从重复到诉诸行动

November 17, 2015

FROM REPETITION TO ENACTMENT
从重复到诉诸行动

In 1954–55 Lacan devoted a substantial part of his Seminar II to a
theoretical analysis of Freud’s concept of the compulsion to repeat
(Wiederholungszwang). As he explained on at least two occasions
during this Seminar (1988c[1954–55]:118, 123), this was a logical
step to take after having dissected the phenomenology of transference,
taking account of the amalgamation of transference and repetition in
Freud’s works.28 It was also an occasion for Lacan to address a
Freudian dilemma Lagache had rehashed in his numerous
contributions to the topic of transference: does transference conform
to the repetition of a need, or to a need for repetition? (Lagache
1952:94–95; 1953[1951]:4–5; 1993[1954]:137).

在1954-55年,拉康专注他的第二研讨班上很充实的部分,探讨弗洛伊德的强迫的观念的理论的分析,为了要重复。他在这个研讨班期间,至少在两个场合,他继续解释。这是一个必要採取的逻辑的步骤,当他已经解剖移情的现象学,描述移情与重复的合并,在弗洛伊德的著作里。那也是一个场合,让拉康能够处理弗洛伊德的困境。拉佳奇曾经在他许多的贡献,探讨移情的主题,曾经复述弗洛伊德的困境:移情符合需求的重复吗?或是符合重复的需求?

In presenting this
dilemma, Lagache had opposed Freud’s description of transference
as the repetition of an unfulfilled need for love (Freud 1912b:100),
following the pleasure principle, to his subsequent account of
transference as a derivative of the compulsion to repeat, and thus of
what functions beyond the pleasure principle (Freud 1920g:20–21).
Hence, the apparently futile question raised by Lagache opened up
onto a cardinal issue: does transference operate in keeping with the
pleasure principle, or does it work against it?29

当拉佳奇呈现这个困境时,他将弗洛伊德对于移情的描述,跟没有被满足的爱的需求的重复,相提并论。他遵循快乐原则,到弗洛伊德随后的描述移情,作为是重复的强迫的衍生物。因此,是超越快乐原则的功能的东西的衍生物。因此,拉佳奇提出的这个表面上说徒劳的问题,展开进入一个主要的议题:移情的运作,符合快乐原则吗?或者抵触快乐原则吗?

Lacan’s trajectory in Seminar II sparked a new interpretation of
‘Beyond the Pleasure Principle’ (Freud 1920g), in which Freud had
conceptualized the repetition compulsion as an infernal cycle compelling
people to re-experience unpleasurable events time and again. By analogy
with the notion of resistance, Lacan dubbed the repetition compulsion
an insistence, linking its compulsive nature to the continuous return of
the signifiers within the symbolic order.

拉康在第二研讨班的探讨引发对于“超越快乐原则”的新的铨释。在” 超越快乐原则“的文章,弗洛伊德曾经建构重复的强迫的观念,作为是内部的迴圈,强迫人们一再地重新经验令人不愉快的事件。拉康则是将它跟抗拒的观念类比,称重复的强迫是一种抗拒。拉康将重复强迫的特性,跟象征秩序内部,能指的继续回落联接一块。

Again minimizing the explanatory
value of the Zeigarnik effect, he attributed the repetition compulsion to
the incessant intrusion of the symbolic machinery which governs all
human life forms, similar to the ongoing exchange of messages within
an isolated, closed circuit (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:87–90). Hence, if
transference follows the repetition compulsion and the latter equals the
insistence of the signifiers within the symbolic order, then transference
must be characterized by that same symbolic insistence and not, for that
matter, by the power of resistance.

再次,当拉康淡化哲噶米克的解释的价值,他将重复的强迫归属于象征的机器的不断的闯入。这个象征的机器统辖所有的人类的生命的形式。类似于正在进行的讯息的交换,在一个孤立的,封闭的迴圈里。因此,假如移情遵循重复的强迫,而重复的强迫相等于是能指的坚持,在象征的秩序里,那么,移情必然是有相同的象征的坚持表现特征。就那件事情而言,移情并不是由抗拒的力量表现特征。

This conclusion urged Lacan to decide
in favour of the analysand’s transference as an unconscious, symbolic
need for repetition functioning beyond the pleasure principle, and it
bolstered his critique of clinicians advocating the analysis of the
transference as a resistance.30 This is not to say that Lacan completely
rejected the resistance side of transference, but he considered it an
unproductive, deceitful departure from its bona fide repetition side—a
deterioration for whose emergence the analyst is as much responsible as
for that of the symbolic insistence.

这个结论催促拉康作决定赞同分析者的移情,作为是无意识,象征的需求重复,发挥功能,超越快乐原则。这个结论支撑临床医生的批判。这些临床医生主张移情的精神分析,作为抗拒。这并不是说,拉康完全排斥移情具有抗拒的一面。代替的,他认为移情是一个没有生产的欺骗的出发,从它的真诚的重复的那一面出发—这是一种恶化。对于这个恶化,分析家同样要负责,如同负责象征的坚持的出现。

Armed with this new distinction between transference insistence
(symbolic repetition) and transference resistance (imaginary projection),
Lacan returned to the case-studies of Dora and the young homosexual
woman, putting Freud’s technical errors into a different light. Following
a juxtaposition of the two cases in Seminar IV, he argued that whereas in
the Dora case Freud had radically ignored the imaginary element of deceit
within Dora’s transference, in the case of the young homosexual woman
he had made exactly the opposite mistake, concentrating exclusively on
the deceitfulness of her dream (to be a happily married woman) without
acknowledging its truthful symbolic articulation (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:
135–136).

拉康装备著这个新的区别,处于移情的坚持(象征的重复),与移情的抗拒(想像的投射)之间的区别,他回转到朵拉与这位年轻同性恋的女人的个案研究,他将弗洛伊德的技术的错误,从不同的观点观看。拉康在第四研讨班,将这两个个案相提并论。他主张说,在朵拉的个案,弗洛伊德强烈地忽略欺骗的想像的元素,在朵拉的移情的内部。而在年轻的同性恋的女人,弗洛伊德犯了确实是相反的错误,他专注地集中于梦的欺骗性(成为婚姻快乐的女人),而没有承认欺骗性是真实的象征的表达。

In his treatment of Dora Freud was led astray by his
unshakeable belief that his patient was unconsciously, yet honestly
reliving her love for Mr K in her relationship with her analyst, whilst in
his analysis of the young homosexual girl he was mistaken in excluding
the possibility that her dream of a happily married life transpired a deeply
felt, though unconscious wish.

在他治疗朵拉时,弗洛伊德的导致迷失,是由于他的没有动摇的信念:他的病人无意识地,可是有诚实地重新经历她对K先生的爱,在她跟她的分析家的关系。弗洛伊德对这位年轻的同性恋者从事精神分析时,他犯错误地排除这个可能性:她对于快乐婚姻的生活的梦想散发出一股深深被感觉,虽然是无意识的愿望。

At the end of the 1950s, with Seminar VII (1992[1959–60]), a radical
shift of perspective took place. Although the entire seminar was intended
as a revaluation of the aims and objectives of psychoanalytic treatment,
Lacan entered into a digression concerning the relation between the
pleasure and reality principles in Freud’s oeuvre to redefine the status of
the signifier.

在1950年代的结束,在第七研讨班,拉康的观点发生强烈的改变。虽然整个的研讨班被意图充当重新评估精神分析治疗的目标与目的。拉康从事离题讨论,关于弗洛伊德的著作里,快乐原则与现实原则之间的关系的离题讨论。为了重新定义能指的地位。

Contrary to what he had proffered in previous seminars, he
now located the signifier, or what Freud had called Vorstellung
(representation), firmly within the realm of the pleasure principle (ibid.:
134). Relying on Freud’s ‘Project for a Scientific Psychology’
(1950a[1895]), Lacan intimated that the pleasure principle, the primary
unconscious process regulating the distribution of libidinal energy
between representations, cannot operate without these representations.
Rather than being an agency functioning beyond the pleasure principle,
the signifier thus became part and parcel of the primary process.

跟在前几个研讨班,他提供的东西恰恰相反,拉康现在定位这个能指,或弗洛伊德所谓的“再现表象”,牢固地定位在快乐原则的领域内部。拉康依靠弗洛伊德的“科学心理学的计划”主张说:快乐原则是最初的无意识的过程,规范力比多的精力的分配,在再现表象之间。假如没有这些再现表象,快乐原则无法运作。能指并非是超越快乐原则发挥功能的代理者,能指因此变成是原初的过程的部分与领域。

This new conception of the signifier evidently challenged the
connection between transference and repetition. Initially, Lacan had
correlated transference with the repetition compulsion and the latter with
the insistence of the signifier beyond the pleasure principle. Now, with
the new alliance between the signifier and the pleasure principle,
transference could no longer be associated with the repetition compulsion,
unless the symbolic mechanism of transference itself was entirely revised.
In addition, the proposed congruence of transference, the signifier and
the pleasure principle seemed to topple Lacan’s original take on Lagache’s
polarization (need for repetition vs. repetition of need) into the opposite
direction, transference appearing quite conspicuously as the repetition
of a need.

能指的这个新的观念明显地挑战移情与重复之间的连接。最初,拉康曾经将移情跟重复的强迫连接一块,将重复的强迫跟能指的坚持超越快乐原则连接一块。现在,随着这个新的联盟,处于能指与快乐之家的新的联盟,移情不再能够跟重复的强迫连想一块。除非移情本身的象征的机制完全被修订。除外,移情,能指与快乐原则的被建议的调和似乎坍塌拉康的原先的接纳拉噶奇的两极化(重复的需求,对抗需求的重复),坍塌成为相反的方向,移情相当显著地出现,作为是需求的重复。

Avoiding this inconsistency in Seminar VII, Lacan devoted his next
seminar entirely to the topic of transference, which incited him to ponder
the two sides of Lagache’s opposition again and to offer the following
provisional solution:

拉康避免在第七研讨班的这个不一贯,他专注他的下一个研讨班,专注探讨移情的主题。移情的主题激发他再次沉思拉噶奇的对立的两面,并且提供以下的暂时的解决:

[I]t seems impossible to me to eliminate from the phenomenon of
transference the fact that it manifests itself in relation to somebody
spoken to. This is a constitutive fact. It constitutes a frontier and it
simultaneously indicates to us that we should not drown the
phenomenon of transference in the general possibility of repetition
constituted by the existence of the unconscious. In analysis, there
are of course repetitions linked to the constancy of the signifying
chain in the subject. These repetitions need to be distinguished
strictly from what we call transference, even when in some cases
they may have homologous effects.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:208)

我似乎不可能从移情的现象里,减少这个事实:移情展示它自己,相关于某个被对谈的人。这是一个具有形成本质的事实。它形成一个边界,它同时跟我们指示,我们不应该将移情的这个现象,淹没于重复的一般可能里,无意识的存在形成的重复的可能里。在精神分析,当然会有重复跟主体里的成为能指的锁链的固定常数连接一块。这些重复需要严格地被区别,跟我们所谓的移情,即使当在某些的情况,他们可能会有同质性的影响。

It would be erroneous to infer from this passage that Lacan took issue
with his own previous equivalence of transference and the need for
repetition, now realigning the occurrence of transference with the
repetition of a need. As a matter of fact, he was making a rudimentary
case for the radical separation of transference and repetition on the basis
of an evaluation of the inherently creative dimension in the transference
phenomenon.

这将是错误的,假如我们从这个段落推论,拉康争议他自己先前将移情与重复的需求的相等。现在则是将移情的发生,跟需求的重复重新等同。事实上,拉康正在建构一个基本的个案,朝向将移情跟重复强烈地分开,基础是评估移情的现象的本质上创造的维度。

On the one hand, Freud’s definition of transference as the
analysand’s reproduction in acts of a repressed historical event within
the presence of the analytic situation (Freud 1914g:150) encouraged
Lacan to loosen the knot between transference and the compulsion to
repeat.

一方面,弗洛伊德的定义移情,作为是分析者的复制,在被压抑的历史的事件的行动里,在分析的情况的存在里面。这鼓励拉康松开这个环结,处于移情于重复的强迫之间的环结。

The element of acting and the incessant implication of the present
within the transference prompted him to approach transference as
something more than the emergence of the compulsion to repeat. On the
other hand, he questioned the view of transference as the repetition of an
ancient unfulfilled need from the vantage point that the analysand never
simply succumbs to this need, but always recreates it within the novel
context of the analytic experience (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:206–207).

在移情内部,行动的元素与目前的不断的暗示,激发拉康探讨移情,作为是某件不仅是重复的强迫的出现。在另一方面,他质问移情的观点,作为旧时没有被满足的需求的重复,从分析者从来没有仅是屈从这个需求的观看点。而是总是重新创造这个需要,在精神分析经验的新奇的内文里。

The vexed issue of the relationship between transference and repetition
was reopened in 1962–63, when Lacan spent a whole year investigating
the topic of anxiety. Broaching yet again the conjunction of transference
and the compulsion to repeat, he underscored that transference cannot
be reduced to the reproduction of an anterior, unresolved conflict. If the
analysand’s transference is marked by love, this affect is always already
related to an object in the present, which Lacan (1991b[1960–61]: 179–
195) illustrated with Socrates’ interpretation of Alcibiades’ love in Plato’s
Symposium (Plato 1951).31

移情与重复之间的关系的恼人的问题重新被展开,当拉康花费一整年的时间,研究焦虑的议题。拉康再次将移情与重复的强迫分开,他强调,移情无法被化简成为前期,没有被解救的冲突的复制。假如分析者的移情被标记著爱,这个情感总是已经恩目前的客体相关。拉康举例说明目前这个客体,用苏格拉底的解释阿西比底斯的爱,这柏拉图的“会饮篇”里。

Concurrently, he insisted that the reduction
of transference to repetition obfuscates the importance of the analyst’s
own part in the entire affair. For if the transference always integrates an
object in the present, analysts cannot escape their being made into the
object of their analy sands’ transference, through which they not only
elicit but also crucially shape their patients’ reactions. Down-playing
the repetitive component of transference and upgrading the analyst’s
creative part in it, Lacan also replaced his previous definition of
countertransference as the sum of the analyst’s prejudices, insufficient
information, passions and difficulties, by the analyst’s essential
implication in the analysand’s transference, whose cautious management
must proceed from the purified desire of the analyst (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]: 221; 1962–63: session of 27 February 1963).32

同时,拉康坚持,移情化简成为重复,抹除分析家扮演的角色的重要性,在整个的情事里。因此,假如移情总是合并目前的客体,分析家无法逃避他们的存在,被填加到他们的分析者的移情的客体里。通过分析者的移情,他们不但召唤,而且关键地塑造他们的病人的反应。贬抑移情的重复的成分,并且提升分析者在移情的重复里扮演创造性的角色,拉康也更换他的先前的反-移情的定义,作为是分析家的各种偏见,不充分的资讯,激情与困难的总和。由于分析家的基本的暗示,在分析者的移情里。对于分析者的谨慎的管理必须前进,从分析家的被纯净化的欲望里。

Lacan’s most distinguished view on the nature of transference
appeared in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]), in which he designated
transference and repetition as two distinct fundamental concepts of
psychoanalysis.33 Disregarding his own previous assertions and criticizing
Freud for presenting a confused account, Lacan proclaimed that repetition
has nothing in common with transference (ibid.: 33, 69).

拉康探讨移情的特性的最明显的观点,出现在第11研讨班。在那里,他指明移情与重复,作为精神分析的两个不同的基本的观念。拉康忽视他自己先前的主张,并且批评弗洛伊德,因为呈现一个感到困惑的描述。拉康宣称,重复跟移情根本没有任何共通的地方。

Whereas
repetition occurs when a missed, traumatic encounter (beyond the
pleasure principle) is integrated within the network of signifiers (following
the pleasure principle), transference ‘is the enactment of the reality of
the unconscious’ (ibid.: 146, 149).34 Gradually disclosing the meaning
of this new, highly aphoristic description of transference, Lacan specified
that the reality of the unconscious is always sexual and that this
unconscious sexual reality underpins all the analysand’s demands within
the transference.

重复发生,当一个被错过的,创伤的遭遇(超越快乐原则)被合并到能指的网络内部(遵循快乐原则),移情就是“无意识的现实的诉诸行动”。拉康逐渐揭露这个新的,高度警语的描述移情的意义。他并且指明,无意识的现实总是性化,这个无意识的性的现实,作为是所有分析者在移情内部的要求。

For example, if an analysand demands that the analyst
say something because she has the impression that the latter does not
seem to be interested in her associations, this demand represents an avatar
of the analysand’s unconscious sexual reality, notably that she derives
excitement from awakening people’s interest and that she cannot tolerate
the idea that somebody might not be attracted to her.

譬如,假如分析者要求:分析家应该说出某件东西。因为她拥有这个印象,分析家似乎对她的联想,没有感到興趣。这个要求代表分析者的无意识的性的现实的具体表现,特别是,分析者获得興奋,从唤醒人们的興趣,她无法容忍这个观念:某个人没有被她吸引。

If the analyst remains
mute, the analysand is bound to interpret his silence as an indication of
the analyst’s lack of interest or, more commonly, as evidence of his lack
of professionalism, and she is likely to employ this interpretation as an
explanation for her own lack of analytic progress. More specifically, she
will attribute the fact that the analyst is not giving her enough (nice
interpretations, kind words, love) to his being a bad practitioner, and she
will try to change his habits by intermittently threatening him with her
imminent departure.

假如分析家始终沉默不语,分析者一定要解释他的沉默,作为是指示分析家的欠缺興趣,或是,更加普遍地,作为证明分析家欠缺专业精神。分析者很可能运用这个解释,作为解释她自己的欠缺精神分析的进步。更加明确地,分析者将个事实:分析家并没有给予她充分的(解释,仁慈的话语,爱),归咎于分析家是差劲的执业者。她将尝试改变分析家的态度,凭借间歇地威胁他,用她的快要来临的离去。

Conversely, when an analysand requests that the
analyst remain silent so that he can devote himself fully to the exploration
of his thoughts, this demand too harbours an unconscious sexual reality,
inasmuch as the analysand might enjoy destroying whatever interest
people may show in him so that he can devote himself quietly to the
narcissistic enjoyment of his own isolated condition.

相反地,当分析者要求:分析家应该始终保持沉默,这样,他才能够充分地专注他自己,探索他的思想。这个要求也怀抱著一个无意识的性的现实。因为分析者可能喜欢恢灭任何让人们在他身上显示的任何興趣。这样,他才会安静地专注他自己,于他自己的孤立的情况的自恋的享受。

Substantiating earlier statements on the analyst’s responsibility,
Lacan added that this enactment of the sexual reality of the unconscious
should not be understood as a mere effect of the analysand’s psychic
structure:

拉康将他早期对于分析家的责任的陈述具体表现,然后补充说,无意识里的性的现实的这个诉诸行动,不应该被理解,作为仅是分析者的心灵的结构的结果。

The transference is a phenomenon in which subject and
psychoanalyst are both included. To divide it in terms of
transference and countertransference—however bold, however
confident what is said on this theme may be—is never more than a
way of avoiding the essence of the matter.
(ibid.: 231)

移情是主体与精神分析家两种都包含在内的现象。用移情与反移情来区分,从来就是逃避问题的本质的方式。无论针对这个主题所说出的话语是多么勇敢,多么自信。

Apropos of the aforementioned examples, this means that the analysand
in the first case will not regard the analyst as a passive figure who lacks
all interest and commitment, expressly formulating the demand that he
start working and acting as a proper analyst, if the latter did not cultivate
an attitude of prolonged silence. Mutatis mutandis, the analysand in the
second case will not vilify the analyst for intervening, impressing on
him the idea that good analysts are supposed to listen and not talk, if the
analyst himself did not engage regularly in asking questions and launching
interpretations.

关于前面所述的例子,这意味着,在第一个个案里的分析者,将不会视分析家,作为一个被动的人物。他欠缺所有的興趣与奉献。他生动地阐述这个要求:他应该开始工作与形动,作为一位恰如分的分析家。假如后者并没有培养延长的沉默的态度。比照起来,在第二个个案的分析者将不会抨击分析家,因为介入,让他接受这个观念:好的分析家被认为是倾听,而不是谈话。假如分析家自己并没有规律地参与询问问题,并发动解释。

The analyst’s conduct in these two cases is crucial for
the emergence of the analysand’s transference as the enactment of the
sexual reality of the unconscious and it simultaneously gives form to it.

在这两个个案里,分析家的行为是重要的,对于分析者的移情的出现,作为是无意识的性的现实的诉诸行动。分析家的行为同时也给予它形式。

Needless to say that the analyst’s conduct in these matters reflects a
particular desire and rests upon an appreciation of the psychic structure of
the analysand before and during analytic sessions. In the first case, the
analyst’s sustained silence will normally proceed from a diagnosis of the
analysand as a hysteric, whereas in the second case the analyst’s nagging
interventions will be based on a diagnosis of obsessional neurosis. Since
hysteria revolves around an ardent desire to elicit the desire of the Other,
the analyst’s silence encompasses a refusal to enter the hysterical dynamics
and is well suited to trigger the hysteric’s fantasy within the transference.

自不待言的是,分析家的行为,在这些事情里,反映出特殊的欲望,并依靠分析者的心灵的结构的赏识,在精神分析节数之前与期间。在第一个个案,分析家的持续的沉默,正常地前进,从诊断分析者,作为癔症。在第二个个案,分析家的唠叨的介入,将会以妄想症的神经症作为基础。因为癔症环绕热切的欲望旋转,为了召唤大他者的欲望。分析家的沉默涵盖拒绝进入癔症的动力结构,并且非常合适地触发癔症的幻见,在移情的内部。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectics of Desire’ Lacan wrote:
[A] calculated vacillation of the analyst’s ‘neutrality’ may be more
valuable for a hysteric than any amount of interpretation, despite
the frenzy which may result from it. That is to say, so that this
frenzy does not entail a rupture and the sequel convinces the subject
that the desire of the analyst was by no means involved.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:321–322, translation modified)

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”,拉康书写到:「比起任何数量的解释,分析家保持“中立”的审慎评估的摇摆,可能更加有价值。尽管从这个摇摆可能造成的狂热。换句话说,这个狂热并没有涵盖中断。这个过程让主体相信,分析家的欲望根本就没有被牵涉在内。

Vice versa, since obsessional neurosis hinges on a desire to neutralize
the desire of the Other, the analyst’s interventions confront the analysand
with a living presence by which the analyst guards himself against the
tentacles of the obsessional apparatus and conjures up the obsessional
fantasy.35 In these two cases, the analyst’s attitude is complementary, yet
in each case it is based on what Lacan called the desire of the analyst, i.e.
a desire that analysands reach the point where they avow their own desire.
Strategies of transference 123

反过来说,因为妄想症的神经症依靠大他者的欲望的保持中立。分析家的介入,让分析者面临一个活生生的存在。凭借这个活生的存在,分析家警戒他自己,对抗妄想症的工具的碰触,并且召唤妄想症者的幻想。在这两个个案里,分析家的态度是互补的。可是,在每个个案,它的基础上是拉康所谓的分析家的欲望。譬如,分析者的欲望到达这一点,在那里,他们宣称他们自己的欲望。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

人格面具 2

November 15, 2015

IV
第四章
NEGATIVE ATTEMPTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY FROM THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
负面的企图,想要替个体性,从集体无意识解放
a. Regressive Restoration of the Persona
人格面具的退行的恢复
254 A collapse of the conscious attitude is no small matter. It
always feels like the end of the world, as though everything had tumbled back into original chaos. One feels delivered up, disori¬ented, like a rudderless ship that is abandoned to the moods of the elements. So at least it seems. In reality, however, one has fallen back upon the collective unconscious, which now takes over the leadership. We could multiply examples of cases where, at the critical moment, a “saving” thought, a vision, an “inner voice,” came with an irresistible power of conviction and gave life a new direction.

意识态度的崩塌可不是小事情。它让人总是感觉像是世界的末日。好像每样东西都崩塌成为原初的混乱。我们感觉被解脱,被解离,就像是一只没有舵的船只,任由自然元素的播弄。所以,至少,看起来是这个样子。可是,现实上,我们跌回到集体无意识。现在,集体无意识接管领导权。我们能够举出许多个案的例子。在那里,在关键的时刻,一个“拯救”的思想,一个“内部”的声音,带着无法抗拒的信念的力量前来,给予生命新的方向。

Probably we could mention just as many cases where the collapse meant a catastrophe that destroyed life, for at such moments morbid ideas are also liable to take root, or ideals wither away, which is no less disastrous. In the one case some psychic oddity develops, or a psychosis; in the other, a state of disorientation and demoralization. But once the unconscious contents break through into consciousness, filling it with their uncanny power of conviction, the question arises of how the in¬dividual will react. Will he be overpowered by these contents? Will he credulously accept them? Or will he reject them? (I am disregarding the ideal reaction, namely critical understanding.)

可能,我们能够提到同样多的个案。在那里,崩塌意味著毁灭生命的灾难。因为在这一样的时刻,病态的观念也容易生根。或是理想枯萎掉。这也是同样是灾难。在前者的个案,心灵的古怪性发展,或是在另外一个个案,精神病发作,那是迷失方向与士气瓦解的状态。但是一旦无意识的内容,突破进入无意识,充满对于无意识的信念的奥秘的力量,就产生这个问题:个人要如何反应?他将会被这些内容压倒吗?他将会轻信地接纳它们吗?或是,他将排斥它们?(我正在忽略理想的反应,也就是,批判的理解)。

The first case signifies paranoia or schizophrenia; the second may either become an eccentric with a taste for prophecy, or he may revert to an infantile attitude and be cut off from human society; the third signifies the regressive restoration of the per¬sona. This formulation sounds very technical, and the reader may justifiably suppose that it has something to do with a complicated psychic reaction such as can be observed in the course of analytical treatment. It would, however, be a mistake to think that cases of this kind make their appearance only in analytical treatment.

第一个个案意味着偏执狂,或精神分裂症。第二个个案可能要就是变成怪癖者,具有预言的喜好,要不就是他可能转向婴孩的态度,然后跟人类的社会隔离。第三个个案意味着“人格面具的退行的恢复”。这种说明听起来非常专业术语,读者可能很有理由认为,它跟复杂的心灵的反应有某些的关系。譬如,在精神分析的治疗的过程,能够被观察到的东西。可是,这将是个错误,假如我们认为,这种的个案仅是在精神分析的治疗里出现它们的面貌。

163

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

The process can be observed just as well, and often better, in other situations of life, namely “in all those careers where there has been some violent and destructive intervention of fate. Everyone, presumably, has suffered adverse turns of for¬tune, but mostly they are wounds that heal and leave no crip¬pling mark. But here we are concerned with experiences that are destructive, that can smash a man completely or at least crip¬ple him for good. Let us take as an example a businessman who takes too great a risk and consequently becomes bankrupt.

这个过程同样能够被观察,经常更加清楚地被观察,在生活的其他情况。也就是,“在所有那些生涯里,在那里,命运相当猛烈而且摧毁性地介入”。每个人都认为是曾经遭受命运的逆向的翻转。但是大部分,它们都是痊愈而且没有留下瘫痪标记的伤痕。但是在此,我们关注的是那些具有毁灭性的经验。这些经验会完全摧毁一个人,或是至少永远地瘫痪他。让我们以一位生意人作例子。他做生意过分冒险,结果终告破产。

If he does not allow himself to be discouraged by this depressing ex-perience, but, un dismayed, keeps his former daring, perhaps with a little salutary caution added, his wound will be healed without permanent injury. But if, on the other hand, he goes to pieces, abjures all further risks, and laboriously tries to patch up his social reputation within the confines of a much more limited personality, doing inferior work with the mentality of a scared child, in a post far below him, then, technically speaking, he will have restored his persona in a regressive way. He will as a result of his fright have slipped back to an earlier phase of his person¬ality; he will have demeaned himself, pretending that he is as he was before the crucial experience, though utterly unable even to think of repeating such a risk. Formerly perhaps he wanted more than he could accomplish; now he does not even dare to attempt what he has it in him to do.

假如他没有让他自己被这个令人沮丧的经验丧失勇气。代替的,他不要心灰意冷,他保持他先前的大胆,或许稍微补充一点令人尊敬的谨慎,他的创伤将会痊愈,没有留下永久的伤害。但是,假如另一方面,他尝试弥补他的社会的名声,在更加有限的人格的范围里面,做劣等的工作,用受的惊吓的小孩的精神,处于有降他身份的职位。那么专业术语来说,他将会恢复他的人格面具,以一个退行的方式。由于他害怕的结果,他将会重新滑落回到他的人格的早先的时期。他将会贬低他自己,伪装他的生命本质,如同在危机时刻之前的模样。虽然他完全不能够去思维到重复这样的冒险。先前,他或许会想要完成超过自己能力的工作;现在,他甚至不敢企图要做他能力所及的工作。

55 Such experiences occur in every walk of life and in every
possible form, hence in psychological treatment also. Here again it is a question of widening the personality, of taking a risk on one’s circumstances or on one’s nature. What the critical experi¬ence is in actual treatment can be seen from the case of our phi¬losophy student: it is the transference. As I have already indi¬cated, it is possible for the patient to slip over the reef of the transference unconsciously, in which case it does not become an experience and nothing fundamental happens.

这样的经验发生在各行各业,以各种可能的方式。因此,也发生在心理学的治疗里。而且,问题是要扩宽人格,针对自己的环境,或自己的天性,採取冒险。在实际治疗时的危机经验的本质,能够被看出来,根据我们哲学系学生的个案,那就是移情。如同我曾经指示过,病人很有可能无意识地滑越过移情的礁岩。在那个情况,移情并没有成为经验,而且也没有任何基本的事情会发生。

The doctor, for the sake of mere convenience, might well wish for such patients. But if they are intelligent, the patients soon discover the exist¬ence of this problem for themselves. If then the doctor, as in the above case, is exalted into the father-lover and consequently has a flood of demands let loose against him, he must perforce think out ways and means of parrying the onslaught, without himself getting drawn into the maelstrom and without injury to the pa¬tient. A violent rupture of the transference may bring on a com¬plete relapse, or worse; so the problem must be handled with great tact and foresight. Another possibility is the pious hope that “in time” the “nonsense” will stop of its own accord. Cer¬tainly everything stops in time, but it may be an unconscionably long time, and the difficulties may be so unbearable for both sides that one might as well give up the idea of time as a healing factor at once.

为了仅是方便缘故,医生很有理由愿望这样的病人。但是,假如病人足够聪明,他们自己不久就发现这个难题的存在。假如医生,如同在以上的个案里,被提升到父亲-情人的地位,随后涌出的许多要求对他处处不利,他必然会想出各种方法与工具,避开这样的攻击,不要让他自己被捲人这个大的漩涡,不要让病人遭受伤害。移情的猛烈的断裂可能会导致完全的重新发作,或者,更加恶化。所以,这个难题必须异常技巧而又有先见之明地处理。另外一个可能是这个虔诚的希望:“时间到时”,这些“无聊的的事情”将会自动自发地停止。的确,每件事情时间到时都会停止,但是,那个时间可能是无意识地漫长。对于两边,这些困难可能如此无法忍受,以致我们很有理由放弃这个想法:让时间同时充当治疗的因素。

256 A far better instrument for “combatting” the transference
would seem to be offered by the Freudian theory of neurosis. The dependence of the patient is explained as an infantile sex¬ual demand that takes the place of a rational application of sex-
. uality. Similar advantages are offered by the Adlerian theory,1 which explains the transference as an infantile power-aim, and as a “security measure.” Both theories fit the neurotic mentality so neatly that every case of neurosis can be explained by both theories at once.2 This highly remarkable fact, which any un¬prejudiced observer is bound to corroborate, can only rest on the circumstance that Freud’s “infantile eroticism” and Adler’s “power drive” are one and the same thing, regardless of the clash of opinions between the two schools. It is simply a frag¬ment of uncontrolled, and at first uncontrollable, primordial in¬stinct that comes to light in the phenomenon of transference. The archaic fantasy-forms that gradually reach the surface of consciousness are only a further proof of this.

弗洛伊德对于神经症的理论,似乎提供一个更好的工具,来“博斗”移情。病人的依赖性被解释作为是婴孩的性的要求,取代性的理性的运用。类似的利益被阿德勒的理论提供。阿德勒理论解释移情,作为是婴孩的权力的目标,譬如“安全措施”。两种理论都如此清楚地适合神经症的精神状态,所以,神经症的每个个案都能够被解释,同时用两个解释。这个高度引人注意的事情,任何没有偏见的观察者一定都会建构,它仅能依靠这个情况:弗洛伊德的婴孩的性爱主义,与阿德勒的“权力冲动”,都是同样的东西,无论这两派之间,意见的冲突是多么大。那仅是无法控制的原始的本能的片断,起初无法被控制。在移情的现象里,这个无法控制的原始的本能真相大白。逐渐到达意识的表面的旧时的幻想与形式,仅是更进一步证明这个、、、

257 We can try both theories to make the patient see how infan-
tile, impossible, and absurd his demands are, and perhaps in the end he will actually come to his senses again. My patient, how¬ever, was not the only one who did not do this. True enough, the doctor can always save his face with these theories and extri¬cate himself from a painful situation more or less humanely.

