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June 26, 2014




Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller




The Object Relation 1956-1957

客体关系 1956-1957












I Introduction导论

II The three forms of object lack客体欠缺的三种形式

III The signifier and the Holy Spirit能指与神圣精神

IV The dialectic of frustration挫折的辩证法

V  On bundling as analysis, and its consequences






VI  The primacy of the phallus and the young homosexual girl


VII 1.:, A Child is Being Beaten and the young homosexual girl


VIII WS Dora and the young homosexual girl






DC The function of the veil


X Identification with the phallus


XI  The phallus and the unsatiated mother









The Z-shaped schema.



The object, lost and refound.




The object, anxiety, the hole.



The fetish and the phobic object.



This year we shall speak on a topic to which the historical evolution of

psychoanalysis, or what is thus named, might give a central position in

theory and in practice, whether in a way that is explicit or not.




This topic is the object relation.




Why did I not choose that when we began these seminars, since it was

already current, primary, critical? Precisely for the reason which motivates

the second part of my title — and Freudian structures.




This topic could be treated, in effect, only after a certain distance had

been taken on the question. We had first to consider the structures in

which Freud has shown us that analysis takes place and operates,

especially the .complex structure of the relation between the two subjects

present in analysis, the analysand, and the analyst. It is to this that our

three years of commentary and criticism of Freud’s texts have been

dedicated, as I shall recall for you briefly.





The first year dealt with the very elements of the technical management

of the cure, that is, with the ideas of transference and resistance. The

second year was concerned with the foundation of the Freudian experience

and discovery, namely, the idea of the unconscious, which I believe I have

sufficiently shown to be what obliged Freud to introduce the principles,

literally paradoxical on the dialectical plane, which figure in Beyond thePleasure Principle. Finally, during the course of the third year, I gave you aclear example of the absolute necessity of isolating that essential

articulation of symbolism which is called the signifier, in order to

understand anything at all, analytically speaking, of the strictly paranoiacfield of the psychoses.






At the end of these three years of criticism, we are thus armed with a

certain number of terms and schemas. The spatiality of the latter is not to

be taken in the intuitive sense of the term schema, but in another perfectlylegitimate, sense, which is topological — it is not a matter of

localizations, but of the relations between places, interposition,

for example, or succession, sequence. Our elaboration culminates in a

schema that we can call the schema, which is the following –





[Diagram, p. 12.]

(Es) S . . o’ other

(Ego) o . . 0 Other





This schema initially provides a notation of the relation of the subject

to the Other. As it is constituted at the beginning of analysis, it is a

relation, of virtual speech by  which he subject receives his own message

from the Other, in the form of speech which is unconscious.






message is, forbidden him, it is profoundly misconstrued [

meconnu] it is deformed, arrested, intercepted, because of the

interception of the imaginary relation


between o and o’, between the ego and the other, which is its typical

object. The imaginary relation, which is essentially an alienated relation,

interrupts, slows down, inhibits, usually inverts, and profoundly

misconstrues the speech relation between the subject and the Other, the

great Other, in so far as this is another subject, a subject par excellence

capable of deceiving.


这个讯息,由于被禁止给他,深深地被错误解释。这个讯息受到扭曲,组碍,拦截,因为在o o’之间,在自我与他者之间的想像的关系受到拦截,因为他者是自我的客体。想像的关系基本上是异化的关系。这个关系会干涉,缓慢,潜抑,通常还会逆转,深深地错误解释主体与大他者,这位伟大的大他者之间的言说关系。因为这是另外一个主体,能够欺骗的无与伦比的主体。





It is not in vain to have introduced this schema into analytic experience,

seeing how that is formulated today by an ever increasing number of

analysts, who give prevalence in analytic theory to the object

without, however, sufficiently commenting on it.




They recenter the

dialectic of the pleasure principle and the reality principle upon it, and

they found analytic progress upon a rectification of the subject’s relation to

the object, considered as a dual relation, which is, they then say, in

speaking of the analytic situation, extremely simple. This relation of

subject to object, which tends more and more to occupy the center of

analytic theory, is precisely what we shall put to test.





Once the object relation considered as dual is seen to correspond

precisely to line o-o’ of our schema, can one thus construct a

satisfactory whole from the phenomena offered to observation in analytic

experience? Does this instrument all by itself allow us to reply to the

facts? Can the more complex schema that we have suggested be put aside,

indeed, must it be discarded?




That the object relation has become, at least in appearance, the principal

theoretical element in analytical explanation, is something that I can

demonstrate to you from a recently published Collective work, to which, infact, the term collective applies particularly well.’ I cannot say that I am

inviting you to delve into it. You will see object relations overvalued and

promoted from one end to the other in a way that is not always very

satisfying in its articulation, but whose monotony and uniformity are

surely striking. You will see the object relation promoted in art article

entitled Evolution de la psychanalyse, and, as the final term in this

evolution, you will see in the article, La Clinique psychanalytique, a

presentation of clinical work which centers it entirely upon the object

relation. Perhaps I might give you some idea of where such a presentation

can lead.






Taken as a whole, the collection is quite striking. One sees analytic

practitioners try to organize their thinking and the understanding they

might have of their own experience around the object relation, without its

seeming to give them full and complete satisfaction, but, on the other

hand, not without its orienting their practice and penetrating it most

profoundly. One cannot say that the fact that they conceive their

experience in these terms is without consequence in their modes of

intervention, in the orientation given to the analysis, and also its results.




That is what one cannot possibly fail to recognize [meconnaitre], in simply

reading them. Analytic theory and practice, it has always been said, cannot

be dissociated, and from the moment that one conceptualizes the

experience in a particular way, it is inevitable that it will also be directed in

that way. Certainly, the practical results can only be partially glimpsed.





To introduce the question of the object relation, and more precisely the

question whether or not it is legitimate and sound to give it a central place

in analytic theory, I shall remind you at least briefly of what this concept

owes, or does not owe, to Freud himself. I shall do so because for us

starting with a commentary on Freud is a sort of guide, and almost a

technical limitation that we have imposed upon ourselves.




Moreover, this year I have sensed in you some questions, if not

disquiet, as to whether I would or would not start off with Freudian texts.

