Archive for the ‘雅克 拉康’ Category

分析家作为另一个主体 3

October 27, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OTHER SUBJECT
精神分析家作为另外一个主体

Since Lacan conceived all his contributions to psychoanalytic theory
from the early 1950s as recuperations of Freud’s legacy, against the
reigning discourse of ego-psychology, it does not come as a surprise that
his initial attempts to describe the function and position of the analyst
were strongly flavoured by his trenchant criticism of mainstream
psychoanalysis.

因为拉康构想他对于精神分析理论的所有的贡献,从1950年代开始,作为是弗洛伊德的遗产地复得,对抗自我-心理学的盛行的辞说。不足为奇的是,他最初的企图,想要描述精神分析家的功能与立场,强烈地被渲染着他对于主流精神分析的锐利的批判。

In the ‘Rome Discourse’ he defined the analyst’s task
primarily in a negative way, choosing his examples of bad practice across
the board of psychoanalytic activity. Unscrupulously, Lacan argued that
analysts whose aim is to redesign their patients’ lives, or to restore their
relationships with the outside world, betray their own profession.
Scorning the contemporary ‘analysis of resistance’, he reproached his
colleagues for disclosing personal feelings and for presenting themselves
as role models (ideal egos) within the ‘here and now’ of the clinical
setting.

在他的“罗马辞说”,他定义精神分析家的工作,最初是以负面的方式。他选择精神分析的活动的领域里恶行恶状的实践的例行。非常不谨慎地,拉康主张:精神分析家的目标,若是朝着重新设计他们的病人的生活,或是目标朝着恢复他们的病人跟外在世界的关系,这些精神分析家都是背叛他们自己的专业。拉康藐视当代的“抗拒的精神分析”,他谴责他的同事,因为他们泄漏个人的感觉,以及因为他们呈现他们自己,作为理想自我的典范,在临床背景的“此时此刻”。

To Lacan, these analysts were breaking their promise of
psychoanalytic treatment because they were simply facilitating
introspection, fostering social competence, building intellectual maturity,
and nurturing communicative abilities, whilst promoting their own lifestyle
as an image of general psychic health with which the patients were
supposed to identify. Lacan believed these therapeutic interventions to
be indicative of the analyst’s avoidance of the symbolic power of speech
and language—the prime source of psychoanalytic effectiveness—in
favour of an imaginary level of functioning.15

对于拉康,这些精神分析家正在破坏他们对精神分析的治疗的许诺。因为他们仅是内省方便行事,培养社会的胜任能力,建造知识的成熟园满,以及滋长沟通的能力。另一方面,他们又提升他们自己的生活方式,作为是通常心灵健康的意象。病人们被认为是认同通常心灵健康的这个意象。拉康相信这些治疗的介入,指示著精神分析的逃避言说与语言的象征的力量–精神分析的有效性的最初的来源—以迁就功能的想像的层次。

Although Lacan’s crusade against the mission statement of American
ego-psychology can be seen as an idiosyncratic act of recalcitrance, he was
in fact merely rewording one of Freud’s admonitions in ‘Lines of Advance
in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a[1918]). In this paper Freud criticized
the way in which the Swiss school (Jung) and some American psychoanalysts
had conceived the analyst’s task as similar to that of indomitable educators,
godlike creatures who incessantly attempt to mould the uneducated into
images of themselves. Against this view, Freud declared:

虽然拉康对于美国的自我-心理学的使命陈述的批判抨击,可以视为是一种顽强的怪癖的行为。他实际上仅是用不同词语陈述,弗洛伊德的警告,在“精神分析的治疗的前进的路线”(1919a)。在这篇论文,弗洛伊德批判瑞士学派(荣格学派)与美国的精神分析家构想精神分析家的工作的方式,作为是类同大无畏的教育家的工作。他们像是神性一般的人们,不断地企图将没有受过教育的人们塑造成为他们自己的意象。反对这样的观点,弗洛伊德宣称:

We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself
into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide
his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is
good…In my opinion, this is after all only to use violence, even
though it is overlaid with the most honourable motives.
(ibid.: 164–165)

我们非常强调地拒绝将病人转化成为我们的财产,虽然病人将他自己放置在我们手里,寻求帮助。我们拒绝代替病人决定他的命运,强迫我们的理想在他们身上,并且带着创造者的骄傲,用我们自己的意象塑造他,然后顾盼自得,情况良好、、、依我之见,这毕竟仅是使用暴力,即使这个暴力充满荣耀的动机。

As an appropriate alternative Freud suggested the ‘rule of abstinence’,
which consists in the analyst’s refusal to gratify the patient’s needs and
demands so that all substitute satisfactions are avoided and a productive
level of suffering is maintained. Freud refused to model the analytic
treatment on a mental hospital’s policy to look after patients and to make
them feel as comfortable as possible inside. He also emphasized that
whatever educational effect psychoanalysis may entail, analysts should
ensure that their patients do not come to resemble them, but are
encouraged in the liberation and realization of their own being.

作为一个合适的替代选择,弗洛伊德建议这个“节制的原则”。这个“节制的原则”主要在于精神分析家拒绝满足病人的需要与要求。这样,所有的替换的满足都被避免,这样,才能维持遭受痛苦具有创造的层次。弗洛伊德拒绝将精神分析的治疗,模拟精神病院的政策,为了照顾病人,并且让病人的内部尽可能感觉舒适。弗洛伊德也强调,精神分析可能涵盖的任何教育的效果,应该保证,他们的病人并不以逐渐类似精神分析家。而是要鼓励病人从事他们的自己的生命实存的解放与体现。

Lacan’s antagonism between the imaginary and the symbolic followed
Freud’s opposition between non-analytic image building and proper
analytic abstinence. It can be summarized as an antagonism between the
psychic register of insuperable, yet regulated difference and that of
deceptive, yet fascinating resemblance.16 Apropos of the symbolic, Lacan
recognized the paragon of the human symbolic function (the ‘original
symbolism’) in the complex rules of matrimonial alliance, the elaborate
laws of kinship and the practices of exchanging gifts that preside over
otherwise ‘pre-modern’, non-industrialized communities (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:65–66).

拉康将想像界与象征界作为互具敌意,是遵循弗洛伊德将非-精神分析的意象的建造,跟本体的精神分析的节制的互相对立。这个互具敌意能够被总结为:心灵的铭记的无法被征服,可是又被规范的差异,与欺骗,可是又是令人著迷的类似之间的互具敌意。关于象征界,拉康体认出这个典范:人类象征的功能的典范,(原初的象征主义),在婚姻联盟的复杂的规则里,亲属关系的复杂的法则里,与礼物交换的实践。这些统辖著不同的“前-现代”,非-工业化的社会。

Whilst none of these regulations is rooted in a preordained
natural order, they structure the natural living conditions in
such a way that distinct group members are continuously forced to
participate in existing agreements and to negotiate new pacts.17 By
contrast, Lacan located the source of the human imaginary in the socalled
‘mirror-stage’ (Lacan 1977c[1949]), whereby the child develops
its identity (its ego) via an identification with the twin image reflected
by the mirror or, in the absence of reflective surfaces, by a similar other.18

虽然这些规则没有一条是根源于预先注定的自然的秩序,它们架构自然的活生生的情况,用这样一种方式,以致于明显的团体成员继续不断地被迫参与现存的协定,并且协商新的盟约。对照起来,拉康将人类的想像的起源定位在社会化的“镜像阶段”。在“镜像阶段”那里,小孩发展它的自我的认同,经由镜子反映的孪生意象的认同。或者,在反映的表面欠缺的时刻,由类似的他者作为镜像反映。

In Seminar I, and in reference to Freud, Lacan defined the ego accordingly
as an agency that ‘is constructed like an onion, one could peel it and
discover the successive identifications which have constituted it’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:171).19 Consequently, the human imaginary has nothing
to do with the installation and regulation of difference; it is fundamentally
geared towards the advancement of similarity and instead of a
symbolic
truce, it induces jealousy, rivalry, competition and aggression.
在第一研讨班,提到弗洛伊德时,拉康遵循弗洛伊德,将自我定义为一位代理者,“像洋葱一样被建造的代理者。我们能够剥开洋葱,然然发现连续的认同的表层,构成这个自我”。结果,人类的想像跟差异的安置与规则,根本没有任何关系。人类的想享基本上被触动,朝向类似的前进,而非是朝向象征的休战。人类的想像引申出敌意,競争与侵凌。

At the end of Seminar II (1988c[1954–55]:243), Lacan integrated
these two discordant dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary into
a comprehensive cartography of psychoanalytic treatment, placing the
principles of ego-psychology orthogonally to a clinical practice which
he deemed more loyal to Freud’s inspiration. This schema of analytic
communication (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:14), to which Lacan also referred
as the ‘Schema L’, comprises four terms (S, o, o’ and O) and two
conflicting relations (imaginary and symbolic-unconscious).20

在第二研讨班的结束时,拉康将象征界与想像界的这两个不协调的维度,合并成为精神分析治疗的一个全面的地图制作。拉康将自我-心理学的原则,正统地放置在临床的实践里。他认为这是更加忠实于弗洛伊德的启发。精神分析的沟通的这个基模,拉康也提到,作为是“L型基模”,它包括四个术语(S,0,0‘, O),与两个冲突的关系 (想像与象征的无意识)。

In this schema the therapeutic alliance between the clinician and the
patient in an ego-psychological setting is displayed as an imaginary
relation between an ego (o) and another ego (o’).

在这个基模,治临床医生与病人的治疗的联盟,在自我-心理学的背景,被展示出来,作为是想像的关系,处于自我(o),与另外一个自我(o‘)之间。

Lacan proclaimed that
the majority of contemporary clinicians were viewing the patient as an
objectified other whose ego needs ‘to gather its strength, to realise itself,
to integrate itself (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245). In keeping with his theory
of the ego as an imaginary construction, he then argued that the patient’s
ego ‘can only re-encounter and reconstitute itself by way of the fellow
being the subject has before him—or behind him’ (ibid.: 245), which is
of course the figure of the analyst. Hence, the patient and the analyst had
become allies in an imaginary exchange of egos, leading to the
replacement of the patient’s former (pathological) identity by the new
(healthy) identity of the analyst.21

拉康宣称:大多数的当代临床医生,正将病人看待作为是一个被客体化的他者。自我需要这个他者来聚集它的力量,为了实现它自己,为了融合它自己。为了跟他的自我的理论保持一致,作文是想像的建构,拉康因此主张,病人的自我仅能够重新遭遇,重新建构它自己,凭借主体在他面前,或在他背后,拥有的这位同胞。这位同胞当然就是精神分析家的人物。因此,病人与精神分析家已经变成联盟,在想像地交换自我。导致病人的先前的(病态)的认同,被精神分析家的新的认同所取代。

Figure I Schema L
Source: J.Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, New York,

In Lacan’s purportedly Freudian alternative, patients had to be
approached as subjects with an unconscious, rather than unitary
objectified others. In Schema L, the subject (S) is identified with the
Freudian Id (Es) and the unconscious is emanating from the Other
according to a symbolic vector which crosses the imaginary axis. This
means that the intervention of the Other (the unknown dimension of the
other) is necessary for the revelation of the unconscious.

在拉康据说是作为弗洛伊德的替换里,病人必须被接近,作为是具有无意识的主体,而非是单一的被客体化的他者。在L基型,主体(S)被认同是弗洛伊德的他我id (Es)。无意识从大他者散发出来,依照象征的向量。这个象征的向量跨越想像的枢扭。这意味着,大他者的介入(大他者的未知的维度)是必要的,对于无意识的启蒙。

The idea is that
if human beings can wonder about the hidden intentions of a fellow being,
or if the latter answers their questions in a way which they had never
expected, they will also be driven to investigate the (hitherto unconscious)
mainspring of their own intentions.22 Whereas on Lacan’s account an
ego-psychologist attributed a patient’s symptom to a weakness of the
ego, or an incomplete self-realization, and remedied this problem by
increasing the patient’s self-awareness, a truly Freudian analyst defined
the symptom as a compromise between unconscious knowledge (the
repressed representations) and conscious ignorance.

这个观念是,假如人会想要知的一个同胞的隐藏的意图,或是一位同胞回答他们的问题,用他们从来没有预期的方式。他们也将会被驱使去研究他们的意图的(迄今是无意识的)泉源。虽然因为拉康的缘故,自我-心理学家将病人的症状归咎于自我的弱点。或是归咎于不完整的自我的实践,然后修补这个难题,凭借增加病人的自我-知识。一位真正的弗洛伊德的精神分析家则是定义这个症状,作为是一种妥协,处于无意识的知识(被压抑的表象)与意识的无知之间的妥协。

To open up this realm
of unconscious knowledge, Lacan posited that the analyst’s task is to be
somewhere in the place of the Other (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:161).
In various interventions from the early 1950s (1977e[1953]:88; 1988c
[1954–55]:246) Lacan specified this task of the analyst as the facilitation
of full speech (parole pleine) or true speech (parole vraie) in the patient.

为了打开无意识的这个领域,拉康假设,精神分析家的工作应该是在大他者的位置的某个地方。从1950年代早期的各种的介入开始,拉康指明精神分析家的这个工作,作为是病人身上的充分言说或真实言说的方便法门。

Full speech is opposed to empty speech (parole vide), ‘where the subject
seems to be talking in vain about someone who, even if he were his spitting
image, can never become one with the assumption of his desire’ (Lacan
1977e[1953]:45).

充分言说跟空洞言说互相对立。在空洞言说,主体似乎白费力气地谈论有关某个人。即使他是他的分裂的意象,这位某个人永远没有办法跟他的欲望的假设成为一体。

Patients producing empty speech continuously objectify
themselves in their words, for example by starting every sentence with ‘I
think I am a person who…’ or by speaking about themselves as objects in
the discourse of others, as in ‘My best friend says that I am…’ Lacan was
keen to point out that the identity a patient conjures up in her empty speech
can bear a striking resemblance to her actual self-image and the reality
perceived by others.

产生空洞言说的病人,继续地用他们的话语,让他们自己成为客体。譬如,凭借从每个句子开始,用“我认为我是这么一个人、、、”或凭借谈论关于他们自己,作为别人辞说里的客体,譬如,在“我的最好的朋友说我是、、、、”拉康渴望地指出,病人用她的空洞的言词召唤的认同,具有显著的类似,跟她的实际的自我-意象与被别人感知的现实。

Hence, empty speech is not necessarily deceitful
speech. Paradoxically, in terms of its correspondence with a factual reality,
empty speech might be more ‘true’ than true speech (Lacan
1966b[1955]:351).

因此,空洞的言说并不必然是欺骗的言说。悖论地,由于空洞的言说跟实际上的现实的对应,空洞的言说可能比起真实的言说更加地“真实”。

For the distinctive characteristic of true speech is not
that it represents matters as they really are; its core feature is that it entails
a genuine subjective commitment, with a perspective on the future. The
truth value of true speech is not related to reality, but to the subject’s
recognition of the desire which he has hitherto discarded.23 In Freudian
terms, subjective truth should be taken in its historical, rather than its
material dimension. In this sense, what ‘is at stake in analysis is the advent
in the subject of that little reality that this desire sustains in him’, whereby
the analyst ‘guides the subject’s discourse towards the realization of his
truth’ (Lacan 1977e[1953]:68, 93).

因为真实的言说的明显的特征并不是:它代表事情的本来的样子。它的核心的特征是:它意味着一个真诚的主体的奉献,具有针对未来的观点。真实言实的真理的价值,并不是跟现实联接一块,而是跟主体的体认他迄今抛弃的欲望联接一块。用弗洛伊德的术语来说,主体的真理应该被看待,根据主体的历史。而不是根据主体的材料的维度。从这个意义来说,在精神分析里岌岌可危的东西,就是在主体身上,欲望在他身上维持的那个小小的现实的来临。凭借这个小小现实的来临,精神分析家引导主体的辞说,朝向他的真理的体现。

Patients should finally arrive at the
verbalization of what they have kept away from themselves and take
responsibility for it, which tallies with Freud’s perspective on the goal of
analysis as the assumption of one’s historical truth.

病人应该最后到达这个文词表现,对于他们曾经保持距离的文词表现,并且替它担负起责任。这符合弗洛伊德的观点,将精神分析的目标,视为是担负起一个人的历史的真理。

This facilitation of full speech in the patient is only possible if the
analyst is indeed somewhere in the position of the Other. Only in the
presence of an unknown Other is the subject able and required to make
symbolic commitments, as exemplified in statements such as ‘You are
my master’ or ‘You are my husband’.24 To maintain this position analysts
are not allowed to reveal their intentions, much less to present themselves
to their patients as familiar others.

病人身上的充分言说的方便法门可能的条件是:病人确实是在大他者的位置的某个地方。仅有在一位未知的大他者的面前,主体才能够并且被要求发表象征的奉献。譬如,在这些陈述里: “你是我的主人“或”你是我的丈夫“。为了维持这个立场,精神分析家并没有被容许显示他的意图,更不用说呈现他们自己给病人,作为熟悉的别人。

Analysts are not fellow human beings
who fully understand and share their experiences with their therapeutic
neighbours.25 Neither the patient nor the analyst is thus involved in the
‘analytic dialogue’ as an imaginary object. The analyst is literally the
mouthpiece of the patient, to the extent that the analyst is the instrument
which enables the patient to make a full statement.26 In principle this
does not imply that analysts ought to remain silent throughout the session
on the condition that their interventions are not designed as the staging
of an encounter between two egos (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245).27

精神分析家并不是这样的同胞,他们充分理解并且分享他们的经验,跟他们治疗的邻居。病人与精神分析家因此没有一位牵涉到“精神分析的对谈“,作为是想像的客体。精神分析家实质上是病人的发言人。甚至,精神分析家是让病人能够从事充分陈述的工具。原则上,这并没有意味著,精神分析家应该保持沉默,在咨商期间里。条件是,他们的介入,不应该被指明,作为是展示这么一种遭遇,处于两个自我之间的遭遇。

The analyst’s interventions can only have the desired effect of eliciting full
speech in the patient if these interventions are themselves paragons of
full speech (Lacan 1966b[1955]:359). Again, this does not mean that
analysts ought to ensure that their interpretations are demonstrably true,
i.e. corresponding with a factual reality, but they must capture the patient’s
subjective historical truth.28 Since the process is directed towards the
subject of the patient (the acknowledgement of the unconscious drives
and desires beyond the ego, which Freud situated in the Id) and analysts
themselves function as subjects in the place of the Other (instead of egoobjects
for identification), Lacan qualified the entire analytic dialectics
as an intersubjective experience.29

精神分析家的介入能够获得在病人身上召唤充足言说的欲望的效果,仅有当这些介入的本身是充分言说的典范。而且,这并不意味着,精神分析家应该保证,他们的解释可证明是真实的。譬如,符合实际的现实。但是,他们必须捕捉病人的主体的历史的真理。因为这个过程被引导朝向病人的主体(承认无意识的冲动与欲望,超越自我。弗洛伊德将这个自我的超越,定位在id (主体)。精神分析家他们自己充当代替大他者的主体(而不是作为认同的自我的客体)。拉康给予完整的精神分析的辩证法,作为是互为主体性的经验。

However, he did not consider it possible for the analytic treatment to
deploy itself exclusively on the symbolic axis of the unconscious. From
his initial introduction of Schema L, Lacan clarified that no analyst manages
to avoid the interference of the imaginary axis. The imaginary interplay
between egos is at once an obstacle and a necessary passage in the symbolic
progression of psychoanalytic treatment, which is represented in Schema
L via the imaginary crossing of the symbolic vector of the unconscious. A
close reading of Lacan’s argument reveals at least four reasons, two on the
side of the analyst and two on the side of the patient, for this unavoidable
inflection of the symbolic towards the imaginary.

可是,拉康并没有认为这是可能的,让精神分析的治疗运作它自己,专门是在无意识的象征的枢纽。从他最初介绍L基型开始,拉康澄清,没有一位精神分析成功地避免想像的轴心的干涉。在两个自我之间的想享的互相作用,既是一种阻碍,同时又是一个必要的经过,在精神分析的治疗的象征的进展。这个象征的进展被代表作L基型里,经有想像的跨越无意识的象征的向量。假如我们仔细阅读拉康的主张,我们会发现至少有四个理由。在精神分析家这边有两个,在病人那边也有两个理由。因为象征会无可避免地内射,朝向想像界。

First, and perhaps most significantly, analysts are not equal to their
jobs as subjects in the position of the Other. According to their job
description, analysts should be capable of relinquishing their ego, or at
least be sufficiently aware of its manifestations to recognize and neutralize
them whenever they threaten to intervene—a manoeuvre for which their
own training analysis should have prepared them. In Seminar II Lacan
described analysts as ‘subjects in whom the ego is absent’ (Lacan 1988c
[1954–55]:246). In Seminar III he argued even more strongly that analysts
‘must be dead enough not to be caught up in the imaginary relation’
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:162).

首先,或者最重要地,精神分析家并没有胜任他们的工作,作为大他者的位置的主体。依照他们的工作的描述,精神分析家应该能够放弃他们的自我。或者,至少精神分析家应该能够充分地知道精神分析的展示,要体认并且让他们保持中立,每当他们威胁要介入的时刻。这一个策略,他们的精神分析的训练本来就应该替他们准备好。在第二研讨班,拉康描述精神分析,作为是“自我缺席的主体“。在第三研讨班,拉康甚至更加强烈地主张,精神分析必须完全死掉,这样他才能够被套陷在想像的关系。

And in ‘Variations of the Standard
Treatment’ he asserted that analysts can only be attentive to the full speech
of their patients if the mirages of their own narcissism have become
transparent (Lacan 1966b[1955]:352). Yet Lacan himself realized that
these are theoretical accounts of an ideal situation, since there is ‘never
a subject without an ego’ (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:246) and since ‘the
analyst is never fully an analyst, for the simple reason that he is a human
being, and that he, too, partakes of the imaginary mechanisms that are
obstacles to the passage of speech’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:162).

在“各式各样的标准治疗“,拉康主张,精神分析家只有在他们自己的自恋的幻景已经变得透明时,他们才会专注病人的充足的言说。可是,拉康他自己体会到,这些都是理想情况的理论的描述。因为主体存在,自我也跟着存在。因为精神分析家永远不是充分地作为精神分析家。理由很简单:精神分析家是个凡人。他也参与想像的心理机制,而这些想像的心理机制构成言说的过程的阻碍。”

This difficulty is represented in Schema L on the vector that runs from O to o.
The second reason on the side of the analyst has to do with what Lacan
called ‘the paradox of the analyst’s position’ (Lacan 1988b[195 3–54]:51).
If analysts are supposed to elicit full speech in their patients, they can
decide to curb their patients’ empty speech by launching interpretations
that probe into its hidden aspects.

这个困难在L基型里被代表,在从O到 o前进的向量。第二个理由,在精神分析家这一边,跟拉康所谓的“精神分析家的立场的悖论息息相关”。假如精神分析家被认为是召唤病人身上的充足的言说,他们能够决的要控制他们的病人的空洞的言说,凭借发动探索这个空洞言说的解释。

Yet they can hardly do this without relying
on their own projections of what is going on in their patients’ minds. Hence,
when the patients’ speech is empty analysts can only intervene effectively
by reducing the influence of their own ego to the lowest possible level,
that is to say by being ‘dead enough’, an operation which drives them to
silence rather than speech.