我们尝试两个理论,为了让病人看出,他的要求是多么的幼稚,不可能,与荒谬。或许,最后,他将会实际上再次恢复他的理智。可是,我的病人并不是第一位没有恢复他的理智的人。的确,医生总是拯救他的面子,使用这些理论,然后让他自己挣脱一个令人痛苦的情况,相当合乎人性地。

There are indeed patients with whom it is, or seems to be, unre¬warding to go to greater lengths; but there are also cases where these procedures cause senseless psychic injury. In the case of my student I dimly felt something of the sort, and I therefore abandoned my rationalistic attempts in order-with ill-concealed mistrust-to give nature a chance to correct what seemed to me to be her own foolishness. As already mentioned, this taught me something extraordinarily important, namely the existence of an unconscious self-regulation.

的确,有些个案不值得,或似乎不值得,如此详细探讨。但是,也有些个案,这些程序引起没有意义的心灵的伤害。在我的学生的个案,我模糊地感觉到某件类似的东西。我因此放弃我的理性的企图—不信任溢于言表—为了给予自然一个机会来改正我觉得是她自己的愚蠢。如同已经被提到的,这教导我某件特殊重要的东西。换句话说,无意识的自我-规范的存在。

2 Cf. supra, pars. 44ff., for an example of such a case.
165

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
Not only can the unconscious “wish,” it can also cancel its own wishes. This realization, of such immense importance for the integrity of the personality, must remain sealed to anyone who cannot get over the idea that it is simply a question of infantilism. He will turn round on the threshold of this realization and tell himself: “It was all non¬sense of course. I am a crazy visionary! The best thing to do would be to bury the unconscious or throw it overboard with all its works.”

无意识不但能够“愿望”,无意识也能够取消它自己的愿望。这个体会,对于人格的尊严具有如此巨大的重要性。这个体会必须保持不让任何人知道,假如他无法理解这个观念:那仅是婴孩主义的问题。他将会在这个体会的门槛转身,然后告诉他自己:「当然,那都是无稽之谈。我是一位多么疯狂的幻想家!最好的事情就是将无意识埋葬,或是将无意识的一切运作,随着抛下大海。“
The meaning and purpose he so eagerly desired he will see only as infantile maunderings. He will understand that his longing was absurd; he learns to be tolerant with himself, resigned. What can he do? Rather than face the conflict he will turn back and, as best he can, regressively restore his shattered persona, discounting all those hopes and expectations that had blossomed under the transference. He will become smaller, more limited, more rationalistic than he was before. One could not say that this result would be an unqualified misfortune in all cases, for there are all too many who, on account of their notori¬ous ineptitude, thrive better in a rationalistic system than in freedom. Freedom is one of the more difficult things. Those who can stomach this way out can say with Faust:

这个意义与目标,他如此地渴望,以致于他仅是看见,作为是婴孩的无目的漫游。他将理解,他的渴望是荒谬的,他学会对他自己包容,顺服。他能够怎么做呢?他非但没有面对这个冲突,他将会转过头,尽他可能地,退行地恢复他被摧毁的人格面具,贬低所有那些希望与期望,在移情之下曾经盛放的希望与期望。他将会变得更加渺小,更加受到限制,更加理性化,比起他以前的样子。我们无法说,无论什么情况,这个结果将是不应该遭遇的不幸。因为有太多的人们,因为他们恶名昭彰的无能为力,他们在理性的系统里较能张罗,比起在自由里。自由是一件更加困难的事情。那些能够承受这个解脱之道的人们,能够跟随浮士德这样说:

This earthly circle I know well enough. Towards the Beyond the view has been cut off; Fool-who directs that way his dazzled eye, Contrives himself a double in the sky!
Let him look round him here, not stray beyond; To a sound man this world must needs respond. To roam into eternity is vain!
What he perceives, he can attain.
Thus let him walk along his earthlong day; Though phantoms haunt him, let him go his way.3

这个大地的圈子,我甚为熟稔。
朝向超验的景象已经被阻隔;
傻瓜—他用那个方式引导他目眩的眼光,
构想他自己在天上有一个本尊!
让他环顾这里周遭,不要迷失于超验世界
对于一位健全的人,这个世界必要回应,
漫游进入永恒是徒劳!
他所感觉的东西,他能够获得。
因此,让他沿着他的世间的日子前行,
虽然萦绕他的魅影重重,任他前行。

258 Such a solution would be perfect if a man were really able to
shake off the unconscious, drain it of its energy and render it inactive. But experience shows that the unconscious can be de
prived of its energy only in part: it remains continually active, for it not only contains but is itself the source of the libido from which the psychic elements flow.

这样的解决将是完美的,假如一个人确实能够摆脱掉无意识,耗尽无意识的能源,并且让无意识动弹不得。但是,我们根据经验知道,无意识仅有部分能够被解除它的能源;无意识始终继续的保存活跃。因为无意识不但包含力比多的来源,无意识本身就是力比多。心灵的元素就是从力比多流露出来。

¬3 Faust, trans. by Louis MacNeice, p. 283 (Part 11, Act V).
166

NEGATIVE ATTEMpTS TO FREE THE INDIVIDUALITY
It is therefore a delusion to think that by some kind of magical theory or method the uncon¬scious can be finally emptied of libido and thus, as it were, elim¬inated. One may for a while play with this delusion, but the day comes when one is forced to say with Faust:

因此,这是一个幻觉,假如我们认为,凭借某种的魔法的理论或方法,无意识最后能够被掏空力比多,因此,所谓的能够被减少。我们有一阵子,都在玩弄这个幻觉,但是这个日子会来临,当我们被迫跟随浮士德这样说:

But now such spectredom so throngs the air
That none knows how to dodge it, none knows where. Though one day greet us with a rational gleam,
The night entangles us in webs of dream.
We come back happy from the fields of spring¬
And a bird croaks. Croaks what? Some evil thing. Enmeshed in superstition night and morn,
It forms and shows itself and comes to warn.
And we, so scared, stand without friend or kin,
And the door creaks-and nobody comes in.4

但是现在,这样的魅影,如此充塞空中,
以致无人知道如何逃避它,无人知道何方,
虽然白天以理性的光辉欢迎我们
在夜晚,我们被纠缠于梦的网络,
我们从春天的原野,快乐地回来—
乌鸦哀鸣,哀鸣什么?某件不祥之事,
纠缠于迷信里,夜晚或清晨,
它现身,并显示自己,前来警告,
我们如此惊恐,没有朋友或亲属伴随
门吱吱响,没有人进入。

Nobody, of his own free will, can strip the unconscious of its effective power. At best, one can merely deceive oneself on this point. For, as Goethe says:

没有人,出之于他自己的自由意志,能够替无意识剥除掉它的有效的力量。针对这一点,充其量,我们仅能够欺骗自己。因为,如同歌德所说:

Unheard by the outward ear
In the heart I whisper fear;
Changing shape from hour to hour
I employ my savage power.5

没有让外倾的耳朵听见,
在内心,我窃窃私语恐惧;
每个时刻,形状都在改变
我运用我的野性的力量。

Only one thing is effective against the unconscious, and that is hard outer necessity. (Those with rather more knowledge of the unconscious will see behind the outer necessity the same fac~ which once gazed at them from within.) An inner necessity can change into an outer one, and so long as the outer necessity is real, and not just faked, psychic problems remain more or less ineffective. This is why Mephisto offers Faust, who is sick of the “madness of magic,” the following advice:
对抗无意识,仅有一件东西是有效的。那就是坚强外表的必要性。(对于无意识的知识更加丰富的人们,将会看见在坚强的外在必要性背后的那个相同的脸孔,曾经从内在凝视他的相同的脸孔。)内在的必要性能够改变成为外在的必要性。只要外在的必要性是真实的,不仅仅是虚构,心灵的难题始终是非常没有效果。这就是为什么浮士德厌倦于“魔法的疯狂“时,魔鬼梅非斯特提供给浮士德以下的劝告。

4 Ibid., p. 281 (Part 11, Act V).
5 Ibid., p. 282 (Part 11, Act V), modified.
167

260
THE RE:LATIONS BE:TW~E:N THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS Pack

Right. There is one way that needs
No money, no physician, and no witch.
Pack up your things and get back to the land
And there begin to dig and ditch;
Keep to the narrow round, confine your mind, And live on fodder of the simplest kind,
A beast among the beasts; and don’t forget
To use your own dung on the crops you set! 6

没错。有一个方法不需要
金钱,医生,或巫师。
打包你的行囊,回到故土
就在那里挖掘犁沟
保持在狭窄的周围,限制你的心灵,
然后依靠朴实的那些草料维生
如同野兽一般。但是不要忘记
使用你自己的粪便,滋养你播种的穀物

It is a well-known fact that the “simple life” cannot be faked, and therefore the unproblematical existence of a poor man, who really is delivered over to fate, cannot be bought by such cheap imitations. Only the man who lives such a life not as a mere possibility, but is actually driven to it by the necessity of his own nature, will blindly pass over the problem of his soul, since he lacks the capacity to grasp it. But once he has seen the Faustian problem, the escape into the “simple life” is closed for ever. There is of course nothing to stop him from taking a two-room cottage in the country, or from pottering about in a garden and eating raw turnips. But his soul laughs at the deception. Only what is really oneself has the power to heal.

这是众所周知的事实。这种“淡泊的生活“无法被虚构。因此,贫穷的人的没有难题的生存。贫穷的人确实被递交给命运,他无法被便宜的模仿所购买。这样的人过著淡泊生活,不是作为是可能,而且实际上受到他自己的天性的驱使来过这样的生活。仅有这样的人才会盲目地忽略他的灵魂的难题。因为他欠缺理解它的这个能力。但是当他一旦看见弗洛伊德的难题,逃避进入“淡泊”的生活,就永远被关闭了。当然,并没有任何东西阻止他驻居在乡下的两个房间的茅屋里。或是阻止他不能在花园里弄东弄西,与吃野生的郁金香花。但是,他的灵魂会嘲笑这个欺骗。仅有确实是属于自己的人,才具有治疗的力量。

!59 The regressive restoration of the persona is a possible course
only for the man who owes the critical failure of his life to his own inflatedness. With diminished personality, he turns back to the measure he can fill. But in every other case resignation and self-belittlement are an evasion, which in the long run can be kept up only at the cost of neurotic sickliness. From the con¬scious point of view of the person concerned, his condition does not 109k like an evasion at all, but seems to be due to the impos¬sibility of coping with the problem. Usually he is a lonely figure, with little or nothing to help him in our present-day culture. Even psychology has only purely reductive interpretations to offer, since it inevitably underlines the archaic and infantile character of these transitional states and makes them unaccept¬able to him. The fact that a medical theory may also serve the purpose of enabling the doctor to pull his own head more or less elegantly out of the noose does not occur to him. That is pre¬cisely why these reductive theories fit the essence of neurosis so beautifully-because they are of such great service to the doctor.

人格面具的退行的恢复,仅有针对这样的人,才是可能的途径。他将他生活的严重的失败,归咎于他自己的自我膨胀。带着被减少的人格,他回转到他能够填补的程度。但是在每一个其他的个案,顺服与自我-贬抑是一种讨避。追根究底,仅有耗费神经症的疾病作为代价,这个自我膨胀才能够被维持。从相关的这个人的意识的观点,他的情况根本就不像是逃避。而是似乎由于不可能处理这个难题。通常,他是一位孤独的人物,在我们当前时代的文化,几乎没有什么东西可以帮助他。即使是心理学也仅能提供纯粹的还原的解释。因为心理学无可避免会强调这些转移的状态的旧时与婴孩的特性。并且让这些转移的状态无法被他接受。医学的理论也可能充当这个目的:让医生能够相当优雅地从这个牛角尖挣脱出来。医生并没有想到这个事实。那确实是为什么这些还原的理论,如此漂亮地配合神经症者的本质。因为他们对于医生的贡献是如此巨大。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

从移情到互为主体性

November 14, 2015

FROM PSYCHOLOGY TO INTERSUBJECTIVITY
从心理学到互为主体性

Lacan’s first extensive protocol on the topic of transference, his 1951
‘Intervention on Transference’, took off from yet another trenchant
critique of mainstream psychoanalysis. Now the unfortunate bugbear
was called Daniel Lagache, an analyst who unlike many of Lacan’s future
adversaries was more drawn to the scientific ideals of academic
psychology than the therapeutic ambitions of ego-psychology.15

拉康的首次的广泛的模式,探讨移情的主题,他在1961年的“论移情的介入’, 出发点是从另外一个猛烈的批判主流的精神分析。现在,这位不幸的怪物被称为丹尼尔 拉噶奇。这位精神分析家不像许多拉康的未来的敌人,他被吸引到学院派的科学的理想,而不是自我-心理学的治疗的企图心。

Echoing a criticism by Maurice Benassy on the encyclopaedic position
paper on transference Lagache had prepared for a 1951 conference, Lacan
developed a vehement rebuttal of Lagache’s explanation of the repetitive
nature of transference via the so-called Zeigarnik effect.16

拉康回应本拿西从百科全书的立场探讨移情的批评,那是拉噶奇替1951年准备的论文。拉康发展猛烈的反驳,针对拉噶奇的解释移情的重复的特性,经由所谓的哲噶米克的效应。

According to
this effect, originally described in 1927 by Bela Zeigarnik, an associate of
the cognitive learning theorist Kurt Lewin, incomplete tasks are more likely
to stay in people’s minds than properly resolved ones.17

依照这个效应,哲噶米克在1927年最初描述的效应。他哲噶米克斯认知学习的理论家科克 列文的助理:没有完成的工作,更加有可能保持在人们的心里,比起合适被解决的工作。

Taking his lead
from a book by Maslow and Mittelmann (1951[1941]:66), Lagache had
claimed that it is easy to put Zeigarnik’s incomplete tasks on a par with the
unresolved infantile conflicts and the thwarted wishes in the mental life of
neurotics, which could elucidate the spring of Freud’s unconscious
repetition compulsion and its ruling over the analysand’s transference.18

拉噶奇从马斯洛与米腾曼的书作为开始,他宣称:我们很容易将哲噶米克的“没有完成的工作,能够相提并论,跟没有被解决的婴孩的冲突,以及遭受挫折的愿望,在神经者的精神生活里。这个宣称可以用来阐释弗洛伊德的无意识的重复的冲动的泉源,以及无意识的重复的冲动对于分析者的移情的统辖。

In his reply, Lacan followed Benassy’s argument that instead of
repetition and transference being determined by the Zeigarnik effect,
matters might very well be the other way round, the Zeigarnik effect
depending on the nature of the transference between the experimenter
and the participants.

在他的回应里,拉康遵循本拿西的论点:重复与移情并没有受的哲噶米克的效应所决定。事情很有可能恰恰相反。哲噶米克的效应依靠处于试验者与参与者之间的移情的特性。

Whereas Benassy had illustrated his point in
reference to the conditions of psychometric testing, Lacan applied it
directly to the psychoanalytic setting, saying that ‘it proceeds entirely in
this relationship of subject to subject, which means that it preserves a
dimension which is irreducible to all psychology considered as the
objectification of certain properties of the individual’ (Lacan
1982a[1951]:62). All individual reactions, Lacan posited, are governed
by the primacy of an intersubjective relationship, which implies that
transference can only be explained through the dialectical process
between the analysand and the analyst.19

虽然本拿西说明他的观的,提的心理量尺的测试的条件。拉康则是将它直接运用到精神分析的背景。拉康并且说,「心理量尺的测试的进行,完全是在主体与主体之间的关系里。这意味着,它保存一个无法被化简的维度,无法被化简成为是被认为是客体化的所有的心理学,个人的某些属性被客体化。拉康提出,所有的个人的反应动作,受到互为主体性的关系的原初地位所统辖。这暗示着,移情能够被解释,仅是凭借分析者与分析家之间的辩证的过程。

So how does the analyst play a part in the emergence of the analysand’s
transference? Three years before his ‘Intervention on Transference’, in
‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis’, Lacan had implicitly espoused Freud’s
recommendation that the analyst ‘should be opaque to his patients and,
like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him’ (Freud
1912e:118). Lacan emphasized that the analyst’s attitude of general
impassibility is exactly what facilitates the beneficial reactivation of
unconscious ‘archaic images’ in the analysand (Lacan 1977d[1948]: 13–
15).

所以,分析家如何扮演一个角色,在分析者的移情的出现?在“论移情的介入”的前三年,在“精神分析的侵凌性”,拉康曾经含蓄地说明弗洛伊德的建议:「分析家应该对他的病人保持模糊。就像是一面镜子,分析家应该跟病人显示,仅是被显示给他的东西。」拉康强调,分析家对于通常无法跨越的态度,确实就是让分析者身上,无意识的“旧时的意象”,方便从事有利的重新触动的因素。

He even embraced Melanie Klein’s theory of the paranoiac’s projection
of bad internal objects onto the outside world, in order to argue that the
opaque psychoanalyst induces a state of controlled paranoia in the
analysand (ibid.: 15).

他甚至接受米兰 克来恩的理论:妄想症者的投射坏的内部的客体,到外在的世界。为了主张,模糊嗳昧的精神分析家在分析者身上,引导出受控制的妄想症的状态。

Whilst Lacan’s account of transference in this early
paper did not attain the high level of sophistication characteristic of his
later work, its central message that the analyst’s controlled inertia within
the treatment determines the analysand’s transference would resound for
years to come.20 Furthermore, Lacan maintained that when the analysand’s
transference turns into an unmanageable aggressive tension, the analyst is
as much responsible for these deleterious developments as for the initial
emergence of transference.

在这篇早期的论文,拉康描述移情,并没有获得他晚期著作的精致的特性。它的主心的讯息是:在治疗内部,分析家的受控制的惰性,分析者的移情将会迴响在未来的好几年。而且,拉康主张,当分析者的移情转变成为一个无法管理的侵凌性的紧张,分析家负同样的责任,对于这个巧妙的发展,如同负责移情的惰性的出现。

These negative reactions only occur when an
analyst exchanges his ‘pure mirror of an unruffled surface’ (ibid.: 15) for
admonitions curtailing the analysand’s wishes or interventions saturated
with good advice (presumably with the best of philanthropic intentions).
In his ‘Intervention on Transference’, Lacan took advantage of Freud’s
trouble with Dora to illustrate how the girl’s negative transference had
indeed taken shape in accordance with Freud’s own clinical conduct,
confirming the assertion that transference follows a dialectics of
intersubjectivity:

这些负面的反应动作会发生,仅是当分析家用他的“纯粹的反映安详的表面”,交换这些预警,缩短分析者的愿望的预警•或是充满善意劝告的介入(被假定是带着最善意的慈善的意图)。在他的“论移情的介入“,拉康利用弗洛伊德的朵拉个案的困扰,来阐述这位女孩的负面的移情,确实是遵照弗洛伊德的自己的临床的行为而成形。拉康证实这个主张:移情遵循互为主体性的辩证法。

[T]he case of Dora, because of what it stands for in the experience
of transference when this experience was still new…[was] the first
case in which Freud recognised that the analyst played his part…
I will be attempting to define in terms of pure dialectics the
transference, which we call negative on the part of the subject as
being the operation of the analyst who interprets it.
(Lacan 1982a[1951]:64–65)

因为朵拉的个案所代表的东西,在移情的经验里,当这个经验当时还是新出现。它是第一个个案,弗洛伊德在那里体认:分析家扮演他的角色、、、我将企图用纯粹的辩证法的术语,来定义移情。我们称为负面的移情,在主体这方面,作为是解释它的分析及的运作。

Restructuring Freud’s entire case around a series of dialectical reversals
and subsequent developments of subjective truth, Lacan ascribed Dora’s
negative transference, which triggered her departure, to Freud’s failure
to implement one crucial reversal. Freud had refrained from showing to
Dora that she was not interested in Mrs K because the woman was her
closest rival, but because she incarnated the mystery of femininity.21 Put
differently, Lacan could only see one reason behind Freud’s downfall:
Mr K must have inspired in the young girl that he could not understand
her love for Mrs K. At the time, Lacan designated Freud’s fixation as
countertransference, ‘the sum total of the prejudices, passions and
difficulties of the analyst, or even of his insufficient information, at any
given moment of the dialectical process’ (ibid.: 71).22
the father of psychoanalysis had been so fixated on the love he believed

当拉康重新建构弗洛伊德的整个的个案,环绕一系列的辩证法的逆转,与主体的真理的随后的发展,他将朵拉的负面的移情归咎于弗洛伊德没有运作一个关键的逆转,因为这个负面的移情触发朵拉的离去。弗洛伊德自我节制,没有对朵拉显露:她对K夫人感到興趣,不是因为那个女人是她最靠近的情敌,而且因为她具体表现女性的神秘。换句话说,拉康仅是看见弗洛伊德的掉落情网的一个理由:K先生当时一定曾经在这位女孩身上启发,他无法理解她对K夫人的爱。在当时,拉康指明弗洛伊德的固著,作为是反-移情,「分析家的各种偏见,激情与困难的总数,或甚至是分析家的不充足的资讯的总数,在这个辩证法的过程的任何特定的时刻」。弗洛伊德作为精神分析之父对于他相信的爱,曾经是如此固著。

He concluded accordingly that ‘transference does not arise from any mysterious property
of affectivity’, but always reflects the analyst’s own position (ibid.: 71).
Having situated transference firmly within psychoanalytic
intersubjectivity, Lacan probed deeper into the phenomenology of
transference with the goal of formulating a more fundamental set of
alternatives than the classic Freudian opposition between an
advantageous, mild positive transference and its infelicitous (erotic or
aggressive) counterpart. The upshot was a clear theoretical distinction
between imaginary and symbolic transference, each incorporating all
possible shades of the entire affective spectrum.

拉康因此下结论:「移情并非产生于情感的任何的神秘的属性。代替的,移情总是反映出分析者自己的立场」。当拉康将移情坚固地定位在精神分析的互为主体性的内部,他更加深入地探索移情的现象,目标朝着阐述一个更加基本的替代选择,比起古典的弗洛伊德的对立,处于有利的,温和的,正面的移情,与不利的侵凌性的负面移情。结局是清楚的理论的区别,想像与象征的移情。每一种都合并整个的情感的光谱的一切可能的色度。

In Seminar I Lacan tabulated symbolic transference as the efficacious
side of the coin, identifying it quite simply with the act of full speech:
‘Each time a man speaks to another in an authentic and full manner,
there is, in the true sense, transference, symbolic transference—something
takes place which changes the nature of the two beings present’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:109).

在第一研讨班,拉康塑造象征的移情,作为是硬币的有效的一面,将它仅是认同于充分言说的行为。「每次一个人跟另外一个人言说,以真诚而充实的方式,就真实的意义而言,就存在着移情,象征的移情—某件东西发生,改变这俩个在场的人物的天性」。

On this symbolic plane, transference operates as
the motor of analysis and it can take either the form of love or hate, and
quite possibly a mixture of both.23 To corroborate the idea that transference
is inextricably linked with the symbolic structure of language, he referred
to Freud’s description of ‘the fact of transference’ in the final chapter of
The Interpretation of Dreams, where he had associated it with the
transmission of energy from an unconscious representation to a
preconscious day’s residue (Freud 1900a:562–563).24 Here, Lacan
stipulated, Freud had explained how transference takes place when a
forbidden unconscious discourse takes hold of a more accessible,
preconscious discourse in order to express itself (Lacan 1988b[1953–
54]:247).

在象征的层面,移情运作,作为精力分析的马达。它要就是採用爱的形式,要不就是採用恨的形式。相当可能的是,採有爱与恨两这混合。为了建构这个观念:移情无法挣脱地跟语言的象征结构息息相关,拉康参照弗洛伊德的描述“移情的事实”,在“梦的解释的最后的章节”。在那里,弗洛伊德将移情跟精力的传递联想一块,从无意识的再现,到前意识的白天的残渣。在此,拉康提出旦书:无意识的辞说掌控更加可以靠近,前意识的辞说,为了表达它自己。

What Lacan dubbed ‘imaginary transference’ coincides with the type
of transference Freud had encountered as an obstacle to the treatment,
with the proviso that Lacan put its dialectical rather than its affective
qualities centre stage. Analysands who are under the spell of an imaginary
transference only approach their analyst as an alter ego, an other who
presents a mirror image of themselves.

拉康所谓的“想像的移情”,巧合于弗洛伊德曾经遭遇的移情的类型,作为是治疗的阻碍。有一个旦书是:拉康将移情的辩证的移情,而不是想像的移情,作为中心的舞台。受到想像的移情的影响之下的分析者,接近分析家,仅是作为他我,一位他者,呈现他们自己的镜子影像。

The love analysands experience
on this plane is strictly narcissistic. Not tolerating the other’s difference,
they only bring into relief those features which the other has in common
with themselves. Likewise, imaginary hate is not oriented towards
breaking a mutually agreed contract, but towards continuous rivalry,
competition and jealousy. Lacan contemplated the analysand’s projection
of archaic infantile images onto the analyst as a standard example of this
imaginary transference.

在这个层面,分析家经验到的爱严格来说是自恋的。他们并没有容忍他者的差异,他们仅是突显他者拥有跟他们自己共同的那些特征。同样地,想像的恨并没有被定向朝向违背互相被同意的契约,而是朝向继续的敌意,競争与妒忌。拉康沉思分析者的投射旧时的婴孩的意象,到分析家身上。作为是想像的移情的标准的例子。
And for all its prevalence within ego-psychology,
he considered it detrimental to the continuation of psychoanalysis:
To bring into play the illusory projection of any one of the subject’s
fundamental relations with the analytic partner, or again the object
relation, the relation between transference and counter-transference,
all this, remaining as it does within a two body psychology, is
inadequate.
(ibid.: 261)25

尽管在自我-心理学的内部,移情的胜行,拉康则是将移情认为是有伤害的,对于精神分析的继续。光是这样运作是不足够的:运作主体跟分析家作为伴侣的基本的关系的任何关系的幻想的投射,移情与反移情之间的关系,所有这一切关系,因为它始终保持在两个身体的心理学。

This claim is of course quite remarkable in light of Lacan’s previous
assessment of the transference in ‘Aggressivity in Psychoanalysis’. For
what had originally appeared as the essence of transference, namely the
reactualization of archaic images, now emerged as its evil underside—a
clinical avenue to be avoided rather than cleared.

这个宣称当然相当引人注意,从拉康的先前的评估移情,在“精神分析的侵凌性”。因为原先出现作为移情的本质,也就是,旧时的意象的重新触动,现在出现,作为它的邪恶的底层—这一个临床的途径应该被避免,而不是被清除。

The second nuance Lacan added to his initial picture of transference
relates to the power of analytic intersubjectivity for eliciting the
analysand’s reactions.

拉康增加第二次细微差别,到移情的这个最初的画面。他将移情跟精神分析的互为主体性的力量牵扯一块,作为召唤分析者的反应动作。

To the extent that transference operates according
to the criteria of full and empty speech, it is difficult to see how analysts,
simply by virtue of their acting as dark mirrors, would actually evoke
these responses. Lacan was forced to conclude from his own restructuring
of the transference phenomenon that ‘the dimension of transference exists
from the start, implicitly, well before analysis begins, before this
concubinage, which analysis is, triggers it’ (ibid.: 271). This perspective
was of course in keeping with Freud’s explanation of transference in the
Dora case—an inevitable necessity brought to light by the circumstances
of psychoanalytic treatment (Freud 1905e[1901]:116–117) —but it also
revived the spectre of the neurotic’s predisposition and the spontaneous
appearance of transference.

随着移情的运作,依照充分言说与空洞言说的标准,我们很困难看出,分析家如何实际上召唤这些反应,仅是凭借他们的行动,作为黑暗的镜子。拉康被迫下结论,根据他自己的重新架构移情现象:移情的维度从开始就存在,含蓄地存在,就在精神分析开始之前,就在这个非婚交媾之前,这就是精神分析的本质,精神分析触发它。这个观点当然符合弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在朵拉的个案。一个无可避免的必要性,由精神分析的治疗的环境启明。但是它也重新复活神经症者的性情的魅影,与移情自动自发地出现。

Therefore Lacan hastened to specify that if
there is a ‘readiness to the transference’ in the patient ‘it is solely by
virtue of his placing himself in the position of acknowledging himself in
speech, and searching out his truth to the end, the end which is there, in
the analyst’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:277–278).26 Although not
diminished, the analyst’s responsibility was consequently restricted to
the emergence of the analysand’s transference along one of the axes of
the symbolic-imaginary divide.27

因此,拉康匆匆指明:假如在病人身上,移情准备出现,那仅是凭借他将他自己放置在这个立场:用言说承认自己,并且彻底地寻找出他的真理,在分析家身上,存在在那里的目标。分析家的责任虽然没有被减少,结果却是被限制于分析者的移情的出现,沿着象征与想像的分界线的其中一个枢纽。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康:移情的策略

November 13, 2015

Chapter 3
第三章
Strategies of transference
移情的策略
THE MANY FACES OF TRANSFERENCE
移情的众多面向

In a small, seemingly futile passage on the termination of analysis in
‘On Beginning the Treatment’, Freud confessed that since the start of his
psychoanalytic career he had noticed a remarkable change in his patients’
attitudes towards the progression of their analysis:

在“治疗的开始”,针对精神分析的终止的这篇简短,表现没有效用的段落里,弗洛伊德坦白承认,自从他的精神分析的事业的开始,他已经注意到一个明显的改变,在他的病人的态度,朝向精神分析的进展。

In the early years of my psychoanalytic practice I used to have the
greatest difficulty in prevailing on my patients to continue their
analysis. This difficulty has long since been shifted, and I now
have to take the greatest pains to induce them to give up.
(Freud 1913c:130)

在我精神分析实践的早年岁月,我常常遭遇极大的困难,要劝告我的病人继续他们的精神分析。这个困难长久以来已经改变。我现在必须花费巨大努力,才能劝导病人放弃。

Freud did not clarify the mainspring of this problem, but numerous
examples can be adduced to demonstrate that the entire issue was
dominated by the vicissitudes of transference.

弗洛伊德并没有澄清这个难题的主要的动力。但是,无数的例子可以作为补充,用来证明整个的问题受到移情的起伏的支配。

For instance, shortly before publishing ‘On Beginning the Treatment’,
Freud had informed Sandor Ferenczi about his ticklish experience with
Elma Palos, whom he had agreed to treat for a short period of about
three months, until Easter 1912:

譬如,就在出版“治疗的开始”不久之前,弗洛伊德曾经告知费伦奇,关于他跟爱玛 帕洛思的神经质的经验。弗洛伊德曾经同意治疗帕洛思,经过大约三个月的简短时期。

With Elma things continue to go gloomily. She has brought out
several quite surprisingly intelligent insights, but she doesn’t want
to get into the experience with you and doesn’t seem to want to
finish with me; i.e., because of the transference she wishes to extend
her stay past Easter, which I don’t want to do. So I am cooling off
noticeably again.
(Brabant et al. 1993:362)

对于爱玛,事情继续阴暗地进行。她已经显露好几个相当令人惊奇的智慧的洞察力。但是,她并不想要跟你一起进入这个经验。并且似乎并不想要跟我一块完成这个经验。换句话说,因为移情,她希望延伸她的停留,超越复活节。我并不想要这样做。所以,我再次明显地冷却下来。

This was neither Freud’s first encounter with a patient reluctant to leave,
nor was it the first time he attributed the phenomenon to the power of
transference. In April 1900, at a moment when he was still groping his
way as to the nature and function of the transference, Freud had already
told Wilhelm Flies about its effect on the duration of his analysis of a
certain Mr E:

这既不是弗洛伊德的第一次遭遇病人不愿意离开,也不是他第一次将这个现象归属于移情的力量。在1900年4月,在这个时刻,他依旧正在模索他的途径,关于移情的特性与功能。弗洛伊德曾经告诉弗利兹,关于移情的影响,对于他对某位E先生的精神分析。

I am beginning to understand that the apparent endlessness of the
treatment is something that occurs regularly and is connected with
the transference…The asymptotic conclusion of the treatment
basically makes no difference to me, but is yet one more
disappointment to outsiders…Since he had to suffer through all
my technical and theoretical errors, I actually think that a future
case could be solved in half the time.
(Masson 1985:409)

我正在理解,治疗的明显的没有终止是某件规律发生的事情,并且跟移情息息相关。治疗的非症状的结论,对我而言,基本上没有任何差异。可是,对于外面的人而言,却是又一次的令人失望。
因为他必须承受痛苦,经历我的技术与理论的错误。我实际上认为,未来的个案,用一半的时间,就能够被解决。

Freud did not have to wait long to test the value of his assertion, for
some six months later an eighteen-year-old hysterical girl suffering from
a welter of psychic and somatic symptoms was referred to him by her
father (ibid.: 427). Compared to Mr E’s treatment, which lasted for more
than a year, Freud’s analysis of Dora (Freud 1905e[1901]) took a mere
three months. This could be seen as an even better result than that which
Freud had anticipated in his letter to Flies, were it not for the fact that
the girl herself decided to break off her analysis before reaching a
satisfactory solution of her problems.1

弗洛伊德并没有等待很久,他就测试他的主张的价值。经过大约六根月之后,一位十八岁的癔症的女孩,遭受心灵与肉体的症状的翻滚。她的父亲带她去就诊弗洛伊德。跟E 先生延续一年多的治疗比较起来,弗洛伊德对于朵拉的精神分析,仅是花费三个月。这能够被视为是具有更佳的结果,比起弗洛伊德曾经写信给弗利兹所预期的结果。假如不是因为这个事实:女孩自己决的要中断她的精神分析,这样,她才能获得她的难题的令人满意的解决。

Again Freud felt that he had made
a technical and theoretical error, and again he regarded his patient’s
behaviour as the corollary of her ‘transferences’ [sic], clinical phenomena
encompassing ‘new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies
which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of analysis’
whereby the patient replaces ‘some earlier person by the person of the
physician’ (ibid.: 116). On the one hand Freud conceded that he must
have been blinded by Dora’s diligence, not seeing that her identification
of him with the dreaded Mr K fuelled her desire to take revenge. On the
other hand he ventured the hypothesis that his technical mistake must
have been rooted in a failure to direct Dora’s attention to her unconscious
homosexual love for Mrs K.2 Whatever the nature of Freud’s mistake,
Dora’s transference did not catalyse an interminable analytic process,
but prompted her to finish the treatment prematurely.