And no doubt it is very difficult, with regard to the object relation, to start

from Freud’s texts themselves, because the object relation is not in them. I

am of course speaking of what is here very strictly taken to be a deviation

in analytic theory. I must therefore start with recent texts and at the same

time, with a critique of their positions. On the other hand, there is no

doubt that we must ultimately refer to the Freudian position, and, at the

same time, we cannot avoid dealing, even if very rapidly, with what

revolves around the very notion of the object in the fundamental themes

that are strictly Freudian.






We cannot do that at the beginning in a way that is fully spelled out. It

is precisely at the end that we shall come back to it, and that we shall be

able to articulate it.




I want, therefore, simply to make a brief reminder that this would not

even be conceivable if there were not behind us three years of

collaboration in textual analysis, and if we had not already encountered

the theme of the object in its various forms.





Freud, of course, speaks of the object. The final part of Three Essays on

the Theory of Sexuality is called precisely “The Finding of an Object”, “Die

Objektfindung”. One is implicitly speaking of the object each time that the

notion of reality comes into play.






One speaks of it in yet a third waywhenever the ambivalence of certain fundamental relations is brought

into play — namely, the fact that the subject makes himself an object for the

other, the fact that there is a particular type of relation in which reciprocity

with regard to an object is patent, and is even a constituent fact.






I would like to put the strongest emphasis on the three modes in which

notions relative to the object before us appear. If you look at Chapter Three

of the Three Essays, you will see something which was already there at the

time that Freud wrote the Entwurf, a text which, I remind you, was only

published by a sort of historical accident, for not only did Freud prefer not

to publish it, but one might say that it was published against his will. Still,

in looking at this first sketch of his psychology, we find the same formula

with regard to the object.






Freud insists that for man, every means to

finding the object is, and is ever, only the pursuit of a drive [tendance] in

which what is at stake is a lost object, an object to be refound.




It is not at all a matter of the object considered in modern theory as

being the fully satisfying object, the typical object, the object par excellence,

the harmonious object, the object that founds man in an adequate reality,

in the reality which gives proof of maturity — the famous genital object.






is striking to see that at the moment when he fabricates the theory of

instinctual development as it was revealed in the earliest analytic

experiences, Freud indicates that the object is grasped by means of a search

for the lost object. The object that corresponds to an advanced state of

instinctual maturation is an object found again, the refound object of early

weaning, the object that first formed the point of attachment in the child’s

earliest satisfactions.




It is clear that a discordance is established by the mere fact of this

repetition. A nostalgia binds the subject to a lost object, and directs the

entire effort of the search. It marks the newly found object

with the sign of

an impossible repitition since this is precisely not the same object — it could

never be.







The primacy of this dialectic puts a fundamental tension at the

center of the subject-object relation, which means that what is sought is

not sought in the same way as what will be found.




It isthe search for a satisfaction past and outgrown that the new object is

sought and it is found and embraced elsewhere it was sought.




There is a fundamental distance introduced by the essentially conflictual

element which all search for the object entails. This is the first form in

which the relation to the object appears in Freud.






May 24, 2014





Aggressivity is the correlative tendency of a mode of

identification that we call narcissistic, and which

determines the formal structure of man’s ego and of the

register of entities characteristic of his world.





The subjective experience of analysis immediately inscribes its results in concrete

psychology. Let us indicate simply what it brings to the psychology of the emotions by

showing the signification common to states as diverse as phantasmatic fear, anger, active

sorrow, or psychasthenic fatigue.




To pass now from the subjectivity of intention to the notion of a tendency to

aggression is to make the leap from the phenomenology of our experience to




But this leap manifests nothing more than a requirement of thought which, in order to

objectify the register of aggressive reactions, and given its inability to seriate this leap in

a quantitative variation, must understand it in a formula of equivalence. This is the use

we make of it in the notion of libido.




The aggressive tendency proves to be fundamental in a certain series of significant

states of the personality, namely, the paranoid and paranoiac psychoses.




In my work I have emphasized that one could co-ordinate by their strictly parallel

seriation the quality of the aggressive reaction to be expected from a particular form of

paranoia with the stage of mental genesis represented by the delusion that is symptomatic

of this same form. A relation that appears even more profound when – I have shown this

in the case of a curable form, self-punishing paranoia – the aggressive act resolves the

delusional construction.




Thus the aggressive reaction is seriated in a continuous manner, from the sudden,

unmotivated outburst of the act, through the whole gamut of belligerent forms, to the cold

war of interpretative demonstrations, paralleled by imputations of noxiousness which, not

to mention the obscure kakon to which the paranoid attributes his alienation from all

living contact, rising in stages from a motivation based on the register of a highly

primitive organicism (poison), to a magical one (evil spells), a telepathic one (influence),

a lesional one (physical intrusion), an abusive one (distortion of intention), a

dispossessive one (appropriation of secrets), a profanatory one (violation of intimacy), a

juridical one (prejudice), a persecutive one (spying and intimidation), one involving

prestige (defamation and attacks on one’s honour), and revenge (damage and






I have shown that in each case this series, in which we find all the successive

envelopes of the biological and social status of the person, retains the original

organization of the forms of the ego and of the object, which are also affected by this

series in their structure, even to the spatial and temporal categories in which the ego and

the object are constituted, experienced as events in a perspective of mirages, as affections

with something stereotypical about them that suspends the workings of the ego/object




Janet, who demonstrated so admirably the signification of feelings of persecution as

phenomenological moments in social behaviour, did not explore their common character,

which is precisely that they are constituted by a stagnation of one of these moments,

similar in their strangeness to the faces of actors when a film is suddenly stopped in mid-action.




Now, this formal stagnation is akin to the most general structure of human knowledge:

that which constitutes the ego and its objects with attributes of permanence, identity, and

substantiality, in short, with entities or ‘things’ that are very different from the Gestalten

that experience enables us to isolate in the shifting field, stretched in accordance with the

lines of animal desire.




In fact, this formal fixation, which introduces a certain rupture of level, a certain

discord between man’s organization and his Umwelt, is the very condition that extends

indefinitely his world and his power, by giving his objects their instrumental polyvalence

and symbolic polyphony, and also their potential as defensive armour.




What I have called paranoic knowledge is shown, therefore, to correspond in its more

or less archaic forms to certain critical moments that mark the history of man’s mental

genesis, each representing a stage in objectifying identification.




