Bataille 08

Bataille 08

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface 序言
9
Now clearly, such an experience of helplessness can’t be effected till all other experiences have been attempted and accomplished–till all other possibilities have been exhausted. So it can’t become the fact of human entirety until the last minute. Only an extremely isolated individual can attempt it in our day, as a consequence of mental confusion and at the same time an undeniable vigor.

現在顯而易見的，這樣一種無助的經驗，要直到所有其他的經驗都被嘗試過，及被完成，直到所有其他的可能性都都被窮盡，它才可能被形成。所以，要直到生命的最後一刻，它才可能成為人類整體性的事實。在我們時代，只有極端孤立的個人，才會從事這個企圖，作為精神混亂的結果，同時又是無可否認的精力旺盛的結果。
If chance is on such a person’s side, the individual can determine an unforeseen balance in this incoherence. Since this audaciously easy and divine state of balance again and again translates into a profound discordancy that remains a tightrope act, I don’t imagine that the “will to power” can attain such a condition in any other way. Given this, the “will to power” considered as an end is regressive. Taking such a course would return me to slavish fragmentation. I’d assign myself another duty, and the good that chooses power would control me.
假如機會是站在如此一個人這邊，個人就能夠決定一位未被預見的平衡，在這個不一致當中。因為平衡點這個容易至極，神秘至極的狀態，一再地翻譯成為一種深深的不協調。這種不協調是一種走繃繩的危險動作。我不敢想像，除此之外，「權力意志」還有什麼方法獲得這樣的條件。假如考慮到這一點，被認為是目標的「權力意志」會正是在倒退。採取這樣一條途徑，將會使我回到奴性的碎片。我將指定給我自己另外一種責任，選擇權力的善行，將會控制我。
The divine exuberance and lightheartedness expressed in Zarathustra’s laughter and dancing would be reabsorbed. And instead of happiness at the brink of the abyss, I’d be tied to weightiness, the slavishness of Kraft durch Freude. If we put aside the equivocations of the “will to power,” the destiny Nietzsche gave humankind places him beyond laceration. There is no return, hence the profound nonviability of this doctrine. In the notes compiled in The Will to Power, proposals for activity and the temptation to work out a goal or politics end up as a maze. His last completed work, Ecce Homo, affirms absence of goals as well as the author’s complete lack of a plan. * Considered from the standpoint of action, Nietzsche’s work amounts to failure (one of the most indefensible!) and his life amounts to nothing–like the life of anyone who tries to put these writings into practice.
在紮拉哲斯特拉的歡笑及跳舞，所表達的這種神秘的豐沛及輕盈，將會被重新吸收。非但沒有獲得深淵邊緣的快樂，我跟沉重緊緊相繫，跟「透過歡樂獲得力量」的奴性緊緊相繫。假如我們將「權力意志」的模棱兩可放在一邊，尼采給予人類的命運，使他超越在苦惱之外。由於沒有回歸，因此這個信條深刻地無法實行。在「權力意志」裏所編輯的注釋裏，活動的建議，解決目標的誘惑或政治，結果成為一所迷宮。他最後被完成的著作，「瞧！這個人！」肯定目標的欠缺及作者的完全缺乏計畫、從行動的觀點來考慮，尼采的著作相當等於是失敗。（這是最無可辯解的失敗！）他的一生等於是空無，就像任何其他人的一生。想要設法將這些著作付諸實踐的人的一生。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 07

Bataille 07

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface 序言
8
If I want to realize totality in my consciousness, I have to relate myself to an immense, ludicrous, and painful convulsion of all of humanity. This impulse moves toward all meanings. It’s true: sensible action (action proceeding toward some single meaning) goes beyond such incoherence, but that is exactly what gives humanity in my time (as well as in the past) its fragmentary aspect. If for a single moment I forget that meaning, will I see Shakespeare’s tragical/ridiculous sum total of eccentricities, his lies, pain, and laughter; the awareness of an immanent totality becomes clear to me–but as laceration. Existence as entirety remains beyond any one meaning–and it is the conscious presence of humanness in the world inasmuch as this is nonmeaning, having nothing to do other than be what it is, no longer able to go beyond itself or give itself some kind of meaning through action.
假如我想要體會我的意識的完整性，我必須要將我跟所有人類的巨大，可笑及痛苦的痙攣結合在一起。這種衝動朝著所有的意義前進。的確，合乎情理的行動（朝向某一單一意義前進的行動），都會超越如此的前後不一致。但這確實是在我的時代（如同過去的時代一樣），它的零碎面向給予人性的東西。假如有單一的時刻，我忘掉意義，我會想起莎士比亞的悲劇與荒謬的怪癖總和，他的謊言，痛苦和歡笑。我清楚地知道一種內在的整體性，但是作為一種苦惱。作為完整性的實存，始終是超越在任何一個意義之外。這是世界的人性的意識的存在，因為這是無意義。關係到這個無意義的，不是別的，就是它的本質。它不再能夠憑藉著行動，超越自己，或是給予自己某種的意義。

This consciousness of totality relates to two opposed ways of using that expression. Nonmeaning normally is a simple negation and is said of an object to be canceled. An intention that rejects what has no meaning in fact is a rejection of the entirety of being–and it’s by reason of this rejection that we’re conscious of the totality of being within us. But if I say nonmeaning with the opposite intention, in the sense of nonsense, with the intention of searching for an object free of meaning, I don’t deny anything. But I make an affirmation in which all life is clarified in consciousness.