而且,弗洛伊德感觉,他曾经犯了一个技术与理论的错误。再次,他将他的病人的行为,视为是她的 移情的必然结果。这些临床的现象涵盖冲动与幻想的新版的拷贝。在精神分析的进展期间,这些冲动与幻想被召唤出来,而且被知道。凭借精神分析,病人用医生这个人物,取代某位早先的人物。在一方面,弗洛伊德承认,他当时一定对于朵拉的勤勉视而不见,他才没有看见,她对他的认同,其实对可恨的K先生的认同。这激发起她想要报复的欲望。在另一方面,弗洛伊德冒险提出假设:他的技术性的错误当时一定是根源于他没有办法引导朵拉注意她的无意识的同性恋的爱,对于K太太。无论弗洛伊德的错误的特性是什么,朵拉的移情,并没有触发一个没有终止的精神分析的过程。而是激发她过早地结束这个治疗。

Years later, Freud applied what he had learnt from the Dora case in his
treatment of another eighteen-year-old girl (Freud 1920a). Like Dora, this
girl had expressed a desire to kill herself. Much like Dora’s, her parents
had become so upset with her demeanour that they decided to seek Freud’s
help. And in keeping with Dora’s erotic interest, albeit more overtly, this
girl’s homosexual orientation underpinned many of her symptoms. When
the girl produced a series of dreams in which she featured as a happily
married mother, Freud declared that she merely wanted to deceive him, in
line with her long-established habit of betraying her father.

几年以后,弗洛伊德运用他从朵拉的个案学习到的东西,远用到他对另外一位十八岁的女孩的治疗。就像朵拉,这位女孩曾经表达想要自杀的欲望。非常酷似朵拉,她的父母对于她的行为感到如此懊恼,所以他们决定寻求弗洛伊德的帮助。这位女孩的同性恋的定向,跟朵拉的性爱的興趣一样,虽然是更加明显,作为是许多她的症状的基础。当这位女孩产生一系列的梦。在梦里,她扮演一位快乐地结婚的母亲。弗洛伊德宣称,她仅是想要欺骗他,以符合她根深蒂固的习惯:背叛她的父亲。

Having
acknowledged the girl’s hostility towards her father and her concurrent
unconscious animosity towards himself as a father representative, Freud
subsequently ended the treatment on his own initiative, insisting that the
girl continue her analysis with a female analyst. By pinpointing the
deceitfulness of his patient’s productions and by effectively dropping his
patient before she had the opportunity to leave her analyst, Freud was
eager to avoid a retake of the Dora case. Yet once again the transference —
in this case an unconscious negative attitude towards the father—proved
decisive in light of the continuation of the analytic process.

弗洛伊德承认,这位女孩对于她的父亲具有敌意,同时对弗洛伊德自己作为父亲的代表,也无意识地具有敌意。弗洛伊德随后自己创议要结束这个治疗,他建议这位女孩应该找一位女性的分析家来继续她的精神分析。凭借有效地甩掉他的病人,在病人有机会离开她的分析家之前。弗洛伊德渴望避开朵拉个案的重演。可是,再一次,这个移情—在这个个案,对于父亲的无意识的负面的态度—证实是决定性关键,从精神分析过程的继续的观点。

A first conclusion to be drawn from Freud’s remarks on transference
is that its manifestation can lead to the analysis becoming either
unpursuable or interminable. Owing to this strong connection between
transference and the duration of psychoanalytic treatment, Lacan
proclaimed in Seminar I that ‘one can say that the transference is the
very concept of analysis, because it is the time of analysis’ (Lacan 1988b
[1953–54]:286).3

从弗洛伊德探讨移情的谈论能够被获得的最初的结论是,对于移情的展示会导致精神分析成为,要就是无法被追寻,要不就是没有终止。由于这个强烈的关联,处于移情与精神分析的治疗的期间,拉康在第一研讨班宣称:「我们能够说,移情就是精神分析的观念。因为移情就是精神分析的时间。」

Here the question emerges whether the analyst’s ‘management’ of
the transference or something in the nature of transference itself decides
over the continuation of the analytic process. Freud’s comments on his
technical mistakes in the Dora case strongly support the former option,
whereas his position in the treatment of the young homosexual woman
seems to endorse the latter. The same ambiguity pervades Freud’s
theoretical discussions of transference in his papers on technique and
the introductory lectures on psychoanalysis.

在此,这个问题出现,无论分析家的“管理移情”或某件事情,用移情本身的特性,是否决定,对于精神分析过程的继续。弗洛伊德的评论他的技术的错误,在朵拉的个案里,强烈地支持前者的选择。弗洛伊德的立场,在年轻同性恋的女人的治疗,似乎是证实后者:精神分析没有终止。相同的模糊嗳昧弥漫弗洛伊德的理论的讨论移情,在他探讨技术的论文与探讨精神分析的介绍性的演讲。

For example, in ‘The
Dynamics of Transference’ he noted: ‘Where the capacity for transference
has become essentially limited to a negative one, as is the case with
paranoiacs, there ceases to be any possibility of influence or cure’ (Freud
1912b:107). A different account, implicitly underscoring the analyst’s
power over the transference, appeared in the paper on transference-love:
‘No doctor who experiences this [the patient’s falling in love] for the
first time will find it easy to retain his grasp on the analytic situation and
to keep clear of the illusion that the treatment is really at an end’ (Freud
1915a[1914]:162, italics added).

譬如,在“移情的动力学”,他注意到:「当移情的能力已经变成基本上被限制于负面的移情。如同偏执狂的个案,那影响与治疗的任何可能性都停止存在」。一个不同的描述,暗示地强调分析家的移情的力量,出现在探讨“移情与爱”的论文:「当医生首次经验到这个移情与爱(病人的爱恋),他将会很容易保留他的理解,针对精神分析的情境,并且避开这个幻觉:治疗确实结束了」。

It seems that for Freud the clue to the entire question lay in the
differential faces of the transference. The mild positive, conscious face
of transference is beneficial for the continuation of analysis, whereas its
resistance face, epitomized by the analy sand’s unconscious negative,
hostile or intensely erotic feelings towards the analyst, is a recipe for
disaster, unless the analyst manages to explain their infantile origin to
the analysand (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:444; 1940a[1938]:174–177).

似乎,对于弗洛伊德,整个的问题的线索就在于移情具有不同的面貌。移情的温和,积极,有意识的脸孔是有利益的,对于精神分析的继续。另一方面,对于移情的抗拒的脸孔,由分析者的无意识的负面,敌意,或强烈性爱的感觉,朝向分析家,可看出轮廓。移情的抗拒的脸孔是形成灾难的要素。处非分析家成功地解释这些负面的移情起源于分析者的婴孩时期。

Because he regarded the analy sand’s feelings in the (hostile or erotic)
transference as a blueprint of a repressed unconscious pattern (Freud
1910a[1909]:50–51), Freud defined the analyst’s task accordingly as
overcoming the aspect of repetition controlling the transference and
opening the psychic avenues of remembering (Freud 1926e:226–228).4
In his re-reading of Freud’s technical papers during the early 1950s,
Lacan progressively exchanged the two constitutive axes (positive,
negative vs. conscious, unconscious) of Freud’s taxonomy of transference
for a structural classification embedded in his own distinction between
the imaginary and the symbolic (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:284).

因为分析家将分析者在敌意或性爱的移情里的感觉,作为是被压抑的无意识的模式的蓝图。弗洛伊德定义分析家的工作,因此作为是克服重复的面向,控制移情与展开记忆的心灵的管道。当拉康重新阅读弗洛伊德的技术的论文,在1950年代期间,拉康逐渐交换这两个组成的枢纽,(积极,负面,对抗意识,无意识),这是弗洛伊德的移情的术语。拉康将它转换成我结构的分类,镶嵌于他自己的区别,处于想像界与象征界之间。
In
emphasizing the imaginary and symbolic dimensions of transference
Lacan at once endeavoured to solve the Freudian riddle why transference
is simultaneously the engine of psychoanalytic treatment and the strongest
weapon of resistance (ibid.: 284). To Lacan this clinical puzzle could
not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by merely relying on the
faces of transference; it required entering into the dialectics of the
imaginary and the symbolic.

当拉康强调移情的想像与象征的维度,他立即尝试解决弗洛伊德的谜团: 为什么移情同时是精神分析治疗的引擎。而且是最强烈的抗拒的武器。对于拉康,这个临床的谜团无法被带到令人满意的结论,凭借仅是依靠移情的脸孔。它要求进入想像界与象征界的辩证法。

Consequently, whereas Freud had predicated
the continuation of analysis on the analyst’s ability to handle the
inherently detrimental faces of transference by exposing their roots in a
repressed, infantile conflict, Lacan emphasized that the analyst’s duty
consisted in guaranteeing that the transference does not disintegrate into
an imaginary relationship of jealousy, rivalry and competition. At the
same time Lacan did not discard the qualities of love and hate within the
transference. On the contrary, he argued that love and hate are the two
central constituents of both symbolic and imaginary transference, with
the caveat that they cannot operate without an additional, generally
neglected factor of ignorance

结果,弗洛伊德曾经描述精神分析的继续,根据分析家的能力,处理本质上具有伤害性的移情的脸孔,凭借揭露他们在被压抑的,婴孩的冲突里的根源。拉康强调,分析家的责任在于保证:移情没有瓦解成为想像的妒忌,敌意,与競争的关系。同时,拉康并没有抛弃在移情里,爱与恨的各种特质。相反地,他主张,爱与恨都是象征界与想像界的两个中心的组成成分。具有这个警示:每当爱与恨运作时,总是会有一个额外,通常被忽略的无知的因素。

Apart from the question as to how transference influences the
continuation of analysis (with respect to its differential form or in keeping
with the analyst’s handling of it), Freud was also intrigued by the origin
of transference. Is it a phenomenon elicited by the conditions of
psychoanalytic treatment or something proceeding from a natural
disposition in neurotic people? If it is triggered by psychoanalysis itself,
should it be attributed to the person of the analyst or to the singularity of
the analytic procedures? And if it can be explained through the analytic
procedures, which of its components are most significant?

除了这个问题,关于移情如何影响精神分析的继续,(关于它的差异的形式或为了符合分析家对它的处理)。弗洛伊德也被移情的起源所著迷。移情的现象是由于精神分析的治疗的情况所召唤?或是某件从神经症人们身上的自然的性情,继续下来。假如移情是受的精神分析本身的触发,它难道应该被归属于分析家这个人?或是应该被归属于精神分析的程序的独异性?假如移情能够被解释,通过精神分析的程序,那么,移情的成分里,哪一个最重要?

Freud broached these questions in many of his writings without
formulating consistent answers.5 In the Dora case he championed the
view that transference is ‘an inevitable necessity’, not created by
psychoanalysis but merely brought to light as part of the analytic
revelation of the patient’s unconscious tendencies (Freud
1905e[1901]:116–117).

弗洛伊德碰触这些•问题,在许多他的著作里,但是他没有铨释一贯的答案。在朵拉的个案,他扞卫这个观点:移情是一个“无可避免的必要性”,移情并不是被精神分析所创造。而仅是被启蒙,作为是病人的无意识的倾向的精神分析的启示部分。

He rehearsed this view in ‘The Dynamics of
Transference’, at once challenging the idea that transference is an
exclusively psychoanalytic phenomenon (Freud 1912b:101). Yet soon
after, in his essay on transference love, Freud balanced towards the other
alternative: ‘He [the analyst] must recognize that the patient’s falling in
love is induced by the analytic situation and is not to be attributed to the
charms of his own person’ (Freud 1915a[1914]: 160–161).

他排演这个观点,在“移情的动力学”,他立即挑战这个观念:移情是一个专门的精神分析的现象。可是,不久之后,在他的探讨移情的爱的论文,弗洛伊德的平衡朝向另外一个替代选择:分析家必须体认到,病人的掉入恋爱,是由于精神分析的情境所诱导,并且不能被归属于他自己的人格的魅力。

But the
explanation Freud had given in the Dora case resurfaced in his
‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’: ‘[W]e must… recognize
that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is intimately bound up
with the nature of the illness itself…[W]e do not believe that the situation
in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings’, although
‘the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment’ enables the patient to
transfer these feelings onto the analyst (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:442).

但是,弗洛伊德在朵拉的个案里,给出的这个解释,重新出现在他的“精神分析的导论“:「我们必须体认到,我们正在处理一个现象,跟疾病的本身的特性息息相关的现象。我们并没有相信,在治疗的情境能够证实这些感觉的发展的正当性。虽然精神分析治疗提供的机会,让病人能够转移这些感觉,到分析家身上。

Compared to Freud’s, Lacan’s take on the source of transference was
at the same time less ambiguous and more radical. Reassessing Freud’s
conduct in the Dora case, Lacan averred that transference—here to be
understood in its pernicious, imaginary side—‘always has the same
direction, of indicating the moments of error and orientation of the
analyst’ (Lacan 1982a[1951]:72, translation modified).

跟弗洛伊德的观点比较起来,拉康对于移情来源的看法,既是比较不那么模糊,也更加积进。拉康确信弗洛伊德在朵拉个案的行为,他主张说:移情—在此应该被理解,用它有害的想像的面向—移情总是拥有相同的方向,移情具有害的想像的面向:指示著错误的时刻与分析家的定向。

Subsequently,
he also held the analyst to play a crucial part in the emergence of the
symbolic transference, not simply by allowing the analysand to mistake
him for somebody else, nor by introducing the rule of free association,
but by embodying the function of supposed subject of knowing.

随后,拉康也认为分析家应该扮演一个重要的角色,在象征的移情的出现。不仅是凭借承认分析者将他错认为某个其他的人。也不是介质自由联想的规则的这个观念。而且凭借具体表现被认为应该知道的主体的功能。

Repudiating the idea that transference is the spontaneous outcome of a
presumed neurotic disposition, Lacan thus argued that it is evoked by
the analytic setting, notably by the analyst’s own implication.6
Since the analyst is de facto implied in the transference, whatever its
form and structure, Lacan went on to state that countertransference is not
an analytic evil, but a necessary counterpart of the analysand’s transference
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:233).

因为拉康排斥这个观念:移情是被认为是神经症的性情的自动自发的结果。拉康因此主张,移情由分析家的背景所召唤。特别是分析家自己的暗示。因为分析家实际上在移情里被暗杀,无论它的形式与结构是什么,拉康继续陈述:反-移情并不是分析家的邪恶,而是分析者的移情的必要的对应物。

On Lacan’s account, the notion of
countertransference ought not be employed as an umbrella for the analyst’s
technical failures, but as a concept conveying the unavoidable implication
of the analyst in the analysand’s transference.7 Instead of assigning the
transference to the quirks of the neurotic condition or to the artificiality of
the analytic setting, Lacan defended the analyst’s responsibility within the
entire process, eventually summarizing his point provocatively in the
formula that there is only one transference in psychoanalysis, namely that
of the analyst (Lacan 1973–74: session of 19 March 1974).

因为拉康的缘故,反-移情不应该被运用,作为是分析家的技术的失败,而是作为一个观念,传递无法分析家的避免的暗示,在分析者的移情里。拉康并没有将移情指定给神经症的情况的诡计,或是归属于精神分析的人为的背景。拉康辩护分析家的责任,在整个的过程,最后他挑衅地总结他的观点,在这个公式里:在精神分析里,仅有一个移情。换句话说,分析家的移情。

The analyst’s essential share in the analysand’s transference also
emboldened Lacan during the early 1960s to reject Freud’s frequent
alignment of transference and repetition.8 Although he himself had
supported this equivalence during the 1950s, Lacan gradually realized
that seeing transference as a pure repetition of an ancient, repressed
infantile conflict, i.e. as something completely alien to the analyst’s
position, not only reduced the analyst’s responsibility for the direction
of the treatment, but also restricted her capacity for manipulating the
transference (Lacan 1962–63: session of 9 January 1963). As I will
demonstrate in the succeeding sections of this chapter, this inevitable
implication of the analyst in the analysand’s transference was not the
only factor motivating Lacan’s separation of transference and repetition,
but it was definitely the most clinically informed one.

分析家基本上分享分享者的移情,在1960年代期间,让拉康大胆地排斥弗洛伊德的经常地将移情与重复等同一块。虽然拉康自己做1950年代,曾经支持这种等同。拉康逐渐地体会到:将移情视为是纯粹地重复的旧时的被压抑的婴孩的冲突,譬如,作为是某件完全外在于分析家的立场。这不但将分析家的责任化简成为治疗的方向,而且限制分析家的能力,作为操控移情的能力。如同我将会证实的,在这个章节的接续的部分,分析家的这个无可避免的暗示,并不是唯一的因素,引起拉康的动机,将移情与重复分开。但是,这确实是最为临床的资讯的因素。

Thus far I have presented two series of questions emanating from
Freud’s scattered glosses on transference: ‘How does transference affect
the continuation (the time) of psychoanalytic treatment?’, and ‘Where
does transference stem from?’. A third, even more contentious issue can
be added to this list, that hinges on the differentiation of transference
and suggestion.

直到现在,我已经呈现两个系列的问题,从弗洛伊德的探讨移情的散开的文章:「移情如何影响精神分析治疗的继续时间?“与“移情从何产生?”第三个议题具有争议性,能够被增加到这个名单,这个议题跟移情与暗示的差异连接一块。

If the analysand’s mild positive transference constitutes
a guarantee for psychoanalytic success (at least in Freud’s conception of
the treatment), how can the effects of psychoanalysis be distinguished
from those obtained by suggestion within traditional forms of hypnosis
and other healing practices? And if analysts are supposed to take
advantage of the analysand’s mild positive transference, curbing all its
complementary forms of expression, in order to obtain the desired results,
to what extent do they act upon a position of power and what prevents
them from abusing the power relegated to them?

假如分析者的温和的正面的移情组成精神分析成功的保障,(至少在弗洛伊德的治疗的观念),精神分析的影响如何能够被区别,跟那些凭借暗示获得的区别,在传统的催眠的形式,与其他的治疗的实践?假如分析家被认为利用分析者的温和的正面的移情,控制所有它的辅助的表达的形式,为了获得渴望的结果。他们根据权力的立场行动,到什么程度?是什么阻止他们不会滥用分配给与他们的权力?

In ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ Freud did not eschew the proposition
that ‘the results of psychoanalysis rest upon suggestion’, if suggestion
means that one person is being influenced by another (Freud 1912b:106).

在“移情的动力学”,弗洛伊德并没有避开这个命题:「精神分析的结果依靠暗示“。假如暗示意味在,一个人正在被另外一个影响。

Developing this point further in his ‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis’, he impressed on his audience that a patient’s ‘tendency to
transference’ (Ubertragungsneigung) is synonymous with Bernheim’s
notion of suggestibility if only its realm of action is extended to include
negative feelings, and provided one is prepared to acknowledge the libidinal
engine of this suggestibility (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:446).9 Faced with
the objection that this inextricable link between transference and suggestion
undermines the originality of the psychoanalytic edifice and might
contribute to its deterioration, Freud subsequently nuanced his opinion,
drawing attention to a dual gulf separating direct hypnotic and
psychoanalytic suggestion.

拉康更进一步发展这一点,在他的”论精神分析的导论“。他给予他的听众这个印象: 病人的倾向于移情,等于是同义词,跟伯罕姆的暗示的观念,只是它的行动的领域被延伸到包含负面的感觉。只要我们准备承认这个暗示的力比多的引擎。当弗洛伊德面临这个反对意见:移情与暗示之间的这个可以挣脱的联结,逐渐损坏精神分析技术的原创性,并且可能促成它的恶化。弗洛伊德随后更详细说明这个意见,提醒注意有一个双重鸿沟,将直接的催眠与精神分析的暗示区分开。

First of all he claimed that contrary to hypnotic
procedures, the analytic modus operandi is not geared towards covering
up the patient’s problems with additional layers of mental strength, even
less towards the prohibition of symptoms. Instead it seeks to rid the
analysands of their symptoms by exposing their underlying conflicts (ibid.:
450–451).10 Second, and more importantly, Freud stressed that whatever
remains of the suggestive influence of the analyst’s interventions is bound
to perish under the weight of analysis itself: ‘In every other kind of
suggestive treatment the transference is carefully preserved and left
untouched; in analysis it is itself subjected to treatment and is dissected in
all the shapes in which it appears’ (ibid.: 453).

首先,他宣称,跟催眠的程序恰恰相反,分析的运作模式被启动,并不是朝向掩盖病人的难题,用额外的精神的力量的层级。甚至不是朝着症状的禁止。代替的,精神分析的运作模式尝试替分析者废除掉他们的症状,凭借揭露他们的作为基础的冲突。其次,而且更加重要地,弗洛伊德强调:任何分析家的介入的暗示的影响,所剩的东西,被发现会在精神分析本身的压力下消灭。「在每一种其他的暗示的治疗里,移情仔细被保留,并且被保存完整。在精神分析,移情本身隶属于治疗,而且被解剖,在它出现的各种形状里。

Not convinced by Freud’s arguments, Lacan remained adamant that
transference and suggestion ought to be kept separate if the analyst is to
steer away from a surreptitious abuse of power.11 In his Seminar V he
pointed out that analysts have an ever-looming suggestive influence over
their patients by virtue of their transference, which is being abused
whenever they take advantage of it, whether to satisfy their patients’
demands, to force an interpretation, or to present themselves as reliable,
competent analysts with whom it is worth identifying (Lacan 1998b
[1957–58]:427–428).

由于拉康并不相信弗洛伊德的论点,拉康始终态度坚定:移情与暗示应该被保持分开。假如分析家想要避免权力的秘密滥用。在他的第四研讨班,拉康指出,分析家拥有越来越明显的暗示的影响,对于他们的病人,凭借病人的移情。病人的移情正在被滥用,每当他们利用它。无论是满足他们的病人的要求,强迫给予解释,或呈现他们自己作为可靠,胜任的分析家。认同这些分析家是值得的。

Of course, the upshot of Lacan’s idea was that
psychoanalytic interventions which do not encompass an element of
suggestion are extremely difficult to define, especially when taking into
account that the analysts’ mere presence could be regarded as a suggestive
fulfilment of the analysands’ demand that they be there. Lacan tried to
escape this clinical impasse for each of the three levels in his schema of
the direction of the treatment: the politics of the analyst, the strategies of
transference and the tactics of interpretation (Lacan 1977i[1958]).12

当然,拉康的观念的结果是,精神分析的介入,并没有涵盖暗示的元素。这种介入是极端难以定义。特别是当我们考虑到,光是精神分析家的存在,就能够被认为是分析者的要求的暗示的满足:分析家应该在那里。拉康尝试逃避这种临床的僵局,因为这三个层次的每一个,在他的治疗的方向的基模里:分析家的政治学,移情的策略,与解释的技术。

First, as I have explained in the previous chapter, he intimated that
the analyst’s position must be characterized both by the death of the ego
and the disbeing of the object a. Second, with respect to the contents of
an interpretation, Lacan replaced the analyst’s mandatory full speech
with the essential ambiguity and nonsensicality of his expressions.13
Finally, on the level of transference, he exposed the widespread analytic
practice of interpreting the transference, whereby its infantile sources
are revealed to the analysand, as a vicious circle:

首先,如同我曾经解释,在先前一章。拉康主张,分析家的立场的特征,必然是自我的死亡与小客体的没有生命实存。其次,关于解释的内容,拉康取代分析家的义务的充分的言说,带有基本的模糊与他的表达的非理解性质。最后,在移情的层次,拉康揭露广泛的精神分析的解释移情的实践。凭借移情,移情的婴孩的来源被揭示给分析者,反过来说,也是一样。

[T]his interpretation, if he [the analyst] gives it, will be received as
coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be. Will
he [the analyst] agree to benefit from this error concerning his person?
Analytic morals do not contradict this, on condition that the
analyst interprets this effect, otherwise the analysis will
amount to little more than a crude suggestion. An
incontestable option, except that the analyst’s words will still
be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, the
subject’s way out of the transference thus being postponed
ad infinitum.
(ibid.: 231, translation modified)

假如分析家给予这个解释,它将会被接收,作为是来自移情灌输给他要成为的那个人。关于这个人,他将会同意从这个错误里获得利益吗?精神分析的道德并没有反驳这一点,只有分析家解释这个效果。否则,精神分析将会等于是仅是粗略的暗示。这个一个无可争议的选择,除了就是,分析家的话语将依旧会被听见,当著是从移情的大他者而来。主体的避开移情的途径因此无限地被拖延。

Transcending the inappropriate, inherently suggestive interpretation of
the transference, Lacan ensuingly deployed the principles of a genuine
analysis of and interpretation within the transference, predicated on its
calculated manipulation by the analyst in light of the downfall of the
supposed subject of knowing (Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January
1968).

拉康超越这个不合适,本质上具有暗示的移情的解释。他随后运用“移情的真诚的精神分析的原则与移情之内的解释”,并且根据分析家对于移情的审慎的操控作为陈述,从作为应该知道的主体的沦落为分析者欲望的客体的原因的观点。

The above three issues, which cover the relationship between
transference and the continuation of the treatment, the origin of
transference, and the relation between transference and suggestion, arise
from three clinical problems in Freud’s oeuvre and represent three central
concerns within Lacan’s theory of transference. Although continuously
in touch with the letter of Freud’s writings, Lacan sought to advance the
founder’s theory of transference by reformulating these problems and
introducing new concepts.

以上的三个议题涵盖移情与治疗的继续之间,移情的起源,移情与暗示之间的关系。这三个议题的产生,是因为三个临床的难题,在弗洛伊德的著作里。它们代表三个中心的关注,在拉康的移情的理论。虽然拉康继续跟弗洛伊德的著作的信息保存联络,他尝试提升这位创办者的移情的理论,凭借重新阐释这些难题,并且介绍新的观念。

In the following sections of this chapter I will
detail these reformulations and new concepts, mapping the evolution of
Lacan’s own views between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, when
his exploration of transference reached its zenith.14 In this way, I hope to
show that Lacan’s theory of transference is neither ‘characterized by
obscurity and linguistic play’, nor ‘leaves one uncertain as to his actual
technical approach’ (Esman 1990:12).

在这个章节的随后的部分,我将详细列出这些重新的阐释与新的观念。并且描绘出拉康自己的观点的进化,在1950年代早期跟1960年代晚期。当时,拉康的对于移情的探索登峰造极。用这个方式,我希望显示:拉康的移情的理论,既不是以模糊嗳昧与语言的游戏作为特征,也不是让我们狐疑不定,关于他实际的技术的方法。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:人格面具

November 12, 2015

III
THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
人格面具作为集体无意识的部分
243 In this chapter we come to a problem which, if overlooked, is
liable to cause the greatest confusion. It will be remembered that in the analysis of the personal unconscious the first things to be added to consciousness are the personal contents, and I sug¬gested that these contents, which have been repressed but are capable of becoming conscious, should be called the personal un¬conscious. I also showed that to annex the deeper layers of the unconscious, which I have called the collective unconscious) pro¬duces an enlargement of the personality leading to the state of inflation. This state is reached by simply continuing the analyti¬cal work, as in the case of the young woman discussed above. By continuing the analysis we add to the personal consciousness cer¬tain fundamental, general, and impersonal characteristics of hu¬manity, thereby bringing about the inflation1 I have just de-
1 Th’is phenomenon, which results from the extension of consciousness, is in no sense specific to analytical treatment. It occurs whenever people are overpowered by knowledge or by some new realization. “Knowledge puffeth up,” Paul writes to the Corinthians, for the new knowledge had turned the heads of many, as in¬deed constantly happens. The inflation has nothing to do with the kind of knowledge, but simply and solely with the fact that any new knowledge can so seize hold of a weak head that he no longer sees and hears anything else. He is hypnotized by it, and instantly believes he has solved the riddle of the universe. But that is equivalent to almighty self-conceit. This process is such a general reaction that, in Genesis 2:17, eating of the tree of knowledge is represented as a deadly sin. It may not be immediately apparent why greater consciousness fol¬lowed by self-conceit should be such a dangerous thing. Genesis represents the act of becoming conscious as a taboo infringement. as though knowledge meant that a sacrosanct barrier had been impiously overstepped. I think that Genesis is right in so far as every step towards greater consciousness is a kind of Prome¬thean guilt: through knowledge, the gods are as it were robbed of their fire, that is, something that was the property of the unconscious powers is torn out of its natural context and subordinated to the whims of the conscious mind. The
156

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE scribed, which might be regarded as one of the unpleasant con¬sequences of becoming fully conscious.

在这个章节,我们面临一个难题。这个难题假如被忽略,很容易引起极大的混乱。我们将记住,在个人的无意识的分析里,首先能够被增加到意识层面的是个人的内容。我建议,这些已经被压抑,却能够被意识知道的内容,应该被称为是“个人无意识”。我也显示,合并更加深层的无意识,我所谓的集体无意识,会产生人格的扩大。这种人格的扩大会导致自我膨胀的状态。光是凭借精神分析,这个状态就会被到达。如同在上面讨论的年轻女子的个案里。凭借继续精神分析,我们将某些基本,一般,与非个人的人类的特性,增加到个人的意识里。这会导致我刚刚描述的自我膨胀。这种自我膨胀可能会被认为是完全被意识知道时的令人不愉快的结果之一。

244 From this point of view the conscious personality is a more or
less arbitrary segment of the collective psyche. It consists in a sum of psychic facts that are felt to be personal. The attribute “personal” means: pertaining exclusively to this particular per¬son. A consciousness that is purely personal stresses its proprie¬tary and original right to its contents with a certain anxiety, and in this way seeks to create a whole. But all those contents that refuse to fit into this whole are either overlooked and forgotten or repressed and denied. This is one way of educating oneself, but it is too arbitrary and too much of a violation. Far too much of our common humanity has to be sacrificed in the interests of an ideal image into which one tries to mould oneself. Hence these purely “personal” people are always very sensitive, for something may easily happen that will bring into consciousness an unwelcome portion of their real (“individual”) character.

从这个观点,意识的人格是集体无意识的相当任意的部分。它的组成是心灵事实的总和。这些心灵事实被感觉是个人的心灵事实。“个人”的这个属性意味著:专门归属于这个特殊的人。纯粹是个人的意识,强调它拥有财产与原先的权利,对于它的内容,带有某种的焦虑。以这种方式,它尝试创造一个整体。但是所有那些拒绝适应到这个整体的内容,要就是被忽略与忘记,要不就是被压抑与被否认。这是一个教育自己的方法。但是这个方法太过于任意性,太过于违背心灵事实。我们尝试替自己塑造一个理想的意象。为了这个理想的意象的利益,我们的共同人性的太多的部分必须被牺牲。因此,这些纯粹的“个人”的人们,总是非常敏感,对于这些牺性的共同人性的部分。因为很容易发生某件事情,就会让意识知道,他们具有一个并不受欢迎的部分,是他们的真实的(个人)的特性。

245 This arbitrary segment of collective psyche-often fashioned
with considerable pains-I have called the persona. The term persona is really a very appropriate expression for this, for origi¬nally it meant the mask once worn by actors to indicate the role they played. If we endeavour to draw a precise distinction be¬tween what psychic material should be considered personal, and what impersonal, we soon find ourselves in the greatest di• lemma, for by definition we have to say of the persona’s contents what we have said of the impersonal unconscious, namely, that it is collective. It is only because the persona represents a more or less arbitrary and fortuitous segment of the collective psyche that we can make the mistake of regarding it in toto as some¬thing individual. It is, as its name implies, only a mask of the collective psyche, a mask that feigns individuality) making others and oneself believe that one is individual, whereas one is simply acting a role through which the collective psyche speaks.