By simple observation we can obtain a glimpse of these different stages in the child’s

development. A Charlotte Bühler, an Elsa Köhler, and, following in their footsteps, the

Chicago School have revealed several levels of significative manifestations; but only the

analytic experience can give them their true value by making it possible to reintegrate the

subjective relation into them.




The first level shows us that experience of oneself in the earliest stage of childhood

develops, in so far as it refers to one’s counterpart, from a situation experienced as

undifferentiated. Thus about the age of eight months, we see in these confrontations

between children (which, if they are to be fruitful, must be between children whose age

differential is no more than two and a half months) those gestures of fictitious actions by

which a subject reconducts the imperfect effort of the other’s gesture by confusing their

distinct application, those synchronies of spectacular captation that are all the more

remarkable in that they precede the complete co-ordination of the motor apparatuses that

they bring into play.




Thus the aggressivity that is manifested in the retaliations of taps and blows cannot be

regarded solely as a playful manifestation of the exercise of strengths and their

employment in the mapping of the body. It must be understood in an order of broader coordination:

one that will subordinate the functions of tonic postures and vegetative

tension to a social relativity – in this regard, one might mention Wallon’s remarkable

work, which has drawn our attention to the prevalence of such a social relativity in the

expressive constitution of the human emotions.




Furthermore, I believed myself that I could show that on such occasions the child

anticipates on the mental plane the conquest of the functional unity of his own body,

which, at that stage, is still incomplete on the plane of voluntary motility.




What we have there is a first captation by the image in which the first stage of the

dialectic of identifications can be discerned. It is linked to a Gestalt phenomenon, thechild’s very early perception of the human form, a form which, as we know, holds the

child’s interest in the first months of life, and even, in the case of the human face, from

the tenth day.




But what demonstrates the phenomenon of recognition, which involves

subjectivity, are the signs of triumphant jubilation and playful discovery that characterize,

from the sixth month, the child’s encounter with his image in the mirror.




This behaviour

contrasts strikingly with the indifference shown even by animals that perceive this image,

the chimpanzee, for example, when they have tested its objectal vanity, and it becomes

even more apparent when one realizes that it occurs at an age when the child, as far as

instrumental intelligence is concerned, is backward in relation to the chimpanzee, which

he catches up with only at eleven months.




What I have called the mirror stage is interesting in that it manifests the affective

dynamism by which the subject originally identifies himself with the visual Gestalt of his

own body: in relation to the still very profound lack of co-ordination of his own motility,

it represents an ideal unity, a salutary imago; it is invested with all the original distress

resulting from the child’s intra-organic and relational discordance during the first six

months, when he bears the signs, neurological and humoral, of a physiological natal




It is this captation by the imago of the human form, rather than an Einfühlung the

absence of which is made abundantly clear in early infancy, which, between the ages of

six months and two and a half years, dominates the entire dialectic of the child’s

behaviour in the presence of his similars.




During the whole of this period, one will record

the emotional reactions and the articulated evidences of a normal transitivism. The child

who strikes another says that he has been struck; the child who sees another fall, cries.

Similarly, it is by means of an identification with the other that he sees the whole gamut

of reactions of bearing and display, whose structural ambivalence is clearly revealed in

his behaviour, the slave being identified with the despot, the actor with the spectator, the

seduced with the seducer.


在这整个时期,我们将会记录正常的「转嫁移情」transitivism 的情感的反应与表达出来的各种证据。小孩打到另外一个小孩时会说,他自己被打,小孩看见另外一位小孩摔倒,会哭喊。同样地,凭借认同于另外一位小孩,他体验到忍受与展示的全部反应。这些忍受与展示的结构的爱恨交加,清楚地显示在他的行为里。奴隶被认同是暴君,演员被认同是观众,被诱惑者被认同是诱惑者。



There is a sort of structural crossroads here to which we must accommodate our

thinking if we are to understand the nature of aggressivity in man and its relation with the

formalism of his ego and his objects. It is in this erotic relation, in which the human

individual fixes upon himself an image that alienates him from himself, that are to be

found the energy and the form on which this organization of the passions that he will call

his ego is based.




This form will crystallize in the subject’s internal conflictual tension, which

determines the awakening of his desire for the object of the other’s desire: here the

primordial coming together (concours) is precipitated into aggressive competitiveness

(concurrence), from which develops the triad of others, the ego and the object, which,

spanning the space of specular communion, is inscribed there according to a formalism

proper to itself that so dominates the affective Einfühlung that a child of that age may

mistake the identity of the most familiar people if they appear in an entirely different




But if the ego appears to be marked from its very origin by this aggressive relativity –

in which minds lacking in objectivity might recognize the emotional erections caused in

an animal solicited, incidentally, in the course of its experimental conditioning, by a

desire – how can one not conceive that each great instinctual metamorphosis in the life ofthe individual will once again challenge its delimitation, composed as it is of a

conjunction of the subject’s history and the unthinkable innateness of his desire?




This is why, except at a limit that even the greatest geniuses have never been able to

approach, man’s ego can never be reduced to his experienced identity; and in the

depressive disruptions of the experienced reverses of inferiority, it engenders essentially

the mortal negations that fix it in its formalism. ‘I am nothing of what happens to me.

You are nothing of value.’





无意识的形成 18

May 22, 2014



无意识的形成 18


13.11.57 29


I must now go a little more quickly, and point out to you that

(25) the whole economy of the analysis which is going to be made

of this forgetting of a name, of this slip in the sense that we

should give to the word slip the meaning that the name has

dropped down.




Everything is going to centre around what we can call a

metonymical approximation. Why? Because what will reemerge at

first, are replacement words: Boltraffio, Botticelli.




How does Freud show us that he understands them in a metonymical

fashion? We are going to grasp it in this fact, and this is why

I am making this detour by way of the analysis of a forgetting,

that the presence of these names, their emergence in place of the

forgotten Signorelli, is situated at the level of a formation, it

is no longer one of substitution, but of combination. There is

no perceptible relationship between the analysis that Freud might

make of the case between Signorelli, Boltraffio and Botticelli,

except the indirect relationships linked solely to phenomena of

the signifier. Botticelli he tells us, and I hold in the first

instance to what he tells us.