可是,每当精神分析家这样做,他们必然依靠他们自己的投射,对于他们的病人的心灵正在进行的东西。因此,当病人的言说是空洞的,精神分析家能够有效地介入,凭借减少他们的自己的自我的影响,到尽可能低的程度。换句话说,凭借成为“充分死掉”,这一个运作,驱使他们保持沉默,而不是言说。

But when the patients’ speech does present an
appropriate level of fullness, analysts should keep their interventions at
bay in order to avoid disturbing the advancement of this full speech. So,
on the one hand analysts cannot really intervene without taking their own
ego as measure, whilst on the other hand their full speech is not required!
Indeed, if the analysts’ task consists in eliciting full speech, it appears that
they can only perform it by absenting themselves and remaining silent,
every utterance encompassing the danger of a new imaginary alienation.
In ‘The Freudian Thing’, Lacan put it as follows:

但是,当病人的言说确实呈现一个合适的充实的层面,精神分析应该节制地保持他们的介入,为了避免扰乱这个充实言说的前进。所以,一分没,精神分析家无法确实介入,而不僵他们自己的自我作为策略。另一方面,他们的充实的言说的确并没有被要求。假如精神分析家的工作,在于召唤充实言说,似乎是,他们能够完成它,仅是凭借让他们自己缺席,并且保持沉默。每个表达涵盖新的想像的异化的这个危险。在“弗洛伊德的物”,拉康表达它如下:

[T]he analyst intervenes concretely in the dialectic of analysis by
pretending he is dead, by cadaverizing his position as the Chinese
say, either by his silence when he is the Other with a capital O, or
by annulling his own resistance when he is the other with a small
o. In either case, and under the respective effects of the symbolic
and the imaginary, he makes death present.
(Lacan 1977f[1955]:140)

精神分析具体地介入精神分析的辩证法,凭借假装他是死人,凭借将他的立场形同行尸走肉,如同中文的成语。要就是凭借他的沉默,当他与具有大写字母O的大他者同在。要不然就是将他自己的抗拒成为无效,当他与具有小写字母o的小他者同位。不论是哪个情况,在象征界与想像界的各别的影响之下,他让死亡呈现。

Third, if analysts too remain subjects endowed with an ego, even after
a prolonged analytical training, it is evident that patients undertaking
analytical work will not be able to associate freely without objectifying
themselves in imaginary identifications with unitary objects. Lacan
conceded that even at the end of analysis the subject ‘refers to this
imaginary unity that is the ego…where he knows himself and
misrecognizes himself, and which is what he speaks about’ (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:161). This ongoing entanglement of the subject with the
ego is represented within Schema L in the vector from S to o’ (the
identifications with the imaginary counterparts on which the ego is based).

第三,假如精神分析家也始终是禀赋的自我的主体,即使经过漫长的精神分析训练之后,显而易见地,从事精神分析工作的病人,将无法自由地联想,而没有让他们自己成为客体,在想像地认同具有独异性的那些客体。拉康承认,即使在精神分析的结束,主体“提到这个想像的一致性,那就是自我、、、在那里,他认识他自己,并且错误地体认他自己。那就是他谈论的事情。主体正在跟自进行的这个纠缠,被代表在L基型,从S 到 o’ 的向量(跟自我作为基础的想象的对应物认同。)

The emergence of the patient’s ego will also reawaken the ego of the
analyst, on whose presence it depends during the analytic session. In
Seminar I, before the actual construction of Schema L, Lacan averred:
Just when he seems ready to come out with something more
authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up
with to then, the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a
statement, which might be the following—I am aware all of a
sudden of the fact of your presence…the subject himself then feels
something like a sharp bend, a sudden turn which causes him to
pass from one slope of the discourse to the other, from one aspect
of the function of speech to another.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:40)

病人的自我的出现将也会重新唤醒精神分析家的自我。病人的自我就是依靠分析家的存在,在精神分析的咨商时刻。在第一研讨班,就在L基型的实际建构之前,拉康主张:

正当主体似乎准备要出来,带着某件更加真诚,更加中肯,比起在那个时候之前已经获得的东西。在这些情况,主体中断,并且表达一个陈述, 这个内容的陈述如下:「我突然知道你存在的这个事实、、主体自己因此感觉某件东西像是锐利的弯曲,突然的转弯,引起他从辞说的一个斜坡,到另外一个斜坡,从言实的功能的一个层面,到另外一个层面。

The experience which Lacan invoked in this passage had already been
described by Freud in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b), as an
example of how the patient’s resistance makes use of the transference,
or of how the transference serves resistance. Lacan reinterpreted it as the
turn of symbolic transference towards its imaginary avatar, which equals
resistance.30

拉康在这个段落召唤的经验,弗洛伊德在“移情的动力结构”已经描述过,作为是病人如何利用移情作为抗拒的典范。或是移情如何替抗拒服务。拉康重新解释它,作为是象征的移情的转移,朝向它的想像的天使下凡。这相当等于是抗拒。
Finally, analysts are continuously solicited by their patients to leave
their position as an (unknown) Other and to intervene as an ego. In the
case of psychotic patients, who are only capable of imaginary
transference, the analyst is automatically allocated the place of a
transparent, imaginary counterpart.31 By contrast, neurotic patients are
extremely apt at seducing analysts to formulate a judgement, to express
an opinion, or to profess a piece of knowledge, which is exactly what the
above model (and the mental economy of neurosis) demands them to
avoid if they want to be successful.

最后,精神分析家继续受到病人的召唤,要离开他们的立场,作为(未知的)的大他者,并且介入作为自我。在精神病人的个案,他仅是能够想像的移情,精神分析家自动地被分配给与透明的,想像的对应物的位置。对照起来,神经症的病人极端容易诱拐精神分析家解释一个判断,表达一个意见,或是宣称某件知识。这确实就是以上的模式(神经症者的精神的活力)要求他们避免的东西,假如他们想要成功。

For example, a hysterical patient (or
a hystericized patient, for that matter) may engage in lengthy complaints
about how he had expected something altogether different from his
analyst: answers to his questions, advice on how and what to decide in
the usual dilemmas of work and love, concrete recommendations on how
to design his future, etc. He may even try to provoke a reaction by stating
that he will inevitably be driven to another practitioner if the situation
does not change rapidly.

譬如,癔症的病人(或成为癔症的病人,就那件事情而言),可能从事冗长的抱怨,关于他如何曾经预期某件跟精神分析家完全不同的东西: 对于他的问题的回答,劝告他应该如何决定,与决定什么,当面临工作与爱的通常的困境。以及具体的推荐,应该如何设计他的未来,等等。他甚至可能挑激一个反应,凭借陈述说:他无可避免地回被驱使到另外一位精神分析家,假如情况没有迅速改善的话。

Sometimes the challenge is more straightforward,
as in the case of a patient who says ‘My mother thinks I am a genius and
my father is convinced I am a fool. What do you think? Why aren’t you
saying anything? Since you seem to be unable to make up your mind,
you must be a fool yourself.’ Depending on the analyst’s own narcissism,
she will be poised to intervene, in which case the analyst’s ego will eclipse
her position as a subject. And, of course, if analysts do give their patients
concrete advice (‘I think you should leave your lover and stay with your
husband’), they are bound to discover that the patients will either use it
against them, or use it to do exactly the opposite.

有时,这种挑战赛更加直接,如同在这个个案,病人说:「我的母亲认为我是一位天才,而我的父亲则是相信我是白痴。你的看法是什么?为什么你不说任何事情?因为你似乎不能够下定你的决心,你自己一定是一位傻瓜。」依靠精神分析家的自己的自恋,她将会很镇定地介入。在那个情况,精神分析家的自我将会模糊她作为主体的立场。当然,假如确实给予他们的病人具体的劝告,(“ 我认为你应该离开你的情人,跟你的丈夫住在一块。“)他们一定会发现,病人要就是用这句话来反对他们,要不然就是确实做相反的事情。

Summarizing, it may be said that the main difference between ego psychology
and classical Freudian analysis, as Lacan conceived it during
the early 1950s, is not that the former is strengthening the imaginary
relationship between ego and (alter) ego, whereas the latter strictly
operates within the symbolic framework of subject and Other. The
difference is rather that ego-psychologists place their money on ego building
techniques to the detriment of a questioning of the patient’s
history, whereas Lacan’s model aimed to install and explore the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other, despite the relentless
interference of imaginary identifications, both in the patient and the
analyst.

总结一下,我们可以说,自我心理学与古典弗洛伊德学派的精神分析之间的主要差异,依照拉康在1950年构想它。主要的差异并不是,自我-心理学正在强化自我与(他)我之间的想像的关系。古典的弗洛伊德学派精神分析则是严格地运作,在主体与大他者之间的象征的架构。相反地,差异的地方是,自我-心理学家将他们的重点放置在建造自我的技术,结果伤害到对于病人的历史的询问。而拉康的模式则是目标朝着安置,并且探索在病人与精神分析家两人身上,主体与大他者之间的象征的关系,尽管想像的认同的无情的干涉。

Not taking the patient’s words at face value, much less employing
them as building blocks for the construction of a new identity, the analyst’s
task consisted in bringing the patient to the point where he questions the
accepted meaning of words, beliefs and values. In the ‘Rome Discourse’
Lacan stated that ‘the art of the analyst must be to suspend the subject’s
certainties until their last mirages have been consumed’ (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:43), so that the subject can make a commitment that is more in
accordance with the true nature of her desire.

精神分析家的工作并不是将病人的话语表面看待,更不是运用这些话语,当著是新的身份的建造的建筑材料。精神分析家的工作在于将病人带到这个点。在那里,他质疑话语,信仰,与价值的被接纳的意义。在“罗马辞说“,拉康陈述:「精神分析家的艺术一定就是悬置主体的确定性,直到最后的幻景已经被消耗。」这样,主体才能够作出奉献,跟她的欲望的真实的天性更加符合的奉献。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为另一个主体 2

October 27, 2015

The emergence of the patient’s ego will also reawaken the ego of the
analyst, on whose presence it depends during the analytic session. In
Seminar I, before the actual construction of Schema L, Lacan averred:
Just when he seems ready to come out with something more
authentic, more to the point than he has ever managed to come up
with to then, the subject, in some cases, breaks off, and utters a
statement, which might be the following—I am aware all of a
sudden of the fact of your presence…the subject himself then feels
something like a sharp bend, a sudden turn which causes him to
pass from one slope of the discourse to the other, from one aspect
of the function of speech to another.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:40)

病人的自我的出现将也会重新唤醒精神分析家的自我。病人的自我就是依靠分析家的存在,在精神分析的咨商时刻。在第一研讨班,就在L基型的实际建构之前,拉康主张:

正当主体似乎准备要出来,带着某件更加真诚,更加中肯,比起在那个时候之前已经获得的东西。在这些情况,主体中断,并且表达一个陈述, 这个内容的陈述如下:「我突然知道你存在的这个事实、、主体自己因此感觉某件东西像是锐利的弯曲,突然的转弯,引起他从辞说的一个斜坡,到另外一个斜坡,从言实的功能的一个层面,到另外一个层面。

The experience which Lacan invoked in this passage had already been
described by Freud in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b), as an
example of how the patient’s resistance makes use of the transference,
or of how the transference serves resistance. Lacan reinterpreted it as the
turn of symbolic transference towards its imaginary avatar, which equals
resistance.30

拉康在这个段落召唤的经验,弗洛伊德在“移情的动力结构”已经描述过,作为是病人如何利用移情作为抗拒的典范。或是移情如何替抗拒服务。拉康重新解释它,作为是象征的移情的转移,朝向它的想像的天使下凡。这相当等于是抗拒。
Finally, analysts are continuously solicited by their patients to leave
their position as an (unknown) Other and to intervene as an ego. In the
case of psychotic patients, who are only capable of imaginary
transference, the analyst is automatically allocated the place of a
transparent, imaginary counterpart.31 By contrast, neurotic patients are
extremely apt at seducing analysts to formulate a judgement, to express
an opinion, or to profess a piece of knowledge, which is exactly what the
above model (and the mental economy of neurosis) demands them to
avoid if they want to be successful.

最后,精神分析家继续受到病人的召唤,要离开他们的立场,作为(未知的)的大他者,并且介入作为自我。在精神病人的个案,他仅是能够想像的移情,精神分析家自动地被分配给与透明的,想像的对应物的位置。对照起来,神经症的病人极端容易诱拐精神分析家解释一个判断,表达一个意见,或是宣称某件知识。这确实就是以上的模式(神经症者的精神的活力)要求他们避免的东西,假如他们想要成功。

For example, a hysterical patient (or
a hystericized patient, for that matter) may engage in lengthy complaints
about how he had expected something altogether different from his
analyst: answers to his questions, advice on how and what to decide in
the usual dilemmas of work and love, concrete recommendations on how
to design his future, etc. He may even try to provoke a reaction by stating
that he will inevitably be driven to another practitioner if the situation
does not change rapidly.

譬如,癔症的病人(或成为癔症的病人,就那件事情而言),可能从事冗长的抱怨,关于他如何曾经预期某件跟精神分析家完全不同的东西: 对于他的问题的回答,劝告他应该如何决定,与决定什么,当面临工作与爱的通常的困境。以及具体的推荐,应该如何设计他的未来,等等。他甚至可能挑激一个反应,凭借陈述说:他无可避免地回被驱使到另外一位精神分析家,假如情况没有迅速改善的话。

Sometimes the challenge is more straightforward,
as in the case of a patient who says ‘My mother thinks I am a genius and
my father is convinced I am a fool. What do you think? Why aren’t you
saying anything? Since you seem to be unable to make up your mind,
you must be a fool yourself.’ Depending on the analyst’s own narcissism,
she will be poised to intervene, in which case the analyst’s ego will eclipse
her position as a subject. And, of course, if analysts do give their patients
concrete advice (‘I think you should leave your lover and stay with your
husband’), they are bound to discover that the patients will either use it
against them, or use it to do exactly the opposite.

有时,这种挑战赛更加直接,如同在这个个案,病人说:「我的母亲认为我是一位天才,而我的父亲则是相信我是白痴。你的看法是什么?为什么你不说任何事情?因为你似乎不能够下定你的决心,你自己一定是一位傻瓜。」依靠精神分析家的自己的自恋,她将会很镇定地介入。在那个情况,精神分析家的自我将会模糊她作为主体的立场。当然,假如确实给予他们的病人具体的劝告,(“ 我认为你应该离开你的情人,跟你的丈夫住在一块。“)他们一定会发现,病人要就是用这句话来反对他们,要不然就是确实做相反的事情。

Summarizing, it may be said that the main difference between ego psychology
and classical Freudian analysis, as Lacan conceived it during
the early 1950s, is not that the former is strengthening the imaginary
relationship between ego and (alter) ego, whereas the latter strictly
operates within the symbolic framework of subject and Other. The
difference is rather that ego-psychologists place their money on ego building
techniques to the detriment of a questioning of the patient’s
history, whereas Lacan’s model aimed to install and explore the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other, despite the relentless
interference of imaginary identifications, both in the patient and the
analyst.

总结一下,我们可以说,自我心理学与古典弗洛伊德学派的精神分析之间的主要差异,依照拉康在1950年构想它。主要的差异并不是,自我-心理学正在强化自我与(他)我之间的想像的关系。古典的弗洛伊德学派精神分析则是严格地运作,在主体与大他者之间的象征的架构。相反地,差异的地方是,自我-心理学家将他们的重点放置在建造自我的技术,结果伤害到对于病人的历史的询问。而拉康的模式则是目标朝着安置,并且探索在病人与精神分析家两人身上,主体与大他者之间的象征的关系,尽管想像的认同的无情的干涉。

Not taking the patient’s words at face value, much less employing
them as building blocks for the construction of a new identity, the analyst’s
task consisted in bringing the patient to the point where he questions the
accepted meaning of words, beliefs and values. In the ‘Rome Discourse’
Lacan stated that ‘the art of the analyst must be to suspend the subject’s
certainties until their last mirages have been consumed’ (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:43), so that the subject can make a commitment that is more in
accordance with the true nature of her desire.

精神分析家的工作并不是将病人的话语表面看待,更不是运用这些话语,当著是新的身份的建造的建筑材料。精神分析家的工作在于将病人带到这个点。在那里,他质疑话语,信仰,与价值的被接纳的意义。在“罗马辞说“,拉康陈述:「精神分析家的艺术一定就是悬置主体的确定性,直到最后的幻景已经被消耗。」这样,主体才能够作出奉献,跟她的欲望的真实的天性更加符合的奉献。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为另外一个主体

October 25, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OTHER SUBJECT
精神分析家作为另外一个主体

Since Lacan conceived all his contributions to psychoanalytic theory
from the early 1950s as recuperations of Freud’s legacy, against the
reigning discourse of ego-psychology, it does not come as a surprise that
his initial attempts to describe the function and position of the analyst
were strongly flavoured by his trenchant criticism of mainstream
psychoanalysis.

因为拉康构想他对于精神分析理论的所有的贡献,从1950年代开始,作为是弗洛伊德的遗产地复得,对抗自我-心理学的盛行的辞说。不足为奇的是,他最初的企图,想要描述精神分析家的功能与立场,强烈地被渲染着他对于主流精神分析的锐利的批判。

In the ‘Rome Discourse’ he defined the analyst’s task
primarily in a negative way, choosing his examples of bad practice across
the board of psychoanalytic activity. Unscrupulously, Lacan argued that
analysts whose aim is to redesign their patients’ lives, or to restore their
relationships with the outside world, betray their own profession.
Scorning the contemporary ‘analysis of resistance’, he reproached his
colleagues for disclosing personal feelings and for presenting themselves
as role models (ideal egos) within the ‘here and now’ of the clinical
setting.

在他的“罗马辞说”,他定义精神分析家的工作,最初是以负面的方式。他选择精神分析的活动的领域里恶行恶状的实践的例行。非常不谨慎地,拉康主张:精神分析家的目标,若是朝着重新设计他们的病人的生活,或是目标朝着恢复他们的病人跟外在世界的关系,这些精神分析家都是背叛他们自己的专业。拉康藐视当代的“抗拒的精神分析”,他谴责他的同事,因为他们泄漏个人的感觉,以及因为他们呈现他们自己,作为理想自我的典范,在临床背景的“此时此刻”。

To Lacan, these analysts were breaking their promise of
psychoanalytic treatment because they were simply facilitating
introspection, fostering social competence, building intellectual maturity,
and nurturing communicative abilities, whilst promoting their own lifestyle
as an image of general psychic health with which the patients were
supposed to identify. Lacan believed these therapeutic interventions to
be indicative of the analyst’s avoidance of the symbolic power of speech
and language—the prime source of psychoanalytic effectiveness—in
favour of an imaginary level of functioning.15

对于拉康,这些精神分析家正在破坏他们对精神分析的治疗的许诺。因为他们仅是内省方便行事,培养社会的胜任能力,建造知识的成熟园满,以及滋长沟通的能力。另一方面,他们又提升他们自己的生活方式,作为是通常心灵健康的意象。病人们被认为是认同通常心灵健康的这个意象。拉康相信这些治疗的介入,指示著精神分析的逃避言说与语言的象征的力量–精神分析的有效性的最初的来源—以迁就功能的想像的层次。

Although Lacan’s crusade against the mission statement of American
ego-psychology can be seen as an idiosyncratic act of recalcitrance, he was
in fact merely rewording one of Freud’s admonitions in ‘Lines of Advance
in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a[1918]). In this paper Freud criticized
the way in which the Swiss school (Jung) and some American psychoanalysts
had conceived the analyst’s task as similar to that of indomitable educators,
godlike creatures who incessantly attempt to mould the uneducated into
images of themselves. Against this view, Freud declared:

虽然拉康对于美国的自我-心理学的使命陈述的批判抨击,可以视为是一种顽强的怪癖的行为。他实际上仅是用不同词语陈述,弗洛伊德的警告,在“精神分析的治疗的前进的路线”(1919a)。在这篇论文,弗洛伊德批判瑞士学派(荣格学派)与美国的精神分析家构想精神分析家的工作的方式,作为是类同大无畏的教育家的工作。他们像是神性一般的人们,不断地企图将没有受过教育的人们塑造成为他们自己的意象。反对这样的观点,弗洛伊德宣称:

We refused most emphatically to turn a patient who puts himself
into our hands in search of help into our private property, to decide
his fate for him, to force our own ideals upon him, and with the
pride of a Creator to form him in our own image and see that it is
good…In my opinion, this is after all only to use violence, even
though it is overlaid with the most honourable motives.
(ibid.: 164–165)

我们非常强调地拒绝将病人转化成为我们的财产,虽然病人将他自己放置在我们手里,寻求帮助。我们拒绝代替病人决定他的命运,强迫我们的理想在他们身上,并且带着创造者的骄傲,用我们自己的意象塑造他,然后顾盼自得,情况良好、、、依我之见,这毕竟仅是使用暴力,即使这个暴力充满荣耀的动机。

As an appropriate alternative Freud suggested the ‘rule of abstinence’,
which consists in the analyst’s refusal to gratify the patient’s needs and
demands so that all substitute satisfactions are avoided and a productive
level of suffering is maintained. Freud refused to model the analytic
treatment on a mental hospital’s policy to look after patients and to make
them feel as comfortable as possible inside. He also emphasized that
whatever educational effect psychoanalysis may entail, analysts should
ensure that their patients do not come to resemble them, but are
encouraged in the liberation and realization of their own being.

作为一个合适的替代选择,弗洛伊德建议这个“节制的原则”。这个“节制的原则”主要在于精神分析家拒绝满足病人的需要与要求。这样,所有的替换的满足都被避免,这样,才能维持遭受痛苦具有创造的层次。弗洛伊德拒绝将精神分析的治疗,模拟精神病院的政策,为了照顾病人,并且让病人的内部尽可能感觉舒适。弗洛伊德也强调,精神分析可能涵盖的任何教育的效果,应该保证,他们的病人并不以逐渐类似精神分析家。而是要鼓励病人从事他们的自己的生命实存的解放与体现。

Lacan’s antagonism between the imaginary and the symbolic followed
Freud’s opposition between non-analytic image building and proper
analytic abstinence. It can be summarized as an antagonism between the
psychic register of insuperable, yet regulated difference and that of
deceptive, yet fascinating resemblance.16 Apropos of the symbolic, Lacan
recognized the paragon of the human symbolic function (the ‘original
symbolism’) in the complex rules of matrimonial alliance, the elaborate
laws of kinship and the practices of exchanging gifts that preside over
otherwise ‘pre-modern’, non-industrialized communities (Lacan 1977e
[1953]:65–66).

拉康将想像界与象征界作为互具敌意,是遵循弗洛伊德将非-精神分析的意象的建造,跟本体的精神分析的节制的互相对立。这个互具敌意能够被总结为:心灵的铭记的无法被征服,可是又被规范的差异,与欺骗,可是又是令人著迷的类似之间的互具敌意。关于象征界,拉康体认出这个典范:人类象征的功能的典范,(原初的象征主义),在婚姻联盟的复杂的规则里,亲属关系的复杂的法则里,与礼物交换的实践。这些统辖著不同的“前-现代”,非-工业化的社会。

Whilst none of these regulations is rooted in a preordained
natural order, they structure the natural living conditions in
such a way that distinct group members are continuously forced to
participate in existing agreements and to negotiate new pacts.17 By
contrast, Lacan located the source of the human imaginary in the socalled
‘mirror-stage’ (Lacan 1977c[1949]), whereby the child develops
its identity (its ego) via an identification with the twin image reflected
by the mirror or, in the absence of reflective surfaces, by a similar other.18

虽然这些规则没有一条是根源于预先注定的自然的秩序,它们架构自然的活生生的情况,用这样一种方式,以致于明显的团体成员继续不断地被迫参与现存的协定,并且协商新的盟约。对照起来,拉康将人类的想像的起源定位在社会化的“镜像阶段”。在“镜像阶段”那里,小孩发展它的自我的认同,经由镜子反映的孪生意象的认同。或者,在反映的表面欠缺的时刻,由类似的他者作为镜像反映。

In Seminar I, and in reference to Freud, Lacan defined the ego accordingly
as an agency that ‘is constructed like an onion, one could peel it and
discover the successive identifications which have constituted it’ (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:171).19 Consequently, the human imaginary has nothing
to do with the installation and regulation of difference; it is fundamentally
geared towards the advancement of similarity and instead of a
symbolic
truce, it induces jealousy, rivalry, competition and aggression.
在第一研讨班,提到弗洛伊德时,拉康遵循弗洛伊德,将自我定义为一位代理者,“像洋葱一样被建造的代理者。我们能够剥开洋葱,然然发现连续的认同的表层,构成这个自我”。结果,人类的想像跟差异的安置与规则,根本没有任何关系。人类的想享基本上被触动,朝向类似的前进,而非是朝向象征的休战。人类的想像引申出敌意,競争与侵凌。

At the end of Seminar II (1988c[1954–55]:243), Lacan integrated
these two discordant dimensions of the symbolic and the imaginary into
a comprehensive cartography of psychoanalytic treatment, placing the
principles of ego-psychology orthogonally to a clinical practice which
he deemed more loyal to Freud’s inspiration. This schema of analytic
communication (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:14), to which Lacan also referred
as the ‘Schema L’, comprises four terms (S, o, o’ and O) and two
conflicting relations (imaginary and symbolic-unconscious).20

在第二研讨班的结束时,拉康将象征界与想像界的这两个不协调的维度,合并成为精神分析治疗的一个全面的地图制作。拉康将自我-心理学的原则,正统地放置在临床的实践里。他认为这是更加忠实于弗洛伊德的启发。精神分析的沟通的这个基模,拉康也提到,作为是“L型基模”,它包括四个术语(S,0,0‘, O),与两个冲突的关系 (想像与象征的无意识)。

In this schema the therapeutic alliance between the clinician and the
patient in an ego-psychological setting is displayed as an imaginary
relation between an ego (o) and another ego (o’).

