Archive for the ‘Freud’ Category

论自恋 g

October 21, 2014

论自恋 g
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

A third way in which we may approach the study of narcissism is by
observing the erotic life of human beings, with its many kinds of
differentiation in man and woman. Just as object-libido at first concealed
ego-libido from our observation, so too in connection with the object-choice of infants (and of growing children) what we first noticed was that they derived their sexual objects from their experiences of satisfaction.

第三个方法,我们用来探索自恋的研究,是凭借观察人类的性爱生活,在男人与女人身上的许多差异。正如客体-力比多首先隐藏自我-力比多,让我们观察不到。关于婴孩(正在成长的小孩)的客体-选择也是一样。我们首先注意到的东西是,他们从满足的经验里获得他们的性的客体。

The first auto-erotic sexual satisfactions are experienced in connection with vital functions which serve the purpose of self-preservation. The sexual instincts are at the outset attached to the satisfaction of the ego-instincts; only later do they become independent of these, and even then we have an indication of that original attachment in the fact that the persons who are concerned with a child’s feeding, care, and protection become his earliest sexual objects: that is to say, in the first instance his mother or a substitute for her. Side by side, however, with this type and source of object-choice, which may be called the ‘anaclitic’ or ‘attachment’ type,2 psycho-analytic research has revealed a second
type, which we were not prepared for finding.

最初的自动-性爱的性的满足被经验到,关于充当自我满足的生命的功能。性的本能从一开头就跟自我-本能的满足联接一块。只有到后来,他们才离开自我-本能独立起来。即使在那时,我们拥有原初联接的这个指示。根据这个事实:跟小孩的餵食,照顾,与保护有关系的人们,变成他最早期的性的客体:换句话说,在第一个情况,他的母亲或母亲的替代者。可是,这种客体-选择与来源,可以被称为是「依附」或「联接」的类型,跟它并列存在的,精神分析研究已经显示第二个类型,我们还没有准备要发现的类型。

We have discovered,
especially clearly in people whose libidinal development has suffered some disturbance, such as perverts and homosexuals, that in their later choice of love-objects they have taken as a model not their mother but their own selves.

特别是在力比多的发展遭受困扰的人们身上,譬如倒错症者与同性恋者,我们清楚地发现,在他们后来对于恋爱-对象的选择,他们採用作为模范的,不是他们的母亲,而是他们自己。

They are plainly seeking themselves as a love-object, and are
exhibiting a type of object-choice which must be termed ‘narcissistic’. In
this observation we have the strongest of the reasons which have led us to adopt the hypothesis of narcissism.

他们清楚地寻求他们自己,作为恋爱对象,并且展示一种可称之为「自恋的」客体-选择。观察到这点,我们拥有最强烈的理由,曾经引导我们採用自恋的假设。

We have, however, not concluded that human beings are divided into
two sharply differentiated groups, according as their object-choice
conforms to the anaclitic or to the narcissistic type; we assume rather that both kinds of object-choice are open to each individual, though he may show a preference for one or the other. We say that a human being has originally two sexual objects—himself and the woman who nurses him— and in doing so we are postulating a primary narcissism in everyone, which may in some cases manifest itself in a dominating fashion in his objectchoice.

可是,我们还没有下这个结论:人类被区分成为两个明显差异的群体,依照他们的客体选择符合依附型或自恋型。相反地,我们假定,两种的客体-选择开放给予每个个人,虽然他可能显示偏爱依附型或自恋型。我们说,每个人原先就有两个性的客体—他自己与照顾他的女人—当我们这样做时,我们提出假设:每个人身上都有原初的自恋。在某些的情况,这个原初的自恋以支使的方式展示它自己,在他的客体-选择。

A comparison of the male and female sexes then shows that there are
fundamental differences between them in respect of their type of objectchoice, although these differences are of course not universal. Complete object-love of the attachment type is, properly speaking, characteristic of the male. It displays the marked sexual overvaluation which is doubtless derived from the child’s original narcissism and thus corresponds to a transference of that narcissism to the sexual object.

比较男人与女人的性因此显示:他们之间有基本的差异,关于他们的客体-选择的类型,虽然这些差异当然并非是普世的差异。依附型的完整的恋爱-客体,贴切地说,表现男性的特征。它展示明显的性的过分评估,无可置疑地,那是从小孩原初的自恋得来,因此对应于那个自恋对于性的客体的移情。

This sexual
overvaluation is the origin of the peculiar state of being in love, a state
suggestive of a neurotic compulsion, which is thus traceable to an
impoverishment of the ego as regards libido in favour of the love-object.1
A different course is followed in the type of female most frequently met with, which is probably the purest and truest one. With the onset of puberty the maturing of the female sexual organs, which up till then have been in a condition of latency, seems to bring about an intensification of the original narcissism, and this is unfavourable to the development of a true objectchoice with its accompanying sexual overvaluation.

对于性的过分评估就是处于恋爱的特殊状态的起源,暗示着神经症的冲动的状态。它因此可被追溯到关于力比多赞同恋爱-客体的自我的贫瘠。经常被遇到的,在女性的类型,则是遵循不同的途径。随着青春期的开始,女性性器官的成熟似乎导致原初自恋的强化,尽管直到那时,它们始终处于潜在的状态。这对于真实的客体-选择的发展是不利的,因为它伴随着性的过分高估。

Women, especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment which compensates them for the social restrictions that are imposed upon them in their choice of object. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an intensity comparable to that of the man’s love for them. Nor does their need lie in the direction of loving, but of being loved; and the man who fulfils this condition is the one who finds favour with them. The importance of this type of woman for the erotic life of mankind is to be rated very high. Such women have the greatest fascination for men, not only for aesthetic reasons, since as a rule they are the most beautiful, but also because of a combination of interesting psychological factors.

女人发展某种的自我满足,特别假如她们长得漂亮。这种自我满足弥补她们,因为社会赋加在她们身上的限制,对于她们的客体-选择。严格地说,这些女人强烈所爱的仅是她们自己,跟男人的爱女人比较起来。她们的需要也不是在于恋爱的方向,而是被爱。满足这个条件的男人就是受到女人喜爱的男人。就人类的性爱生活而言,这种女人的重要性,应该被评估很高。这些女人对于男人拥有最强烈的吸引力,不但是因为美学的理由。因为通常她们都是非常美丽,而且因为有趣的心理的因素的组合。

For it seems very evident that another person’s narcissism has a great
attraction for those who have renounced part of their own narcissism and
are in search of object-love. The charm of a child lies to a great extent in
his narcissism, his self-contentment and inaccessibility, just as does the
charm of certain animals which seem not to concern themselves about us, such as cats and the large beasts of prey. Indeed, even great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it.

