Archive for the ‘Maurice Ponty 梅洛 龐帝’ Category

庞蒂论自由 525

May 17, 2014

庞蒂论自由 525

What, then, becomes of the freedom we spoke about at the outset, if
this point of view is taken? I can no longer pretend to be a nihilation
(neant), and to choose myself continually out of nothing at all. If it is
through subjectivity that nothingness appears in the world, it can
equally be said that it is through the world that nothingness comes into
being.

假如这个观点被採纳,那么,我们从一开始谈论的自己是什么情况呢?我不再伪装是一位虚无主义者,也不再从空无当中自己选择。假如空无出现在这个世界,凭借主体性。我们同样可以说,空无存在,是凭借这个世界。

I am a general refusal to be anything, accompanied surreptitiously
by a continual acceptance of such and such a qualified form of
being.

我通常是拒绝成为任何一个,秘密地伴随继续接纳生命实存的如此这般的特质的形式。

For even this general refusal is still one manner of being, and has its place in the
world. It is true that I can at any moment interrupt my projects. But what
is this power? It is the power to begin something else, for we never
remain suspended in nothingness.

即使是这个通常的拒绝,依旧是生命实存的一个方式,在世界里拥有它的位置。的确,我能够在任何时刻中断我的计划。但是这个力量是什么?这是开始某件其他东西的力量,因为我们没有永远保持在空无当中。

We are always in a plenum, in being,
just as a face, even in repose, even in death, is always doomed to express
something (there are people whose faces, in death, bear expressions of
surprise, or peace, or discretion), and just as silence is still a modality
of the world of sound.

我们总是处于压力空间,处于生命实存。正如一个脸孔,甚至休息时,甚至死亡时,总是注定表达某件东西 (有些人们的脸孔,在死亡时,呈现出惊奇、详和、或谨慎的表情),正如沉默依旧是声音的世界的模式。

I may defy all accepted form, and spurn everything,
for there is no case in which I am utterly committed: but in this
case I do not withdraw into my freedom, I commit myself elsewhere.
Instead of thinking about my bereavement, I look at my nails, or
have lunch, or engage in politics. Far from its being the case that my freedom is always unattended, it is never without an accomplice, and
its power of perpetually tearing itself away finds its fulcrum in my
universal commitment in the world.

我必须挑衅一切被接纳的形式,并且搅乱一切。因为并没有任何情况,让我完全奉献。但是在这个情况,我并没有撤退进入我的自由。我奉献自己在别的地方。非但没有想到我的丧失自由,我观看我的指甲,或是吃午餐,或是参与政治。这根本就不是我的自由总是没有行使的情况,它总是有某个共犯。它具有永远将自己撕扯开的力量,在我奉献于普世的世界里,找到它的枢纽。

My actual freedom is not on the
hither side of my being, but before me, in things. We must not say that
I continually choose myself, on the excuse that I might continually
refuse what I am. Not to refuse is not the same thing as to choose. We
could identify drift and action only by depriving the implicit of all
phenomenal value, and at every instant arraying the world before us in
perfect transparency, that is, by destroying the world’s ‘worldliness’.
Consciousness holds itself responsible for everything, and takes everything
upon itself, but it has nothing of its own and makes its life in the
world.

我实际的自由并不是在我生命实存的这一边。而是在我之前,在事物里。我们一定不要说,我继续地自己选择,根据这个藉口:我可能继续地拒绝我的真实样子。没有拒绝跟选择并不是相同的事情。我们仅是凭借着剥夺掉所有的现象的价值的暗示意义,我们才能辨认漂浮与行动。然后在每个瞬间安顿我们面前的世界在完美的透明当中。换句话说,凭借毁灭世界的「世俗化」。意识自己承担一切的责任,并且将一切都承担到自己身上。但是它并没有属于它自己的东西,并且在世界里创造它的生命。

We are led to conceive freedom as a choice continually remade
as long as we do not bring in the notion of a generalized or natural
time. We have seen that there is no natural time, if we understand
thereby a time of things without subjectivity. There is, however, at least
a generalized time, and this is what the common notion of time envisages.
It is the perpetual reiteration of the sequence of past, present and
future.

我们被引导构想自由,作为是不断地重新所做的选择,只要我们没有带进一般性时间或自然时间的观念。我们已经看出,假如我们因此理解一个没有主体性的事物的时间,并没有自然的时间。可是,至少有一个一般性的时间。这是时间的共同观念所构想的。这是过去,现在,与未来的系列的永远的重复。

It is, as it were, a constant disappointment and failure. This is
what is expressed by saying that it is continuous: the present which it
brings to us is never a present for good, since it is already over when it
appears, and the future has, in it, only the appearance of a goal towards
which we make our way, since it quickly comes into the present,
whereupon we turn towards a fresh future. This time is the time of our
bodily functions, which like it, are cyclic, and it is also that of nature
with which we co-exist. It offers us only the adumbration and the
abstract form of a commitment, since it continually erodes itself and
undoes that which it has just done.

这就是所谓的不断的失望与失败。这就是凭借说它是继续的,所被表达的东西。它带给我们的现在,永远不是永恒的现在。因为当它出现时,它已经过去。在它里面,未来仅有一个目标的外表,我们就朝着这个目标前进。因为它很快地就进入现在。在那里,我们转向一个新鲜的未来。这一次是我们身体运作的时间。这些身体的运作,像它一样,是循环的。它也是我们与之共同存在的自然的时间。它提供我们仅是奉献的轮廓与抽象的形式。因为它继续地腐蚀它自己,并瓦解它刚刚做的东西。

As long as we place in opposition,
with no mediator, the For Itself and the In Itself, and fail to perceive,
between ourselves and the world, this natural foreshadowing of a subjectivity,
this prepersonal time which rests upon itself, acts are needed
to sustain the upsurge of time, and everything becomes equally a matter
of choice, the respiratory reflex no less than the moral decision,
conservation no less than creation.

只要我们将「为了它自己」与「在它自己本身」处于对立状态,没有中介调节,并且在我们自己与世界之间,没有看出主体性的这个自然的预兆,这个依靠它自己的前个人的时间,就有需要採取行动来维持时间的洶涌。每样事情都同样地变成是选择的问题。呼吸的反射作用跟道德的决定一样,保存跟创造一样。

As far as we are concerned, consciousness
attributes this power of universal constitution to itself only
if it ignores the event which provides its infrastructure and which is its
birth. A consciousness for which the world ‘can be taken for granted’,
which finds it ‘already constituted’ and present even in consciousness
itself, does not absolutely choose either its being or its manner of
being.

就我们而言,意识将普世的形成的这个力量归属于它自己,只有当它忽略这个供应它的内部结构的,也是诞生它的事件。这个世界「能够被视为理所当然」的这个意识,发现它「已经被构成」,并且甚至在意识里呈现它自己,这样的意识并没有绝对地选择它的生命实存,或是它的生命实存的方式。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞帝论自由 521

May 16, 2014

庞帝论自由 521
We therefore recognize, around our initiatives and around that
strictly individual project which is on self, a zone of generalized existence
and of projects already formed, significances which trail between
ourselves and things and which confer upon us the quality of man,
bourgeois or worker.

环绕我们的创议,环绕那个针对自己的严格的个人的计划,我们因此体认出一般化存在的地区,已经被形成的计划的地区,追逐在我们自己与事物之间的各种意义,赋予我们作为人,布尔乔亚,或工人的特征。

Already generality intervenes, already our presence
to ourselves is mediated by it and we cease to be pure consciousness,
as soon as the natural or social constellation ceases to be an
unformulated this and crystallizes into a situation, as soon as it has a
meaning—in short, as soon as we exist.

一般性已经介入,我们呈现给自己受到它的调节,我们不再是纯粹的意识,当自然或社会的汇集不再是没有被说明的「这个」,并且具体成为一种情境,当它具有一种意义—总之,当我们存在。

Every thing appears to us
through a medium to which it lends its own fundamental quality; this
piece of wood is neither a collection of colours and tactile data, not
even their total Gestalt, but something from which there emanates a
woody essence; these ‘sensory givens’ modulate a certain theme or
illustrate a certain style which is the wood itself, and which creates,
round this piece of wood and the perception I have of it, a horizon of
significance. The natural world, as we have seen, is nothing other than
the place of all possible themes and styles.

每样事情经由媒介发生到我们身上。它借助它自己的基本的特质。这块木材既不是颜色与触觉资料的收集,甚至也不是它们的整个的格式塔行为。而是某件木材的本质从那里散发出来的东西。这些「感官的指称物」调节某个主题,或是说明属于木某种个风格。环绕这块木材,及我对于它的感知,它创造意义的视阔。如同我们所见的,自然的世界实实在在就是所有的可能主题与风格的地方。

It is indissolubly an
unmatched individual and a significance. Correspondingly, the generality
and the individuality of the subject, subjectivity qualified and
pure, the anonymity of the One and the anonymity of consciousness
are not two conceptions of the subject between which philosophy has
to choose, but two stages of a unique structure which is the concrete
subject.

无法解决地,这是一个无与伦比的个人与意义。作为对应,主体的这个一般性与个人性,被给予特质与纯粹的主体性,「整体的一」的匿名与意识的匿名,并不是哲学必须做选择的主体的两个观念。而是独特结构的两个阶段,这个结构是具体的主体。

Let us consider, for example, sense experience. I lose myself in this red which is before me, without in any way qualifying it, and it
seems that this experience brings me into contact with a pre-human
subject. Who perceives this red? It is nobody who can be named and
placed among other perceiving subjects.

譬如,让我们考虑一下意义的经验。我迷失于在我面前的这个红色,而没有以任何方式给予它的特质。似乎,这个经验带领我跟一位前人类的主体接触。是谁感知这个红色?没有人能够被提出名字,然后被放置在其他的感知的主体里。

For, between this experience
of red which I have, and that about which other people speak to me, no
direct comparison will ever be possible. I am here in my own point of
view, and since all experience, in so far as it derives from impression, is
in the same way strictly my own, it seems that a unique and unduplicated
subject enfolds them all.

因为,在我拥有的红色的这个经验,关于这个经验,别人跟我谈论,两者之间,不可能做直接的比较。我在此,处于我自己的观点。因为所有的经验以相同的方式严格来说都是我自己的经验,当它从印象获得。似乎,一位独特而无法复制的主体将它们全部展开。

Suppose I formulate a thought, the God
of Spinoza, for example; this thought as it is in my living experience is
a certain landscape to which no one will ever have access, even if,
moreover, I manage to enter into a discussion with a friend on the
subject of Spinoza’s God. However, the very individuality of these
experiences is not quite unadulterated.