這個整體性的意識，跟使用那個表達的兩個相對立的方式有關。無意義正常來說，是一個單純的否定，並且據說是會被取消的一個客體。意圖拒絕沒有意義的東西，實際上，等於是拒絕生命實存的完整性。因為這種拒絕，我們意識到我們內在生命實存的整體性。但是假如我說，無意義帶有這個相反的意圖，從無意義來理解，意圖要尋找一個免于意義的客體，我並不拒絕任何東西。但是我從事一種肯定，在這種肯定裏，一切的生命在意識裏豁然開朗。
Whatever moves toward this consciousness of totality, toward this total friendship of humanness and humanity for itself, is quite correctly held to be lacking a basic seriousness. Following this path I become ridiculous. I acquire the inconsistency of all humans (humanness taken as a whole, and overlooking whatever leads to important changes). I’m not suggesting that I’m accounting for Nietzsche’s illness this way (from what we know, it had some somatic basis), though it must be said, all the same, that the main impulse that leads to human entirety is tantamount to madness. I let go of good. I let go of reason (meaning). And under my feet, I open an abyss which my activity and my binding judgments once kept from me. At least the awareness of totality is first of all within me as a despair and a crisis. If I give up the viewpoint of action, my perfect nakedness is revealed to me. I have no recourse in the world, there’s nothing to help me–and I collapse. No other outcome is possible, except endless incoherence, in which only chance is my guide.

無論是什麼朝著整體性的意識前進，朝著人性的這個整體的友愛及人性的本身，它相當正確地被認為是欠缺一個基本的認真態度。跟隨著這條途徑，我變得荒謬可笑。我獲得的是所有人性的前後不一致。（作為整體的人性，忽視任何導致重要改變的東西）。我並不是在建議，我要以種方式說明尼采的弊病（據我們所知，尼采的弊病是基於身體的疾病。）雖然我仍然必須說，導致人類整體性的主要衝動，相當等於是瘋狂。我放開善行。我放開理性（意義）。在我的腳下，我開放一個深淵，我的活動及約束的判斷力有一陣子保護我不要掉下去。至少，覺察到整體性，在我內心，首先作為一種絕望跟危機。假如我放棄行動的觀點，我會目睹到我全然的赤裸。我在世界上完全沒有憑藉，沒有一樣東西能夠幫助我。我崩潰矣！沒有其他的結果是可能的，除了就是無窮盡帶前後不一致。在此，唯有睹運氣，是我的引導。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 06

Bataille 06

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
7
You have to experience a problem like this to understand how strange it really is. It’s easy to argue its meaning by saying, Infinite tasks are imposed on us. Precisely in the present. That much is obvious and undeniable. Still, it is at least equally true that human entirety or totality (the inevitable term) is making its initial appearance now. For two reasons. The first, negative, is that specialization is everywhere, and emphasized alarmingly. The second is that in our time overwhelming tasks nonetheless appear within their exact limits.
你們必須經驗到像這樣的難題，才能瞭解它其實是多麽奇怪。僅是靠著嘴巴說來爭辯它的意義是很容易。無限的工作被賦加在我們上面。確實就是在當下。顯而易見，而且無可否認。可是，這至少是同樣的真實，人的完整性或整體性（這個無可置疑的術語），現在正要初次出現。因為兩個理由：第一個理由是負面的，限制到處都有，而且還令人驚駭地被強調。第二個理由是，在我們的時代，壓倒性的工作仍然在它們明確定範圍內出現。
In earlier times the horizon couldn’t be discerned. The object of seriousness was first defined as the good of the city, although the city was confused with the gods. The object thereafter became the salvation of the soul. In both cases the goal of action, on the one hand, was some limited and comprehensible end, and on the other, a totality defined as inaccessible in this world (transcendent). Action in modern conditions has precise ends that are completely adequate to the possible, and human totality no longer has a mythic aspect. Seen as accessible in all that surrounds us, totality becomes the fulfillment of tasks as they are defined materially. So that totality is remote, and the tasks that subordinate our minds also fragment them. Totality, however, is still discernible.
在早先的時代，地平線無法被覺察出來。這個嚴肅的客體首先被定義，作為城市的善德，雖然城市跟眾神會混淆在一起。從此以後，客體變成靈魂的救贖。在一方面，不管是哪一個情況，行動的目標都是某種受到限制，而且是可理解的目標。在另一方面，在這個世界，這是一種被定義為無法接近的整體性。在現代情況的行動，有完全適合於可能性的明確的目標。人類的整體性不再有神秘的一面。在我們被包圍的一切裏，被認為是可接近的整體性，成為一種工作的實現，因為它們具體地被定義。所以，整體性是遙遠的，我們的心靈被隸屬的工作，也使它們變成零碎。可是，整體性依舊能夠被覺察出來。
A totality like this, necessarily aborted by our work, is nonetheless offered by that very work. Not as a goal, since the goal is to change the world and give it human dimensions. But as the inevitable result. As change comes about, humanity-attached-to-the-task-of-changing-the-world, which is only a single and fragmentary aspect of humanity, will itself be changed to humanity-as-entirety. For humanity this result seems remote, but defined tasks describe it: It doesn’t transcend us like the gods (the sacred city), nor is it like the soul’s afterlife; it is in the immanence of “humanity-attached . . .” We can put off thinking about it till later, though it’s still contiguous to us. If human beings can’t yet be consciously aware of it in their common existence, what separates them from this notion isn’t that they are human instead of divine, nor the fact of not being dead: It’s the duties of a particular moment.
一個像這樣的整體性，必然會被我們的工作廢除。可是，它仍然被那個工作所提供。不是作為目標，因為目標是要改變這個世界，然後給它人類的維度。但是作為無可避免的結果是：隨著改變發生，作為「跟改變世界緊連的人性」，它僅是人性的單一而且碎片的一面，本身將會被改變成為「完整的人性」。對於人性而言，這個結果似乎很遙遠。但是被「定義」的工作描述它。它沒有像（神聖城市的）神祗一樣，超越我們，它也不像靈魂的來生一樣。它就是在跟人性相連的內在性上。「我們能夠拖延思考它直到後來，雖然它依舊會傳染給我們。假如人類還不能夠意識到它，在它們的共同的存在，那麼分開它們跟這個觀念的，並不是他們是人，而不是神。也不是他們不會死亡的這個事實。這就是某一個特別時刻的責任。」
Similarly, a man in combat must only think (provisionally) of driving back the enemy. To be sure, situations of calm during even the most violent wars give rise to peacetime interests. Still, such matters immediately appear minor. The toughest minds will join in these moments of relaxation as they seek a way to put aside their seriousness. In some sense they’re wrong to do so. Since isn’t seriousness essentially why blood flows? And that’s inevitable. For how could seriousness not be the same as blood? How could a free life, a life unconstrained by combat, a life disengaged from the necessities of action and no longer fragmented–how could such a life not appear frivolous? In a world released from the gods and from any interest in salvation, even “tragedy” seems a distraction, a moment of relaxation within the context of goals shaped by activity alone.
同樣地，一個在戰鬥中的人唯一暫時思考的是：將敵人驅退。的確，即使在最猛烈的戰爭中，平靜的情況會產生和平時期的利益。可是，這樣的事情立可會顯得無足輕重。即使是最強悍的心靈，也會加入輕鬆的時刻，當他們尋找一個方法來將他們的嚴肅擺放一邊。從某個意義來說，他們這樣做是錯誤的。因為嚴肅難道不就是為什麼要流血的原因嗎？那是無可避免的。因為嚴肅如何能夠跟流血劃清界限呢？一個自由的生活，一個不受戰鬥約束的生活，一個擺脫行動的需要而不再是碎片的生活。這樣一種生活如何能不顯得任性輕浮呢？在一個從神祗釋放出來，從救贖的任何利益釋放出來的世界，即使「悲劇」都似乎是一種分神，一個輕鬆的時刻，在只有行動塑造的神祗的內涵裏。

