象的包裹与指明。无可置疑地，在德文，「物象」的原初的意义，跟程序，深思熟虑，或法律辩论的观念有关系。Das Ding 可能意味着，并不是法律的程序的本身，而是让它成为可能的聚会，这个公共聚会Volksversammlung。

Don’t imagine that this use of etymology, these insights, these etymological
soundings, are what I prefer to guide myself by – although Freud does
remind us all the time that in order to follow the track of the accumulated
experience of tradition, of past generations, linguistic inquiry is the surest
vehicle of the transmission of a development which marks psychic reality.
Current practice, taking note of the use of the signifier in its synchrony, is
infinitely more precious to us. We attach a far greater weight to the way in
which Ding and Sache are used in current speech. Moreover, if we look up
an etymological dictionary, we will find that Sache, too, originally had to do
with a legal proceeding. Sache is the thing that is juridically questioned or,
in our vocabulary, the transition to the symbolic order of a conflict between
men.

你们不要想象，字源学的这个用途，这些见识，这些字源的意义，是我喜欢我用来引导我自己的东西—虽然弗洛依德确实始终提醒我们：为了追踪传统，过去的世代的经验的累积的脉络，语言的研究是最确实的工具，来传递标示心理现实界的发展。目前的做法，注意到能指在它的同时性synchrony的使用，这对我们是弥足珍贵。我们更加重视Ding跟Sache在目前语言被使用的方式。而且，假如我们查阅字源辞典，我们将会发现，Sache，原先也是跟法律程序有关系。Sache是司法上被质疑的物象，或是在我们的词汇里，它转移到人际之间的冲突的符号象征的秩序。

Nevertheless, the two terms are not at all equivalent. For that matter you
may have noted last time in Mr. Lefevre-Pontalis’s remarks a quotation of
terms whose thrust, as he brought out in his presentation, was to raise this
question, it seems to me, in opposition to my doctrine – and it is all the more
praiseworthy in his case since he doesn’t know German. It had to do with
that passage in Freud’s article entided “The Unconscious,” in which the representation
of things, Sachvorstellung, is on every occasion opposed to that of
words, Worworstellung.

可是，这两个术语根不相等。就那件事情而言，上次在潘塔力斯的谈论里，你们
可能已经注意到各种术语的一个引言，他在他的演讲中显露，这些术语的冲撞就是要提出反对我的信条的这个问题，我觉得。以他的情况，这是更加值得赞赏的，因为他并不懂德文。它必须跟弗洛依德的文章的这个段落有关系，文章的题目是：「无意识」。在这篇文章里，事情的符号再现，Sachvorstellung，在每个场合，跟文字的再现Wortvorstellung，格格不入。

I will not enter today into the discussion of the factors that would allow
one to respond to that passage, so often invoked at least in the form of a
question mark, by those of you who are inspired by my lectures to read
Freud- It is a passage which appears to them to constitute an objection to the
emphasis I place on signifying articulation as providing the true structure of
the unconscious.

今天，我将不会从事讨论让我们能够回答那个段落的这些因素。那个段落经常被引用，至少以疑问号的形式，你们那些受到我的演讲启发的人，为了阅读弗洛依德而提问。他们觉得这个段落是构成对于我放置的强调的反对，我强调能指化的表达，作为供应无意识的真实的结构。

The passage in question seems to go against mat, since it opposes Sachvorstellung,
as belonging to the unconscious, to Worworstellung, as belonging to
the preconscious. I would just beg those who stop at that passage – the majority
of you presumably do not go and verify in Freud’s texts what I affirm
here in my commentaries – I would beg them to read together, one after the
other, the article called “the Verdrangung” or “Repression,” which precedes
the article on the unconscious, then that article itself, before arriving at the
passage involved. I will just note for the rest of you that it has precisely to do
with the question that the schizophrenic’s attitude poses for Freud, that is to
say, the manifestly extraordinary prevalence of affinities between words in
what one might call the schizophrenic world.
受到质疑的这个结构似乎反对那个信条。因为它反对事情的符号再现sachvorstellung，作为属于前意识。我将只有请求那些对那个段落适可而止的人们—你们大多数人假定不会去找弗洛依德的文本验证我在此的评论所肯定的东西—我将请求他们一起阅读这篇文章，陆续地。这篇文章的标题是Die Verdrangung 或是「压抑」。这篇文章在讨论无意识的那篇文章之前。这篇文章的本身，在到达牵涉到这个段落之前，我将跟你们其余的人提醒，它确实必须跟这个问题有关，精神分裂症患者的态度对于弗洛依德提出的问题。换句话说，在我们所谓的精神分裂症患者的世界里，字词之间的密切关系，佔有显著的特别的优势。

