Archive for the ‘Bataille巴岱伊’ Category

巴岱伊論尼采 32

June 24, 2011

Bataille 32

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 32
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微
XIII
Now I’LL articulate some of the questions implicit in the account I gave.
現在我將表達我所給予的描述蘊含的一些問題。

Is there a moral goal that I can reach beyond being?
有一種我能夠到達的超越生命實存的道德目標嗎?

To which I have already answered, in any event, that I wouldn’t be able to go searching for it–or talking about it.
無論如何,對於這個問題,我已經回答,所以我不再能夠去尋找它—或是談論它。

I live, and in me is life (language). Now, the language that is in me can’t give up having a moral goal . . . All it can do is suggest that if I follow the slopes of decline, I’ll never arrive at that goal.
我生活,在我內在是生命(語言)。現在,在我內在的語言無法放棄擁有一個道德目標、、、它所能做的就是建議:假如我遵照衰微的斜坡,我永遠不會到達那個目標。

And this said, I continue to live.
說完這話,我繼續生活。

I’ll add (speaking in my name), I can’t find a good to substitute for the goal eluding me.
我將補充一句(以我的名義說話),我無法找到一個「良善」,來取代我無法掌握的目標。

I no longer know of any reason–outside me–to sacrifice either myself or the small quantity of strength I have.
我不再知道任何理性—在我之外—來犧牲我自己,或是我擁有的那些微的力量。

I live, vulnerable to laughter on one hand (leaving me cheerful), and sexual stimulation on the other (leaving me anxious).
我生活,一方面歡笑而易受傷(讓我心曠神怡),另一方面性的刺激(讓我感到焦慮)。

Mystical states are available to me, if that is what I want.
神秘的狀態,我唾手可得,假如那是想要的。

Maintaining my distance from beliefs, deprived of hopes, nothing compels me to enter these states.
維持我跟信仰的距離,被剝奪希望,沒有一樣東西逼我進入這些狀態。

I feel removed from the notion of making efforts to attain them.
我感覺脫離這個觀念:努力去獲得它們。

Making my inner experience a project: doesn’t that result in a remoteness, on my part, from the summit that might have been?
將我的內在經驗化為計畫:那樣難道不會造成在我這方面,遠離本來會存在的顛峰嗎?

With those who have motives and reasons, I don’t feel as if I’m missing anything, so I’m not envious. Just the opposite. Since I encourage them to share my fate. My mistrust of motivations and fragility, are, I think, propitious. The greatest difficulty in my situation is my luck. I’m intoxicated by it.
對於那些擁有動機及理性的人,我不覺得好像我正在錯過任何東西。所以我並不羡慕。恰恰相反。因為我鼓勵他們分享我的命運。我認為,我對於動機及脆弱的不信任是適合的。在我的情境的最大困難是我的幸運。我陶醉於我的幸運。

But exploding inside me, despite everything, is a question: WHAT CAN A CLEAR-SIGHTED PERSON DO IN THIS WORLD, HAVING INCONTROVERTIBLE DEMANDS WITHIN?
但是,儘管一切,我內在的爆炸是一個問題。在這個世界,一位具有清澈洞見的人,假如他內在具有清楚明白的要求,他能夠做些什麼?

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchomec.com.tw
http://springheo.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 31

June 21, 2011

Bataille 31

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 31
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微
XII
And again and again the human species claimed, ‘We definitely don’t have the right to just laugh at anything!” And the most prescient philosophers added, “Not just laughter and joyful prudence, but tragedy and sublime folly too, are among the means and necessities of preserving the species.”–This is consistent!–it follows!
— Gay Science
反復再三,人類的種族宣稱,「我們明確沒有權利對任何事情歡笑!」具有先知之見的哲學家補充說:「不僅是歡笑及歡喜的謹慎,而且悲劇與崇高的愚蠢,都是為了延續人類種族的工具及必需物。」–這是一致性!—它順理成章!
—尼采:歡愉的智慧

MORAL AMBIGUITIES constitute a fairly stable system of equilibrium regarded from the standpoint of existence generally. But we can never completely go back to them. Who would deny that self sacrifice has a place in the scheme of things? Should we be surprised if that involves compromise with well-understood common interests? Still, the existence of morality and the confusion generated by it extend my investigation far beyond such an immediate outlook. In the lengthy and preceding considerations, I don’t know if I’ve made it sufficiently clear how lacerating this last investigation has been. I’ll now develop a viewpoint that, though external to the simple questions I wanted to introduce, nonetheless brings out their implications.

道德的曖昧性組成一個非常穩定的平衡系統,從一般的生命存在的觀點來看。但是我們永遠不會完全回到它們。有誰將會否認:自我犧牲在這些事情的規劃上,佔有一席之地?假如那牽涉到跟大家耳熟能詳的共同利益的妥協,我們應該感到驚奇嗎?雖然如此,道德的存在及被它產生的混淆,將我的探討延伸超越如此當下的觀點。在漫長而在先的考量,我並不知道我是否充分地表達清楚,這個最後的探討始終是裂痕重重。我現在將會發展一個觀點,雖然是外在於我想要介紹的簡單的問題。可是,這個問題顯露它們的內涵。
As long as the excessive impulses to which desire leads can be linked to useful actions or considered to be such (useful, that is, for individuals in decline, who are reduced to the necessity of accumulating strength), there was a way to fulfill the desire for a summit. Thus people of other times made sacrifices, even indulged in orgies while attributing to sacrifice and orgy an efficacy of action that would act to benefit the clan or the state.