在这个基模,治临床医生与病人的治疗的联盟,在自我-心理学的背景,被展示出来,作为是想像的关系,处于自我(o),与另外一个自我(o‘)之间。

Lacan proclaimed that
the majority of contemporary clinicians were viewing the patient as an
objectified other whose ego needs ‘to gather its strength, to realise itself,
to integrate itself (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:245). In keeping with his theory
of the ego as an imaginary construction, he then argued that the patient’s
ego ‘can only re-encounter and reconstitute itself by way of the fellow
being the subject has before him—or behind him’ (ibid.: 245), which is
of course the figure of the analyst. Hence, the patient and the analyst had
become allies in an imaginary exchange of egos, leading to the
replacement of the patient’s former (pathological) identity by the new
(healthy) identity of the analyst.21

拉康宣称:大多数的当代临床医生,正将病人看待作为是一个被客体化的他者。自我需要这个他者来聚集它的力量,为了实现它自己,为了融合它自己。为了跟他的自我的理论保持一致,作文是想像的建构,拉康因此主张,病人的自我仅能够重新遭遇,重新建构它自己,凭借主体在他面前,或在他背后,拥有的这位同胞。这位同胞当然就是精神分析家的人物。因此,病人与精神分析家已经变成联盟,在想像地交换自我。导致病人的先前的(病态)的认同,被精神分析家的新的认同所取代。

Figure I Schema L
Source: J.Lacan, The Seminar, Book III, The Psychoses, New York,
W.W.Norton, 1993, p. 14.
What does the analyst want? 65

分析家想要什么?

October 23, 2015

Chapter 2
第二章
What does the analyst want?
精神分析家想要什么?

FREUD’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL SLEUTHING
弗洛伊的的考古学的调查

In order to explain the general attitude of the psychoanalyst during
the treatment, Freud often appealed to highly imaginative metaphors.
For example, in his 1914 essay on transference-love
(1915a[1914]:170) he defined analysts as warriors who are incessantly
waging a threefold battle with their recalcitrant patients, their own
oppressive mental forces and their political opponents outside the
clinical setting.

为了解释精神分析家在治疗时刻的一般态度,弗洛伊德经常诉诸于高度想像的隐喻。譬如,在他的1914年探讨移情与爱的论文,他定义精神分析家作战士,不断地从事三重的战役,跟他们的顽抗的病人,他们自己的压迫的心理的力量,与他们在临床背景之外的政治的对手。

Years later, in Lecture 34 of the ‘New Introductory
Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’, he argued that analysts are principally
in the same position as the medieval woman who is suspected of
witchcraft and therefore sentenced to being ‘stewed in a cauldron of
boiling water’ (Freud 1933a[1932]:155), a judgement epitomizing a
surreptitious, yet inescapable death penalty.1

几年之后,在“精神分析的新导论讲演“的34讲里,弗洛伊德主张,精神分析家原则上处于相同的立场,跟中世纪被怀疑具有巫术的女巫。这些女巫因此被判在”滚热的水的大锅里煮泡”。这个判断词描绘秘密而又无可逃避的死刑的轮廓。

Freud’s most insistent and compelling metaphor of the analyst is
definitely that of the archaeologist, a representation which he not only
applied to the abstract practitioner in his writings, but which he himself
embraced wholeheartedly, from the dawn of his analytic itinerary to his
years of forced exile.2 In his preface to the famous Dora case, Freud’s
first extensive report of a psychoanalytic treatment, he divulged that he
had proceeded like a ‘conscientious archaeologist’, bringing ‘to the light
of day after long burial the priceless though mutilated remnants of
antiquity’ and reassembling the shattered pieces without concealing where
‘reconstruction supplements the authentic’ (Freud 1905e[1901]:12–13).

弗洛伊德最持续而强烈的隐喻精神分析家,很明确地说考古学家的隐喻。这一个表象,他不但运用到他的著作里的那些抽象的执业者,而且他自己全心全意地接受这个表象。从精神分析的探索的开始,到他强迫退休的几年。在著名的“朵拉”的个案的序言,弗洛伊德最初广泛地报导精神分析的治疗,他详细说明,他曾经前进,就像一位“孜孜不倦的考古学家”,将“古代的珍贵而切割的残余物,经过长久埋藏之后,重新见到光明“,并且重新组合这些被破坏的碎片。但是没有隐藏“重新建造补足真诚之物”的地方。

In his recollections of Freud, the ‘Wolf Man’ conceded that the Berggasse
consultation rooms ‘must have been a surprise to any patient, for they in
no way reminded one of a doctor’s office, but rather of an archaeologist’s
study’, a feature which Freud explained to his patient by stating that ‘the
psychoanalyst, like the archaeologist in his excavations, must uncover
layer after layer of the patient’s psyche, before coming to the deepest,
most valuable treasures’ (Gardiner 1972:139).3

在弗洛伊德的回忆里,“狼人”承认,博加瑟咨商室“当时一定让任何病人大吃一惊,因为咨商室根本就不会让人想起医生的诊疗室。相反地,它让人想起考古学家的研究室”。弗洛伊德对他的病人解释这个特征时,他陈述说:“精神分析家,就像考古学家在挖掘考古。他必须揭露病人的心灵的每个层面,这样,他才能够来到最深层,最宝贵的宝藏那里。”

The metaphor reappeared
in ‘Civilization and its Discontents’ (1930a[1929]:69–72) and in
‘Constructions in Analysis’ (1937d:259–260), Freud’s testament of
analytic technique, although he now assured that analysts are in a sense
more fortunate than archaeologists, since they have the opportunity to
operate on living materials whose structures have not been eroded by
the accumulated covers.4

在“文明与其不满”,这个隐喻重新出现。在“精神分析的建构”,弗洛伊德处理精神分析的技术。虽然他现在确定,精神分析在某个意义来说,比起考古学家更加幸运。因为他们拥有这个机会来探索活生生的材料。这些材料的结构还没有被腐蚀,被累积的表层。

In his designation of the analyst, including himself, as an archaeologist,
Freud was fascinated by the nineteenth-century German explorer Heinrich
Schliemann, who managed to unearth the remains of Troy and a score of
Mycenaean treasures with Homer’s poetry as his main guide. After the
example of Schliemann, Freud aspired to be a tireless digger and proud
discoverer, not of the sociocultural heritage of humanity, but of the
familial antecedents of the neurotic individual, taking the patient’s
contrived associations, a series of apparently meaningless words, as his
principal lead.5

当弗洛伊德指明精神分析家,包括他自己,作为是考古学家。他著迷于十九世纪的探险家希乐曼。希乐曼成功地挖掘出特洛城的遗迹,以及二十多个迈锡尼文明的财宝。他用荷马的史诗作为他的主要的引导。经过希乐曼的榜样后,弗洛伊德渴望成为一位永不疲倦的挖掘者与自负的发现者,不是发现人类的社会与文化的遗产,而是发现神经症的个人的家庭的先辈。弗洛伊德将病人的计谋的联想,一系列显然没有意义的词语,当作是他的主要的引导。

Also in the wake of Schliemann, Freud was less concerned
with the correct reconstruction of the retrieved fragments than with the
historical value of the relics themselves. Historical truth, predicated upon
the legitimate connection between a current state of affairs and a historical
event, mattered more to Freud than material truth, presupposing a strict
congruence between the past and its representation in the present.6

而且,跟随着希乐曼之后,弗洛伊德所关注的东西并不是这些复得的碎片的正确的重新的建构。他关注的是这个残余物本身的历史的价值。历史的真理,根据合法联机来描述,在目前的事物的状态与历史的事件之间。对于弗洛伊德,历史的真理更加重要,胜过于材料的真实。因为它预先假设,过去与它的现在的表象之间,有严格的一致性。

However elliptic or distorted the patients’ accounts and however fantastic
their symptoms, Freud maintained that these neurotic phenomena are
supported by an unconscious scaffolding, elements which had once been
part and parcel of the patients’ conscious daily reality.

病人的描述无论多么地失漏与被扭曲,他们症状无论多么的匪夷所思,弗洛伊德主张,这些神经症的现象,受的无意识的框架的支持。这些元素曾经是病人的意识的日常的现实的部分与包裹。

Consequently, the Freudian clinician was held to gather as many clues
as possible from the patients’ psychopathology of everyday life, building
hypotheses and drawing maps of the original constellation, and
penetrating into the submerged psychic architecture in order to reveal
the foundations of the symptoms. Whereas the analyst’s theoretical
framework was profoundly archaeological, his methods were deemed
investigative, drawing upon Ovid’s formula Causa latet, vis est notissima
—the cause is hidden but its effect is conspicuous. Yet instead of relying
on the most salient features of his patients’ clinical condition when
venturing this work of reconstruction, Freud put all his trust in apparently
meaningless trifles: slips of the tongue, dreams, parapraxes, lapses of
memory, etc.

结果,弗洛伊德学派的临床医生被认为尽可能收集,从病人的日常生活的心理治疗,建造一些假设,并且绘制原初的心理情意丛的地图,然后贯穿进入潜藏的心灵的建筑结构,为了显示症状的基础。精神分析家的理论的架构虽然是深刻的考古学,他的方法却被认为是研究的方法,依靠奥维德的公式:“原因隐藏,但是结果显露。可是,弗洛伊德并没有依靠他的病人的临床的情况的最有趣的特征,当他冒险从事重建的这个工作。代替的,弗洛伊德将他所有的信任,放在明显没有意义的琐碎的事情:口误,梦,遗忘,记忆失误,等等。

This Freudian analytic procedure of inferring causes from the careful
observation of ostensibly insignificant details mirrored the so-called
‘method of Zadig’, a technique immortalized by Voltaire in a short story
from the mid-eighteenth century and subsequently designated by the
agnosticist Thomas Huxley as the method of ‘retrospective prophecy’.7

这个弗洛伊德的精神分析的程序,根据仔细地观察不重要的细节,反映出这个所谓的“启蒙大师的方法“,这一个技术,由于伏尔泰的短篇小说变得不朽,从十八世纪开始。随后被不可知论者赫胥黎指明是”内省的预言“。

By scrutinizing the trees lining a narrow road and the marks on the ground,
Voltaire’s Zadig succeeded in describing all the essential characteristics
of the horse that had recently passed by, including the length of its tail
and the quality of its bit. Yet, apart from Zadig’s method, Freud’s modus
operandi was also reminiscent of a widely acclaimed procedure for
determining the authorship of works of art which had been developed by
the Italian physician Giovanni Morelli during the nineteenth century.

凭借审查这些树,排列在狭窄的路上,与地上的标记,伏尔泰的启蒙大师成功地描述最近刚刚经过的马的所有的基本的特征。包括尾巴的长度,与马的脚链的品质。可是,除了启蒙大师的方法,弗洛伊德的“动作模式”也让人想起广泛被宣称的程序,用来决的艺术作品的作者归属。这个方法曾经由义大利的医生摩瑞利发展,在十九世纪。

Morelli argued that the tiny details of a painting, such as a character’s
earlobes, reveal more about the identity of the artist than the style of its
central depiction. In ‘The Moses of Michelangelo’ Freud admitted to his
long familiarity with Morelli’s procedure, and put it on a par with the
central research method in psychoanalysis:

摩瑞利主张,图画的小小的细节,譬如一个人物的耳叶,更加显示出艺术家的身份,远超过它的中心的描述。在“米开兰吉罗的摩西”,弗洛伊德承认他对于摩瑞利的程序耳熟能详很久了。他并且将它与精神分析的中央的研究方法相提并论。

It seems to me that his [Morelli’s] method of inquiry is closely
related to the technique of psychoanalysis. It, too, is accustomed
to divine secret concealed things from despised or unnoticed
features, from the rubbish-heap, as it were, of our observations.
(Freud 1914b:222)

我觉得,他的摩瑞利的研究的方法,跟精神分析的技术息息相关。这个方法也习惯于被用来猜测秘密被隐藏的东西,从被轻视或没有被注意到的特征,也就是,从我们的观察的垃圾堆里。

To the extent that psychoanalysts, on Freud’s account, study their patients’
clinical pictures with the Zadig-Morelli method, their mode of operation
also resembles that of a host of fictional detectives, the most prominent
being Poe’s C.Auguste Dupin and Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes. To many a
reader’s delight these characters have been portrayed as expert Zadigs,
whose capacities for ‘looking awry’, coupled with an exceptional acumen,
enable them time and again to solve even the most persistent of mysteries.
Likewise, and although the metaphor never appeared in his writings,
Freud intimated that the analyst is some sort of professional clinical
gumshoe, a mental health sleuth whose task consists in dissolving present
psychic crises by retrieving their historical causes via the analysis of
apparently meaningless details.8

因为弗洛伊德的缘故,精神分析研究他们的病人的临床的画面,用摩瑞利-启蒙大师的方法,它们的运作模式也类似许多的幻奇侦探的运作模式一样。最具名声的莫过于爱伦坡的奥古斯特 杜品与道尔的夏洛克 福尔摩斯。令许多读者感的快乐的事,这些人物曾经被描绘成为启蒙大师的专家。他们的“冷眼看世间”能力,再加上特殊的洞察力,让他们有时能够解答即使是顽抗难解的神秘。同样地,在弗洛伊德的著作里,隐喻从来没有出现,他宣告,精神分析家是某种专业的临床侦探,心灵健康的警探,他们的工作就是在于解决目前的心灵的危机。他们获得这些心灵危机的原因,经由表面上没有意义的细节。

Inspired by this contiguity, film directors have often modelled their
detectives—from Hitchcock’s characters for Ingrid Bergman and Scan
Connery in Spellbound and Marnie, to Peter Falk in the role of the
inimitable inspector Columbo—on the image of the Freudian analyst.9
The setting of the Columbo series is particularly relevant here, because
as Slavoj •i•ek has noted in The Plague of Fantasies:

受到这种靠近的启发,电影的导演经常模仿他们的侦探—从希区考克的人物模仿英格丽 柏格曼与史康 科尼立,在“Spellbound and Mamie”,到皮特 法尔克,在大无畏的警探科伦坡—他们模仿弗洛伊德学派的精神分析家。科伦坡警探的系列的背景在此具有特殊关了,因为如同齐泽克在“幻见的瘟疫”里注意到的:

[T]he enigma to be resolved is not that of ‘whodunit?’, but of how the
detective will establish the link between the deceptive surface (the
‘manifest content’ of the crime scene) and the truth about the crime
(its ‘latent thought’)—how he will prove his or her guilt to the culprit.
(•i•ek 1997:106)

应该被解答的谜团并不是“谁幹这件事”,而是侦探如何建立这个关联,处于欺骗的表面与真相之间的关联。表面上犯罪的场景的“表面内容”,真相则是关于犯罪(潜在的思想)–他如何整面他或她的罪行,对于犯罪者。

However, the viewer is not the only person who knows the identity of
the murderer in advance for, as •i•ek has emphasized, the other
distinguishing feature of the Columbo series is that the detective also
seems to know the ins and outs of the matter, including the identity of
the criminal, from the moment he arrives at the scene (ibid.: 107).

可是,观众并不是唯一的人,预先知的谋杀者的身份。如同齐泽克所说的,科伦伯警探系列的区别特征是,侦探也似乎知道事情的内外原委。包括犯罪者的身份,从他到达现场开始。

In a similar vein, Freud worked from a mysterious yet singularly
adequate universal knowledge base, which can deservedly be called
‘mythical’ since it was anchored in Sophocles’ poetic account of the rise
and fall of Thebe. Epistemologically, Freud employed an Oedipal
template, which allowed him to ‘guess’ the pivotal elements of his
patients’ lives even before they had presented them(selves) to him.

同样地,弗洛伊德根据神马可是又独异地充分的普世的知识作为基础开始研究。这个充分的普世知识应该值得被称为“神秘”,因为它能够被追溯到索弗克利斯的史诗的描述西伯家族的興起与衰亡。这让他能够“猜测”病人的生活的关键的因素,即使在这些因素呈现给他之前。

Which
infantile constellation presided over his patients’ adult experiences and
which relationships determined their mental crises were questions Freud
did not need to answer. The only mystery the patients had in store
concerned the way in which the historical truth pervaded the intricate
cobweb of their present symptoms, a mystery which, for its known
Oedipal context, was no less difficult to resolve. Freud’s pre-eminent
challenge was how to dissolve the patients’ smokescreens and confront
them with the naked truth of what they had hitherto been hiding from
their environment and, of course, from themselves.10

哪一个婴孩时代的情结主宰病人的成年的经验?哪一个关系决定他们的精神的危机?这些并不是弗洛伊德需要回答的问题。病人拥有的唯一的等待回答的神秘,跟这个方式息息相关,跟历史的真相弥漫目前的症状的复杂的蜘蛛网的方式息息相关。这一个神秘,因为它已经被知道的伊狄浦斯的内文,同样困难解决。弗洛伊德的杰出的挑战是要如何解的病人的烟幕窗帘,并且让它们面对赤裸裸的真相,他们迄今隐藏的真相,不让环境知道,当然,也不让他们自己知道。

Technically, Freud’s analytical method of ‘retrospective prophecy’,
or, if one prefers, of ‘archaeological sleuthing’ followed the same route
as that which had led to the formation of the patient’s symptoms, albeit
in the opposite direction. For the patients this implied that they had to
recognize the historical (infantile) causes of their symptoms, after the
analyst had succeeded in reconstructing these causes out of the traces
they had left behind.

技术方面来说,弗洛伊德的精神分析的方法“回顾的预测”,或者,我们不妨说是“考古学的技术”,遵循相同的途径,如同曾经导致病人的症状的形成的途径。虽然是朝著相反的方向。对于病人,这暗示着,他们必须体认他们的症状在历史(婴孩)的原有。当精神分析家曾经成功地重新建造这些原因,根据他们留下来的痕迹。

As such, Freudian analysis strictly relied on the
present perfect tense: events starting in the past were expected to have a
lasting, yet unconscious impact on the present and the patients were urged
to come to terms with their contemporary condition by acknowledging
‘what has been’. This idea corresponds to the classical medical maxim
of Ablata causa, tollitur effectus (if the cause is taken away, its effect
will disappear), and it has contributed enormously to the common
designation of Freudian psychoanalysis as a paragon of causal therapy.

作为这样的途径,弗洛伊德学派的精神分析严格遵循“现在完成式”:从过去开始的事件被预期会具有永久,可是无意识的影响目前。病人被建议要跟他们的当时的情境互相妥协,凭借承认“曾经发生过的事情”。这个观念对应于古典的医学的公理:“假如原因被拿走,它的结果将会消失)。它相当程度促成弗洛伊德学派的精神分析的共同指明,作为是因果律治疗的典范。

Once the (infantile) causes had been liberated from the psychic
dungeon to which repression had relegated them, Freud expected these
causes to lose their pathogenic effect automatically. In another extensive
archaeological metaphor, he underscored that ‘in mental life nothing
which has once been formed can perish’, just like the burial of precious
objects under myriad layers of sand contributes to their survival (Freud
1930a[1929]:69–70). But he was keen to add that when these objects are
excavated they are so vulnerable that they can rapidly disintegrate into
insignificant grains of dust, thus returning to their proper place as objects
belonging to a remote past.

一旦(婴孩的)原因已经被解放,从心灵的地牢,压抑曾经将这些原因打到地牢里。弗洛伊德期望这些原因自动地丧失它们的病因的影响。在另外一个广泛的考古学的隐喻,他理解到,在心灵生活里,曾经被形成的东西,没有一样会消灭。就像是珍贵东西的被埋藏在无数层的沙堆里,这个埋藏促成它们的存活。但是弗洛伊德很渴望补充说:当这些东西被挖掘出来,他们是如此容易受到伤害,以致他们迅速地瓦解成为无足轻重的灰尘,因此回到它们本来的位置,作为属于遥远的过去的东西。

‘[T]he destruction of Pompeii was only
beginning now that it had been dug up’, he told the Rat Man (Freud
1909d:176). This is precisely what Freud expected to happen with the
retrieved historical causes of his patients’ symptoms. He anticipated
symptomatic effects to disappear spontaneously following the liberation
of their historical causes from their secret unconscious shelters.

庞贝城的毁灭才刚刚开始,一旦它已经被挖掘出土。弗洛伊德告诉鼠人。这确实是弗洛伊德期望发生的事情,对于他的病人的症状的复得到历史的原因。他预期症状的结果的自动自发地消失,跟随在他们的历史的原因的解放,从他们的秘密的无意识的庇护所。

He believed that a patient’s assumption of his historical truth (as cause) would
have a benign effect on his symptoms, because the patient’s
acknowledgement would grant these causes a new, conscious and
innocuous guise. In the process, the temporal status of psychic events
gradually transformed itself from the present perfect into the past tense.11
Despite its compelling outlook, Freud noticed that something in the
nature of the unconscious itself hindered the full realization of this
analytical project.

弗洛伊德相信,病人的假设他的历史真相(作为原因),将会有良性的影响,对于他的症状。因为病人的承认将会给予他们的原因,重新有意识地伪装成为无害。在这个过程,心灵事件的暂时的状态逐渐转化它自己,从现在完成式,转化成为过去式。尽管它的诱人的外观,弗洛伊德注意到,某件具有无意识本身的特性,阻碍这个精神分析的计划的充分实现。

Already in the final paragraphs of ‘The Dynamics of
Transference’ he observed that the patient’s unwillingness or inability
to subscribe to the rule of free association cannot be attributed entirely
to the psychic power of resistance. Freud had to admit that unconscious
impulses ‘refuse to be remembered’ (wollen nicht erinnert werden) and
are strictly aimed at reproducing themselves (Freud 1912b:107–108).

在“移情的动力结构“的最后一段,弗洛伊德观察到:病人不愿意或是不能够同意自由联想到规则,并无法完全被归咎于抗拒的心灵的力量。弗洛伊德必须承认,无意识的冲动”拒绝被记住“,并且目标严格地朝向复制它们自己。

In
subsequent texts, he conceptualized this unconscious force alternatively
as a not wanting to know (Freud 1913c:141–142), negative therapeutic
reactions (Freud 1923b:49) and the compulsion to repeat (Freud 1920g:
18–20), mental derivatives of the death drive which operates beyond the
pleasure principle. But naming the force and its engine was not sufficient
to eradicate the problem, neither theoretically nor clinically. In Lecture
31 of the ‘New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’, Freud
summarized the work of analysis as follows:

在随后的文本,弗洛伊德替换地建构这个无意识的力量的观念,作为是不想要知道,负面的治疗的反应。与重复的冲动,死亡冲动的精神衍生物,死亡冲动的运作超越快乐原则。但是,光是命名这个力量与力量的引擎,并不足够抹除这个难题,无论是理论上,或是临床方面。在“精神分析新导论的第31演讲班“,弗洛伊德总结精神分析的工作如下:

[Impressions] which have been sunk into the id by repression, are
virtually immortal; after the passage of decades they behave as
though they had just occurred. They can only be recognized as
belonging to the past, can only lose their importance…when they
have been made conscious by the work of analysis, and it is on this
that the therapeutic effect of analytic treatment rests to no small
extent. Again and again I have had the impression that we have
made too little theoretical use of this fact…of the unalterability by
time of the repressed.
(Freud 1933a[1932]:73–74)

被压抑沉入到本我的那些印象,几乎的永久不灭的。经过几十年的过程,它们行为好像它们才刚刚发生。它们仅能够被体认,作为是属于过去,仅能够丧失它们的重要性。当它们被精神分析的工作挖掘到意识层面。精神分析治疗的疗愈的效果,有相当程度就是依靠这一点。经常地,我曾经有这个印象:我们理论上太少运用这个事实:被压抑的事情并没有被时间改变!