Everything that I have just discussed seems to me to lead in only one direction,
namely, that Verdrangung operates on nothing other than signifiers. The
fundamental situation of repression is organized around a relationship of the
subject to the signifier. As Freud emphasizes, it is only from that perspective
that it is possible to speak in a precise, analytical sense – I would call it
operational – of unconscious and conscious. He realizes that the special situation
of the schizophrenic, more clearly than that of any other form of neurosis,
places us in the presence of the problem of representation.

我刚刚讨论的每件事情，我觉得是引导仅是朝向一个方向。也就是说，压抑Verdrangung 实实在在就是运作在各种能指上。压抑的基本的情况被组织，环绕着主体跟能指的关系。如同弗洛依德强调的，仅是从那个观点，我们可能用确实的精神分析的意义谈论—我将称它为运作性质—无意识与意识的运作性质。他体会到，精神分裂的特别的情况，比任何其它神经症的情况更加清楚，它将我们放置在符号再现的问题的面前。

I will perhaps have the opportunity to come back to this text later. But you
will note that by offering the solution he seems to be offering in opposing
Worworstellung to Sachvorstellung, there is a problem, an impasse, that Freud
himself emphasizes and that can be explained by the state of linguistics in his
time. He, nevertheless, understood and formulated admirably the distinction
to be made between the operation of language as a function – namely, the
moment when it is articulated and, in effect, plays an essential role in the
preconscious – and the structure of language, as a result of which those elements
put in play in the unconscious are organized. In between, those coordinations
are set up, those Bahnungen, that concatenation, which dominate
its whole economy.

我等一下或许将拥有机会回头谈论这个文本。但是你们将会注意到，凭借提供这个解决，他似乎正在提供的解决，将Wortvorstellung 跟Sachvorstellung 相提并论，会有一个问题，一个僵局。弗洛依德他自己强调的僵局，能够被解释，根据他当代的语言学的状态。可是，他了解并且令人赞赏地说明这个被形成的区别，处于语言的运作，跟语言的结构之间的区别。前者作为一种功用—换句话说，当它一被表达，实际上在前意识，扮演一个基本的角色—后者的结果是，被放置在无意识的那些元素被组织。在两者之间，那些协调座标被建立，那些Bahnungen，那个锁链的状态，它们支配它的整个经济活动。

I have digressed too much, since today I only want to restrict myself to the
remark that Freud speaks of Sachvorstellung and not Dingvorstellung. Moreover,
it is no accident if the Sachvorstellungen are linked to Wortvorstellungen,
since it tells us that there is a relationship between thing and word. The straw
of words only appears to us as straw insofar as we have separated it from the
grain of things, and it was first the straw which bore that grain.

我刚才离题太远，因为今天我仅是想要限制自己谈论，弗洛依德谈论的Sachvorstellung，而不是Dingvorstellung。而且，假如这个Sachvorstellungen 跟Wortvorstellungen息息相关，这并非是偶然。因为它告诉我们，在物象与文字之间，有一层关系。文字的草仅是出现在我们面前，作为草，因为我们将它跟物象的穀粒分开。生出穀粒的首先是草。

I don’t want to begin developing a theory of knowledge here, but it is
obvious that the things of the human world are things in a universe structured
by words, that language, symbolic processes, dominate and govern all.
When we seek to explore the frontier between the animal and the human
world, it is apparent to what extent the symbolic process as such doesn’t
function in the animal world – a phenomenon that can only be a matter of
astonishment for us. A difference in the intelligence, the flexibility, and the
complexity of the apparatuses involved cannot be the only means of explaining
that absence. That man is caught up in symbolic processes of a kind to
which no animal has access cannot be resolved in psychological terms, since
it implies that we first have a complete and precise knowledge of what this
symbolic process means.