假如我说明一个思想,譬如,史宾诺莎的上帝,如同在我生活的经验,这个思想是某种的风景,没有人将会接近的风景。而且,即使我成功地跟一位朋友从事讨论,关于史宾诺莎的上帝的主体。可是,这些经验的个人性并不完全是没有受到混杂。

For the thickness of this red, its
thisness, the power it has of reaching me and saturating me, are attributable
to the fact that it requires and obtains from my gaze a certain
vibration, and imply that I am familiar with a world of colours of
which this one is a particular variation. The concrete colour red, therefore,
stands out against a background of generality, and this is why,
even without transferring myself to another’s point of view, I grasp
myself in perception as a perceiving subject, and not as unclassifiable
consciousness.

因为这个红的厚度,它的「这个」,它拥有到达我,饱满我的这个力量,它们都可归属于这个事实: 它从我的凝视,要求并且获得某种的震动,并且暗示,我熟悉于一个颜色的世界。这个世界是它的特殊的变化的世界。因此,这个具体的红的颜色,以一般性的背景作为衬托。这就是为什么,即使没有将我自己转移到另一个人的观点,我在感知里理解为自己,作为一位感知的主体,而不是作为一位没有被分类的意识。

I feel, all round my perception of red, all the regions of
my being unaffected by it, and that region set aside for colours,
‘vision’, through which the perception finds its way into me. Similarly
my thought about the God of Spinoza is only apparently a strictly
unique experience, for it is the concretion of a certain cultural world,
the Spinozist philosophy, or of a certain philosophic style in which I
immediately recognize a ‘Spinozist’ idea.

环绕所有我对红色的感知,我感觉我的生命实存没有受到它影响的所有领域。那个领域被保留给颜色。凭借那个视象,感知找到它的途径进入我。同样地,关于史宾诺莎的上帝的我的思想,仅表面上,是一个独特非凡的经验。因为它是某种的文化的世界的具体化,史宾诺莎的哲学,或是属于某种的哲学的风格。用这种风格,我立即体认出一个「史宾诺莎」的观念。

There is therefore no occasion
to ask ourselves why the thinking subject or consciousness perceives
itself as a man, or an incarnate or historical subject, nor must we
treat this apperception as a second order operation which it somehow
performs starting from its absolute existence: the absolute flow takes
shape beneath its own gaze as ‘a consciousness’, or a man, or an incarnate
subject, because it is a field of presence—to itself, to others and to
the world—and because this presence throws it into the natural and
cultural world from which it arrives at an understanding of itself. We
must not envisage this flux as absolute contact with oneself, as an absolute density with no internal fault, but on the contrary as a being
which is in pursuit of itself outside.

这因此并没有机会来询问我们自己,为什么这位思想的主体或意识会感知它自己,作为一个人,或一位具体化身或历史的主体。我们也一定不要对待这种统觉,当著是次级层次的运作,它从它的绝对存在开始,用某种方式执行这种运作。在它自己的凝视之下,这个绝对的流动形成形状,作为「一个意识」,或一个人,或一个具体化身的主体。因为这是一个存在的领域,属于它自己,属于别人,属于这个世界。因为这个存在将它投掷进入这个自然与文化的世界。从这个世界那里,它获得对它自己的理解。我们一定不要拟想这种流动,作为是跟自己的绝对的接触,作为是一种绝对的密度,没有内部的缺点。而是相反地,要作为在外部追寻它自己的生命实存。

If the subject made a constant and
at all times peculiar choice of himself, one might wonder why his
experience always ties up with itself and presents him with objects and
definite historical phases, why we have a general notion of time valid
through all times, and why finally the experience of each one of us
links up with that of others. But it is the question itself which must be
questioned: for what is given, is not one fragment of time followed by
another, one individual flux, then another; it is the taking up of each
subjectivity by itself, and of subjectivities by each other in the generality
of a single nature, the cohesion of an intersubjective life and a
world.

假如主体对于自己从事不断而且经常的特殊的选择,我们会想要知道,为什他的经验总是跟它自己息息相关,并且呈现给他各种客体育明确的历史的时期,为什么我们对与自古以来的正确时间,有个一般的观念。为什么最后我们每个人的经验跟别人的经验息息相关。但是必须要质疑的是这个问题本身。因为所被给予的东西,并不是接续而来的时间的碎片,接续而来的个体的流动。每个主体性自身的从事,以及在单一的自然一般性里互为主体性的从事,互为主体性与世界的凝聚。

The present mediates between the For Oneself and the For
Others, between individuality and generality. True reflection presents
me to myself not as idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but as identical
with my presence in the world and to others, as I am now realizing it: I
am all that I see, I am an intersubjective field, not despite my body and
historical situation, but, on the contrary, by being this body and this
situation, and through them, all the rest.

目前时刻调节于「为了自己」与「为了别人」之间,个人与一般性之间。真实的反思将我呈现给我自己,不是作为惰性与无法接近的主体性。而是作为认同于我存在于世界与认同于别人。因为我现在逐渐地实现它。我就是我看见的一切,我是一位互为主体性的领域。倒不是尽管我的身体与历史的情境。相反地,凭借跟这个身体,这个情境同在,经由它们,以及其余的东西。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由 520

May 15, 2014

庞蒂论自由 520

Provided that this is so, there can be situations, a direction* of history,
and a historical truth: three ways of saying the same thing. If
indeed I made myself into a worker or a bourgeois by an absolute
initiative, and if in general terms nothing ever courted our freedom,
history would display no structure, no event would be seen to take
shape in it, and anything might emerge from anything else. There
would be no British Empire as a relatively stable historical form to
which a name can be given, and in which certain probable properties
are recognizable.

只要情况是这样,有时会有一些情况,历史的方向,历史的真理。以三种方式来说相同的事情。假如,我的确让我自己成为工人或布尔乔亚,凭借绝对的创议。假如用通常的术语,没有一样东西追求我们的自由,历史就不会展示任何的结果,没有任何事件将会被看见,在历史里面成形。每样东西将会从任何别的东西出现。将不会有英国的帝国,作为能够被给予名字的比较稳定的历史的形式。以这样的形式,某些可能的属性能够被体认出来。

There would not be, in the history of social progress,
revolutionary situations or periods of set-back. A social revolution
would be equally possible at any moment, and one might reasonably
expect a despot to undergo conversion to anarchism. History would
never move in any direction, nor would it be possible to say that even
over a short period of time events were conspiring to produce any
definite outcome.

在社会进步的历史,将不会有革命的情况或挫折的时期。社会的革命在任何时刻都将是同样地可能。我们很有理由预期一位暴君经历转变成为无政府主义者。历史永远不会朝任何方向移动。我们也不可能说,事件共谋要产生任何明确的结果,即使是短暂时期。

The statesman would always be an adventurer, that is
to say, he would turn events to his own advantage by conferring upon
them a meaning which they did not have. Now if it is true that history is
powerless to complete anything independently of consciousnesses
which assume it and thereby decide its course, and if consequently it
can never be detached from us to play the part of an alien force using us
for its own ends, then precisely because it is always history lived through we
cannot withhold from it at least a fragmentary meaning. Something is
being prepared which will perhaps come to nothing but which may,
for the moment, conform to the adumbrations of the present.

政治家将总是冒险家。换句话说,他将事件转变成为对自己有利益,凭借赋予它们原先并没有具有的意义。现在,假如历史确实没有力量完成任何独立于意识的东西,这个意识假定它,因此决定它的途径,假如结果历史永远无法跟我们隔离,扮演外来力量的角色,使用我们充当它的目的,那么,确实是因为它总是被经历过的历史,我们无法从它支持至少是一个片刻的意义。某件东西正在被凖备,这个东西或许并没有意义,但是暂时地,它跟目前的先兆是一致的。

Nothing
can so order it that, in the France of 1799, a military power ‘above
classes’ should not appear as a natural product of the ebb of revolution,
and that the role of military dictator should not here be ‘a part that has
to be played’. It is Bonaparte’s project, known to us through its realization,
which causes us to pass such a judgement.

没有一样东西能够如此命令它,以致于在1799年的法国,军事的力量,上层阶级)不应该出现,作为是革命退潮的自然产物,军事独裁者不应该在此成为「必须被扮演的角色」。那是拿破仑的计谋,众所周知,由于它的实现,引起我们给予如此的判断。

But before Bonaparte,
Dumouriez, Custine and others had envisaged it, and this common
tendency has to be accounted for. What is known as the significance of
events is not an idea which produces them, or the fortuitous result of
their occurring together. It is the concrete project of a future which is
elaborated within social coexistence and in the One* before any personal
decision is made.

但是,在拿破仑之前,杜莫瑞斯,丘庭与其他人,都曾经拟想过它。这个共同的倾向必须被解释。众所周知的事件的意义,并不是产生它们的点子,或是它们一并发生的偶然的结果。它是一个未来的具体的计划,在社会的共同存在里面被构想,在任何个人的决定被做之前的这个「整体」。

At the point of revolutionary history to which
class dynamics had carried it by 1799, when neither the Revolution
could be carried forward nor the clock put back, the situation was such
that, all due reservations as to individual freedom having been made,
each individual, through the functional and generalized existence
which makes a historical subject of him, tended to fall back upon what
had been acquired.

在革命的历史的时刻,在1799年之前,阶级的动力曾经带领它到革命的历史。既不是革命能够被带领前景,也不是时钟能够倒转,当时的情境是这样,关于个人的自由,各种合适的保留都曾经被做,每个个人,倾向于依靠所曾经被获得的东西,经由功能性与一般性的存在,让他成为历史的主体。

It would have been a historical mistake at that stage
to suggest to them either a resumption of the methods of revolutionary
government or a reversion to the social conditions of 1789, not
because there is a truth of history independent of our projects and
evaluations, which are always free, but because there is an average and
statistical significance of these projects. Which means that we confer
upon history its significance, but not without its putting that significance
forward itself. The Sinngebung is not merely centrifugal, which is
why the subject of history is not the individual. There is an exchange
between generalized and individual existence, each receiving and
giving something.

假如我们当时跟他们建议重新採有革命政府的方法,或倒转回1789年的社会的情况,在那个阶段而言,那本来会是一个历史的错误。倒不是因为有一个独立于我们的计划与评估之外的历史的真理,它们总是自由的。而是因为这些计划有一个平均与统计上的重要性。这意味着,我们赋予历史它的重要性,但是还是难免将这个重要性朝向历史的本身。Sinngebung不仅是离心力,这就是为什么历史的主体并不是个人。在一般性与个人的存在之间,有一个交换,每一个都接收与给予某件东西。

There is a moment at which the significance which
was foreshadowed in the One, and which was merely a precarious
possibility threatened by the contingency of history, is taken up by an
individual. It may well happen that now, having taken command of
history, he leads it, for a time at least, far beyond what seemed to
comprise its significance, and involves it in a fresh dialectic, as when
Bonaparte, from being Consul, made himself Emperor and conqueror.