集体心灵的任意性部分,我称之为“人格面具”,通常是费尽心力才塑造而成。“人格面具”的这个术语确实是一个非常合适的表达集体心灵的任意性部分。因为它原先的意义是演员所戴的“面具”,为了指示他们扮演的角色。假如我们尝试获得明确的区别,在应该被认为是个人的心灵的材料,与应该被认为是非个人的心灵材料之间的区别。我们不久就发现我们自己处于进退维谷当中。因为定义上,我们必须将我们曾经说到的非个人的无意识,说成就是人格面具的内容。欢句话说,人格面具是集体无意识。仅是因为人格面具代表集体心灵的相当任意性与偶然性的部分时,我们才会犯上这个错误,错误地将完整的集体心灵,视为是某件个人的东西。顾名思义,人格面具仅是集体心灵的面具。这一个人格面具伪装成为个人,让别人与自己相信:我是个人,虽然我仅是扮演一个角色。通过这个角色,集体的心灵言说。

an who has usurped the new knowledge suffers, however, a transformation or enlargement of consciousness, which no longer resembles that of his fellow men. He has raised himself above the human level of his age (“ye shall become like unto God”), but in so doing has alienated himself from humanity. The pain of this loneliness is the vengeance of the gods, for never again can he return to mankind. He is, as the myth says, chained to the lonely cliffs of the Caucasus, forsaken of God and man.
157

TH::f: RELATiONS nETWEEN TH:E EGO AND Tt-lE UNCONSCIOUS
146 When we analyse the persona we strip off the mask, and dis-
cover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask of the collec¬tive psyche. Fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. He takes a name, earns a title, exercises a function, he is this or that. In a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a compromise formation, in mak¬ing which others often have a greater share than he. The per¬sona is a semblance, a two-dimensional reality, to give it a nick¬name.

当我们分析这个人格面具时,我们剥除掉这个面具,然后发现,表面似乎是个人心灵,骨子里却是集体心灵。换句话说,人格面具仅是集体心灵的面具。基本上,人格面具并非是真实的东西:人格面具仅是个人与社会之间的一种妥协,关于一个人应该显现怎么的样子。他取一个名字,获得一个头衔,运用一个功能,他是这个,他是那个。从某个意义来说,所有这一切都是真实。可是,就相关的个人的基本的个体性而言,人格面具仅是一个次要的现实,一个妥协的形成。从事这个妥协的形成时,别的人经常比他具有更多的参与。人格面具是一个类似物,给它取一个绰号,“二维度的现实”。

!47 It would be wrong to leave the matter as it stands without
at the same time recognizing that there is, after all, something individual in the peculiar choice and delineation of the persona, and that despite the exclusive identity of the ego-consciousness with the persona the unconscious self, one’s real individuality, is always present and makes itself felt indirectly if not directly. Although the ego-consciousness is at first identical with the per-sona-that compromise role in which we parade before the community-yet the unconscious self can never be repressed to the point of extinction. Its influence is chiefly manifest in the special nature of the contrasting and compensating contents of the unconscious.

这将是错误的,假如我们将事情保持目前的状态,而没有同时体认到, 毕竟还是有某件个人的东西,在人格面具的特殊选择与描绘里。尽管自我意识专门地认同于人格面具, 无意识的自性,也就是一个人的真实的个体性,总是出现,并且让它自己间接地被感觉到,虽然并不是直接被感觉到。虽然自我意识起初认同与人格面具—那个作为妥协的角色。以那个角色,我们展示在社会的面前。可是,无意识的自性永远没有办法被压抑到销声匿迹的程度。无意识的自性的影响主要被展示在这个特别的特性:无意识具有作为对照与补偿的内容。

The purely personal attitude of the conscious mind evokes reactions on the part of the unconscious, and these, together with personal repressions, contain the seeds of individ¬ual development in the guise of collective fantasies. Through the analysis of the personal unconscious, the conscious mind be¬comes suffused with collective material which brings with it the elements of individuality. I am well aware that this conclusion must be almost unintelligible to anyone not familiar with my views and technique, and particularly so to those who habitually regard the unconscious from the standpoint of Freudian theory. But if the reader will recall my example of the philosophy stu¬dent, he can form a rough idea of what I mean. At the beginning of the treatment the patient was quite unconscious of the fact that her relation to her father was a fixation, and that she was therefore seeking a man like her father, whom she could then meet with her intellect. This in itself would not have been a mistake if her intellect had not had that peculiarly protesting character such as is unfortunately often encountered in intellec¬tual women.

意识心灵的这个纯粹个人的态度,会引起反动抗拒,在无意识的这方面。这些反动抗拒,再加上个人的压抑,就包含个人的发展的种种,以集体的幻想作为伪装。通过个人的意识的分析,意识的心灵变成充满了集体的材料。这个集体材料随之带来个体化的元素。我清楚知道,这个结论一定是匪夷所思,对于任何不熟悉我的观点与精神分析技术的人而言。特别是习惯于用弗洛伊德的理论的观点,来看待无意识的人们。但是假如读者愿意回想一下我举的哲学系学生的例子,对于我的意思,他能够建构粗略的观念。在治疗的开始,病人完全不知道这个事实:她跟她的父亲的关系是一种固著。她因此寻找一位像是她的父亲的人物。这个人物在知识能力,能够跟她匹配。这个关系的本身本来不会是错误,假如她的知识能力当时不是那么具有特殊的抗议的性质。譬如,在知识份子的女人身上,很不幸地经常遭遇到的特殊抗议的性质。
158

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE
Such an intellect is always trying to point out mistakes in others; it is pre-eminently critical, with a dis¬agreeably personal undertone, yet it always wants to be consid¬ered objective. This invariably makes a man bad-tempered, par¬ticularly if, as so often happens, the criticism touches on some weak spot which, in the interests of fruitful discussion, were bet¬ter avoided. But far from wishing the discussion to be fruitful, it is the unfortunate peculiarity of this feminine intellect to seek out a man’s weak spots, fasten on them, and exasperate him. This is not usually a conscious aim, but rather has the uncon¬scious purpose of forcing a man into a superior position and thus making him an object of admiration. The man does not as a rule notice that he is having the role of the hero thrust upon him; he merely finds her taunts so odious that in future he will go a long way to avoid meeting the lady. In the end the only man who can stand her is the one who gives in at the start, and therefore has nothing wonderful about him.
这样的知识份子总是尝试指出别人身上的错误。显而易见,这是批评性质,具有令人不愉快的个人的语气,可是,它又总是想要被认为是具有客观性。这必然会让男人脾气发作,特别是,如同经常所发生的状况,这种批评触及到某的弱点。为了让讨论具有成果的利益,对于弱点的人身攻击最后避免。但是,女性知识份子根本就不想要讨论具有成果,她具有不幸的特殊性质,就像想要寻找出男人的弱点,紧盯着这些弱点,然后激怒他。这通常并不是一个意识的目的。相反地,这具有无意识的目的,就是强迫男人进入一个比较优秀的立场,然后,让他成为的崇拜的目标。这个男人通常每有注意到,他正在扮演强迫在他身上的英雄的角色。他发现她的挑衅如此令人厌恶,以致于未来,他将会刻意迴避,避免见到这位女士。最后,唯一能够忍受这位女性知识份子的男人,就是从一开始就屈服的男人。因此,这样的男人并没有什么出奇之处。

248 My patient naturally found much to reflect upon in all this,
for she had no notion of the game she was playing. Moreover she still had to gain insight into the regular romance that had been enacted between her and her father ever since childhood. It would lead us too far to describe in detail how, from her earliest years, with unconscious sympathy, she had played upon the shadow-side of her father which her mother never saw, and how, far in advance of her years, she became her mother’s rival. All this came to light in the analysis of the personal unconscious. Since, if only for professional reasons, I could not allow myself to be irritated, I inevitably became the hero and father-lover.

我的病人当然会在这一切当中发现有许多值得反思之处。因为她并不知的她正在扮演的游戏。而且,她依旧必须获得洞察力,对于曾经被扮演过的规律的浪漫情怀,在她跟她的父亲之间,自从童年以来。这将会牵扯太远,以致我们无法详细描述,她如何从她的早年开始,就带着无意识的同情,扮演她的父亲的阴影的面向。那是她的母亲从来没有看见的。以及她如何变成熟她的母亲的情敌,在她成长之前的岁月里。在个人无意识的精神分析里,所有这一切都真相大白。因为我无可避免地就成为她的英雄与父亲兼情人。仅是为了专业的理由,我不能够让我自己被她激怒。

The transference too consisted at first of contents from the personal unconscious. My role as a hero was just a sham, and so, as it turned me into the merest phantom, she was able to play her traditional role of the supremely wise, very grown-up, all-under¬standing mother-daughter-beloved-an empty role, a persona behind which her real and authentic being, her individual self, lay hidden. Indeed, to the extent that she at first completely identified herself with her role, she was altogether unconscious of her real self. She was still in her nebulous infantile world and had not yet discovered the real world at all. But as, through pro¬gressive analysis, she became conscious of the nature of her transference, the dreams I spoke of in Chapter I began to mate¬rialize.

移情首先也是由个人无意识的内容组成。我作为英雄的角色仅是一种伪装。所以,当移情将我转变成为仅是一个魅影人物。她能够扮演她的传统的角色,超级聪明,成熟稳重,通情达理的母亲兼女儿兼情人的角色,一个空洞的角色,一个人格面具。在这个人格面具背后,她的真实与真诚的生命实存,她的个人的自性,隐藏起来。的确,当她起初完全将她自己完全认同她的角色,她完全不知道她的真实的自性。她依旧是处于朦胧的婴孩的世界,她根本就还没有发现真实的世界。但是,经历过逐渐进步的精神分析,她逐渐知道她的移情的特性,我在第一节谈论到的那些梦,开始具体成形。

159

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS
They brought up bits of the collective unconscious, and that was the end of her infantile world and of all the heroics. She came to herself and to her own real potentialities. This is roughly the way things go in most cases, if the analysis is carried far enough. That the consciousness of her individuality should coincide exactly with the reactivation of an archaic god-image is not just an isolated coincidence, but a very frequent occurrence which, in my view, corresponds to an unconscious law.

这些梦显露集体无意识的片断。那就是她的婴孩的世界与所有的英雄行为的结束。她苏醒过来,恢复她自己的真实的潜力。在大部分的个案,这大约就是事情进行的方式,假如精神分析被充分贯彻。她的个体性的意识竟然确实巧合于旧时的神性-意象的重新触动。这不仅是孤立的巧合,而且是经常发生的事情。依照我的观的,经常的发生的事情符合无意识的法则。

19 After this digression, let us turn back to our earlier reflec-
tions.
)0 Once the personal repressions are lifted, the individuality
and the collective psyche begin to emerge in a coalescent state, thus releasing the hitherto repressed personal fantasies. The fan¬tasies and dreams which now appear assume a somewhat differ¬ent aspect. An infallible sign of collective images seems to be the appearance of the “cosmic” element, i.e., the images in the dream or fantasy are connected with cosmic qualities, such as temporal and spatial infinity, enormous speed and extension of movement, “astrological” associations, telluric, lunar, and solar analogies, changes in the proportions of the body, etc. The obvi¬ous occurrence of mythological and religious motifs in a dream also points to the activity of the collective unconscious. The col¬lective element is very often announced by peculiar symptoms,2 as for example by dreams where the dreamer is flying through space like a comet, or feels that he is the earth, or the sun, or a star; or else is of immense size, or dwarfishly small; or that he is dead, is in a strange place, is a stranger to himself, confused, mad, etc. Similarly, feelings of disorientation, of dizziness and the like, may appear along with symptoms of inflation.

经过这场离题。让我们回到我们早先的反思。一旦个人的压抑被撤除,个体性与集体心灵开始出现在融合的状态。因此释放出迄今被压抑的个人的幻想。现在出现的这些幻想与梦,扮演一个相当不同的面向。集体的各种意象的无误的讯号,似乎就是“宇宙”的元素的出现。换句话说,在梦里或幻想里的各种意象,跟宇宙的特质息息相关。譬如,时间与空间的无限,运动的强烈快速与范围。“天文学的联想”,大地电流,月亮与太阳的类比,身体的比例的变化,等等。在梦里,神话与宗教的母题的明显的出现,也指向集体无意识的活动。集体的因素经常由特殊的症状宣告出来。譬如,有这些梦宣告出来:在这个梦里,作梦者正在飞行,像是彗星,穿越过太空。或是,作梦者感觉他就是地球,或是太阳,或是星星。要不然就是,他的体积特别巨大,或是特别矮小。或是他死亡,在一个陌生的地方,他自己陌生的地方,迷惘,疯狂,等等。同样地,失序的感觉,晕眩的感觉,等等,可能会伴随自我膨胀的症状出现。

)l The forces that burst out of the collective psyche have a con-
fusing and blinding effect. One result of the dissolution of the persona is a release of involuntary fantasy, which is apparently nothing else than the specific activity of the collective psyche. This activity throws up contents whose existence one had never suspected before. But as the influence of the collective unconscious increases, so the conscious mind loses its power of leader¬ship. Imperceptibly it becomes the led, while an unconscious and impersonal process gradually takes control. Thus, without noticing it, the conscious personality is pushed about like a fig¬ure on a chess-board by an invisible player. It is this player who decides the game of fate, not the conscious mind and its plans. This is how the resolution of the transference, apparently so im¬possible to the conscious mind, was brought about in my earlier example.

从集体心灵突然爆发的各种力量,具有令人混乱,令人目眩的效果。人格面具的瓦解的结果是释放非自愿的幻想。这些非自愿的幻想,显而易见不是别的,实实在在就是集体心灵的明确的活动。这个活动产生我们以前从来没有怀疑是存在的内容。但是,随着集体无意识的影响的增加,意识的心灵逐渐丧失它的领导的力量。不知不觉地,意识的心灵变成是被引导者,而无意识与非个人的过程逐渐掌控一切。因此,意识的人格并没有注意到这个转变。就像祺盘上的祺子,意识的人格被推来推去,被一位隐形的下祺者。这位隐形的下祺者决定命运的祺戏,而不是意识的心灵与其计划。在我早先的例子,这就是移情的解决被达成的方式。虽然对于意识的心灵,这显而易见是非常的不可能。

2 It may not be superfluous to note that collective elements in dreams are not restricted to this stage of the analytical treatment. There are many psychological situations in which the activity of the collective unconscious can come to the surface. But this is not the place to enlarge upon these conditions.
160

THE PERSONA AS A SEGMENT OF THE COLLECTIVE PSYCHE scious

252 The plunge into this process becomes unavoidable whenever
the necessity arises of overcoming an apparently insuperable difficulty. It goes without saying that this necessity does not oc¬cur in every case of neurosis, since perhaps in the majority the prime consideration is only the removal of temporary difficulties of adaptation. Certainly severe cases cannot be cured without a far-reaching change of character or of attitude. In by far the greater number, adaptation to external reality demands so much work that inner adaptation to the collective unconscious cannot be considered for a very long time. But when this inner adapta¬tion becomes a problem, a strange, irresistible attraction pro¬ceeds from the unconscious and exerts a powerful influence on the conscious direction of life.

投掷进入这个过程变成是无可避免,每当产生这个必要性:要克服明显是无法克服的困难。自不待言的是,这个必要性并没有发生在神经症者的每个个案里。因为或许在大多数的个案,主要的考虑仅是要移除暂时的适应的困难。的确,严重的个案被治疗时,总是会有深远的人格的改变或态度的改变。就大多数的神经症这的个案而言,对于外在现实的适应要求费尽心力,以致有很漫长的时间,对于集体无意识的适应无法被考虑到。但是当内心的适应成为难题时,一个奇异,无法抗拒的吸引力就从无意识前进,从事强烈的影响,对于意识的生命的方向。

The predominance of uncon¬scious influences, together with the associated disintegration of the persona and the deposition of the conscious mind from power, constitute a state of psychic disequilibrium which, in analytical treatment, is artificially induced for the therapeutic purpose of resolving a difficulty that might block further devel¬opment. There are of course innumerable obstacles that can be overcome with good advice and a little moral support, aided by goodwill and understanding on the part of the patient. Excel¬lent curative results can be obtained in this way.

无意识的影响的占优势,跟人格面具的联想的瓦解,与拥有权力的意识心灵的性情,形成心灵的不平衡的状态。在精神分析的治疗里,这个心灵的不平衡,人为地被减少。为了治疗的目的:解决可能阻碍更进一步的发展的困难。这些能够用良好劝告与一些道德支持来克服的障碍,当然然数量无限。在病人方面,它们也受的善意与理解的帮助。用这种方式,能够获得治疗的效果。

Cases are not uncommon where there is no need to breathe a word about the unconscious. But again, there are difficulties for which one can foresee no satisfactory solution. If in these cases the psychic equi¬librium is not already disturbed before treatment begins, it will certainly be upset during the analysis, and sometimes without any interference by the doctor. It often seems as though these patients had only been waiting to find a trustworthy person in order to give up and collapse. Such a loss of balance is similar in prinCIple to a psychotic disturbance; that is, it differs from the initial stages of mental illness only by the fact that it leads in the end to greater health, while the latter leads to yet greater destruction.

寻常见到的一些个案,根本就没有必要谈论到无意识。但是,仍然存在著一些困难,我们无法预见有任何令人满意的解决。假如在这些个案,心灵的平衡,并没有已经受到扰乱,在治疗开始之前。心灵的平衡确实将会被扰乱,在精神分析期间,并且有时没有医生的任何的干扰。它们经常看起来像是这些病人仅是正在等待找到一位可信任的人,为了放弃并崩溃。平衡的这种丧失,原则上,类似精神疾病。换句话说,它跟精神疾病的最初的阶段的差异,仅是根据这个事实: 平衡的丧失最后导致更大的健康。而精神疾病则是导致更大的毁灭。

161

THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EGO AND THE UNCONSCIOUS

It is a condition of panic, a letting go in face of appar¬ently hopeless complications.Mostly it was preceded by desper¬ate efforts to master the difficulty by force of will; then came the collapse, and the once guiding will crumbles completely. The energy thus freed disappears from consciousness and falls into the unconscious. As a matter of fact, it is at these moments that the first signs of unconscious activity appear. (I am thinking of the example of that young man who was weak in the head.) Obviously the energy that fell away from consciousness has acti¬vated the unconscious. The immediate result is a change of atti¬tude. One can easily imagine that a stronger head would have taken that vision of the stars as a healing apparition, and would have looked upon human suffering sub specie aeternitatis, in which case his senses would have been restored.3

这是惊慌的情况,面临明显无助的併发症,束手无策。大部分的情况,前导存在着绝望的努力,想要掌控这个困难,凭借意志的力量,然后逐渐崩溃。这个曾经作为引导的意志,完全崩溃了。因此被解放出来的能源,从意识消失,然后掉落到无意识。事实上,就在这些时刻,无意识的活动的最初的迹象出现。(我正想到那位头脑薄弱的年轻人的例子。显而易见地,从意识掉落的能源已经触动无意识。当下的结果是态度的转变。我们很容易想像,假如他当时是一位头脑更加强壮的人,他本来会将那些星星的幻景,视为是治疗的魅影。他本来会俯瞰人类的痛苦,从永恒的观照之下。在永恒的观照之下的情况,他的各种感觉本来会被恢复的。

53 Had this happened, an apparently insurmountable obstacle
would have been removed. Hence I regard the loss of balance as purposive, since it replaces a defective consciousness by the automatic and instinctive activity of the unconscious, which is aiming all the time at the creation of a new balance and will moreover achieve this aim, provided that the conscious mind is capable of assimilating the contents produced by the uncon¬scious, i.e., of understanding and digesting them. If the uncon¬scious simply rides roughshod over the conscious mind, a psy¬chotic condition develops. If it can neither completely prevail nor yet be understood, the result is a conflict that cripples all further advance. But with this question, namely the understand¬ing of the collective unconscious, we come to a formidable diffi¬culty which I have made the theme of my next chapter.

假如发生这种状况,无法被克服的阻碍本来会被移除的。因此,我将平衡的丧失视为是具有目的的。因为平衡的丧失取代具有缺点的意识,被无意识的自动与本能的活动取代。无意识的自动与本能的活动目标始终是朝向创造新的平衡。而且,将会获得这个目标,只要意识的心灵能够吸收无意识产生的内容。譬如,理解与消化它们的内容。假如无意识仅是霸凌意识的心灵,那将会显示精神病的状况。假如无意识既不是完全地占优势,也无法被理解,结果将是一场冲突,瘫痪所有的前进的发展。但是,就这个问题而言,也就是,对于集体无意识的理解,我们逐渐遭遇巨大的困难。我已经订好我下次的章节的主题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

荣格:精神病内容

November 7, 2015

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
精神病的内容
Carl Jung 卡尔 荣格
320 Psychiatry is a stepchild of medicine. All the other branches
of medicine have one great advantage: the scientific method. In all other branches there are things that can be seen and touched, physical and chemical methods of investigation to be followed. The microscope reveals the dreaded bacillus, the surgeon’s knife halts at no anatomical difficulty and gives us glimpses into the most vital and inaccessible organs. Psychiatry, the art of healing the soul, still stands at the door, seeking in vain to weigh and measure as in the other departments of science. We have long known that we have to do with a definite organ, the brain; but only beyond the brain, beyond the anatomical substrate, do we reach what is important for us-the psyche, as indefinable as ever, still eluding all explanation, no matter how ingenious.

精神病是医学的继子。医学的所有的其他分科都拥有一个很大的优点:科学的方法。在所有其他的分科,有些东西能够被看见,被碰触到,生理或化学的研究方法能够被遵循。显微镜显示可怕的杆菌,外科医生的手术刀面对解剖,并无任何困难,并且让我们瞥见最具有生命力与无法接近的器官。精神病学,治疗灵魂的艺术,则是依旧站在门边,白费力气地尝试衡量与测量,如同在科学的其他部门。我们长久以来就知道,我们必须处理明确的器官,脑。但是仅有在超越脑之外,超越解剖的次级层面之外,我们才获得对于我们是重要的东西—心灵,像以往一样无法被定义,依旧逃避所有的解释,无论是多么聪明的解释。

321 Former ages, endowing the soul with substance and personi-
fying every incomprehensible occurrence in nature, regarded mental illness as the work of evil spirits; the patient was looked upon as one possessed, and the methods of treatment were such as befitted this conception. It is not unknown for this medieval view to find credence and expression even today. A classic example is the expulsion of the devil which was successfully per¬formed by the elder Pastor Blumhardt in the famous case of the Dittus sisters. 1 To the honour of the Middle Ages be it said that there were also early evidences of a sound rationalism.

以前的时代,赋予灵魂具有物质,并且让每一个无法被理解的自然的事件具有人格化。以前的时代将精神疾病视为是邪恶精灵的运作:病人被看待作为是被鬼魂著魔。治疗的方法是如此合适于这个观念。中世纪的观点并非不知道如何找到即使在今天的可信度与表达。古典的例子就是将恶魔驱除出去。这个驱魔出去由年长的牧师布伦哈特执行。在著名的狄塔斯姐妹的个案。中世纪的令人推崇之处,我们不妨说,它也具有健全的理性主义的证据。

Thus, in the sixteenth century at the Julius Hospital in Wiirzburg, mental patients were already being treated side by side with the physically sick, and the treatment seems to have been really humane. With the opening of the modern era and the dawn of the first scientific ideas, the original barbaric personification of unknown powers gradually disappeared; a change arose in the conception of mental disease in favour of a more philosophic moral attitude. The ancient view that every misfortune was the vengeance of offended gods returned in a new guise to suit the times. Just as physical diseases can, in many cases, be traced back to some frivolous self-injury, so mental diseases were believed to be due to some moral injury, or sin. Behind this conception, too, lurks the angry deity.

因此,在十六世纪,在维兹伯格的朱利斯医院,精神病人已经被治疗,跟生理疾病的病人并排一块。这种治疗在当时似乎确实合乎人性。随着现代的时代的开始,与科学的观念的开始,原先的野蛮的将未知的力量予以拟人化,逐渐就消失。精神疾病的观念产生改变,以赞同更加具有哲学的道德的态度。古代的观念认为,每个不幸都是众神受到冒犯产生的报复。这个古老的观点回转过来,具有新的伪装,以符合新的时代。正如在许的的个案里,生理的疾病能够被追踪,回到某个任意的自我的伤害。精神疾病也被相信是由于某个道德的伤害,或原罪。在这个观念的背后,也潜藏著愤怒的神祗。

1 Bresler, “Kulturhistorischer Beitrag zur Hysterie” (1897); Zlindel, Pfan’er J. C. Blumhardt (1880). [Also Cal”ter, Pastor Blumhardt.-EDIToRs.]
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THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
322 Such views played a great role right up to the beginning of
the last century, especially in German psychiatry. In France, however, at about the same time, a new idea was appearing, des¬tined to sway psychiatry for a hundred years. Pinel, whose statue fittingly stands at the gateway of the Salpetriere in Paris, re¬moved the chains from the insane and thus freed them from the stigma of the criminal. In this way he gave the most effective expression to the humane and scientific conceptions of modern times. A little later Esquirol and Bayle made the discovery that certain forms of insanity ended in death after a relatively short time, and that regular changes in the brain could be demon¬strated post mortem.2 Esquirol had discovered general paralysis of the insane (or, as it was popularly called, “softening of the brain”), a disease which is always accompanied by chronic in¬flammatory shrinkage of the cerebral tissue. Thus was laid the foundation of the dogma which you will find repeated in every text-book of psychiatry: “Mental diseases are diseases of the brain.”

这些观点扮演重要的角色,一直到上个世纪的开始,特别是在德国的精神病学。可是,在法国,大约在同时,一个新的观念正在出现,注定会影响精神病学,有百年之久。皮内尔的雕像恰如其分地站立在巴黎的萨培瑞尔医院的大门。他将锁链从疯狂者身上移开开,因此解放他们,免疫罪犯的标志。用这个方式,他给予最有效的表达,对于现代的人性与科学的观念。后来,耶斯奎洛与巴尔发现到:某些疯狂的形式结果造成死亡,经过比较短暂的时期。根据死后解剖,脑部的规律的改变能够被证明。耶斯奎洛曾经发现到疯狂者的通常的麻痹)或者,如它通俗被称为是“脑部的软化”),这一个疾病总是伴随着脑细胞组织的慢性的发炎的萎缩。因此,这个信条的基础被奠定下来。你将会发现这个信条被重复,在精神病的每一本教科书上:「精神疾病就是脑的疾病」。

323 Further confirmation of this view was furnished about the
same time by the discoveries of Gall, who traced partial or com¬plete loss of the power of speech-a psychic faculty-to a lesion in the region of the lower left frontal convolution. Later this view proved to be exceedingly fruitful. Innumerable cases of extreme idiocy and other serious mental disorders were found to be caused by tumours of the brain. Towards the end of the nine¬teenth century Wernicke (recently deceased) localized the speech-centre in the left temporal lobe. This epoch-making dis¬covery raised hopes to the highest pitch. It was expected that the time was not far off when every characteristic and every psychic activity would be assigned its place in the cortical grey matter. Gradually, more and more attempts were made to trace the primary mental changes in the psychoses back to parallel changes in the brain.

这个观点的更进一步的被证实,大约同时间,由嘉尔的发现所提供。嘉尔追踪心灵的能力,也就是,言说的力量的部分或完全的丧失,回溯到左下方的前面迴旋的地区的病变。后来,这个观点证明是极端有成果的。无数的极端白痴与其他严重的精神疾病的个案,被发现是脑的肿瘤所引起。将近十九世纪的末期,温米克(最近生病了)找出言说中心的位置,在左边的脑的颞页。这个创世纪的发现,将希望提升到最高度。大家期望,在这个表皮的灰色的物质,每个具有特效,每个心灵的活动,将会被指明它的位置,这个时机为时不远了。逐渐地,越来越多的企图被从事,为了追踪精神病这的原初的精神的改变,回归到脑部的并行的改变。
2 [For these and other historic medical personages mentioned in this volume, cf. ZiIboorg and Hemy, History of Medical Psychology, index, S.V.-EDITORS.]
159

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328
324
325
326

THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF MENTAL DISEASE

Meynert, the famous Viennese psychiatrist, pro¬pounded a regular system in which the alteration of the blood-supply to certain areas of the cortex was to play the chief role in the origin of the psychoses. Wernicke made a similar but far more ingenious attempt at an anatomical explanation of psychic’ disturbances. One visible result of this tendency can be seen in the fact that nowadays even the smallest and most out of the way asylum has its anatomical laboratory, where cerebral sections are cut, stained, and examined under the microscope. Our numerous psychiatric journals are full of morphological con¬tributions, investigations on the path of the fibres in the brain and spinal cord, on the structure and distribution of cells in the cerebral cortex, and the various ways they are destroyed in dif-ferent mental diseases.

梅内特,这位著名的维也纳精神科医生,提出一个规律的系统。在这个系统里,血液供应给脑部的某些地区的轮替,扮演主要的角色,在精神病的起源。温米克从事类似,但是更加聪明的企图,要对心灵的疾病,用解剖学来解释。这个倾向的可看见的结果,能够被看见,根据这个事实:今天,即使是最小规模或即使是最偏远的精神病院,都拥有它的解剖的实验室。在那里,脑皮层的部分被切开,被灌上药水,被检查,在显微镜下。我们的无数的精神病学的杂志充满了形态学的投稿与研究,针对脑的组织与脊椎的途径,针对大皮质心的细胞的结构与分布,以及它们被毁灭的各种的方式,在不同的精神疾病里。

Psychiatry has been charged with gross materialism. And quite rightly, for it is on the road to putting the organ, the instrument, above the function-or rather, it has long been doing so. Function has become the appendage of its organ, the psyche an appendage of the brain. In modern psychiatry the psyche has come off very badly. While immense progress has been made in cerebral anatomy, we know practically nothing about the psyche, or even less than we did before. Modern psychiatry behaves like someone who thinks he can decipher the meaning and purpose of a building by a mineralogical analysis of its stones. Let us try to form a statistical picture of the number and types of mental patients who show any clear lesions of the brain.

精神病学已经被赋予笼统的物质主义。这是相当正确的,因为精神病学正朝着前进,将器官,工具,放置在功能之上。或者说,精神病学长久以来就是这样做。功能已经变成是它的器官的附属品,心灵就是脑的附属品。在现代的精神病学,心灵已经遭受痛苦的结果。虽然在脑的解剖,已经有了重大的进展,对于心灵,我们几乎一无所知。甚至比起以前,还更加不如。现代的精神病学行为好像某个人认为他能够解释一栋建筑物的意义与目的,凭借对于建筑物的石头,从事矿物学的分析。让我们尝试形成统计学的画面,对于精神病人的人数与种类,他们显示任何的脑的病变。

In the last four years we have admitted 1,325 mental patients to Burgholzli Mental Hospital-some 331 a year-of whom 9% suffer from constitutional psychic anomalies. By this I mean an inborn defect of the psyche. Of the 9%, about a quarter are imbeciles, congenitally feeble-minded. In them we find definite cerebral changes such as congenital microcephalus, pronounced hydrocephalus, and malformation of certain parts of the brain. The remaining three quarters of the psychopathically inferior show no trace of typical findings in the brain.

在过去四年来,我们已经收容1,325位病人,到博格尔利精神病院—平均一年331位病人。他们百分之9遭受身体体质的心灵的异常症状。我说这个的意思是,心灵的天生的缺陷。在这百分之9的病人当中,大约有四方之一是低能儿,天生的心智低落。在他们身上,我们发现明确的脑的改变,譬如,天生的畸形小头,又被称为是脑水肿病,脑的某些部分的形成不良。这个低劣的畸形小头的剩余的三个部分,并没有显示任何脑的典型发现的痕迹。

Three per cent of our patients suffer from epileptic mental disturbances. In the course of epilepsy a typical degeneration of the brain gradually sets in, which I cannot describe more closely 160

329
33°

THE CONTENT OF THE PSYCHOSES
here. The degeneration is demonstrable only in severe cases and after the illness has lasted a long time. If the attacks have been present for a relatively short time only, not more than a few

years, as a rule nothing can be discovered in the brain.

我们的病人的百分之三遭受癫痫的精神疾病的痛苦。在癫痫的过程,一个典型的脑的恶化逐渐开始。我在此要最为详细描述这个脑的典型的恶化。这个恶化仅有在严重的案例里,才能够被展示,当疾病已经延续一段漫长的时间后。假如疾病的侵袭仅是出现比较短的时间,则是仅有少数的恶化。

Seventeen per cent of our patients suffer from progressive
paralysis and senile deterioration. Both diseases present char-acteristic cerebral findings. In progressive paralysis there is regu¬larly an extensive shrinkage of the brain, so that the cerebral cortex in particular is often reduced by one half. Especially the frontal portions of the brain may be reduced to a third of the normal weight. A similar destruction occurs in senile deteriora¬tion ..