我不想要在此开始发展一种知识的理论，但是显而易见地，人类世界的物象，是受到文字架构的宇宙的物象。语言，符号象征的过程，支配而且统辖一切。当我们尝试探究这个边界，处于动物跟人类之间的边界，显而易见的是，符号象征过程的本身并没有在动物的世界运作。对于这样一个现象，我们不禁大为惊奇。对于那种欠缺，我们无法仅是凭借脑的构造的智慧，弹性及复杂性的差异来做解释。
人被套陷于某种的符号象征的过程，这是动物无法进入的过程，这个事实无法用心理学的术语来解决，因为它暗示着，我们首先要有一套完整而确实的知识，对于这个符号象征意味着什么。
The Sache is clearly the thing, a product of industry and of human action
as governed by language. However implicit they may first be in the genesis
of that action, things are always on the surface, always within range of an
explanation. To the extent that it is subjacent to and implicit in every human
action, that activity of which things are the fruit belongs to the preconscious
order, that is to say, something that our interest can bring to consciousness,
on condition that we pay enough attention to it, that we take notice of it. The
word is there in a reciprocal position to the extent that it articulates itself,
that it comes to explain itself beside the thing, to the extent also that an action
– which is itself dominated by language, indeed by command – will have
separated out this object and given it birth.

这个Sache很清楚是这个物象，勤勉及人类活动受到语言统辖的产物。在那个行动的开始，无论它们首先是怎样的意涵，物象总是在表面，总是在解释的范围之内。直到它们隶属于及暗含于人类的每个行动。物象是其结果的活动，属于前意识的秩序。换句话说，我们的興趣能够让某件东西浮上意识层面，只要我们对它充分地注意，我们注意它。文字以一种互惠的方式在那里，直到它表达它自己。它前来物象的旁边解释它自己。直到一个行动将会已经将这个客体分离，并且生产它。这本身是受到语言支配，的确，受到命令支配。

Sache and Wort are, therefore, closely linked; they form a couple. Das Ding
is found somewhere else.

I would like today to show you this Ding in life and in the reality principle
that Freud introduces at the beginning of his thought and that persists to the
end. I will point out the reference to it in a given passage of the Entwurf on
the reality principle and in the article entitled “the Verneinung” or “Denegation”
in which it is an essential point.

Sache 与Wort 因此是息息相关。它们形成一个配对。物象Das Ding 则是在别的地方被找到。
我今天想要跟你们谈论，在生命及现实原则里的这个物象，弗洛依德在他思想的开始介绍的现实原则，这个现实原则持续直到结束。我将要指出跟它的关系，以讨论现实原则的这个构图Entwurf的一个特定的段落，在一篇标题是「否定」Die Verneinung或是Denegation的文章，在里面，那是基本的要点。
雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 46
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康
IV Das Ding
第四章：物象
SACHE UND WORT
NIEDERSCHRIFTEN
NEBENMENSCH
FREMDE

This Ding is not in the relationship – which is to some extent a calculated
one insofar as it is explicable – that causes man to question his words as
referring to things which they have moreover created. There is something
different in das Ding.

这个物象并没有处于这个关系—这个关系有某个程度是经过计算的关系，因为它是可以说明的。那个关系引起人质疑他的话语，因为他的话语提到他们说创造的那些东西。在“物象”里，有某件不同的东西。

What one finds in das Ding is the true secret. For the reality principle has
a secret that, as Lefevre-Pontalis pointed out last time, is paradoxical. If
Freud speaks of the reality principle, it is in order to reveal to us that from a
certain point of view it is always defeated; it only manages to affirm itself at
the margin. And this is so by reason of a kind of pressure that one might say,
if things didn’t, in fact, go much further, Freud calls not “the vital needs” –
as is often said in order to emphasize the secondary process – but the Not des
Lebens in the German text. An infinitely stronger phrase. Something that
wishes. “Need” and not “needs.” Pressure, urgency. The state of Not is the
state of emergency in life.