因为似乎显而易见地,另外一个人的自恋对于另外一个人具有强烈的吸引力,对于那些放弃他们自己的部分的自恋,并且正在寻找客体之爱的人们。小孩的魅力主要是在于他的自恋,他的自我-满足与无法接近。正如某些动物的魅力似乎关注的不是我们,譬如猫与大地猎食动物。的确,即使是可恶的罪犯与可爱的幽默大师,如同他们在文学里被代表。他们引起我们的興趣,由于自恋的一贯性。他们以这个自恋的一贯性,来避开会损害他们的自我的任何东西。

It is as if we envied them for maintaining a blissful state of mind—an unassailable libidinal position which we ourselves have since abandoned. The great charm of narcissistic women has, however, its reverse side; a large part of the lover’s dissatisfaction, of his doubts of the woman’s love, of his complaints of her enigmatic nature, has its root in this incongruity between the types of object-choice.

好像我们妒忌他们,因为他们维持一种幸福的心灵状态—一个无懈可击的力比多的立场,那是我们自己从此已经放弃的立场。可是,自恋的女人的强烈魅力也有它的不利的负面,恋人满足的一大部分,他对于女人的爱恋的怀疑的负面,他抱怨她的迷团一般的天性,都具有它的根源于这个不协调,这些客体-选择之间的不协调。

Perhaps it is not out of place here to give an assurance that this
description of the feminine form of erotic life is not due to any tendentious desire on my part to depreciate women. Apart from the fact that tendentiousness is quite alien to me, I know that these different lines of development correspond to the differentiation of functions in a highly
complicated biological whole; further, I am ready to admit that there are
quite a number of women who love according to the masculine type and
who also develop the sexual overvaluation proper to that type.

或许,在此这并非不适合,假如我们如此地确定:女性的性爱生活的描述,并不是由于我这边具有任何固执的欲望,想要贬低女人。除了这个事实:我的天性绝非固执。我知道,这些不同的发展的脉络,对应于各种功能的差异,在非常复杂的生物的整体。而且,我准备承认,有相当多的女人依照男性的类型恋爱,并且也发展那种类型对性的过分高估。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

论自恋 f2

October 20, 2014

论自恋 f
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

We see that, if we follow up this line of thought, we come up against
the problem not only of hypochondria, but of the other ‘actual’ neuroses— neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis. Let us therefore stop at this point. It is not within the scope of a purely psychological inquiry to penetrate so far behind the frontiers of physiological research. I will merely mention that from this point of view we may suspect that the relation of hypochondria to paraphrenia is similar to that of the other ‘actual’ neuroses to hysteria and obsessional neurosis: we may suspect, that is, that it is dependent on egolibido just as the others are on object-libido, and that hypochondriacal anxiety is the counterpart, as coming from ego-libido, to neurotic anxiety.

我们看见,假如我们遵循这个思想脉络,我们会遭遇不但是忧郁症的难题,而且也会遭遇另外一种「实际」的神经症—神经衰弱与焦虑神经症。让我们因此这一点适可而止。要如此深入地贯穿到心理学研究的边境背后,并不是纯粹心理学的研究的范围之内。我将仅是提到,从这个观点,我们可能怀孕,忧郁症跟神经衰弱的关系,类同于另外的「实际」神经症跟歇斯底里与妄想神经症的关系。也就是说,我们可能怀疑,忧郁症依靠自我-力比多,正如其他两种依靠客体力比多。因为它来自自我-力比多,忧郁症的焦虑就是神经症的焦虑。

Further, since we are already familiar with the idea that the mechanism of falling ill and of the formation of symptoms in the transference neuroses— the path from introversion to regression—is to be linked to a damming-up of object-libido,2 we may come to closer quarters with the idea of a damming-up of ego-libido as well and may bring this idea into relation with the phenomena of hypochondria and paraphrenia.

而且,因为我们已经熟悉这个观念:在移情神经症者,生病与病征的形成的心理机制,从内倾到退转的途径,应该更客体-力比多的阻塞息息相关。我们可能来到更加靠近的地区,也带着自我-力比多的阻塞的观念,并且将这个观念带进跟忧郁症与神经衰弱的现象的关系。

At this point, our curiosity will of course raise the question why this
damming-up of libido in the ego should have to be experienced as
unpleasurable. I shall content myself with the answer that unpleasure is
always the expression of a higher degree of tension, and that therefore
what is happening is that a quantity in the field of material events is being transformed here as elsewhere into the psychical quality of unpleasure.

在这点,我们的好奇心当然会提出这个问题:为什么自我的力比多的阻塞竟然必须被经验,作为是不快乐。我就满足于这个回答:不快乐总是表达更高程度的紧张。因此,正在发生的事情是,物质事件的领域,数量正在在此被转换,如同别的地方,被转换进入不快乐的心灵的品质。

Nevertheless it may be that what is decisive for the generation of
unpleasure is not the absolute magnitude of the material event, but rather some particular function of that absolute magnitude.1 Here we may even venture to touch on the question of what makes it necessary at all for our mental life to pass beyond the limits of narcissism and to attach the libido to objects.2 The answer which would follow from our line of thought would once more be that this necessity arises when the cathexis of the ego with libido exceeds a certain amount.

可是,可能,对于不快乐的产生,决定性的东西并不是物质事件的绝对幅度。在此,我们甚至冒险探索到这个问题:为什么我们的精神生命需要通过超越自恋的限制,并且将力比多跟各种客体联接一块。从我们思想脉络获得的回答再次是:当自我对力比多的投注超过某个数量,这个必要就会产生。

A strong egoism is a protection against falling ill, but in the last resort we must begin to love in order not to fall ill, and we are bound to fall ill if, in consequence of frustration, we are unable to love. This follows somewhat on the lines of Heine’s picture of the psychogenesis of the Creation:

强烈的自我主义就是保护不要生病。但是追根究底,我们必须开始爱,为了不要生病。假如由于挫折的结果,我们不能够爱。我们一定会生病。这跟海因描绘创世纪的心灵起源的画面的诗句不谋而合:

God is imagined as saying: ‘Illness was no doubt the final cause of the whole
urge to create. By creating, I could recover; by creating, I became healthy.’ Neue

上帝被想像这样说:「疾病无可置疑是整个创造渴望的原因。凭借创造,我能够恢复;凭借创造,我变成健康。」

We have recognized our mental apparatus as being first and foremost
a device designed for mastering excitations which would otherwise be felt as distressing or would have pathogenic effects. Working them over in the mind helps remarkably towards an internal draining away of excitations which are incapable of direct discharge outwards, or for which such a discharge is for the moment undesirable.