我们病人的百分之十七,遭受逐渐的麻痹与衰老的恶化。两种的疾病呈现特征的脑的发现。在逐渐的脑性麻痹,脑会规律地广泛的委缩。所以,特别是脑皮质经常被减缩到一半。特别是脑的前叶的部分,可能被减缩到正常的重量的一半。同样的毁灭发生在衰老的恶化。

Fourteen per cent of the patients admitted annually suffer from poisoning, at least 13% of the cases being due to alcohol. As a rule, in milder cases nothing can be found in the brain; only in relatively few of the more severe cases is there a slight shrinkage of the cortex. The number of these severe cases amounts to less than 1 % of the yearly cases of alcoholism.

百分之十四的病人承认每年会遭受中毒的痛苦。至少百分之十三的病人是由于酒精中毒。通常,在温和的案例,在脑部,并没有发现任何东西。仅有在比较少数的严重的案例,才有脑皮质的轻微的委缩。这些严重的案例的数目总数不到百分之一,在每年的酒精中毒的案例里。

Six per cent of the patients suffer from so-called manic-de-pressive insanity, which comprises the manias and the melan¬cholias. The essence of this disease can be understood even by the layman. Melancholia is a condition of abnormal sadness with no disturbance of intelligence and memory. Mania is the opposite, the rule being an abnormally excited state with great restlessness, but without any deeper disturbance of intelligence and memory. In this disease no morphological lesions of the brain can be demonstrated.

百分之六的病人遭受所谓的躁郁与具沮丧的疯狂。这个疯狂包括躁郁症者与忧郁症者。这个疾病的本质能够被理解,即使是外行人。忧郁症是一种不正常的悲伤的情况,并没有智力与记忆的疾病。躁郁症则是恰恰相反,通常是不正常地興奋的状态,具有强烈的不安。但是并没有任何智力与记忆的更加严重的疾病。在这个疾病,并没有脑的形态学的病变能够被展示。

Forty-five per cent of the patients suffer from the authentic and common disease known as dementia praecox. The name is a very unhappy one, for the dementia is not always precocious, nor in all cases is there dementia. Unfortunately the disease is too often incurable; even in the best cases, in recoveries where the layman would notice no abnormality, one always finds some defect in the patient’s emotional life. The clinical picture is incredibly varied; usually there is some disturbance of feeling, very often there are delusions and hallucinations. As a rule there is nothing to be found in the brain. Even in cases of the most severe type, lasting for years, an intact brain is not infrequently found post mortem. Only in a few cases are slight changes to be found, which cannot yet, however, be proved to be regular.

百分之四十五的这些病人遭受真诚而普遍的疾病,众所周知的精神分裂症。这个名称是一个很不快乐的名称。因为精神分析并不总是早发性质的。在各个案例里,也没有精神分裂。不幸地,这个疾病通常是无法被治疗。即使是在最佳的案例,在外行人并没有发现异常状况的复发里。我们总是找的某个缺陷,在病人的情感的生活里。临床的画面是难以置信地各式各样。通常会有感觉的某个困扰。经常会有幻觉与幻象。通常,在脑部,并没有发析现什么。即使在最严重的种类的个案,延续两年,死后解剖后,一个完整的脑还是经常被找到。
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THE PSYCHOGENESIS OF MENTAL DISEASE
To sum up: in round figures about a quarter of our patients show more or less extensive alterations and lesions of the brain, while three-fourths have a brain which seems to be generally unimpaired or at most exhibits changes such as afford abso-lutely no explanation of the psychological disturbance.

总而言之,在园形的图形里,大约四分之一的我们的病人显示或多或少的脑的广泛轮替与病变。四分之三的我们的病人则是拥有一个似乎通常没有受到损伤的脑。或是至多,他们展示一些改变,譬如,这些改变绝的不容许用心灵的疾病来解释。

These figures offer the best possible proof that the purely anatomical approach of modern psychiatry leads-to put it mildly-only very indirectly to the goal, which is the under-standing of the psychic disturbance. In addition, it must be remembered that the mental patients who show the most strik-ing lesions of the brain die after a relatively short time: conse-quently, the chronic inmates of the asylum, who form its real population, consist of up to 70 or 80% cases of dementia prae¬cox, that is, of patients in whom anatomical changes are prac¬tically non-existent. The way to a psychiatry of the future, which is to come to grips with the essence of the matter, is therefore clearly marked out: it can only be by way of psychology. For this reason we have entirely abandoned the anatomical approach in our Zurich Clinic and have turned to the psychological in-vestigation of mental disease. Since most of our patients suffer from dementia praecox, this disease is naturally our chief prob¬lem.

这些图形提供最佳的证据:现代的精神病学的解剖的方法,温和地说,仅是间接地导致目标。这个目标就是要理解心灵的疾病。除外,我们必须记住,显示脑的明星的病变的精神病这,在比较短的时间内死亡。结果,精神病院的这些慢性的病人,形成是精神病院的主要人口。精神分裂症的个案占据百分之70到80。 换句话说,在这些病人身上,解剖的改变几乎是不存在的。到达未来的精神分裂症的途径,是要处理这个物质的本质,这个途径因此清楚地被标示出来;那就是凭借心理学的途径。因为这个理由,我们完全地放弃解剖学的途径,在我们的苏黎世的诊所,并且诉诸于精神病的心理的研究。因为大部分的我们的病人遭受精神分裂症的痛苦,这个疾病当然是我们主要的难题。

The older clinicians paid great attention to the psycho¬logical precursors of insanity, just as the lay public still does, following a true instinct. We took up this trail and care-fully investigated the previous psychological history whenever possible. Our efforts were richly rewarded, for we found sur¬prisingly often that the illness broke out at a moment of some great emotion which, in its turn, had arisen in a more or less normal manner. We also found that in the mental disease which ensued there were a number of symptoms that could not be understood at all from the anatomical standpoint. These symp-toms immediately became comprehensible when considered from the standpoint of the individual’s previous history. Freud’s pioneering investigations into the psychology of hysteria and dreams afforded us the greatest stimulus and help in our work.

老经验的临床医生会专注注意疯狂的心理的先兆,如同外行的大众现在依旧这样做。他们遵循真实的本能。我们从事这个途径,并且尽可能小心地研究先前的心理的历史。我们的努力收获非常丰盛。因为我们经常感到惊奇地发现到,这个疾病发作在强烈情感的时刻。反过来,这个强烈的情感会以相当正常的方式产生。我们也发现到,在随之而来的精神的疾病,会有许多的症状,从解剖的观点,根本就无法被理解。当它们从个人的先前的历史的观点来考虑,这些症状立即变得可以被理解。弗洛伊德的开先锋的研究癔症与梦的心理学,供应我们的工作最强大的刺激与帮助。

A few examples of the most recent departures in psychiatry will, I think, make the subject clearer than any amount of dry theory. In order to bring home to you the difference in our con-ception I shall, in each case, first describe the medical history in the older fashion, and then give the solution characteristic of the new approach.

精神分裂症最近的研究发展的几个例子,让这个主题更加清楚,比起再多的枯燥的理论的数目。为了让你们清楚明白我们的观念的差异。我将在每个个案里,首先描述古老的方式的医学的历史。然后,给予具有新的途径的特征的解决。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

162

精神分析的不可能的艺术

November 6, 2015

THE IMPOSSIBLE ART OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

精神分析的不可能的艺术

Once the purity of the analyst’s desire had exploded at the end of Seminar
XI, Lacan started to investigate the analyst’s relation with the object a
(the cause of the analy sand’s desire), which the analyst was expected to
support in order to elicit (rather than mould or dampen down) the desire
of the analysand.

一旦精神分析家的欲望的纯粹性在第11研讨班的结束时爆发开来,拉康开始研究分析家跟小客体的关系 (分析者的欲望的原因)。分析家被期望要支持这个小客体,为了召唤(而不是塑造或淡化)分析者的欲望。

What could it possibly mean to be the support of object
a? Lacan rejected vigorously all the obvious solutions: analysts must try
to understand what the cause of the analysand’s desire is and convey
their understanding, analysts must interpret this cause, analysts must
incarnate it. As the only possible alternative, he eventually came up with
the idea that the analyst’s desire must be to ‘disbe’ the object a, i.e. to be
a semblance of the object a.

成为小客体的支持,可能是什么意思?拉康强烈地拒绝所有表面的解决:分析家必须尝试理解分析者的欲望的原因是什么,并且传递他们的理解;分析家必须解释这个原因,分析家必须具体表现这个原因。作为唯一可能的替代,拉康最后获得这个观念:分析家的欲望必须是要“剥除生命实存”,剥除小客体的生命实存。也就是说,分析家的欲望是要成为小客体的类似物。

In 1967, Lacan admitted that this is not exactly a tenable position
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). Yet he recalled that at the end of his career the
founder of psychoanalysis had described his invention as an impossible
profession too. For in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’, Freud
had written:

在1967年,拉康承认,这并不是确实能自园其说的立场。可是,他提醒,在事业的结束时,精神分析的创办者曾经描述他的发明,作为也是不可能的专业。因为在“终止与没有终止的精神分析”一文,弗洛伊德写到:

[L]et us pause for a moment to assure the analyst that he has our
sincere sympathy in the very exacting demands he has to fulfil in
carrying out his activities. It almost looks as if analysis were the
third of those ‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure
beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which
have been known much longer, are education and government.
(Freud 1937c:248)

让我们暂停一下,为了要让分析家确实,他获得我们诚恳的同情,对于他必须实践的这个严酷的要求,当他实现他的活动时。看起来好像是,精神分析是那些“不可能的”的专业的第三个。在这些“不可能”的专业里,我们能够预先确实获得的结果是不令人满意的。其他两个不可能的专业,大家知道的时间较长,那就是教育与政府。

This gloss on the three impossible professions should not be read as a
statement in which the notion of impossibility covers a specific
psychoanalytic meaning. For impossibility is not a Freudian concept.
Moreover, from Freud’s reference to the ‘impossible professions’ in his
preface to August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth (Freud 1925f), it can be
inferred that the entire expression constituted some kind of German
commonplace rather than a Freudian invention in its own right. In this
preface Freud had conceded: ‘From an early period on, I have adopted
the joke of the three impossible professions—as there are: educating,
healing and governing —and I was also greatly preoccupied with the
means of these assignments’ (ibid.: 273).

这三个不可能的专业的虚饰外表不应该被阅读为这个陈述。在这个陈述里,不可能的这个观念掩盖明确的精神分析的意义。因为不可能并不是弗洛伊德的观念。而且,从弗洛伊德的提到’不可能的专业“,在他写的序文,给艾奇封的“迷失的青春”。我们可以推论,整个的表达构成某种的德国的公共场域,而不是弗洛伊德学派自己拥有的发明。在这篇序文,弗洛伊德承认:「从早期开始,我就採用“三个不可能的专业”的这个笑话。这三个专业就是教育,治疗,与统治。我也非常专注探讨这些行业的工具。

A comparison between this mention and the 1937 one reveals that
Freud at one stage substituted the analytic profession for the healing
profession while keeping the two other professions unaltered. This
substitution may be interpreted in at least two different ways. First, one
could argue that in 1937 Freud ultimately acknowledged that healing
and analysing are the same, that nobody is healed if not subjected to the
process of analysis, although both practices are fundamentally impossible.
Second, it could be said that Freud finally considered healing to be an
altogether possible achievement and therefore out of place within the
series of impossible professions, filling the empty space with
psychoanalysis. Contrary to the first interpretation, healing is here
essentially different from analysing, the former being possible and the
latter impossible.

比较一下这次的提到跟1937年的提到,我们发现,弗洛伊德在一个阶段,用精神分析的专业,来替换治疗的专业。另一方面,他又保持这两个其他的专业原封不动。这样的替换可能被解释,用至少是两个不同的方式。首先,我们能够争论,在1937年,弗洛伊德最后承认,治疗与精神分析是相同的。没有人被治疗好,假如他没有被承受过精神分析的过程。虽然两个行业的实践基本上都是不可能的。其次,我们能够说,弗洛伊德最后认为治疗是一个完全可能的成就,因此并不适合被归纳到不可能的专业的系列之内,作为是填补精神分析的空虚的空间。跟第一个解释恰恰相反,治疗在此基本上是不同于精神分析,治疗是可能的,而精神分析则是不可能。

Proceeding from Lacan’s conclusion concerning the untenable position
of the analyst and his formalization of the analyst’s discourse during the
late 1960s, I shall argue in favour of yet a third interpretation, saying
that healing and analysing are both impossible, but that the impossibility
is not the same due to a different position of the agencies. It will appear
then that the impossibility of psychoanalysis is highly specific and more
related to the position of the analyst than to the analytic process as such.
Impossibility gained momentum in Lacan’s works from the mid-1960s
onwards.

从拉康的结论继续前进,关于精神分析家的这个难以自圆其说的立场,以及精神分析家的辞说的的正式化,在1960年代期间。我将主张,赞同还有第三种的解释,并且说:治疗与精神分析两者都是不可能的。但是,这个不可能并不相同,由于代理者的不同的立场。因此,看起来,精神分析的不可能是非常明确的,而且跟分析家的立场更加息息相关,而不是由于精神分析的过程的本身。在拉康的著作里,从1960年代开始,不可能就获得强调的力量。

After its initial alignment with the real in Seminar XI (1977b
[1964]:167) the impossible gradually achieved currency as a central
Lacanian concept, defined in Seminar XX as ‘what does not stop not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:59, 94). Although the notion had
figured in Freud’s ‘joke’ of the three professions, Lacan did not revive
‘impossibility’ through the centralization of a marginal Freudian term,
as he had done previously with the notion of foreclosure (Verwerfung),
but by introducing the categories of modal logic into psychoanalytic
theory.66

经过最初的认同实在界,在第11研讨班,这个不可能逐渐获得流通,作为是中央的拉康派的观念。在第20研讨班,这个不可能被定义为“不停止不被书写的东西”。虽然这个观念已经包含在弗洛伊德的三个专业的笑话里,拉康重新主张“不可能”的观念,并不是经由将边缘的弗洛伊德的术语,拿来作为中心,如同拉康先前曾经做过的,对于“除权弃绝”的观念。相反地,拉康是重新主张不可能,是凭借将模态逻辑的范畴,介绍进入精神分析理论。

One of the seminal texts in which Lacan defined psychoanalytic
practice on the basis of an impossibility is the transcript of the opening
session of Seminar XIII, The Object of Psychoanalysis (1965–66), which
was published separately as ‘Science and Truth’ (1989b[1965]). Here
Lacan readdressed the vexed issue with which he had opened and closed
his Seminar XI in 1964: ‘Is psychoanalysis a science?’ (Lacan 1977b
[1964]:7, 264).

在其中一个研讨班的文本,拉康定义精神分析的实践,根据不可能作为基础。那就是第13研讨班,“精神分析的目标”的开始的几堂的录音稿。这个研讨班分开被出版,标题是“科学与真理”。在此,拉康重新处理这个感到懊恼的问题。他用这个问题来开始与结束他在1964年的第11研讨班:精神分析是一门科学吗?

In ‘Science and Truth’, his answer to this question was
not only much more elaborate than in Seminar XI, it also left little doubt
as to the exact position of psychoanalysis vis-a-vis science. Whereas in
Seminar XI Lacan had drawn attention to the ‘ambiguity that persists in
the question as to what in psychoanalysis is or is not reducible to science’
(ibid.: 265), in ‘Science and Truth’ he distinguished sharply between
psychoanalysis and science on the basis of their differential relation to
the function of truth as cause. Finding support, once again, in the second
book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:38–42), Lacan argued that science is
predicated upon truth as a formal cause, whereas psychoanalysis
encompasses truth as a material cause.67

在“科学与真理”,拉康对于这个问题的回答,不但更加地复制,比起第11研讨班。这个回答也留下几乎无可置疑,关于精神分析家的确实的立场,跟科学面对面。在第11研讨班,拉康已经注意到“关于在精神分析什么可化简,什么不可化简成为科学的这个问题,其间持续存在的模糊嗳昧”。在“科学与真理”,拉康锐利地区别精神分析与科学,根据它们的差异的关系,跟真理的功能,作为原因。拉康再次找到支持,在“亚里斯多德的物理学”的第二册。拉康主张,科学并不是以真理的述语,作为是正式的原因。而精神分析则是涵盖真理,作为物质的原因。

In science, Lacan intimated, the nature of a process and its various
components is represented in a formal law, such as E=mc2 , which is
itself the result of extensive empirical research or experimental testing.
Scientists use these formulas to explain why certain things happen the
way they do, which tallies with Aristotle’s description of a formal cause:
A second way in which the word [cause] is used is for the form or
pattern (i.e. the formula for what a thing is, both specifically and
generically, and the terms which play a part in the formula). For
example, the ratio 2:1, and number in general, cause the octave.
(Aristotle 1996:39)

拉康主张,在科学,过程的特性与过程的各种不同的成分被代表,作为是正式的法则,譬如,爱因斯坦的能源公式E=mc2,跟亚里斯多德的描述正式的原因不谋而合。第二个方式,真理(原因)被使用的方式,是为了形式或模式之用。(譬如,作为某件东西存在的内容的公式,不论述明确地或一般地。还有,在公式里扮演角色的术语)。譬如,2 :1 的比例,与一般的数字,会引起程式语言。

Lacan proclaimed that in science truth functions as a formal cause because
truth is the quality assigned to properly developed scientific laws (Lacan
1989b[1965]:22). Scientific formulas stemming from controlled
observations or carefully conducted experiments are believed to be true
(generally or under specific circumstances), and their truth value indicates
the extent to which they can be used to explain certain events. Put
differently, the extent to which a formula explains (causes) a certain
phenomenon provides an indication of the formula’s truth.

拉康宣称,在科学,真理发挥功能,作为是正式的原因,因为真理作为特质,是被指定给合适发展的科学的法则。科学的公式,起源于被控制的观察,或仔细主导的实验。这些公式被相信是真实的(一般性或在明确的环境之下)。它们的真理的价值指示著这个程度。它们被使用来解释某些事件的程度。换句话说,一个公式解释(或引起)某个现象的程度,提供公式的真理的一个指示。

In psychoanalysis, however, truth functions as a material cause and
the materiality is conditioned by the signifier (ibid.: 22–23). To understand
Lacan’s point, one should note that for Aristotle the material cause was
an answer to the question ‘What is this thing made of?’ rather than ‘Why
and how has this thing come about?’. In claiming that psychoanalytic
truth functions as a material cause by means of the signifier, Lacan thus
argued that in psychoanalysis the truth of an event (say, a symptom) is
always embedded in the symbolic order; it is made of signifiers, so to
speak.

可是,在精神分析,真理发挥功能,作为是材料的原因。这个材料受到能指的制约。为了理解拉康的要点,我们应该注意到,对于亚里斯多德,材料真理并没有解答这个问题:「这个东西由什么组成?」而是要解答这个问题:「这个东西为什么发生,如何发生?“当拉康宣称,精神分析的真理发挥功能,作为凭据能指的材料的原因。拉康因此主张,在精神分析,事件的真理(譬如,症状),总是被镶嵌在象征的秩序里。也就是说,它由能指组成。

As he had already tried to demonstrate via the rhetorical figure of
a prosopopea (‘I, truth, will speak’) to a bemused audience of Viennese
psychoanalysts in 1955 (Lacan 1977f[1955]:121–123), Lacan contended
that psychoanalysts could only proceed from the idea that the truth is
something which speaks internally and not, as scientists claim, something
‘out there’ which is silent and simply waiting to be laid down in formal
knowledge.68 Yet assuming that the truth speaks implies that it is
impossible to develop a knowledge which represents this truth fully and
adequately, for knowledge also takes root in language and there is no
language through which the truth does not speak.69

如同在1955年,针对维也纳的精神分析家的感的困惑的听众,拉康已经尝试过证明,凭借作为客观的第三者的修词的人物,(我,真理,将言说)。拉康主张,精神分析的前进,仅能从这个观念:真理是某件从内部言说的东西。真理并不是某件“外在于那里“的东西,如同科学家所宣称的。这个”外在于那里“的东西沉默,而且仅是等待着被正式的知识宣告出来。可是,假定真理会言说,暗示着,要发展充分而且充足地代表这个真理的知识是不可能。因为知识也生根于语言。然而,却没有一种语言,这个真理不经由它来言说。

Hence the first and foremost impossibility in psychoanalysis: it is
impossible to cover truth by relying on knowledge, whether the
knowledge is that incorporated and acted on by the analyst or that
produced by the analysand. In yet another piece of bravado, Lacan
summarized his thesis as follows in the opening paragraph of Television:
I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no
way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet
it’s through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real.
(Lacan 1990d[1973]:3)

因此,在精神分析最初与最重要的不可能是:要依靠知识来涵盖真理是不可能。无论这个知识是被分析家融合或诉诸行动的知识,或是被分析者产生的知识。在另外一篇虚张声势的文章,在“电视“访谈的开头的段落,拉康总结他的主题如下:

我总是言说真理。不是完整的真理。因为要说出全部真理是不可能的。全部说出真理实质上是不可能的:因为话语做不到。可是,就是要通过话语失败的方式,真理才掌握到实在界。

Due to this epistemological impossibility, psychoanalysis is more akin
to art than science. Freud would have been quite reluctant to accept such
a designation, because in his view psychoanalysis had to be based on
truthfulness and the eradication of semblance and deceit—art only
generating illusions.70 Lacan however had favoured a conception of
‘psychoanalysis as art’ from the very start of his teachings. For instance,
in the 1953 lecture ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth’, he prepared his
audience of philosophers for his new interpretation of the Rat Man by
broaching the contentious issue as to whether psychoanalysis is a science.
His answer could not have been more categorical:

由于认识论的不可能,精神分析更加类似于艺术,而不是科学。弗洛伊德本来会相当不愿意接受这样的指称。因为在他的观的,精神分析的基础必须是真理,与抹除类似物与欺骗。艺术仅是产生幻觉。可是,拉康则是赞同“精神分析作为艺术“的观念,从他的教学的开始。譬如,在1953年的演讲”神经症者的个人神话“,他让他的哲学家们的听众,准备接纳他对于”鼠人“的新的解释。他装饰这个具有争议的议题,关于精神分析是否是一门科学。他的回答当时完全是范畴的观念。

It is often said that psychoanalysis is not, strictly speaking, a science,
which seems to imply by contrast that it is quite simply an art.
That is erroneous if one takes it to mean that psychoanalysis is
only a technique, an operational method, an aggregate to formulas.
But it is not erroneous if you use this word art in the sense in
which it was used in the Middle Ages to speak of the liberal arts—
that series going from astronomy to dialectic by way of arithmetic,
geometry, music, and grammar.
(Lacan 1979[1953]:406)

经常有人说,精神分析严格来说并不是一门科学。这似乎对照地暗示着:精神分析仅仅是一门艺术。那是错误的观念,假如我们将它意思解释为:精神分析仅是一门技术,一个运作的方法,各种公式的聚集处。但是,这样的解释不算是错误,假如你们使用“艺术“这个字词,如同它在中世纪所使用的意义,当提到liberal arts (通识技艺)。那个系列包含天文学,到辩证法,经由算术,几何,音乐,与文法。

Lacan claimed that the medieval ‘liberal arts’ distinguish themselves
from the sciences due to their ‘fundamental relation to human proportion’,
a relation which is ‘implied pre-eminently in the use of speech’ (ibid.:
406). His ensuing assertion on the singular status of psychoanalysis as a
fundamental art clearly foreshadowed his formulation on psychoanalytic
truth as a material cause in ‘Science and Truth’:

拉康宣称,中世纪的“通识技艺“区别它们自己跟理科的科学的不同,是由于它们跟人类的属性具有基本的关系。这个关系被暗示出了,特别是在对于言说的使用。拉康随后的主张,针对精神分析的独特的地位,作为是一门基本的艺术,由他对于精神分析的真理的阐述清楚地看出端倪,作为是”科学与真理“的研讨班的材料的原因。

It is in this respect that analytic experience is not definitively
objectifiable. It always implies within itself the emergence of a
truth that cannot be said, since what constitutes truth is speech,
and then you would have in some way to say speech itself which is
exactly what cannot be said in its function as speech.
(ibid.: 406)

在这方面,精神分析的经验并没有明确地可以被形成客体。它总是暗示着,在精神分析经验的内部,会有无法被说出的真理的出现。因为那是组成真理作为言说的东西。然后,你们将必须用某个方式说出言说的本身。那确实是无法被说出的东西,在它作为言说的功能。

With the concept of the impossible established, Lacan returned to Freud’s
three impossible professions, in order to situate them with regard to his
theory of the four discourses. In 1970 Lacan was interviewed on the
topic of his theoretical contributions to psychoanalysis by the academic
Robert Georgin, whom he described contemptuously as ‘a funny Belgian
who has asked me some questions’ (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:213).71 Part
of the interview was first broadcasted by the French-speaking official
Belgian radio station and afterwards also by the official French station.
‘Radiophonie’ (1970), the text of Lacan’s carefully prepared answers,
constitutes one of his most important later works.72 Lacan’s answer to
Georgin’s seventh question, which was never on the air, is of particular
significance here. The question ran as follows:

随着这个不可能的观念被建立,拉康回到弗洛伊德的三个不可能的专业,为了定位它们,关于他的“四个辞说“的理论。在1970年,拉康接受学院派的罗伯 乔金的访谈,针对这个议题:他对于精神分析的理论的贡献。拉康藐视地描绘罗伯 乔金,作为1”滑稽的比利时人,他询问我一下问题“。访谈的部分内容首先被播放,由说法语的官方的比利时的无线电台,随后,由官方的法语电台”Radiophnie“。拉康这次的仔细准备的回答的文本,构成他晚期的最重要的著作之一。拉康对于乔金的第七个问题的回答,从来没有播放过,在此具有特殊的意义。这个问题内容如下:

Governing, educating and psychoanalysing are three untenable
challenges. None the less, it is necessary for the psychoanalyst to
commit himself to this perpetual dispute of every discourse,
especially his own. The psychoanalyst clings to a knowledge—the
analytic knowledge—which he disputes by definition. How do you
solve—or not—this contradiction? Status of the impossible? The
impossible, is it the real?
(ibid.: 96)

统治,教育,与精神分析是三个无法自园其说的挑战。可人,精神分析家仍然有必要奉献他自己,对于日常辞说的这个永久的争论,特别是他自己的辞说.精神分析紧捉住一门知识—精神分析的知识。他用定义来争论的精神分析的知识。你如何解决,或不解决这个悖论?不可能的状态的悖论?不可能界,那是实在界吗?

Endorsing the equivalence of the impossible and the real, Lacan
emphasized that it is rather premature to state that the three Freudian
challenges are impossible and therefore real. Instead of defining the
practices of government, education and psychoanalysis as equally and
indistinctively impossible, Lacan posited that they each comprise a
specific impossibility, based on a specific impotence, as illustrated in his
formulas of the four discourses.73

拉康替不可能界等于是实在界背书,并且强调说这是为时过早,假如我们还不能陈述:三个弗洛伊德的挑战都是不可能,因此都是实在界。拉康并没有定义政府,教育与精神分析的实践,作为是同样而且模糊地不可能。拉康假设,它们每一个都包含一个明确的不可能性。以明确的无能为力作为基础。如同他的四个辞说的公式所说明。

To substantiate these differing impossibilities, he pointed out that the
discourse of the analyst transforms the impossibility of the discourse of
the master into impotence (impuissance), and its impotence into
impossibility. This transformation becomes clear when comparing the
formulas of the discourse of the master and the discourse of the analyst,
which Lacan introduced in the first session of Seminar XVII (1991 a
[1969–70]:9–27).

为了将这些不同的不可能性具体表现,拉康指出,精神分析家的辞说转化主人辞说的不可能性,转化成为无能为力。并且将主人辞说的无能为力,转化成为不可能性。这种转化变得清楚,当他比较主人辞说的公式,与精神分析家的辞说。

In Lacan’s formulas of discourse, impossibility always directs the
relationship between the two upper terms (represented by an arrow),
whereas impotence is characteristic for the relationship between the two
lower terms (represented by a double slash). As such, it can be verified
that the impossibility between S1 and S2 in the master’s discourse becomes
an impotence in the analyst’s discourse, whereas the impotence between
a and becomes an impossibility. In this way, the discourse of the master
reveals itself as the opposite of the discourse of the analyst, or, in other
words, governing is the reverse of psychoanalysing.74

在拉康的辞说的公司,不可能总是引的这两个上方的术语之间的关系(由箭头代表)。无能为力力的特征则是这两个下方的术语之间的关系(由双重的划杠代表)。作为这样的公式,我们可以验证:在主人辞说里,在S1 与 S2 之间的不可能,在分析家的辞说里,变得无能为力。在小客体与被阉割的主体之间的无能为力,则是变成不可能。用这个方式,主人辞说显示它自己,作为是精神分析辞说的对立。或者,换句话说,统治就是精神分析的相反。

But how are impossibility and impotence to be interpreted here? What
does it mean for the impossibility of the master’s discourse to be
transformed in impotence in the analyst’s discourse, and vice versa? In
‘Radiophonie’ Lacan divulged that in the master’s discourse, the
impossibility signifies the failure of the agency

但是,不可能与无能为力在此如何能够被解释?那是什么意思,让主人辞说的不可能,被转化成为精神分析辞说的无能为力?反过来说,也是一样?在“电台广播访谈”,拉康详述:在主人辞说理,这个不可能意味着代理者能指S的无法命令主体S的知识。

Whether a socially identified ruler or the psychic mastery of each and every individual, no matter how hard a master (S) tries to govern and control knowledge (S), the latter will always partially escape.

无论他说一位被社会认同的统治者,或们每个个人的心灵的掌控者,无论一位主人多么努力尝试要统治与控制主体的知识,后者将总是部分地逃避。

The reason for this lack of control is to be found in the impotence which
characterizes the relationship between the two lower terms of the formula.
Governing produces a result (the object a), but this result is powerless in
relation to the truth of the whole process. The truth of the master’s
discourse is that knowledge is partly unconscious and that this
unconscious part does not comprise a subject ().

控制的这个欠缺的理由能够被找到,在这个无能为力里。因为无能为力的特征就是公式的两个下方的术语之间的关系。统治产生一个结果(小客体a),但是这个结果是无能为力,当它与整个过程的真理的关系。主人的辞说的真理是,知识部分是无意识的,而且这个无意识的部分,并没有组成一个被阉割的主体S。

Unconscious knowledge
is not known by a particular agency; the only thing that can be said about
this knowledge is that it works and that it knows itself. Unconscious
knowledge is strictly self-contained and organizes the life of human
beings without they themselves knowing it. At the level of unconscious
knowledge there is a lack of agency, which is just another way of saying
that in the realm of unconscious knowledge the subject is barred (). The
product of the master’s discourse is not capable of reducing this lack,
for this product, which Lacan calls object a, is but a substitute stopgap—
not at all adequate for annihilating the lack () and for producing
some kind of jouissance. Therefore it is impossible to command
knowledge. Whatever the result of governing, the lack remains, due to
the barrier of jouissance on the level of impotence.

无意识的知识并没有根据一个特殊的代理者来认识。关于这个知识,唯一能够被说的事情是,它运转,它知道它自己。无意识的知识是严格地自我包容,并且组织人类的生命,但是他们自己却不知道它。在无意识的知识的层面,有一个代理者的欠缺。这是另外一种方式来说:在无意识的知识的领域里,主体是被划杠。主人辞说的产物并不能化减这个欠缺。因为这个产物,拉康称为是小客体a,仅是一个替代的替身—它根本就不足够来消灭这个欠缺,也不足够来产生某种的欢爽。因此,这是不可能,要命令知识。无论统治的结果是什么,这个欠缺始终存在。由于在无能为力的层面,欢爽的受到阻碍。

In the analyst’s discourse, the impossibility between S and S
2
of the master’s discourse becomes itself an impotence. This implies that the
discourse is based on the powerlessness of a signifier (S1) to control an existing frame of knowledge. The master signifier (S 1) is unable to organize the body of signifiers (S
2 ) for once and for all, and to reveal the definitive
signification of knowledge. In terms of what I have explained above (see
p. 87) within the context of the analyst’s task to dissolve coagulated centres
of signification in light of the analysand’s avowal of desire, the impotence
of the analyst’s discourse rests upon the unavoidable production of new
master signifiers, new loci of control whose power does not extend beyond
the reorganization of the symbolic order.

在精神分析家的辞说,能指1与能指2之间的不可能本身就变成无能为力。这暗示著,这个辞说的基础上能指1的无能为力,无法控制知识的现存的架构。主人能指(S1)没有能力一劳永逸地组织能指们(S2)的身体,也无法显示知识的明确的意义。用我以上刚刚解释的术语,在分析家的工作的内文里,要溶解意义的被凝固的中心,从分析者的宣称欲望的观点,分析家的辞说的无能为力,依靠无可避免的新的主人的能指的产生,新的控制的轨迹,它的力量并没有延伸超越象征的秩序的重新组织。

This specific impotence of the
analyst’s discourse is responsible for a specific impossibility, which I wish
to designate here as the impossibility to analyse what is merely a lack. If
the process of analysis were to enable the analysand to make sense of all
(conscious and unconscious) knowledge, the analysand would become
the material agent of his condition and ‘complete analysis’ would be
possible.