有一个时刻,这个重要性已经有先兆,在这个「整体」,并且仅是一个不稳定的可能性,受到历史的偶然性所威胁,被个人所从事。很可能发生的是,现在,已经掌控历史之后,他引导它,至少有一段时间,远超过似乎组成它的重要性的东西,并且牵涉它,以一个新鲜的辩证法。当拿破仑从领事,让自己成为皇帝与征服者。

We are not asserting that history from end to end has only one meaning,
any more than has an individual life. We mean simply that in any
case freedom modifies it only by taking up the meaning which history
was offering at the moment in question, and by a kind of unobtrusive
assimilation. On the strength of this proposal made by the present, the
adventurer can be distinguished from the statesman, historical imposture
from the truth of an epoch, with the result that our assessment of
the past, though never arriving at absolute objectivity, is at the same
time never entitled to be arbitrary.

我们并不是主张,历史从头到尾都仅有一个意义。正如个人的生活也不是。我们的意思仅是,无论如何,自由仅是凭借从事意义来修改意义。历史在受到质疑的时刻提供意义,并且凭借某种没有遮拦的吸收。凭借目前所做的这个建议,冒险家能够跟政治家区分开来,将历史的欺骗跟时代的真理区别开来。结果是,我们对于过去的评估,虽然没有达到绝对的客观性,同时从来没有被判定为任意性。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由 518

May 12, 2014

庞蒂论自由 518

Idealism (like objective thought) bypasses true intentionality, which is at its object rather than positing it. Idealism overlooks the interrogative, the subjunctive, the aspiration,
the expectation, the positive indeterminacy of these modes of consciousness,
for it is acquainted only with consciousness in the present
or future indicative, which is why it fails to account for class. For class
is a matter neither for observation nor decree; like the appointed order
of the capitalistic system, like revolution, before being thought it is
lived through as an obsessive presence, as possibility, enigma and
myth.

理想主义(就像客观思想)绕过真实的意图性。这个真实的意图些朝着它的目标,而不是提出它。理想主义忽略这个质疑,这个假设,这个渴望,这个期望,意识的这些模式的积极的不决定。因为它仅是用目前或未来的指示灯意识来获得。这就是为什么它无法解释阶级。因为阶级既不是观察,也不是命令的事情。就像资本主义的系统的被指定的秩序,就像革命,在被思考之前,它被生活经历,作为一种著魔的存在,作为可能性,谜团与神话。

To make class-consciousness the outcome of a decision and a
choice is to say that problems are solved on the day they are posed, that
every question already contains the reply that it awaits; it is, in short, to
revert to immanence and abandon the attempt to understand history.
In reality, the intellectual project and the positing of ends are merely
the bringing to completion of an existential project. It is I who give a
direction, significance and future to my life, but that does not mean
that these are concepts; they spring from my present and past and in
particular from my mode of present and past coexistence.

为了让阶级意识成为决定与选择的结果,等于是说,问题在它们被提出的那一天被解救,每个问题已经包括它等待的回答。总之,那是要回转到内在性,并且放弃想要理解现实的历史的企图。在现实界,知识的计划于目标的提出仅仅就是将现存的计划予以完成。将方向,意义,与未来给予我的生活的人是我,但是这并不意味着,这些东西都是观念。它们起源于我的目前与过去,特别是起源于我的现在与过去的共同-实存的模式。

Even in the
case of the intellectual who turns revolutionary, his decision does not
arise ex nihilo; it may follow upon a prolonged period of solitude: the
intellectual is in search of a doctrine which shall make great demands
on him and cure him of his subjectivity; or he may yield to the clear
light thrown by a Marxist interpretation of history, in which case he
has given knowledge pride of place in his life, and that in itself is
understandable only in virtue of his past and his childhood. Even the
decision to become a revolutionary without motive, and by an act of
pure freedom would express a certain way of being in the natural and
social world, which is typically that of the intellectual. He ‘throws in
his lot with the working class’ from the starting point of his situation as
an intellectual and from nowhere else (and this is why even fideism, in
his case, remains rightly suspect).

即使在知识份子转变成为革命份子的情况,他的决定仍然不是从空无中产生。它可能跟随在漫长的孤独的时期之后。知识份子正在寻找一种要求他从事的信念,这个信念能够治疗他的主观性,或者,他可能接受马克思的历史的解释的启蒙。在那个情况,他已经给予知识作为他生命的骄傲的位置。仅有凭借他的过去与他的童年,它本身才能够被理解。甚至有些决定成为革命份在,是没有动机,凭借纯粹自由的行动,这种决定表的某种的生命实存,在自然与社会的世界。这典型是知识份子的世界。他「投掷他的生命跟工人阶级同在」,从他的情境的出发点,作为一名知识份子,而不是从其他地方(这就是为什么在他的情况,即使是信仰主义也始终是可疑的。)

Now with the worker it is a fortiori the
case that his decision is elaborated in the course of his life. This time it
is through no misunderstanding that the horizon of a particular life
and revolutionary aims coincide: for the worker revolution is a more
immediate possibility, and one closer to his own interests than for the
intellectual, since he is at grips with the economic system in his very
life.

现在,就工人而言,更有理由是这种情况。在他的人生的过程,他的决定被建构。这次,特殊生活的视阔与革命的目标不谋而合,并不是经由误解。对于工人,革命是更加当下的可能。比起知识份子,革命更加靠近他的利益。因为他跟他的一生里的经济制度相搏斗。

For this reason there are, statistically, more workers than middle
class people in a revolutionary party. Motivation, of course, does not do
away with freedom. Working class parties of the most unmistakable kind have had many intellectuals among their leaders, and it is likely
that a man such as Lenin identified himself with revolution and eventually
transcended the distinction between intellectual and worker. But
these are the virtues proper to action and commitment; at the outset, I
am not an individual beyond class, I am situated in a social environment,
and my freedom, though it may have the power to commit me
elsewhere, has not the power to transform me instantaneously into
what I decide to be.

因为这个理由,统计数目上,在革命党里,工人的人数比中产阶级多。当然,动机并没有废除自由。即使是千真万确的工人阶级党派,都会有许多的知识份子充当他们的领导者。很有可能的事,诸如列宁这样的人认同于革命,最后超越知识份子与工人的区别。但是这些是作为行动与奉献的本体的品德。刚一开始,我并不是超越阶级的个人,我被定位在社会的环境里。我的自由,虽然具有让我奉献别处的力量,并没有具有瞬间将我转变成为我决定成为的人物的力量。

Thus to be a bourgeois or a worker is not only to
be aware of being one or the other, it is to identify oneself as worker or
bourgeois through an implicit or existential project which merges into
our way of patterning the world and co-existing with other people. My
decision draws together a spontaneous meaning of my life which it
may confirm or repudiate, but not annul. Both idealism and objective
thinking fail to pin down the coming into being of class consciousness,
the former because it deduces actual existence from consciousness, the
latter because it derives consciousness from de facto existence, and both
because they overlook the relationship of motivation.

因此,成为布尔乔亚或工人,不但是要知道前者或是后者,那就是要认同自己作为工人,或作为布尔乔亚,经由一个暗含或现存的计划。这个计划融入我们的方式,将这个世界定型及跟别人共存。我的决定将我的人生的自动自发的意义聚拢一块,它可能肯定,或排斥,但没有让它无效。理想主义与客观思想没有将阶级意识到逐渐产生固定下来。前者是因为它从意识推论出实际的存在。后者则是因为它从实际的存在里获得意识。两者都因为他们忽略动机的关联。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由 517

May 11, 2014

庞蒂论自由 517

Both find their journey’s end
in revolution, which would perhaps have terrified them had it been
described and represented to them in advance. One might say at the
most that revolution is at the end of the road they have taken and in
their projects in the form of ‘things must change’, which each one
experiences concretely in his distinctive difficulties and in the depths
of his particular prejudices. Neither the appointed order, nor the free
act which destroys it, is represented; they are lived through in ambiguity.

两者都发现他们的旅途,以革命作为结束。或许,他们当时假如被给予描述及具体呈现,他们本来会感到惊吓。我们充其量可以说,他们採取的道路的终端就是革命,以「事情必须改变」的形式从事的他们的计划。在每个人的不同的困难里,与在他特别的偏见的深度里,每个人都具体地经验到「事情必须改变」。既没有被指定的秩序,也没有毁灭它的自由的行动,被代表出来。它们在模糊当中被经历。

This does not mean that workers and peasants bring about revolution
without being aware of it, and that we have here blind, ‘elementary
forces’ cleverly exploited by a few shrewd agitators. It is possibly in this
light that the prefect of police will view history.

这并不意味着,工人与农夫不知不觉地导致革命。在此,我们遭遇盲动的「基本的力量」被一些精明的煽动家狡猾地利用。警察总长看待历史,可能就是从这个观点。

But such ways of
seeing things do not help him when faced with a genuine revolutionary
situation, in which the slogans of the alleged agitators are immediately
understood, as if by some pre-established harmony, and meet
with concurrence on all sides, because they crystallize what is latent in
the life of all productive workers.

但是当他面对真正的革命的情境时,这些看待事情的方式对他并无帮助。在那个情境里,被宣称是煽动家的口号,好像凭借某种先前建立的和谐,当下被理解,并且从四面八方都同时响应。因为它们具体表现在所有的生产的工人的生活里潜藏的东西。

The revolutionary movement, like the
work of the artist, is an intention which itself creates its instruments and its means of expression. The revolutionary project is not the result
of a deliberate judgement, or the explicit positing of an end. It is these
things in the case of the propagandist, because the propagandist has
been trained by the intellectual, or, in the case of the intellectual,
because he regulates his life on the basis of his thoughts.

革命的运动,就像艺术家的作品,它是创造它的工具与它作为表达的方法的的意图。革命的计划并不是深思熟虑的判断的结果,或是明确地提出一个目标。在宣传家的情况,它是这些东西,因为宣传家曾经接受知识份子的训练,或者,在知识份子的情况,因为他根据他的思想,规划他的生涯。

But it does not
cease to be the abstract decision of a thinker and become a historical
reality until it is worked out in the dealings men have with each other,
and in the relations of the man to his job. It is, therefore, true that I
recognize myself as a worker or a bourgeois on the day I take my stand
in relation to a possible revolution, and that this taking of a stand is not
the outcome, through some mechanical causality, of my status as
workman or bourgeois (which is why all classes have their traitors),
but neither is it an unwarranted evaluation, instantaneous and
unmotivated; it is prepared by some molecular process, it matures in
co-existence before bursting forth into words and being related to
objective ends.

但是它仍然是思想家的抽象决定,直到它在人们互相来往的处理当中运作,以及在人跟他的工作的关系当中运作,它才成为历史的现实。因此,这是真实的,我体认出我自己,作为工人,或布尔乔亚,在我採取我的立场,跟可能的革命的关系。这个立场的採取,经过某些机制的因果关系,并不是我作为工人或布尔乔亚的地位的结果。(这就是为什么所有的阶级都有他们的背叛者)。但是它也不是没有保证的评估,临时发生而且没有动机。某些的分子的过程准备着,它在共同的存在中成熟后,它才突然绽放成为文字,并且跟客观的目的息息相关。

One is justified in drawing attention to the fact that it is
not the greatest poverty which produces the most clear-sighted revolutionaries,
but one forgets to ask why a return of prosperity frequently
brings with it a more radical mood among the masses. It is because the
easing of living conditions makes a fresh structure of social space possible:
the horizon is not restricted to the most immediate concerns,
there is economic play and room for a new project in relation to living.