只要欲望導致的這些過度的衝動,能夠被連接到有用的行動,或是被認為是這樣(也就是,對於衰微中的個人有用,因為他們被淪落到有必要累積力量),有一個方法滿足想要到達顛峰的欲望。因此,其他時代的人們從事犧性,甚至放縱於狂歡,一方面,又將行動的效率歸功於犧性與狂歡。這個行動的被採取,是為了利益民族或國家。

Any violation of others, like war, possesses a beneficial value so long as it finds success–and rightly so. Beyond narrow, visibly heavy-handed, egotistical political benefits, and despite the possibilities of individual self-sacrifice, the inequities in the division of state wealth (arising from disorder) made people seek some good that would accord with the feeling for justice. Beyond the egotistical state good, salvation (or the concern for personal salvation after death) became the motivation for action and, as well, the means to link action to an ascent to the summit and to a surpassing of self.

其他種類的違背,譬如戰爭,都擁有一個美麗的價值,只有它獲得成功—而且還振振有詞。它超越偏狹的明目張膽的壓制,自體中心的政治利益,儘管個人自我犧牲的可能性,在國家區分的不平等(起源於混亂),會使人們尋求某種的善,以符合正義的感覺。因為超越自體中心的國家的善,救贖就成為行動的動機(或是對於死亡之後的個人救贖的關心),而且也是這個工具,用以連接行動跟到達顛峰的攀登,及自我的超越。

In a general way, personal salvation allowed escape from the lacerations breaking down society. Injustice became tolerable. It allowed the possibility of appeal, and people even began joining together in their effort to fight the results of injustice. Beyond the specific goods considered to be so many motives for action by the state and then the Church (the Church in turn becoming the analog for the state, so that during the Crusades people will die for it), the possibility of radically abolishing the obstacle created by unequal conditions defined a sort of beneficial action and motivated the sacririce of lives.

一般來說,個人的救贖容許從撕裂社會的這些裂痕逃避出來。不公平變得讓人無法忍受。不公平要容許人申訴,人們甚至開始團結在一起,努力去戰鬥不公平的結果。超越被國家及教會認為是行動的許多動機的這些明確的善,(教會反過來成為國家電類似物,所以在十字軍東征時,人們願意為它而死,)不平等情況創造的阻礙,有可能予以強烈地廢除,定義了某種利益的行動,並且激發生命的犧牲。

So throughout history–and in the process of making history–there developed reasons to proceed to the summit and risk ourselves. The difficulty beyond this is to proceed to the summit without motivation and without pretext. As I said, to speak of the summit is to put ourselves in a position of instability. We only discover it by speaking of something else.

有史以來—在創造歷史的過程—要繼續到達顛峰及自我冒險的理由,被發展出來。超越這一點的困難,是要繼續到達顛峰,沒有動機及沒有藉口。如我所說,談論顛峰,就是要將我們自己放置在不穩定的立場。我們憑藉談論某件其他東西,才能發現它。

To put it another way. Because all risk, ascent, and sacrifice, like sensual excess, is loss of strength or expenditure, we have to motivate expenditures each time with promises of advantage, whether illusory or not.

換另外一種方式說,因為所有的冒險,攀登,及犧牲,就像感官的過度,是力量的損失及消耗,我們必須激發消耗的動機,每次都帶著獲得利益的許諾,無論是幻想的利益與否。
Envisaged in a general economy, this situation seems strange.

從一般的經濟學來擬想,這種情況似乎很奇怪。

I can imagine some kind of historical situation in which all possibilities of action are put on hold, kept in reserve, like the agèd when they live beyond life’s limits, abrogating all their further hopes and plans beyond limits already attained. Revolutionary action would found classless society, beyond which further historical action wouldn’t arise.

我能夠想像某種歷史的情況,在那裏,所有行動的可能性都被掌控,被保留,就像老年人,當他們生活在生命的限制之外,取消所有他們更進一步的希望及計畫,超越已經被獲得的極限。革命的行動將會創立一個沒有階級的社會,不可能有更進一步的歷史的行動,超越這個社會。

Or so I assume in any event. Still, I have to make an observation. In a general way, apparently, humanly speaking, the sum of energy produced is always greater than the sum necessary for its production. Hence the continuous and overly full churning out of energy, leading us endlessly to some summit, constituting a baleful element that (largely pointlessly) we attempt to expend for a common good.

或者,我無論如何都認為。可是,我必須從事一種觀察。一般來說,明顯從人道角度來說,被產生的精力的數目總是大過於產生精力的數目。因此,精力繼續而且豐沛的消耗,會永無止盡地引導我們登上某個顛峰,組成我們企圖為一個共同的善而消耗的一個不幸的元素,(大體上這是沒有意義的)。

Governed by concerns with the good and the primacy of the future, the mind considers it repugnant to contemplate squanderings that might be defined as guilty, or useless, or even harmful. Now, since the motivations for action are missing which till now have been pretexts for infinite squandering, it seems humanity is discovering possibilities for rest and for recovery . . . But what then will we do with the excess energies that fall to our lot? . . .

當心靈受到對於善的關心及未來的優先所操控,它會覺得盤算浪費是令人厭惡。這些浪費可能會被定義為罪惡,無用,甚至是有害。現在,因為行動的動機正在喪失,直到現在,這些動機一直是無窮盡浪費的藉口。似乎,人類漸漸發現到休息與恢復的可能性、、、但是我們將如何來處理,降臨到我們命運的這些精力的旺盛?

I’ve tried insidiously to suggest the external ramifications that my question might have. In all honesty, I have to admit that, as it stands–on the level of economic calculation–the question loses in sharpness what it has gained in amplitude. The reality is, the question has changed. The more interest came to be factored in, the more expenditure had to depend on it. That is an obvious dead-end, since in the long run we can’t continue spending to gain–and as I’ve said, the sum of energy produced is always greater. . .