Returning to this issue in the third chapter of ‘Analysis Terminable and
Interminable’, Freud ultimately concluded that an analysis may have a
practical end (when the patient and the analyst stop seeing each other)
but not a definitive end, since the treatment procedure is incapable of
neutralizing deleterious unconscious impulses for once and for all.

当弗洛伊德回到“精神分析的终止与没有终止“的第三章节的这个议题,他最后下结论说:精神分析可能拥有一个实际的结束(当病人与精神分析家停止互相再见面)。但是,这并不是明确的结束。因为治疗的程序并不能够让有害的无意识的冲动一劳永逸地保持中立。

Faced with this theoretical and clinical impasse of the Freudian model,
post-Freudian authors have constructed a variety of escape routes. For
instance, ego-psychologists have argued that Freud overestimated the
clinical impact of the death drive or, conversely, that he underestimated
the power of analytic treatment to master its most pervasive outlets, the
manifestations of aggression and destruction.12

面对弗洛伊德的模式的理论与临床的僵局,后-弗洛伊德学派的作者们已经建造各式各样的逃离的路线。譬如,自我-心理学家曾经主张:弗洛伊德过分高估死亡冲动对于临床的影响。或者,反过来说,弗洛伊德过分低估精神分析治疗可以掌控即使到处弥漫的出口的力量,掌控侵凌性与毁灭性的展示。

From a different angle,
psychodynamic therapists have exchanged Freud’s paradigm of
archaeological sleuthing for an alternative treatment model in which the
retrieval of unconscious memories into consciousness is replaced by less
demanding, more superficial procedures, such as the creation and
maintenance of adequate coping strategies and ‘corrective emotional
experiences’.13

从不同角度来看,精神分析动力结构的治疗师,曾经将弗洛伊德的考古学的技术的典范,交换成为替换的治疗的模式。在那里,无意识的记忆的重新进入意识被取代,被比较不那么严格要求,更加表面的程序取代。譬如,充分的应付策略与改进的情感的经验的创造与维持。

In yet another branch of psychoanalysis, object-relations
therapists have sustained Freud’s general conception of analytic treatment,
whilst shifting its focus to the reparation of the patients’ early childhood
relationships, with the analyst functioning as a ‘good enough mother’.14
Each of these developments could be canvassed in its historical origins
and its clinical-theoretical premises, yet within the scope of this book I
will merely focus on Lacan’s answer to the apparent deadlock of Freudian
psychoanalysis.

在另一个精神分析的部门,客体关系的治疗师曾经维持弗洛伊德的精神分析治疗的观念。虽然他们转换它的焦点,到病人的早期的童年的关系的恢复。由精神分析家充当“足够良善的母亲“。每一个发展都能够被细查,在它的历史的起源里与它的临床与理论的假设里被细查。可是,在这本书的范围里面,我将仅是专注于拉康的回答,对于弗洛伊德学派的精神分析的明显的僵局。
During the first years of his seminars, Lacan generally
espoused Freud’s views on the end of analysis—interpreted in terms of
its termination, its goal and its results. For example, in the final session
of Seminar I (1988b[1953–54]:273–287), he argued that the analyst’s
task consists in encouraging patients to embark on a progressive
verbalization of those elements which they have never integrated into
their life history, in view of the full realization of their subjective truth.

在拉康的研讨班的前几年,拉康通常说明弗洛伊德对于精神分析终止的观点—他用精神分析的终止,它的目标与它的结果的术语来解释。譬如,在第一研讨班的最后一节,拉康主张,精神分析家的工作就在于鼓励病人从事逐渐进步的文词表达这些因素,他们从来没有将这些因素融合到他们的生命的历史,因为他们的主体的真理的充分的实现。

During the late 1950s, this Freudian goal was gradually reformulated as
‘the subject’s avowal of his desire’ in its indebtedness to the desire of
the Other (Lacan 1977i[1958]:275; 1991b[1960–61]:234). From the mid-
1960s, and especially with Seminar XI, Lacan then explored the psychic
backdrop of this subjective avowal of desire, which cleared the way for
his conceptualization of ‘traversing the fantasy’ (Lacan
1977b[1964]:273–274) and ‘subjective destitution’ (Lacan
1995b[1967]:8) as the most advanced analytic goals, to be reserved for
those clinical experiences which have training effects on the analysand.

在1950年晚期,这个弗洛德的目标逐渐被重新说明,作为是主体的承认他的欲望,由于主体感谢大他者的欲望。从1960年开始,特别是第11研讨班,拉康当时探索主体的承认欲望的心灵的背景。这清除这个途径,让他能够建构这两个观念:“亲厉幻见“与”主体的匮乏“。作为是最进步的精神分析的目标,应该被保留给那些临床的经验,这些经验对于分析者具有训练的效果。

This gradual shift from fullness (the reintegration of one’s personal
history) to emptiness (the acknowledgement of an irrecuperable loss in
the avowal of desire) as the appropriate terminus of analytic treatment
correlated with Lacan’s ongoing reflection upon the analyst’s clinical
position and his theoretical re-evaluation of the Freudian unconscious.
Eventually, it opened up entirely new perspectives on the clinical politics
of the analyst, which he formalized in the so-called ‘discourse of the
analyst’ (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:31–42).

逐渐的转变,从充实(一个人的个人的历史的融合),到空虚(承认欲望时,承认丧失的无法复得),作为是精神分析治疗的的合适的终止。这个拉康正在进行的反思息息相关,反思精神分析家的临床的立场,与其理论的重新评估弗洛伊德的无意识。最后,它展开完全崭新的观点,对于精神分析家的临床的活动。他在所谓的“精神分析家的辞说“里,说明这个活动。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 10

October 21, 2015

WHITHER PERVERSION?
是否倒错

When discerning the three clinical paradoxes between speech and
language in his 1953 ‘Rome Discourse’, Lacan did not venture upon an
alternative definition of the nosological category of perversion. Instead,
he described the third paradox as ‘the subject who loses his meaning in
the objectifications of discourse’, which opened a more metaphysical
perspective on the antagonistic relationship between the subject (sujet)
and the ego (moi). Lacan put the ‘disguises of perversion’ in the neurotic
compartment—alongside the ‘talking arms of character’ and the ‘seals
of self-punishment’—as ‘hermetic elements’ which the psychoanalytic
exegesis can resolve (Lacan 1977e[1953]:70).

当拉康辨别处于言说与语言之间的这三种悖论时,他于他的1953年的“罗马辞说”,他并没有探测一个替代的定义,对于倒错的分类的范畴。代替的,他描述这第三个悖论,作为是“丧失他的意义于辞说的客体化的主体”,这个辞说展开一个更加形上学的观点,探讨主体与自我之间的敌意的关系。拉康将“倒错的伪装”,放置在神经症的分类。伴随着“人格的谈话的手臂”与“自我-惩罚的封印”—作为是“解释的元素”,精神分析的存在能够解决的“解释的元素”。

Lacan’s hesitation to qualify perversion as a discrete clinical structure
permeated much of his work from the 1950s, and is rooted in the
theoretical inconsistencies which troubled Freud in his pioneering
psychoanalytic explorations of the topic. Using the concept of perversion
in its then accepted medico-legal meaning of sexual phenomena
precluding genital union and/or the involvement of two consenting adult
human beings belonging to the opposite sex, Freud averred in his casestudy
of Dora and in his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ that
all psychoneurotics possess forceful, albeit repressed perverse tendencies,
and that the sexual constitution of the child, owing to its being ruled by
disorganized partial drives, is polymorphously perverse (Freud
1905d:231–232; 1905e [1901]:50).

拉康的犹豫,不愿将倒错的品质定为是混杂的临床结构。他的犹豫弥漫于他的许的著作里,从1950年代开始,并且根源于让弗洛伊德感到困扰的理论的不一致,在他开前锋的精神分析对这个议题的探索。弗洛伊德使用倒错的观念,在它当时被接受的医学与法律的意义,对于这些性的现象,预先包含性器官的结合与(或)两位同意的成年人的牵涉,他们属于不同的性别。弗洛伊德在他的个案研究“朵拉”,与“性学三论”,主张,所有的心理的神经症者拥有强迫性,虽然是压迫的倒错的倾向。小孩的性的体质,由于受的瓦解的部分冲动的统辖,呈现多种样体的倒错。

Consequently, the category of
perversion was expanded to include children as well as adults,
psychoneurotics as well as ‘genuine’ perverts, and Freud saw himself
faced with the question as to what distinguishes true ‘positive perversion’
(perversion proper) from its false, ‘negative’ avatars.
After having discarded the nature of the sexual behaviours and the
contents of the fantasies, Freud eventually confided in the genuine pervert’s
fixation on the sexual object and the perverse exclusiveness with regard to
the sexual aim, processes which he attributed to an interaction of
constitutional and accidental factors (Freud 1905d:162, 235–240). Of
course, both fixation and exclusiveness are quantitative rather than
qualitative criteria, which probably explains why Freud continued to look
for more reliable distinctions between perversion and neurosis.

结果,倒错的范畴被扩大到包含小孩与成年人,心理神经症者与“真正”的倒错症者。弗洛伊德自己看见,当他面对这个问题:如何区别真正的“正面倒错者”(本体的倒错者)与虚假的“负面的”倒错者的天使下凡之间的差异。弗洛伊德抛弃性的行为的特性与幻见的内容之后,他最后坦白承认,在他论述真正的倒错者的固著于性的客体,与倒错者的排除,关于行的目的。他将这些过程归属于体质与意外的因素的互相作用。当然,两种固著与排除都是数量方面,而非是品质方面的标准。这可能解释为什么弗洛伊德继续寻找更可靠的区别,在倒错者与神经症者之间。

In ‘Fetishism’ (1927e), he launched the criterion of disavowal
(Verleugnung) to explain how a male child develops into a fetishist. When
confronted with the reality of sexual difference, the child disavows
castration (the mother’s lack of a penis) by convincing himself that the
mother does possess a penis. As a substitute for the painfully missed
penis of the mother, the fetish serves to sustain this psychic reaction of
disavowal and produces a split in the child’s ego, because it symbolizes
both mental triumph and the inherent threat of castration. According to
Freud (ibid.: 156–157), this split could also account for the fetishist’s
ambiguous attitude vis-a-vis his objects.

在“论恋物癖”,弗洛伊德竖立起这个标准:不承认。为了解释一位男性的小孩为什么发展成为恋物癖者。当小孩面临性的差异的现实,小孩不承认被阉割(母亲的欠缺阴茎)。他说服自己:母亲并没有拥有阴茎。作为母亲的这个令人痛苦的丧失的阴茎,恋物癖被用来维持这个心灵的反应,并且产生小孩的自我的分裂。因为它象征精神的胜利与阉割的本质的威胁。依照弗洛伊德,这个分裂的小孩也能够解释恋物癖的模糊嗳昧的态度,当他面临他的客体时。

Although a proper qualitative criterion for (fetishistic) perversion,
similar to that of repression in neurosis, Freud’s mechanism of
disavowal proved as indiscriminate as the nature of the sexual
behaviours and the contents of the fantasies. For shortly before his
death, in ‘An Outline of Psycho-Analysis’ (1940a[1938]:204), he
emphasized the possibility of a disavowal of castration in non-fetishistic
subjects, that not only put the specificity of fetishism, but that of the
entire category of perversion at risk.

虽然有关“恋物癖”的倒错症者的合适的品质的标准,类似神经症者的压抑的标准。弗洛伊德对于“不承认”的心理机制,作为是区别性行为的特性与幻见的内容。因为在他死亡之前不久,在“论精神分析的钢要”,他强调“不承认被阉割”的可能,在非-恋物癖的主体。那不但让恋物癖的特殊性,而且让倒错的整个的范畴的特殊性,陷于危险。

During the early 1950s, Lacan embraced the same definition of
perversion as Freud, and embarked on an analogous project of
differentiating between the polymorphous perversity of the child, the
perverse sexuality of neurotics (and psychotics) and the psychic structure
of genuine perverts.48 In Seminar I, he posited that the structure of
perversion is characterized by the reduction of the (symbolic) register of
intersubjective recognition to an imaginary relationship (Lacan
1988b[1953–54]:221).

在1950年代早期,拉康接受跟弗洛伊德相同的对应倒错者的定义。他开始从事一个类似的计划,区别小孩的多重样态的倒错行为,神经症这(精神病者)的倒错的性行为,与真正的倒错症者的心理的结构。在第一研讨班,他提出假设:倒错症者的结构的特色,是减少互为主体性的体认的“象征”的铭记,减少成为想像的关系。

By this he meant that perverts try to reduce their
partners to mere objects, to instruments or idols—short of seeking solace
in idealized inanimate objects—whose only function is to satisfy their
own desires, with the caveat that the positions within this relationship of
submission/dominance can suddenly be reversed so that the original
master becomes the slave and vice versa. To the degree that this
observation ostensibly enabled Lacan to separate authentic perversion
from sexual ‘phenomena which one calls perverted’ on the ‘plane of an
exclusively playful execution’ (ibid.: 215), it did not stand the test of
infantile sexuality.

他这样假设的意义是,倒错症者尝试减少他们的伴侣,甚至成为仅是客体,仅是工具与木偶。他并不是要被理念化的没有生物的客体里寻找安慰。这些客体的唯一的功能是满足他们自己的欲望。他们主张,这顺服与支配的这个关系之内的这些立场,能够突然地被倒转。这样,原初的主人变成奴隶,原初的奴隶变成主人。甚至,这个观察夸张地让拉康分开真正的倒错症者与我们所谓的倒错症者的性的“现象”,根据“专注的运作的执行的层面“。它并没有经得起婴孩的性的考验。

For in the same seminar Lacan admitted that ‘[I]f
analytic theory has qualified as polymorphously perverse this or that
mode or symptom in the child’s behaviour, it is in so far as perversion
implies the dimension of imaginary intersubjectivity’ (ibid.: 217–218).
Lacan returned to this issue in Seminar IV, in which he undertook a
year-long theoretical analysis of the child’s pre-Oedipal, pre-genital
object-relations, notably those that were being held to support its status
of polymorphous perversity as an imaginary intersubjectivity. Here he
defended the innovative idea that the pre-Oedipal relations between a
child and its mother are not governed by imaginary intersubjectivity at
all, because they are always already inhabited by the symbolic universe
in which human beings function.

因为在相同的研讨班,拉康承认,假如精神分析理论已经给予特质,作为是多重样态的倒错症,小孩的行为的这种或那种模式,或症状,那是因为倒错症暗示着想像的互为主体性的维度。拉康回到这个议题,在第四研讨班。在那里,他从事一年之久的理论的分析小孩的前-伊狄浦斯,前-性器官的客体的关系。特别是那些人们,被认为是支持小孩的多重样态的倒错的地位,作为是想像的互为主体性。在此,他辩护这个创新的观念:小孩与母亲的前-伊狄浦斯的关系,根本就没有受到互为想像的互为主体性所统辖。因为他们总是准备已经被象征的宇宙所驻居。在那里,人能发挥功能。

To Lacan the primary mother-child
relationship is not a pre-established, symbiotic bond, but an essentially
heterogeneous sphere reigned by tension, conflict and misunderstanding
on both sides.

对于拉康,这个原初的母亲与小孩的关系,并不是一个预先建立的象征的关系,而是基本上异质性的领域,受到两边的紧张,冲突,与误解的统辖。

Criticizing Balint’s conception of the primary motherchild
interaction as a perfectly tuned, reciprocal exchange, Lacan claimed
that mothers do not love (nurture, nurse and nourish) their children simply
for the fact that they constitute their precious and vulnerable offspring,
but also because the children present them with an additional source of
satisfaction.49 Put differently, a mother loves her child not so much
because she is acting upon a natural mother instinct, but because she
unconsciously uses the child to cover up her symbolic lack of enjoyment
and to obtain supplementary satisfaction in a carefree and selfish way. In
Lacan’s terminology, there ‘is always in the mother, on the side of the
child, the requirement of the phallus, which the child more or less
symbolizes or realizes’ (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:56).

当拉康批评巴林特的观念:将原初的母亲与小孩的互动,作为是一个完美调适,互惠的交换。拉康宣称,母亲爱(滋养,看护,与养育)她们的小孩,并不仅是因为这个事实:他们形成他们珍贵而易受伤害的后代。而是因为小孩呈现给与她们额外的满足的来源。换句话说,母亲爱她的小孩,并不是因为她根据自然的母亲的本能採取行动,而是因为她无意识地使用小孩掩盖她的象征的欠缺快乐,并且为了获得补充的满足,用任意与自私的方式。用拉康的术语,在母亲身上,在小孩这边,总是有阳具的要求。小孩相当程度象征或体现阳具。

As far as the child
itself is concerned, Lacan argued that it experiences a psychic crisis when
it discovers that in order to secure the love of the mother more is required
than simply ‘being there’, that in order to sustain her love it is not enough
to offer oneself. The fact that the child is also ‘the phallus, as object of
the desire of the mother …constitutes an insurmountable barrier for the
satisfaction of the desire of the child, which is to be the exclusive object
of the desire of the mother’ (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:285–286).

就小孩自身而言,拉康主张,它经验到心灵的危机,当它发现,为了获得母亲的爱,它所需要的东西,不仅是“在那里”。为了维持她的爱,光是提供它自己是不足够的。小孩也是“阳具”,作为母亲的欲望的客体的这个事实,形成一个无法被克服的阻碍,对于小孩的欲望的满足。那就是要成为母亲的欲望的专注的客体。

The child can alleviate this conflict in two different ways (Lacan 1994
[1956–57]:81–86). On the one hand, it can try to maintain the satisfaction
of its own desire (to be the exclusive object of the mother) by identifying
with the phallus (the object of the desire of the mother), whereas on the
other hand it can acknowledge the sociocultural exclusion of a fully
satisfying relationship with the mother and its concurrent promise of a
different, future fulfilment. In the former case the child endeavours to
satisfy all of the mother’s desires, thus putting its relationship with the
mother under the aegis of the imaginary, which entails unselfish
interdependence and strict reciprocity; in the latter case, the child
assimilates the symbolic convention of the prohibited relationship with
the mother, accepts its desire to remain fundamentally unsatisfied and
engages in a quest for substitute satisfactions.

小孩能够减轻这个冲突,用两个不同的方式。一方面,小孩能够尝试维持它自己的欲望的满足,(成为母亲的专注的客体),小孩认同阳具(母亲的欲望的客体)。另一方面,小孩能够承认社会与文化的排除,对于充分令人满意的关系,跟母亲与小孩同时的承诺给予不同的,未来的满足。在前者的情况,小孩努力满足所有的母亲的欲望,因此将它跟母亲的关系,放置在想像结的枢纽。这意味着,没有私心地互相依靠与严格的互惠。在后者的情况,小孩接受象征的传统:跟母亲具有禁止的关系。小孩接受它的欲望基本上始终不被满足,并且尝与追寻替换的满足。

Lacan argued that the
former solution leads to fetishism, the ‘perversion of perversions’ (ibid.:
194), whereas the latter introduces the child into the structure of neurosis.50
Despite its appeal, this elaborate explanation of perversion proved as
unsatisfactory as the previous one (of the reduction of the symbolic to
an imaginary intersubjectivity), since it begged the question as to how
perverts differ from psychotics, whom Lacan had also located outside
the symbolic pact.

拉康主张,先前的关系导致恋物癖,“倒错症中的倒错”。后者则是介绍小孩进入神经症的结构。尽管它的诉求,这个复杂的倒错症的解释,证明同样不令人满意,跟先前的解释(将象征化简成为想像的互为主体性)。因为它闪躲这个问题, 关于倒错症者如何不同于精神病者。拉康也将精神病定位在象征的盟约的外面。

Neither did Lacan’s solution answer the question
whether true perverts are any different from the multitude of neurotics
and psychotics who display ‘perverse’ behaviours.51 Accounting for these
neurotic and psychotic ‘perverse’ behaviours, Lacan often talked about
‘paradoxical perverse reactions’, perverse ‘paroxysms’, and passage a
l’acte, conceding that they too rest upon a shortening of the symbolically
regulated distance between the subject and his object of satisfaction, and
that ill-advised analysts can easily induce these reductions unknowingly
during the course of analytic treatment (ibid.: 81).52

拉康的解决也没有回答这个问题:真正的倒错症者是否不同于显示“倒错行为”的多数的神经症者与精神病者。当拉康解释这些神经症与精神病的“倒错”的行为时,他经常谈论关于“悖论的倒错症的反应,倒错症者的“麻痹”,与”行动的过程“。他承认,它们也依靠缩短被象征规范的距离,在主体与他的满足的客体之间的距离。那个并不恰当被劝告的精神分析家能够容易地引导出这些化简,不知不觉地,在精神分析的治疗的过程。

To resolve the issue of the separation between perversion and
psychosis, Lacan returned to Freud’s 1919 essay ‘A Child is Being
Beaten’, in order to proclaim that perversion, unlike psychosis, follows
the fundamental pattern of the Oedipus complex:

为了解的倒错症者与精神病这之间分开的这个问题,拉康回到弗洛伊德1919年的论文“论小孩正在被打“,为了宣称:倒错症者,并不像精神病者,他们遵循伊狄浦斯情结的基本模式。

Perversion is usually considered to be a drive which has not been
elaborated by the Oedipal, neurotic mechanism—a pure and simple
survival, the persistence of an irreducible partial drive. Freud, on
the contrary, in this primordial paper [‘A Child is Being Beaten’]
and also in many other places, indicates sufficiently that no perverse
structuring, no matter how primitive we suppose it to be…can be
articulated without…the process, the organisation, the articulation
of the Oedipus complex.
(ibid.: 120–121)

倒错症通常被认为是一种还没有被伊狄浦斯,神经症的心理机制建构的冲动—一个纯粹而单纯的存活,无法被化简的部分的冲的的持续。相反地,在这篇原初的论文”小孩正在被打“,也在许多其他的场合,弗洛伊德充分地指示:每个倒错症的结构被表达时,无论我们认为它是多么的原始,总是会有伊狄浦斯情结的这个过程,这个组织,这个表达。

One year later, Lacan used almost exactly the same words to describe
the Oedipal character of perversion, yet now also broaching the ensuing
congruence of perversion and neurosis:

一年以后,拉康使用几乎完全相同的字词,来描述倒错症的伊狄浦斯的特性。可是,现在,他也转过倒错症与神经症的随后的协调。

In order to abandon the notion that perversion is purely and simply
the emerging drive, that is to say the contrary of neurosis, one had
to wait for the signal of the conductor, that is to say the moment
when Freud wrote Ein Kind wird geschlagen…Perversion does
not appear as the pure and simple manifestation of a drive, but it
turns out to be related to a dialectical context which is as subtle, as
composite, as rich in compromise, as ambiguous as a neurosis.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:230–231)

为了放弃这个观念:倒错症纯粹而单纯地是出现的冲动。换句话说,神经症的相反。我们必须等待行为者的讯息,也就是说,当弗洛伊德书写“性学三论”时,倒错症并没有出现,作为是冲动的纯粹而简单的证明。但是,倒错症结果证明跟辩证的内容息息相关。这个辩证内容跟神经症一样的微妙,一样组成,一样富有妥协,一样模糊嗳昧。

Later in the same seminar Lacan deployed the structural analogy between
perversion and neurosis further by claiming that the neurotic mechanism
of repression equally applies to perversion, ‘inasmuch as it presents itself
also as a symptom and not as the pure and simple manifestation of an
unconscious desire’ (ibid.: 336).53

后来,在相同的研讨班,拉康运用倒错症与神经症之间结构的类似。他宣称,压抑的神经症的心理机制,同样运用到倒错。因为它也呈现它自己,作为症状,而不是作为纯粹而单纯的展示无意识的欲望。

Having postulated this constitutive link between the structures of
neurosis and perversion, Lacan’s subsequent move was to situate
perversion with regard to the neurotic dynamics of jouissance, desire,
object a and the fantasy.54 The groundwork for this new differentiation
was done in Seminar VI, in which Lacan contended that ‘the fantasy [?
a] marks every human passion with those traits which we call perverse’,
although ‘in the perversion, the accent is on the object a, [whereas] the
neurosis can be situated as having its accent on the other term of the
fantasy, the ’ (1977a[1959]:14, 16).