More than one advantage accrues when human “reason for being” comes in the back way. So the total person is first disclosed in immanence in areas of life that are lived frivolously. A life like this–a frivolous life–can’t be taken seriously. Even if it is deeply tragic. And that is its liberating prospect–it acquires the worst simplicity and nakedness. Without any guile I’m saying, I feel grateful to those whose serious attitudes and life lived at the edge of death define me as an empty human being and dreamer (there are moments when I’m on their side). Fundamentally, an entire human being is simply a being in whom transcendence is abolished, from whom there’s no separating anything now. An entire human being is partly a clown, partly God, partly crazy . . . and is transparence.
我們所獲得的利益不僅一項，當人的「生存理由」，以倒退的方式進來。所以整體的人，首先在內在性當中被揭露出來，在任性輕浮地過活動生活領域。一個像這樣的生活，一個任性輕浮的生活，無法被認真地看待。即使它是深深的悲劇。這就是它被解放的展望，它要求最糟糕的單純跟赤裸。沒有任何我正在說的狡詐，我感到感激，對於那些人懷著嚴肅態度和生活的人。他們生活在死亡的邊緣，將我定義為空洞的人及夢想家（有些時刻，我也是站在他們那一邊）。根本上來說，一個完整的人，僅是他的超驗部份被廢除的人。現在不可能將任何東西跟他們分開。一個完整的人，部份是小丑，部份是上帝，部份是瘋狂。他是「電磁流通體」。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 05

Bataille 05

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
6
Nonetheless, I don’t want my inclination to make fun of myself or act comic to lead readers astray. The basic problem tackled in this chaotic book (chaotic because it has to be) is the same one Nietzsche experienced and attempted to resolve in his work–the problem of the whole human being.
可是，我不想要我嘲笑自己及扮演滑稽的傾向，誤導讀者迷失。在這本混亂的書裏的基本的難題，（它之所以混亂，是因為它非混亂不可），跟尼采經驗的混亂相同。並且企圖以他自己的著作作為解決，解決全人類的難題。
“The majority of people,” he wrote, “are a fragmentary, exclusive image of what humanity is; you have to add them up to get humanity. In this sense, whole eras and whole peoples have something fragmentary about them; and it may be necessary for humanity’s growth for it to develop only in parts. It is a crucial matter therefore to see that what is at stake is always the idea of producing a synthetic humanity and that the inferior humans who make up a majority of us are only preliminaries, or preparatory attempts whose concerted play allows a whole human being to appear here and there like a military boundary marker showing the extent of humanity’s advance.” ( The Will to Power)

「大多數的人們，」他寫到，「對於人性是什麼，只有零碎及專有的意象。你必須將它們總加起來，才能獲得人性的概念。從這層意義來說，整個人類及整個民族擁有的只是某件零碎的東西。讓人性只是以部份方式發展，對於人性的成長的必須的。因此，很重要的是要看出，岌岌可危的總是想要產生綜合人性的觀念。組成我們大多數人的劣等的人類，只是初步或是預備的企圖。這些企圖的一致性的扮演，容許整個人類到處出現，就像是一個軍事的邊界標示，顯示出人性進步的程度。」（權力意志）
But what does that fragmentation mean? Or better, what causes it if not a need to act that specializes us and limits us to the horizon of a particular activity? Even if it turns out to be for the general interest (which normally isn’t true), the activity that subordinates each of our aspects to a specific result suppresses our being as an entirety. Whoever acts, substitutes a particular end for what he or she is, as a total being: in the least specialized cases it is the glory of the state or the triumph of a party. Every action specializes insofar as it is limited as action. A plant usually doesn’t act, and isn’t specialized; it’s specialized when gobbling up flies!