精神分析家的辞说的明确的无能为力,要替明确的不可能负责。我但愿能够在此将这个明确的不可能,指明是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。假如精神分析的过程要是让分析者能够理解所有的知识(无论是意识或是无意识的知识)。分析者将会变成是他的条件的物质代理者。那时,“完整”的精神分析将是可能的。

But as it happens, the patient remains a barred subject and the
only thing that can ever follow is her acceptance of this position. Rather
than effects of signification, the analyst’s discourse has effects of nonsense,
in so far as meaning is always fleeting, elusive.75 This seems to me
the reason why Lacan said in Seminar XXII that ‘The effect of meaning
required of the analytic discourse is not imaginary. It is neither symbolic.
It has to be real.’ (Lacan 1975c[1974–75]:4/96).

但是,偶然地,病人始终是一个被划杠阉割的主体。唯一可能跟随而来的东西,是病人接受这个立场。分析家的辞说并不是意义的效果,而是拥用无意识作为效果。因为意义总是瞬间消失,闪烁不定。我觉得这似乎就是这个理由,为什么拉康在第22研讨班会说:对于精神分析辞说所要求的意义的效果,并不是想像界。它也不是象征界。它必须是实在界。

The critical importance of Lacan’s point of view cannot be overrated,
especially when compared to what many psychoanalysts have done and
some continue to do. Instead of acknowledging the barrier their discourse
imposes on the process of ‘sense-making’, they radically eliminate it.
Many analysts indeed only try to make sense of other people’s lives and
of a whole range of sociocultural phenomena. The analyst’s job allegedly
consists in making sense where all others have failed; if nobody is capable
of making sense of what happens, there is still the analyst who can. Here,
the analyst is convinced that the master signifiers of his discourse do
control knowledge and he is obviously enjoying it.

拉康的观点具有关键的重要性,无论如何高估也不为过。特别是当我们比较他的观点,跟许多精神分析家已经做过,还有一些分析家继续在做的事情比较起来。他们非常没有承认他们的辞说赋加的阻碍,给予“理解意义”的过程。他们反而强烈地减少它。许多精神分析家确实仅是尝试理解别人的生活,以及仅是理解社会与文化的现象的整个范围。精神分析家的工作被宣称就是在于理解所有的其他分析家失败的地方。即使没有人能够理解所发生的事情,依旧还有分析家能够理解。分析家相信:他的辞说的主人能指,确实控制知识,他显而易见地正在享受知识。

Alongside the aforementioned situation (see p. 78) of analysts advocating a discourse
of the right to jouissance, this could be a second instance of a surreptitious
lapse of the analyst’s discourse into the realm of perversion.
When the analyst’s discourse is supported by the enjoyment of making
sense it cannot possibly be analytic anymore, because in Lacan’s
representation of the analyst’s discourse, the barrier between S
1 and S 2 is insuperable. The whole Lacanian dynamics of the analyst’s discourse
can thus be reduced to a single formula, which could serve as a rewording
of the ‘paradox of the position of the analyst’: one cannot enjoy being an
analyst and continue to be one.

除了精神分析家的以上提到解决,他们主张拥有欢爽的权利。还可能有第二个例子,精神分析家的辞实秘密地掉入倒错症的领域。当精神分析家的辞说受的理解的欢爽的支持,它就不再可能是精神分析。因为在拉康对于精神分析辞说的再现,在能指1与能指2之间的阻碍是无法克服的。整个的拉康的精神分析辞说的动力学,因此能够被化简成为单一个公式。这个公式可以充当是重新描述“精神分析家的立场的悖论”。我们无法享受成为一位分析家,又继续成为一位分析家。

The corollary of this paradox should not come as a surprise anymore.
After excluding the jouissance of the analyst, Lacan re-emphasized the
desire of the analyst. In relation to the formula of the analyst’s discourse
this desire comprises two aspects. First, it is a desire to put knowledge in
the place of truth. Indeed, in the analyst’s discourse knowledge (S
2) is situated in the lower left-hand corner, which Lacan defined as the place
of truth (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:106).

这个悖论的必然结局不应该再引人惊奇。拉康将分析家的欢爽排除在外后,他重新强调,分析家的欲望,跟分析家的辞说的公式息息相关。这个欲望包含两个层面。首先,那是一个欲望,要将知识取代真理。的确,在精神分析家的辞说,知识(S2)被定位在下方的左手边的角落。拉康定义它,作为真理的位置。

On first sight, this could be seen
as contradicting the impossibility between knowledge and truth. Yet Lacan
argued that knowledge functioning on the place of truth has nothing to
do with knowledge being used as unquestionable truth. When analysts
are expected to use their knowledge as a manifestation of truth, they
should let their knowledge speak within everything they say, whilst
realizing that its base does not contain all the answers to the analysand’s
problems.

乍然一看,这可以被视为是反驳这个不可能,知识与真理之间的不可能。可是,拉康主张,在真理的位置发挥功能的知识,跟被使用作为无可置疑的真理的知识,并没有丝毫关系。当分析家被期待要使用他们的知识,作为真理的证明。他们不应该让他们的知识言说,在他们所说的一切事情之内。另一方面,他们体认到,知识的基地并没有包含所有的答案,针对分析者的难题的答案。

This point is similar to what I have discussed above (see p.
75) apropos of the analyst’s ignorance and the paradox of stupidity.76
Second, the desire of the analyst is evidently related to ‘disbeing’, to
making oneself appear as the cause of the desire of the analysand, even
to making the analysand believe that the analyst is the cause of her desire.

这一点类似我以上讨论的东西,关于精神分析家的无知与愚蠢的悖论。其次,精神分析家的欲望显而易见地跟“没有生命实存”息息相关,跟让自己出现,作为是分析者的欲望的客体的原因息息相关,甚至跟让分析者相信,分析家说她的欲望的原因。

This entails a second impossibility, although it is essentially the same as
the one described above (see p. 95) as ‘the impossibility to analyse what
is merely a lack’. It is impossible for the analyst to cause the desire of
the other through being the object a, because the object a is not something
a human being can identify with, and in so far as the analyst would try to
confront the analysand directly with the cause of his desire the analysand
is likely to experience anxiety.77

这涵盖第二个不可能,虽然它基本上是相同的,跟以上被描述的这个不可能,作为是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。精神分析家不可能引起他者的欲望,凭借充当小客体a。因为小客体a并不是某件人类能够认同的东西。因为精神分析家将会尝试让分析者直接面对欲望的原因,分析者很可能经验到焦虑。

Hence, the desire of the analysand can
only be invoked if it is sustained by an object which the analysand assigns
to the analyst, but of which the analyst knows nothing about. In Seminar
XVII, Lacan described the ensuing impossibility in the following terms:

因此,分析家的欲望能够被召唤的条件,仅是当它受到客体的维持,分析者指定给分析家的客体。但是,对于这个客体,分析家一无所知。在第17研讨班,拉康描述随之而来的不可能,用以下的术语:

‘what is at stake in the position of the analyst [is] this seduction of truth
he presents, insofar as he would know something about what he
principally represents. Do I emphasize enough the relief of the
impossibility of his position?’ (ibid.: 205). So, if the enjoyment of the
analyst is excluded, it appears that the desire of the analyst harbours a
double impossibility: an impossibility between truth and knowledge and
an impossibility to cause the desire of the analysand. The counterpart of
the above formula on the enjoyment of the analyst could therefore read:
one cannot adopt the desire of the analyst and also analyse.

「分析家的立场岌岌可危的地方,就是他呈现的真理的诱拐。因为他将会知道某件东西,关于他主要代表的东西。我充分强调过分析家的立场的不可能的这个解除吗?假如分析家的欢爽被排除,似乎,分析家怀抱著双重的不可能:一是真理与知识之间的不可能。另外一个不可能是要引起分析者的欲望。分析家的欢爽的的以上的公式的对应物,因此能够被阅读成为:我们无法採用分析家的欲望,也还能够分析。

In Lacanian theory, psychoanalysis is not simply an art; it is a real art.
This implies that it is an impossible art, but also that it is unrealized.

用拉康的理论,精神分析不但是一门艺术,它而且是实在界的艺术。这暗示着,精神分析是不可能的艺术,而是是无法被实现的艺术。

Psychoanalytic organizations tend to transform the practice of
psychoanalysis into a respectful profession, but in this way, the ontological
impossibilities of psychoanalysis are remodelled into the various
necessities of science: knowledge has to be true, the position of the
researcher-agent has to be well defined, results have to be validated,
intentions have to be clarified, the whole process has to be (quality)
controlled.

精神分析的组织倾向于将精神分析的实践,转化成为令人尊敬的行业。但是,用这个方式,精神分析的本体的不可能,被重新修改成为是科学的各色各样的需要:知识必须是真实,研究员-代理者的立场必须被清楚定义,结果必须是能够被验证,意图必须明朗,整个的过程必须被品质管控。

Lacan’s itinerary contains an implicit argument against the
professionalization of psychoanalysis, if professionalization means that
those who practice psychoanalysis can become authorized clinicians when
they are able to prove that the effects they produce are valuable to their
analysands and to society in general.78 However, Lacan also constructed
an argument substantiating psychoanalysis as an impossible profession,
not reading Freud’s joke as a demand to overcome a deplorable social
condition, but as an accurate assessment of a complicated practice which
must be maintained as such.79

拉康的旅行路线包含一个暗含的论点,反对精神分析变成专门职业。假如专门职业的意思是,那些作为精神分析的执业者,能够成为是被授权的临床医生,当他们能够证明,他们产生的效果是有价值的,对于他们的分析者,以及对于一般的社会。可是,拉康也建构一个论点:他让精神分析实质表现,作为是不可能的专业。他阅读弗洛伊德的笑话,不是作为要求克服令人哀叹的社会的情况,而是作为正确的评估复杂的执业实践,它必须被维持作为这样一个令人哀叹的情况。
But if psychoanalysis is a real art and as such twice as impossible,
and if it should remain that way, what can stop us from abolishing it
altogether? If there is only psychoanalytic impossibility and an argument
in favour of its necessity is not psychoanalytic, where does psychoanalysis
derive its raison d’etre from? To these questions, there is only one possible
answer: because of contingency, or what Lacan dubbed ‘what stops not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:94).

但是,假如精神分析是实在界的艺术,作为这样的艺术,精神分析成为双倍的不可能。假如精神分析始终保持是那个方式,有什么能够阻止我们,不去完全地废除它?假如存在的仅是精神分析的不可能,赞同这种不可能的必要性的论点,并不是精神分析。那精神分析要从哪里获得它的“存在的理由“?针对这些问题,仅有一个可能的解答:因为偶然性,或拉康所谓的”没有停止被书些的东西“。

As Freud himself advocated
in his metaphor of archaeological sleuthing, psychoanalysis is geared
towards making discoveries, towards the creation of wonder and surprise
at the revelation of the unexpected, in short towards the crystallization
of new signifiers that reduce the painful necessity of repetition and are
therefore able to change the analysand’s life. In this sense, the Lacanian
practice of psychoanalysis is a genuine labour of love—not a love which
turns the contingency of an encounter into the necessity of a relationship,
but a love which cherishes both the marvel and the uncertainty of the
first accidental meeting (ibid.: 145).

如同弗洛伊德他自己主张,在他的考古学的技艺的隐喻,精神分析被发动,朝向要从事发现,朝向创造惊奇与神奇,在意料之外的启蒙处,总之,朝向新的能指的具体成形。这些新的能止减少重复的令人痛苦的必要,并且因此能够改变分析者的一生。就这个意义而言,拉康派的精神分析的执业实践,是真诚的爱的劳苦。这个爱的劳苦,并不是将遭遇的偶然性转变成为关系的必然性。而是珍惜首次的偶然的邂逅的惊奇与不确定。

Since Lacan conceived his practice
as radically Freudian, the inspiration for this idea had evidently come
from the founder. ‘Essentially, one might say, the cure is effected by
love’, Freud had written to Jung in December 1906 (McGuire 1974:12–
13), repeating his phrase to a group of followers in January 1907 as ‘Our
cures are cures of love’ (Nunberg and Federn 1962:101).

因为拉康构想他的执业实践,作为是强烈的弗洛伊德学派,作为这个观念的启发显而易见是来自创办者。「基本上,我们可以说,治疗是由爱所造成的。」弗洛伊德曾经写信给荣格,在1906年的12月。在1907年,他重复他的词语,对于一群的跟随者,作为是“我们的治疗是爱的治疗)。

In a sense, what Freud defined as love in these passages concerned
the analysand’s transference more than the analyst’s clinical intentions.
This evidently stirs the question as to how analysts, inasmuch as their
practice is inhabited by love, should deal with the transference-love on
the side of their patients. Freud formulated a tentative, quite unsatisfactory
answer in his ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]),
whereas Lacan explored the issue in his year-long Seminar VIII on
transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]). It is to these clinical vicissitudes
of transference that I will direct my attention in the following chapter.

从某个意义来说,弗洛伊德定义作为爱的东西,在这些段落里,跟分析者的移情的关联,远胜过跟分析家的临床的意图的关联。这显而易见地触动这个问题,关于分析家应该如何处理移情与爱,在病人的这边,既然他们的执业实践就是被爱所驻居。弗洛伊德阐述一个尝试性,相当不令人满意的回答,在他的“针对移情与爱的观察”。拉康则是探索这个问题,在他长达一年的第八研讨班,“论移情”。在以下的章节,我将引导我的注意力,朝向移情在临床的起伏变化。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

逻辑时间机器

November 5, 2015

LACAN’S LOGICAL TIME MACHINE
拉康的逻辑时间机器

At this stage, it is necessary to return to the Freudian goals of
psychoanalysis and their associated deadlock, in order to show how Lacan
reformulated these goals following his own changing perspectives on
the position of the analyst.

在这个阶段,我们有必要回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的目标,与目标息息相关的僵局。为了显示拉康重新阐释这些目标,遵循他自己的逐渐改变的观的,针对分析家的立场。

In the third session of Seminar XI, within the context of an inquiry
into the ontological status of the unconscious, Lacan revealed what he
believed to be a contradiction in Freud’s description of the unconscious
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:31–32).

在第11研讨班的第三堂,在探讨无意识的本体的地位的内文里,拉康显示他相信的一种悖论,在弗洛伊德的描述无意识。

On the one hand, Freud had stressed on
various occasions (Freud 1912b:108; 1915e:187; 1920g:28) that
unconscious processes are not structured according to a temporal order
(Zeitlosigkeit), whereas on the other hand he had noted that repressed
unconscious impulses do not change over time (Freud 1920g:28;
1933a[1932]:73–74).

在另一方面,弗洛伊德曾经在各个场合强调:无意识的过程并不是依照时间的秩序来建立架构。在另一方面,弗洛伊德已经注意到,被压抑的无意识的冲动,并没有随着时间而改变。

To Lacan, Freud’s second statement implied that a
repressed unconscious impulse, which he dubbed ‘desire’, does function
according to a particular temporal order, notably the order of unvarying
duration, which evidently contradicts the first claim on the absence of
time in the unconscious. To solve this problem, Lacan proposed a
distinction between two kinds of temporal processes: a modality
according to which objects are characterized by duration—a short or
prolonged existence over time—and a logical modality, in which the
existence of an object can only be established with hindsight, as an
inference from the logical succession of two moments (Lacan
1977b[1964]:32).

对于拉康,弗洛伊德的第二个陈述暗示着:被压抑的无意识的冲动,他命名为“欲望”,确实是依照特殊的时间的秩序发挥功能。特别是依照一成不变的期间的秩序。这个一成不变的时间显然互相抵触最初的宣称:在无意识里,时间的缺席。为了解决这个难题,拉康建议区别两种的时间的过程:依照其中一个模式,客体由期间来表现特征,随着时间的简短或延长的存在。另外一个模式则1逻辑的模式。在那里,客体的存在仅能靠着后见之明来建立。作为是从两个时空的逻辑的连续来推论。

To illustrate how this modality of logical time functions, Lacan referred
to a puzzle he had analysed in an article of 1945 (1988a[1945]). The
story runs as follows. A prison governor explains to three prisoners that
he wants to set one of them free without taking responsibility for who it
shall be. He shows the inmates three white and two black disks, telling
them that he will pin one of these five disks between their shoulders, so
that each will be able to see the colour of the disk on the back of the two
others, but not the colour of his own. He also emphasizes that they are
not allowed to mirror themselves nor to engage in conversation, the latter
activity running counter to their own interest. The first prisoner who
thinks he has figured out the nature of his colour and who can explain
how he has arrived at the conclusion will be released.54

为了解释逻辑时间的这个模式如何运作,拉康提到他曾经分析过的一个谜团,在1945年的一篇文章。故事的内容如下:一位监狱的典狱长对三位囚犯解释,他想要释放他们其中的一位,但是他不负责决定是哪一位。他给这些犯人观看三个白色与两个黑色的园盘。他告诉他们,他将这些园盘的每一个挂在他们的肩膀背后。这样,每一位都将会看见前面两位其他犯人的背后的园盘的颜色。但是看不见他自己的背后的园盘的颜色。他也强调,他们不被容许反映他们自己,也不许参与谈话。后者的行动跟他们自己的利益相违背。第一位认为他已经想出他的颜色的特色的人,以及第一位能够解释他如何获得这个结论的犯人,将会被释放。

It goes without saying that the evil governor attaches a white disk to
each prisoner’s back, thus putting them in the same position.55 From the
moment the exercise starts, each prisoner sees two white disks, which is
likely to stir bewilderment, confusion and anxiety. This is what Lacan
called ‘the instant of the glance’ (l’instant du regard) (ibid.: 206). What
happens next is difficult to grasp, yet the prisoner who succeeds in
deducing the colour of his disk correctly—‘the moment of concluding’
(le moment de conclure) in Lacan’s terminology—can claim, in retrospect,
that the time between these two moments (of seeing and concluding)
was taken up by a fruitful ‘time for comprehending’ (temps pour
comprendre). Not until the final assertion (‘I am black’, ‘I am white’)
can the existence of genuine understanding be substantiated and measured
in its quality of understanding.56

自不待言的是,邪恶的典狱长附加一个白色的园盘到每位犯人的背上,然后将他们放置相同的位置。从这个运用开始,每位犯人看见两个白色园盘,很可能引起困窘,困惑与焦虑的园盘。这就是拉康所谓的”瞥见的瞬间“,可是,成功于正确推论出他的园盘的颜色的这位犯人,”结论的时刻“—能够宣称,回顾地,处于这两个时刻的时间(看见与下结论),被接续而来的具有成果的”理解的时刻“。直到最后的主张(”我是黑色“”我是白色“),真正的理论的存在才会成为具体,根据它的理解的品质来测量。

Consequently, the ontological status of what is situated between the
instant of the glance and the moment of concluding is highly peculiar.
As long as the moment of concluding has not occurred, one cannot be
sure that comprehending (the fruitful production of knowledge) exists at
all, whereas from the moment a conclusion is reached, comprehending
exists no more, relegated as it is to a past experience.

结果,被定位在瞥见的瞬间与下结论的时刻之间的本体的地位,非常特殊。只要下结论的时刻还没有发生,我们无法确定,理解会不会存在(具有成功的知识的产物。另一方面,从结论的时刻被到达时,理解就不再存在,因为它分配给过去的经验。

To Lacan, logical time offered a new explanation of how the unconscious
operates temporally. Disputing Freud’s claim that the unconscious is not
marked by a temporal order, he argued that it may be impossible to
‘measure’ the unconscious in terms of duration over time, but that its
existence can be substantiated as a logical inference. Like the time for
comprehending in the story of the three prisoners, the unconscious thus
acquired the peculiar ontological status—although Lacan preferred to call
it ‘pre-ontological’ or ‘ontic’—of neither being, nor non-being (Lacan
1977b[1964]:29, 31).

对于拉康,逻辑时间提供一个新的解释,对于无意识如何时间地运转。当拉康争论弗洛伊德的主张:无意识并没有被时间的秩序。拉康主张,要凭借时间里的期间,来“测量“无意识是不可能的。但是无意识的存在能够被具体表现,作为是逻辑的推论。就像作为理解的时间,在三位犯人的故事里,无意识因此获得特殊的本体的地位—虽然拉康宁可称它为”前-本体“或”本体的“,既不是”生命实存“,也非”非生命实存“。

Throughout Seminar XI he launched a range of terms
to capture this status, from the unrealized to the function of limbo (ibid.:
30). In ‘Position of the Unconscious’, a text con temporary to Seminar XI,
he even compared the unconscious to a cave where one can never arrive
before closing-time and whose gate only opens when somebody knocks
from the inside (Lacan 1995a[1964]:267).

在第11研讨班,拉康发动一连串的术语来捕捉这个地位,从没有被实现的地位,到力比多的功能。在“无意识的位置“,跟第11研讨班同时的文本,拉康甚至将无意识比喻为一个洞穴。在洞穴那里,我们永远无法在结束时间以前到达。这个洞穴的大门仅有当某个人东里面敲门,它才会打开。

With this definition of the unconscious as an elusive, unrealized
structure in mind, Lacan returned to the clinical impasse of Freudian
analysis. To Freud, remembering reached its limit in the unconscious
striving for repetition; a process inherent to the unconscious vehemently
opposes the analytic retrieval of repressed impulses and the ensuing
reduction of their pathogenic influence. In Lacan’s reinterpretation of
these dynamics, repetition did no longer constitute an insuperable problem
for the progression of psychoanalytic treatment, or a factor whose
influence psychoanalysts should try to neutralize. Whereas Freud had
argued that repetition symbolizes the inertia of unconscious processes
and the imminent failure of the analytic enterprise, Lacan refused to
conceptualize repetition as the evil counterpart of remembering. For
example, in Seminar XI he pointed out:

当无意识的定义,作为是闪烁,没有被实现的心灵的结构,拉康回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的临床的僵局。对于弗洛伊的,回忆到达它的极限,在无意识的追寻重复。作为无意识本质具有的过程,强烈地对立于被压迫的冲动的精神分析的复得,以及随之而来的化简他们的病因的影响。当拉康解释这些动力时,重复并不再形成一个无法被克服的难题,对于精神分析的治疗的进展,或是一个因素。这个影响精神分析的因素应该尝试保持中立。虽然弗洛伊德曾经主张,重复象征无意识的过程的惰性,以及精神分析事业的逼近的失败。拉康拒绝将重概念化,作为是记忆的邪恶复本。譬如,在第11研讨班,拉康指出:

Remembering always involves a limit. And, no doubt, it can be
obtained more completely by other ways than analysis…It is here
that we must distinguish the scope of these two directions,
remembering and repetition. From the one to the other, there is no
more temporal orientation than there is reversibility. It is simply
that they are not commutative—to begin by remembering in order
to deal with the resistances of repetition is not the same thing as to
begin by repetition in order to tackle remembering.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:40)

记忆总是牵涉到限制。无可置疑,记忆能够更加完成地被获得,凭借除了精神分析以外的其他方法。就在这里,我们必须区别这两个方向的范围,记忆与重复。从记忆到重复,除了逆转之外,不再有时间的定向。这仅是因为记忆与重复并没有互相沟通—凭借记忆开始,为了处理重复的抗菌,并不相同于,凭借重复开始,为了克服记忆。

In highlighting the non-commutativity of the relationship between
remembering and repetition, Lacan claimed that repetition is an essential
feature of the unconscious whose power cannot be diminished by
encouraging the analysand to remember, although a momentary standstill
of the repetitive cycle may induce recollection.57

当拉康强调记忆与重复之间的关系的非-沟通时,拉康宣称,重复是无意识的一个基本的特征。无意识的力量无法被减少,凭借鼓励分析者记者。虽然重复的循环的暂时的停顿可能引起回忆。

Lacan had already extrapolated Freud’s thesis that repetition is inherent
to the unconscious, despite being beyond the pleasure principle, in Seminar
II, in which he had broached the linguistic organization of the unconscious:

拉康已经列举弗洛伊德的主题:重复说无意识本质具有。尽管无意识超越快乐原则。在第二研讨班,拉康曾经将无意识的语言的组织粗略描绘。

[T]he unconscious is the discourse of the other. This discourse of
the other is not the discourse of the abstract other, of the other in the
dyad, of my correspondent, nor even of my slave, it is the discourse
of the circuit in which I am integrated. I am one of its links. It is the
discourse of my father for instance, in so far as my father made
mistakes which I am absolutely condemned to reproduce…That’s
what the need for repetition is, as we see it emerge beyond the
pleasure principle. It vacillates beyond all the biological mechanisms
of equilibration, of harmonisation and of agreement. It is only
introduced by the register of language, by the function of the symbol,
by the problematic of the question within the human order.
(Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:89–90)

无意识是大他者的辞说。大他者的辞说并不是抽象的大他者,二元的大他者,我的对应者的辞说,甚至也不是我的奴隶的辞说。大他者的辞说是循环的辞说,我被合并在那个循环里。我是其中一个连接。譬如,我的父亲的辞识,因为我的父亲犯下错误,我绝的被注意要复制的错误。那就是重复的需要,如同我们看见它出现,超越快乐原则。它摇摆于超越所有生物的平衡,和谐与同意的机制。重复的需要被介绍,仅是凭借语言的铭记,凭借象征的功能,凭借这个问题的难题,在人类的秩序里。

Repetition appears not as an obscure unconscious mechanism which puts
human beings continuously under the infernal spell of pain, ultimately
driving them towards self-destruction, but as an irreducible aspect of the
symbolic embodment of the unconscious. Like the transmission of signals
within an electronic circuit, signifiers circulate within the symbolic network
of the unconscious, which is what Lacan dubbed ‘repetition automatism’
(automatisme de repetition) (Lacan 1972[1956]:39).

重复出现,并不是作为一个模糊的无意识的机制。这个无意识的机制让人类继续承受内部的痛苦的压力,最后逼迫人类朝向自我毁灭。重复出现,作为无法无意识的象征的具体化身的化简的层面。就像在电子的循环迴路里,讯号的传递,能指在无意识的象征的网络里循环1。这就是拉康所谓的“重复的自动机制”。

The replacement of
Freud’s ‘compulsion’ with the new ‘automation’ signals the self-regulating
quality of the process.58 The pre-eminent clinical implication of this idea
is that every analytic attempt at countering repetition unavoidably runs
aground on the durability of the unconscious. Since repetition is part and
parcel of the symbolically structured unconscious and psychoanalysis
cannot lay claim to eradicating the unconscious, the reign of repetition
must remain unblemished. This insight prompted Lacan to take issue with
the envisaged reintegration of the patient’s life history via an induced
verbalization of its censored chapters, notably Freud’s own view on the
goal of psychoanalysis which he himself had embraced during the early
1950s (Lacan 1977e[1953]:46–48).

弗洛伊德的“冲动”被替换为新的“自动机制”,意味着这个过程的自我-规范的特质。这个观念具有优先的临床的暗示是,每个精神分析的企图反对重复,无可避免地失败,在无意识的期间。因为重复是做为象征的结构的无意识的部分与包裹。精神分析无法宣称抹除无意识,重复的统治必须始终没有瑕疵。这个洞见激发拉康主张病人的一生的历史被构想地重新融合,经由它的被审查的章节的文辞表达。特别是弗洛伊德自己的观点,针对精神分析的目标。他自己在1950年代主张的精神分析的目标。

In Seminar XI, Lacan re-examined these dynamics, relativizing his own
previous propositions on the signifier as object of repetition. Two central
issues were at stake. First, what is the nature of the event that is being
repeated? And second, what is responsible for the process of repetition
itself? To answer these questions, Lacan mustered the notions of tuche
and automaton from the second book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:42–
48).

在第11研讨班,拉康重新检查这些动力,将他自己先前的主张相对化,针对将能指视为重复的客体。两个主要的命题岌岌可危。首先,正在被重复的事件的特性是什么?其次,是什么负责重复本身的过程?为了回答这些问题,拉康聚集“邂逅”与“自动机制”的观念,从亚里斯多德得到“物理学”。

Tuche literally means ‘accident’ or ‘chance’, as in ‘something which
happens by accident’ or ‘a chance encounter’, yet the term also conveys
‘luck’ and ‘fortune’, as in ‘I was lucky enough to escape’ or ‘I was fortunate
to have him around’. Each of these meanings points towards uncontrollable
circumstances, events which a human being cannot foresee.59 Lacan
redefined tuche in his own nomenclature as an encounter with the real,
and designated it as the object of repetition (Lacan 1977b[1964]:69).

“邂逅”实质上意味着“意外”或“偶然”,作为是某件偶然发生的事情,或“偶然的遭遇”。可是,这个术语也传达“运气”与“幸运”,如同“我足够幸运逃避出来”或是“我足够好运拥有他作伴”。这些意义的每一个都指向无法控制的环境,人类无法预先看见的事件。拉康重新定义“邂逅”,用他自己的专业术语,作为是“与实在界遭遇”,并且指明“邂逅”,作为是重复的客体。

Whereas Lacan’s concept of the real had scarcely outweighed that of
common-sense reality during the first ten years of his seminar, he now
considered it to be the equivalent of the impossible (ibid.: 167). As an
encounter with the real, an accident always entails the emergence of the
impossible, because the subject never expects the event in question to
happen. Since it is impossible to prepare oneself for what happens by
accident, Lacan also claimed that encounters with the real are inherently
missed and inescapably traumatic (ibid.: 55). The event itself can be either
pleasurable (eutuchia, good fortune) or unpleasurable (dustuchia, bad
fortune), but this has no bearing whatsoever on its devastating impact.
Encounters with the real therefore operate beyond good and bad or, in
Freudian terms, beyond the pleasure principle (ibid.: 53–54).

虽然拉康对于实在界的观念几乎没有超过共同常识的现实,在他研讨班的前十年。他现在则是认为实在界是相等于是不可能界。作为跟实在界遭遇,一个意外事件总是意味着不可能界的出现。因为主体从来没有预期这个受到质疑的事件会发生。因为要意外发生的事件有心理准备是不可能的。拉康也宣称,跟实在界的遭遇本质上会被错过,并且无可逃避地形成创伤。这个事件本身要就是令人愉快(好运),要不就是令人不愉快(坏运)。但是,这跟它的毁灭性的影响并没有丝毫的关系。跟实在界的遭遇,运作超越善与恶。或者,用弗洛伊德的术语来说,超越快乐原则。

Having defined the object of repetition as tuche, an essentially
traumatic encounter with the real, Lacan then employed Aristotle’s term
automaton to describe the ‘engine’ of repetition (ibid.: 52). Automaton
is usually rendered as ‘spontaneity’ in English translations of Aristotle’s
Physics, a term whose meaning is not too far removed from that of the
transliteration ‘automatism’. Both ‘spontaneous’ and ‘automatic’ indicate
that something in the nature of the event itself triggered its occurrence,
as in ‘spontaneous combustion’. In Lacan’s discourse automaton
coincided with the insistence of the network of signifiers and with Freud’s
pleasure principle (ibid.: 54).

拉康将重复的客体定义为“邂逅”,基本上是跟实在界的创伤的遭遇。然后,拉康运用亚里斯多德的术语“自动机制”来描述重复的“引擎”。自动机制automaton通常被翻译成为啥“自动自发’, 用英文翻译亚里斯多德的物理学来说。这一个术语的意义,跟实质翻译的automatism(自动机制),意思相差不远。”自动自发” 与“自动的”都指示著,某件事情,具有事件的特性,触动它的发生。如同在“自动自发的冲动”。在拉康的辞说“自动机制”,巧合于能指的网络的坚持,也恰合于弗洛伊德的快乐原则。

This seemingly abstruse connection is fairly
easy to understand when taking into account that the transition from
‘chance encounter’ to ‘repetition’ involves a transformation of
‘contingency’ into ‘necessity’. Such a transformation can only take place
if a de-randomizing operator is capable of reducing the chance element.
In other words, for an (unfortunate or lucky) accident to leave an indelible
mark, for a trauma to induce ineradicable mental and or physical scars,
something must have transformed the missed encounter into unavoidable
destiny. Lacan believed that the symbolic order, the network of signifiers
functioning in the unconscious, constitutes the powerhouse of this
transformation. Without a symbolic structure, however simple or
complicated it may be, fate will never catch up with people after they
have been the victim of an encounter with the real.60

表面上是抽象的关联,则是非常容易理解。假如我们考虑到,从“偶然的遭遇”到“重复”的转变,牵涉到“偶然性”的转化成为“必要性”。这样的转化的发生,仅有当一个除掉-任意性的运作者能够减少偶然的元素。换句话说,为了让一个(不幸或幸运)的意外,留下无法抹灭的记号,为了让一个创伤减少无法抹除的精神与生理的疤痕。某件东西必须已经将错过的遭遇,转化成为无法避免的命运。拉康相信,象征的秩序,在无意识里运作的能指的网络,组成转化的发电所。假如没有象征的结构,无论多么简单或复制,命运将永远追赶不上人们,在他们已经成为跟实在界遭遇的受害者之后。

Lacan’s analysis of the object and engine of repetition defied Freud’s
own views on repetition in at least four respects. First, whereas repetition
had appeared to Freud as a stubborn resistance to remembering, in Lacan’s
theory it followed an ‘automatic’ process based on a real encounter and
a symbolic machinery. Second, whilst Freud had situated repetition
entirely beyond the pleasure principle, Lacan only assigned the object
of repetition to this ‘beyond’, situating the engine firmly within the
boundaries of the pleasure principle.