当拉康提出这个结构性的关联,处于神经症与倒错症之间的结构之间。拉康的随后的行动就是定位倒错症,关于神经症的动力结构:欢爽,欲望,小客体,与幻见。作为这个新的差异的基础被完成,在第六研讨班。在那里,拉康主张,这个幻见标示每个人的激情,具有我们所谓的“倒错症”的特征。虽然在“倒错症,强调的是小客体。而神经症者则是被定位在将它的强调放在幻见的另外一个术语”。

Throughout the remainder of his
career, Lacan employed this criterion of the fantasy as a tool to separate
neurosis from perversion. In Seminar XI, for example, he stated that the
structure of perversion is strictly speaking an inverted effect of the fantasy,
because it ‘is the subject who determines himself as object, in his
encounter with the division of subjectivity’ (Lacan 1977b[1964]:185).

在拉康事业的晚年,拉康运用幻见的这个标准,作为是分开神经症与倒错症的工具。譬如,在第十研讨班,他陈述:倒错症的结构严格来说,是这个幻见到倒转的影响。因为它是“决定他自己作为客体的主体,在他遭遇到主体的分裂时“。

Unfortunately, it is easier to pinpoint these references than to explain
what they mean. The gist of Lacan’s argument seems to be contained in
a passage from the 1960 text ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the
Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious’, in which he wrote:
Perversion adds [to the privileged place of jouissance] a
recuperation of the f that would scarcely appear as original, if it
did not interest the Other as such in a very particular way. Only my
formulation of the fantasy enables us to reveal that the subject
here makes himself the instrument of the Other’s jouissance. It is
all the more important …to grasp the relevance of this formula in
the case of the neurotic, precisely because the neurotic falsifies it.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:320, translation modified)

不幸地,我们更加容易强调这些指称,胜过解释它们是什么意思。拉康的论点的要旨似乎能够被包括在1960年的文本的段落,“弗洛伊德的无意识,作为主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法”。在那里,拉康写到:倒错症增添原先并没有出现的这个阳具的恢复,作为欢爽的具有特权的位置。假日它对大他者的本身,以一个特殊的方式。只有我对于幻见的说明让我们能够揭示,在此的主体让他自己成为是大他者的欢爽的工具。这是更加重要的,要理解这个公式的相关性,在神经症的个案,确实是因为神经症让它成为虚假。

If perverts pass through the Oedipus complex, as Lacan had learnt from
Freud, then they must experience a loss of enjoyment (-f) in the same
way as neurotics (obsessionals and hysterics) do. Like neurotics they
must also set out to retrieve that lost jouissance, a project whose end
result would comprise the restoration of subjective fullness. Therefore,
the perverse recuperation of the f scarcely appears as original, because
the same mechanism is valid for neurosis.

假如倒错症者通过伊狄浦斯情结,如同拉康从弗洛伊德学习到,那么他们必须经验阳具享乐的丧失,如同神经症者(妄想症者与癔症者)一样。就像神经症者,倒错症者也必须出发去重新复得那个丧失的享乐。这个计划的结果将会组成主体的充实的恢复。因此,倒错症者的恢复这个阳具的享乐,原先并没有出现。因为相同的心理机制,对于神经症者是有效的。

What does distinguish a pervert
from a neurotic though, is the former’s peculiar involvement of the Other
in the subjective process of the recuperation of the lost enjoyment.
I have already explained that in Lacan’s idiom hysterical subjects
try to come to terms with symbolic castration (the loss of enjoyment)
by arousing and sustaining the desire of the Other. In a sense, hysterics
derive satisfaction from making themselves desirable, but not enjoyable.

区别倒错症者与神经症者的东西,就是倒错症者的大他者特殊地牵涉到,这个丧失的享乐的这个恢复的主体的过程。我已经解释过,在拉康的术语,癔症的主体尝试要达成妥协,跟象征的阉割(享乐的丧失)。他召唤并且维持大他者的欲望。就某个意义言,癔症者获得满足,从让他们自己被欲望,但是不是被享乐。

When dealing with hysterics one often finds that they are extremely
attractive but utterly unpalatable, which is exactly what they intend to
achieve. For the hysteric, the enjoyment of the Other is what needs to
be avoided at all costs. In a slightly different way, obsessionals try to
overcome symbolic castration by neutralizing the desire of the Other.

当一个人处理癔症这时,我们经常发现,他们极端地迷人,但是完全令人乏味。这确实是他们想要获得的。对于癔症者,大他者的享乐就是需要被避免的东西,不计任何代价地。用稍微不同的方式,妄想症者尝试克服象征的阉割,凭借将大他者的欲望保持中立。

Obsessional neurotics derive satisfaction from an estrangement of/from
the Other and perceive complete isolation as the most splendid of life
achievements. However palatable obsessional neurotics may be, they
do not really want to be desired, let alone enjoyed by others. Hence,
despite their divergent strategies vis-a-vis the desire of the Other, both
hysterics and obsessionals shun the Other’s jouissance. The worst thing
that can happen to them is to become an object for the enjoyment of
the Other.

妄想症的神经症者获得满足,从大他者的纠缠,并且感知完全的孤立,作为是最辉煌的成就。妄想症的神经症者无论多么讨人喜欢,他们并没有确实想要被欲望。更不用说想要被别人享乐。因此,尽管各式各样的策略,面临大他者的欲望时,癔症者与妄想症者逃避大他者的欢爽。他们身上发生的最糟糕的事情,是成为大他者的享乐的客体。

This is precisely where the perverse structure branches off.55 In Lacan’s
view, perverts obtain satisfaction by ensuring the enjoyment of the Other,
thereby transforming themselves into an ‘instrument of the Other’s
jouissance’. Deriving satisfaction from conjuring up jouissance in the
Other, the pervert’s strategy to annihilate the effect of castration involves
neither taking things back from the Other (hysteria), nor minimizing the
loss (obsessional neurosis), but creating an alternative symbolic order in
which jouissance holds pride of place.

这确实就是倒错症者的结构分叉出来的地方。从拉康的观点,倒错症者获得满足,凭借遵循大他者的享乐,因此转化他们自己,成为“大他者的欢爽的工具”。当倒错症者获的满足,从召唤大他者身上的欢爽,倒错症者想要毁灭阉割的效果的策略,既没有牵涉到把东西从大他者那里要回来(癔症者),也没有忽视这个丧尸(妄想症神经症者)。代替地,倒错症者创造一个象征的秩序,让欢爽在那里拥有骄傲的地位。

The pervert transcends the neurotic
opposition between jouissance and desire which results from the curtailing
impact of the symbolic law, and builds jouissance into the very heart of
the Other. In this way, the pervert literally perverts the neurotic law
according to which ‘jouissance is forbidden to him who speaks as such’
(ibid.: 319), advocating instead a ‘discourse of the right to jouissance’
(Lacan 1989a[1962]:60). From an excluded, prohibited privilege in the
neurotic’s economy, jouissance thus gains ascendancy in the pervert’s
ideology as a formal universal principle which is applicable to everyone
in every situation.56

倒错症者超越神经症者的对立于欢爽与欲望之间。这个欲望是因为缩短象征法则的影响所形成。倒错症者将欢爽建造进入大他者的核心。用这个方式,倒错症者实质上倒错神经症的法则。依照这个法则,欢爽被拒绝给予那些言说作为神经症者的人。代替地,倒错症者主张获得欢爽的权利的辞说。从一个在神经症者的生命活力,欢爽作为被排除,被禁止的特权。在倒错症者的意识形态,作为是正式的普世的原则,欢爽获得提升。这可运用到日常生活情况的每个人。

In Seminar XI Lacan designated this perverse solution as an inverted
effect of the fantasy (Lacan 1977b[1964]:185). Normally, in neurosis,
the fantasy contains images of utter bliss in the presence of perfectly
adequate, obliging objects. The neurotic fantasy glorifies every
imaginable, prohibited sexual activity (and much more), which is why it
can be called ‘perverse’ in line with the aforementioned, classic definition
of perversion.

在第11研讨班,拉康指明这个倒错的解决,作为是幻见的倒错的影响。正常来说,在神经症者,幻见包含完全幸福的各种意象,就在完全充足的讨人喜欢的客体的面前。神经症者的幻想推崇每个可以想像的,被禁止的性的活动,(不仅如此)。这就是为什么它会被称为是“倒错”,以符合前面提到的古典对于倒错症者的定义。

By contrast, the fantasy of the pervert is oriented towards
pure and unblemished, yet deficient and disconcerted objects that are
desperately in need of satisfaction. On the level of the fantasy, the pervert
does not desire lascivious and voluptuous studs (or vixens), but ostensibly
innocent, sexually deprived angels. The pervert’s fantasy is therefore
paradoxically less ‘perverse’ than that of the neurotic, with the proviso
that the pervert is keen to corrupt the cherished morality of the fantasized
objects.

比较起来,倒错症者的幻见被定向,朝向纯粹而没有被污染,可是不足而且令人狼狈的客体。这些客体绝望地需要被满足。在幻见的层次,倒错症者并没有欲望那些猛男或浪女,而是夸张地于欲望纯真,性纯洁的天使。倒错症者的幻想因此悖论地并没有那么“倒错”,比起神经症者的倒错。但书是,倒错症者非常渴望败坏被幻见的客体的被怀抱的道德。

During the first decade of Lacan’s teachings, the original confusion
between the polymorphous perversity of the child, the perverse activities
of the neurotic and genuine perversion gradually evaporated, giving rise
to the delineation of a separate perverse structure. The latter appeared
less as a particular type of sexual behaviours, notably all those
transcending the adult genital heterosexual standard, but more as a specific
relationship between the subject, the object and the symbolic order.

在拉康的教学的前十年,这个原先的混淆,处于多重样态的小孩的倒错,神经症者与真正的倒错之间的原先的混淆逐渐消失,产生分开的倒错症的结构的描述。后者比较罕见出现,作为是特殊的性的行为,特别是那些超越成年人的性器官的异性的标准的性行为。代替地,它作为一个明确的关系,处于主体,客体与象征秩序之间。

None
the less, it would also appear that the perverts’ construction of an
alternative ‘law of enjoyment’ makes them especially prone to indulge
in those sexual behaviours that are culturally prohibited. In other words,
Lacan’s theory implies that perverse behaviours—defined as above—do
not discriminate between neurotics, psychotics and perverts, although
perverts are likely to find great comfort in those sexual behaviours that
are forbidden by religious, moral or legal standards.57

表面看来,倒错症者的建构一个替换的“享乐的法则”,仍然让他们特别容易耽溺于那些性的行为,在文化方面被禁止的性的行为。换句话说,拉康的理论暗示着,倒错的行为—被定义如上—并没有区别神经症者,精神病者与倒错症者。虽然倒错症者很可能找到强烈的安慰,在那些性的行为,被宗教,道的,或法律的标准禁止的行为。

Compared to his numerous reflections on the analytic treatment of
neurotics and psychotics, Lacan’s suggestions about how to work
analytically with structurally perverse patients are extremely limited. Is
it possible to diagnose perversion on the basis of the patient’s speech
and transference? How do perverts relate to knowledge and truth? Are
they affected by symptoms and if so, how do they experience them?
What, if anything, drives a pervert towards an analyst and would he be
approached as a supposed subject of knowing?

跟无数的反思比较起来,反思神经症者与精神病者的精神分析的治疗。拉康的建议是极端有限制的,关于如何在精神分析方面处理结构上说倒错的病人。这是可能的吗?我们诊断倒错症,根据病人的言说与移情的基础?倒错症者如何跟知识与真理扯上关联?他们受到症状的影响吗?假如是受到症状的影响,他们如何经验到这些症状?是什么驱使一位倒错症者朝向精神分析家?他愿意被接近,作为是被认为是知道的主体吗?

Can the analyst who is
working with a pervert use the same techniques of interpretation and the
same procedures for transference handling as those applicable with
neurotics? These and other technical questions are largely left in abeyance.
Some authors have insinuated that Lacan’s silence concerning the
analytic treatment of perverse patients should not bother analysts too
much, since perverts hardly ever come to see an analyst, either because
they are perfectly happy with their objects and methods of sexual
gratification, or because they are afraid that therapy will force them to
relinquish parts of their enjoyment (Miller 1996a[1989]:309–310).

正在处理倒错症者的精神分析家,使用相同的解释的技术与相同处理移情的程序吗?跟运用到神经症者的处理移情的程序相同吗?这些以及其他的技术的问题主要都留置于欠缺当中。有些作者曾经嘲讽:拉康的沉默,关于精神分析的治疗倒错症者的病人,不应该让精神分析家太过于懊脑。因为倒错症者很少会前来跟精神分析家就诊。要就是因为他们对于他们的性的满足的客体与方法,非常快乐。要不就是因为他们害怕,治疗会强迫他们放弃部分他们的享乐。

It has also been advanced that those who do come are seldom interested in
a proper analysis; they are rather looking for technical advice on how to
carry on with some of their unlawful practices whilst keeping on the
‘right side’ of the law, which is but a surreptitious demand for extra
enjoyment. In the light of these observations, the attention of Lacanian
analysts has frequently shifted from the principles governing the analytic
treatment of perverts towards the clinical management of so-called
‘perverse traits’ (fetishistic practices, homosexual object-choice, sadistic
fantasies) in neurotic and psychotic patients.58

也曾经有人主张,那些前来精神分析家就诊的倒错症者,很少对于一个精神分析的本体感到興趣。相反地,他们正在寻求技术性的劝告,关于如何继续某些他们不合法的做法。另一方面,他们又继续遵守法律的“正确的这一边”。这仅是一种秘密的要求额外的享乐。从这些观察的观点,拉康派的精神分析家的注意力,经常地转换,从统辖倒错症者的精神分析的治疗,转换朝向临床的管理所谓的“倒错症的特征“(恋物癖的做法,同性恋的客体-选择,自虐狂的幻想),在神经症与精神病的病人身上。

However small the structurally perverse clientele of the analyst may
be, it is definitely worth the effort to reopen the issue of how to direct the
treatment and, perhaps more significantly, of how to diagnose perversion
on the basis of speech and transference. Indeed, one can reasonably
assume that some perverts, irrespective of their access to gratifying sexual
objects within a self-styled symbolic order, may experience recurrent
bouts of anxiety or depression that propel them into psychoanalytic
treatment.59

虽然精神分析家的结构上属于倒错症的病人人数很少,这确实是值得这个努力,要重新展开这个议题:如何引导治疗,或是更加重要地,如何诊断倒错症,根据言说与移情的基础。的确,我们能合理地假设:某些的倒错症者,尽管他们接近令人满足的性的客体,在自己承认的象征的秩序里,他们可能经验到焦虑或沮丧的重复发作。因为焦虑与沮丧的重复发作驱使他们接受精神分析的治疗。

Examples of how perverse patients enter analysis, including technical
and diagnostic guidelines for the practitioner, have been described in an
illuminating fashion by Andre (1993). Zeroing in on the extraordinary
nature of the pervert’s speech and transference, this Lacanian analyst
contended:

倒错症的病人如何进入精神分析的例子,包括技术性与诊断的指导方针,对于执业分析家。这些例子被安德鲁描述,用启蒙的方式。当这位拉康派的精神分析家目标朝着探索倒错症者的言说与移情的特殊性质,他主张说:

Perversion is traceable as such within the transference. It manifests
itself through a reversal of the relation with the Other and through
a radical subversion of the position of the supposed subject of
knowing …Hearing the pervert speak, it is impossible not to
experience an impression of indecency; one always feels a bit
violated by the pervert’s discourse…There is a perverse way of
pronouncing the fantasy…[Perverts have] a tendency to display
their fantasies, often by means of a provocation.
(Andre 1993:53–54)

倒错症的本身能够被追踪到移情内部。倒错症展示它自己,通过跟大他者的关系的倒转,并且通过强烈的颠覆被认为知道的主体的位置。当我们听见倒错症者言说时,我们不可能经验不正当行为的表达。我们总是觉得倒错症者的辞说有点令人反感、、、有一种倒错的方式来宣告幻见。倒错症者拥有一个倾向,要展示他们的幻见,经常是凭借挑衅。

This fragment contains all the elements an analyst needs to diagnose a
pervert. Unlike neurotics, perverts have no difficulty charting their sexual
fantasies and seem to derive enjoyment from embarrassing, shocking or
exciting the analyst with their kinky and sleazy details. This is what
distinguishes them from the patients on whose stories Freud based his
account of the fantasy in ‘A Child is Being Beaten’, because Freud’s
patients expressed their masturbatory fantasies with hesitation, uncertainty,
resistance, shame and guilt (Freud 1919e:179).

这个片段包含所有的元素,精神分析家需要这些元素来诊断倒错症者。不像神经症者,倒错症者并没有任何可困难,来描绘出性的幻想,并且似乎获得快乐,从让精神分析家感到尴尬,惊吓或興奋,用他们的古怪而卑下的细节。这就是区别他们跟那些病人不同的地方。那些病人的故事,弗洛伊德将它们的基础定制幻见的描述里,在“小孩正在被打”。因为弗洛伊德的病人表的他们的手淫式的幻想,用犹豫,不确定,抗拒,羞愧,与罪恶感。

In addition, perverts do
not consult the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, but as a supposed
subject of enjoying, which means that they assume her to be infatuated
with the same things as they themselves are, or desperately seeking the
satisfaction which the analytic profession does not allow and which they
themselves have on offer. As with everybody else, the pervert prompts the
analyst to let go of her restrictive code and to become an ally, or at least to
endorse the attractiveness of a life and law of enjoyment. Instead of
addressing the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, perverts present
themselves as supposed subjects of knowing.

除外,倒错症者并没有就诊于精神分析家,作为是被认为是知道的主体。而是作为被认为是享乐的主体。这意味着,他们认为她是著迷于相同的事情,当他们自身正在或併命地寻求这个满足,精神分析的专业病没有容许的满足,他们自己必须提供追寻的满足。如何对应每一位其他的人,倒错症者激励精神分析家放开她的限制的符码,并且为了成为盟友,或至少认可享乐的生活与法则的吸引人。倒错症者并没有对著精神分析家谈论,作为是被认为的知道的主体。倒错症者呈现他们自己,作为被认为是知道的主体。

This perverse knowledge
concerns the pathways to enjoyment and they will try to convince the
analyst, whom they expect to be suffering from an obstinate reluctance to
follow these pathways, of their universal value as royal roads to happiness.60

这个倒错症的知识关系到通往享乐的这些途径。这些途径将会说服精神分析家。他们期望精神分析家遭受痛苦,因为他们顽固地不愿意遵循这些途径,他们让精神分析家相信他们的普世的价值,作为是通往快乐的捷径。

Still, these diagnostic indications provide analysts with little guidance as
to how they should conduct their clinical vehicle when the passenger happens
to be a pervert. In one of his scarce outpourings on the analysis of perverts,
and in sharp contrast to the patent complexity of the situation, Lacan
maintained that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate, interpretable,
analyzable, and on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16). Here he reiterated Freud’s conviction that ‘the positive
perversions [perversion proper] are also accessible to psychoanalytic therapy’
(Freud 1905d:232).

可是,这些诊断的暗示并没有供应精神分析家多少的引导,关于他们应该如何运用他们的临床的工具,当来客恰好是一位倒错症者。拉康在一次颇为罕见地发现对于倒错症者的精神分析,并且跟这个情境的专业的复杂性,成强烈对比。拉康主张,倒错症者确实是某件表达清楚,可以解释,可以分析,跟神经症者确实处于相同的层面。在此,拉康重复弗洛伊德的信念:正面的倒错症者(倒错症本体),也可以接受精神分析的治疗。

Freud based his assertion on the idea that the fixation
and regression to an infantile sexual tendency in the ‘positive perversions’
must also originate in a repression of mainstream sexual development,
consistent with the central psychic mechanism in the neuroses. In Lacan’s
reading of Freud this meant that perversion is rooted in the Oedipus complex
or, in his own terminology, that the perverse individual succumbs to symbolic
castration as much as the neurotic does, leading to the installation of divided
subjectivity (), desire, fantasy and (lost) jouissance. Such being the case,
Lacan’s point seemed to be that neurosis and perversion can indeed be
analysed on the same (Oedipal) level.61

弗洛伊德将他的主张,以这个观念为基础:在“正面的倒错症者”的婴孩的性的倾向的固著与退行,也必须起源于主流的性的发展的退行。这个主流的性的发展,跟神经症者的中心的心灵的心理机制互相一致。当拉康阅读弗洛伊德时,这意味着,倒错症根源于伊狄浦斯情结。或者,用他自己的术语来说,倒错症的个人屈从于象征的阉割,跟神经症者一样。这导致的安置是:分裂的主体,0,欲望,幻想,与丧失的欢爽。情况既然是这样,拉康的重点似乎是,神经症与倒错症确实能够被分析,在相同的伊狄浦斯情结。

Nonetheless, the inverted effect of the fantasy in perversion, formalized
as a ? , constitutes yet another major challenge for the analyst, because it
somehow mirrors the analyst’s own position as Lacan conceived it at the
end of the 1960s. For the discourse of the analyst which Lacan constructed
in Seminar XVII (1991a[1969–70]) also has the analyst operating as an
object a and the analysand functioning as a divided subject (, the analytic
effect of hysterisation), which implies that there is a remarkable ‘structural
analogy between the desire of the analyst and the desire of the pervert’
(Andre 1993:17).

可是,在倒错症的幻想的颠倒的影响,被成为正式,作为小客体a,它组成另外一个主要的挑战,对于精神分析家。因为它以某种方式反映出精神分析家自己的位置,依照拉康所构想它,在1960年代的末期。拉康在第17研讨班建构的精神分析家的辞说,也让精神分析家运作,作为一个小客体,而分析者则是充当分裂的主体的功能(让精神分析成为癔症的结果)。这暗示着,有一个明显的结构主义的类比,处于精神分析家的欲望与倒错症者的欲望之间的类比。

This formal congruence elicits at least two cardinal
questions. First, what prevents the analyst from being an institutionalized
pervert? How can we distinguish between the enduring dedication of the
analyst and the quintessential commitment of the pervert? And second,
assuming that there is a crucial difference between analysts and perverts,
how can analysts intervene effectively when their patients represent an
image of themselves? How can the non-perverse analyst work with a
singularly analytic pervert?

这个正式的协调,至少引来两个主要的问题:首先,是什么阻止精神分析家不要成为一个被体制制约的倒错症者?我们如何区别精神分析家持久的奉献,与倒错症者的本质的奉献?其次,当精神分析家假设,在精神分析家与倒错症者之间存在着重大的差异,精神分析家如何有效地介入,当他们的病人代表他们自己的一个意象?这位非-倒错症的精神分析家,如何能够处理一位具有独异性精神分析的倒错症者?

These clinical issues, alongside those emerging from the analysis of
neurotics and psychotics, will be elaborated in the following chapters of
this book, dealing respectively with the position of the Lacanian analyst
within the treatment, the strategies of transference handling and the tactics
of analytic interpretation.