我们已经体认出我们的精神的仪器,作为首要是被设计来掌控各种興奋的仪器。否则,这些興奋将会被感觉是令人痛苦,或是会有产生病原的影响。在心灵里掌控这些興奋,显然有助于朝向从内部耗尽这些興奋。因为它们不能够直接朝外排泄,或是因为这些興奋,这样的排泄暂时不被渴望。

In the first instance, however, it is a matter of indifference whether this internal process of working-over is carried out upon real or imaginary objects. The difference does not appear till later—if the turning of the libido on to unreal objects (introversion) has led to its being dammed up. In paraphrenics, megalomania allows of a similar internal working-over of libido which has returned to the ego; perhaps it is only when the megalomania fails that the damming-up of libido in the ego becomes pathogenic and starts the process of recovery which gives us the impression of being a disease.

可是,在第一个情况,掌控的内部过程是否在真实或想像的客体被执行,并无关紧要。直到后来,差异才会出现—假如力比多转向非真实的客体(内倾),导致力比多被阻塞。在精神衰弱症,自大狂容许类似的回到自我的力比多的内部的掌控。或许,仅有当自大狂失败,自我的力比多的阻塞变成病因,然后开始恢复的过程,给予我们是生病的印象。

I shall try here to penetrate a little further into the mechanism of
paraphrenia and shall bring together those views which already seem to
me to deserve consideration. The difference between paraphrenic
affections and the transference neuroses appears to me to lie in the
circumstance that, in the former, the libido that is liberated by frustration
does not remain attached to objects in phantasy, but withdraws on to the
ego.

我将在此尝试更加深入地探索神经衰弱症的心理机制。并且将我觉得值得考虑到那些观点汇集一块。我认为,精神衰弱症的情感与移情神秘症似乎在于这个环境:在精神衰弱症,因为挫折而解放的力比多,并没有始终跟幻想的各种客体联接一块。而是退转到自我。

Megalomania would accordingly correspond to the psychical
mastering of this latter amount of libido, and would thus be the counterpart of the introversion on to phantasies that is found in the transference neuroses; a failure of this psychical function gives rise to the hypochondria of paraphrenia and this is homologous to the anxiety of the transference neuroses. We know that this anxiety can be resolved by further psychical working-over, i.e. by conversion, reaction-formation or the construction of protections (phobias).

自大狂因此对应于心灵的掌控力比多的这个后者的数量。并且因此会是内倾到幻想的类似物,在移情神经症身上被找到的内倾类似物。这种心灵功能的失败产生精神衰弱的忧郁症。这是类同于移情神经症的焦虑。我们知道,这种焦虑能够凭借更加深入的心灵的掌控来解决。譬如,凭借转换,反应的形成,或保护的建构(恐惧)。

The corresponding process in paraphrenics is an
attempt at restoration, to which the striking manifestations of the disease
are due. Since paraphrenia frequently, if not usually, brings about only a
partial detachment of the libido from objects, we can distinguish three
groups of phenomena in the clinical picture: (1) those representing what
remains of a normal state or of neurosis (residual phenomena); (2) those
representing the morbid process (detachment of libido from its objects and, further, megalomania, hypochondria, affective disturbance and every kind of regression); (3) those representing restoration, in which the libido is once more attached to objects, after the manner of a hysteria (in dementia praecox or paraphrenia proper), or of an obsessional neurosis (in paranoia).

精神衰弱症的对应的过程是一种想要恢复的企图。因为这种企图,就会有疾病的显明的展示。因为精神衰弱症经常,虽然不是通常,会导致力比多跟各种客体仅是部分的隔离。在临床的画面,我们能够区别三种的现象: 其一、那些代表正常状态或神经症的现象(残渣的现象);其二、那些代表病态过程的现象(力比多跟它的客体的隔离;而且,跟自大狂,忧郁症,情感困扰与每一种的退转);其三、那些代表恢复的现象,在那里,力比多再次跟各种客体联接一块,模仿歇斯底里症的方式(在早发精神病或精神衰弱的本体),或是妄想症神经症(在偏执狂)。

This fresh libidinal cathexis differs from the primary one in that it
starts from another level and under other conditions.1 The difference between the transference neuroses brought about in the case of this fresh kind of libidinal cathexis and the corresponding formations where the ego is normal should be able to afford us the deepest insight into the structure of our mental apparatus.

这个新鲜的力比多的投注不同于原初的力比多投注,因为它从另外一个层次开始,而且在其他的情况之下。在这个新鲜的力比多投注的情况产生的移情神经症,与正常自我的对应的形成之间的差异,应该能够供应给予我们最深刻的洞察,对于我们精神仪器的结构。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

弗洛依德论自恋f

October 20, 2014

论自恋f
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

– 81 –
II
Certain special difficulties seem to me to lie in the way of a direct study
of narcissism. Our chief means of access to it will probably remain the
analysis of the paraphrenias. Just as the transference neuroses have
enabled us to trace the libidinal instinctual impulses, so dementia praecox and paranoia will give us an insight into the psychology of the ego.

我觉得,某些特别的困难似乎就在于阻碍自恋的直接研究。我们主要的接近工具很可能始终是精神分裂症的分析。正如移情的神经症让我们能够追踪本能的冲动,所以早发性精神病与偏执狂将会给予我们洞察到自我心理学。

Once
more, in order to arrive at an understanding of what seems so simple in
normal phenomena, we shall have to turn to the field of pathology with its
distortions and exaggerations. At the same time, other means of approach remain open to us, by which we may obtain a better knowledge of narcissism.

再一次,为了获得理解,对于在正常现象似乎如此单纯的事情。我们将必须转向病理学的领域,以及它的扭曲与夸张。同时,其他的接近的工具始终开放给予我们。凭借这些工具,我们可能获得更加的理解对于自恋。

These I shall now discuss in the following order: the study of
organic disease, of hypochondria and of the erotic life of the sexes.
In estimating the influence of organic disease upon the distribution of
libido, I follow a suggestion made to me orally by Sándor Ferenczi. It is
universally known, and we take it as a matter of course, that a person who is tormented by organic pain and discomfort gives up his interest in the things of the external world, in so far as they do not concern his suffering.

我现在将按照以下的顺序讨论这些:器官疾病的研究,忧郁症的研究,两性的性爱生活的研究。当我们评估器官疾病对于力比多的分配的影响时,我遵循善德、费伦奇口头对我的建议。众所周知,我们将它视为理所当然,受到器官痛苦与不舒服的人们,会放弃他们对于外在世界的興趣,因为那些興趣跟他的痛苦没有关系。

Closer observation teaches us that he also withdraws libidinal interest from his love-objects: so long as he suffers, he ceases to love. The
commonplace nature of this fact is no reason why we should be deterred
from translating it into terms of the libido theory. We should then say: the
sick man withdraws his libidinal cathexes back upon his own ego, and
sends them out again when he recovers. ‘Concentrated is his soul’, says
Wilhelm Busch of the poet suffering from toothache, ‘in his molar’s narrow hole.’