我曾經私下嘗試聯想我的問題可能會有分歧。非常坦白地說,我必須承認,事實上,在經濟盤算的層次,這個牽涉到廣度累積的問題,從敏銳度來看,就自然消失。事實上,這個問題已經改變。越多的利益被算計在裏面,越多的消耗就必須依靠它。那是一種顯而易見的僵局。因為總歸到底,我們無法繼續為了獲得而消費—如我曾經說過,被產生的精力的數目總是大過於、、、

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊论尼采 30

June 20, 2011

Bataille 30

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

XI
Like Kafka’s castle, in the final analysis the summit is simply whatever is inaccessible. It slips away from us, at least until we stop being human, that is, until we stop speaking.

就像卡夫卡的「城堡」,總歸到底,顛峰就是無法接近的地方。它從我們身上溜走,至少直到我們停止為人。換句話說,直到我們停止言說。

The summit can, though, be opposed to decline as evil to good.
The summit isn’t “what we ought to reach”; nor is decline “what ought to be done away with.”
Just as in the last analysis the summit is simply inaccessible, from the start, decline is inevitable.

雖然如此,顛峰能夠跟衰微對立,如同惡與善對立。
顛峰並不是「我們應該到達的地方」;衰微也不是「我們應該廢除的地方」。
正如總歸到底,顛峰總是無法接近,從一開始,衰微就是無可避免。
PUTTING ASIDE popular confusions, though, I haven’t done away with the necessity for a summit (I haven’t done away with the desire for it). Admitting its inaccessible nature (I approach it only by not setting out for it), I’m not on that score compelled to accept the undisputed sovereignty of the decline (speaking commits me to this stance). I can’t deny the inevitability of decline. The summit itself indicates it. If the summit isn’t death, the necessity of descent follows thereafter. Essentially, the summit is where life is pushed to an impossible limit. I reach it, in the faint way that I do, only by recklessly expending my strength. I won’t again possess a strength to waste unless, through work, I can gain back the strength lost.

儘管如此,當我將通俗的混亂放置一邊時,我並沒有廢除追求顛峰的必要(我並沒有廢除對於顛峰的渴望)。雖然我承認顛峰無法到達的特性(我僅是憑藉不出發去追求而接近它。)我並不因為那個原因而被迫接受衰微的無可爭辯的統治(言說使我採取這樣的姿態。)我無法否認衰微的無可避免性。顛峰的本身指示它。假如顛峰並不是死亡,上升到需要隨後會跟隨而來。基本上,顛峰就是生命被迫達到一個不可能的極限。我到達這個極限,以我所為的模糊的方式,僅是悍然地消耗我的力量。我不再擁有一個可以耗費的力量,除非我能憑藉工作,重新獲得失去的力量。

What am I moreover? Inscribed in a human context, I can’t dispossess myself of my will to act. The possibility of giving up work forever and in some way pushing myself definitively to some goal, which in the long run is illusory: This isn’t conceivable. Let’s even suppose (in an ideal way) that I’m considering the Caesarean option of suicide. This albeit attractive possibility arises for me as an endeavor causing me to place concerns for the future over those for the present. But I can’t give up the summit! I protest (intending to put lucid, dispassionate ardor into such protests) against anything that asks of us that we stifle desire.

而且,我是怎樣一個人?當我被銘記著人類的內文,我無法沒收我行動的意志。永遠放棄工作以及用某種方式明確地逼迫我到達某個目標的可能性,這個目標總歸到底,是個幻覺。這是無法被想像的。讓我們甚至認為(以一個理想的方式),我正在考慮從事凱撒式的從容就義的觀念。就我而言,這個雖然很迷人的可能性出現作為一種企圖,引起我將關心放置在未來,勝過於對目前的關新。但是我無法放棄顛峰!我抗議(打算將清楚冷靜的熱誠,放進這樣的抗議,)對抗任何要求我們應該悶死欲望的東西。

Though I can only contentedly resign myself to the fate compelling me to work: I’d never dream of doing away with moral rules, since they spring from inevitable decline. We are always declining, and ruinous desire returns again only as strength is restored. Because powerlessness in us requires recognition, and because we don’t have unlimited strength, why not acknowledge such a necessity, giving in to it even as we deny it? We’re no match for the empty sky that infinitely assaults and annihilates us down to the last human being. I can only morosely say, of the necessity to which I submit, that it humanizes me by giving me undeniable dominion over things. I have the option, however, of not regarding it as a sign of weakness.

雖然我只能夠滿足地自己順服於逼迫我工作的命運,我將不會夢想廢除道德軌則,因為它們起源於無可避免的衰微。我們總是在衰微當中,遭受毀滅的欲望再一次回轉,僅是作為力量被恢復。因為在我們身上的無力感要求被承認,因為我們並沒有無限的力量,我們為什麼不承認這樣一種需要,屈服於它,甚至當我們否認它的時候?我們不是空曠天空的對手,那種天空無限地攻擊並毀滅我們,成為最後的人類,我僅能憂鬱地說,關於我屈服的這個需要,它讓我變得更加人性化,因為它給予我無可否認地支配事物。可是,我擁有這個選擇,不將它認為是一種衰弱的跡象。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 29

June 18, 2011

Bataille 29

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 29
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

X
What you see is the birth of a hybrid species, the artist–removed from crime through weakness of will and fear of society, though not yet ready for the insane asylum, and oddly extending his antennae in both directions.
— 1888

你所看到的就是混雜品種的誕生。這種藝術家由於意志的薄弱及對於社會的恐懼,遠離罪惡,雖然他尚未準備進入瘋人院,並且古怪地延伸他的觸角,朝兩個方向。
–1888
We have to go further.
To articulate such a critique is already to decline.
The fact of “speaking” of a summit morality itself belongs to a decline of morality.