那個碎片意味著什麼？或者說得更貼切些，引起它的難道不就是一種演出的需求？它難道不是使我們專注並局限與特別活動的地平線？即使它結果證明對於一般人有利益，（正常來說，這未必是真實的）。使我們生命的每一個面向，都隸屬於明確定結果，壓制了我們生命的實存，作為完整的人。而在開闊的領域，卻又是被國家的榮耀及黨派的勝利所專擅。每一個專注的行動，就成為被限制的行動。植物通常不行動，也就無所謂局限。它只有在吞吃蒼蠅時，才受到限制。
I cannot exist entirely except when somehow I go beyond the stage of action. Otherwise I’m a soldier, a professional, a man of learning, not a “total human being.” The fragmentary state of humanity is basically the same as the choice of an object. When you limit your desires to possessing political power, for instance, you act and know what you have to do. The possibility of failure isn’t important–and right from the start, you insert your existence advantageously into time. Each of your moments becomes useful. With each moment, the possibility is given you to advance to some chosen goal, and your time becomes a march toward that goal–what’s normally called living. Similarly, if salvation is the goal. Every action makes you a fragmentary existence. I hold onto my nature as an entirety only by refusing to act–or at least by denying the superiority of time, which is reserved for action.
我無法完整地實存，除了當我以某種方法超越行動的階段。否則我是一個士兵，一個專業人員，一個知識份子，而不是一個「完整的人」。人性的碎片狀態，基本上是跟一個客體的選擇是相同的。例如，當你限制你的欲望於擁有政治的權力，你採取行動，並且知道你必須做什麼。失敗的可能性並不重要，然後從一開始，你有利地將你的生命實存，插入時間。你的每一刻都變成很有用。隨著每一刻，你被給予前進到某個選擇的目標。你的時間變成一種朝向目標的前進。這就是正常所謂的生活。同樣的，假人救贖就是目標，每一個行動會使你成為一種碎片的存在。我只有以拒絕行動，來掌握我的天性，作為一個完整性。或者，我拒絕給予保留給行動的時間的優越感。
Life is whole only when it isn’t subordinate to a specific object that exceeds it. In this way, the essence of entirety is freedom. Still, I can’t choose to become an entire human being by simply fighting for freedom, even if the struggle for freedom is an appropriate activity for me–because within me I can’t confuse the state of entirety with my struggle. It’s the positive practice of freedom, not the negative struggle against a particular oppression, that has lifted me above a mutilated existence. Each of us learns with bitterness that to struggle for freedom is first of all to alienate ourselves.
只有不隸屬於超過它的明確的客體，人生才是完整的。以這種方式，完整性的本質才是自由。可是，我無法僅僅是為自由而奮鬥，就能選擇成為一個完整的人。即使這個為自由而奮鬥，對於我而言，是一個適當的方式。因為在我內心，我不能將我的完整性跟我的奮鬥混淆。提升我超越一種殘缺的存在，是自由的積極實踐，而不是消極的奮鬥，對抗某一個特別的壓迫。我們每一個人都經歷痛苦學會，為自由而奮鬥，首先就是要跟我們自己疏離。

I’ve already said it: the practice of freedom lies within evil, not beyond it, while the struggle for freedom is a struggle to conquer a good. To the extent that life is entire within me, I can’t distribute it or let it serve the interests of a good belonging to someone else, to God or myself. I can’t acquire anything at all: I can only give and give unstintingly, without the gift ever having as its object anyone’s interest. (In this respect, I look at the other’s good as deceptive, since if I will that good it’s to find my own, unless I identify it as my own. Entirety exists within me as exuberance. Only in empty longing, only in an unlucky desire to be consumed simply by the desire to burn with desire, is entirety wholly what it is. In this respect, entirety is also longing for laughter, longing for pleasure, holiness, or death. Entirety lacks further tasks to fulfill.)

我已經說過：自由的實踐在於邪惡之內，而不超越邪惡。而為自由而奮鬥則是奮鬥為了征服一種善德。只要生命在我之內還是完整的，我就不能將它分散，或讓它替屬於某個其他人的某個善德的利益服務，替上帝服務，或是替我自己服務。我根本無法獲得任何東西。我只能給予，不吝惜地給予，不讓天賦擁有任何人的利益，充當它的目標。（在這一方面，我觀看另一個人的善德，當作是欺騙。因為即使我想要那個善德，那也是為了找到我自己的善德，除非我認同它，當著我自己的善德。它完全存在於我的內在，作為豐沛的力量。只有在空洞的渴望，只有在一種不幸的欲望想要被燃燒，僅是被充溢激情的欲望燃燒。這就是完完整整生命的本質。在這一方面，完整性也就是歡笑的渴望，渴望歡樂，神聖，或是死亡。完整性欠缺前進的工作來實踐。）

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 04

Bataille 04

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
5
In the helter-skelter of this book, I didn’t develop my views as theory. In fact, I even believe that efforts of that kind are tainted with ponderousness. Nietzsche wrote “with his blood,” and criticizing or, better, experiencing him means pouring out one’s lifeblood.
匆促寫作本書時，我並沒有發展我的觀點成為理論，事實上，我甚至相信，那樣的努力未免過於沉重。尼采是「用他的血」來寫作的人。批評他，或更好的是經驗他，意味著要嘔心瀝血。
I wrote hoping my book would appear in time for the centenary of his birth ( October 15, 1844). I wrote from February through August, counting on the German retreat to make publication possible. I began with a theoretical statement of the problem (this is part 2, p. 29), but that short section is essentially only the account of a personal experience, an experience which continued for twenty years and came to be weighted in fear. It might prove useful here to dispel an ambiguity. There exists an idea of Nietzsche as the philosopher of a “will to power,” the idea that this is how he saw himself and how he was accepted. I think of him more as a philosopher of evil. For him the attraction and value of evil, it seems to me, gave significance to what he intended when he spoke of power. Otherwise, how can passages like this be explained?
我寫作時，希望我的書將會及時出現，趕得上他出生的百年紀念（1844年十月十五日）。我從二月寫到八月，盼望德國的撤離，使出版成為可能。我從難題的理論陳述開始，但是短篇部份基本上是描述一個個人的經驗。這個經驗繼續了二十年，而且漸漸充滿恐懼的壓力。在此驅散某些模糊曖昧證明是有幫助的。這裏存在著尼采的觀念，作為「權力意志」的哲學家。這個觀念是，他如何看待他自己，以及他如何被接納。我寧可把他認為是一位「邪惡」的哲學家。我覺得，對於他，邪惡的吸引力跟價值，對於他談論到權力時，所打算要的東西，給賦予意義。否則，像這樣的段落要如何來解釋？

“WET BLANKET.
A: You’re a wet blanket, and everybody knows it!
B: Obviously! I’m dampening an enthusiasm that encourages belonging to some party, which is what parties won’t forgive” ( Gay Science).
掃興的人 （歡愉的智慧）
A: 你真是個掃興的人，每個人都知道！
B: 顯而易見的！我替那些鼓勵歸屬黨派的熱情，潑灑冷水。這是各黨派不會原諒我的。

That observation, among many others, doesn’t in any way square with the type of practical conduct or politics derived from the “will to power” principle. In his lifetime Nietzsche had a distinct dislike for anything the expression of that will produced. If he was drawn, felt it necessary, even, to trample on received morality it’s equally certain that methods of oppression (the police) aroused his disgust too. He justified his hatred of the good as a condition for freedom itself. Personally, and with no illusions concerning the impact of this attitude, I am opposed to all forms of coercion–but this doesn’t keep me from seeing evil as an object of moral exploration. Because evil is the opposite of a constraint that on principle is practiced with a view toward good. Of course evil isn’t what a hypocritical series of misunderstandings makes it out to be: isn’t it essentially a concrete freedom, the uneasy breaking of a taboo?