更加仔细的观察教导我们,他也撤退力比多的興趣,从他的爱恋-客体:只要他遭受痛苦,他就不再爱恋。这个事实的共同特性,并不是我们应该被拖延,不能翻译它成为力比多理论的理由。我们因此应该说:病人撤退他的力比多的投注,回到他自己的自我,然后当他恢复时,再将它们送出去。遭受牙痛之苦的诗人威罕、布希说:「他的灵魂被专注于他的臼齿的狭窄的洞里。」

Here libido and ego-interest share the same fate and are once more
indistinguishable from each other. The familiar egoism of the sick person
covers both. We find it so natural because we are certain that in the same situation we should behave in just the same way. The way in which a lover’s feelings, however strong, are banished by bodily ailments, and suddenly replaced by complete indifference, is a theme which has been exploited by comic writers to an appropriate extent.

在此,力比多与自我-興趣分享相同的命运,并且再一次彼此之间更加无法区别。病人的熟悉的自我主义掩盖两者。我们发现它是如此自然,因为我们确定,假如在相同的情况,我们将会就是同样方式地行为。恋人的感觉,无论多么强烈,将会被身体的疼痛所驱除,而且突然被完全的冷漠所取代。这种方式就是嘲讽作家一直使用得淋漓尽致的主题。

The condition of sleep, too, resembles illness in implying a narcissistic
withdrawal of the positions of the libido on to the subject’s own self, or,
more precisely, on to the single wish to sleep. The egoism of dreams fits
very well into this context. [Cf. below, p. 223.] In both states we have, if
nothing else, examples of changes in the distribution of libido that are
consequent upon an alteration of the ego.

睡眠的情况也类似疾病,当睡眠暗示着自恋从力比多的立场,撤退到主体的自己的自性。或者,更加贴切地说,撤退到睡眠的单一愿望。梦的自我主义跟这个内外搭配得恰恰好。在两周状态,我们都拥有力比多的分配的改变的例子,即使没有别的。力比多的分配的改变是自我的替换的结果。

Hypochondria, like organic disease, manifests itself in distressing and
painful bodily sensations, and it has the same effect as organic disease on the distribution of libido. The hypochondriac withdraws both interest and libido—the latter specially markedly—from the objects of the external world and concentrates both of them upon the organ that is engaging his attention.

忧郁症,就像器官的疾病,展示它自己,在令人痛苦与疼痛的身体的感觉。它具有跟器官的疾病的相同的影响,在力比多的分配。忧郁症者撤退興趣与力比多—后者特别明显—从外在世界的客体撤退,并且将興趣与力比多专注于正在吸引他的注意力的器官。

A difference between hypochondria and organic disease now
becomes evident: in the latter, the distressing sensations are based upon demonstrable [organic] changes; in the former, this is not so. But it would be entirely in keeping with our general conception of the processes of neurosis if we decided to say that hypochondria must be right: organic changes must be supposed to be present in it, too.

忧郁症与器官疾病之间的差异,现在变得明显。在器官的疾病,令人痛苦的感觉以可展示的器官的改变作为基础。在忧郁症,情况并不是这样。但是它将会跟神经症的过程的我们一般的观念符合一致,假如我们决定说,忧郁症必须是正确的:器官的改变必须被认为也存在于忧郁症者那里。

But what could these changes be? We will let ourselves be guided at
this point by our experience, which shows that bodily sensations of an
unpleasurable nature, comparable to those of hypochondria, occur in the
other neuroses as well. I have said before that I am inclined to class
hypochondria with neurasthenia and anxiety-neurosis as a third ‘actual’
neurosis.1 It would probably not be going too far to suppose that in the
case of the other neuroses a small amount of hypochondria was regularly formed at the same time as well.

但是这些改变会是什么?这个时刻,我们将会让我们自己被引导,被我们精神分析经验引导。精神分析经验显示,不愉快的天性的身体的感觉,跟忧郁症者的身体的感觉比较起来,也会发生在其他的神经症者。我以前曾经说过,我倾向于将忧郁症分类,跟精神衰弱与焦虑神经症,分类为第三个「实际」的神经症。假如我们认为,这另外两者的神经症者,少量的忧郁症同时也规律地被形成,可能并不会是过分之词。

We have the best
example of this, I think, in anxiety neurosis with its superstructure of
hysteria. Now the familiar prototype of an organ that is painfully tender,
that is in some way changed and that is yet not diseased in the ordinary
sense, is the genital organ in its states of excitation. In that condition it
becomes congested with blood, swollen and humected, and is the seat of a multiplicity of sensations.

我们拥有这个的最佳例子。我认为,在焦虑的神经症,具有歇斯底里症的超级结构。现在,性器官在興奋斗状态,就是器官的耳熟能详的原型。这个器官如此令人痛苦地温柔,也就是,它在某方面改变,可是,从通常意义而言,它又不是疾病。在那种情况,这个器官充塞血液,膨胀,而且挺直。那是各种感觉多重性的位置。

Let us now, taking any part of the body,
describe its activity of sending sexually exciting stimuli to the mind as its
‘erotogenicity’, and let us further reflect that the considerations on which
our theory of sexuality was based have long accustomed us to the notion
that certain other parts of the body—the ‘erotogenic’ zones—may act as
substitutes for the genitals and behave analogously to them.1 We have
then only one more step to take. We can decide to regard erotogenicity as a general characteristic of all organs and may then speak of an increase or decrease of it in a particular part of the body. For every such change in the erotogenicity of the organs there might then be a parallel change of libidinal cathexis in the ego. Such factors would constitute what we believe to underlie hypochondria and what may have the same effect upon the distribution of libido as is produced by a material illness of the organs.

让我们现在,以身体的任何部分为例,描述它送出性的興奋刺激的活动到心灵里,作为它的「性的亢奋」。让我们更进一步反思一下:我们性的理论就是以这些考虑作为基础,这些考虑长久以来,让我们习惯于这个观念:身体的某些其他的部分—性感地带—可以充当性器官的替代品,并且跟性器官同样地行为。我们因此仅需再走一步。我们能够决定将性爱亢奋视为所有器官的一般特性,并且谈论到疾病的增加,在身体的特殊的部分。对于器官的性爱亢奋的每一个这样的改变,一定会有自我的力比多投注的对比的改变。这些因素将会组成我们相信作为忧郁症的基础,可能会有相同的影响,对于力比多的分配,依照那些器官的物质的疾病所产生。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

论自恋 d

October 19, 2014

论自恋 d
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

I try in general to keep psychology clear from everything that is different in nature from it, even biological lines of thought. For that very
reason I should like at this point expressly to admit that the hypothesis of
separate ego-instincts and sexual instincts (that is to say, the libido theory) rests scarcely at all upon a psychological basis, but derives its principal support from biology. But I shall be consistent enough [with my general rule] to drop this hypothesis if psycho-analytic work should itself produce some other, more serviceable hypothesis about the instincts.