我們必須前進更遠。
為了表達如此一種批判已經將衰微。
顛峰道德本身的「言說」這個事實,屬於道德的衰微。

HAVING SAID good-bye to worries about the future with a blasphemous oath–I lose all reason for existing, in fact, all reason, period.

當我使用褻瀆的誓言,跟未來的焦慮說再見,我喪失所有生命實存時期的理性,事實上,是所有的理性。

I lose the possibility of speaking.
Especially speaking as I am now of summit morality is something utterly ridiculous!
Out of what reason and to what end, going beyond the summit itself, would I want to explain such a morality?
And to begin with, how to structure the explanation?

我喪失言說的可能。
特別是我現在處於顛峰道德時,「言說」是某件完全荒謬的東西!
出乎怎樣的理性,為了怎樣的目的,進行超越顛峰的本身,我會想要解釋這樣一種道德嗎?
首先,我們如何架構這樣的解釋?

To me, to structure and explain the summit morality assumes the decline, since it assumes accepting moral rules relating to fear. Frankly put, the summit, when suggested as an end, is not the summit, since I’m reducing it to the search for advantage when speaking of it. To construe utter dissipation as the moral summit is to completely change its nature. Specifically: in such dissi pation I’m thus depriving myself of the power of reaching the summit.

對於我而言,要架構及解釋:顛峰道德假定它會衰微,因為它假定會接受跟恐懼相關的道德規則。坦白地說,當顛峰被建議作為一種目的,它不是顛峰,因為我正在將它淪落為對於言說到它時的一種利益的追尋。
The only possible way for dissipation to reach the summit is by not intending it. The ultimate moment of the senses requires real innocence and absence of moral pretensions and, as a result, even a feeling of evil.

唯一可能讓擴散到達顛峰的的方式是不要意圖這樣做。感官的最後時刻要求全然的純真及道德偽裝的欠缺。結果甚至會說一種邪惡的感覺。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 28

June 17, 2011

Bataille 28

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 28
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

IX
I can’t recall efforts, there’s no trace of struggle in my life, and I’m the opposite of heroic natures. My experience knows nothing at all about what it means to “will” a thing or work at it ambitiously or relate to some “goal” or realization of desire.
— Ecce Homo

我無法回憶奮鬥,在我一生中並沒有奮鬥的痕跡。我是英雄天性的相反。
–尼采:瞧這個人!

So that ordinarily, mystical states are conditioned by a search for salvation.

所以一般來說,神秘的狀態是受到尋求救贖的制約。

IT APPEARS that the summit’s link between a mystical state and impoverished existence, with fear and greed expressed as values of decline, is in a sense superficial and very likely to be deeply fallacious. This doesn’t make it any less what is the case. Solitary ascetics pursue an end whose means is ecstasy–and ascetics work for their salvation like merchants buying and selling with profit in mind or like workers sweating for their wages.
在神秘狀態與貧瘠的生命實存之間的顛峰的聯接,以恐懼與貪婪作為衰微的價值,似乎在某個意義上是膚淺,而且很有可能是謬誤。儘管這樣,這就是它的本來樣子。孤獨的禁欲者追求一個方法是狂喜的目標,禁欲者為他們的救贖而工作,就像商人作買賣,心裏掛念著利潤,或就像工人為了工資而流汗。

If workers or merchants had wealth for the asking, without worries about a future, without fearing death or destruction, they’d leave their workplace or business without further ado and seek out whatever dangerous pleasures presented themselves. As for ascetics: by falling into common human misery, they become possessed by a possibility of undertaking the lengthy work of deliverance.

假如工人或商人擁有唾手可得的財富,不必憂慮未來,不必恐懼死亡或毀滅,他們將會不再麻煩地離開他們的工作地方或生意場所,尋求呈現在他們面前的任何危險的歡樂。至於禁欲主義者,由於陷入共同的人類悲慘,他們著迷於一種可能:從事接受拯救的漫長工作

Ascetic practices are human precisely insofar as they aren’t much different from surveying work. To be sure, the greatest difficulty in the end is to take cognizance of that limitation. Without the bait of salvation (or something like it), who could ever discover the mystical way? People must have agreed among themselves (or among others), that this or that is advisable in view of this or that result, this or that gain.

禁欲主義者確實是合乎人性的,因為他們跟勘察的工作沒有什麼兩樣。的確,最後最大的困難在於承認那個限制。假如沒有救贖的釣餌,(或類似的東西),有誰可能會找的神秘的途徑呢?人們本來會跟自己人(或跟別人)同意說:由於這個或那個結果,這個利益或那個利益,這樣是比較好。

Without these crude artifices they wouldn’t have committed themselves to the behavior that marks out decline (the infinite sadness, the ridiculous seriousness required by effort!). Isn’t it obvious? As soon as I say–oh why give a damn about some future!–then and there I break into infinite laughter. At the same moment, though, I’ve lost the reason to make efforts.

假如沒有這些粗略的巧計,他們本來會全神奉獻於標示衰微的行為(無限的悲傷,奮鬥所要求的荒謬的嚴肅!)這難道不是顯而易見嗎?當我一這樣說—哦!為什麼在在乎未來!當時當地,我狂笑不已!雖然,在相同時刻,我已經喪失奮鬥的理由。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 27

June 15, 2011

Bataille 27

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

VIII
And as for decadence, the image of this in many ways is people who do not die prematurely; from their experience, they know the instincts that this implies; during nearly half their lives human beings are decadent.
 1888
至於頹廢,在很多方面這種頹廢的意象是沒有過早死去的人們。根據他們的經驗,他們知道這種頹廢暗示的本能。在他們幾乎是他們的大半生裏,人類的頹廢的。

Substitution of spiritual summits for immediate ones, however, won’t take place if we don’t admit the primacy of the future over the present and if we don’t draw the consequences of the inevitable decline that follows the summit. Spiritual summits are a negation of what might be given as a summit morality. And they fall into the category ‘the morality of the decline.’