弗洛依德如何告诉我们,他用换喻的方式来理解它们?我们将会从这个事实理解它。这就是为什么我正在从事这个迂迴,凭借分析遗忘。这些名字的存在,它们的出现,替换被遗忘的Signorelli。它们的存在被定位在字词形成的层次,它不再是替换的层次,而是联接的层次。在弗洛依德可能从事的分析之间,并没有可感知的关系,对于signorelli, Boltraffio,以及Botticelli 之间的个案。除了仅是跟能指的音素关联的间接的关系。他告诉我们 Botticelli,在第一个例子,我坚持他告诉我们的东西。



I should say that it is one of the clearest demonstrations that

Freud ever gave of the mechanisms of the analysis of a phenomenon

of formation or deformation, linked to the unconscious. As

regards clarity it leaves absolutely nothing to be desired. I am

obliged for the clarity of my account, to present it to you in an

indirect fashion by saying that this is what Freud says.





(26) Freud says makes its impact by its rigour, in any case what

he says is of this order, it is namely that Botticelli is there

because it is the remainder in its second half, is the “elli” of

Signorelli left incomplete by the fact that Signor is forgotten;

“bo” is the remainder, the something incomplete from Bosnia

Herzogovina, in so far as the “Her” is repressed.


弗洛依德所说的东西,由于它的严谨产生它的影响。无论如何,他所说的东西属于这个秩序。换句话说,Botticelli 在那里,因为它以他的后半部作为剩余物,那就是Signorelli 的”elli”, 它的不完整是因为这个事实:Signor 被遗忘,“bo”就是剩余物,从Bosinia Herzogovina 留下的不完整的东西。因为“Her”被潜抑。


Likewise for

Boltraffio, it is the same repression of “Her” which explains

that Boltraffio associates the “bo” of Bosnia Herzogovina with

Trafoi, which is a locality immediately preceding the adventures

of this journey, the place where he heard of the suicide of one

of his patients for reasons of sexual impotence, namely the same

term as the one evoked in the conversation that immediately

preceded with the person who is in the train between Ragusa and

Herzogivina, and who evokes those Turks, those Hohommadens who

are such lovely people who, when the doctor has not succeeded in

curing them, say to him: “Herr (sir), we know that you have done

everything you could, but nevertheless etc ………. “



跟“bo“联想一块,Herzogovina 跟Trafoi 联想一块。它的位置就在这个旅途的各种冒险的前面。他听到他的一位病人因为性无能而自杀的地方。换句话说,这是相同的术语,跟这个谈话被引用的术语相同。在Ragusa与Herzogivina 之间的火车上跟他谈话的这个人之前。他引述那些土耳其人的话,那些Hohommadens 人们。他们是如此可爱的人们。虽然医生并没有成功地治疗他们,他们对医生说:「先生Herr(sir),我们知道你已经尽你所能,可是….」


The “Herr”, the

particular weighting, the significant accent, namely this

something that is at the limit of the sayable, this absolute

“Herr” which is death, this death which as La Rochefoucauld says,

“one cannot like the sun steadily regard it”, and which

effectively Freud, no more than anybody else, cannot steadily

regard. While, it makes itself present to him through his role

as a doctor on the one hand, by a certain liaison which is also

manifestly present, it, on the other hand with a quite personal

(27) accent.


这个“Herr”,这个特殊的衡量,这个重要的强调,这个处于可说出的东西的限制的东西,这个绝对的“Herr”是死亡,依照La Rochefoucauld 所说的,这个死亡,就像太阳一样,为民无法正视它。实际上,弗洛依德跟任何其他人一样,无法镇定地正视死亡。虽然死亡呈现自己给弗洛依德观看,一方面,通过他作为医生的角色,凭借也是明显出现的某种的沟通。另一方面,死亡也具有相当私人的强调。



Unconscious 09

May 11, 2014

Unconscious 09

Jacques Lacan








The Formations of the Unconscious


1957 – 1958


Seminar 1; Wednesday 6 November 1957


Because I hope that since the last day, most of you at least haveopened Jokes and their relation to the unconscious, you can seefor yourselves that his reference to the technique of the jokequa language-technique, is very precisely the point around whichhis argument always pivots; and that if what emerges in terms ofmeaning, in terms of signification in the joke is something thatseems to him to deserve to be related to the unconscious, it isonly – I want to hammer home that everything that I have to sayabout the witticism is related to this – founded on its veryfunction of pleasure which pivots and turns always and uniquely(3) because of analogies of structure that are only conceivableon the plane of linguistics, analogies of structure between whathappens in the joke, I mean the technical aspect of the joke, let

us call it the verbal aspect of the joke, and what happens underdifferent names that Freud discovered, moments under differentnames, which is the mechanism proper to the unconscious, namelythe mechanisms such as condensation anddisplacement. I limitmyself to these two for today.




Here then is where we are: Hirsch-Hyacinth speaking to HeinrichHeine; or Hirsch-Hyacinth, a fiction of Heinrich Heine, gives anaccount of what happened to him. Something happens at thebeginning, to limit ourselves to the segment that I have justisolated, something particularly clear, raising in a way in orderto put it on a plateau, to exalt it, what is to follow, thisinvocation of the universal witness and of the personalrelationship of the subject to this witness, namely God. “Astrue as God shall grant me all good things”, which isincontestably something that is at once significant by itsmeaning, and ironic because of what reality can show us as

lacking in it, but starting from here the enunciation is made: “Iwas sitting beside Solomon Rothschild, quite as an equal.”


在此,这就是我们的处境。Hirsch-Hyacinth 跟 HeinrichHeine谈话; 或Hirsch-Hyacinth是Heinrich Heine的幻想人物。他描绘他发生的事情。在开头发生某件事情。为了探讨仅限于我刚刚孤立出来的片断,某件特别清楚的东西,为了将它放置在一个高地,推崇它,它以某种方式提出应该被追寻的东西。这是召唤普遍性的见证与主体跟这个见证的私人关系,也就是跟上帝的关系。「像上帝那么良善,赐给我一切美好的东西。」这无可争议地上某件具有意义上的重要性,又具有反讽性。因为现实能够跟我们显示,作为它里面的欠缺。但是从这里开始,表述就形成:「我当时正坐在索罗门、洛思查德的旁边,完全是于平起平坐。」


Herewe have the emergence of the object; this “quite” carries with itsomething which is significant enough. Every time we invoke the”quite”, the totality, it is because we are not altogether sure(4) that this totality is really closed, and in effect this canbe discovered at many levels, and indeed at every level at which

this notion of totality is used.