通常,我尝试保持心理学的纯正,避开跟它性质不同的东西,即使是生物学的思想脉络。因为那个理由,我此时想要生动地承认:分开自我本能与性的本能的假设(换句话说,力比多理论),根本就不是依靠心理学的基础。而是从生物学获得它的主要的支持。但是,我将是足够一致(跟我平常一致),即使我抛开这个假设。假如精神分析的研究本身竟然产生某个其他,更加具有服役性质的假设,关于这些本能。

So far, this has not happened. It may turn out that, most basically and on the longest view, sexual energy—libido—is only the product of a differentiation in the energy at work generally in the mind. But such an assertion has no relevance. It relates to matters which are so remote from the problems of our observation, and of which we have so little cognizance, that it is as idle to dispute it as to affirm it; this primal identity may well have as little to do with our analytic interests as the primal kinship of all the races of mankind has to do with the proof of kinship required in order to establish a legal right of inheritance.

迄今,这个情况还没有发生。结果是,最基本而且从长远眼光来看,性的精力—力比多—仅是一般运作在心灵的精力的差异的产物。但是这样的主张,并不相干。它跟我们观察的难题如此遥远的物质相关。我们对于这个物质如此欠缺认识。争论它跟肯定它,同样都是白费之举。原初的认同很有可能跟我们精神分析的興趣几乎没有什么关联。如同原初的人类的所有种族的亲属关系,几乎没有什么关联,跟被要求的亲属的证据,为了建立继承的合法权利。

All these speculations take us nowhere. Since we
cannot wait for another science to present us with the final conclusions on the theory of the instincts, it is far more to the purpose that we should try to see what light may be thrown upon this basic problem of biology by a synthesis of the psychological phenomena.

所有这些推测并没有让我们有所进展。因为我们无法等待另外一门科学呈现给我们最后的结论,对于本能的理论。更加合乎我们的目标的是,我们应该尝试看出,凭借心理学现象的综合,对于生物学的难题,可能获得怎样的启蒙。

Let us face the possibility of error; but do not let us be deterred from pursuing the logical implications of the hypothesis we first adopted1 of an antithesis between ego-instincts and sexual instincts (a hypothesis to which we were forcibly led by analysis of the transference neuroses), and from seeing whether it turns out to be without contradictions and fruitful, and whether it can be applied to other disorders as well, such as schizophrenia.

让我们面对错误的可能,但是不是让我们被拖延,不去追寻我们首先採用的这个假设的逻辑的暗示,关于自我本能与性本能的对立的假设(移情神经症的精神分析强烈地引导我们回到这个假设),不去看出它结果是否有矛盾与成果,以及是否它也能够被运用于其他的疾病,譬如精神分裂症。)

It would, of course, be a different matter if it were proved that the libido
theory has already come to grief in the attempt to explain the latter
disease. This has been asserted by C. G. Jung (1912) and it is on that
account that I have been obliged to enter upon this last discussion, which I would gladly have been spared. I should have preferred to follow to its end the course embarked upon in the analysis of the Schreber case without any discussion of its premisses. But Jung’s assertion is- 79 –
to say the least of it, premature. The grounds he gives for it are scanty.

当然,情况将会不同,假如它被证明,力比多理论已经遭受困境,当它企图解释后者的疾病。荣格在(1912年)曾经这样主张。因为那个原因,我被迫要从事这个最后的讨论,我本来很乐意省免的讨论。我本来想要将许瑞伯个案的精神分析从事的途径遵循到底,而不去讨论它的假设。但是,荣格的主张是不足成熟的,保守地说。他给出证实它的理由是贫瘠的。

In the first place, he appeals to an admission of my own that I myself have been obliged, owing to the difficulties of the Schreber analysis, to extend the concept of libido (that is, to give up its sexual content) and to identify libido with psychical interest in general. Ferenczi (1913b), in an exhaustive criticism of Jung’s work, has already said all that is necessary in correction of this erroneous interpretation. I can only corroborate his criticism and repeat that I have never made any such retractation of the libido theory.

首先,他诉诸于我自己的承认:由于许瑞伯精神分析的诸多困难,我不得不将力比多的观念延伸,(也就是放弃性的内容),并且将力比多认同于心灵的一般興趣。费伦奇(1913)全面评判荣格的研究,已经道尽一切必要的东西,改正这个错误的解释。我仅是综合他的批判,重复强调,我从来没有对力比多理论从事如此的偏离。

Another argument of Jung’s, namely, that we cannot suppose that the
withdrawal of the libido is in itself enough to bring about the loss of the
normal function of reality,1 is no argument but a dictum. It ‘begs the
question’,2 and saves discussion; for whether and how this is possible was precisely the point that should have been under investigation. In his next major work, Jung (1913 [339-40]) just misses the solution I had long since indicated: ‘

荣格的另外一个主张,也就是,我们无法假设,力比多的撤退本身足够导致现实的正常的功能的丧失。这并不是主张,而且权威的宣称。它闪躲质疑,而避开讨论。因为这是否可能,与如何可能,确实就是本来应该接受调查的要点。在他的接续的主要著作,荣格(193-40)就是避开我长期指示的这个解决。

At the same time’, he writes, ‘there is this to be further taken
into consideration (a point to which, incidentally, Freud refers in his work
on the Schreber case [1911c])—that the introversion of the libido sexualis leads to a cathexis of the “ego”, and that it may possibly be this that produces the result of a loss of reality. It is indeed a tempting possibility to explain the psychology of the loss of reality in this fashion.’

他写道:「同时,这个东西应该该进一步被考虑(意外地,弗洛依德在他的论许瑞伯个案里(1911c)提到这一点—性的力比多的内倾导致「自我」的投注。很可能就是自我的投注,产生现实的丧失的结果。这确实是诱惑人的可能,以这种方式解释现实的丧失的心理学。

But Jung does not enter much further into a discussion of this possibility. A few lines3 later he dismisses it with the remark that this determinant ‘would result in the psychology of an ascetic anchorite, not in a dementia praecox’.

但是荣格并没有更加深入讨论这个可能。稍后的几行,他排斥它,用这个评论:这个决定因素将会造成禁欲隐士的心理学,而不是精神病患的心理学。

How little this inapt analogy can help us to decide the question may be learnt from the consideration that an anchorite of this kind, who ‘tries to eradicate every trace of sexual interest’ (but only in the popular sense of the word ‘sexual’), does not even necessarily display any pathogenic allocation of the libido.