可是,精神顛峰取代當下顛峰並沒有發生,假如我們不承認未來的地位優於現在,假如我們沒獲得跟隨在顛峰之後的無可避免的衰微的結果。精神的顛峰是對於可能會被給予的顛峰道德的一種否定。精神顛峰會陷入「衰微的道德」的範疇。

THE SHIFT to spiritual forms requires one main condition, since a pretext would be necessary before rejecting sensuality. If I suppressed consideration of the time to come, I wouldn’t be in a position to resist temptation. I must helplessly give in to the slightest impulse. Temptation isn’t even a notion that can occur to me: from then on temptation is ruled out, and I’m easy prey for desires that now can be thwarted only through outward difficulties. To be honest, this blessed openness isn’t humanly imaginable. Human nature can’t as such reject worries about the future, and the states in which such preoccupations aren’t applicable are either above humanness or below it.

轉化成為精神的形態要求一個主要的條件,因為需要一種藉口,它才能拒絕感官。假如我壓抑未來時間的考慮,我將沒有立場來阻抗誘惑。我必須無助地屈服於即使是最輕微的欲望衝動。誘惑甚至不是我會想到一個觀念:從那時開始,誘惑就被排除。我是欲望的輕易的獵物,這些欲望現在只有經歷外在的困難,才能夠被阻擋。坦白說,這種喜悅的開放不是一般人類所能想像。人類的天性本身不可能拒絕對於未來的憂慮。這種預先註定無法應用的狀態,要就是高於人性,要不就是低於人性。
Whatever the case, we escape a giddying sensuality only by representing for ourselves some good situated in a future time, a future that sensuality would destroy and that we have to keep from it. So we can reach the summit beyond the fever of the senses only provided we set up a subsequent goal. Or, if you like (a clearer, more serious consideration), we reach a nonsensual, nonimmediate summit only by referring to a necessarily higher end. And this end isn’t simply located above sensuality (which it brings to a halt); it also must be situated above the spiritual summit. Beyond sensuality, beyond the reply to desire, we are in fact in the realm of the good–which is the realm of the primacy of the future against the present, the area of being’s preservation, contrasted with its glorious loss.

無論如何,只有以某種被定位在未來的善,一種感官將會毀滅的未來,我們必須避開感官的未來,來代表我們自己,我們才能逃避一種令人暈眩的感官。所以,只有當我們建立一個後來的目標,我們能夠到達這種超越感官的顛峰。或者,假如你願意,(一個更清楚,更加嚴肅的考慮),只有提到一個必然是更高的目標,我們才能到達一個沒有感官,沒有當下的顛峰。這個目標的位置不僅高過感官,(它會中止感官),它也必須定位在高於這個精神的顛峰。超越感官,超越對於欲望的回應,我們事實上是處於善待領域—這個善的領域是未來地位優於現在的領域,生命實存保存的領域,對照于它的輝煌的喪失。。

Another way of saying this: resistance to temptation implies abandoning the summit morality, belonging, as this resistance does, to the morality of decline. When we feel our strength ebbing and we decline, we condemn excesses of expenditure in the name of some higher good. As long as youthful excitement impels us, we consent to dangerous squandering, boldly taking the risks that present themselves.

還有另外一種方式這樣說:對於誘惑的阻抗暗示要放棄顛峰道德,如同阻抗一樣,都歸屬于衰微的道德。當我們感覺我們的力量衰退,我們衰退,以更高的善的名義,我們譴責耗費的過度。只要年輕的激情驅使我們,我們同意危險的揮霍,大膽地冒呈現出來的危險。

But as soon as our strength begins to ebb or we start to perceive the limits of this strength (when we start to decline), we’re preoccupied with gaining and accumulating goods of all kinds, acquiring wealth, since we’re thinking of the difficulties to come. We act. And the end of action and efforts can only be the acquisition of strength. Now, to the extent that a spiritual summit–which opposes sensuality and pits itself against it–becomes revealed in an unfolding action, it’s associated with efforts that desire to gain some good. Such a summit no longer comes within the rubric of a summit morality, and a decline morality prompts it not so much to desire as to make efforts.

但是當我們的力量開始衰退,或是我們開始感覺到這個力量的限制(當我們開始衰微),我們沒有專注於獲得及累積各種的善,獲得財富,因為我們正想到未來的困難。我們行動。行動與努力的目標僅是在獲得力量。現在,隨著精神顛峰(反對感官並且對抗感官)在展開的行動中被啟示出來,它會跟欲望獲得某種善的努力聯接在一塊。這樣一種顛峰不再是在一種顛峰道德的範圍之內。一種衰微道德激發它,不是為了欲望,而是為了努力。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchoome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 26

June 10, 2011

Bataille 26

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采 26
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

VII
The happiness we find in becoming is possible only by annihilating the reality of “existences” and lovely appearance, and through the pessimistic destruction of illusions: so, by annihilating even the loveliest appearances, Dionysian happiness attains its height.
 1885-86

只有毀滅「存在」與可愛外表的現實界,並且透過對於幻覺的悲觀的毀滅,我們在生成過程找到的快樂是可能的:所以,憑藉毀滅即使是最可愛的外表,戴奧尼修斯的快樂達到顛峰。

IF, in the light of the principles that I’ve presented, I now return to Christian ecstasy, I’m free to regard it as part of a single impulse that encompasses erotic and criminal transports.