除外，跟從「權力意志」得來到那種實際行為跟政治，那個觀察根本就格格不入。在他的一生當中，尼采顯而易見地討厭那種的意志表達的東西。假如他感覺到有必要被吸引到踐踏眾所接受的道德，同樣可以確定的是，諸如員警式的壓迫方法，也會引起他的厭惡。他認為他對善行的厭惡是振振有理，作為自由本身的條件。就我個人而言，由於對於他的這個態度的影響沒有幻想，我反對任何種類的脅迫。但是這並沒有阻止我，不將「邪惡」當著是道德探索的客體。因為邪惡是對於某個約束的對立。原則上，這個約束被實踐，目標是朝著善行。當然，邪惡並不是虛偽的誤解所理解的樣子：困難地突破禁忌，基本上難道不就是一種具體的自由？
Anarchy bothers me, particularly run-of-the-mill doctrines apologizing for those commonly taken to be criminals. Gestapo practices now coming to light show how deep the affinities are that unite the underworld and the police. It is people who hold nothing sacred who’re the ones most likely to torture people and cruelly carry out the orders of a coercive apparatus. I can only feel intense dislike for muddled thinkers who confusedly demand all rights for the individual. An individual’s limit is not represented simply by the rights of another individual but even more by rights of the masses. We are all inextricably bound up with the masses, participating in their innermost sufferings and their victories. And in our innermost being, we form part of a living group–though we are no less alone, for all that, when things go wrong.

無政府主義令我感到懊惱，特別是那些庸俗的教條，還替那些被公認的罪犯辯解。秘密員警蓋世太保現在內情大白，顯示出黑社會跟員警的關係是多麽緊密相關。任何神聖都不信仰的人，最有可能用苦刑拷打人，並且殘酷地執行脅迫的國家機器的命令。對於頭腦不清的思想家，不分好壞地要求人人都有平等的權利，我只會感到強烈的厭惡。一個人的限制，不能僅僅由另外一個人的權利來代表，而是由群眾的權利來代表。我們跟群眾糾纏不清的息息相關，參與他們最內在的痛苦跟他們的勝利。在我們最內層的生命實存，我們形成一個生命團體的部份。儘管這樣，當事情出錯時，我們還是同樣感到孤單。
As a means to triumph over significant difficulties of this kind and over the opposition between individual and collective or good and evil, over the exasperating contradictions from which, generally speaking, we are able to disentangle ourselves mostly through denial–it seems to me that only certain chance movements, or the audacity that comes from taking chances, will freely prevail. Chance represents a way of going beyond when life reaches the outer limits of the possible and gives up. Refusing to pull back, never looking behind, our uninhibited boldness discovers that solutions develop where cautious logic is baffled. So that it was only with my life that I wrote the Nietzsche book that I had planned–a book in which I intended to pose and resolve intimate problems of morality.
作為一個工具，克服這種重大的困難，克服個人與集體之間，或是善與惡之間的對立，克服這些令了惱怒的矛盾，一般說來，我們能夠憑藉著拒絕參與而擺脫糾纏。我覺得，只有偶爾的一些運動，或是敢於冒險的膽識，才會自由地戰勝。冒險一試代表一種超越的方法，當人生到達外在各種可能的限制，要放棄的時刻。拒絕往後退讓，永遠不回顧，我們勇往直前的膽識會發現，在謹慎的邏輯束手無措的地方，解決會豁然開朗。所以，我只是用我的生命，來寫作我曾經計畫的尼采的書。以這本書，我打算提出並解決道德的基本難題。
Only my life, only its ludicrous resources, only these made a quest for the grail of chance possible for me. Chance, as it turned out, corresponded to Nietzsche’s intentions more accurately than power could. Only “play” gave me the possibility of exploring the far reaches of possibility and not prejudicing the results, of giving to the future alone and its free occurrence the power usually assigned to choosing sides (which is only a form of the past). In a sense my book is the day-to-day record of what turned up as the dice were thrown–without, I hasten to say, there being a lot by way of resources. I apologize for the truly comical year of personal interests chronicled in my diary entries. They are not a source of pain, and I’m glad to make fun of myself, knowing no better way to lose myself in immanence.

只有憑藉我的生命，只有憑藉生命荒謬的機智，只有憑藉這些，我從事可能冒險的「聖杯」的追求。結果是，比起權力所能的作為，冒險跟尼采的意圖，更加正確地相符合。只有「遊戲」給予我這個可能性，探索可能性的遙遠領域，而沒有受到結果先人為主的限制。只有「遊戲」，我才有可能僅給予未來及未來可自由發生的事，有著通常要選邊才會有的這種力量（選邊其實就是沿習過去的一種形式）。從某種意義來說，我的書是我日常放手一搏出現的結果的記載。容我匆促補充一句，機智並沒有許多的發揮空間。對於我把那荒唐可笑的那一年，我個人的興趣，以日記編排來發表，我表達歉意。它們並不是我痛苦的來源，我很樂意拿自己開玩笑，因為我尋找不出更好的方式，來讓我自己迷失在內在性當中。
雄伯譯
32hsijung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 03