这个低俗的类比对于我们要决定这个问题,并无多大帮助,我们可能从这个考虑可以获知:这类的隐士尝试抹除性的興趣的痕迹,(但是仅是「性」这个字词的通俗意义而言),他们甚至没有必要展示力比多的病因的分配。

He may have diverted his sexual interest from human beings
entirely, and yet may have sublimated it into a heightened interest in the
divine, in nature, or in the animal kingdom, without his libido having
undergone an introversion on to his phantasies or a return to
his ego. This analogy would seem to rule out in advance the possibility of
differentiating between interest emanating from erotic sources and from
others.

他可能将他的性的興趣,从人类那里完全转移,并且可能将它升华进入神性的强烈的興趣。在自然界,或在动物界,他的力比多并没有经历内倾到他的幻想,或回到他的自我。这种类比似乎事先排除这种差异的可能,区别从性爱资源发出的興趣,与从其他资源发出的興趣的差异。

Let us remember, further, that the researches of the Swiss school, however valuable, have elucidated only two features in the picture of
dementia praecox—the presence in it of complexes known to us both in
healthy and neurotic subjects, and the similarity of the phantasies that
occur in it to popular myths—but that they have not been able to throw any further light on the mechanism of the disease. We may repudiate Jung’s assertion, then, that the libido theory has come to grief in the attempt to explain dementia praecox, and that it is therefore disposed of for the other neuroses as well.

而且,让我们记住,瑞士学派的研究,无论多么有价值,仅是阐释两个特征,在早发性精神病的画面—在健康与神经症的主体身上,众所周知的各种情结存在它那里;以及在它那里跟发生于通俗神话的幻想的类似。但是对于这个疾病的心理机制,他们己经没有进一步的启蒙。因此,我们可能排斥荣格的主张:力比多的理论已经遭受挫折,当它企图解释早发性精神病,以及作为其他的神经症,力比多理论因此也被排除。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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论自恋

October 19, 2014

论自恋
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

The value of the concepts ‘ego-libido’ and ‘object-libido’ lies in the fact
that they are derived from the study of the intimate characteristics of
neurotic and psychotic processes. A differentiation of libido into a kind
which is proper to the ego and one which is attached to objects is an
unavoidable corollary to an original hypothesis which distinguished
between sexual instincts and ego-instincts. At any rate, analysis of the
pure transference neuroses (hysteria and obsessional neurosis) compelled me to make this distinction and I only know that all attempts to
account for these phenomena by other means have been completely
unsuccessful.

自我力比多与客体力比多的观念的价值在于这个事实:它们从神经症与精神病的过程的亲密的特征研究得来。将力比多区别成为一种自我的本体,与跟客体连接一块的本体,是原先假设的无可避免的结果。原先的假设区别性的本能与自我的本能。无论如何,纯粹移去神经症的分析(歇斯底里症与妄想神经症)驱使我从事这个区别。我仅是知道,所有凭借其他方法企图解释这些现象,完全没有成功。

In the total absence of any theory of the instincts which would help us
to find our bearings, we may be permitted, or rather, it is incumbent upon
us, to start off by working out some hypothesis to its logical conclusion,
until it either breaks down or is confirmed.

由于完全欠缺本能的理论来帮助我们发现我们的关联,我们可能被容许,或我们有此必要,开始时,先从对于它的逻辑的结论设计一个假设,直到这个假设要就是瓦解,要不就是被证实。

There are various points in
favour of the hypothesis of there having been from the first a separation
between sexual instincts and others, ego-instincts, besides the
serviceability of such a hypothesis in the analysis of the transference
neuroses. I admit that this latter consideration alone would not be
unambiguous, for it might be a question of an indifferent psychical energy1 which only becomes libido through the act of cathecting an object.

除了服役这个假设在神经症移情的精神分析外,有各种的要点赞同这个假设:从一开始,在性的本能与其他本能,自我本能之间,就有分离。我承认,光是后者的考虑将会是模糊暧昧,因为产生这个问题:仅是通过对于客体的投注,中立的心灵能源才能成为力比多。

But, in
the first place, the distinction made in this concept corresponds to the
common, popular distinction between hunger and love. In the second
place, there are biological considerations in its favour. The individual does actually carry on a twofold existence: one to serve his own purposes and the other as a link in a chain, which he serves against his will, or at least involuntarily.

但是,首先,在这个观念所做的区别对应于在饥饿与爱之间的共同,通俗的区别。其次,有生物的考虑赞同它。个人确实实际上从事双重的存在,一个存在是服役他自己的目的;另一个存在,作为锁链的联接。他违背他的意志,或至少不是情愿地,服役这个锁链。

The individual himself regards sexuality as one of his own
ends; whereas from another point of view he is an appendage to his
germplasm, at whose disposal he puts his energies in return for a bonus of pleasure. He is the mortal vehicle of a (possibly) immortal substance—like the inheritor of an entailed property, who is only the temporary holder of an estate which survives him.

个人自己将性视为是他的其中一个目的。从另外一个观点,他是他的种原的附属物。在种原的支使下,它运作他的精力回报快乐的红利。他是永生物质(可能)的有限生命的工具—就像是被指定的财产继承人,他仅是这个比他的生命更长久的财产的暂时的拥有者。

The separation of the sexual instincts from the
ego-instincts would simply reflect this twofold function of the individual.2
Thirdly, we must recollect that all our provisional ideas in psychology will
presumably some day be based on an organic substructure. This makes it probable that it is special substances and chemical processes which
perform the operations of sexuality and provide for the extension of
individual life into that of the species.3 We are taking this probability into
account in replacing the special chemical substances by special psychical forces.

性的本能与自我本能的分离,仅是反映个人的这个双重的功能。第三,我们必须回忆一下,在心理学,我们所有的暂时的观念,假的有一天会死以有机体的次级结构作为基础。这就很有这个可能:执行性的运作,并且供应个人生命的延伸到种族的生命的延伸,是这些特别的物质与化学的过程。我们考虑到这个可能,当我们凭借心灵的力量,来取代这些特别的化学的物质。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
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论自恋 b

October 18, 2014

论自恋 b
Sigmund Freud
西格蒙、弗洛依德

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论

The question arises: What happens to the libido which has been
withdrawn from external objects in schizophrenia? The megalomania
characteristic of these states points the way. This megalomania has no
doubt come into being at the expense of object-libido.