拉康对于重复的客体与引擎的分析,挑衅到弗洛伊德自己对重复的观点,至少有两个层面。第一,对于弗洛伊德,重复出现作为是顽固的抗拒记忆;在拉康的理论,重复则是遵循一个“自动机制”的过程,以跟实在界遭遇与象征的机器作为基础。其次,弗洛伊德曾经将重复定位,完全超越快乐原则之外;拉康则仅是将重复的客体指定给这个“超越”,将引擎牢固的定位快乐原则的边界内部。

Third, whereas Freud had studied
repetition mainly on the level of behavioural acts (as opposed to verbal
productions), Lacan conceived repetition as a process strictly belonging
to the network of signifiers and thus to the structure of language. In
Lacan’s account, every repetitive event, whether verbal (digital) or
behavioural (analogous), had a symbolic status. Fourth, whilst Freud
had remained convinced that the stream of repetition could be embanked,
igniting a partial liberation of the pathogenic impulses and their
reintegration into the patient’s history as past events, Lacan posited that
repetition, being an essential function of the symbolic order, cannot be
cancelled out.

第三,弗洛伊德曾经研究重复,主要是指行为的行为的层面(跟文辞的产生相对立);拉康则是构想重复,作为是严格属于能指的网络的过程,因此属于语言的结构的过程。在拉康的描述里,每个重复的事件,无论是文词(数位)或行为的(类似的)的事件,它们都有象征的地位。第四,弗洛伊德始终相信,重复的水流能够用堤岸拦住,触发病因的冲动的部分解放;拉康则是假设,重复,由于是象征的秩序的基本的功能,无法被完全取消。

This does not imply that psychic change is altogether impossible within
Lacan’s conception of analytic treatment. It simply means that psychic
change needs to be situated on an entirely different level. Whereas Freud
believed he could dismantle the unconscious machinery of repetition
with the lever of remembering, Lacan set out to bring the endless
circulation of traumatic events within the machine’s memory to a halt by
modifying the structure of the machine itself. Indeed, if we accept that
the unconscious operates as a pre-ontological, permanently inchoate
structure, in accordance with the principle of logical time, and if we also
acknowledge that repetition is governed by the network of signifiers, a
huge arsenal of new opportunities for psychic change is opened.

这并不意味着,心灵的改变是完全不可能,在拉康的精神分析的治疗的构想里面。它仅是意味着,心灵的改变需要被定位在完全不同的层面。虽然弗洛伊德相信,他能够拆解重复的无意识的机器,用记忆作为杆杠。拉康则是出发,将机器的记忆里,创伤事件的无穷尽的循环,让它停止,凭借修改机器本身的结构。的确,假如我们接受,无意识运作作为前-本体的,永远是未完成的结构,以符合逻辑时间的原则。假如我们也承认,重复被能指的网络所统辖,作为心灵改变的新的机会,就像巨大军火库被打开。

Starting with the threefold structure of logical time, the story of the
three prisoners makes clear that the moment of concluding, through which
the preceding ‘time for comprehending’ becomes meaningful, is not a
moment of certainty. When one of the prisoners finally decides that he is
white, the only criterion he can rely on for making that decision is the
hesitation, or perhaps the indecisiveness of the two other prisoners, which
is of course not a reliable criterion. Hence, on the basis of what he has
concocted during the interval, the prisoner cannot be absolutely certain
about the truth of his decision. At the moment of concluding, he can
only anticipate its truth value. When the director eventually reveals to
the prisoner that his disk is white, it will prove to him that he has been
correct in assuming that the hesitation of the other prisoners was proof
of his being white. In case his disk turns out to be black, it will prove to
him that he had erroneously interpreted the hesitation of the others, or
that his time for comprehending was not about comprehending at all.

从逻辑时间的三重结构开始,这三位犯人清楚显示,通过结论的时刻,先前的“理解的时间”才变得具有意义。这个结论的时刻并不是确定的时刻。当其中一位犯人最后决的,他背后的盘子是白色,他做那个决定所依靠的唯一的标准,就是犹豫,或者说是前两位其他犯人的不作决定。这当然并不是一个可靠的标准。因此,根据在过程期间,他所编造的东西,作为基础。这位犯人无法绝对确定关于这个决定具有真理的价值。当导演最后给这位犯人显示,他背后的园盘是白色,这将跟他证明:他已经正确地假定,前两位犯人的犹豫证明他背后的园盘是白色。万一他背后的园盘是黑色,或是他错误地解释其他两位犯人的犹豫,或是他的理解的时间,根本就不是关于理解。

As formations of the unconscious, symptoms are also structured along
these lines of logical time. Rather than being controlled by a historical
event, the truth of a symptom—including its very status of symptom—
is pending, which encouraged Lacan to produce the pun that the reality
of the subject is always en souffrance, that is to say both ‘in a state of
suffering’ and ‘in abeyance’ (ibid.: 56). Due to the fact that the truth of
a symptom depends on something occurring in the future, Lacan
exchanged the Freudian ‘present perfect tense’ for a ‘future perfect tense’
(futur anterieur). The gist of this idea was already contained in a paragraph
from his ‘Rome Discourse’:

作为无意识的形成,症状也是沿着逻辑时间的脉络作为结构。征状的真理并没有受的历史事件的控制。症状的真理,以及症状的真理的地位,都拖延来临。这鼓励拉康产生这个双关语,主体的现实总是“en souffrance,”(尚未被接收),换句话说,“处于遭受痛苦的状态”与悬置当中。由于这个事实:症状的真理依靠某件未来发生的事情。拉康将弗洛伊德的“现在完成式”,改换成我“未来完成式”的时态。这个观念的要点已经被包含在他的“罗马辞说”的一个段落里。

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was,
since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in
what I am, but the future perfect of what I shall have been for what
I am in the process of becoming.

在我的历史中被实现的东西,并不是过去明确地存在过的东西。因为它目前并不再存在,或甚至是在我的生命实存里,曾经存在过的事情的现在完成式。而是未来完成式,对于我未来将已经形成的事情,针对我在生成的过程里,我的生命实存。
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:86, translation modified)

Instead of the classical analytic question ‘What has happened to me (during
my childhood) that could possibly explain my present misery?’, the
Lacanian analyst ushers the patient to ask ‘What is going to happen to me
that will explain both my current situation and my life-history?’.

并非是古典的精神分析的问题:「我曾经发生什么事(在我的童年),可以用来解释我的目前的悲惨?」拉康派的精神分析家引导病人询问:「我将会发生什么事,将会解释我的目前的情境,与我的一生的历史?」

For the
analysand, this Lacanian strategy implies that he is freed from the
deterministic historical truth and introduced into a new realm of freedom.
Whereas in a Freudian setting analysands cannot alter the pathogenic impact
of the circumstances they have been subjected to, Lacanian analysands
are being given the keys to their own destiny, since the pathogenic impact
of an event is dependent upon the future, whose face has evidently not
been decided upon. Rather than reducing the impact of traumatic events
by liberating them from their historical dungeons and relocating them into
a remote, innocuous past, the Lacanian analyst is thus held to liberate
history as such by ensuring that its meaning can depend on the future.

对于分析者,这位拉康派的策略暗示着:他被免除这个命定论的历史的真理,并且被介绍进入自由的新的领域。虽然在弗洛伊德学派的背景,分析者无法改变环境的病因的影响,他们一直被隶属于的环境。拉康派对分析者正在被给予他们自己的命运的钥匙。因为事件作为病因的影响依靠着未来,未来的脸孔显而易见地还没有被决定。非但没有减少创伤的事件的影响,凭借解放它们,从历史的地牢,并且重新分派它们进入遥远,而无害的过去。拉康派对分析家因此被认为是将历史本身解放出来,凭借保证,历史的意义依靠未来。

A further possibility of change resides in Lacan’s assertion that
repetition is part and parcel of the network of signifiers. As an organization
of innumerable discrete elements, the symbolic order does not represent
a closed circuit characterized by stability, inertia and linear causality.
Each signifier can contribute to the organization of the symbolic order, a
particular series of signifiers can spark off a whole range of subsequent
signifiers, one signifier can originate in a variety of previous signifiers,
and there is a continuous effect of ‘retro-version’ (feedback) whereby
every signifier is simultaneously the cause and the effect of another
signifier (Lacan 1977k[1960]:306).

一个更进一步的改变的可能性驻居在拉康的主张:重复苏能指的网络的部分与包裹。作为无数的众多的元素的组织,象征的秩序并没有代表一个封闭的循环,具有稳定,惰性,与直线的因果律特色。每个能指都能够贡献象征秩序的组织,特殊的系列的能指能够激发整个范围的随后的能指,一个能指能够起源于各色各样的先前的能指,并且存在着“反向逆转”的连续的影响(回馈),在那里,每个能指既是另外一个能指的原因,又是结果。

The rise and development of
cybernetics during the 1950s inspired Lacan to model this functioning
of the symbolic order on the patterns of interaction within natural and
artificial systems as described by Norbert Wiener, Ludwig von Bertalanffy
and others. The results of cybernetics informed Lacan’s Seminar II
(1988c[1954–55]: 294–308), especially his reading of the itinerary of
the letter in Poe’s story of ‘The Purloined Letter’ (1972[1956]), but they
continued to support his descriptions of the symbolic order, as well as
his graphical representations of unconscious processes.61

在1960年代,网际网络的興起与发展,启发拉康模拟象征秩序的功能,针对自然与人为的系统的内部,互相运作的模式。如同诺博特 温纳,范 博塔坦非与其他人们所描述的。网际网络的结果告知拉康的第二研讨班,特别是他阅读爱伦坡的故事“被偷窃的信”,信的流落途径。但是他们无法继续他的描述象征的秩序,以及无意识的过程的画面式的再现。

Because the symbolic order operates according to the principles of an
open system, its patterns of repetition are not inherently durable. When
durable patterns do occur, it is due to an installed impermeability, an inflexible
obduracy, or what could perhaps also be dubbed ‘network sclerosis’. Hence,
enduring patterns of repetition only come into operation when something
(an accident, an encounter with the real) has been sedimented into a sclerotic
nucleus. Countering these sclerotic nuclei implies that their force is being
weakened to the point where their constitutive parts re-enter a relationship
with the other components of the network.

因为象征的秩序运作,依照开放的系统的原则,它的重复的模式并没有本质上的持续期间。当持续期间确实发生,那是由于被安置的不可穿透性,一种没有弹性的不受劝告,或许可能被称为是“网络的硬化症”。因此,仅有当某件事情(意味,跟实在界的遭遇),已经被沉淀成为硬化症的核心,重复的持久的模式才会发生。反抗这些硬化症的核心暗示着:他们的力量被在被减弱,甚至他们的形成的部分重新进入关系,跟网络的其他成分的关系。

Strange as it may seem, this is exactly what the Lacanian analyst is
held to do, at least with neurotics and perverts.62 Dissolving coagulated
centres of signification, undermining the vicious circle of recurrent
combinations of signifiers, opening up a space of desire between ageold
patterns of demand and complaint, and urging the analysand to avow
this desire, the Lacanian analyst operates on the network of signifiers in
light of the production of something new. Unlike the Freudian analyst,
the Lacanian practitioner does not engage in archaeological sleuthing.
Within a Lacanian analytic format, change is not to be expected from
plumbing the depths of the psyche—as Freud himself was forced to
confess now and again—but only from the reorganization of the symbolic
system.

虽然听起来似乎古怪,这确实就是拉康派的精神分析家被认为要做的事情,至少就神经症者与倒错症者而言。拉康的分析家瓦解被凝固的意义的中心,逐渐损坏各种能指的反复的组合的恶性循环,打开处于要求与抱怨的古老的模式之间的欲望的空间,并且建议分析者宣称这个欲望。拉康派的分析家运作能指的网络,从某件新的东西的产生的观点。不像弗络伊德的分析家,拉康派的实践者并没有参与考古学的专业技术。在拉康派的精神分析的格式里,改变并没有被期望,从探索心灵的深处。如同弗洛伊德自己被迫要一再地坦白承认,但是仅是从象征系统的重新组织。

To the extent that Freudian analysis can be associated with ‘depth
psychology’, Lacanian practice is therefore extremely ‘superficial’.63
When faced with psychotic patients, whether in a residential setting or
in private practice, Lacanian analysts have also espoused the ethical
principle according to which their clinical practice is governed by a desire
to obtain absolute difference, and not by the imposition of rules or the
promise of happiness. Their strength of purpose reflects a strict adherence
to the idea that a treatment can only be called psychoanalysis if its
fundamental ethical principle is acknowledged.

因为弗洛伊德学派的精神分析家能够跟“深度心理学”联想一块,拉康派的实践因此是极端表面。当拉康派的精神分析家面对精神病的病人时,无论是住宅的背景或是私人诊所,分析家也主张伦理学的原则。依照这个伦理学的原则,他们的临床的实践,受到获得绝对差异的欲望的统辖,并且并不是凭借赋家规则或许诺给予幸福。他们的目的的力量反映出一个严格的坚持这个观念:仅有当它的基本的伦理的原则被承认时,治疗才能够被称为是精神分析。

As far as the analysand’s
‘avowal of desire’ is concerned—the envisaged goal of a Lacanian analytic
process—psychotic patients are not regarded as being capable of achieving
this aim, owing to the fact that desire is an outcome of the psychic integration
of the symbolic order, an effect of the symbolic castration which the
psychotic, according to Lacanian theory, has not undergone. Since the
three mental structures of psychosis, neurosis and perversion are defined
as mutually exclusive categories, trying to neuroticize psychotics by
stimulating this symbolic castration is a futile enterprise.

就分析者的“宣称欲望”而言—拉康派的精神分析的过程的被拟想的目标—精神病的病人并没有被认为是能够达到这个目标。由于这个事实:欲望是象征秩序的心灵的融合的结果,是象征阉割的影响。依照拉康的理论,精神病者并没有经历象征的阉割。因为精神病,神经症,与倒错症的三个精神的结构,被定义为互相排斥的范畴。尝试让精神病者成为神经症,凭借刺激这个象征的阉割,是件失败的事业。

None the less, Lacanian analysts have deployed a plethora of alternative
strategies to relieve psychotic suffering, encouraged by Lacan’s directive
that the analyst must not back away from psychosis (Lacan 19771:12). In
this way, Lacanians have, for example, argued that an analyst working
with psychotics should adopt the position of a detached secretary (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:206) or a silent witness who registers the patients’ words
whilst prompting them to elaborate their visions of the world, in order to
accelerate their construction of a solid and stable delusion (Soler 1987).

可是,拉康派的精神分析家曾经运用大量的替代的策略,来解除精神病的痛苦,由拉康的指令所鼓励。分析家一定不要看见精神病者就撤退。用这个方式,譬如,拉康学派主张,从事治疗精神病者的分析家,应该採有中立的秘书的立场,或是沉默的见证人,铭记病人的话语。另一方面,激励他们建构他们对于世界的幻景。为了加速他们的建构牢固而稳定的幻觉。

In keeping with Freud’s propositions on the stabilizing function of Schreber’s
delusion (Freud 1911c[1910]:71), these Lacanians believe that the
construction of a balanced delusional system has a tranquillizing effect on
the patient’s mind, facilitating reintegration into society. Relying on Lacan’s
promotion, in his year-long seminar on Joyce (Lacan 1976–77 [1975–
76]), of the term ‘suppletion’ (suppleance) as an umbrella for a variety of
phenomena preventing the outbreak of psychosis or stabilizing the
psychotic breakdown,

这些拉康学派分析家为了符合弗洛伊德的命题,针对许瑞伯的幻觉的具有稳定的功能。他们相信,一个平衡的幻觉的系统的建构具有稳的效果,对于病人的心灵,有利于重新融合进入社会。依靠拉康的提倡,在他一年之久的探讨乔伊斯的研讨班。拉康提倡这个术语“异根补充”,作为是各式各样的现象的雨伞,阻止精神病的暴发,或是稳的精神病的崩溃。

Lacanian analysts have also advocated the
installation and/or maintenance of suppletions as a possible analytic goal
in the treatment of psychotics (Brousse 1988; Liart 1988; Stevens 1988).
These suppletions can be imaginary (in the form of identifications leading
to the formation of a new ego), symbolic (through writing and fine art) or
real (via so-called psychosomatic phenomena). In general they serve as
limitations of the psychotic’s overwhelming intrusive enjoyment, enabling
him to lead a relatively decent social life, whether before the psychosis
has become manifest or after the actual outbreak.64

拉康的精神分析家也主张“异根补充”的安置与(或)维护,作为是精神病的治疗的可能的精神分析的目标。这些异根补充有时是想像界(以认同的形式,导致新的自我的形成),有时是象征界(经有写作与精美的艺术),或有时是实在界(经由所谓的心理与生理的现象)。一般说来,它们充当限制精神病的压倒性的侵凌的享乐,让他能够过着比较正常的社会的生活。无论是精神病已经变得明显之前,或实际的崩溃之后。

In trying to overcome the deadlock of Freudian analysis Lacan thus
developed a clinical framework that is less deterministic, for including
more radical options of freedom, less historical, for strictly future orientated,
and less restrictive, for also accommodating psychotic
patients.65 Does this make the analyst’s task easier, or less impossible
than that of the Freudian clinician? Does Lacan’s logical time-machine
make analysts feel more at home within the constraints of their clinical
practice? In order to answer these questions we must return to the concepts
Lacan coined during the late 1960s as the theoretical cornerstones of the
analyst’s position: the desire of the analyst, object a and disbeing.
What does the analyst want? 89

当拉康尝试克服弗洛伊德的精神分析的僵局时,拉康因此发展一个临床的架构。这个临床的架构比较不那么命定论,因为包含更多的强烈的选择的自由,也比较不那么历史性质,因为它严格地以未来为定向。也比较不那么具有限制,因为它也接纳精神病者。这种临床架构难的让精神分析家的工作变得比较容易吗?或是比较不可能,比起弗洛伊德学派的临床医生?拉康的逻辑时间机器让精神分析家在他们的临床实践的约束里面,会感觉更加地自在吗?为了回答这些问题,我们必须回到拉康铸造的观念,在1960年代晚期。作为是精神分析家的立场的理论的基石;精神分析家的欲望,作为小客体与没有生命实存。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家的欲望

November 2, 2015

分析家作为欲望的客体

Loaded with the question as to what an analyst is, Lacan embarked
on an investigation of what could possibly lie beyond the technique of
psychoanalysis. For what analysts are supposed to say and do in the
context of interpretation and transference handling, some technical
guidelines can be formulated, yet when it comes to describing what an
analyst should be, technical rules are fundamentally inadequate. As I
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Freud sought solace in a
plead of imaginative metaphors to answer the question ‘What is an
analyst?’, singling out that of the archaeologist as the most representative
trope.

关于精神分析家的生命实存,充满各种问题,拉康开始从事研究在精神分析的技术之外,可能隐藏什么东西。因为在解释与处理移情的内文里,精神分析家应该要说与要做的事情,某些的技术的引导方针能够被说明。可是,当提到描述精神分析家应该做什么时,技术性的规则基本上是不足够的。如同我在这个章节的开始指出,弗洛伊德寻求安慰,诉诸于想像的隐喻来回答这个问题:“精神分析家是什么?”弗洛伊德挑选出考古学家,作为是最具代表性的团体。

Rather than espousing Freud’s metaphors, Lacan, for his part, tried
to capture their signification within the realm of desire.42 Not satisfied
with the analyst as a clinical archaeologist or a mental health sleuth,
Lacan began to explore what really animates these people, adding new
and different metaphors to the Freudian list as he went along. In this
way, Lacan’s concept of the desire of the analyst was born, alongside a
profound reflection upon the ethics of psychoanalysis as the necessary
counterpart to clinical technique. By situating the most fundamental of
analytic policies within the realm of desire and ethics, he at once solved
the impasse of reciprocal demands within an intersubjective relationship:
the analyst was no longer simply an Other subject but a figure imbued
with a specific desire.

拉康并没有铨释弗洛伊德的隐喻。就拉康而言,他尝试捕捉这些隐喻的意义,在欲望的领域之内。因为拉康并不满意精神分析家作为是临床的考古学家,或是精神健康的专家。他开始探索确实激发这些人们的动机是什么。随着他的进展,他补充新鲜而且不同的隐喻,到弗洛伊德的名单。用这个方式,拉康对于精神分析的欲望的观念诞生,伴随着深刻的反思,对于精神分析伦理学,作为是临床技术的必要的对应之物。凭借将精神分析策略的最基本的东西定位在欲望与伦理学的领域之内,他立即解答在互为主体性的关系里面,互惠的要求的僵局。精神分析家不再仅是大他者的主体,而是充满明确欲望的人物。

But what is this desire of the analyst? Where does it come from and
what is it aimed at? If it involves a judgement on the nature of analytic
action, what kind of judgement is it? Does the analyst communicate this
judgement to the analysand and, if so, how? And how does a concrete
analyst experience and sustain this desire during psychoanalytic
treatment?

但是精神分析家的这个欲望是什么呢?分析家的欲望从何而来?分析家的欲望目标朝着什么?这牵涉到对于精神分析的行动的特性的判断。它是什么性质的判断?精神分析家会跟分析者沟通这个判断吗?假如会,要如何沟通?一位具体的精神分析家如何经验与维持这个欲望,在精神分析的治疗的期间?

Apropos of the first question, Lacan responded initially, and in his
customary mode, by saying what the desire of the analyst should not
encompass. Some of these negative definitions followed directly from
his previous elaborations. As such, he argued that the desire of the analyst
is not a desire to understand the analysand, because the analyst’s
understanding will always be illusory and it will inevitably dampen down
the production of speech on the side of the patient. In ‘The Direction of
the Treatment’ he wrote: ‘To think, it is often better not to understand,
and one can gallop through miles of understanding without the least
thought being produced’ (ibid.: 252).

关于这个最初的问题,拉康最初回应。用他的习惯的模式,拉康说,精神分析家的欲望不应该涵盖什么。有些的负面的定义直接从先前的建构推衍而来。作为这样的定义,拉康主张,精神分析家的欲望并不是想要理解分析者的欲望。因为精神分析家的理解将总是一种幻觉,它无可避免地会浸湿病人这边的言说的产物。在“治疗的引导”,拉康写道:「想想看!不去理解往往还比较好些。我们理解了好半天,其实什么思想也没产生。」

The corollary of this first admonition
was that the desire of the analyst should neither be a desire to fulfil the
analysand’s demands—whatever they are and whether implicit or
explicit—because responding to these demands can only proceed from
an understanding of what they convey (ibid.: 254). In light of this ethical
principle of non-understanding Lacan later rejuvenated Freud’s idea that
analysts should suspend their previous knowledge and experience, each
time they are confronted with a new case, in order to recognize and reveal
its singularity (Freud 1912e:114; 1933a[1932]:173–175).

这个最初的警告的必然的结果是,精神分析家的欲望,既不应该是满足分析者的要求—无论这些要求是什么,无论是暗示或明确的要求—因为回应这些要求仅是从理解它们传递的东西前进。从非理解的伦理的原则的观点,拉康后来重新更新弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析家应该悬置他们的先前的知识与经验,每当他们面对新的个案。为了要体认而且显示这个个案的独异性。

Lacan fully
endorsed Freud’s opinion, stating that one of the most important matters
for psychoanalysis is ‘the intentional consolidation in him [the analyst]
of his ignorance of each subject who comes to him for analysis, of an
ever renewed ignorance that prevents anyone becoming a “case”’ (Lacan
1977k[1960]:322).

拉康充分认同弗洛伊德的意见。他陈述:对于精神分析,最重要的事情之一精神“精神分析家意图跟他对每个主体的无知团结一块,每个前来跟他就诊的主体。这种无知永远在更新当中,阻止任何人成为”个案“。

To the analysand’s ignorance, which undergirds both her desire to
know the truth about her symptoms and her investment of the analyst
with the function of supposed subject of knowing, the analyst is thus
held to respond with ignorance too!43 This idea tallies with Lacan’s
advocacy in Seminar I of the analyst’s ignorantia docta (wise ignorance)
as an alternative to the clinical proclamation of knowledge, and follows
directly from Freud’s observation in ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(1913c:141–142) that it is counter-productive to imbue hysterics with
the knowledge they consciously lack. However, it is not because the
analyst and the analysand proceed from ignorance that their attitude to
that ignorance is the same.

对于分析者的这个无知,支持她想要知道真理的欲望,关于她1的症状与她对于精神分析的投注具有应该知道的主体的功能。精神分析家因此被认为也用无知来回应。这个观念符合拉康的主张,在第一研讨班,谈论到精神分析家的“大智若愚“,作为是替代临床具有知识的宣称。拉康从弗洛伊德的观察,在”治疗的开始“,直接推论出来:让癔症者充满他们在意识层面欠缺的知识,并没有正面产生的效果。可是,精神分析家与分析者虽然都从无知前进,他们对于那种无知的态度,并不一样。

As Lacan explained in the opening session of
Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]:1–2), the analyst’s ignorance, his ‘I don’t
want to know anything about it’, is perfectly adequate to him, whereas
the analysand experiences his ignorance as a burden whose weight can
only be reduced by the acquisition of additional knowledge. Moreover,
it is not because the analyst refrains from producing knowledge that the
analysand will automatically perceive him as stupid, i.e. that he will loose
his status as supposed subject of knowing.

如同拉康在第20研讨班的开始的一堂解释说,精神分析家的无知,他的“我不想要知道关于它的任何东西“。这对精神分析家而言是相当足够的。但是分析者经验他的无知,则是作为一种负担。这个负担的重量,仅能凭借获得额外的知识,才能够被减少。而且,分析者并不会因为分享家的节制不产生知识,就因此自动地将分析家视为是愚笨。他仍然没有放松他的地位,作为是应该知道的主体。

On the contrary, the analyst
hails ‘the sublimity of stupidity’ (ibid.: 13) because he can maintain his
position of supposed wisdom more effectively by the enunciation of
ostensibly stupid sentences, than by the proclamation of rocket science.
This paradox of stupidity (the more one expresses knowledge, the more
one is regarded as stupid, and vice versa) and its relation to the
maintenance of transference emboldened Lacan on numerous occasions
to portray the analyst as a latter-day Socrates or a Western Zen-master.44

相反地•精神分析家欢呼“愚笨的升华“。因为他能够更加有效地维持他具有被认为的智慧的地位,凭借发表表面上是愚蠢的句子。比起凭借宣称具有火箭的科学。愚笨的这个悖论(我们越是表达知识,我们越是被认为是愚笨。)以及它跟维持移情的关系,让拉康在许多的场合,大胆地描绘精神分析家,作为是晚年的苏格拉底,或西方的禅宗大师。

Even more provocatively, Lacan stated that the desire of the analyst should
not be geared towards the advancement of the patient’s well-being, let alone
the promotion of happiness. Much more than ‘The Direction of the Treatment’
this theme pervaded Lacan’s Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, in
which he claimed that analysts who promise their patients a full restoration
of their mental, physical and social happiness are simply deluding them
with false hopes, despite the fact that happiness may be their patients’ one
and only demand.

更加具有挑衅地,拉康陈述:精神分析家的欲望不应该被发动朝向提升病人的幸福,更不用说是朝向快乐的提升。比起“治疗的方向“更加过分,这次的主题弥漫着第七研讨班,”精神分析的伦理学“。在那里,拉康宣称:假如精神分析家给他们的病人承诺,要完全恢复他们的健康,生理与社会的快乐,他们是在欺骗分析者,用虚假的希望。尽管这个事实:快乐是他们的病人的仅有的一个要求。

To Lacan, the analyst not only does not ‘have that Sovereign
Good that is asked of him, but he also knows there isn’t any’ (Lacan
1992[1959–60]:300). Happiness was only one amongst a multitude of values
Lacan felt obliged to discard as fraudulent ‘analytic ideals’—a proliferous,
yet prolific list including also the moral goals of genital sexuality, authenticity,
independence and temperateness. This perspective matched Lacan’s deeprooted
contempt for the preferential therapeutic goals of psychoanalysis, a
view which he deemed fully compatible with that of the founder. For instance,
in his 1955 ‘Variations of the Standard Treatment’ he had argued that the
analyst is better off without therapeutic ambitions, designating ‘health’ as a
bonus of psychoanalytic treatment:

对于拉康,精神分析家不但没有人家对他要求的“拥有那个统辖的善“,而且分析家也知道,并没有任何统辖的善。快乐仅是众多的价值中间的一个。拉康觉得有这个义务,要抛弃这些价值,作为是欺骗的”精神分析的理想“—这个增加,可是又多产的名单,包括性器官交媾的道德目标,真诚性,对立与中庸。跟这个观点相匹配的是拉康根深蒂固地藐视精神分析的被偏爱的治疗的目标。他认为这个观点跟创办者的观点是完全和谐的。譬如,在1955年的”标准治疗的各种类型“,他主张,假如没有治疗的企图心,分析家的情况会好些。拉康指明”健康“作为是精神分析治疗的额外收获。

Thoroughly warned by Freud to look closely at the effects in his
[the analyst’s] experience of that whose danger the term furor
sanandi sufficiently draws the attention to, after all he [the analyst]
does not really care to keep up its appearances. If he thus accepts
healing as a supplementary benefit of the psychoanalytic treatment,
he guards himself against any abuse of the desire to heal…
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:324)

弗洛伊德彻底警告要仔细看待这些影响,在精神分析家经验到“治疗激情”这个术语提醒我们注意的危险。毕竟,精神分析家并没有确实想要维持“治疗的激情”的外表。假如精神分析因此接受治疗,当著是精神分析治疗的辅助的利益,他也警戒他自己,不要过分使用“治疗的欲望”。

In scorning the analyst’s ‘healing fury’ Lacan clearly recalled Freud’s
assertion in his paper on transference-love (1915a[1914]:171) that a
human society needs furor sanandi as little as any other type of fanaticism.
Applying this principle to his own practice, Freud had actually repeated
on various occasions, in private correspondence as well as published
writings, that he was not possessed with a desire to heal.45

拉康藐视精神分析家的“治疗的狂热”。在他探讨移情与爱的论文,拉康清楚地提醒弗洛伊德的主张:人类的社会很少需要“治疗的激情”,如同很少需要任何其他种类的狂热主义。弗洛伊德将这个原则运用到他自己的实践,他实际上在好几个场合重复说,在私人的通信与出版的著作里,他并没有著魔于治疗的欲望。

‘At every moment’, Lacan contended in Seminar VII, ‘we need to know
what our effective relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to
cure’ (Lacan 1992[1959–60]:218). But is there a positive way to define this
relationship? After having designated what the desire of the analyst is not, is
it possible to name its essential qualities? ‘Desire must be taken literally’,
Lacan proclaimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:256),
which seemed to imply that the desire in question must be contemplated as
a restless, objectless yearning, a relentless striving to obtain nothing. So
much was at least confirmed in Seminar VII, where Lacan compared the
analyst’s desire to that of Antigone in Sophocles’ eponymous play: it concerns
a pure desire, a desire for nothing, even a desire for death inasmuch as death
is the ultimate non-object (Lacan 1992[1959–60]: 282–283).

拉康在第七研讨班主张:「在每个时刻,我们需要知的我们有效的关系,是跟行善的欲望的关系,跟治疗的欲望的关系」。但是,有一个积极的方式来定义这个关系吗?当拉康指明精神分析家的欲望的负面本质后,命名分析家的欲望的基本的特质是可能的吗?“欲望必须被实质地看待”,拉康在“治疗的方向”一文里宣称。这句话似乎暗示着:受到质疑的欲望必须被沉思,作为是一种没有休止,没有目标的渴望,无情地奋斗,想要获得空无。在第七研讨班,如此多的欲望至少被证实。在那里,拉康将精神分析家的欲望比喻为索福克利斯的同名标题“安提戈涅”戏剧里的安提戈涅:这个戏剧关注一个纯粹的欲望,追寻空无的欲望,甚至是追寻死亡的欲望。因为死亡是最后的非-客体。

In Lacan’s interpretation, Antigone had succeeded in ridding her desire of all the worldly
objects and concerns which foul human desire, in order to follow the course
of her desire as a formal ethical duty. Antigone’s desire had acceded to the
level of a Kantian categorical imperative, with which one complies for no
other reason than the naked fact of its imposition.46 In his ethics of
psychoanalysis Lacan accordingly propagated the analysts’ mandatory
involvement in their practice as categorically desiring beings. The ethical
judgement with which analysts have to pay in order to direct their treatment
properly concerns the acknowledgement that their action is inhabited by an
absolute desire and not, for that matter, by the formulation of demands or
the promulgation of moral goals.