Bataille 03

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
4
As I write, I’ll admit that moral investigations that aim to surpass the good lead first of all to disorder. There’s no guarantee yet I’ll pass the test. Founded on painful experience, this admission allows me to dismiss those who, in attacks on or exploitations of Nietzsche, confuse his position with that of Hitler.
當我寫作時，我將會承認，目標是要超越善的道德探究，首先會造成混亂。並沒有任何保證我會通得過這個考驗。根據我痛苦的經驗，先這樣的坦承，我才能夠反駁那些將尼采的立場，與希特勒的立場混為一談的人，當他們在攻擊或研究尼采的時候。
“In what height is my abode? Ascending, I’ve never counted the steps leading to myself–and where the steps cease, that is where I have my roof and my abode.” * [The Will to Power]
「我的居所在怎樣的高處？在攀登處。我從來沒有計算通往我自己的腳步。在腳步停止的地方，那就是我的屋頂及我的居所。」（ 權力意志）
Thus a demand is expressed, one not directed at some comprehensible good–but all the more consuming to the degree that it’s experienced.
因此，有個要求被表達。這個要求目標不是朝向可理解的善，而是更加全神貫注，直到這個要求被體驗到。
I lose patience with crude equivocations. It’s frightening to see thought reduced to the propaganda level–thought that remains comically unemployable, opening to those whom the void inspires. According to some critics, Nietzsche exercised a great influence on his times. I doubt it: No one expected him to dismiss moral laws. But above all he took no political stance and, when pressed to, refused to choose a party, disturbed at the possibility of either a right- or leftwing identification. The idea of a person’s subordinating his or her thinking to a cause appalled him.

對於那些鄙陋的模棱兩可，我甚感不耐。目睹思想淪落到政治宣傳的地步，始終無法被滑稽利用的思想，被昏聵空虛的人所操弄，我實在驚駭莫名。有些批評者顯示，尼采在他當地產生巨大影響。我懷疑這一點。沒有人會預期他排斥道德法則。但是尤其是，他並沒有採取政治立場。當他被強迫時，他拒絕選擇黨派。對於要認同左翼，或是右翼，他甚感懊惱。對於一個人要將他的思想隸屬於一個政治目標，他驚駭不己。
His strong feelings on politics date from his falling out with Wagner and from his disillusionment with Wagner’s German grossness-Wagner the socialist, the Francophobe, the anti-Semite . . . The spirit of the Second Reich, especially in its pre-Hitlerite tendencies–the emblem of which is anti-Semitism–is what he most despised. Pan-German propaganda made him sick.
他對於政治的強烈感受，開始于他跟華格納的爭吵，及開始於他幻夢覺醒于華格納的德國人粗野習性。華格納這位社會主義者，仇恨法國人份子，及反閃族份子。第二帝國的精神，特別在希特勒尚未得勢前的趨勢，它的標誌就是反閃族。這是他最為輕視的。泛德國人的宣傳令他感到厭惡。
“I like creating from tabula rasa,” he wrote. “It is in fact one of my ambitions to be imputed a great scorner of the Germans. Even at the age of twenty-six, I expressed the suspicions that their nature had aroused in me” ( Third Jeremiad). “To me, there is something impossible about the Germans, and if I try to imagine a type repellent to all my instincts, it’s always a German who comes to mind” ( Ecce Homo). For the clear-sighted, at a political level Nietzsche was a prophet, foretelling the crude German fate. He was the first to give it in detail. He loathed the impervious, vengeful, self-satisfied foolishness that took hold of the German mind after 1870, which today is being spent in Hitlerite madness. No more deadly error has ever led a whole people astray and so terribly ordained it for destruction. But taking leave of the (by now) dedicated crowd, he went his way, refusing to be part of orgies of “self-satisfaction.” His strictness had its consequences.
「我喜歡從沒有偏見開始創造，」他寫到。「事實上，我的企圖心就是要被認為是德國人的藐視者。」即使在二十六歲的時候，我就表達懷疑：德國人的天性在我身上喚起什麼。（第三個悲情故事）「對於我而言，德國人有某件令人反感的東西。假如要我設法想像一種我所有本能感到厭惡的東西，我想到的總是一個德國人。」（瞧！那個人）對於腦筋清楚的人而言，在政治上，尼采是一位預言家，預測粗鄙的德國人的命運。他是第一位詳細預測的人。他痛恨，在1870年之後，掌控德國人心靈的那種固執，仇恨，及沾沾自喜的愚蠢。這種愚蠢今天正在希特勒身上驗證出來。整個民族被引導進入歧途，可怕地註定會淪亡，這種致命的錯誤，真是前所未有。但是在他跟當時全神貫注的群眾分道揚鑣之後，他選擇自己的方式前進，拒絕成為那種「沾沾自喜」的狂飆的一份子。他的嚴謹招致它的後果。
Germany chose to ignore a genius so unwilling to flatter her. It was only Nietzsche’s notoriety abroad that belatedly secured the attention of his people . . . I know of no better example of the wall of incomprehension existing between one person and his or her country: for fifteen years a whole nation remaining deaf to that voice–isn’t this a serious matter? As witnesses to that destruction, we ought to look in admiration at the fact that while Germany took the path leading to the worst developments, one of the best and most passionate Germans turned away from his country with feelings of horror and uncontrollable disgust. Taken all round in any case, in their attempts to evade him as much as in their aberrations, doesn’t hindsight let us see something vulnerable in this inconclusiveness?
德國選擇忽視一位不願意恭維她的天才。只有當尼采在國外的名聲，才過晚地獲得他國人的注意。、、、我想不出有任何更好的例子來說明，存在於一個人跟他或她的國家之間的互相不理解的牆壁：十五年來整個國家對於他的聲音充耳不聞。這難道不是一件很嚴重的事嗎？作為那場毀滅的經歷者，我們應該欽佩地看待這個事實：當德國選擇導致最糟糕發展的途徑時，有一位最優秀最熱情的德國人背離他的國家，帶著恐懼及無法控制的厭惡的感情。德國人當時被帶得團團轉，企圖避開尼采，脫軌前進。現在回顧起來，難道不是讓我們從這種未定之天，看出某件最脆弱的東西？
In their opposition to each other, at last both Nietzsche and Germany will probably experience the same fate: both equally, aroused by demented hopes, though not to any purpose. Beyond this tragically pointless confusion, lacerations, and hatreds governed their relations. The resemblances are insignificant. If the habit of not taking Nietzsche seriously did not exist, the habit of doing what most annoyed him, giving him a cursory reading to exploit him, without even putting aside positions which he saw as being incompatible with his, his teaching would be seen for what it is–the most violent of solvents. To view this teaching as supporting causes it actually discredits not only insults it but rides roughshod over it–showing that his readers know nothing at all about what they claim to like. To try, as I have, to push the possibilities of his teaching to the limit is to become, like Nietzsche, a field of infinite contradictions. Following his paradoxical doctrines, you are forced to see yourself as excluded from participating in current causes. You’ll eventually see that solitude is your only lot.