假如從我曾經呈現的原則的觀點來看,我現在回到基督教的狂歡。我自由地將狂歡視為是一種單一的衝動,涵蓋性欲與犯罪的狂喜。

More than any believer, Christian mystics crucify Jesus. The mystic’s love requires God to risk himself, to shriek out his despair or the cross. The basic crime associated with the saints is erotic, related to the transports and tortured fevers that produce a burning love in the solitude of monasteries and convents.

遠超過任何信仰者,基督教的神秘主義將耶穌釘上十字架。神秘主義的愛要求上帝自己冒險,尖聲發出他的絕望或是十字架。跟聖人聯想在一塊的基本罪行是性欲,跟狂喜與受折磨的狂熱有關係。它們產生一種燃燒的愛,在修道院與修女庵的孤獨當中。

Aspects of the extreme laceration evident in prayer at the foot of the cross can be compared to non-Christian mystical states. For both. sexual desire awakens ecstatic moments, and the object of the love that is this impulse inexorably becomes the individual’s annihilation. Sometimes the nothingness connected to mystical states is the nothingness of the subject, sometimes the individual’s nothingness considered within the world totality. The “night of anguish” theme is found in one form or other in Asian meditations.

在十字架下的祈禱,明顯出現的極端苦惱的層面,能夠被比喻為非基督教神秘主義的狀態。對於兩者,性的欲望喚醒狂喜的時刻,屬於這個衝動的愛的客體,無情地成為個人的毀滅。有時候,跟神秘狀態息息相關的空無,就是生命主體的空無。有時候,個人的空無從世界的整體性裏面來考慮。這個「苦難的夜晚」主題,在亞洲的沉思,以某種方式被找到。

Whatever the religious tradition from which mystical trance is derived, it exhausts itself by exceeding being. Taken at a fever pitch, the fire within relentlessly consumes whatever gives people and things their stable appearance–whatever gives them confidence, whatever acts as a support. Little by little, desire lifts the mystic to such utter ruin and expenditure that the life of that person becomes more or less a solar brightness.

神秘的狂喜從宗教傳統得來,無論這個宗教傳統是什麼,它以超過生命實存,而耗盡自己。從狂熱的高潮來看,在無情消耗任何給予人們及物資穩定的外表,任何給予他們信心,任何充當支持的東西。漸漸地,欲望將神秘送向如此徹底的毀滅及耗盡,以致於那個人的生命變成相當是太陽光的璨爛。
Clearly, however, whether we are dealing with yogis, Buddhists, or Christian monks, there is no reality to such ruins, to such perfections associated with desire. With them, crime or the annihilation of existence is a representation. Their general compromise with regard to morality can easily be shown. Real license was rejected from the arena of the possible as being fraught with unpleasant consequences: orgies or sacrifices, for instance.

可是,顯而易見的,無論我們是在處理瑜伽,佛教徒,或基督教的僧侶,這樣的毀滅,跟欲望息息相關的如此完美,並沒有現實界。對於他們而言,犯罪或是存在的毀滅都是一種再現。關於道德,他們通常的妥協很容易被顯現出來。真實的放縱從可能的競技場被拒絕,當著充滿不愉快的結果:例如,狂歡或是犧牲。

But since there remains the desire for a summit with which these acts are connected, and since beings are still under the necessity of “communicating” with their beyond, symbols (or fictions) have replaced reality. The sacrifice of the mass as representing the reality of the death of Jesus is simply a symbol of the infinite renewal of the Church. Meditational subjects have taken the place of real orgies, drunkenness, and flesh and blood–the latter becoming objects of disapproval. In this way there still remained a summit connected with desire, while the various violations of existence related to that summit no longer were compromising, since now they had become mental representations.

但是因為對於顛峰的欲望始終在那裏,這些行動跟它們連接一塊。因為人的生命依舊有必要跟他們的超越「溝通」,象徵(或虛構)已經取代現實。大眾的犧性作為代表耶穌的死亡的現實界,僅是一種教會的無限重新復活的象徵。沉思的生命主體已經取代了真實的狂歡,爛醉,以及肉身與血液。後者成為受到非難道目標。以這種方式,依舊還有一種顛峰跟欲望相連接。而跟那種顛峰相連接的生命實存,各種的違背不再是妥協,因為它們已經成為精神的再現。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 24

June 6, 2011

Bataille 24

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微
V
Juxtaposed with these propositions, the essence of “popular morality” is most clearly brought to the fore when dealing with sexual license.

跟這些假設平行比列,「通俗道德」的本質顯而易見地突顯出來,當我們在處理性的容許問題。

To the extent human beings take it on themselves to give others a rule of life, they must make an appeal to merit, propose the good of being as an end that finds accomplishment in the time to come.

隨著人類自己承擔起這個責任,給予別人一套生活的規範,他們必須訴諸于美德,建議生命的實存的善,作為在未來的時間找到成就的目的。

If my life is threatened for some comprehensible good–for instance, for the nation or a useful cause–my behavior is deserving and is popularly considered moral. And for the same reasons I’ll kill and wreck havoc in conformity to moral law.

假如我的生命因為可理解的善受到威脅,例如,因為國家或是一個有用的目標,我們的行為應該的值得,而且通常會被稱為道德。同樣的理由,為了要與道德法則相一致,我將殺戮及召致混亂。

In another area, squandering resources through gambling and drinking is wrong: though it’s right to improve the fate of the poor.

在另一個地區,透過賭博及飲酒耗費資源是不對的,雖然改善窮人的命運的正確的。

Blood sacrifice itself is execrated (a cruel waste). But the object of the greatest loathing is the freedom of the senses.