Here in effect he begins again with this “quite”, and he says:”quite …… “, and it is here that the phenomenon is produced,the unexpected thing, the scandal in the enunciation, namely thisnew message, this something that we do not even yet know what itis, that we are not yet able to name, and which is”….f amillionairely”, something of which we do not know whetherit is a parapraxis or a successful act, an accident or a poeticcreation. We will see. It can be all of these at once, but it

would be well to lay stress on the formation on the strictsignifying plane, of the phenomenon of what will be taken upafterwards.




I will tell you what it is, and I already announced it the lastday: in a signifying function which is proper to it qua signifierescaping from the code, that is from everything that had been accumulated up to this in terms of formations of the

signifier in its functions as a creator of the signified,something new appears there, that can be linked to the verysources of what can be called the progress of a tongue, itschanges.




We must pause first of all at this something in its very formation, I mean at the point at which it is situated in (5) relation to the formative mechanism of the signifier. We

have to lay stress on it in order to be able even to continue in a valid way on what will turn out to be the consequences of the phenomenon, even of what accompanies it, even its sources, it reference points.





But the essential phenomenon, is this nexus,

is this point, at which appears this new paradoxical signifier. this famillionaire from which Freud begins, and to which he

repeatedly returns, on which he asks us to dwell, to which, as

you will see up to the end of his speculation on the witticism,

he does not fail to return as designating the essential

phenomenon, the technical phenomenon that specifies the joke, and

that allows us to discern what the central phenomenon is, that by

which he teaches us on the plane that is our own proper plane,

namely the relationship with the unconscious, and that which

allows us also at the same time to illuminate from a new

perspective everything that surrounds it, everything that leads

it towards what can be called the Tendenzen, because it is the

term Tendenz that is employed in this work, of this phenomenon

that has different spheres of influences, the comic, laughter,

etc…; phenomena that may radiate out from it.


但是这个基本的现象,就是这个核心,这个点,这个新的悖论的能指出现的点。这个弗洛伊德用来开始的这个famillionaire,他重复地回归到这个familliionaire,他要求我们详述它的famillionaire,如同你们将会看出,一直到他沉思「机智语」的结束。他一定会回到这个famillionaire,作为指明基本的现象,指明「笑话」的技术的现象。并且让我们能够觉察出,这个基本的现象是什么。凭借这个现象,他在这个层次教导我们,在我们自己本体的层次。换句话说,跟无意识的关系,以及也让我们能够从新的观点启蒙每样环绕它的东西。每样引导它朝向所谓的the Tendenzen。因为就是Tendenz这个术语,被运用在这个著作里。拥有不同的影响的领域的这个现象,这个滑稽的笑声,等等、、、可能从它那里焕发光辉的现象。


Let us pause then at famillionaire. There are several ways to

approach it, this is the aim, not just of this schema, but of

this schema in so far as it is provided to allow you to inscribe

(6) the different planes of the signifying elaboration, the word

elaboration being chosen here specially, because it is expressly

chosen here, Freud introduces it specially.


让我们因此对这个familionaire 暂停一下。有好几种方式来探讨它。这不仅是这个基模的目的,而且属于这个基模。因为它被供应,为了让你们能够铭记能指的建构的不同的层面。「建构」这个字词在此明确地被选择,因为它在此明白地被选择,弗洛依德特别介绍它。


Let us stress this, and in order not to surprise you too much,

let us begin to perceive the direction in which it is going.

What happens when famillionaire appears? It can be said that

something is indicated there that we experience as a perspective

opening out towards meaning; something tends to emerge from it

that is ironical, even satirical, also something that is less

evident, but which develops we might say, in the after-effects of

the phenomenon, in what is going to be propagated from here into

the world as a consequence.


让我们强调这个。为了不要太过惊吓你们,让我们开始感知它正在进行的这个方向。当famillionaire 出现时,发生什么事情?我们能够说,在那里某件东西被指示,我们经验到它,作为一个朝向意义展开的观点,某件东西倾向于从它出现。那是反讽,甚至是讽刺,它也是某件比较不明显的东西。我们不妨说,它以这个现象的后续影响在发展,在将会从这里被宣导进入世界,作为结果。


It is a type of emergence of an

object, that itself tends rather in the direction of the comical,

of the absurd, of the nonsensical. It is the famillionaire

in so far as it derides the millionaire, by tending to take on

the form of a figure, and it would not be difficult to indicate

the direction in which in fact it tends to be embodied.


这是一种客体的出现。这个客体倾向于朝滑稽,荒谬,无意义的方向。这就是famillionaire,因为它从millionaire (百万富翁)一词演变而来。倾向于具有一个人物的形态。要指示这个方向并不困难,事实上,它倾向于被具体表现的方向。


Moreover, Freud mentions in passing that in another place also,

Heinrich Heine reduplicating his joke, calls the millionaire the

millionnar, which in German means the idiotic millionaire, and

can be translated in French following on the line of the

substantivation of millionaire that I have just spoken to you

(7) about, the fat-millionaire with a hyphen. This is to show you

that we have here an approach which ensures that we do not remain


而且,弗洛依德也在另外一个地方顺便提到,Heinrich Heine复制他的笑话,称the millionaire (百万富翁)为millionnar。在德文,意思是白痴般的百万富翁。在法文,根据百万富翁的实质化的脉络,在法文,我刚刚跟你们谈论到的,它能够被翻译为fat-millionaire(肥胖的百万富翁),中间有条横杆连号。这是要告诉你们,我们在此拥有一个方法,保证我们始终脱离人本位。


Let us not go much further, because to tell the truth this is not

the time, this is just the type of step not to taken too

quickly, namely not to be too quickly understood, because by

understanding too quickly, one understands absolutely nothing at

all. This still does not explain the phenomenon that has just

occurred in front of him, namely how it can be connected with

what we can call the general economy of the function of the






精神病 341

April 2, 2014




We have come to the point at which there is no common measure between

ourselves and this you such as we have brought it out. There is ostension

necessarily followed by reabsorption, injunction followed by disjunction. In

order to have an authentic relationship with the other at this level and on this

plane, he must answer, Thou art the one wham I follow. Here we are on his

wavelength, and it’s he who guides our desire.