我们很有理由提醒注意这个事实:并不是极度的贫穷 才产生明目张胆的革命。而是,我们忘记去询问,为什么繁荣的回转在大众眼中,经常随之带来更加激烈的情绪。这是因为生活情况的安逸让社会空间的更新结构成为可能。前途的展望并没有局限于日常生活所需。

This phenomenon does not, then, go to prove that the worker makes
himself into worker and revolutionary ex nihilo, but on the contrary that
he does so on a certain basis of co-existence. The mistake inherent in
the conception under discussion is, in general, that of disregarding all
but intellectual projects, instead of considering the existential project,
which is the polarization of a life towards a goal which is both
determinate and indeterminate, which, to the person concerned, is
entirely unrepresented, and which is recognized only on being
attained. Intentionality is brought down to the particular cases of the
objectifying acts, the proletarian condition is made an object of
thought, and no difficulty is experienced in showing, in accordance
with idealism’s permanent method, that, like every other object of
thought, it subsists only before and through the consciousness
which constitutes it as an object.

因此,这个现象并们足以证明,工人并不是从空无中创造,让他自己成为工人及革命份子。而是相反地,他这样做,是根据共同-存在的某个基础。探讨中的这个观念本质上的错误,一般而言,是忽视几乎是知识份子的计划的错误,而没有考虑到生命实存的计划。这个生命实存的计划,就是生活朝向一个目标的极端化。这个目标既是决定性,也同时并不是决定性。对于相关的这个人,这个目标完全没有被代表,仅有在被获得时,这个目标才被体认。意图性被运用到客观化的行动的特殊个案,普罗阶级的情况被迫成为思想的对象。跟理想主义的永久的方法不谋而合,它没有经历任何困难就会显示,就像思想的每个其他目标,它仅是存在于以前,并且通过构成它作为对象的意识才存在。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由 515

May 9, 2014

庞蒂论自由 515

Let us suppose that I have a certain style of living, being at the mercy
of booms and slumps, not being free to do as I like, receiving a weekly
wage, having no control over either the conditions or the products of
my work, and consequently feeling a stranger in my factory, my nation
and my life. I have acquired the habit of reckoning with a fatum, or
appointed order, which I do not respect, but which I have to humour.

让我们假设,我有某种的生活的风格,受生活的興衰起落的支配,没有办法如我所愿地自由,领个周薪。对于我的工作的情况或产品,没有掌控能力。结果感受到在我的工厂,我的国家,与我的生活里,有位陌生人。我已经养成这样的习惯: 考虑到现实,或生活得有条理。我并不推崇生活的条理,但是我必须迁就这样的条理。

Or suppose that I work as a day-labourer, having no farm of my own,
no tools, going from one farm to another hiring myself out at harvest time; in that case I have the feeling that there is some anonymous power hovering over me and making a nomad of me, even though I want to settle into a regular job. Or finally suppose I am the tenant of a
farm to which the owner has had no electricity laid on, though the
mains are less than two hundred yards away. I have, for my family and
myself, only one habitable room, although it would be easy to make
other rooms available in the house.

或是假设,我白天充电劳力工作者,没有我自己的农场,没有工具。在收获季节,从一家农场到另一家农场,寻求雇用。在那种情况,我有这种感觉,有个匿名的力量萦绕在我头上,让我成为流浪汉。即使我想要找个规律工作稳定下来。或是,最后你们假设,我就是农场的佃户,主人并没有在农场安装电力。即使主要电力杆线距离不到两百码。就我的家庭与我自己而言,我仅有一个可居住的房间,虽然要在房屋里找到其他房间很容易。

My fellow workers in factory or
field, or other farmers, do the same work as I do in comparable conditions;
we co-exist in the same situation and feel alike, not in virtue of
some comparison, as if each one of us lived primarily within himself,
but on the basis of our tasks and gestures.

我在工厂,或农地的同事,或其他农夫跟我一样,处于类似的情况,做相同的工作,。我们共同生存在相同的情境,感觉相同,并没有凭借某种的比较,好像我们每个人最初都生活在他自身之内。但是根据我们的工作与姿态的基础。

These situations do not imply
any express evaluation, and if there is a tacit evaluation, it represents the
thrust of a freedom devoid of any project against unknown obstacles;
one cannot in any case talk about a choice, for in all three cases it is
enough that I should be born into the world and that I exist in order to
experience my life as full of difficulties and constraints—I do not
choose so to experience it.

这些情境并没有暗示任何明白的评估。假如有一个沉默的评估,它代表欠缺任何计划的自由的冲动,来反抗无名的阻碍。无论如何,我们无法谈论有关选择,因为在这三个情况里,我竟然诞生到这个世界,我竟然生产,为了经验我充满困难与约束的生活,这就足够了。我并没有选择,为了经验它。

But this state of affairs can persist without
my becoming class-conscious, understanding that I am of the proletariat
and becoming a revolutionary. How then am I to make this
change? The worker learns that other workers in a different trade have,
after striking, obtained a wage-increase, and notices that subsequently
wages have gone up in his own factory. The appointed order with
which he was at grips is beginning to take on a clearer shape.

但是事情的状态持续下去,我必然会有阶级意识,因为我理解到,我是属于普罗阶级,而且成为革命份子。因此,我如何想要从事这个改变?工人获知,处于不同行业的其他的工人,经过摆工之后,获得加薪。并且注意到,随后,在他自己的工厂里,工资已经调高。他勉强应付的安排的生活条理,逐渐开始形成更清楚的轮廓。

The daylabourer
who has not often seen workers in regular employment, who
is not like them and has little love for them, sees the price of manufactured
goods and the cost of living going up, and becomes aware that
he can no longer earn a livelihood. He may at this point blame town
workers, in which case class-consciousness will not make its appearance.
If it does, it is not because the day-labourer has decided to
become a revolutionary and consequently confers a value upon his
actual condition; it is because he has perceived, in a concrete way, that
his life is synchronized with the life of the town labourers and that all
share a common lot.

这位白天的劳工并没有经常见到正规俜用的工作者,他并并不像他们,他对他们并不喜欢。他看待被制造的货物的价格,与生活费用的上涨,逐渐知道,他不再能谋取生计。在这个时刻,他可能怪罪于城市的工作者。在那个情况,阶级意识将不会出现。假如阶级意识出现,那并不是因为白日劳工己经决定成为革命份子,结果赐予某个价值给他的实际的情况。那是因为他已经感受到,以具体的方式,他的生活跟城市的生活是同步调,大家都分担共同的命运。

The small farmer who does not associate himself
with the day-labourers, still less with the town labourers, being separated
from them by a whole world of customs and value judgements,
nevertheless feels that he is on the same side as the journeyman when
he pays them an inadequate wage, and he even feels that he has something in common with the town workers when he learns that the
farm owner is chairman of the board of directors of several industrial
concerns. Social space begins to acquire a magnetic field, and a region
of the exploited is seen to appear.

小农农夫并没有将自己跟白天劳工联想一块,更不用说是城市劳工。因为他们彼此分隔许多的习俗与价值判断的差异。可是,他感觉到,他站在跟熟练工人相同的一边,当他付给他们菲薄的工资。他甚至感觉,他跟城市工人有某件相同的地方,当他获知农场主人是好几家工业会社的董事会的主席。社会的空间开始获得吸引的磁场。被剥削者的领域被看见出现。

At every pressure felt from any
quarter of the social horizon, the process of regrouping becomes
clearly discernible beyond ideologies and various occupations. Class is
coming into being, and we say that a situation is revolutionary when
the connection objectively existing between the sections of the proletariat
(the connection, that is, which an absolute observer would recognize
as so existing) is finally experienced in perception as a common
obstacle to the existence of each and every one.

从社会的领域的任何地区感受到的压力,重新聚拢一块的过程,清楚地被觉察出来,超越意识形态与各种的职业。阶级逐渐存在,我们说,一种情况是革命的,当客观地存在于普罗阶级的各部门之间的关联,(换句话说,绝对的观察者可体认出来,作为如此存在的关联)。这种关联最后在感知中被经验到,作为每个人的生命实存的共同阻碍。

It is not at all necessary
that at any single moment a representation of revolution should arise. For
example, it is doubtful whether the Russian peasants of 1917 expressly
envisaged revolution and the transfer of property. Revolution arises day
by day from the concatenation of less remote and more remote ends. It
is not necessary that each member of the proletariat should think of
himself as such, in the sense that a Marxist theoretician gives to the
word. It is sufficient that the journeyman or the farmer should feel that
he is on the march towards a certain crossroads, to which the road
trodden by the town labourers also leads.

这根本就不是必然的,在任何时刻,革命的再现表征竟然会出现。譬如,1917年的苏俄的农夫生动地构型革命,并转移财产,是值得置疑。革命每天都在出现,即使比较靠近或比较遥远的目标的协同一块。这并非是必然的,普罗阶级的每个成员,竟然会认为自己是这样的人。如同马克思的理论家给予这个字词的意义。熟练工人或农副竟然会觉得,他正朝着某个十字路口迎向前去,城市的劳工践踏的道路也通往这个十字路口。这就足够了。
雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

May 4, 2014

庞蒂论自由 513

We shall arrive at the same result by considering our relations with
history. Taking myself in my absolute concreteness, as I am presented
to myself in reflection, I find that I am an anonymous and pre-human
flux, as yet unqualified as, for instance, ‘a working man’ or ‘middle
class’. If I subsequently think of myself as a man among men, a bourgeois
among bourgeois, this can be, it would seem, no more than a
second order view of myself; I am never in my heart of hearts a worker
or a bourgeois, but a consciousness which freely evaluates itself as a
middle class or proletarian consciousness.

我们将获得相同的结果,凭借考虑我们跟历史的关系。当我接纳我自己,作为绝对的具体,如同我在反思中呈现个自己,我发现,我是一位匿名的前人类的流体,譬如,还没有资格,作为一位「工人」,或「中产阶级」。假如我随后认为我自己是人中之人,其中一位布尔乔亚,这似乎仅是我可能观看自己的第二秩序。在我心灵的最内层,我从来就不是工人或中产阶级。而是一种意识,自由地评估自己,作为中产阶级,或普罗阶级的意识。

And indeed, it is never the
case that my objective position in the production process is sufficient to
awaken class consciousness. There was exploitation long before there
were revolutionaries. Nor is it always in periods of economic difficulty
that the working class movement makes headway. Revolt is, then, not
the outcome of objective conditions, but it is rather the decision taken
by the worker to will revolution that makes a proletarian of him.