这些临床的问题,伴随着从神经症者与精神病者的精神分析一块出现的问题,将会被建构,在本书的以下的章节。它们各别地处理拉康学派的精神分析家的立场,在治疗的内部,处理移情的策略,以及精神分析解释的技巧。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践9

October 21, 2015

This fragment contains all the elements an analyst needs to diagnose a
pervert. Unlike neurotics, perverts have no difficulty charting their sexual
fantasies and seem to derive enjoyment from embarrassing, shocking or
exciting the analyst with their kinky and sleazy details. This is what
distinguishes them from the patients on whose stories Freud based his
account of the fantasy in ‘A Child is Being Beaten’, because Freud’s
patients expressed their masturbatory fantasies with hesitation, uncertainty,
resistance, shame and guilt (Freud 1919e:179).

这个片段包含所有的元素,精神分析家需要这些元素来诊断倒错症者。不像神经症者,倒错症者并没有任何可困难,来描绘出性的幻想,并且似乎获得快乐,从让精神分析家感到尴尬,惊吓或興奋,用他们的古怪而卑下的细节。这就是区别他们跟那些病人不同的地方。那些病人的故事,弗洛伊德将它们的基础定制幻见的描述里,在“小孩正在被打”。因为弗洛伊德的病人表的他们的手淫式的幻想,用犹豫,不确定,抗拒,羞愧,与罪恶感。

In addition, perverts do
not consult the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, but as a supposed
subject of enjoying, which means that they assume her to be infatuated
with the same things as they themselves are, or desperately seeking the
satisfaction which the analytic profession does not allow and which they
themselves have on offer. As with everybody else, the pervert prompts the
analyst to let go of her restrictive code and to become an ally, or at least to
endorse the attractiveness of a life and law of enjoyment. Instead of
addressing the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing, perverts present
themselves as supposed subjects of knowing.

除外,倒错症者并没有就诊于精神分析家,作为是被认为是知道的主体。而是作为被认为是享乐的主体。这意味着,他们认为她是著迷于相同的事情,当他们自身正在或併命地寻求这个满足,精神分析的专业病没有容许的满足,他们自己必须提供追寻的满足。如何对应每一位其他的人,倒错症者激励精神分析家放开她的限制的符码,并且为了成为盟友,或至少认可享乐的生活与法则的吸引人。倒错症者并没有对著精神分析家谈论,作为是被认为的知道的主体。倒错症者呈现他们自己,作为被认为是知道的主体。

This perverse knowledge
concerns the pathways to enjoyment and they will try to convince the
analyst, whom they expect to be suffering from an obstinate reluctance to
follow these pathways, of their universal value as royal roads to happiness.60

这个倒错症的知识关系到通往享乐的这些途径。这些途径将会说服精神分析家。他们期望精神分析家遭受痛苦,因为他们顽固地不愿意遵循这些途径,他们让精神分析家相信他们的普世的价值,作为是通往快乐的捷径。

Still, these diagnostic indications provide analysts with little guidance as
to how they should conduct their clinical vehicle when the passenger happens
to be a pervert. In one of his scarce outpourings on the analysis of perverts,
and in sharp contrast to the patent complexity of the situation, Lacan
maintained that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate, interpretable,
analyzable, and on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16). Here he reiterated Freud’s conviction that ‘the positive
perversions [perversion proper] are also accessible to psychoanalytic therapy’
(Freud 1905d:232).

可是,这些诊断的暗示并没有供应精神分析家多少的引导,关于他们应该如何运用他们的临床的工具,当来客恰好是一位倒错症者。拉康在一次颇为罕见地发现对于倒错症者的精神分析,并且跟这个情境的专业的复杂性,成强烈对比。拉康主张,倒错症者确实是某件表达清楚,可以解释,可以分析,跟神经症者确实处于相同的层面。在此,拉康重复弗洛伊德的信念:正面的倒错症者(倒错症本体),也可以接受精神分析的治疗。

Freud based his assertion on the idea that the fixation
and regression to an infantile sexual tendency in the ‘positive perversions’
must also originate in a repression of mainstream sexual development,
consistent with the central psychic mechanism in the neuroses. In Lacan’s
reading of Freud this meant that perversion is rooted in the Oedipus complex
or, in his own terminology, that the perverse individual succumbs to symbolic
castration as much as the neurotic does, leading to the installation of divided
subjectivity (), desire, fantasy and (lost) jouissance. Such being the case,
Lacan’s point seemed to be that neurosis and perversion can indeed be
analysed on the same (Oedipal) level.61

弗洛伊德将他的主张,以这个观念为基础:在“正面的倒错症者”的婴孩的性的倾向的固著与退行,也必须起源于主流的性的发展的退行。这个主流的性的发展,跟神经症者的中心的心灵的心理机制互相一致。当拉康阅读弗洛伊德时,这意味着,倒错症根源于伊狄浦斯情结。或者,用他自己的术语来说,倒错症的个人屈从于象征的阉割,跟神经症者一样。这导致的安置是:分裂的主体,0,欲望,幻想,与丧失的欢爽。情况既然是这样,拉康的重点似乎是,神经症与倒错症确实能够被分析,在相同的伊狄浦斯情结。

Nonetheless, the inverted effect of the fantasy in perversion, formalized
as a ? , constitutes yet another major challenge for the analyst, because it
somehow mirrors the analyst’s own position as Lacan conceived it at the
end of the 1960s. For the discourse of the analyst which Lacan constructed
in Seminar XVII (1991a[1969–70]) also has the analyst operating as an
object a and the analysand functioning as a divided subject (, the analytic
effect of hysterisation), which implies that there is a remarkable ‘structural
analogy between the desire of the analyst and the desire of the pervert’
(Andre 1993:17).

可是,在倒错症的幻想的颠倒的影响,被成为正式,作为小客体a,它组成另外一个主要的挑战,对于精神分析家。因为它以某种方式反映出精神分析家自己的位置,依照拉康所构想它,在1960年代的末期。拉康在第17研讨班建构的精神分析家的辞说,也让精神分析家运作,作为一个小客体,而分析者则是充当分裂的主体的功能(让精神分析成为癔症的结果)。这暗示着,有一个明显的结构主义的类比,处于精神分析家的欲望与倒错症者的欲望之间的类比。

This formal congruence elicits at least two cardinal
questions. First, what prevents the analyst from being an institutionalized
pervert? How can we distinguish between the enduring dedication of the
analyst and the quintessential commitment of the pervert? And second,
assuming that there is a crucial difference between analysts and perverts,
how can analysts intervene effectively when their patients represent an
image of themselves? How can the non-perverse analyst work with a
singularly analytic pervert?

这个正式的协调,至少引来两个主要的问题:首先,是什么阻止精神分析家不要成为一个被体制制约的倒错症者?我们如何区别精神分析家持久的奉献,与倒错症者的本质的奉献?其次,当精神分析家假设,在精神分析家与倒错症者之间存在着重大的差异,精神分析家如何有效地介入,当他们的病人代表他们自己的一个意象?这位非-倒错症的精神分析家,如何能够处理一位具有独异性精神分析的倒错症者?

These clinical issues, alongside those emerging from the analysis of
neurotics and psychotics, will be elaborated in the following chapters of
this book, dealing respectively with the position of the Lacanian analyst
within the treatment, the strategies of transference handling and the tactics
of analytic interpretation.

这些临床的问题,伴随着从神经症者与精神病者的精神分析一块出现的问题,将会被建构,在本书的以下的章节。它们各别地处理拉康学派的精神分析家的立场,在治疗的内部,处理移情的策略,以及精神分析解释的技巧。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 8

October 16, 2015

The problematic nature of the ‘supposed subject of knowing’ in
obsessional neurosis, and the hysterical promotion of the unconscious (as
functional yet inaccessible knowledge) probably emboldened Lacan to
argue that the hysterisation of the patient is the subjective condition for the
deployment of the analytic discourse. In Seminar XVII he put it as follows:
What the analyst institutes as analytic experience can be said simply
—it is the hysterisation of discourse. In other words, it is the
structural introduction, under artificial conditions, of the discourse
of the hysteric…
(Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:35–36)

“被认为是知道的主体“,在妄想神经症者是一个问题重重的特性。癔症者将无意识提升(作为功能,可是无法接近的知识),可能让拉康大胆主张,病人的成为癔症,是主体获得精神分析辞说的策略的情况。在第七研讨班,拉康表达它如下:精神分析家所开启的东西,作为精神分析的经验,能够简单地说:让辞说成为癔症。换句话说,在人为的情况下,癔症者的辞说介绍结构、、、

Hysteria is a precondition for the pursuit of proper analytic treatment
because only hysterical transference involves the installation of a
‘supposed subject of knowing’ in combination with a ‘knowledge that is
not known’ (un savoir qui ne se sait pas) (ibid.: 32–33). The process of
hysterisation itself involves no more no less than the analyst’s induction
of a question on the side of the analysand.

癔症是精神分析治疗的追寻的先前情况。因为仅有癔症的移情牵涉到“被认为是知道的主体“的安置,跟”没有被知道的知识“组合一块。成为癔症的过程本身就牵涉到恰恰就是精神分析家,站在分析者的这边,推论问题。

When faced with obsessional
neurotics, hysterisation implies that the analyst tries to bring his patients
to the point where they admit that the analyst is not merely a necessary
burden, a slightly annoying artefact of the analytic disposition, but a
figure from whom they can expect a solution to their problems. Such an
avowal presupposes the obsessional patients’ acknowledgement that they
lack conscious control over some key aspects of their lives or, in Lacanese,
that some kind of knowledge seems to be at work in them that they
themselves know nothing about (a headless knowledge, so to speak).

当成为癔症面临妄想神经症,这暗示着,精神分析家尝试要将病人带地这个点:他们承认,精神分析家不仅是一个必要的负担,精神分析的性情的稍微令人懊恼的人工赝品。而且也是一个人物,他们期望从他那里获得他们的难题的解答。这样一个宣称预先假设妄想症的病人的承认:他们欠缺意识的控制他们生活的某些关键的层面。或者,用拉康的话说,某种的知识似乎正在他们身上运作。他们自己什么都不知的,关于(一个无头无脑的知识,也就是说)。

Analysts might infer from the hysterical supposition of knowledge
that it gives them a privileged position in the treatment, to the extent that
it enables them to apply their theoretical and clinical expertise to the
details of the individual life-history and to initiate their hysterical patients
into the true nature of their suffering. However, matters are not that
straightforward. By way of example I can refer to Freud’s description of
what happened in the case of a young girl each time he revealed to her
the details of a homosexual experience which she had apparently
repressed, and of which the girl’s mother had informed him:

精神分析可能推论,根据癔症者对于知识的假设,这给予他们具有特权的地位,在治疗里。甚至,这让他们能够运用他们的理论与临床的专业,探讨个人生命-历史的细节,并且启发他们的癔症的病人,探讨他们痛苦的真实的特性。可是,事情并不是那样直接了当。作为例子,我能够提到弗洛伊德的描述,对于一位年轻女孩的个案所发生的事情。每一次他跟她显示同性恋的经验的细节,她显而易见曾经压抑的同性恋的经验。这女孩的母亲曾经告诉他,有关这个同性恋:

Every time I repeated her mother’s story to the girl she reacted
with a hysterical attack, and after this she forgot the story once
more. There is no doubt that the patient was expressing a violent
resistance against the knowledge that was being forced upon her.
Finally she simulated feeble-mindedness and a complete loss of
memory in order to protect herself against what I had told her.
(Freud 1913c:141–142)

每次,我对这位女孩重复她的母亲的故事,她的反应是癔症的发作。癔症发作之后,她再次忘记这个故事。无可置疑地,病人正在表达猛烈的抗拒,对抗被强制在他身上的这个知识。最后,她伪装精神衰弱,以及完全丧失记忆,为了保护她自己,对抗我告诉他的东西。

This hysterical patient suffered from a severe lapse of memory and an
ardent desire to know the truth, but as soon as Freud told her what had
happened she refused to acknowledge it, pretending she had not heard,
or developing new symptoms merely to challenge the validity of the
analyst’s comments.45

这位癔症的病人遭受严重的记忆的丧失的痛苦,以及熱切地想要知道真理。但是当弗洛伊德告诉他所曾经发生过的事情,她拒绝承认它。她假装她没有听见,或是显示新的症状,仅是为了挑战精神分析家评论的正确性。

This process indicates how the hysterical cultivation of the relativity
of knowledge not only distorts the patients’ memories, but also invalidates
the theories with which they are being imbued by those who believe that
hysterics are merely seeking to know. By the very nature of their
relationship to knowledge, hysterics are keen to find omnipotent sources
of learning, but as soon as these master-figures become convinced of the
reality of their positions the power of their knowledge is nullified. In yet
another discussion of Freud’s Dora case, Lacan claimed that the hysteric
incarnates the truth of the master, which is that the master is castrated
(Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:110).

这个过程指示著,这位癔症者对于知识的相对性的培养,不但扭曲病人的记忆,而且让理论成为无效。他们正在被灌输的这些理论,被那些人们。那些人们相信癔症者仅是尝试要知道。由于他们跟知识的关系的这特性,癔症者很渴望找到无所不能的学问的来源。但是当这些大师-人物变得相信他们的立场的现实,知识的力量被变成无效。在弗洛伊德探讨朵拉的个案的另一个讨论。拉康宣称,癔症者具体表现主人的真理。那就是,这位主人被阉割。

This dynamics poses a major challenge to the analyst working with
(hystericized) neurotic patients, because he must refrain from complying
with their incessant demands for knowledge whilst ensuring that this
‘refusal to answer’ does not eliminate the symbolic transference, i.e. the
patient’s view of the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing. Another
difficulty concerns the hysterical indulgence in so-called ‘lateral
transferences’, whereby patients submerge themselves in a panoply of
relationships with alternative ‘supposed subjects of knowing’—including
friends, family members, and non-analytic professionals—merely to
discredit the analyst’s interventions. In this situation, the analyst may
feel that she has to compete with a score of would-be analysts, since the
patient is incessantly comparing her interpretations to those of others.

这个动力结构形成一个主要的挑战,对于研究(癔症)的神经症的病人的精神分析家。因为他必须控制不要同意他们的不断的要求获得知识。另一方面,他必须保证,这个“拒绝回答“病没有减少象征的移情。譬如,病人对于精神分析家的观点,作为是被认为是知道的主体。另外一个困难关系到癔症者耽溺于所谓的”后期的移情“。在那里,病人隐藏自己在跟替代的”被认为知道的主体“的关系的华服美饰。包括朋友,家庭成员,与非-精神分析的专业。仅是为了否定精神分析家的介入。在这个情况,精神分析家可能感觉,她必须跟许多的自愿的精神分析分庭抗礼。因为病人不断地将她的解释跟其他人们的解释做比较。

In the final session of his seminar on Freud’s technical papers, Lacan
tried to solve these problems by arguing that the analyst’s position should
emblematize ignorantia docta, a ‘wise ignorance’, in the sense of a
recognition of the limits of one’s understanding, as described by the
German Renaissance philosopher Nicholas Cusanus (Lacan 1988b[1953–
54]: 278).46 At the end of the 1960s, he formalized this analytic ignorantia
docta in the so-called ‘discourse of the analyst’, in which knowledge
(savoir) functions on the place of truth and the ‘supposed subject of
knowing’ is transferred to the side of the patient (Lacan 1991a[1969–
70]: 32–42).47

在拉康探讨弗洛伊德的精神分析技术论文的最后几堂,拉康尝试解决这些难题。他主张说,精神分析家的立场应该让“大智若愚“成为标志。因为分析家体认到一个人的理解力的限制。如同德国文艺复興时期的哲学家尼古拉 邱撒那所描述的。在1960年代末期,拉康说明精神分析家的“大智若愚”,用所谓的“精神分析家的辞说”。在那里,知识在真理的位置发挥功能,“被认为知道的主体”被转移到病人的这一边。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 7

October 15, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

HYSTERIA AND OBSESSIONAL NEUROSIS
癔症与妄想神经症

Although all neurotics are uniformly under the spell of repression,
suffering from something unspoken which none the less continues to
speak in a different realm, Lacan maintained Freud’s decomposition of
the neurotic picture in a hysterical and an obsessional side.28 From the
1890s till the 1930s, Freud had experimented with a whole gamut of
criteria distinguishing hysterics from obsessional neurotics, such as the
time and nature of the traumatic sexual experience, constitutional factors,
the moment of disease onset, the location of the symptoms, the fixated
phase of libidinal development, the type of repression, and the patients’
unconscious attitudes towards sexuality.

虽然所有的神经症者都一致地受到压抑的影响,他们遭受某件没有说出的东西的痛苦。这个没有说出的东西仍然继续言说,在不同的领域。拉康维持弗洛伊德对于神经症画面的解构,处于癔症与妄想症的这一边。从1890年,直到1930年,弗洛伊德曾经试验一整套的标准,区别癔症跟妄想神经症的不同,譬如,创伤的性的经验的时间与特性,结构性的因素,疾病开始的时刻,症状的位置,力比多发展的固定的时期,压抑的种类,与病人对应性的无意识的态度。

Some of these criteria, notably
the nature of the traumatic sexual experience (passive and painful in
hysteria versus active and pleasurable in obsessional neurosis), he had
come to reject as his theory evolved, whereas others he had suggested
without detailing their impact.29 On various occasions, Freud (1918b
[1914]:76; 1926d[1925]:113) had also conceded that every obsessional
neurosis seems to encapsulate a hysterical nucleus, out of which it
develops along complex, obscure pathways. Unlocking the mystery of
obsessional neurosis thus involved the challenge of finding its formula
of transformation, something for which Freud never claimed credit.
Lacan dressed his own differentiation of hysteria and obsessional
neurosis in his preferred conceptual garments of subject, Other, object,
fantasy, desire and jouissance, without betraying his allegiance to Freud.

有一些的这些标准,特别是创伤的性的经验的癔症(癔症者的被动与令人痛苦,对比于妄想症者的主动与快乐),他逐渐排除它们,随着他的理论的进展。另一方面,他曾经建议其他的标准,但是没有详述它们的影响。在各个不同的场合,弗洛伊德也曾经承认,每个妄想症的神经症似乎总栝癔症的核心。每个妄想神经症就从癔症的核心发展出来,沿着复杂而模糊的途径。解答妄想神经症的神秘,因此牵涉到这个挑战:要找出它的转化的公式,对于这个转化的公式,弗洛伊德从来宣称予以推崇。拉康则是用他较为喜爱的观念的外衣:主体,大他者,客体,幻见,欲望与欢爽,装扮他自己对于癔症与妄想症的区别。但是拉康病没有背叛对于弗洛伊德的忠诚。

Here, Lacan’s Freudian inspiration can be inferred from his unremitting
faith in the value of Freud’s case-studies of Dora (1905e[1901]), the Rat
Man (1909d) and the Wolf Man (1918b[1914]), as well as from his
trenchant critique of the purportedly ‘deviant’, post-Freudian accounts
of hysteria and obsessional neurosis, such as the object-relations
perspective espoused by Maurice Bouvet during the late 1940s and 1950s
(Lacan 1994[1956–57]:26–28; 1998b[1957–58]:387–421).30

在此,拉康的获得弗洛伊德的启发,可以从头永不休止的信仰弗洛伊的个案研究的价值推论出来:“朵拉”,“鼠人”,“狼人”,以及从他的锐利地批判据说是“偏离的”后-弗洛伊德学派,他们对于癔症与妄想症的描述。譬如,莫瑞斯,博维特主张的客体关系的观点,在1940年代晚期与1950年代。

Following Freud (1909d:156), Lacan argued that the analysis of obsessional
neurotics is much more demanding than that of hysterical patients, since
what the analyst needs is ‘not only the plan of a reconstructed labyrinth,
or even a batch of plans already drawn up’, but also ‘the general
combinatory that governs their variety…[and], even more usefully,
accounts for the illusions, or rather shifts of perspective to be found in
the labyrinth (Lacan 1977i[1958]:266).

追随弗洛伊德之后,拉康主张,妄想神经症的分析,比起癔症病人的分析,要求严格得多。因为精神分析家所需要的东西,“不但是重新建立迷宫的计划,或甚至是一堆已经被拟定的计划,而且是统辖它们的多样态的一般组合、、、甚至更加有用地,对于幻觉的描述,或者说,在迷宫里能够被找到的观点的改变。

In keeping with Freud
(1913i:319), Lacan also surmised that hysteria and obsessional neurosis
are two neurotic languages, whereby the obsessional idiom is a dialect
of the hysterical standard. Towards the end of his career, Lacan even
adduced that the psychoanalytic treatment of all neurotics rests upon a
‘hysterisation’ of the patient, which indicates that he agreed with Freud
on the hysterical core within obsessional neurosis (Lacan 1991a[1969–
70]:35–36).

虽然遵循弗洛伊德,拉康也推断,癔症与妄想神经症是两种神经症的语言。妄想神经症的词语是癔症的标准语的方言。在他事业的末期,拉康甚至补充说:精神分析对于所有的神经症的治疗,依靠病人的“成为癔症“,这指示著:拉康同意弗洛伊德,对于癔症的核心,在妄想神经症内部。

Lacan’s proposition that every neurotic subject recognizes and is being
recognized by the Other (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:168) provides a good
starting-point for a summary of his ideas on hysteria and obsessional
neurosis.31 Throughout his seminars, Lacan explored the effects of this
neurotic acknowledgement of the Other (the laws of language, the
language of laws, the sociocultural rules and regulations), both on the
human condition and on the structure of language itself. In a first
movement, he aligned the individual’s assimilation of the symbolic order
with the normal deployment of the Oedipus and castration complexes in
Freud’s theory, according to which the child relinquishes its primary
love-object (the mother) in favour of an identification with the father as
the representative of the law (Freud 1924d; Lacan 1994[1956–57]:61,
199–230).

拉康的命题是:每个神经症的主体体认出大他者,而且正在被大他者体认。这个命题提供一个很好的出发点,作为他对于癔症与妄想神经症的观念的总结。在他的研讨班里,拉康探索这个神经症的承认大他者的影响(语言的法则,法则的语言,社会与文化的规则与规定)。一方面是依据人类的情况,另一方面则是依据语言本身的结构。在一个最初的运动里,拉康将个人的接受象征秩序,等同于弗洛伊德的理论里,伊狄浦斯与阉割情结的正常的发展。依照弗洛伊德的理论,小孩放弃它的最初的爱的客体(母亲),以迁就对于父亲的认同,作为是法则的代表。

Concurrently, Lacan reinterpreted Freud’s notion of castration
—the boy’s observation that his mother lacks a penis and the ensuing
fear that his own will be cut off by way of punishment for violating a
prohibition—as a symbolic cut resulting from the individual’s compliance
with the Other.32 According to Lacan, every society forces human beings
to postpone the satisfaction of some of their drives and prohibits the
expression of some drives altogether, which implies ‘that jouissance
[enjoyment] is forbidden to him who speaks as such’ (Lacan 1977k
[1960]:319).

同时,拉康重新解释弗洛伊德对于阉割的观念—小孩观察到,他的母亲欠缺阳具,并且随后恐惧,他自己的阳具将会被切割,作为处罚,因为他违背一个禁令—作为因为个人的同意大他者造成的象征的切割。依照拉康,每个社会都强迫人类拖延某些的冲动的满足,并且也一块禁止某些冲动的表达。这暗示着:欢爽被禁止,对于言说作为欢爽的人。

Originally defined by Freud as a perceived punishment for
transgressing a symbolic law (the incest prohibition), in Lacan’s version
castration became part and parcel of leading a law-abiding life. Following
this symbolic cut of castration, the neurotic individual experiences both
a loss of jouissance, which Lacan designated as -f, and an internal lack,
which he dubbed or split subject.33 The entire operation awakens the
neurotic’s desire to retrieve what is lost and to annihilate the lack. Desire
and jouissance are therefore the two poles of the psychic spectrum within
which the neurotic individual has to organize his life (Lacan 1998b[1957–
58]:261–317).