这个问题产生了。在精神分裂症,从外在的客体撤退下来的力比多发生怎样的事情?这些状态的自大狂的特性指示著途径。无可置疑地,自大狂的存在,就是牺牲客体-力比多。

The libido that has been withdrawn from the external world
has been directed to the ego and thus gives rise to an attitude which may be called narcissism. But the megalomania itself is no new creation; on the contrary, it is, as we know, a magnification and plainer manifestation of a condition which had already existed previously.

从外在世界撤退下来的力比多,已经被引导到自我,因此产生可以被称为自恋的态度。但是自大狂的本身并不是新的创造。相反地,据我们所知,它是早先就已经存在的情况的放大与较明白的展示。

This leads us to look upon the narcissism which arises through the drawing in of object-cathexes as a secondary one, superimposed upon a primary narcissism that is obscured by a number of different influences.
Let me insist that I am not proposing here to explain or penetrate further into the problem of schizophrenia, but that I am merely putting
together what has already been said elsewhere,1 in order to justify the
introduction of the concept of narcissism.

这引导我们将这种自恋,通过客体-投注的吸收而产生的自恋,视为次级的自恋,受到原初的自恋所监督,原初被许多不同的影响模糊掉的自恋。让我们坚持,我在此并不是正在建议要更加深入地解释或贯彻精神分裂症的难题。我仅是将在别处已经说过的东西放置在一块,为了替自恋的观念的导引自言其说。

This extension of the libido theory—in my opinion, a legitimate one—
receives reinforcement from a third quarter, namely, from our observations and views on the mental life of children and primitive peoples. In the latter we find characteristics which, if they occurred singly, might be put down to megalomania: an over-estimation of the power of their wishes and mental acts, the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’, a belief in the thaumaturgic force of words, and a technique for dealing with the external world—‘magic’—which appears to be a logical application of these grandiose premisses.2

力比多理论的延伸—依我之见,是合理的理论—从第三部分接受增强,换句话说,从我们的观察与观点,对于小孩与原始民族的精神生活。在后者,我们发现一些特征,假如它们是单独发生,可能会被归属于自大狂:过分估计他们的愿望与精神的行动的力量,以及处理外在世界的技术—魔力—似乎就是这些辉煌假设的逻辑的运用。

In the
children of to-day, whose development is much more obscure to us, we
expect to find an exactly analogous attitude towards the external world.3

在今天的小孩,他们的发展对于我们是更加模糊。我们期望找到更加确实的类似的态度,对待外在的世界。

Thus we form the idea of there being an original libidinal cathexis of the
ego, from which some is later given off to objects, but which fundamentally persists and is related to the object-cathexes much as the body of an amoeba is related to the pseudopodia which it puts out.4

因此,我们形成这个观念:有一个原先的自我的力比多的投注。从那里,有些力比多后来被发出到客体那里。但是基本上,它们持续下来并且跟客体-投注息息相关。如同阿尼巴的身体更它产生的伪足。

In our researches, taking, as they did, neurotic symptoms for their starting-point, this part of the allocation of libido necessarily remained hidden from us at the outset. All that we noticed were the emanations of this libido—the object-cathexes, which can be sent out and drawn back again. We see also, broadly speaking, an antithesis between ego-libido and object-libido.1

在我们的研究里,因为他们将神经症的病症当作研究的出发点,力比多的分配的部分必然从一开拓就始终被隐藏不让我们知道。所有我们注意到的东西,都是力比多的残余物—客体的投注能够被送出然后再次被撤回。广义地说,我们也看见自我-力比多与客体-力比多的对立。

The more of the one is employed, the more the other becomes depleted.
The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality in favour of an object-cathexis; while we have the opposite condition in the paranoic’s phantasy (or self-perception) of the ‘end of the world’.2

自我-力比多越是被运用,客体-力比多越是会欠缺。客体-力比能够从事的发展的最高部分,在恋爱的状态里被看见。当主体似乎放弃他自己的人格,以赞同客体-投注。另一方面,我们在「世界末日」的偏执狂的幻想(或自我-观念)里,拥有相反的情况。

Finally, as regards the differentiation of psychical energies, we are
led to the conclusion that to begin with, during the state of narcissism, they exist together and that our analysis is too coarse to distinguish between them; not until there is object-cathexis is it possible to discriminate a sexual energy—the libido—from an energy of the ego-instincts.3

最后,关于心灵的精力的差异,我们被引导到这个结论:首先,在自恋的状态,他们存在一块。我们的精神分析太过于粗糙,无法区别它们。直到有客体-投注,才有可能区别性的精力—力比多—跟自我-本能的精力。

Before going any further I must touch on two questions which lead us
to the heart of the difficulties of our subject. In the first place, what is the
relation of the narcissism of which we are now speaking to auto-erotism,
which we have described as an early state of the libido?4 Secondly, if we
grant the ego a primary cathexis of libido, why is there any necessity for
further distinguishing a sexual libido from a non-sexual energy of the egoinstincts?

在更加深入之前,我必须谈了两个引导我们到我们主体的困难的核心的问题。首先,我们正在谈论的自恋,跟自动-性爱有什么关系?我们曾经将自动-色情描述为力比多的早期的状态。其次,假如我们给予自我,力比多的原初的投注,为什么还有必要更进一步区别性的力比多跟自我本能的非性的精力?

Would not the postulation of a single kind of psychical energy
save us all the difficulties of differentiating an energy of the ego-instincts
from ego-libido, and ego-libido from object-libido?5

单一种类的心灵的精力的假设,将会替我们解决所有的困难吗?区别自我-本能的精力,跟自我-力比多,以及区别自我-力比多跟客体-力比多的困难吗?

As regards the first question, I may point out that we are
bound to suppose that a unity comparable to the ego cannot exist in the
individual from the start; the ego has to be developed. The auto-erotic
instincts, however, are there from the very first; so there must be
something added to auto-erotism—a new psychical action—in order to
bring about narcissism.

关于第一个问题,我可以指出,我们一定会认为,跟自我相提并论的一致性,从一开头,就无法存在于个人身上。自我必须被发展。自动-性爱

To be asked to give a definite answer to the second question must
occasion perceptible uneasiness in every psycho-analyst. One dislikes the thought of abandoning observation for barren theoretical controversy, but nevertheless one must not shirk an attempt at clarification. It is true that notions such as that of an ego-libido, an energy of the ego-instincts, and so on, are neither particularly easy to grasp, nor sufficiently rich in content; a speculative theory of the relations in question would begin by seeking to obtain a sharply defined concept as its basis.
对于第二个问题,要求被给予明确的回答,一定会造成知觉的不安,在每位精神分析家身上。我们不喜欢因为些微的理论争议就放弃观察到这个想法。可是,我们一定不要逃避澄清的企图。的确,诸如自我-力比多的精力,自我-本能的精力,等等的观念,既不是特别容易理解,内容也没有充分丰富,受到置疑的各种关系的推测的理论开始时,将会尝试获得明确定义的观念,作为它的基础。

But I am of opinion that that is just the difference between a speculative theory and a science erected on empirical interpretation. The latter will not envy speculation its privilege of having a smooth, logically unassailable foundation, but will gladly content itself with nebulous, scarcely imaginable basic concepts, which it hopes to apprehend more clearly in the course of its development, or which it is even prepared to replace by others. For these ideas are not the foundation of science, upon which everything rests: that foundation is observation alone. They are not the bottom but the top of the whole structure, and they can be replaced and discarded without damaging it.