的确,我在生产过程的客观的立场,从来没有处于足够唤醒阶级意识的情况。在各种革命之前,剥削存在已久。工人阶级运动迎向前去,也并非总是处于经济困难的时期。反叛因此并非是客观情况的结果。相反地,工人意志想要革命所做的决定,让他成为普罗阶级。

The evaluation of the present operates through one’s free project for the
future. From which we might conclude that history by itself has no
significance, but only that conferred upon it by our will. Yet here again
we are slipping into the method of ‘the indispensable condition failing
which . . .’: in opposition to objective thought, which includes the
subject in its deterministic system, we set idealist reflection which
makes determinism dependent upon the constituting activity of the subject.

目前的评估运作于自己对未来的自由的计划过程。从那里,我们可以作出结论:历史本身并无意义,仅是我们的意志赋予它的东西。可是,在此,我们正在掉落于这个方法:「无可免除的掉落的情况、、、」跟客观的思想对立。这个客观的思想包括处于它的决定系统的主体,我们从事理想主义的反思,这让决定论依靠主体的形成的活动。

Now, we have already seen that objective thought and analytical reflection are two aspects of the same mistake, two ways of overlooking the phenomena. Objective thought derives class consciousness from the objective condition of the proletariat. Idealist
reflection reduces the proletarian condition to the awareness of it,
which the proletarian arrives at.

现在,我们已经看见,客观的思想与分析的反思是相同错我的两面,忽视现象的两种方式。客观思想获得阶级意识,根据普罗阶级的客观情况。理想主义的反思将普罗阶级的情况还原成为对它的觉醒,普罗阶级获得的觉醒。

The former traces class-consciousness
to the class defined in terms of objective characteristics, the latter on
the other hand reduces ‘being a workman’ to the consciousness of
being one. In each case we are in the realm of abstraction, because we
remain torn between the in itself and the for itself. If we approach the
question afresh with the idea of discovering, not the causes of the act of
becoming aware, for there is no cause which can act from outside upon
a consciousness—nor the conditions of its possibility, for we need
to know the conditions which actually produce it—but class consciousness
itself, if, in short, we apply a genuinely existential
method, what do we find?

前者追踪阶级意识,到用客观特性的术语定义的阶级。在另一方面,后者将「成为工人」还原成为作为一名工人的意识。在每一个情况,我们都处于抽象的领域,因为我们被撕裂于「它自身」及「为了它自身」之间。假如我们重新探索这个问题,用发现的观念,而不是成为觉醒的行动的目标,因为没有任何目标能够从外面根据意识来行动,除了阶级意识到自身—也没有它的可能性的各种情况。因为我们需要知道实际上产生它的这些情况。总之,假如我们应有真诚的生命实存的方法,我们会找到什么?

I am not conscious of being working class or
middle class simply because, as a matter of fact, I sell my labour or,
equally as a matter of fact, because my interests are bound up with
capitalism, nor do I become one or the other on the day on which I
elect to view history in the light of the class struggle: what happens is
that ‘I exist as working class’ or ‘I exist as middle class’ in the first place,
and it is this mode of dealing with the world and society which provides
both the motives for my revolutionary or conservative projects
and my explicit judgements of the type: ‘I am working class’ or ‘I am
middle class’, without its being possible to deduce the former from the
latter, or vice versa.

我并没有意识到我是工人阶级或中产阶级,仅是因为实际上,我卖出我的劳力,或同样地,事实上,因为我的興趣跟资本主义息息相关。我也没有在那一天,成为工人或中产阶级,当我选择从阶级意识的观点来看历史。所发生的事情是,首先,「我存在作为工人阶级」或「我存在作为中产阶级」。处理世界与社会的这个模式供应我从事革命的动机,或保守的计划,以及我明确的那种判断:「我是工人阶级」或「我是中产阶级」。不可能从后者推论前者,也不可能从前者推论后者。

What makes me a proletarian is not the economic
system or society considered as systems of impersonal forces, but these
institutions as I carry them within me and experience them; nor is it an
intellectual operation devoid of motive, but my way of being in the
world within this institutional framework.

让我成为普罗阶级的原因,并不是经济系统,或被认为是客观力量的系统的社会。而是这些体制,当我在自身之内具有它们,并且经验它们。这也不是欠缺动机的知识的运作,而是我存在于世界的方式,在体制的架构里面。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由 510

May 3, 2014

庞蒂论自由 510

When I say that this rock is unclimbable, it is certain that this attribute,
like that of being big or little, straight and oblique, and indeed like
all attributes in general, can be conferred upon it only by the project of
climbing it, and by a human presence. It is, therefore, freedom which
brings into being the obstacles to freedom, so that the latter can be set
over against it as its bounds. However, it is clear that, one and the same
project being given, one rock will appear as an obstacle, and another,
being more negotiable, as a means.

当我说这块岩石是无法攀登时,确定的是这个属性,就像无论是大或小的属性,直或歪斜的属性,的确,就像通常的所有属性,仅有凭借攀登它的计划,凭借人的存在,才能赋予给它。因此,这是一种将自由的阻碍具有生命实存的自由。这样,后者才能重新调整对抗它,作为它的限制。可是,显而易见地,当相同的计划被给予时,一块岩石将会出现,作为一种阻碍。另外一块岩石,却是更加可以协商,作为一种工具。

My freedom, then, does not so
contrive it that this way there is an obstacle, and that way a way
through, it arranges for there to be obstacles and ways through
in general; it does not draw the particular outline of this world, but
merely lays down its general structures. It may be objected that there is
no difference; if my freedom conditions the structure of the ‘there is’,
that of the ‘here’ and the ‘there’, it is present wherever these structures
arise. We cannot distinguish the quality of ‘obstacle’ from the obstacle itself, and relate one to freedom and the other to the world in itself which, without freedom, would be merely an amorphous and
unnameable mass.

因此,我的自由并没有如设计它,阻碍存在的方式,通过的那种方式,它安排阻碍存在,以及通常的通过方式。它对这个世界并没有获得特别的轮廓,而仅是奠定它的一般结构。有人反对说,这并没有什么差异。假如我的自由制约「存在」的结构,「在此」与「在彼」的结构,每当这些结构产生时,它就存在。我们无法区别「阻碍」的特质跟阻碍本身会有什么不同。然后将前者跟自由挂钩,将后者跟世界的自身挂钩。假如没有自由,这世界自身将仅是无定形,无法命名的质块。

It is not, therefore, outside myself that I am able to
find a limit to my freedom. But do I not find it in myself? We must
indeed distinguish between my express intentions, for example the
plan I now make to climb those mountains, and general intentions
which evaluate the potentialities of my environment. Whether or not I
have decided to climb them, these mountains appear high to me,
because they exceed my body’s power to take them in its stride, and,
even if I have just read Micromegas, I cannot so contrive it that they are
small for me. Underlying myself as a thinking subject, who am able to
take my place at will on Sirius or on the earth’s surface, there is,
therefore, as it were a natural self which does not budge from its
terrestrial situation and which constantly adumbrates absolute valuations.

因为,并不是在我自身外面,我能够找到我的自由的限制。但是我难道不是在我自己自身发现自已的限制吗?我们确实必须区别我快速的意图与一般的意义,前者,譬如我现在做计划要攀登那些山,后者评估我的环境的潜在因素。无论我已经决定攀登那些山,那些山对于我而言似乎都是高。因为它们超过我的身体要克服它的力量。即使我刚刚阅读过Micromegas 时论双月刊,我无法如此设计它,让它们对于我而言变小。我作为思想主体的基础,我能够任意地处身于西奈,或地球的表面,因此,会存在着所谓的自然的自我,面对它的地球的情况时,没有退缩,并且不断地概括绝对的评估。

What is more, my projects as a thinking being are clearly modelled
on the latter; if I elect to see things from the point of view of
Sirius, it is still to my terrestrial experience that I must have recourse in
order to do so; I may say, for example, that the Alps are molehills. In so
far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which
are not dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings
in a way which I do not choose.

而且,我的各种计划,作为思想的人,清楚地模仿后者。假如我选择从西奈的观点看待事情,为了这样做,我依旧必须诉诸于我的地球上的经验。譬如,我可能说,阿尔卑斯山是蚁丘,因为我有双手,双脚,身体,我环绕我自身许多并没有依靠我的决定的意图。这些意图影响我的环境,用我没有选择的方式。

These intentions are general in a
double sense: firstly in the sense that they constitute a system in which
all possible objects are simultaneously included; if the mountain
appears high and upright, the tree appears small and sloping; and
furthermore in the sense that they are not simply mine, they originate
from other than myself, and I am not surprised to find them in all
psycho-physical subjects organized as I am. Hence, as Gestalt psychology
has shown, there are for me certain shapes which are particularly
favoured, as they are for other men, and which are capable of giving
rise to a psychological science and rigorous laws.

这些意图通常具有双重意义:首先,它们形成一种系统,所有可能的客体同时被包括在里面的系统。假如山似乎高而矗立,树似乎小而倾斜。而且,它们不仅属于我,它们起源于我之外的东西,我若是在所有跟我一样组织的具有心理与生理的主体身上发现它们,我并不会惊讶。因此,如同格式塔心理学所显示,对于我而言,有某些的形状特别地被喜爱,如同它们对于其他人而言。这些形状能够产生心理的科学与严谨的法则。

The grouping of dots
. . . . . . .. . . ..
is always perceived as six pairs of dots with two millimetres between
each pair, while one figure is always perceived as a cube, and another as
a plane mosaic.5 It is as if, on the hither side of our judgement and our freedom, someone were assigning such and such a significance to such
and such a given grouping. It is indeed true that perceptual structures
do not always force themselves upon the observer; there are some
which are ambiguous.

、、、、、、小数点的汇集总是被感知作为六个小数点的配对,每个配对之间有两个公喱。而一个图形总是被感知,作为一个立方体,另外一个,作为平面的马赛克。好像在我们的判断与我们的自由的那一边,某个人总是指定某某的意义,给某某的特点的汇集。的确,感知的结构未必强加它们自己在观察者身上。有些感知的结构是暧昧的。

But these reveal even more effectively the presence
within us of spontaneous evaluation: for they are elusive shapes
which suggest constantly changing meanings to us. Now a pure consciousness
is capable of anything except being ignorant of its intentions,
and an absolute freedom cannot choose itself as hesitant, since
that amounts to allowing itself to be drawn in several directions, and
since, the possibilities being ex hypothesi indebted to freedom for all the
strength they have, the weight that freedom gives to one is thereby
withdrawn from the rest.

但是这些结构甚至更加有效地显示在我们内部具有自动自发的评估存在。因为它们是闪躲不定的形状,对于我们,暗示着不断改变的意义。现在,纯粹的意识能够做任何事情,除了就是无知于它的意图。绝对的自由无法选择它自身,作为犹豫,因为那相等于是容许它自己朝好几个方向被拉扯。因为各种可能性就是「从假设诞生」,这归功于他们拥有的力量的自由。因此,自由给予一个人的重量,因此从其余的重量隐退。

We can break up a shape by looking at it awry,
but this too is because freedom uses the gaze along with its spontaneous
evaluations. Without the latter, we would not have a world, that
is, a collection of things which emerge from a background of formlessness
by presenting themselves to our body as ‘to be touched’, ‘to be
taken’, ‘to be climbed over’.