阉割原先被弗洛伊德定义,作为是被感知的处罚,因为逾越象征的法则(乱伦的禁令)。在拉康的版本,阉割则是成为遵守法则的生活的部分与包裹。神经症的个人遵循这个阉割的象征,并且经验到欢爽的丧失与内部的欠缺。前者,拉康指明作为是-f;后者,他称之为分裂的主体。整个的运作唤醒神经症的欲望,要重新获得丧失的东西,并且消灭这个欠缺。欲望与欢爽因此是心灵光谱的两个极端。在这心灵光谱内部,神经症的个人必须组织他的生活。

In a second movement, Lacan investigated the relationship between
the neurotic’s lack (the split subject ) and the objects with which she tries
to neutralize it, simultaneously satisfying her desire and reinstating the
feeling of ‘fullness’. This entailed an extrapolation of Freud’s suggestion,
in the final pages of his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’
(1905d:222–230), that the objects to which a person turns in adulthood
are always but substitutes for a lost primary object which can never be
retrieved.

在第二个运动,拉康研究神经症者的欠缺(分裂的主体)与客体的关系。神经症者尝试用这些客体来让关系保持中立,同时又满足她的欲望,并且重新恢复“充实“的感觉。这意味着推断弗洛伊德的建议,在”性学三论文“的最后几页。一个人在成年时转向这些客体,这些客体总是仅是已经丧失的原初的客体的替代品。已经丧失的原初的客体永远无法被重新获得。

From the late 1950s Lacan conceptualized these fascinating, yet
inadequate, objects which turn the neurotic individual on because he ‘reads’
their promise of fulfilment as objects a. In Seminar VI he described an
object a as something which ‘satisfies no need and is itself already relative,
i.e. placed in relation to the subject…The object takes the place, I would
say, of what the subject is—symbolically—deprived of (Lacan
1977a[1959]:15). Again in accordance with Freud, Lacan defined an
individual’s relationship with these purportedly satisfying objects as
‘fantasy’, for which he constructed the algebraic formula ? a in which ?
stands for ‘desire of/for’ (Lacan 1977k[1960]:313).34

从1950年晚期,拉康将这些令人著迷,可是又不充足的客体建构成概念。这些客体让神经症者感到著迷,因为他“阅读“出它们作为客体,具有让人满足的展望。在第六研讨班,拉康描述一个小客体,作为是某件并没有满足任何需要,小客体本身总是相对价值,譬如,小客体跟主体的相对地位。我不妨说,小客体具有主体被剥夺的东西的这个位置—象征方面而言。而且,为了符合弗洛伊德,拉康定义一个人跟这些据说令人满足的客体的关系,作为是”幻见“。拉康替这个”幻见“建构一个代数的公数”Sa“,在这个公式里,a代表”欲望所在,或欲望的目标“。

To the extent that an individual’s partners (parents, peers, lovers,
colleagues) have also integrated the Other, they will equally function
according to this dynamics of desire and jouissance. Hence, neurotics not
only fantasize about what they themselves desire, but also about what other
people desire—in their capacity as Other—and about how to transform
themselves into desirable, loveable objects for these others. Until his
conceptualization of the object a during the late 1950s, Lacan contended
that a child who wants to satisfy its mother will identify with the imaginary
phallus (f), the object she has ostensibly lost, and vice versa that a mother
who uses her child as a new source of enjoyment will approach it as an
imaginary phallus (Lacan 1994[1956–57]:71).

随着个人的伙伴(父母,同侪,情人,同事)也已经将大他者融合一块,他们同样地发挥功能,依照欲望与欢爽的动力结构。因此,神经症者不但幻想有关他们自己的欲望的东西,他们也幻想别人欲望的东西—由于他们具有充当大他者的能力—他们幻想如何将他们自己转化成为被欲望的,可爱的客体,对于这些别人。一直到1950年代的晚期,拉康都将这个小客体,建构观念。拉康主张,想要满足它的母亲的欲望的小孩,将会认同想像的阳具,(f),她已经明显地丧失的客体。反过来说也是一样。使用她的小孩充当享乐的来源的母亲,将会接近小孩,充当是想像的阳具。

Later on he argued that
human beings can only relate to the Other’s objects of desire (the objects
a), about which they fantasize and with which they try to satisfy the Other.
Rather than something with which human beings identify, the objects a
are a kind of exchange objects which enable them to enter relationships
with others, at once attempting to satisfy themselves and their partners.
Yet since the objects a are but inadequate substitutes for the lost enjoyment,
neither of these ambitions to obtain satisfaction will ever be realized.

后来,拉康主张,人类仅能跟大他这的欲望的客体(小客体)扯上关联。他们幻想关于这些小客体,他们尝试用这些小客体满足大他者。这些小客体并不是人类认同的东西。它们是一种交换的小客体,让他们能够进入跟别人的关系。他们企图满足他们自己,也同时满足他们的伙伴。可是,因为这些小客体仅是丧失的享乐的不充足的替代品,想要获得满足的这些企图心,没有一样将会永久地实现。

According to Lacan (1998a[1972–73]:126) the formula ‘I ask you to refuse
what I offer you because that’s not it’ captured the unconscious truth of
any neurotic love-relationship, because the object that is offered by the
lover is inefficient for restoring the lost enjoyment of the beloved.

依照拉康,这个公式“我要求你拒绝我提供给你的东西,因为那并不是我提供给你的东西),掌握到任何神经者的爱的关系的无意识的真理。因为被情人提供的这个客体,并没有能力来恢复被爱的人的丧失的享乐。

Once the conceptual beacons of Lacan’s theoretical itinerary during
the 1950s and 1960s have been described, it is relatively easy to explain
how he differentiated between hysterics and obsessional neurotics.35
Hysterical subjects take the Other—whether one of its concrete
representatives, or society in general—unconsciously to task for
tampering with their enjoyment. They hold the Other responsible for
their current misery and swear to take revenge on the Other for all the
harm that has been done to them.

一旦1950年代与1960年代,拉康的理论的脉络的观念的灯塔已经被描述出来。我们就比较容易解释,为什么他区别癔症与妄想神经症。癔症的主体无意识地谴责大他者—无论大他者是它的具体代表,或一般的社会的其中一位–因为大他者损害他们的享乐。他们要大他者替他们目前的悲惨负起责任,并且宣誓要对大他者报复,因为大他者对于他们造成的伤害。

It is this hysterical accusation of the
Other which Freud initially mistook for a genuine account of sexual
abuse during an infantile scene of seduction (Masson 1985:212).
Subsequently, hysterics attempt to recuperate what they believe to be
unjustly in the possession of the Other through arousing the Other’s desire,
which serves as sufficient proof that the Other has been deprived of
something. This hysterical strategy prompted Lacan to propose that ‘the
hysteric’s desire is not the desire for an object, but the desire for a desire,
an effort to maintain oneself in front of this point…where the desire of
the Other is’ (Lacan 1998b [1957–58]:407).

就是癔症的指控大他者,弗洛伊德最初将它误解成为是性的凌虐的真诚的描述,在婴孩时代受的诱拐的场景。随后,癔症者企图恢复他们相信不公正地被大他者占有的东西,通过唤醒大他者的欲望。大他者的欲望充当充分的证据:大他者被剥夺掉某件东西。这个癔症的策略激发拉康建议:癔症者的欲望并不是欲望一个客体,而是对于欲望的欲望。癔症者努力要维持他自己,在这一点的面前。大他者的欲望所在的地方。

To elicit this desire of the Other, hysterics mould themselves into a
figure which they think will arouse the Other, something which grips the
Other’s attention and which provokes interest, fascination, attachment
or love. And in transforming themselves into an enticing object for the
Other, they try to kill two birds with one stone: whilst inducing the lack
of the Other, they also annihilate their own (neurotic) loss of enjoyment.
For hysterics unconsciously enjoy their complicated ploys to trigger the
Other’s desire by incarnating its presumed object.

为了召唤大他者的欲望,癔症者塑造他们自己成为他们认为可以唤醒大他者的人物。吸引大他者注意的东西,并且引起興趣,著迷,情感或爱。当癔症者将他们自己转化成为对于大他者是引诱人的客体,他们尝试一举两得。一方面,他们诱拐大他者的欠缺;另一方面,他们也消灭他们自己(神经症)的享乐的丧失。因为癔症者无意识地享受他们的复杂的策略,为了触发大他者的欲望,凭借将它被认为的客体具体体现。

As to the hysteric’s own desire, Lacan stressed on various occasions
that it is fundamentally unsatisfied, to the benefit of the desire of the Other
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:407; 1977i[1958]:261; 1977k[1960]:321).36
Hysterics give the impression of sacrificing their own interests, of
postponing the fulfilment of their own desire, and of putting themselves to
extreme inconvenience in favour of the Other. It goes without saying that
this self-immolation is only a semblance because it is an inherent part of
the hysterical strategy to manipulate the Other.

至于癔症者自己的欲望,拉康在各个不同的场合强调:癔症者的欲望基本上是没有被满足,结果有利于大他者的欲望。癔症者给予的印象是:牺性他们自己的利益,拖延他们自己的欲望的满足,并且将他们自己置身于极端不利当中,以迁就大他者。自不待言的是,这种自我牺性1仅是一种类似物,因为它是癔症者的策略的本质的部分,为了操控大他者。
No matter what they display,
hysterics do not really want to compensate the desire of the Other, but to
sustain it in its very status as lack, deficit, shortcoming. Hysterical subjects
are at great pains to keep the Other’s desire unsatisfied too, by preventing
the Other from enjoying what they have to offer. When the enjoyment of
the Other does loom up, hysterics do their utmost best to change their
object-status or to disappear altogether. In 1960 Lacan wrote: ‘[D]esire is
maintained [in the Other] only through the lack of satisfaction [the hysteric]
produces in it by slipping away from it as object’ (Lacan 1977k[1960]:320,
translation modified).

无论癔症者展现什么,他们并没有确实想要补偿大他者的欲望。而是想要维持大他者的欲望,作为欠缺,失落,缺点的现状。癔症者的主体费尽心力想要维持大他者的欲望也没有被满足。他们阻止大他者不能享受他们必须提供的东西。当大他者的享乐隐隐在望,癔症者尽他们的全力改变他们的客体的地位,或完全消失。在1960年,拉康写到:「欲望被维持在大他者那里,仅是凭借癔症者在它那里产生的满足的欠缺。他们从它那里溜走掉,作为客体。」

In a clinical setting the psychoanalyst can derive this hysterical economy
from the way in which patients talk about their professional and/or love
relationships. As a matter of fact, there is hardly anything else hysterics
talk and complain about. The following example illustrates how hysteria
manifests itself on the level of speech. During analysis, a woman describes
her continuous efforts to make herself loveable for her environment, whilst
complaining about the fact that she only attracts people who want to take
advantage of her or who refuse to take her seriously. Every time she
manages to secure herself of somebody’s love, she feels that her partner
uses her merely as an interchangeable commodity or as an instrument
designed for the satisfaction of sexual lust, which compels her to escape
the relationship, physically and/or mentally.

在临床的背景,精神分析家能够获得这个癔症者的经济活力,从病人谈谈他们的专业与(或)爱的关系的方式。事实上,癔症者谈论或抱怨的东西,几乎不是任何的其他的东西。以下的例子说明癔症者如何展示它自己,在言说的层面。在精神分析期间,一位女人描述她继续不断的努力,想要让她自己变得可爱,对于她的环境。另一方面,她抱怨关于这个事实:她仅是吸引那些想要利用她的人们,他们拒绝认真地看待她。每一次她成功地让自己获得某个人的爱,她感觉,她的伴侣使用她,仅是充当一个互相交换的货品,或是充当一个工具,被设计来满足性的欲望的工具。这个性的欲望驱使他讨避这个关系,无论是生理上或是精神上的关系。

She scorns men for using her
vagina merely as a tool for masturbating, but she cannot refrain from
offering it to them because it makes her feel important. Whilst priding
herself on her ability to lure every partner she wants, she bears witness to
an extreme sense of loneliness and despondency.

她轻视男人,因为他们使用她的阴户,仅是作为手淫的工具。但是她无法控制不提供阴户给男人。因为这让她感觉重要。虽然她以她诱拐她想要的每个伴侣的能力沾沾自傲,她见证到极端的孤独与沮丧的感觉。

And although she realizes
that she is capable of triggering everybody’s desire, she basically suffers
from the fact that nobody desires her as she wants to be desired, inasmuch
as all the people she seduces are still interested in other women, or seem to
enjoy her simply as a sex object. In other words, no matter how hard she
tries in making people desire her, they never desire her enough, because
they either desire other people too, or employ her simply as an object for
their own satisfaction.37 Since she is constantly enmeshed in complicated
intrigues, secret affairs and impossible relationships, she wonders about
what it really means to be a woman for a man and for other women.38 To
solve this question, she sometimes identifies with other men—assuming
that they know women better than women know themselves—or draws
other women into friendships that are pervaded by admiration as well as
rivalry.

虽然她体会到,她能够激发每个人的欲望,她基本上遭受痛苦,对于这个事实:没有人欲望她,依照她想要被欲望的,或甚至似乎享受她,仅是当著是性的客体。换句话说,无论她如何努力尝试让人们欲望她,他们从来没有充分地欲望她。因为他们要不就是也欲望别人,要不然就是仅是将她作为满足他们自己的客体。因为她不断地纠缠于复杂的诡计,秘密的私通,与不可能的关系。她想要知道关于成为女人究竟是什么意义,对于男人与其他女人。为了解答这个问题,她有时认同其他的男人—她假设男人知道女人,更胜过女人认识女人自己。或是,她吸引其他女人跟她产生关系,瀰漫著崇拜与敌意的关系。

By contrast, obsessional neurotics refuse to accept that the intervention
of the Other has in any way affected their enjoyment. Unlike hysterics
they do not accuse the Other of stealing something precious from them.
Instead they unconsciously strive to minimize the power which the Other
exercises by neutralizing the Other’s desire.

对照起来,妄想症神经症者拒绝接受;大他者的介入,有任何方式影响他们的享乐。不像癔症者,他们并没有控诉大他者,从他们那里偷窃某个珍贵的东西。相反地,他们无意识地奋斗,要轻视大他者运用的这个力量。他们将大他者的欲望保持中立。

To Lacan, this becomes
apparent primarily on the level of language, through the protective
formulae with which obsessional neurotics defend themselves against
all kinds of imaginary dangers. For example, in Seminar V he stated:
[O]bsession is always verbalised. Freud has no doubts about this.
Even when he is faced with a latent obsessional conduct, he bears
in mind that it has not revealed its structure until it has taken the
shape of a verbal obsession…All obsessional formulae have to do
with a well articulated destruction…

对于拉康,最初这变成显而易见,在语言的层面。凭借保护的公式,妄想神经症防卫他们自己,对抗各种各样的想像危险。譬如,在第五研讨班,拉康陈述:妄想症者总是侃侃而言。弗洛伊德并没有怀疑关于这点。甚至当他面对一个潜在的妄想症的行为,弗洛伊德牢记在心:妄想症者直到它採取文词的妄想的形状,它才会显露它的结构。所有妄想症的公式都必须处理侃侃而谈的毁灭性。

(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:470)39
Besides these formulae, obsessional neurotics espouse a score of other
unconscious strategies to neutralize the Other’s desire. From time to time
they may ensconce in vivid fantasies of oblation, meeting all of the Other’s
requests following the principle ‘Your wish is my command’. By
satisfying all of the Other’ s demands, they believe that the Other will
have nothing to desire anymore.40

除了这些公式,妄想症神经症者信奉许的的其他的无意识的策略,为了让大他者的欲望保持中立。有时,他们用生活的钩消的幻想安顿下来,满足所有的大他者的要求遵循这个原则:“你的愿望就是我的命令。”凭借满足大他者的所有的命令,他们相信:大他者将会不再有任何欲望的东西。

Alternatively, they may go to all lengths
to obtain the Other’s approval before embarking on a particular project,
from starting a relationship to choosing a career. The rationale is that if
something is done with the Other’ s explicit permission the desire of the
Other can be stilled. Furthermore, obsessional neurotics may harbour
sadistic fantasies of torture, destruction and mass extermination, which
serve the same purpose of killing the desire of the Other. With regard to
these sadistic fantasies, Lacan emphasized in Seminar V:

替代地,他们可能尽一切力量,为了获得大他者的同意。这样,他们才从事一个特殊的计划,从开始一个关系,到选择一个事业。基本原理是,假如有某件东西是凭借大他者的明确的容许才做成,大他者的欲望就能够被平静下来。而且,妄想神经症者可能怀抱中折磨,毁灭,集体消灭的凌虐的幻想。这些幻想充当相同的目的,杀死大他者的欲望。关于这些凌虐的幻想,拉康在第五研讨班强调:

[W]e cannot content ourselves with articulating them as
manifestations of a tendency; we ought to see in them an
organisation which is itself indicative [signifiante] of the
relationships between the subject and the Other as such. It is of the
economic role of these fantasies as they are articulated that we
have to present a formula. In the obsessional subject, these fantasies
are characterized by the fact that they remain on the level of
fantasies. Only very exceptionally are these fantasies realized and
these realizations are always disappointing for the subject.
(ibid.: 411)

我们无法满足我们自己,以表达他们作为是一个倾向的展示。我们应该在他们身上,看出一个组织。这个组织本身指示著主体与大他者自身的关系。我们必须呈现一个公式,关于这些幻想扮演的经济活力,当它们被表达时。在妄想症者的主体,这些幻想的特色是这个事实:它们始终是在幻想的层面。仅有非常特殊的时刻,这些幻想才会被实践。这些实践总是令人失望的,对于主体而言。

Complicating the picture further, obsessionals may also try to prove to the
Other that they possess nothing of value, that they are unworthy of interest,
that they lack even the most basic of human qualities, or that they will
misuse whatever the Other invests in them. This strategy comes down to
letting other people know that they are replenished, thus cancelling out
their reasons for seeking fulfilment outside their own realm of functioning.
It goes without saying that none of these unconscious obsessional
strategies is completely successful and that obsessionals will encounter
the desire of the Other time and again.

妄想症者将这个画面弄得更加复杂。他们可能也尝试对大他者证明,他们并没有拥有任何有价值的东西。他们并不值得引起興趣,他们甚至欠缺最基本的人类的特质,或是他们将会误用任何大他者投注他们的东西。这个策略总结成为:让别人知的他们被重新补足,因此他们取消他们的理由,作为寻求满足的理由,在他们自己的功能的领域之外。不用说,这些无意识的妄想症的策略,没有一样是完全成功。妄想症者将会一再地遭遇大他者的欲望。

Whereas hysterics decry the fact
that the Other’s desire is never enough, obsessionals describe the Other’s
desire as being always too much. For example, an obsessional patient
observes with anger and surprise that his wife is still interested in him,
despite his numerous openly confessed extra-marital affairs and despite
his carefully directed monstrosities at home. Likewise, another
obsessional patient confesses that she has done everything in her power
to satisfy her husband and that she has never done anything without
negotiating it with him first, yet not succeeding in eradicating her own
anxiety in the face of his desires.41

虽然癔症者抨击这个事实:大他者的欲望永远不足够。妄想症者则是描述大他者的欲望,作为总是太多。譬如,一位妄想症的病人渴望而起惊奇地观察到,他的妻子依旧对他感到興趣,尽管他无数次公开坦承有婚外情事,尽管他在家里仔细导演怪诞行为。同样地,另外一位妄想症病人坦承:她曾经尽她的力量所能,来满足她的丈夫,她每次做任何事情,她总是首先跟她的丈夫商量。可是,她并没有成功地抹除她自己的焦虑,当面临他的欲望。

Apart from the sheer multiplicity of strategies to neutralize the desire
of the Other, obsessional neurotics present a labyrinthine case to the
analyst because most of these strategies are outright paradoxical. To
preserve their own independence, obsessional neurotics indulge in the
most obsequious of behaviours.

除了用各色各样的策略来保持大他者的欲望成为中立,妄想症者呈现一个迷宫般的情况给精神分析家。因为大部分的这些策略都是彻底矛盾。为了保持他们的独立性,妄想症的神经症者耽溺于最极尽奉承的行为。

They can agree with everything the
analyst says, simply to maintain their own ideas about what is going on
in their lives. Similar to the Wolf Man during his analysis with Freud
(1918b[1914]:91), obsessional patients have no problems subjecting
themselves to the imposed rule of free association, but they only comply
with it to satisfy the analyst and to avoid what really matters to them.

他们能够同意精神分析家说的一切事情,仅是为了维持他们自己的观念,关于在他们的生活里,所正在进行的东西。类似在弗洛伊德的精神分析的“狼人”,妄想症的病人毫无困难地将他们自己隶属于自由联想赋加的规则。但是他们仅是同意这个规则,为了满足精神分析家,以及为了避免对于他们确实是重要的事情。

Whereas hysterical patients are very uncompromising in their attitude
towards the analytic setting—discussing the appointment schedule,
breaking the rule of free association by staying quiet, complaining about
the lack of attention the analyst is paying to them, in short doing
everything to dissatisfy the analyst—obsessional neurotics are generally
quite obliging and extraordinarily flexible in making appointments.
Hysterical patients often enjoy discussing appointment times, but they
hardly miss appointments once they have been made, only to remain
silent during the entire session.

虽然癔症的病人非常不妥协,在他们对待精神分析背景的态度。他们讨论看诊的行事曆,以沉默不语来违背自由联想的规则,抱怨关于精神分析家给予他们的关注的欠缺,总之,他们尽一切力量来让精神分析家感到不满意。妄想神经症者则是通常都相的顺从而且特别具有弹性,当他们约定看诊时间。癔症的病人经常喜欢讨论看诊的时间,但是他们很少错过看诊时间。一旦这些时间已经被确定。结果,在整个看诊时间里,保持沉默。

Conversely, obsessional patients can be
extremely reluctant to disagree with a suggested appointment time; they
often accept commitments that they know very well they will not meet,
or that they know they will only meet in a deceitful way, for instance by
acting the part of the good analysand within the analytic play.

相反地,妄想症的病人有时极端不愿意不同意被建议的看诊的时间,他们接受承诺,因为他们清楚知的,他们将不会会面,或是他们知的,他们用欺骗的方式会面。譬如,他们扮演乖乖的分析者的角色,在精神分析的游戏里。

Since obsessional neurotics refuse to acknowledge that the Other has
curtailed their enjoyment, they cannot bear the manifestations of their
own desire because these expressions signal the fact that they have lost
something after all. The desire of the obsessional neurotic is not
unsatisfied, but impossible (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:291).

因为妄想神经症者拒绝承认,大他者曾经切除他们的享乐。他们无法忍受他们自己的欲望的展示。因为这些表达意味著这个事实:他们毕竟已经丧失某件东西。妄想神经症者的欲望并不是没有被满足,而是不可能满足。

Consequently,
obsessional neurotics try to avoid everything they associate with the
emergence of their desire. For example, one obsessional patient divulges
that she only buys the books that do not interest her, because these are
the only books she is capable of reading. Sometimes it happens that one
of these books does rouse her interest, in which case she has to throw it
away or bring it to a second-hand bookstore. Another patient meditates
on the exceptional beauty of the girl he secretly covets, but he would not
dream of approaching her, much less starting a relationship. During a
sexual encounter with a lookalike he was impotent, which has made him
think that he is doomed to have relationships with girls whom he does
not really desire. As obsessional neurotics set out to kill their own desire
as much as the desire of the Other, they obviously worry about what
keeps them alive. Therefore the hysterical question ‘Am I a man or a
woman?’ finds its obsessional counterpart in ‘Am I dead or alive?’.