Tu e$ celui queje suis lends itself to a play on words.5 It’s the relationship

of identification with the other that is involved, but if we in fact guide one

another in our reciprocal identification towards our desire, we shall necessarily

encounter one another there, and we shall encounter one another in an

incomparable way, since it’s insofar as I am you that I am – here the ambiguity

is complete. Je suis isn’t only to follow, it’s also Je suis, et toi, tu es, I

am and thou art, and also, toi, celui qui, thou, the one who, to the point of

encountering, me tueras, wilt kill me. When the other is captured as an object

in the relation of ostension, we can only encounter this relation as a subjectivity

equivalent to our own on the imaginary plane, the plane of the mot ou

toi, I or thou, one or the other, all confusion is possible concerning the object

relation. The object of our love is only ourselves, it’s the tu es celui qui me

lues, thou art the one who kilst me.


Tu e$ celui queje suis有助于玩文字遊戏。“Thou art the one whom I follow,” “Thou art the one who I am,” “Kill theone whom I follow,” and “Kill the one who I am.”你是我跟随的这个人」,你是我存在的这个人」,请你杀死我跟随的这个人」,请你杀死我存在的这个人」。被牵涉到的是跟大他者的认同的关系。但是,假如我们事实上互相引导,在互惠的认同,朝向我们的欲望。我们将必然会在那里互相邂逅。我们将以无与伦比的方式互相邂逅。因为我是你,故我存在。在这种暧昧的完整的。Je suis并不是仅要跟随,它也是Je suis, et toi, tu es,我存在与你存在。也是toi, celui qui, thou,你」这个人,甚至邂逅时,会杀死我的人。当他者被捕获,作为处于伪装关系的客体。我们仅能邂逅这个关系,作为是在想象的层次相等我们自己的主体性。我或你的层次,此在与他在的层次。关于这个客体关系,可能会有各种混淆。


Observe the fortunate opportunity that the signifier offers us in French,

with the different ways of understanding tu es.6 One can make use of it indefinitely.


请你们观察这个幸运的机会,能指用法文提供给我们的机会,用不同的方式来理解tu es.。我们能够任意地使用它。


If I were to say to you that we do this all day long – instead of saying,

To be or not… to be or. .. ,7 one may say, Tu es celui quime. . .tues.. .,

Thau art the one who. . . me. . . thou art.. . , etc. This is the foundation of

the relationship with the other. In all imaginary identification, the tu es, thou

art, ends in the destruction of the other, and vice versa, because this destruction

is simply there in the form of transference and hides itself in what we

shall call thouness.




In this respect I could have brought you a particularly disheartening and

stupid analysis of the type to be found in the famous Meaning of Meaning,

which elevates this kind of drivel to giddy heights.8 Similarly for this famous

passage in which it’s a matter of urging people who have the beginnings of

virtue to have at least the consistency to finish the job. One of them says

something like this – Toi quinepeux supporter le tu, tue-moi, Thou who canst

not bear the thou, kilst me. This is a reasonable idea – if you can’t bear the

truth of the thou, you can always be designated for what you are, namely a

scoundrel. If you want your neighbors’ respect, raise yourself to the notion

of normal distances, that is, to a general notion of the other, the order of the

world, and the law. This thou seems to have disconcerted commentators, and

as a matter of fact I think that today’s thouness will familiarize you with the register in question.






精神病 339

March 29, 2014





We can’t exhaust everything proposed to us concerning the analysis of this

 verb to be by the philosophers who have centered their meditation on the

question of Dasein, and especially Mr. Heidegger, who has begun to consider

it from the grammatical and etymological angle in texts that are quite faithfully

expounded in several articles that Monsieur Jean Wahl has recently

devoted to them.




Mr. Heidegger attaches a great deal of importance to the signifier at the

level of the analysis of the word and of conjugation, as it’s usually called –

let us more accurately say declension. In German as in French this famous

verb to be is far from being a simple verb and even from being one single





It’s evident that the form suis, am, doesn’t come from the same root as

e$, art, est, is, Stes, [you] are, and as fut, [it] was, nor is there any strict equivalence

to the form iti, been. Whereas fut has an equivalent in Latin, as does

suis and the series of est, iti comes from another source, from stare. The

distribution is equally different in German where sind, [they] are, is grouped

with bist, art, whereas in French the second person is grouped with the third.


显而易见,am 的这个形式,并不是来自跟 is arewas  相同的字根。也没有任何严格的相等语,跟been 的这个形式。虽然 fut 在拉丁文有一个相等语,如同suis est 的系列,来自于另外一个来源,来自stare。在德文,这个分佈同样地不同。在德文,sind are),跟bistart 聚拢一块。虽然在法文,第二人称跟第三人称聚拢一块。


Three roots have been more or less uncovered for all the European languages,

those that correspond to sommes, [we] are, est and fut, which has been compared

with the root phusis in Greek, which is related to the idea of life and

growth. As to the others, Mr. Heidegger insists upon the two aspects, Sten

which would be closer to stare, to stand alone, and Verbahen, to last, to endure,

this sense being nevertheless attached to the source phusis. According to Mr.

Heidegger, the idea of standing erect, the idea of life and the idea of lasting,

enduring, is therefore what an etymological analysis combined with a grammatical analysis yields, and it’s out of a kind of reduction or of indeterminationcast over these senses as a whole that the notion of being emerges.


对于所有的欧洲的语言,三个字根曾经被揭露得差不多。对应于sommes, [we] are, est and fut,的那些字根,曾经被拿来跟希腊文的phusis的字根作比较。它跟生命与成长的观念息息相关。至于其他的字根,海德格坚持两个层面,比较靠近stare,单独存在的sten。而Verbahen是延续,持久。这些意义仍然跟phusis的来源息息相关。依照海德格,挺直站立的观念,生命的观念,延续,持久的观念,因此就是字源的分析跟文法的分析产生的东西。生命实存的观念的出现,就是这些时态作为整体投射的不确定的还原。


I summarize, so as to give you some idea of the thing. I must say that an

analysis of this order is rather inclined to elide, to mask, what Mr. Heidegger

is trying to initiate us into, namely that which is absolutely irreducible in the

function of the verb to be, the copulatory function pure and simple. One

would be mistaken to think that this function is disclosed through a gradual

shift in direction of these various terms.