我们能够分解一个形状,凭借歪扭地看待它。但是这也是因为自己使用凝视,以及它的自动自发的评估。假如没有后者,我们将不会有一个世界。换句话说,从没有形状的背景出现的物象的汇集,凭借呈现它们给我们的身体,作为「能够被碰触」,「能够被接纳」,「能够被攀登」。

We should never be aware of adjusting
ourselves to things and reaching them where they are, beyond us, but
would be conscious only of restricting our thoughts to the immanent
objects of our intentions, and we should not be in the world, ourselves
implicated in the spectacle and, so to speak, intermingled with things,
we should simply enjoy the spectacle of a universe. It is, therefore, true
that there are no obstacles in themselves, but the self which qualifies
them as such is not some acosmic subject; it runs ahead of itself in
relation to things in order to confer upon them the form of things.

我们将不知道,我们适应于各种物象,并且在它们所在之处,超越我们之处,抵达它们。我们仅是意识到限制我们的思想于我们各种意图的内在性的客体。我们将不是在世界里,我们自己被牵涉到景象里。所谓的跟各种物象混杂一块。我们仅是享受宇宙的景象。因此,各种物象自身确实并没有阻碍,但是作为它们的特质的自身,并不是某个非宇宙的主体,它运作在跟物象相关的它自身前头,为了要赋予它们物象的形式。

There is an autochthonous significance of the world which is constituted
in the dealings which our incarnate existence has with it, and
which provides the ground of every deliberate Sinngebung.

在我们肉身的存在跟它的这些来往中被形成的世界,具有原生的意义。这个世界供应每个刻意的「赋予意义Sinngebung」的场域。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