用拉康的解释,安提戈涅已经成功地将她的欲望,解除卑下人类所欲望的所有的世界的客体与关注。为了遵循她的欲望的途径,作为正式的伦理的责任。安提戈涅的欲望认同康德的范畴的命令的层次。她同意康德的范畴的命令,没有任何其他理由,除了就是范畴命令的赋加的这个赤裸的事实。在他的精神分析伦理学,拉康因此主张精神分析家的强迫性地参与,在他们的实践里,作为是具有范畴方面的欲望的生命人物。精神分析家必须用伦理学的判断来付出代价,为了恰如其分地引导他们的治疗。这个伦理的判断关注到这个承认:就那件事而言,他们的行动充满绝对的欲望,而不是要求的说明,或道德目标的宣扬。

Needless to say that an analyst is not born with such a pure desire; his
desire is as much governed by ‘pathological’ objects (in the Kantian
sense) and vivid fantasies as that of the majority of people. The analyst’s
is an ‘experienced desire’ (ibid.: 300–301) which is the result of a
fundamental ‘mutation in the economy of desire’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:220–221) that has occurred during her training analysis. With this
‘mutation in the economy of desire’, Lacan pointed towards the necessary
reduction of the status of the object as a mesmerizing, fascinating
otherness in the analysand’s fantasy.

自不待言,精神分析家并没有诞生时就具有纯粹的欲望。他的欲望同样“受到污染的”客体的污染(用康德的意义来说),同样具有生动的幻想,跟大多数的人们的欲望一样。精神分析家的欲望是一个“被经验过的”欲望,是欲望的经济活力的基本的切割的结果,这个基本的切割发生在她的精神分析训练的期间。拉康用这个“欲望的活力的切割”来指出,朝向将客体的地位的必要的化减成为是在分析者的幻见里的纠缠而令人著迷的他者。

Since ‘being an analyst’ also
occupies the place of such an object, the upshot was that the candidate
who desired to be an analyst was supposed to perform a mutation of that
object too, even to the point where it lost all its seductive colours, before
he could have access to the pure desire of the analyst.

因为“成为分析家”也占有如此一个客体的地位,结果是,欲望成为分析家的候选人,被认为是也是执行那个客体的切割,甚至它丧失所有的客体的诱拐的颜色。这样,他才能够得以进入分析家的纯粹的欲望。

As Lacan conceived
it, the desire to be an analyst was as much a hindrance to the emergence
of the desire of the analyst as any other ‘pathological’ desire.47
Prima facie, this renewed picture of the analyst seemed to substantiate
the popular image of the analyst as somebody who has realized the Stoic
ideal of apathy.

如同拉康构想它,成为分析家的欲望同样是一种阻碍,对于分析家的欲望的出现,如同任何的“受到污染”的欲望。乍然看来,分析家的这个更新的画面似乎具体表现分析家的通俗的意象,作为是某位已经实践禁欲学派的冷漠的理想的人。

Stoic wisdom, as exemplified in the works of Epictetus
and Seneca, demands sustine et abstine (people should endure what they
are supposed to do and refrain from doing anything else) whilst
simultaneously exonerating people from all blame when they exercise their
power or express their desire.48 Isn’t this an accurate representation of the
analyst acting upon pure desire? Aren’t analysts indeed expected to fulfil
their duty without reproaching their patients for indulging in the satisfaction
of their unconscious desires?

禁欲学派的智慧,以伊壁鸠鲁与西尼卡的著作作为榜样。他们要求“人们应该忍受他们被认为应该要做的事情,并且自我节制,不要做任何其他事情”。另一方面,他们同时也让人们免除所有的责备,当他们运用他们的力量,或表达他们的欲望。这难道不就是分析家根据纯粹的欲望来行动的正确的表象吗?分析家难道不确实就是被期望要实践他们的责任,但是又没有谴责他们的病人,因为耽溺于他们的无意识的欲望的满足?

At the end of Seminar VII Lacan suggested,
albeit implicitly, that the philosophical position of Stoicism cannot be
brought in line with the ethics of psychoanalysis. In Stoically tolerating
the Other’s betrayal of confidence, or the mere whimsicality of the Other’s
desire, analysts give ground relative to their own desire, in which case
they do not act in accordance with the ethical standards of their practice
(Lacan 1992[1959–60]:320–321).

在第七研讨班的结束时,拉康建议,虽然是暗示地建议,禁欲学派的哲学的立场无法被带来符合精神分析的伦理学。当分析家以禁欲学派的方式容忍大他者的背叛的信任时,或是大他者的欲望的怪异想像时,分析对于他们自己的欲望,相对地退让。在那样的情况,分析家并不是遵照他们的实践的伦理的标准来行动。

More fundamentally, Lacan intimated
that analysts who adopt the Stoic ideal of apathy silently associate
themselves with the morality of the master/tyrant and, more generally,
with the reigning discourse of power.49 This does not mean that they agree
with the Other’s limitless enjoyment; they merely believe that once the
Other has discovered the meaning of its action, it will automatically repent.
Remarkably, this principle is quite similar to Freud’s conviction that
recovery will follow spontaneously once the patient’s historical truth
(the true meaning of the symptoms) has been excavated, according to
the paradigm of archaeological sleuthing. Yet Lacan was deeply sceptical
about the expected outcome:

更加基本地,拉康暗示说,採用禁欲学派的的冷漠的分析家,沉默地将他们自己,跟主人与暴君的道德联想一块。更加通俗地说,跟统辖的权力的辞说联想一块。这并不意味着,他们同意大他者的无限的享乐。他们仅是相信,一旦大他者已经发现它的行动的意义,它将会自动地後悔。明显地,这个原则跟弗洛伊德的信念相当一致:一旦病人的历史的真理(症状的真实的意义)已经被挖掘出来,康复将会自动自发地跟随而来,依照考古学专业的典范。可是,拉康表示深深地怀疑,对于这个被期望的结果。

The question is, once it is over, once the return to the meaning of
an action has been accomplished, once the deep meaning has been
liberated—that is to say, separated out through a catharsis in the
sense of decantation—will everything work out right by itself? Or,
to be more precise, will there be nothing but goodness?
(ibid.: 312)

问题是,一旦它已经结束,一旦回归到行动的意义已经被完成,一旦深层意义已经被解放出来—换句话说,一旦它经由分离意义的心理倾注而被分离开来—每样东西都会自动自发地获得恰当的解决吗?或者,更加确实地说,存在的将仅就是善意吗?

Whatever their philosophy may dictate, Stoics should not rest assured
that their apathy will have a redemptive effect, partly because the Other
might just sustain its jouissance, partly because the Other might try to
eradicate its repentance by neutralizing the one who instilled it.50 In
refusing to be the guarantees of the jouissance of the Other, in declining
to provide their patients with the satisfaction they desperately miss,
analysts at once refrain from adopting the position of the pervert, to
which the nature of their practice surreptitiously invites them. Put
differently, to the extent that analysts neither advocate, nor condone a
‘discourse of the right to jouissance’, they withstand the looming threat
of becoming institutionalized perverts. This is a decisive criterion for
differentiating between an analyst and a pervert, whose positions with
respect to the fantasy are otherwise remarkably similar.51

无论他们的哲学指示什么,禁欲学派不应该满意确定:他们的冷漠将具有救赎的效果。部分是因为大他者可能刚刚维持它的欢爽,部分是因为大他者可能尝试抹除它的后悔,凭借将灌输后悔观念的人保持中立。当分析家拒绝大他者的欢爽的保证,当分析家婉拒供应给病人,用病人迫切想要的满足,分析家立即自我节制,不採用倒错症者的立场。分析家的实践的特性秘密地邀请他们採取倒错症者的立场。换句话说,甚至,分析家既没有主张,也没有宽恕获得欢爽的权利的辞说。分析抵挡这个隐隐在现的威胁:成为被体制同化的倒错症者。这是一个决定性的标准,用来区别分析家与倒错症者。关于幻见,他们两者的立场在其他方面非常酷似。

During the early 1960s, Lacan realized that grounding the desire of
the analyst merely in Kant’s categorical imperative clears the path for its
return as a ruthless, moral tyranny of power. As he demonstrated in ‘Kant
with Sade’ (1989a[1962]), the Sadian universe of radical evil is strictly
congruent with the Kantian universe of detached morality.52 At the end
of Seminar XI, Lacan reiterated that for Kant ‘the moral law…is simply
desire in its pure state’, yet now adding that:

在960年代早期,拉康体会到,将分析家的欲望的基础,仅是定位在康德的范畴命令,替它清理途径,可以回转,作为权力的无情的道德暴君。如同拉康在“康德与萨德”一文里证明,萨德的强烈邪恶的宇宙,跟康德的保持中立的道德的宇宙,严格地不谋而合。在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重复强调:对于康德,道德的法则仅是纯粹状态的欲望。可是,现在,拉康补充说:

[it] culminates in the sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that
is the object of love in one’s human tenderness—I would say, not
only in the rejection of the pathological object, but also in its
sacrifice and murder. That is why I wrote ‘Kant avec Sade’.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:275–276)

道德的法则以牺牲来获得高潮,严格地说,就是以牺牲人的温柔里一切属于爱的客体的东西,来获得高潮。我不妨说,道德法则不但拒绝受到世俗污染的客体,而且拒绝这个客体的牺性与谋杀。那就是为什么我书写“康德与萨德”。

Because the desire of the analyst cannot possibly coincide with an
institutionalized, systematic extermination of all goods, Lacan was forced
to modify his earlier view on the purity of the analyst’s desire. Once the
obscene underside of Kant’s moral law exposed, he ended his Seminar
XI with the statement: ‘The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a
desire to obtain absolute difference’ (ibid.: 276).

因为分析家的欲望不可能巧合于被体制同化的系统的毁灭所有的善,拉康被迫修改他较早期的观点,对于分析家的欲望。一旦康德的道德的法则的卑下的阴谋被揭露,他结束他的第11研讨班,用这个陈述:分析家的欲望并不是纯粹的欲望。分析家的欲望是想要获得绝对差异的欲望。

Compared to previous
definitions, the analyst’s desire emerged here not as a desire for nothing,
but as a structural, symbolic force which recognizes and sustains the
other as Other. Instead of manoeuvring the analysands into a situation
where they can identify with their analyst, analysts had to manoeuvre
themselves into a position which enabled their analysands to dis-identify,
to discover their desire in its modulation by the desire of the Other, and
to avow that desire in its essential nothingness. Lacan believed that this
process would only unfold if the analyst puts himself into the position of
the support of object a, not an object with which the analysands can
satisfy their desire, but an object which causes it (ibid.: 273).

跟先前的定义比较起来,分析家的欲望出现这里,并不是作为追寻空无的欲望,而是作为结构的,象征的力量。这个力量体认而且维持他者作为大他者的地位。分析家并没有将分析者操控进入这么一个情境,让他们能够认同分析家的情境。代替的,分析家必须操控他们自己进入这么一个立场,让他们的分析者能够解除-认同,能够发现他们的欲望,在分析者的基本的空无里。拉康相信:仅有当分析家将自己放进小客体的支持的立场,这个过程才会展开。这个小客体并不是分析者能够用来满足他们的欲望的客体,而是引起他们的欲望的客体。

The difference between Lacan’ s 1964 conception of the position of
the analyst and his earlier view on the topic could not have been more
radical. Here the analyst was no longer expected to act as an Other subject
in an intersubjective relationship with the analysand, but as an objectcause
within a bond marked by subjective disparity. As the support of
object a within this new bond, the analyst was neither expected to
understand the analysand’s desire, nor to think about what could possibly
be causing it, to the extent that such thinking could only proceed from
the illusory constraints of the analyst’s own fantasy.53

在拉康1964年的分析家的立场的观念,与他较早前针对这个主题的观点之家的差异,在这个地方表现最为强烈。在此,分析家不再被期望行动,作为一个大者的主体,跟分析者处于互为主体性的关系。而是作为分析者的欲望的客体的原因,这个盟约的特征是主体性的差异。分析家作为在这个新的盟约内部的小客体的支持,分析家既没有被期望要理解分析者的欲望,也没有被期望要思维是什么引起分析者的欲望。甚至,这样的思维的前进,仅是由于分析家自己的幻见的幻觉的自我约束。

If thinking about the cause of the analysand’s desire was not an
appropriate solution, then perhaps being this cause was a better one, but
how could an analyst ever incarnate an object devoid of substance?
Furthermore, being an object a, in so far as it is fully achievable, seemed
to coincide with a state of jouissance, which one could hardly deem
compatible with the desire of the analyst. In a small yet instructive text
from the late 1960s, Lacan explained the difficulty of the analyst’s
position in the following terms:

假如思维到分析者的欲望的原因,并不是适当的解决。那么,或许成为分析者的欲望的原因是较恰当的解决。但是,分析家如何能够具体表现一个没有物质的客体?而且,成为小客体,就它所能够被充分完成而言,似乎是巧合于欢爽的状态。我们很少将这种欢爽的状体,认为是跟分析家的欲望互相和谐。在一篇从1960年代晚期的简短而且有启发的文本,拉康解释分析家的立场的困难,用以下的术语:

The analysand is the one who manages to realize that his ‘I think’
is an alienation, that is to say who discovers the fantasy as the
motor of psychic reality, that of the divided subject. He can only
do that by granting the analyst the function of (a), which he [the
analyst] would not be capable of being without vanishing
immediately.

分析者是这个人,他成功地体会到这一点:他的”我思“是一种异化。换句话说,分析者发现这个幻见,作为是心灵现实的动力,作为分裂的主体的动力。分析者要先承认分析家具有小客体的功能,他才能够那样做。分析家若是能够成为小客体的功能,他必然立即消失。

Hence, the analyst ought to know that, far from being
the measure of reality, he only clears the ground for the subject’s
truth by offering himself as support of this disbeing [desetre]…Well
then, this is where the psychoanalyst finds himself in an untenable
position: an alienation conditioned by an ‘I am’ whose own
condition…is an ‘I am not thinking’, reinforced by the addition
that…he [the analyst] knows it.
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59)

因此,分析家应该知道,他根本就不是现实的测量者。他仅是清理作为主体的这个场地,他提供他自己,作为这个“没有生命实存“的支持。呵呵,这就是这个地方,精神分析家发现他自己处于无法自园其说的立场:由”我具有生命实存“所制约的异化。这个”我具有生命实存“的自己的情况是:”我并没有在思维“。这个情况的更加强化的补充是:他(分析家)知道这个情况。

As one can derive from this paragraph, Lacan’s answer to the question
as to what analysts should do or be with regard to their supporting of the
object a highlighted the analysts’ disbeing (desetre), their semblance of
being object a. This position allows them to function as object a for the
analysand whilst retaining their desire as analysts. Contrary to what he
had claimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, Lacan now stressed
that analysts should not act with their being, but with their ‘disbeing’,
and it is easy to see that this guideline did not make the analyst’s position
more feasible. I will explore the issue further in the final part of this
chapter, when discussing Freud’s take on psychoanalysis as an impossible
profession and Lacan’s integration of this impossibility in his formula
of the discourse of the analyst.

如同我们能够从这个段落获得,拉康对于这个问题的回答,关于分析家应该做什么,或关于分析家作为小客体的支持。拉康的回答强调:分析家并没有生命实存,分析家类似小客体。这个立场让分析家能够发挥作为小客体的功能,针对分析者。 另一方面,这个立场保留分析家的欲望,作为分析家的欲望。跟拉康在“治疗的方向“里所宣称的恰恰相反,拉康现在强调,分析家不应该用他们的生命实存来行为,而是要用他们的”没有生命实存“。我们很容易看出,这个引导方针并没有让分析家的立场更加具有实用性。在这个章节的最后的部分,我将更加深入地探索这个议题。我将讨论弗洛伊德的看待精神分析,视为是不可能的专业。以及拉康将这个不可能,融合在他的公式,分析家的辞说的公式。

雄伯译
32hsiung@cphome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为欲望的客体

October 29, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OBJECT OF DESIRE
分析家作为欲望的客体

Lacan’s rekindling of Freud’s ‘rule of abstinence’ as a symbolic,
intersubjective relationship between the subject of the analysand and the
analyst as Other subject subsisted until the late 1950s. It gave way to an
entirely different conception of the analyst’s position when Lacan realized
that the analyst’s functioning as Other subject is not a sufficient guarantee
for excluding the occurrence of identifications between analyst and
analysand, or for preventing the deterioration of the analytic treatment
into a reciprocal working alliance. The following passage from Seminar V
betrays Lacan’s mercurial self-criticism concerning the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other:

拉康重新启示弗洛伊德的“节制的规则”,作为是象征,互为主体性的关系,处于分析者的主体,与作为大他者主体的分析家之间的关系。这个重新启示一直维持到1950年代,才被取代,由分析家的地位的具有完全不同的观念取代。当拉康体会到,分析家的充当大他者主体的功能,并不是充分的保证,作为排除认同的发生,处于分析家与分析者之间的认同的发生。或作为阻止精神分析的关系的恶化成为互惠的运作的联盟。从第四研讨班的以下的段落,显露出拉康的敏捷的自我批判,关于主体与大他者之间的象征的关系。

[T]he distinction between the Other and himself [the subject] is
initially the most difficult distinction to make…These two modes
of ambiguity, these two limits—that which is situated on the
imaginary level and the one belonging to the symbolic order,
through which desire is founded in the speech of the Other—these
two modes of crossing which imply that the subject alienates
himself, do not coincide…Yet there is always the question as to
what happens when these subjects are two of a kind, that is to say,
when the subject is supporting itself in the presence of the Other.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:357–358)

大他者与他自己(主体)之间的区别最初是最困难作的区别。这两个模糊嗳昧的模式,这两个限制—被定位在想像的层次与属于象征秩序的层次—这两个交会的模式暗示着,主体异化他自己,并没有巧合。可是,总是存在着这个问题,关于发生的事情,当这两个主体是属于相同种类的主体。换句话说,当主体正在支持它自己,在大他者的面前。

Here Lacan acknowledged that a relationship between two subjects,
despite one of them being in the position of Other, is as much open to
reciprocal solidarity as an imaginary bond between two egos. Although
the result may be a symbolic instead of an imaginary identification, it is
much the same problem.32 The issue is illustrated by a common experience
of analysts who insist that the patient comply with the rule of free
association.

在此,拉康承认,处于两个主体之间的关系,尽管其中一位处于大他者的立场。这个关系同样开发给互惠的团聚,如同想像的盟约,处于两个自我之间。虽然这个结果可能是象征,而不是想像的认同。这是相同的难体。这个问题由精神分析家的共同经验来说明。这位精神分析家坚持,病人应该同意自由联想的规则。

The more they demand that the patient comply with the
ground rule the more they encounter ‘resistance’, in the form of a
reciprocal demand of the patient that the analyst speak, or a general
unwillingness to cooperate.33 In Seminar V Lacan exemplified this by
referring to what happens when a mother (as Other subject) demands
something of her child (as subject). Before long, the child discovers that
its possession of what the Other is asking for equips it with the power to
return the question: You want me to give what I have, but I will only give
it to you if you are willing to give me what you have first. ‘On the level
of demand’, Lacan stated, ‘the subject and the Other are in a situation of
reciprocity’ (ibid.: 359). Seeking to overcome this deadlock, Lacan started
to insist on the crucial importance of the Other’s desire:

分析家越是要求病人应该同意这个基本规则,他们越是遭遇到“抗拒”,用病人的互惠的要求的形式,病人要求精神分析家言说,或病人通常不愿意合作。在第四研讨班,拉康提到一个发生的例子说明。当一位母亲(作为大者主体),要求某件属于小孩的东西(作为主体)。不久,小孩发现,它拥有大他者要求的东西,让它具有这个权力来回应这个问题:你要我给予我拥有的东西,但是我将仅是给出它,假如你愿意给予我,你首先拥有的东西。“在要求的层次”,拉康陈述,“主体与大他者处于互惠的情境”。当拉康尝试克服这个僵局时,他开始坚持大他者的欲望的这个关键的重要性。

What I would like to draw your attention to, is the function of this
desire of the Other, insofar as it makes it possible for the distinction
between the subject and the Other to establish itself once and for
all …What needs to be introduced and what is there from the start,
latent from the beginning, is that, beyond what the subject demands
and what the Other demands from the subject, there is the necessary
presence and dimension of what the Other desires.
(ibid.: 359, italics added)

我想要吸引你们注意的东西是,大他者的欲望的这个功能。因为它让这个区别成为可能,主体与大他者之间的区别,为了一劳永逸地建立它自己。所需要被介绍的东西,与从一开始就存在那里的东西,从一开始就潜在的东西是:超越主体的要求的东西,与大他者从主体要求东东西,必然存在着大他者欲望的东西的维度。

In Lacan’s theory of the late 1950s, desire originated in the human
being’s incapability to express its vital, biological needs through the
linguistic function of demand. Because human beings grow up in a
symbolic world, they are pushed to employ language as a means for
conveying their needs to others. A child does not simply act upon its
bodily processes when it is hungry, it makes its need clear to an Other by
demanding food—whether intentionally and independently, or primarily
through the Other’s reading of the child’s conduct. The same holds for
the Other, who does not merely supply the food the child is asking for,
but who demands that the child allow itself to be fed (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:238).

在拉康1950年代晚期的理论,欲望起源于人类的没有能力表达它的生命的生物的需要,凭借要求的语言的功能。因为人们成长于象征的世界里,他们被迫运用语言,作为工具,来传达他们的需要给别人。小孩并不仅根据它的身体的过程来行动,当它饥饿时。小孩让它的需要让大他者知道,凭借要求食物—无论是意图地与独立地,或是主要是经由大他者阅读小孩的行为。相同的道理适用于大他者。大他者并不仅是供应小孩正在要求的食物,而且大他者要求,小孩应该容许它自己被餵食。

Yet when a subject raises its biological need to the level of
demand, the need cannot be articulated fully in the signifiers of the
subject’s language, for language can only inappropriately represent that
which is essentially beyond it. Lacan put this discordance between need
and demand on a par with Freud’s concept of primal repression (Freud
1915d) arguing, in accordance with Freud’s idea of the dynamic
unconscious, that the repressed inarticulate part of the need will put out
a new sprout (rejeton), which ‘presents itself in man as desire’ (Lacan
1977j[1958]:286). Hence, desire is what stems from the leftover need
after it has been articulated in the signifiers of a demand.34

可是,当主体将它的生物的需要提升到要求的层次,这个需要无法充分地被表达,用主体的语言的能指。因为语言仅能够不合适地代表基本上是超越它的东西。拉康将需要与要求之间的不协调,跟弗洛伊德的原初的压抑的主张相提并论。以符合弗洛伊德的动力结构的无意识。需要的被压抑的无法表达的部分将产生一个新的奔放。这个新的奔放呈现它自己,在人的身上,作为欲望。因此,欲望就是起源于这个残存的需要,在需要已经被表达之后,在要求的能指里。

As if this explanation proved unsatisfactory, Lacan revealed yet another
source of desire.35 Probing further into the nature of human demand,
Lacan arrived at the conclusion that a vital need is not the only factor
triggering it.

好像这个解释证明并不令人满意,拉康揭露欲望的另外一个来源。当拉康更加深入地探索人类要求的特性时,他获得这个结论:生命的需要并不是触动需要的唯一的因素。

Apart from specific objects which can satisfy their primary
physiological necessities, people also demand something much more
insubstantial, which can be called ‘love’. In this case, the object becomes
less important than the Other’s act of giving it, which the subject perceives
as an indication of the Other’s affection. When demanding something, a
subject is thus not only pressing for the satisfaction of its needs, it is also
questioning the love of the Other, even to the extent that the subject will
be happy to accept anything as long as it testifies to the Other’s loving
concern. In this way the subject’s demand for what the Other possesses,
an object that is capable of satisfying the subject’s needs, is transformed
into a demand for what the Other does not possess as an exchangeable
object.36

除了能够满足他们的原初的生理的需求的明确的客体之外,人们也要求某件更加是抽象的东西,它可以被称为是”爱“。在这个情况,客体变得不像大他者的给予它的行动那么重要。主体感知大他者给予它的行动,作为是大他者的情感的指示。当主体要求大他者时,主体因此不但强迫要求它的欲望的满足,它也询问大他者的爱。甚至,主体将会快乐地接受任何东西,只有它证实是大他者的爱的关心。用这个方式,主体要求大他者所拥有的东西,能够满足这主体的需要的的客体,被转化成为是要求大他者并没有拥有的东西,作为是可以被交换的客体。

Similar to the residue produced by the transformation of a need into a
demand, Lacan believed that the transition from the demand for a material
object to the demand for love generates a rest. In the demand for love the
particularity of the object is annihilated, but the object itself does not
disappear.37 When the demand for an object becomes a demand for love
(and, in a sense, demand always already includes this dimension), the object
is no longer appreciated for its intrinsic qualities or its use value, but acquires
a higher status, incorporating a surplus value.38 The object in an exchange
governed by a demand for love might be something completely useless,
indeed it can be ‘a piece of shit’, but for the partners involved this essentially
worthless object will be invaluable as a proof of love. Whereas the demand
for love appears to relinquish the objects that feature prominently in the
demand for the satisfaction of a need, the former is not a pure negation of
the latter, but rather an obliteration (ibid.: 287). According to Lacan, the
residue of the object, after the annulment of its particularity by the demand
for love, constituted the ‘absolute condition’ for desire:

类似于这个残渣,需要转化成为要求所产生的残渣,拉康相信:从要求物质的客体,转换成为爱的要求,产生一个停顿。在对爱的要求里,客体的特殊性被毁灭。但是客体的自身并没有消失。当对于客体的要求变成熟对爱的要求(从某个意义言,要求总是已经包含这个维度)。客体不再是被欣赏,因为它的内在的品质,或是它的使用价值。客体获得更高的地位,合并一个剩余价值。在交换里被爱的要求统辖的客体,可能是某件完全没有用途的东西。的确,它可能是一件“无拥之物”,但是对于被牵涉的伴侣,这个基本上没有价值的客体,将是无价之宝,作为是爱的证明。虽然爱的要求似乎放弃这些客体,主要是作为特征的客体,在要求需求的满足。前者并不是纯粹否定后者。相反地,前者抹除后者。依照拉康,客体的残渣,经过它的特殊性的宣告无效,被爱的要求,则是组成对于欲望的“绝对的条件”。

[T]his condition indeed brings to a denouement the aversion which
the proof of love has to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is
neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but
the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the
second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung).
(ibid.: 287, translation modified)

这个绝对条件确实造成这样的结局:爱的证据厌恶需要的满足。因此,欲望既不是对于满足的欲望,也不是对于爱的要求。而是从欲望的满足,扣除爱的要求的差异,欲望的满足与爱的要求之间的分裂的现象。

The crucial point of this paragraph is that desire, unlike need and demand,
never balances towards an object, whether a concrete object of satisfaction
or the ‘anything and nothing’ of love. Contrary to need and demand, desire
derives its power from the priceless remainder of an object after it has been
accommodated within the symbolic register. In the context of Seminar V
(1998b[1957–58]), Lacan expressed the same idea when he said that desire
is born from the (object of) jouissance that is lost through symbolic
castration.39 Objects functioning in the realms of need and demand have an
assuaging, quenching effect, whilst objects in the realm of desire only serve
to sustain it. With this conceptualization of desire, as a power beyond need
and demand, Lacan revised his original schema of analytic intersubjectivity,
newly designating the relationship between patient and analyst as a ‘subjective
disparity’ which revolves around the desire of the analyst.

这个段落的关键重点是,不像需要与要求,欲望从来不是朝向客体的平衡。无论是满足的具体的客体,或是爱的任何东西与爱的空无。跟需要与要求恰恰相反,欲望获得它的力量,从客体的珍贵的残余物,在欲望欲望已经被接纳在象征的铭记内部之后。在第四研讨班,拉康表达相同的观念,当他说,欲望诞生于欢爽的这个客体,由于象征的阉割而失落的欢爽的客体。在需要与要求的领域发挥功能的那些客体,具有舒缓,止渴的效果。而在欲望的领域的那些客体,仅是充当维持欲望的功能。拉康将欲望如此构成观念,作为是超越需要与要求的力量时,他重新订正他的原先的”互为主体性“的基型。他重新指明病人与精神分析家之间的关系,作为是”主体的不一致“。这个主体的不一致环绕精神分析家的欲望旋转。

Lacan’s promotion of ‘subjective disparity’ within analytic treatment
coincided with his discussion of transference in Seminar VIII. In the
opening lesson of this Seminar he explained his decision to introduce
the notion of ‘subjective disparity’ by disclosing his eagerness to find a
proper term to describe the opposite of intersubjectivity. Although he
himself had advocated intersubjectivity time and again as the only way
forward in psychoanalysis, now he could only see the drawbacks of his
former prodigy (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:20–22, 233).

在精神分析的治疗,拉康的提倡“主体的不一致“,恰合于在第八研讨班,他对于移情的讨论。在这个研讨班的开始的几堂,拉康解释他的决定,要介绍”主体的不一致“的观念。他显露他的渴望,要找到一个合适的术语,来描述互为主体性的这个对立。虽然拉康自己经常主张互为主体性,作为是唯一前进的途径,在精神分析里。现在,拉康则仅是看出他先前的宏观的挫折。

As described on
p. 70, Lacan had already broached the pitfalls of intersubjectivity in
Seminar V within the context of a critical discussion on reciprocity. Now,
in Seminar VIII, he added that transference itself runs counter to
intersubjectivity, inasmuch as the position of those involved in a
transference relationship is by no means equivalent (ibid.: 233).40 In the
‘pseudo-situation’ of the analytic treatment—as Lacan described it in
Seminar VIII—subjective disparity reigns because the patient’s demand
(for help, advice, happiness, etc.) does not meet a reciprocal demand
(for letting oneself be cured) in the analyst. The analyst’s policy does
not hinge on a demand, but on a specific desire.

如同在第10页所描述的,拉康已经将第四研讨班时的互为主体性的陷阱粗略描绘,在批判地讨论互为主体性的内文里。现在,在第八研讨班,他补充说:移情的本身跟互为主体性并行不悖。因为牵涉到移情关系里的那些人们的立场,绝非是平等的。在精神分析治疗的“虚假-情境”—如同拉康在第八研讨班描述它—主体的不一致统辖一切,因为病人的要求(帮助,劝告,快乐,等等),并没有满足在精神分析家身上的互惠的要求(要求让自己被治疗)。精神分析家的政策并没有悬置在要求,而是悬置在明确的欲望。

The concept of the desire of the analyst appeared for the first time in
‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’
(1977i[1958]:252), one of Lacan’s most clinically informed writings from
the 1950s. Fulminating, yet again, against the deplorable clinical conduct
of his contemporaries, Lacan underscored that analysts should be
concerned with the direction of the treatment and not with the direction
of their patients (ibid.: 227).

精神分析家的欲望的观念,首次出现在“治疗的方向与治疗的力量的原则”。那是一篇最具有临床资讯的著作,从1950年代开始。拉康再次猛烈抨击他的当代的精神分析家的令人悲叹的临床行径。拉康强调,精神分析家应该关注治疗的引导,而不是关注他们的病人的引导。

Directing the treatment implied that besides
the patient, the analyst too has to pay for what is happening, notably in a
triple fashion. First of all, the analyst has to pay the analysand with words
taking the form of analytic interpretations.41 Second, analysts must tolerate
their being invested by analysands with all the strengths and weaknesses
of the significant others in the analysand’s experience. This is what Freud
described in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b) as the libidinal
cathexis of the analyst by the analysand, through which the analyst is
inscribed, qua form and contents, within one of the analysand’s psychic
series.

治疗的引导暗示着,除了病人之外,精神分析家也必须付出代价,对于正在发生的事情。特别是用三重的形式。首先,精神分析家必须付给分析者,使用精神分析的解释的形态。其次,精神分析家必须容忍他们自己被分析者投注所有的力量与弱点,在分析者的经验里,她的重要的他人的力量与弱点。这就是弗洛伊德所描述的,在“移情的动力结构”,作为是精神分析家的生命的力比多受到分析者的倾注。经有这个力比多的倾注,精神分析家被铭记,作为形式与内容,被铭记在分析者的心灵的感觉内部。

In Lacan’s terminology, it meant that an analysand’s transference
dispossesses the analyst of his identity, and that the analyst’s proper
handling of the transference entails that he is willing to pay for analysis
with his person. Finally, and most significantly, Lacan was also convinced
that analysts have to pay with a judgement on the nature of their action,
all the more so that to them the precise nature of analytic effectiveness
generally remains a mystery too. In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ he
explained that whereas the first two payments relate to what the analyst
says and does, the third corresponds to what the analyst is, i.e. to the
analyst’s being (Lacan 1977i[1958]:227–228, 250–256).

使用拉康的术语来说,这个力比多的倾注意味著,分析者的移情,替精神分析家剥除他的身份。精神分析家的合适的处理移情意味著,精神分析家愿意用他的个人生命付出精神分析的代价。最后,而且最重要地,拉康也相信,精神分析家必须付出代价,用对于他们的行动的特性的判断。更加是如此的状况,这样,对于他们,精神分析的有效性的明确的特性,通常始终也保持是神秘。在“治疗的引导”一文,拉康解释,虽然前两个付出,跟精神分析家的所说所为息息相关,第三个付出,则是对应于精神分析家的生命实存,也就是,对应于精神分析家的生命的本质。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com