他們互相的對立，最後，尼采跟德國很可能會經驗到相同的命運：兩者都是受到瘋狂的希望所激發，但是都是徒勞無功。除外，支配他們關係的，是這場悲劇地沒有意義的混亂，撕裂及仇恨。這些類似其實無關緊要。即使忽視尼采的習慣已不再存在，可是大家還是習慣於做最令他感到懊惱的事情，匆促流覽他的著作，就想要利用他，甚至沒有擺開跟他認為是格格不入的立場，沒有按照他的教導的內涵去觀看，這種習慣是最粗暴的解決方法。拿這種教導，作為支持實際上是尼采蔑視的目標，那不但是污辱它，而且是強暴它。這顯示：讀者對於他們所宣稱的喜歡的東西，其實一無所知。我的做法是，設法將尼采的教導的可能性推到極限，就是像尼采一樣，成為一個無限矛盾的領域。當你遵從他的矛盾重重的信條時，你被迫看待你自己，當著是從參與目前目標中被排除出來。最後，你將會看到，孤獨是你唯一的命運。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 02

Bataille 02

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
2
An extreme, unconditional human yearning was expressed for the first time by Nietzsche independently of moral goals or of serving God.
首次，尼采在「超越道德目標與服侍上帝」一書，表達一個極端的無條件的人的渴望。
Nietzsche can’t really define it, but it motivates him and it’s what he unreservedly makes his own. Of course, ardor that doesn’t address a dramatically articulated moral obligation is a paradox. In this context there is no preaching or action that is possible. The result from this is something disturbing. If we stop looking at states of ardor as simply preliminary to other and subsequent conditions grasped as beneficial, the state I propose seems a pure play of lightning, merely an empty consummation. Lacking any relation to material benefits such as power or the growth of the state (or of God or a Church or a party), this consuming can’t even be comprehended. It appears that the positive value of loss can only be given as gain.
尼采並沒有真正替它下定義，但是它引起他的動機。這是他徹底的獨立。當然，徒有激情，而沒有處理一個強烈表達的道德責任，是個悖論。在這個情境，沒有一個傳道或行動是可能的。因此的結果是某件令人困擾的東西。假如我們不再觀看激情的狀態，當著僅僅是其他隨後被理解為有利的情況的初階。我建議的情況似乎是純粹光的遊戲，僅僅是空虛的消耗。跟材料的利益欠缺任何的關係，譬如權力，或是這個情況的成長（或是上帝，或是教堂，或是黨派的成長）。這種消耗甚至無法被理解。似乎，損失的正面價值，只能被給予當著述獲得。
Nietzsche wasn’t entirely clear on this difficulty. He must have known he failed, and in the end knew he was a voice crying out in the wilderness. To be done with obligation and good, to expose the lying emptiness of morality, he destroyed the effective value of language. Fame came late to him, and as it did, he thwarted it. His expectations went unanswered.

尼采對於這個困難，並不完全清楚。他當時一定知道他失敗，最後，他知道他是一個在荒野呼喊的聲音。當他跟責任與善行一刀兩斷，揭露道德的謊言的空虛，他毀滅了語言的有效價值。名聲很晚才來到他這裏，當名聲來時時，他阻擾它。他的期望始終沒有得到回應。
Today it appears that I ought to say his readers and his admirers show him scant respect (he knew this and said so). * Except for me? (I am oversimplifying). Still . . . to try, as he asked, to follow him is to be vulnerable to trials and tribulations similar to his.
今天，似乎我應該說，他的讀者跟他的崇拜者很少對他表示崇敬（他知道而且如此說）。「除了我？」（我只是簡述）。可是、、、如他所要求的，設法跟隨他，等於是曝露於類似他承受的考驗與磨難的傷害。
This total liberation of human possibility as he defined it, of all possibilities is, of course, the only one to remain untried (I repeat by way of simplification, except perhaps by me?). At the current historical juncture, I suppose each conceivable teaching preached has had its effect. Nietzsche in turn conceived and preached a new doctrine, he gathered disciples, aspired to found an order. He had contempt for what he received–vulgar praise!
如他所定義的，人類可能性的完全解放，所有可能性的解放，當然就是唯一沒有被考驗的解放。（ 我重複作為簡化，或許除了被我簡化？） 在目前的歷史的危機，我認為每一個可被構想的傳道的教學，都會有它的影響力。尼采也構想並佈道一個新的信條。他聚集門徒，渴望建立一種秩序。他藐視他所收到庸俗的稱讚。
I think it is appropriate today to state my confusion. Within myself I tried to draw out consequences of a lucid doctrine impelling and attracting me to it as if to the light. I’ve reaped a harvest of anguish and, most often, a feeling of going under.
我認為，我今天陳述我的困惑是合宜的。在我內心，我設法顯現清楚信條的結果。這些信條激勵我，吸引我到它那裏，好像吸引我到光。我曾經收穫大量的痛苦，往往還是沉淪的感覺。
3
Going under, I don’t abandon the yearnings I spoke of. Or rather they don’t abandon me. And I die. Even dying doesn’t silence me: at least that’s my belief. And I want those I love also to undergo–to go under also.