我总结一下,为了让你们稍微理解这个物象。我必须说,这个秩序的分析相当倾向于闪躲,遮蔽。海德格尝试启发我们进入,也就是,绝对无法还原的东西,在to be这个动词的功能,纯净而简单的交媾的功能。假如我们认为,这个功能的显露,是通过缓慢的转变,朝著这些各式各样的术语的方向,那你们就错误了。


We raise this question – at what moment and by what mechanism does the

you, such as we have defined it as a form of punctuation, as an indeterminate

signifying mode of hooking on, achieve subjectivity? Well then, I believe that

it’s essentially when it’s taken in the copulatory function in pure form and in

the ostensive function. And it’s for this reason that I chose the exemplary

sentences that we started with – thou art the one who. . . .




Which element is it that, elevating the you, makes it go beyond its indeterminate

function of boredom and begins to turn it, if not into subjectivity,

then at least into something that constitutes a first step towards the Thou art

the one who wilt follow me? It is the It i$ thou who will follow me. This is

ostension, which in fact implies the presence of the assembly of all those who,

whether or not united into a community, are supposed to form its body, to

be the support of the discourse in which ostension is inscribed. This it is thou

corresponds to the second formula, namely, thou art the one who will follow







精神病 324

March 19, 2014

精神病 324




Indeed it’s one of the most profound characteristics of the mental foundation

of the Judaeo-Christian tradition that against it speech clearly profiles the

being of the / as its ultimate ground. On all the essential questions the subject

always finds himself in a position, summoned, to justify himself as /• The /

who says, I am the one who am, this / , absolutely alone, is the one who radically

sustains the thou in his interpellation. That’s all the difference there is

between the god of the tradition we come from and the god of the Greek

tradition. I wondered whether the Greek god is capable of proffering himself in the mode of any /. Would he say, I am the one who i$? This is out of the

question, however. The super-attenuated form of the Greek god isn’t something

that there is any reason to laugh at, or to believe that it’s situated on

the path to the atheistic disappearance of God. It’s rather the god Voltaire

was interested in to the point of regarding Diderot as a cretin, the god of

deism, who is of the half-flesh, half-fish order of the I am the one who is.




Your minds won’t readily dwell on the god of Aristotle, because this has

become unthinkable for us. But still, try to get yourselves to meditate – a

mode of this medeor I was speaking to you about last time, and which is the

original verb of your medical function – for a second on what the relationship

to the world might have been for a disciple of Aristotle’s for whom God was

the most immutable sphere in the sky. He isn’t a god who announces himself

through the word, like the one we were evoking a second ago. He is that part

of the starry sphere that includes the fixed stars, he is that sphere in the world

that doesn’t move. This obviously involves a relationship to the other that to

us is foreign and unthinkable and much more distant than the one put into

play, for example, in the punitive fantasm [lafantaisie punitive].




Nobody dwells on this – it’s because at the heart of the religious thought

that has formed us there is the idea of making us live in fear and trembling,

that the coloration of guilt is so fundamental in our psychological experience

of the neuroses, without its being possible for all that to prejudge what they

are in another cultural sphere. This coloration is even so fundamental that it

was by its means that we explored the neuroses and noticed that they were

structured in a subjective and intersubjective mode. This is why there is

every reason to wonder whether the tradition that announces itself in the

expression which is, we’re told, flanked by a little tree on fire -I am the one

who am, doesn’t fundamentally bear upon our relationship to the other. We’re

not so far from our subject matter. It’s a question of this in President Schreber

– of a mode of constructing the Other-God.






精神病 313

March 11, 2014

精神病 313



This is the function of the you in man according to Mr. Isakower, and I

would be happy to make an apologue of this in order to get the experience of

the you understood, but at its lowest level. One totally misrecognizes its function

if one neglects that it leads to the you as signifies




Analysts – the path I’m following here isn’t a solitary one – have emphasized

yet another point. I can’t dwell upon the relation that exists between

the superego, which is nothing other than the function of the you, and the

sentiment of reality. I don’t need to insist on this for the simple reason that

it’s stressed on every page of President Schreber’s observation. If the subject

doesn’t doubt the reality of what he hears, it’s because of this characteristic

of foreign body that the intimation of the delusional you presents. Need I

invoke the philosophy of Kant, who recognizes a fixed reality only in the

starry skies above our heads and the voice of conscience within?16 This foreignness,

like the character Tartuffe, is the true possessor of the house who

readily says to the ego – You will have to leave. When the feeling of foreignness,

strangeness, strikes somewhere, it’s never on the side of the superego

– it’s always the ego that loses its bearings, it’s the ego that enters the state

of you, it’s the ego that thinks it is in the state of the double, that is, expelled

from the house, while the you remains the possessor of things.




That’s our experience. We don’t have to stop there all the same. But ultimately

we have to be reminded of these truths if we are to understand where

the structural problem lies.




It may seem strange to you that I mechanize things in this way, and perhaps

you will imagine that I’m working with an elementary notion of the

discourse I teach, that everything is contained within the relation between

the I and the you, between the ego and the other.




This is what linguists – not to mention psychoanalysts – start mumbling

about whenever they investigate the question of discourse. One may even

regret seeing that Pichon, in the quite remarkable work I have mentioned,

finds it necessary to remind us that for the basis of his definition of verbal

distributories17 – as he puts it – one has to set out from the idea that discourse

is always addressed to an other, to the allocutor.18 And so he begins

with the simple locutory plane19 found in the imperative, Come here! There’s

no need to say much about this – Come here! presupposes an I, it presupposes

a you. There is moreover a narrative plane that is delocutory,20 on which

there’s always I and you, but on which one is alluding to something else.




We can only think that one is not fully satisfied with such a distribution,

since a new problem arises concerning the interrogative, which we shall introduce

with a dissymmetry that forms a symmetry provided we regard the

number three as the best.





精神病 293

March 3, 2014

精神病 293



The quilting point













Does the subject hear with his ears something that exists or something that

doesn’t exist? It’s quite obvious that it doesn’t exist and that consequently

it’s of the order of a hallucination, that is, of a false perception. Is this adequate

for us?




This massive conception of reality leads to the quite mysterious explanation,

advanced by analysts, according to which a so-called refusal to perceive

produces a hole and there then appears in reality a drive that has been rejected

by the subject. But why should something as complex and architectured as

speech appear in this hole? This is what we are not told.