我们在“物象”里发现的东西，就是这个真实的秘密。因为现实原则拥有一个秘密，如同雷费瑞-潘塔利斯上次指出的，这是个矛盾的秘密。假如弗洛依德谈论现实原则，那是为了跟我们显示：从某个观点，现实原则总是被击败。现实原则仅是在边缘成功地肯定它自己。情况是这样，因为某种的压力，我们不妨说，这种压力实际上还会更加深入，假如事情没有这样的话。弗洛依德并不是称它为：生命的需求“，如同经常所说的，为了强调次要的过程—而是用德文文本称它为”die Not des Lebens“。这是更加强烈无比的词语。某件”愿望“的东西。”需求“而不是”各种需求“。压力，迫切感。这个”不“的状态就是生命里迫切感的状态。

This Not des Lebens intervenes at the level of the secondary process, but in
a deeper way than through that corrective activity; it intervenes so as to determine
the Qη level – the quantity of energy conserved by the organism in
proportion to the response – which is necessary for the conservation of life.
Take note that it is at the level of secondary process that the level of this
necessary determination is exercised.

这个“Not des Lebens“介入在次要的过程的层次，但是以更加深入的方式，比起通过那个修正的活动。它介入，为了决定这个”Qµ“的层次—生命精力的数量被有机体保存，跟回应成比例。这个生命精力的数量是必要的，对于生命的保存。请你们注意，就是在这个次要的过程的层面，这个必要的决定论被运用。

Let us return to the reality principle that is thus invoked from the point of
view of its necessity effect. This remark puts us on the track of what I call its
secret, namely, the following: As soon as we try to articulate the reality principle
so as to make it depend on the physical world to which Freud’s purpose
seems to require us to relate it, it is clear that it functions, in fact, to isolate
the subject from reality.

让我们回到因此而被召唤的现实原则，从它的必要的影响的观点。这个谈论让我们追踪我所谓的它的秘密。换句话说，就是以下：当我们一旦尝试表达这个现实原则，为了让现实原则依靠这个物理的世界，弗洛依德的目的似乎要求我们要将它跟这个物理的世界连接一块。显而易见地，实际上，它发挥功能，为了将主体跟现实分离开来。

We find in it nothing more than that which biology, in effect, teaches us,
namely, that the structure of a living being is dominated by a process of
homeostasis, of isolation from reality. Is that all Freud has to tell us when he
speaks of the functioning of the reality principle? Apparendy, yes. And he
shows us that neither the quantitative element nor the qualitative element in
reality enters the realm – the term he uses is Reich – of the secondary process.

我们在它里面发现的东西，仅仅就是生物学实际上教导我们的东西。换句话说，生物的结构受到“体内平衡“的过程的支配，跟现实脱离的过程的支配。那就是弗洛依德教导我们的一切吗？当他谈论到现实原则的发挥功能。显而易见地，答案是肯定。弗洛依德告诉我们，进入这个次要过程的领域的，既不是现实原则的数量的因数，也不是品质的因素—他用的术语是”Reich“领域。

Exterior quantity enters into contact with the apparatus called the φ system,
that is to say, that part of the whole neuronic apparatus which is directly
turned to the exterior or, roughly speaking, the nerve ends at the level of the
skin, the tendons, and even the muscles and the bones, deep sensitivity.
Everything is done so that Q quantity is definitely blocked, stopped in relation
to that which is supported by another quantity, the Qη quantity – the
latter determines the level that distinguishes the ψ apparatus within the neuronic whole. For the Entwurf is, in fact, the theory of a neuronic apparatus
in relation to which the organism remains exterior, just as much as the outside
world.

外在的数量跟所谓的这个“φ“系统的机制达成接触。换句话说，整个神经症的机制的那个部分，直接地被转移到外部，或者简约地说，神经在皮肤，肌腱，甚至肌肉与骨头，深度感觉的层面结束。每样事情被做，这样”Qn“的数量才会被明确地被阻挡，被阻止，关于被另外一个数量所支持的东西，这个”Qn“数量—后者决定这个层面，区别这个”φ“的机制的层面，在神经的整体内部的层面。因为这个”Entwurf”蓝图，实际上，就是神经的机制的理论，关于这个神经的机制，有机体始终是在外部，正如外在世界是在外部。

Let us turn to quality. There, too, the outside world doesn’t lose all quality.
But, as the theory of the sensory organs shows, this quality is inscribed
in a discontinuous way, according to a scale cut off at each end and shortened
in relation to the different sensory fields in question. A sensory apparatus,
Freud tells us, doesn’t only play the role of extinguisher or of shock-absorber,
like the φ apparatus in general, but also plays the role of sieve.