庞蒂论自由

May 2, 2014

龐蒂論自由 01
Merleau-Ponty on Freedom
From The Phenomenology of Perception 感覺現象學 p.434
Again, it is clear that no causal relationship is conceivable between the subject and his body, his world or his society. Only at the cost of losing the basis of all my certainties can I question what is conveyed to me by my presence to myself.
再一次,顯而易見,我們無法想像,主體跟其身體、世界、或社會,有任何因果關係。只有以喪失我所有的穩定結構的基礎作為代價,我才可能會質疑到,我存在於自我世界,所被傳達的訊息。
Now the moment I turn to myself in order to describe myself, I have a glimpse of an anonymous flux, a comprehensive project in which there are so far no ‘states of consciousness’, nor, a fortiori, characteristics of any sort. For myself I am neither ‘ jealous,’ nor ‘inquisitive’, nor ‘ hunchbacked’, nor ‘ a civil servant’.
此時,我一轉身內省,以便描述自己,我瞥見一股無以名狀的流動,一種迄今尚無「意識狀態」,遑論有任何特徵的全面洪流。對我自己而言,人家說我妒嫉、好打聽、駝背、或公務員,皆非我內在屬性。
It is often a matter of surprise that the cripple or the invalid can put up with himself. The reason is such people are not for themselves deformed or at death’s door. Until the final coma, the dying man is inhabited by a consciousness, he is all that he sees, and enjoys this much of an outlet. Consciousness can never objectify itself into invalid-consciousness or cripple-consciousness, and even if the old man complains of his age or the cripple of his deformity, they can do so only by comparing themselves with others, that is, by taking a statistical and objective view of themselves, so that such complaints are never absolutely genuine: when he is back in the heart of his own consciousness, each one of us feels beyond his limitations and thereupon resigns himself to them. They are the price which we automatically pay for being in the world, a formality which we take for granted. Hence we may speak disparagingly of our looks and still not want to change our face for another.
我們時常驚奇,殘障人士跟病患為何能忍受他們自己的處境。道理很簡單,對他們自己而言,他們並沒有意識到自己是殘障或彌留病床。直到昏迷之前,逗留在垂死者心中的,只有一種意識,那就是他自己是他所看到的一切,對於這樣的逃避現實,他坦然心安。意識永遠無法客體化成為成為病患意識,或殘障意識。即使老人抱怨自己的年老體衰,殘障人士抱怨自己的殘疾不全,他們會如此抱怨,是因為跟別人互相的比較,或是透過別人眼光看待自己,換句話說,他們開始以量化及客觀的觀點看待自己,所以這種抱怨並非全然都是真誠發出。當他回到自己意識的核心,我們每個人都會感覺到,自己能超越自己局限性,因此對於他們也就不會那麼耿耿於懷。我們生存在世,必然要付出代價承接這樣的局限性,這是我們視為理所當然的條件。因此我們或許會對自己的容貌自慚形穢,可是依舊不願以自己的容貌跟別人交換。
No idiosyncrasy can, seeming, be attached to the insuperable generality of consciousness, nor can any limit be set to this immeasurable power of escape. In order to be determined ( in the two sense of the word) by an external factor, it is necessary that I should be a thing. Neither my freedom nor my universality can admit of any eclipse. It is inconceivable that I should be free in certain of my actions and determined in others: how should we understand a dormant freedom that gave full scope to determinism? And it is assumed that it is snuffed out when it is not in action, how could it be rekindled? If per impossibile I had once succeeded in making myself into a thing, how should I subsequently reconvert myself to consciousness?
似乎,意識這種無法客體化的普遍性,也不能將它歸咎於任何怪誕行徑,正如人有逃避現實的無窮能力,也無法受到任何限制。我若是要受外在因素所決定(決定論的雙重意涵),我必然會淪為物化的命運。可是,我的自由跟我的意識無法客體化的普遍性,卻不容許受到任何損害。我們無法想像,我的某些行為是自由行使,而在其它行為上卻是受到命運決定。我們怎麼可能理解:我們的自由會備而不用,卻讓決定論大行其道?有人假設自由不行使時,會像燭火熄滅,那請問要如何重新點燃?就算是我有朝一日真的成功地將自己物化(實際上不可能),我以後要怎麼將自己重新轉換回到意識?
Once I am free, I am not to be counted among things, and I must then be uninterruptedly free. Once my actions cease to be mine, I shall never recover them, and if I lose my hold on the world, it will never be restored to me. It is equally inconceivable that my liberty should be attenuated; one cannot be to some extent free, and if, as is often said, motives incline me in a certain direction, one of two things happens: either they are strong enough to force me to act, in which case there is no freedom, or else they are not strong enough, and then freedom is complete, and as great in the worst torments as in the peace of one’s home.
一但我是自由,我就不可能被認為是物化,我必須毫無阻礙地自由。一但我的行動不再屬於我自己的意志,我將身不由己。假如我失去對於世界的掌控,我將永遠無法恢復這種掌控世界的自由。我們也同樣無法想像,我的自由應該受到約束,因為我們不可能只是有限度的自由。就算是如俗話所說,動機會使我們必然走向某個方向,這時只有兩種可能:一種是動機足夠強烈,我不得不聽令行事,在這種情況,我無自由可言。另一種是動機不夠強烈,我的自由毫髮無傷,無論是接受苦刑拷打,或是在自己平靜的家裡,我都自由自在。
We ought, therefore, to reject not only the idea of causality, but also that of motivation. The alleged motive does not burden my decision; on the contrary my decision lends the motive its force. Everything that I ‘am’ in virtue of nature or history—hunchbacked, handsome or Jewish—I never am completely for myself, as we have just explained; and I may well be these things for other people, nevertheless I remain free to posit another person as a consciousness whose views strike through to my very being, or on the other hand merely as an object.
因此,我們不但應該拒絕因果的觀念,而且也要拒絕動機的觀念。別人所宣稱的動機,並沒有成為我決定的負擔,相反的,我的決定借助力量給動機。我因為天生或歷史遺傳的我的屬性,無論是駝背,帥俊,或猶太人血統,我都不是因為自己而擁有這些屬性,如我剛才所說,而是因為別人的看待才如此被物化。可是,我始終擁有自由選擇另外一個人一方面作為意識,這個意識的觀點直接襲擊到我存在核心,或者另一方面僅僅是當一個客體。
It is also true that this option is itself a form of constraint: if I am ugly, I have the choice between being an object of disapproval or disapproving of others. I am left free to be a masochist or a sadist, but not free to ignore others. But this dilemma, which is given as port of the human lot, is not one for me as pure consciousness: it is still I who makes another to be for me and makes each of us be as human beings.
沒錯,這種選擇本身也是一種受到約束的形式:假如我長得醜,我可以選擇成為別人不認同的對象,也可以選擇不認同別人的觀點。問題是,我有自由選擇成為受虐狂者或虐待狂者,卻沒有自由選擇不理會別人觀點。但是這個困境是人類的部份命運,我並不必要把它當著是我的純淨意識:創造另一種困境來充當我的存在,使我們兩個人各自擁有作為人的存在的,依舊是我。
Moreover, even if existence as a human being were imposed upon me, the manner alone being left to my choice, and considering this choice itself and ignoring the small number of forms it might take, it would still be a free choice. If it is said that my temperament inclines me particularly to either sadism or masochism, it is still merely a manner of speaking, for my temperament exists only for the second order knowledge that I gain about myself when I see myself as others see me, and in so far as I recognize it, confer value upon it, and in that sense, choose it.
而且,即使作為人的存在是上天賦予,聽任我選擇的方式只有一種,這依舊算是一種自由的選擇,假如我們考慮到這種選擇的本身的性質,並且不要去理會選澤的方式是多麼有限。即使我的性情據說會使我特別傾向於成為虐待狂,或受虐狂,那也是表達的問題,因為我的性情的存在,僅是我對於自己的次級的知識,也就是我依照別人看待我的方式看待自己,再依照我的認識,賦予價值在那個知識上,然後以那個意義選擇我的性情。
What misleads us on this, is that we often look for freedom in the voluntary deliberation which examines one motive after another and seems to opt for the weightiest or most convincing. In reality the deliberation follows the decision, and it is my secret decision which brings the motives to light, for it would be difficult to conceive what the force of a motive might be in the absence of a decision which it confirms or to which it runs counter.
在此誤導我們的是,我們往往在一廂情願的深思熟慮中尋求自由,將動機反覆審察,似乎總是選擇最沉重,或是最令人信服的。事實上,先有決定才跟著深思熟慮,而且是我的秘密決定使動機為人所知,因為動機所證實,所對立的決定若是不存在,我們很難想像動機的力量是什麼。
When I have abandoned a project, the motives which I thought held me to it suddenly lose their force and collapse. In order to resuscitate them, an effort is required on my part to reopen time and set me back to the moment preceding the making of the decision. Even while I am deliberating, already I find it an effort to suspend time’s flow, and to keep open a situation which I feel is closed by a decision which is already there and which I am holding off. That is why it so often happens that after giving up a plan I experience a feeling of relief: “ After all, I wasn’t all that involved’; the debate was purely a matter of form, and the deliberation a mere parody, for I had decided against from the start.
當我已經放棄一個計劃,原先讓我堅持以赴的動機,會突然失去力量而崩塌。為了復甦這些動機,我必需要努力重新開啟時間,讓我回到做決定前的那個時刻。即使在我深思熟慮的時刻,我發覺要費相當努力,才能將時間的流動懸置,並開放一個情境。這個情境被我認為是已經存在,而且我正在抗拒的決定所封閉。這就是為什麼在我放棄一個計劃之後,我往往會經驗到身心輕鬆的感覺:「畢竟,我還不至於那麼欲罷不能!」所爭議的純粹是形式的問題,深思熟慮充其量是扭捏作態,因為從一開頭,我就已經是決定反對。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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龐蒂論自由 506
龐蒂論自由 02
We often see the weakness of the will brought forward as an argument against freedom. And indeed, although I can will myself to adopt a course of conduct and act the part of a warrior or a seducer, it is not within my power to be a warrior or a seducer with ease and in a way that ‘comes naturally’; really to be one, that is.
我們時常看到,意志的軟弱被提出來,作為反駁自由的論點。的確,雖然我有意願要從事某種行為,扮演鬥士或誘拐者的角色,我不見得就有那個能力輕而易舉成為鬥士或誘拐者,那樣天然渾成,換言之,我不是天生的鬥士或誘拐者。
But neither should we seek freedom in the act of will, which is, in its very meaning, something short of an act. We have recourse to an act of will only in order to go against our true decision, and, as it were, for the purpose of proving our powerlessness.
但是我們也不應該在意志的行動中尋找自由,因為意志的行動,就其意義而言,意志先行,行動未必履行。我們訴諸於意志的行動,只是要違背我們自己的真實決定,也就是所謂,為了證明自己的無可奈何。
If we had really and truly made the conduct of the warrior or the seducer our own, then we should be one or the other. Even what are called obstacles to freedom are in reality deployed by it.
假如我們真實道地將鬥士或誘拐者的行為,表現為我們自己的行為,那麼我們應該就是鬥士或是誘拐者。即使所謂的阻礙實際上已被清除。
An unclimbable rock face, a large or small, vertical or slanting rock, are things which have no meaning for anyone who is not intending to surmount them, for a subject whose projects do not carve out such determinate forms from the uniform mass of the in itself and cause an orientated world to arise—a significance in things.
一座高不可攀的岩層,無論大小,垂直或傾斜,對於無意去征服他們的人,不具有意義,因為他們並沒有計劃要從大自然的質樸表面從事決心的舉動,產生意義,展現有向度的世界。
There is, then, ultimately nothing that can set limits to freedom, except those limits that freedom itself has set in the form of its various initiatives, so that the subject has simply the external world that he gives himself.
因此,追根究底,自由沒有任何限制,除了自由本身因為具有各種創意而豎立的那些限制,所以主體只擁有他自己所給予的外在世界。
Since it is the latter who, on coming into being, brings to light significance and value in things, and since no thing can impinge upon it except through acquiring, thanks to it, significance and value, there is no action of things on the subject, but merely a signification ( in the active sense), a centrifugal Sinngebung.
既然是具有創意的人出現時,才會使事物的意義跟價值出現,既然自由不會受到任何侵犯,除非你因為自由的創意而獲得意義跟價值,主體本身並沒有事物的行動,僅僅是一種意義(主動的意義),一種離心的意義。
The choice would seem to lie between scientism’s conception of causality, which is incompatible with the consciousness which we have of ourselves, and the assertion of an absolute freedom divorced from the outside. It is impossible to decide beyond which point things cease to be εψμων. Either they all lie within our power, or none does.
有兩種選擇,一種是科學家的因果觀念,跟我們對於自己所擁有的意識不相和諧。另一種是絕對自由的主張,跟外在世界脫離。我們無法決定,超越哪一點事物就蕩然無存。事物要就是在我們的掌控力量之內,要不就全都無法操控。
The result, however, of this first reflection on freedom would appear to be to rule it out altogether. If indeed it is the case that our freedom is the same in all our actions, and even in our passions, if it is not to be measured in terms of our conduct, and if the slave displays freedom as much by living in fear as by breaking this chains, then it cannot be held that there is such a thing as free action, freedom being anterior to all actions.
可是,對於自由最初反省的結果常是將自由完全地排除掉。的確,假如我們的自由都一樣,不論在我們所有的行動,或在我們的激情,假如我們的自由不是以我們的行為的表現來衡量,假如奴隸生活於恐懼中的自由,跟打破鎖鏈的自由沒什麼兩樣,那麼我們很難相信有自由行動這樣的東西,早先於行動的自由。
In any case it will not be possible to declare: “ Here freedom makes its appearance”, since free action, in order to be discernible, has to stand out against a background of life from which it is entirely, or almost entirely, absent. We may say in this case that it is everywhere, but equally nowhere. In the name of freedom we reject the idea of acquisition, since freedom has become a primordial acquisition and, as it were, our state of nature.
無論如何,我們不可能宣稱:「自由出現在此」,因為自由行動要能被覺察出來,必先要有一個生活的背景作為對抗,而在那裡,自由完全,或近乎完全不存在。在此情形,我們可以說,人無處不自由,但同樣的也無處自由。以自由之名,我們排除獲得的觀念,因為自由已經變成原初的獲得,也就是我們的自然狀態。
Since we do not have to provide it, it is the gift granted to us of having no gift, it is the nature of consciousness which consists in having no nature, and in no case can it find external expression or a place in our life. The idea of action, therefore, disappears: nothing can pass from us to the world, since we are nothing that can be specified, and since the non-being which constitutes us could not possibly find its way into the world’s plenum.
既然自由不是我們必須提供,而是一種上天賦予我們的不是天賦的天賦,是一種不需要有任何特性的意識的特性,它無法在我們的生活中找到外在的表達或位置。行動的觀念因此消失,因為沒有一樣東西能從我們身上傳遞到世界,因為我們不是任何所被指定的東西,因為組成我們的空性,不可能在世界的空間找到一個安身立命之處。
There are merely intentions immediately followed by their effects, and we are very near to the Kantian idea of an intention which is tantamount to the act, which Scheler countered with the argument that the cripple who would like to be able to save a drowning man and the good swimmer who actually saves him do not have the same experience of autonomy.
緊跟隨他們的情意而來的僅僅是意向性。在此,我們跟康德的意向就是行動的觀念頗為接近。希勒曾經反駁說:想要拯救溺水的殘障者跟實際上救起他的游泳高手,他們的自主的經驗並不相同。
The very idea of choice vanishes, for to choose is to choose something in which freedom sees, at least for a moment, a symbol of itself. There is free choice only if freedom comes into play in its decision, and posits the situation chosen as a situation of freedom.
選擇的觀念消失不見,因為選擇是要選擇某件自由看得到本身的符號,至少有那麼一個時刻。只有自由在做決定時運作,並假設有一個情況,可以選擇來當自由的情況,這樣才有自由的選擇。
A freedom which has no need to be exercised because it is already acquired could not commit itself in this way: it knows that the following instant will find it, come way may, just as free and just as indeterminate. The very notion of freedom demands that our decision should plunge into the future, that something should have been done by it, that the subsequent instant should benefit from its predecessor and, though not necessitated, should be at least required by it.
一個已經擁有的自由,就不需要去運用,無法以這個方式呈現:它無時無刻不自由,無論發生何事,同樣自由,同樣任性。自由的觀念要求,我們的決定應該投入未來,自由本來應該有所作為,隨後的瞬間應該從前頭的瞬間得到益處,至少應該受到它所要求,雖然未必有此需要。
If freedom is doing, it is necessary that what it does should not be immediately undone by a new freedom.
假如自由正在運用,它所運用的不應該立刻被新的自由所破壞。
Each instant, therefore, must not be a closed world; one instant must be able to commit its successors and, a decision once taken and action once begun, I must have something acquired at my disposal, I must benefit from my impetus, I must be inclined to carry on, and there must be a bent or propensity of the mind.
因此,每個瞬間切不可是一個封閉的世界,一個瞬間必須能夠銜接前一個瞬間。一但下定決心,一但採取行動,我必須要有某件聽由我支配的東西,我必須要從我的動機得到益處。我必須要有執行的意向,我的心必須意志堅決。
It was Descartes who held that conservation demands a power as great as does creation; a view which implies a realistic notion of the instant. It is true that the instant is not a philosopher’s fiction. It is the point at which one project is brought to fruition and another begun—the point at which my gaze is transferred from one end to another, it is the Augen-Blick.
笛卡爾認為,保存所需要的力量跟創造一樣強烈。這個觀點暗示著瞬間有著實際的觀念。的確,瞬間並非是哲學家的幻想。它是一個計劃圓滿達成,另一個計劃開始的時刻。此時,我的眼光從一端轉移到另一端,這被稱為「創造瞬間」。
But this break in time cannot occur unless each of the two spans is of a piece. Consciousness, it is said, though not atomized into instants, at least haunted by the specter of the instant which it is obliged continually to exorcise by a free act.
但是這個時間的中斷不會發生,除非兩段時間有一段尾隨在後。據說,意識雖然不會分裂成為瞬間,至少會被瞬間所縈迴,因此它不得不用自由的行動,將瞬間驅除。
We shall soon see that we have indeed always the power to interrupt, but it implies in any case a power to begin, for there would be no severance unless freedom had taken up its abode somewhere and were preparing to move it.
我們不久將看到,我們總是有中斷的力量,但它意味著隨時都有開始的力量。因為除非自由曾經停駐,並且正準備離開,否則不會有分劣
Unless there are cycles of behavior , open situations requiring a certain completion and capable of constituting a background to either a confirmatory or transformatory decision, we never experience freedom.
除非有行為的循環及開放的情境,要求某種的完成,並且能夠形成可以驗證或轉移的決定的背景,我們永遠不會經驗到自由。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw

庞蒂论自由 544
Choice of an intelligible
sort is excluded, not only because there is no time anterior to time, but
because choice presupposes a prior commitment and because the idea
of an initial choice involves a contradiction. If freedom is to have room*
in which to move, if it is to be describable as freedom, there must be
something to hold it away from its objectives, it must have a field, which
means that there must be for it special possibilities, or realities which
tend to cling to being.

属于明智的选择被排除。不但是因为没有时间之前的时间,而且因为选择预先假设一个先前的奉献,因为最初的选择牵涉到悖论。假如自由是要拥有能够运动的空间,假如它应该可被描述为自由,就必须要有某件东西保留它,避开它的各种目标,它必须要有一个「领域」。这意味着,必须要有特别的可能性给自由。或倾向于坚持生命实存的现实。

As J. P. Sartre himself observes, dreaming is
incompatible with freedom because, in the realm of imagination, we
have no sooner taken a certain significance as our goal than we already
believe that we have intuitively brought it into being, in short, because
there is no obstacle and nothing to do.4 It is established that freedom is
not to be confused with those abstract decisions of will at grips with
motives or passions, for the classical conception of deliberation is relevant
only to a freedom ‘in bad faith’ which secretly harbours antagonistic
motives without being prepared to act on them, and so itself
manufactures the alleged proofs of its impotence.