血的犧牲本身被憎恨(一種殘酷的浪費)。但是最大的憎惡毒目標,是各種感官的自由。

Sexual life considered in relation to these ends is almost entirely excess–a savage eruption toward an inaccessible summit-exuberance as essential opposition to concerns for the time to come. The nothingness of obscenity can’t be subjected to anything. The fact that it’s not a cancellation of existence but only a notion, and one resulting from contact, far from alleviates, and actually increases the disapproval generally felt. It is unrelated to value. It is not as if the erotic summit is something heroic attained at the cost of harsh sufferings. Clearly, the results bear no relation to the efforts. Only chance seems in charge here.

跟這些目標相關的考慮的性的生活,幾乎完全就是過度—一種野蠻的爆發,朝向一個無法接近的高峰—豐沛作為一種基本的對立,跟時時的關心—卑賤的空無無法被隸屬於任何東西。那不是生命實存的取消,而僅是一種觀念,一個由於接觸而來的觀念,絲毫沒有緩和,實際上是增加一般感受到的不贊同。它跟價值沒有關係。好像性愛的高峰時是某件獲得的東西,以嚴酷的痛苦作為代價。顯而易見,這些結果跟努力沒有什麼關係。在此掌控的似乎僅是機率。

Chance plays a role in wartime disorders-though effort and courage assign the appreciable part to merit. War’s tragical aspects, in contrast with the laughable indecencies of lovemaking, have the effect of raising the tone of morality, which extols war (and economic profits) to the detriment of any sensual life. I am afraid that I still haven’t clearly enough demonstrated the naïveté of a moral bias. The weightier argument stresses the benefit to family life, which is clearly injured by sensual excess. Constantly identified with the harshness of moral yearnings, concern for the integrity of beings is painfully demonstrated.

機率在戰時的混亂扮演一個角色—雖然努力跟勇氣指定這個可稱讚的部分給美德。對比於作愛的可笑的猥褻,戰爭的悲劇的層面,擁有提升道德語調的效果。道德語調頌揚戰爭(及經濟利益),結果傷害到任何感官的生命。對於一種道德的偏見的率真,恐怕我依舊還沒有足夠清楚地證實。還有更沉重的主張強調家庭生活的利益,它顯而易見地受到感官過度的傷害。由於不斷地認同與道德渴望的嚴酷,對於人類尊嚴的關心,令人痛苦地被證實。

In popular opinion, the substantive aspect of moral action is its subordination to utility, and the impulses for a yearning to transcend being are related to the good of one’s being. In this view, morality becomes simply a negation of morality. The result of this equivocation is to contrast the good of others with the good of the particular being that I am. In fact, this shift continues to identify a superficial contempt with the deep submission that acts on behalf of being. Evil is egotism–altruism good.

在通俗的意見,道德行動的實質的一面是隸屬於實用,渴望要超越生命實存的欲念衝動,跟一個人的生命實存的善相關。從這個觀點,道德變成僅是道德的否定。這種模棱兩可的結果,是將別人的善,跟作為「我」的特別的生命實存作對比。事實上,這種轉變繼續將表面的藐視,認同是代表生命實存行動的深刻的臣服。邪惡是自我中心,而利他則是善。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 23

June 5, 2011

Bataille 23

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微
V
And they believed in all that!
They called it moral!
Écrasez l’infame!

他們全盤相信!
他們稱它為道德!
打倒吃人的禮教!

Have you understood? Dionysus facing the Crucified . . .
 Ecce Homo

你們已經瞭解嗎?戴奧尼修斯面對被釘上十架的耶穌、、、
—瞧!那個人!

TO MAKE distinctions is simply impoverishment–even the least holding back offends fate. Whatever, for it, is simply excessiveness harmful to excessivness itself, for another person isn’t so at all. For someone else positioned further on. Is it true nothing human is foreign to me? Gambling, risking, even the smallest bet–I open up the prospect of infinitely upping the ante.

區別它們僅是精神的貧瘠化。即使稍微畏縮不前,都是對於命運的冒犯。就命運而言,對於過度本身有害的任何東西,僅僅就是過度。但是對於另外一個人而言,根本就不算是過度。對於某一個其他的人而言,他的立場還要更加一步過度。對於人性的內涵,我已經善惡好壞一一遍曆,這是真實的嗎?賭博、冒險,甚至最微小的賭注,我都將賭金無限增加的展望開放。

Within that retreating prospect can be glimpsed a summit.
As the highest point (or most intense degree) of life’s attraction to itself that life itself can define.
As a kind of solar explosion, independent of consequences.

在那個撤退的展望裏,一座高峰能夠被瞥見。
作為生命被吸引到生命能夠定義本身的最高點(或最強烈點)。
作為一種太陽爆炸,獨立於任何後果。

In what precedes I’ve presented evil as a means to use to “communicate.”

先前的條件是:我曾經呈現邪惡,作為「心靈交流」的使用工具。

I’ve stated: “without evil, human existence would be enclosed in itself,” or ” . . . evil appears . . . as a life source!” Thus I suggested a fictional relationship. By letting “communication” be seen as the good of being, I identified “communication” precisely with the being that it exceeds. Inasmuch as “communication,” evil, or summit, are “the good of being,” to be honest, they’re reduced to the slavishness they can’t be surrendered to. The very notions of good or being interpose a duration and concern that essentially are unknown to evil or summit. What is substantially rejected in evil is a concern with the time to come. It’s precisely in this sense that longing for summit–that our impulses toward evil–constitute all morality within us. Morality in itself has no value (in the strong sense) except as it leads to going beyond being and rejecting concerns for a time to come.