让我们回到品质。外在世界也没有丧失所有的品质。但是，依照感官器官的理论所教导的，品质被铭记，用断断续续的方式。依照一个在每个末端被切断的规模，并且关于受到质疑的不同的感官的领域，品质被缩减。弗洛依德告诉我们，一个感官的机制并不仅是扮演灭火器的角色，或是避震器的角色，就像通俗的这个φ的机制，而且也扮演筛检的角色。

He doesn’t go any further in the direction of potential solutions that properly
belong to the domain of the physiologist, of the man who wrote The
Sensations, Mr. Pieron. The question of whether, in the field likely to provoke
visual, auditory or other perceptions, the choice is made in this way or
that is not pursued further. Still, we do have there also the notion of a deep
subjectivization of the outside world. Something sifts, sieves, in such a way
that reality is only perceived by man, in his natural, spontaneous state at
least, as radically selected. Man deals with selected bits of reality.

弗洛依德没有更加深入探讨，朝著可能解决的方向。贴切地说，这些可能解决属于生理学家的领域，属于这个人的领域，皮尔容先生，他写这本书“感官现象“。在这个可能引起视觉，听觉，或其他感官感觉到领域，所做的选择，是这个方式或另外一个方式的这个问题，则是没有更加深入被探讨。可是，我们确实在那里也拥有这个观念，外在世界的深层主体性的观念。某件东西过滤，筛检，以这样一种方式，以致于现实被人感觉到，仅是在他自然，自动自发的状态，至少是作为强烈地被选择。人处理被选择过的现实的碎片。

In truth, that only occurs in a function which is localized in relation to the
economy of the whole; it doesn’t concern quality to the extent that it provides
deeper information, that it achieves an essence, but only signs. Freud only
sees them playing a role insofar as they are Qualitatszeichen, but the function
of sign isn’t significant in relation to opaque and enigmatic quality. It is a
sign to the extent that it alerts us to the presence of something that has, in
effect, to do with the outside world; it signals to consciousness that it has to
deal with the outside world.

实际上，那仅是发生在一个被局部化的功能，相关与整体的生命活力。它关心的品质，并没有强烈到它提供更加深入的资讯的程度，让它获得本质的程度。而仅是获得各种记号的程度。弗洛依德仅是看见它们扮演一个角色，因为它们是品质记号 Qualitatszeichen，但是记号的功能并不具有意义，相较于模糊与谜团一般的品质。它作为记号，甚至它提醒我们，对于某件东西是存在，实际上，这个东西跟外在世界有关系。它给予讯号给意识，它必须处理这个外在的世界。

Consciousness has to come to terms with that outside world, and it has had
to come to terms with it ever since men have existed and thought and tried
out theories of knowledge. Freud doesn’t take the problem any further except
to note that it is certainly highly complex and that we are still a long way
from being able to outline a solution of that which organically determines its
particular genesis so precisely.

意识必须跟外在世界达成妥协。自从人类存在，并且思维及尝试知识的各种理论以来，意识始终必须跟外在世界达成妥协。弗洛依德并没有更加深入探讨这个难题，除了就是注意到，这个难题确实高度复杂，我们连描绘一下解决的轮廓的能力，都为时尚早。解决是什么在器官方面明确地决定它的特殊的起源。

But given this, is that all that is involved when Freud speaks to us of the
reality principle? Isn’t this relation no more than that which certain theorists
of behaviorism suggest to us? The kind which represents the fortunate
encounters of an organism faced with a world where it doubtless finds something
to eat and of which it is capable of assimilating certain elements, but
which is in principle made up of random events and chance meetings, chaotic.

但是考虑到这点时，那就是弗洛依德跟我们谈论关于现实原则所牵涉到的一切吗？这个关系难道不是远超过某些行为学派的理论家跟我们暗示的东西吗？这种东西代表面临世界的有机体的幸运的遭遇，在这个世界里，它无可置疑地找到某件可以吃的东西，它能够吸收这个世界的某些元素。但是这个世界原则上又是由散乱的事件组成，由偶然的遭遇，混乱所组成。

Is that all Freud expresses when he speaks of the reality principle?
That is the question I am raising here today with the notion of das Ding.

这就是弗洛依德所表达的一切吗？当他谈论现实原则？那就是我今天在此提出的问题，用“物象“这个观念。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com