但是我认为,那仅是推测理论与根据经验解释建立的科学之间的差异。后者将不会妒忌推测理论,因为它们拥有逻辑上无懈可击的顺畅的优点。而后很乐意满足于朦胧,几乎无法想像的基本的观念。它希望更加清楚地理解这些基本的观念,在它发展的过程,要不就是,它甚至准备用其他的基本观念来替换它们。因为这些观念并不是每样东西依靠的科学的基础:那个基础仅是观察。它们并不是整个结构的底端,而是顶端。它们能够被替换与放弃,而不会损害它。

The same thing is happening in our day in the science of physics, the basic notions of which as regards matter, centres of force, attraction, etc., are scarcely less debatable than the corresponding notions in psychoanalysis.

同样的事情也发生在我们时代的物理的科学。关于物质,力量的核心,引力,等等,物理科学的基本观念,跟精神分析的对应的观念,同样都是具有某些的争议性。

雄伯译
32shiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

弗洛依德论自恋

October 6, 2014

论自恋

On Narcissism: an Introduction
论自恋:导论
Freud
弗洛依德
I
The term narcissism is derived from clinical description and was
chosen by Paul Näcke1 in 1899 to denote the attitude of a person who
treats his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily treated—who looks at it, that is to say, strokes it and fondles it till he obtains complete satisfaction through these activities. Developed to this degree, narcissism has the significance of a perversion that has absorbed the whole of the subject’s sexual life, and it will consequently exhibit the characteristics which we expect to meet with in the study of all perversions.

自恋这个术语从临床描述得来,在1899年,由保罗、拿凯选用来指明一个人的态度: 他对待他自己的身体,如同性爱对象的身体一般地对待的方式。他观看这个性爱对象的身体,也就是说,爱抚它,抚摸它,直到他通过这些动作,获得完整的满足。自恋被发展到这个程度,就具有将主体的性生活的整体吸纳过去的变态的意义。自恋结果将会展示我们预期会遇到的那些特性,当我们研究所有的变态症时。

Psycho-analytic observers were subsequently struck by the fact that
individual features of the narcissistic attitude are found in many people
who suffer from other disorders—for instance, as Sadger has pointed out, in homosexuals—and finally it seemed probable that an allocation of the libido such as deserved to be described as narcissism might be present far more extensively, and that it might claim a place in the regular course of human sexual development.2

精神分析的观察者随后对这个事实感到印象深刻:自恋的态度的个人的特征在很多人身上发现,他们遭受其他疾病的痛苦。譬如,如萨德基已经指出,在同性恋者身上。最后似乎可能的是,应该值得被描述为自恋的力比多的分配,可能更加广泛地呈现。它在人类的性的发展的规律的过程,具有重要地位。

Difficulties in psycho-analytic work upon neurotics led to the same supposition, for it seemed as though this kind of narcissistic attitude in them constituted one of the limits to their susceptibility to influence. Narcissism in this sense would not be a perversion, but the libidinal
–complement to the egoism of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be attributed to every living creature.

精神分析演讲神经症遭遇的诸多困难,引导到相同的假设。因为神经症者的这种自恋的态度看起来好像组成他们接受影响的其中一个限制。假如从这个意义来看,自恋将不会是变态。而是力比多的互补,为了保存自我的本能的自我主义的互补。这样的策略可以自圆其说地归属于每个生物。

A pressing motive for occupying ourselves with the conception of a
primary and normal narcissism arose when the attempt was made to
subsume what we know of dementia praecox (Kraepelin) or schizophrenia (Bleuler) under the hypothesis of the libido theory. Patients of this kind, whom I have proposed to term paraphrenics,1 display two fundamental characteristics: megalomania and diversion of their interest from the external world—from people and things. In consequence of the latter change, they become inaccessible to the influence of psychoanalysis and cannot be cured by our efforts. But the paraphrenic’s turning away from the external world needs to be more precisely characterized.

当我们企图要将我们所知道的关于早发性痴呆(克瑞培林)或精神分裂症(布留勒),归类于力比多理论的假设之下,就产生一个迫切的动机,我们要专注于探索原初与正常的自恋。这类的病人,我曾经建议给予精神分裂症的术语。他们展示两个基本点特性:自大狂与興趣偏离外在的世界—偏离人们与事物。由于后者改变的结果,他们变得不容易接受精神分析的影响,并且无法依靠我们的努力来治疗。但是精神分裂症者的转移离开外在的世界,还有待更加明确地表现其特性。

A patient suffering from hysteria or obsessional neurosis has also, as far as his illness extends, given up his relation to reality. But analysis shows that he has by no means broken off his erotic relations to people and things. He still retains them in phantasy; i.e. he has, on the one hand, substituted for real objects imaginary ones from his memory, or has mixed the latter with the former; and on the other hand, he has renounced the initiation of motor activities for the attainment of his aims in connection with those objects.

罹患歇斯底里症或妄想神经症的病人,在他发病的期间,也曾经放弃他跟现实的关系。但是精神分析显示:他根本就没有中断他跟人们与事物的性爱关系。他在幻想里依旧保留这种性爱关系。譬如,一方面,他用他记忆里的想像的对象,来替换真实的对象,或是将后者与前者混淆。另一方面,他已经放弃动力活动的启动,为了获得他跟那些对象的目标。

Only to this condition of the libido may we legitimately apply the term
‘introversion’ of the libido which is used by Jung indiscriminately.2 It is
otherwise with the paraphrenic. He seems really to have withdrawn his
libido from people and things in the external world, without replacing them by others in phantasy. When he does so replace them, the process seems to be a secondary one and to be part of an attempt at recovery, designed to lead the libido back to objects.3

我们将荣格浮滥使用的力比多的「内倾」这个术语,仅是合理地运用到力比多的这个情况。就精神分裂症者,「内倾」的情况并不一样。他似乎已经从外在世界的人们与事物,撤退他的力比多,但是没有在幻想里用其他的东西来替换他们。当他确实替换他们时,这个过程似乎是次要的过程,而且是企图恢复的部分。这个企图被设计来引导力比多回到那些对象。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com