我曾經陳述:「假如沒有邪惡,人類的存在將會被封閉在本身裏面」,或是「邪惡出現、、、作為生命的來源!」因此,我建議一種虛構的關係。當我讓「心靈交流」被認為是生命實存的善,我將「心靈交流」認同是它超越的生命實存。當「心靈交流」,邪惡,或高峰,都是「生命實存的善」,坦白說,他們被淪為它們無法被屈服的卑從。「選擇善或生命實存」的這個觀念,提出一種期間與關懷,這些基本上是邪惡或高峰並不知道的東西。確實就是在這層意義上,對於高峰的渴望—也就是我們朝向邪惡的欲望衝動—組成我們內心所有的道德。道德的本身並沒有什麼價值(強烈意義的價值),除了它導致超越生命實存,及拒絕有時的關懷。

Morality has value only when advising us to risk ourselves. Otherwise it’s only a rule of interest, lacking any element of elation (the giddiness of the summit baptized by impoverishment under a servile and imperative name).

只有當道德勸告我們冒險自己時,道德才具有價值。否則它僅是一套利益的規則,欠缺任何意氣風發的因素,(高峰的暈眩,接受精神貧瘠化,以屈從及命令的洗禮)。

雄伯譯
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

巴岱伊論尼采 22

June 3, 2011

Bataille 22

Bataille on Nietzsche
巴岱伊論尼采
PART II
Summit and Decline
巔峰與衰微

IV
It was right for the other, the preacher of the humble, to suffer and bear humankind’s sins. As for me, I rejoice in great sin as in my great solace.
 Zarathustra, “On the Superman”
別的人,也就是謙卑者的教誨師,要忍受及承受人類的原罪之苦,那是他求仁得仁。我可是以原罪感到歡樂,如同對於我的安慰之物。
—紮拉哲斯特拉,「論超人」
. . . the highest good and highest evil are the same.
— 1885-86
—最高的善與最高的惡都是一樣的。
— 1885-86

INDIVIDUALS OR humans can only “communicate”–live–outside of themselves. And being under the necessity to “communicate,” they’re compelled to will evil and defilement, which, by risking the being within them, renders them mutually penetrable each to the other.

個人或人類只能在他們自身之外「心靈交流」或「生活」。當他們處於必須要「心靈交流」的情況,他們被迫「想要」邪惡跟污染。這種「想要」使他們彼此能夠互相洞察,由於讓邪惡與污染之內的生命實存承受危險。

I once wrote ( Inner Experience), “What you are relates to an activity that links the uncounted elements that compose you to an intense communication of these elements among themselves. These elements are contagions of energy, movement, and heat, or transfers of elements, and they constitute the inner life of all organic beings. Life is never situated at some specific point, but quickly moves from one point to another (or from multiple points to other points) like a current or sort of electrical stream . . .”
有一陣子我寫作「內在的經驗」,「你生命的本質跟一個活動息息相關。這個活動將無數的組成你的元素,連接到這些元素內部的強烈的交流。這些元素是精力,行動,與熱力,或是元素的轉移到擴散物。它們組成一切有機生命實存的內在生命。生命從未定位在某一個明確的點,而是很快地移動離開一個點到另外一個點(或是從許多點,到其他的點),就像是一種水流,或是一種電流。

And further on, “Your life is not limited to that incomprehensible inner stream; it also streams out from itself, incessantly opening to whatever flows out or rushes up to it.

而且,「你的生命並不限制於那個無法理解的內部流動。它也是從它自己內部流出來,不斷地開放給任何流出來的東西,或是流向它的東西。」

The ongoing whirling that composes you collides with similar whirlings, which form a vast figure driven by rhythmic restlessness. Now, for you to live signifies not just the flows and momentary dispositions of light that unite in you but the movements of heat or light moving from one person to another, or from you to another person, or from another to you (even as you now read me, the contagion of my fever reaches you): words, books, monuments, symbols, laughter–all these represent just so many paths to that contagiousness, to those impulses . . .”

組成你的正在進行的旋渦,跟類似的旋渦相衝突。它們形成一個被韻律的不安所驅使的廣大的人形。現在,讓你活著不僅是意味著,在你內部統合的光的這些流動與暫時的氣質,而且意味著,從一個人到另一個人的熱與光電行動,或是從你到另一個人,或是從另一個人到你(如同你現在閱讀我,我的狂熱的擴散物抵達你):文字、書藉、紀念碑、象徵符號、歡笑—所有這些僅是代表許多途徑,通往那個擴散物,那些欲望衝動。

But these burning trajectories only replace isolated humanness if there’s some consent, if not to annihilation, then to risking yourself and, in the same impulse, risking other people.

但是這些燃燒的投射軌道,只是代替孤立的人。即使有某個同意,這個同意即使不是朝向毀滅,就是朝向冒著自己的危險。而且,在相同的欲念衝動中,也讓別人陷於危險。

All “communication” participates in suicide, in crime.
Lethal horror goes with it, and disgust is its sign.
And in such a light, evil appears–as a life source!

一切的「心靈交流」都參與自殺,參與犯罪。
致命的恐懼跟隨它而來,厭惡就是它的跡象。
從這樣一種觀點,邪惡出現。

By destroying the integrity of existence in myself and in others, I open myself to communion–I attain a moral summit.

我毀滅我內部與他人內部的生命實存的尊嚴。藉此,我敞開我自己,給心靈交流—我抵達一個道德的高峰。

And the summit isn’t a submission to but a willing of evil. It is a voluntary pact with sin, crime, and evil. A pact made with a relentless fate that requires that while some live, others die.

這個高峰並不是屈從於邪惡,而是邪惡的意志。這是跟原罪、犯罪、與邪惡的一個自願的盟約。一個跟無情的命運訂定的盟約,它要求:某些人死掉時,某些人還活著。