To be sure, such an explanation already constitutes progress over the classical

conception, but we can go further. In short, we can expect that the

phenomenon of psychosis will enable us to restore the proper relationship,

increasingly misunderstood in analytic work, between the signifier and the






I remind you that at the end of the period during which the external world

disintegrated for Schreber, with its roots in that period, there appeared in

him a structuration of the relations between the signifier and the signified

that is presented thus – there are always two planes.




They are without doubt indefinitely subdivided within themselves. But

Schreber’s efforts always to locate an anterior plane and a plane beyond is

obviously imposed on him by his experience, and this guides us towards

something that is really deep-seated in psychotic structure. I have sometimes

got you to feel this in an immediate way in my presentations.




On one of these planes phenomena are produced that are above all ones

the subject regards as neutralized, as signifying less and less a true other –

phrases, he says, learned by rote, drummed into the birds from the sky who

repeat them to him, who don’t know what they are saying. This term birds

leads to the parrot – it’s a question of the transmission of something empty.

that wearies and exhausts the subject. At their first appearance these phenomena

are situated at the limit of meaning, but they soon turn into quite

the contrary – residue, refuse, empty bodies.




I have already mentioned these interrupted sentences that suggest a continuation.

They teach us a great deal about the unity that prevails at the level of

the signifier – in particular, that the latter isn’t isolatable.




These unfinished sentences are in general interrupted at the point at which

the full word that would give them their meaning is still lacking but is implied.

I’ve already picked out more than one example of this. For instance, the

subject hears – Do you still speak. . . , and the sentence stops. This means –

Do you still speak. . . foreign languages?1




The said conception of souls is this dialogue, which is much fuller than the

drummed-in words the souls exchange with him, in teaching him an entire

psychology of thoughts, on the subject of himself. What first of all manifested

itself at the beginning of the delusion, like an ineffable and vigorous form of

expression, withdraws to a distance, becomes enigmatic, passes into the posterior

realms of God, at the level of which the intrusive and absurd voices

multiply. Even further beyond these voices there are other voices which express

themselves in striking formulas.




I remind you of one that is not the least striking of them – Lacking now is

. . . the leading thought.2 They also speak to him of Gesinnung, which can

mean either conviction or faith. Gesinnung, they explain, is something we owe

any good man, even the blackest of sinners, subject to the demands of purification

inherent in the order of the universe, something we owe him in

exchange [dans V6change\> in the name of that which must regulate our relations

with human beings. It is indeed faith that is in question, that minimum

of good faith implied by recognition of the other.


我提醒你们一个很引人注意的公式,欠缺现在是、、、主要的思想」。他们也对他谈论到Gesinnung。这个Gesinnung 意思是信念或是信仰。他们解释,信念或信仰是我们亏欠好人的东西,即使最阴暗的原罪者。他们承受在宇宙的秩序里原来具有的净化的要求。信念或信仰是我们交换时亏欠他的东西,以必须规范我们跟人类的关系的名义。受到质疑的确是是信念,由于他者的体认所暗示的最少量的美好的信仰。


A certain period of his hallucinations goes much further still. We have the

most unusual expression [. • .]. It’s a rare word, extremely difficult to translate.

After consulting with people who know about these things, I had arrived

at the idea that it was a question of nothing other than what I call the base

word, the key, the ultimate linchpin, rather than the solution. It has a tech-

nical connotation, in fact, in the art of hunting – it would be what hunters

call xhefunties, that is, the traces of big game.









精神病 240

February 14, 2014

精神病 240



 Be that as it may, on this occasion we’re unable to avoid wondering whether

a certain incompleteness in the realization of the paternal function isn’t involved

in Schreber’s case. Every author has in fact attempted to explain the onset of

Schreber’s delusion with reference to the father. Not that Schreber was in

conflict with his father at the time – he had disappeared a long time previously.




Not that he was at a time of setback in acceding to paternal functions,

since on the contrary he was entering a brilliant stage of his career and had

been placed in a position of authority that seems to have solicited him to truly

adopt a paternal position, to have offered him a support for idealizing and

referring himself to this position. President Schreber’s delusion would therefore

depend more on the giddiness of success than on a sense of failure. This

is what the understanding generated by authors of the mechanism determining

the psychosis revolves around, at least on the psychical level.



For my part, I would make three responses on the subject of the function

of the father.




Normally, the conquest of the Oedipal realization, the integration and

introjection of the Oedipal image, is carried out – Freud says this unambiguously

– by way of an aggressive relationship. In other words, it’s by way of

an imaginary conflict that symbolic integration takes place.




There is another way, different in nature. Ethnological experience shows

us the importance, however residual it may be, of the phenomenon of couvade

– imaginary realization here takes place by the symbolic putting into play of

conduct. Isn’t it something of this order that we have been able to locate in

neurosis? The hysterical pregnancy that Eisler describes, which occurred fol-

lowing a traumatic breakdown of his equilibrium, isn’t imaginary but symbolic.




Isn’t there a third way, which is in some sense embodied in delusions?

These little men are forms of reabsorption, but they’re also the representation

of what will take place in the future. The world will be repeopled by Schreber

men, men of a Schreberian spirit, small, fantasmatic beings – procreation

after the deluge. Such is the prospect.




In sum, in the normal form the emphasis is placed upon the symbolic

realization of the father by way of imaginary conflict – in the neurotic or

paraneurotic form, upon the imaginary realization of the father by way of a

symbolic exercise of conduct. And here, what do we see if not the real function

of generation?




There’s something here that nobody’s interested in, neither neurotics nor

primitives. I’m not saying that the latter don’t know the real function played

by the father in generation, simply that they’re not interested in it. What

they’re interested in is the begetting of the soul, the begetting of the mind by

the father, the father as either symbolic or imaginary. But, curiously, in delusion

it’s in fact the father’s real function in generation that we see emerge in

an imaginary form, at least if we accept the identification analysts make between

the little men and spermatozoa. There’s a movement of retreat here between

the three functions that define the problematic of the paternal function.




We are now engaged in reading this text and in the task of actualizing it to

the utmost in the dialectical register of signifier and signified.




To each and everyone of you here I shall say this – if you investigate, as is

certainly legitimate, the question of being, don’t be too arrogant about it. In

the articulated phenomenal dialectic I’ve put to you, speech is indeed the

central reference point.

25 April 1956