沉淪，我並沒有放棄我談論的渴望。或者不妨說是，我談論的渴望並沒有放棄我。然後我就死亡。甚至死亡都不能使我沉默不語，至少那是我的信仰。我要我愛的那些人也去沉淪，也去沉淪。
In the essence of humanness a fierce impulse seeks autonomy, the freedom to be. Naturally, freedom can be understood in many different ways–but is it any wonder that people today are dying for it? On my own, I’ll have to face the same difficulties as Nietzsche–putting God and the good behind him, though all ablaze with the ardor possessed by those who lay down their lives for God or the good. The discouraging loneliness he described oppresses me. But breaking away from moral entities gives such truth to the air I breathe, I’d rather live as a cripple or die than fall back into slavery!
在人性的本質，一個強烈的欲望驅力是尋求自主性，尋求生命實存的自由。當然，自由可以用許多方式來理解。但是今天的人們如此渴望自由，這難道不令人驚奇？獨立地，我將必須面對跟尼采相同的困難：就是將上帝跟善行拋置身後，雖然我全身燃燒著，跟那些為了上帝或是善行而捐軀的人們的熱情。尼采描述的令人洩氣的孤獨，壓迫著我。但是，脫離道德的本體，讓我呼吸的空氣，有如此的真理。我寧可作為一個殘障而生或死亡，也不願意重回奴隸的境地。
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Bataille 01

Bataille 01

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
Preface
1
Do you seek warmth of me? Come not too close, I counsel, or your hands may burn. For look! My ardor exceeds the limit, and I barely restrain the flames from leaping from my body!
序言
1
你尋找屬於我的溫暖嗎？請勿過於靠近，這是我的忠告，否則你的手將會燙傷。你瞧！我的狂熱超越了極限，我幾乎無法控制從我的身體跳躍出來的火焰！
— 1881-86 *
MOTIVATING THIS writing–as I see it–is fear of going crazy.
激發我這次寫作的動機，依我看來，就是恐怕我會瘋狂。
I’m on fire with painful longings, persisting in me like unsatisfied desire.
我燃燒著痛苦的渴望，這些渴望在我內心持續燃燒，有如無法滿足的欲望。
In one sense, my tension is a crazy urge to laugh, not so different in its way from the ravaging passions of Sade’s heroes but close, too, to the tensions of the martyrs and saints . . .
從某個意義來說，我的緊張就是瘋狂地渴望要大笑。這種大笑在方式上，不同於薩德的小說人物那種狂飆的激情。但是也類似烈士及聖徒的緊張。
On this score, I have few doubts–my delirium brings out human qualities. Though by implication an imbalance is there as well–and distressingly I’m deprived of all rest. I’m ablaze, disoriented–and finally empty. Whatever great or necessary actions come to mind, none answers to this feverishness. I’m speaking of moral concerns–of discovering some object that surpasses all others in value!
就這點而言，我很少懷疑：我的激情顯露人性的本質。雖然它也意味著：激情當中也存在著不平衡。痛苦萬分地，我喪失一切的安息。我熱情澎湃，瘋狂失控，最後是空虛。我回想人類各種偉大或必要的壯烈行動，可是沒有一樣跟我的狂熱相符合。我談論到道德的關懷，談論到要發現某個目標，在價值方面，超越所有的其他目標。
Compared to the moral ends normally advanced, the object I refer to is incommensurable. Moral ends seem deceptive and lusterless. Still, only moral ends translate to acts (aren’t they determined as a demand for definite acts?).
跟正常被提倡的道德的目標相比，我提到的目標跟它們截然不同。道德的目標欺騙人，而且沒有光輝。可是，只有道德的目標轉換成為行動（它們難道不是被決定為一種明確行動的需求？）
The truth is, concern about this or that limited good can sometimes lead to the summit I am approaching. But this occurs in a roundabout way. And moral ends, in this case, are distinct from any excesses they occasion. States of glory and moments of sacredness (which reveal incommensurability) surpass results intentionally sought. Ordinary morality puts these results on the same footing as sacrificial ends. Sacrifice explores the grounding of worlds, and the destruction realized discloses a sacrificial laceration. All the same, it’s for the most banal reasons that sacrifice is celebrated. Morality addresses our good.
真相是，對於這個或那個有限度的善行的關懷，有時會通往我正要到達的高峰。但是兩邊的會合是以迂迴的方式。在此情況，道德的目標截然不同於它們所引起的逾越。光榮的狀態與神聖的時刻，（它們彼此完全不同），超過意圖追求的結果。普通的道德將這些結果，跟犧牲的目標，擺放在相同的立足點。犧牲是在探索世界的基礎，而被實現的毀滅洩漏出犧牲的懊惱。依舊地，因為這個陳腐的理由，犧牲被慶祝。道德在處理我們的善行。

(Things changed in appearance when God was represented as a unique and veritable end. Now, some will say the incommensurability of which I speak is simply God’s transcendence. But for me transcendence is avoiding my object. Nothing radically changes when instead of human satisfaction, we think of the satisfaction of some heavenly being! God’s person displaces the problem and does not abolish it. It simply introduces confusions. When so moved or when circumstances require–in regard to God–being will grant itself an incommensurable essence. By serving God and acting on his behalf we reduce him to ordinary, ends that exist in action. If he were situated beyond, there would be nothing to be done on his behalf.)
（外表上，事情已經改變，當上帝被呈現當著一個獨特而可以驗證的目標。現在，有些人會說，我所提到的無以倫比，僅僅就是上帝的超驗。但是對我而言，超驗非我的目標所能到達。情況並沒有多大改變，我們想的還是某個天神的滿意，而不是人的滿意。上帝的化身為人，遮蔽了難題，但是並沒有消除難題。它僅僅介紹混淆。當上帝如此被移除，或情況要求我們移除，人的生命實存賦予它自己無以倫比的本質。我們服侍上帝，並且代理他行動。以這種方式，我們將上帝淪落成為存在于行動的普通目標。假如上帝被定為超驗，那就沒有任何事情，能夠讓我們代替他來做。）
雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com