如同萨特自己观察到,梦跟自由并不和谐。因为在想像的国度,我们才刚拥有某个意义作为我们的目标,我们就已经相信,我们已经直觉地让这个意义存在。总之,因为没有阻碍,没有事情好做。有人证明,自由不应该跟意志的那些抽象的决定混淆,因为它们正在跟动机与激情互相博斗。因为使用心计的古典观念跟自由相关的仅是「恶念」。这种「恶念」秘密地怀抱著敌意的动机,却没有凖备根据它们採取行动。所以,恶念自身制造的是它的无能为力的宣告的证明。

3 J. P. Sartre, L’Etre et le Neant, p. 544

We can see, beneath
these noisy debates and these fruitless efforts to ‘construct’ ourselves,
the tacit decisions whereby we have marked out round ourselves the
field of possibility, and it is true that nothing is done as long as we
cling to these fixed points, and everything is easy as soon as we have
weighed anchor. This is why our freedom is not to be sought in spurious
discussion on the conflict between a style of life which we have no
wish to reappraise and circumstances suggestive of another: the real
choice is that of whole character and our manner of being in the world.

从吵杂的争论及这些徒劳的努力要「建构」我们自己底下,我们能够看出那些沉默的决定。在那里,我们已经标记出可能性的领域,环绕我们自己。的确,只要我们坚持这些固定的点,就没有什么可做,只要我们已经下定锚点,一切都容易。这就是为什么我们的自由不应该在似是而非的讨论中寻找,讨论生活方式与环境的冲突。对于前者,我们并没有意愿重新评估;而后者暗示着另外一种生活方式。真实的选择是整体性格,以及在世界中的存在方式的选择。

But either this total choice is never uttered, since it is the silent upsurge
of our being in the world, in which case it is not clear in what sense it
could be said to be ours, since this freedom glides over itself and is the
equivalent of a fate—or else our choice of ourselves is truly a choice, a
conversion involving our whole existence.

但是,这个整体的选择永远没有被表达,因为我们存在于世界是沉默的涌出。在那种情况,实在很难清楚,它在怎样的意义能够说是属于我们。因为自由的自身在滑动,自由相等于就是命运。否则我们对于自己的选择确实是选择,牵涉到我们整个的生命的存在的转换。

In this case, however, there is presupposed a previous acquisition which the choice sets out to
modify and it founds a new tradition: this leads us to ask whether the
perpetual severance in terms of which we initially defined freedom is
not simply the negative aspect of our universal commitment to a
world, and whether our indifference to each determinate thing does
not express merely our involvement in all; whether the ready-made
freedom from which we started is not reducible to a power of initiative,
which cannot be transformed into doing without taking up some
proposition of the world, and whether, in short, concrete and actual
freedom is not indeed to be found in this exchange.

在这种情况,有一个先前的习得被预先假设,选择出发改正这种习得,它作为新的传统的基础。这引导我们寻问,使用永久的割裂这个术语,我们定义自由,这个永久的割裂,是否不仅是我们普遍性地献身一个世界的负面,我们对于每个决定的事情的漠视,是否表达的不仅是我们牵涉到整体。我们开头用现成的自由,这个现成的自由,能否被还原成为创意的力量。这个力量被转换成为行为时,必然会从事世界的某个主张。总之,具体与实际的自由确实不应该在这个交换里被找到。

It is true that
nothing has significance and value for anyone but me and through anyone
but me, but this proposition remains indeterminate and is still indistinguishable
from the Kantian idea of a consciousness which ‘finds in
things only what it has put into them’, and from the idealist refutation
of realism, as long as we fail to make clear how we understand significance
and the self.

的确,对于除了我以外的任何人,通过除了我以为的任何人,没有一样东西具有意义与价值。但是,这个主张始终是不确定的,并且依旧无法跟康德的意识的观念被区别。康德认为,意识在物象里仅是找到它已经放进它的东西。并且依旧无法跟写实主义对理念的反驳区别,只要我们没有澄清我们是如何理解意义及自性。

By defining ourselves as a universal power of Sinn-
Gebung, we have reverted to the method of the ‘thing without which’
and to the analytical reflection of the traditional type, which seeks the
conditions of possibility without concerning itself with the conditions
of reality. We must therefore resume the analysis of the Sinngebung, and
show how it can be both centrifugal and centripetal, since it has been
established that there is no freedom without a field.

凭借定义我们自己,作为是「被赋予意义」 Sinn Getung 的普遍性力量。我们转移到「没有的物象」thing without which ,并且转移到传统种类的分析的反思。这种反思寻找可能性的情况,却并不关怀现实的情况。我们因此必须重新开始分析「被赋予的意义」Sinn Getung ,然后显示它如何有时离心力,有时又是向心力。因为已经被证实的是,自由必然会有场域。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

伊丽嘉瑞论梅洛庞蒂的交织

December 1, 2013

梅洛庞蒂

从某个意义而言,假如我们想要明确表达人类的身体的建筑学,它的本体的架构,以及它如何看见自己及听见自己,我们将会看出,身体的的沉默的世界是如此强大,以致于语言的所有的可能性已经在里面被给予。我们作为看见者的存在已经被给予(也就是,我们说,我们作为将世界转回它自身的生命实存,它们通过到另外一边,他们用眼睛互相看见。
(p.179)

从梅洛庞蒂的观点,世界转回它自身。看见者并没有张开眼睛给这个世界或他者,在寻求及尊敬他们的差异的视阔的沉思当中。他翻转这个世界,如同他翻转他的手,他的玩物,他的创造吗?他能够将世界的结构投掷进入它的深度,或成功地涵盖它吗?但是什么姿态,什么姿态的品质能够让他相信,他已经涵盖这个世界?为了思想,梅洛庞蒂所需要的是直觉,还是信仰?一个他必须给出自己的场域?一个循环回到当思想进行时的相同的点的场域或思想?为了要进行下去。就像地球环绕太阳移动及环绕它自己的太阳?我们将会感觉,遭遇这个世界,观看他者,在这些循环的各种交会点?互相看见,通过他者看见每一个?

互相看见,假如我们发现自己在这个过程当中,处于让互相看见成为可能的迴圈的交会处?那似乎并不是一件被给予可见物与看见者之间的可逆性,过程的问题,可逆性对于这个「我」与这个「你」所涵盖的封闭的世界。在这个世界里面,运动是如此的强烈,以致于需要特殊的运气,两位看见者才会互相看见,在相同的迴圈的轨道和交岔途径彼此发现对方。或是互相观看,当他们走在平行的线上。或偶然会发生的是,他们互相看见彼此的眼睛?这是非常不可能的另外一个可能性。为了让这件事情发生,必须要先发生两位看见者吸收这个普遍性的世界,它的影响,这个世界,以确实相同的方式,他们在空间与时间的相同的点发现对方。这样的运气或机率太不可能?或是这样的恩典太不可能?在某个时刻,它让我们互相认同。

但是梅洛庞蒂并没有谈论这点。其余的部分仅会上肉身的幻梦。我们从来没有互相看见对方,我们并没有看见互相的眼睛。无论言说是多么的普遍性,我们的世界将我们分离,我们从没有跟它分离的世界。无论如何,依照这种我们怀抱的关系,在梅洛庞蒂的分析里。我们「将世界回转到它的自身」,并且「通过到另外一边」,因为我们是看见者?无可置疑地,在每个瞬间,对于可见度的视阔的保护薄膜,但不是对整个的世界。这个世界将必须被完成。这是可能的,假如身体的建筑学的这个解释,它的本体论的架构,显示所有的语言的可能性在沉默的世界被给予。假如没有语言,这个世界无法被感觉,可是,所有的语言都虚拟地存在于沉默当中。所有有待被说的东西是,世界跟主体是异质同形,反过来说也是一样。整体被封闭在迴圈里。没有新的事情发生,仅是处于世界与主体之间的这个永恒的编织。这个编织假设,主体看见整体,它是一切事物的敏锐洞见,一览无遗。世界与他自身都被洞见。假如所有的语言都已经驻居在主体与世界的沉默里,就像它们的本体论的组织,那么我将能够将世界回转到它自身,及回转到我自己,当我已经通过到另外一面。我正在跟语言的世界玩弄圈套遊戏吗?我增加了什么?或是我拿走什么?它总是一样。我环绕这个「中心」,这个锚碇点旋转,而没有更加靠近。我继续重复一个或许让我掉入,让我深入的姿态吗?掉入与深入这个世界?依照梅洛庞蒂,生命精力在这个纺织机的来回答动作里玩得精疲力尽。但是以这种方式编织可见物与我的眼神,我同样有理由说,我封闭它们,避开我自己。这些织料越来越紧,将我带进它,在那里庇护我,但是也囚禁我。

以某种的方式,这个主体从没有进入这个世界。他从来没有从这个分解当中出现,让他能够对他者说「你是谁」的这个分解。但也是说「我是谁」。当我们在一块时,我们互相代表怎样种类的事件?无可逆转的各种事件,除了在跟死亡相关的地方。梅洛庞蒂企图的这个肉身的现象学是无可置疑的。它并没有空间或中间,给两者之间质疑的自由。没有小他者或大他者来让这个世界保持开放。没有创世纪。没有神的恩典。因为人已经变成神,他运作与玩弄这个世界,直到它精疲力尽?非常小心地。但是没有某种的倦怠吗?由自己感受的。

梅洛庞蒂

从某个意义来说,理解一个词语实实在在就是用它自己响亮的存在充分地欢迎它,或者,如同我们清楚表达的,听见它所说的东西。
(p 179)

在此,意义跟声音混合,所被说出的东西的锁链的整体性,被融合于文辞锁链的各种差异化。它用文字给予那些有耳朵听见的人们,以及那些被定位于被文字笼罩的风景。它因此仅是言说的变调。每样东西都被给予,里面与外面。它始终仅是要欢迎,解密,诠释,与听见。

梅洛庞蒂

从某个意义而言,哲学的整体,如同胡赛尔所说的,就在于恢复能给予意义的力量,意义的诞生,或是疯狂的意义,由语言所给予的经验的表达。它特别澄清语言的这个特别的领域。
(p 179)

每样东西都被给予,可是哲学的功用就是要恢复给予意义的力量,意义的诞生,或疯狂的意义。问题是: 假如没有改变语言的基础,哲学能否能够可能做到?假如没有撤销这个假设:可逆性是最后的真理?这是一个必须被质疑而且被展开的假设,假如尚未被听见的意义将会存在的话。这是性化的语言的意义,它通过言说,以及在这个世界里,遭遇无法还原成为它的性别,它不可能跟它拥有可逆性的关系,而没有剩余物。

雄伯译
32hsiung@phcome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com