结果,妄想神经症者尝试避免一切他们联想的东西,跟他们的欲望出现联想一块的东西。譬如,有一位妄想症的病人详述:她仅是买了一些她并不感到興趣的书,因为这些书她能够阅读的仅有的书。有时,恰巧地,其中有一本书引起她的興趣。在那个情况,她必须将它丢掉,要不然就送的二手书店。另外一位病人沉思他秘密垂涎的那位女孩的特殊的美丽。但是他不愿意梦想接近她,更不用说,开始一个关系。在跟一位类似相貌的人的性的接触时,他变得性无能。这让他认为,他注的要跟那些他并确实欲望的那些女人拥有关系。当妄想神经者出发去杀死他们自己的欲望与大他者的欲望时,他们显而易见地焦虑,关于让他们保持活力的东西。因此,癔症者的问题:“我是男人?还是女人?”,找的它的妄想神经症的对应:”我死了?还是活著?“

Whereas the hysterical question highlights the issues of sexual
relationships and sexual identity, the obsessional question zooms in on
the vicissitudes of existence (Lacan 1966c [1957]:451). To reassure
themselves of their existence and to reduce accumulated libidinal tension,
obsessional neurotics may engage in all kinds of exploits, from outbursts
of senseless violence to relatively innocuous joyriding (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:417–418). Or they may inflate their behaviours
(labouring away night and day) and their personalities (playing ringleader
to the crowd), to the point of holding themselves up to utter ridicule
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:302).

虽然癔症者的问题强调性的关系的问题,妄想症者的问题则是强调生命存在的起伏。为了让他们的生命存在安心,为了将累积的力比多的张力减少,妄想神经症者可能从事各色各样的企图,从没有意义的暴力的发泄,到比较无害的追求享乐。或者,他们可能膨胀他们的行为,(日夜地工作),与他们的人格(在群众里扮演领导者),甚至让他们自己承受完全的嘲笑。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
http://springhjero.wordpressw.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 6

October 14, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

NEUROTIC SPEECH
神经症的言说

In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan drew attention to a second clinical paradox
in the relations between speech and language. After having categorized
as psychotic those people who talk freely and fluently without really
speaking, he defined people who also speak beyond the words they
consciously use as neurotic. In the first (psychotic) situation, language
operates without speech, whilst in the second (neurotic) case speech also
functions beyond verbalized language. Whereas psychotics do not manage
to speak, however articulate the sentences they produce, neurotics cannot
prevent themselves from saying more than what they intend to convey
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70).

在他的“罗马辞说”,拉康注意到第二个临床悖论,在言说与语言之间的关系。他将那些人们归类为精神病者,那些自由地侃侃而谈而没有确实在言谈的人们。他定义那些人们,那些言说超过他们意识所使用的字词的人们,作为是神经症者。在第一个情况,精神病的情况,语言没有言说地运作。而在第二个情况,神经症的情况,言说也发挥功能,超越文词化的语言。精神病者没有成功地言说,无论他们产生的句子多么清楚。神经症者则是无法阻止他们自己言说超过他们意图要表的东西。

Twenty years later, in his seminar Encore,
Lacan rephrased this insight as follows: ‘I speak without knowing it. I
speak with my body and I do so unbeknownst to myself. Thus I always
say more than I know’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:119).

二十年后,在他的研讨班“再来”,拉康重新铨释这个洞见,如下:「我不知道言说地言说,我用我的身体言说,我这样言说,我自己却不知道。因此,我总是说出超过我知道的东西。」

Here, Lacan aimed less at a reintegration of the communicative value
of non-verbal cues in psychoanalysis—he actually vilified clinicians who
interpreted the patients’ bodily movements as well as their associations
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:337) —than at restoring neurotic symptoms,
inhibitions and anxieties as meaningful units of analysis. To Lacan, this
neurotic paradox, much more than its psychotic counterpart, encompassed
‘the privileged domain of psychoanalytic discovery’ because Freud would
not have developed psychoanalysis if he had not regarded neurotic
symptoms (ranging from bodily disorders to slips of the tongue) as being
sustained by an unconscious idea (wish, representation) that tries to
express itself (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69).

在此,拉康目标并不是朝中重新融合精神病者的非文辞的线索的沟通的价值—他实际上贬低那些临床医生,当他们铨释病人的身体的动作与他们的联想。拉康的目标是要恢复神经症者的症状,压抑与焦虑,作为是精神分析的有意义的单位。对于拉康,这个神经症的悖论,远超过它的精神病的伙伴,它涵盖精神分析的发现的特权的领域。因为弗洛伊德本来不会发展精神分析,假如他当时没有将神经症的症状(范围从生理的疾病到口误),视为是由尝试表达它自己的无意识的观念(愿望,表象)所维持。

As to the nature of this neurotic economy, Freud had already
cleared most of the ground in two seminal essays on the
neuropsychoses of defence from the mid-1890s (Freud 1894a;
1896b). In these papers, he had argued that both hysteria and
obsessional neurosis originate in an unconscious act of defence
against a traumatic experience, whose nature is always sexual.23
When individuals encounter something that is incompatible with
the reigning mass of representations (Vorstellungsmasse) in their
ego (Ich), the latter tries to maintain its integrity by driving the
event out of consciousness. Freud believed that this defence (or
repression) takes place via a withdrawal of the affect (a quantum of
energy) from the event’s psychic representation, through which the
event itself is transformed into an unconscious memory trace, while
its affect is displaced to another representation.

至于这个神经症的经济活力的特性,弗洛伊德已经清理出大部分的场域,在两篇影响巨大的论文“论神经症这与精神病者的防卫机制”,在1950年代中叶。在这些论文里,他曾经主张,癔症与妄想神经症起源于无意识的防卫行动,抵挡创伤的经验。创伤的经验总是性。当个人遭遇某件不相和谐的东西,跟他们的自我的统辖的表象集团不相和谐的东西。自我的统辖集团尝试维持它的尊严,凭借将事件从意识驱赶出去。弗洛伊德相信,这个防卫机制(或压抑),发生,凭借将情感(能源的量子)撤退,从事件的心灵的表象。通过事件的心灵表象,事件本身被转化成为无意识的记忆的痕迹。虽然它的情感被替换成为另外一个表象。

Since repression entails the dismantling and eradication of sexual
representations that are impossible to handle, neurotics can only recount
their experiences in a lacunary fashion, whereby the gaps can be either
exceedingly manifest—some patients say they have no memories at all
of what happened to them—or smoothed over by so-called ‘screenmemories’,
which generally serve to make the story coherent. Until the
1910s, Freud was convinced that neurotics had simply ‘forgotten’ the
awkward representations and that one of the analyst’s tasks consisted in
helping them to recover their lost memories.

因为压抑涵盖拆解与抹除那些不可能处理的性的表象,神经症者仅能够描述他们的经验,用有空隙的方式。这次差距要就是过分的明显—有些病人说,他们根本就没有记忆,对于发生在他们身上的事情。要不然,就是他们被所谓的“屏隔回忆”。“屏隔回忆”通常用来让故事前后一致。直到1910年,弗洛伊德相信,神经者就是“忘记”那些笨拙的表象。精神分析家的其中一个工作就是在于帮助他们恢复他们失去的记忆。

Yet clinical and theoretical
considerations led him to think that instead of suffering from a
straightforward forgetting, patients were animated by a powerful ‘not
wanting to know’ (Freud 1913c:141–142). Therefore he considered it
pointless for analysts to imbue their patients with the knowledge they
are ostensibly lacking, because this is unlikely to bring about change in
the patient’s situation—on the contrary, he might immediately erect a
protective shield against the analyst’s suggestions.24

可是,临床与理论的考虑引导他认为,病人病没有遭受直接遗忘的痛苦。相反地,病人受的强烈的“不想要知的”所触动。因此,弗洛伊德认为这是没有意义的,对于精神分析家要让病人充满他们明显欠缺的这些知识。因为这并不可能导致病人的情况的改变。相反地,他可能立即竖立起保护的盔甲,对抗精神分析家的建议。

In Seminar I, Lacan reformulated this neurotic ‘not wanting to know’
as the passion of ignorance, a dimension superseding the dualism of
knowing and not-knowing (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:277–278). Simple
ignorance does not equal a lack of conscious knowledge and, vice versa,
a huge amount of conscious knowledge can perfectly coincide with radical
ignorance. As mentioned on pp. 20–21, Lacan maintained that ignorance
underpins the patient’s capacity for symbolic transference, because it
enables him to regard the analyst as a supposed subject of knowing. By
contrast, the ‘passion of ignorance’ is a psychic power which urges
patients to prefer the deleterious status quo of their symptomatic condition
over the even more painful encounter with that which caused it. The
passion of ignorance thus coincides with the unconscious jouissance
(enjoyment) the patient derives from his symptom.

在第一研讨班,拉康重新铨释神经症“不想要知道”,作为是无知的激情。这一个维度取代知道与不知道的双重论。单纯的无知并不相等于欠缺意识的知道,反过来说,也是一样。巨大数量的意识的知识能够完美地巧合于强烈的无知。如同在20-21页所提到,拉康主张,无知强调病人接受象征移情的能力。因为它让他能够将精神分析家视为是被认为知道的主体。对照起来,“无知的激情”是一种心灵的力量,建议病人比较喜欢他们症状的情况的巧妙的现状,胜过于那甚至更加令人痛苦的遭遇,跟引起症状的东西。无知的激情因此巧合于无意识的欢爽,病人从他的症状获得的欢爽。

In Freud’s theory repression not only causes the sexual representation
to fall into the unconscious, the original affect also reconnects itself to a
relatively innocuous substitute representation. Freud regarded this ‘false
connection’ as the nucleus of the neurotic symptom. Whether a bodily
disorder or a compulsive thought process, the neurotic symptom is a
compromise between a component of the repressed event (the affect) and
an element of the repressive structure (the substitute representation), and
thus also an insidious ‘return of the repressed’.

在弗洛伊德的理论,压抑不但引起性的表象,掉落于无意识里。原初的情感也重新连接它自己跟比较无害的替换的表象。弗洛伊德将这个“虚假的连接”视为是神经症的症状的核心。无论是生理的疾病或是强迫性的思想的过程,神经症者的症状都是一种妥协,处于被压抑的事件(情感)的成分,与压抑的结构(替换的表象)的元素之间。因此,这也是“被压抑的东西的潜在的回转”。

Via the neurotic symptom,
an aspect of the event which had been driven out of consciousness tries to
express itself again, although the individual can no longer understand this.
For Lacan, this part of Freud’s theory implied that the neurotic symptom
conveys a hidden meaning, which the patient can only understand once she
has found the laws according to which its constitutive components have
been bound up with each other.

经由神经症的症状,从意识里被驱赶出来的事件的一个层面,尝试要再次表达它自己。虽然个人不再能够理解这个。对于拉康,弗洛伊德的这个部分暗示着:神经症的症状传递一个隐藏的意义。仅有当病人已经找到这些法则,她才能够理解这个隐藏的意义。依照这个法则,它的组成的成分彼此互相连接一块。

Put differently, the neurotic symptom means
something, but it is impossible to grasp that meaning until the language
system governing its combinations has been discovered. Whilst being
generally ‘silent’, neurotic symptoms continue to speak in a language that is
unknown to the individual, prompting Lacan to compare them to blazons,
enigmas, hieroglyphics, oracles, seals, etc. (Lacan 1977e[1953]:69–70) and
to identify them eventually as metaphors (Lacan 1977g[1957]:175). All of
these figures include a message, but its exact nature remains a mystery as
long as one has not found the proper code to decipher them.25

换句话说,神经症者具有某个意义。但是我们不可能理解那个意义,直到统辖它的组合的语言系统已经被发现。神经症的症状通常都是“沉默”,它们却继续言说,用个人自己并不知道的语言。这引起拉康要将它们比喻为盾章,谜团,象形文字,预言,封印,等等。并且最后将它们辨认为隐喻。所有的这些东西都包含一个讯息。但是这个讯息的确实的特性始终处于神秘当中,只有我们还没有找到合适的符码来解答它们。

Now it becomes clear how the neurotic’s speech differs from the
psychotic communication detailed above. Unlike psychotic individuals,
neurotics have no privileged access to the true meaning of their words
and their general living conditions. They are continuously under the
impression that the words they use do not capture exactly what they
want to say or, conversely, that these words express much more than
they have intended to. Whereas psychotics engage in a stereotypical form
of communication which is unmarked by redundancies and ambiguities,
neurotics are incessantly aware of the inadequacy of language for
conveying their experiences.

现在,显而易见的是,神经症者的言说,不同于以上详述的精神病的沟通。不像精神病的个人,神经症者对于他们的字词的真实意义与他们的通常的生活情况,并没有任何特权的接近。他们继续拥有这个印象:他们使用的字词并没有确是捕捉到他们想要说出的东西。或许反过来说,这些字词表达远超过他们意图要说出的东西。精神病者参与沟通的典型化的形式,这些沟通仍然是沟通,尽管充满累赘语与模糊嗳昧。神经症者则是持续地知的语言的不能胜任,来传递他们的表达。

Sometimes they feel that they simply lack
or cannot find the words to say something; at other times they are surprised
by the fact that they have said something they did not want to say at all.
Moreover, whilst psychotics are being pervaded by an infallible, full
knowledge about themselves and others, neurotics are troubled time and
again by the realization that their knowledge is incomplete, inconsistent
and incoherent.

有时,他们觉得他们仅是欠缺或是无法找到字词来说某件东西。还有些时候,他们对这个事实大吃一惊:他们已经说出某件他们并不想要说出的事情。而且,精神病者正充斥着绝对可靠,充分的知识,关于他们自己与别人。神经症者则是经常受的困扰,由于体会到:他们的知识是不完整,不一贯,而且不一致。

Eager to find unshakeable evidence, yet struck by its
fraudulent character from the moment it is established, neurotics bear
witness to a deeply ingrained feeling that nothing is really trustworthy,
that they are constantly being deceived by everything and everyone,
including themselves. Although they like to think that someone is reliable,
or that something is genuine, neurotics realize that their opinion is but a
vulnerable belief and that they could easily be duped by appearances.
Distrust and suspicion, two affects that are often associated with paranoia,
can thus be encountered as readily in neurosis as in psychosis, the difference
being that in the latter case they rest upon a firmly rooted conviction,
whereas in the former they proceed from profound uncertainty.
神经症这因为渴望找的无法动摇的证据,可是又为这个证据的欺骗的性质所迷惑,从证据被建立的开始。神经症者见证到根深蒂固的感觉:没有任何东西确实值得信任,他们不断地被欺骗,被每件事情与每个人欺骗,包括他们自己。虽然他们喜欢认为,某个人是可靠的,或是某件事情是真诚的,神经症者体会到,他们的意见仅是一个容易受到伤害的信仰。他们很容易被外表所欺骗。不信任与怀疑,这两个情感经常跟偏执狂者连想一块,在神经症者与精神病者身上,也很容易被遭遇到。差别是:在后者的情况,他们依靠根深蒂固的信念。而在前者,他们则是从深刻的不确定前进。

A psychotic
patient will approach someone with due suspicion because he has read the
other’s intentions, whereas a neurotic will harbour suspicion because she
is doubtful about the other, due to the interference of the Other. As Lacan
put it in Seminar III, the dimension of the unknown, ‘the Other of speech…is
the determining factor in neurosis’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:168).

精神病的病人将会接近某个人,带着适当的怀疑。因为他已经阅读出他人的意图。而神经症者则是怀抱怀孕,因为她怀疑别人,由于大他者的介入。如同拉康在第三研讨班表达它,这个未知者的维度,言说的大他者,就是神经症者的决定的因素。

This structural difference between neurotic and psychotic people,
despite the similarity of their symptoms and affects, often manifests itself
during the so-called ‘preliminary conversations’ (the Lacanian equivalent
of Freud’s ‘trial period’) when patients reflect upon the progress they
are making.

神经症者与精神病者的结构上的差异,尽管他们的症状与情感的类似,经常显示它自己,在所谓的“初期的谈话”,当病人反应出他们正在从事的进展。

When a neurotic patient voices his concern over the fact that
he has not experienced any improvement in his condition since the start
of the consultations, he will be poised between the enticing idea that his
analyst is probably not very good (indeed, that she may not be a properly
trained analyst at all) and the bitter awareness that he himself is after all
the one who has chosen her because of her acumen and charisma.

当神经症者表达他的关系,对于这个事实:自从看诊开始以来,他并没有经验的他的情况的任何的改进。他将会保持平衡,一方面是忍不住地认为:他的精神分析可能并不是很高明(的确,她可能根本就不是受过合适训练的精神分析家)。另一方面,他痛苦地知道,他自己毕竟就算选择这位分析家的人,因为分析家的敏锐与魅力。

A psychotic, on the other hand, will easily reach the conclusion that since
she has not made any progress, her analyst must be part of the same
conspiracy that is responsible for all her misery. In both instances, the
patient fears that the analyst is not what he pretends to be, yet in the
former (neurotic) case the suspicion rests upon doubt and uncertainty
rather than firm conviction.

另一方面,精神病者将会很容易地获得这个结论:因为她还没有任何的进展,她的分析家一定是相同阴谋的部分,要为她所有的悲惨负责的阴谋。无论哪个情况,病人都害怕,精神分析家并不是他伪装成为的那个样子。可是,在前者(神经症者)的情况,这个怀疑依靠怀疑与不确定,而不是依靠坚定的信念。

Contrary to psychotics, neurotics take account of the Other of speech,
which is in turn based on the installation of the ‘wall of language’ between
the speaker and her interlocutors, the presence of quilting points between
signifier and signified, and the acknowledgement of the Name-of-the-
Father. Neurotics differ from psychotics in so far as they have assimilated
the sociocultural rules embedded in language, whose principle is the
paternal function.

跟精神病者相反,神经症者考虑到言说的大他者。这个言说的大他者则是以“语言的墙壁”的安置作为基础,处于言说者与她的对谈者之间的“语言的墙壁”。能指与所指之间的缝合点的存在,与以父之名的承认。神经症者跟精神病者有所差异,因为他们已经吸收被镶嵌于语言里的社会与文化的规则。这个语言的原则就是父亲的功能。

Throughout his works, Lacan linked this psychic assimilation of the
symbolic order to Freud’s concept of repression, arguing that the
integration of the symbolic system is a necessary and sufficient condition
for repression to occur. Drawing on data gathered from Freud’s famous
case-study of the Wolf Man (1918b[1914]), he stated in Seminar I:
The trauma, in so far as it has a repressing action, intervenes after
the fact, nachtraglich.

在拉康的全集,拉康将这个心灵的接受象征的秩序,跟弗洛伊德的压抑的观念连接一块。拉康主张说,象征系统的融合是一个必要而且充分的情况,让压抑发生。依靠从弗洛伊德的著名的个案研究“狼人”收集的资料,拉康在第一研讨班陈述:因为创伤具有压抑的行动,创伤介入“事实之后”。

At this specific moment, something of the
subject’s becomes detached in the very symbolic world that he is
engaged in integrating. From then on, it will no longer be something
belonging to the subject. The subject will no longer speak it, will
no longer integrate it. Nevertheless, it will remain there, somewhere,
spoken, if one can put it this way, by something the subject does
not control. [It will be the first nucleus of what one will
subsequently call his symptoms.]26
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:191)

在这个明确的时刻,属于主体的某件东西变得区隔,在他参与融合的象征的世界。从那时开始,那个东西不再属于主体。主体将不再言说它,将不再将它融合一块。可是,它将始终就在那里,某个地方,被某件东西言说,请容许我这样说,被主体没有控制的东西。(那就是我们随后所谓的症状的东西的核心)。

Here Lacan tried to explain how events only become painful and fall
prey to repression from the moment the subject adopts a symbolic
framework of norms and values. What Freud had designated as an
incompatibility between two mental representations, Lacan translated
as the ‘detachment’ of signifiers from the symbolic order, as a mere
result of its assimilation by the subject. Hence, no event is inherently
traumatic; it acquires this epithet ‘after the fact’, when it becomes
meaningful through the intervention of a symbolic system.

因此,拉康尝试解释,事件如何变得仅是痛苦,并且成为压抑的猎物,从主体採用象征的架构来命名与制定价值。弗洛伊德所指明作为能指的“区隔”,跟象征秩序的区隔,作为仅是被主体吸收的结果。因此,没有一个事件是本质上的创伤。这个事件获得这个后记“事实之后”。当它经过象征的系统的介入之后,它才变得有意义。

Lacan’s view entailed that only neurotics, who have integrated the
symbolic order and its distinctions between good/right and bad/wrong,
separate traumatic from non-traumatic events in a culturally recognizable
fashion. A psychotic, who is living in an entirely different world, can put
events which a neurotic is likely to experience as shocking in a neutral
or even pleasurable context, and the other way round. A psychotic man,
for example, can be extremely affected by a score of ostensibly nonintrusive
phenomena, whilst remaining unmoved by the fact that he has
been repeatedly raped by a group of thugs in the back of a van.27
Diagnosis via speech and transference 27

拉康的观念意味著,仅有神经症者将创伤与非-创伤的事情分开,用文化层面被体认的方式。因为他们已经融合象征的秩序与它的区别善意跟正确与坏与错误。精神病者由于生活于完全不同的世界里,他们将神经症者很可能经验到的事件,当著是令人惊吓,在中立,或甚至是令人愉快的环境里,或是令人惊吓的环境当著是令人愉快。譬如,一位精神病者有时会极端地受到影响,受到许多夸张地非侵犯性的现象的影响。另一方面,他对于这个事实却又无动于衷:他已经被一群的恶棍重复地强暴,在货车的背后。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康与弗洛伊德的临床实践 5

October 13, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of
Psychoanalysis

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and
Transference
第一章
经由言说与移情的诊断

PSYCHOTIC TRANSFERENCE
精神病移情

Whilst according a central diagnostic significance to the language
disturbances in psychosis, Lacan was eager to emphasize that psychosis
is not ‘a pure and simple fact of language’ (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:61).
The foreclosure of the Name-of-the-Father does not only affect the
individual’s speech, but also influences his sexual identity and
relationships with others.

虽然拉康给予精神病的语言困扰,一个中心的诊断意义,他很渴望强调,精神病并不是“纯粹而简的语言的事实”。以父之名的除权弃绝并不仅影响个人的言词,而且影响他的性的认同与跟别人的关系。

Lacan was of the view that the function of the father—the cornerstone
of the symbolic order—overwrites a human being’s natural status of
‘sexuation’, and introduces her into a set of norms dictating what it is to
be masculine or feminine and defining what men and women should do
if they want to be perceived as belonging to a particular gender (Lacan
1995a[1964]:276).

拉康的观点是,父亲的功能—作为象征秩序的基石—复写一个人的性化的自然地位。并且介绍她进入一套命名。这套命名指示成为男性或成为女性是什么样子,并且定义男人与女人应该做什么,假如他们想要被感知,作为是属于特殊的性别。

The principle of this symbolic sexual order is the
symbolic phallus (F), which represents the mark of difference between
the signifiers, including those of masculinity and femininity. When the
paternal function is foreclosed the phallus does not establish itself within
the symbolic order, which induces a peculiar ‘blending’ of the signifiers
(dubbed ‘holophrase’ by Lacan) and which also blurs the culturally
installed differences between masculinity and femininity.17 In psychosis
the symbolic pegs of sexual identity do not hold, through which
masculinity and femininity start to melt into one another.

象征的性的秩序的原则就是象征的阳具。象征的阳具代表这些能指之间的差异的标记,包括男性与女性的那些差异。当父亲的功能被除权弃绝,阳具并没有建立它自己,在象征的秩序里。这导致这些能指的特殊的“混合”(被拉康命名为“单词语”)。它也模糊了被文化安置的差异,男性与女性之间的差异)。在精神病,性的认同的象征的塞子挡住,因为这样,男性与女性开始互相融合一块。

Schreber was
for instance convinced that his body was being emasculated in view of
his final transformation into a woman who, after having been inseminated
by the divine agencies, would beget a new human race.18 In a sense,
Schreber’ s conviction does not exemplify the psychotic collapse of sexual
differences as such, because it is already part and parcel of his attempt to
introduce a certain order, albeit a delusional one, into his chaotic
experiences.19 However, it does indicate to what extent he did not assume
a shared sociocultural system of distinct sexual identities, succumbing
to a sexual matrix in which the boundaries between the categories have
become very hazy.

譬如,许瑞伯相信,他的身体正在变得柔弱,因为他最后转化成为女人。经过神性的代理者的授精之后,这位女人将会生下一个新的人类的品质。许瑞伯的相信并没有替性的差异本身的精神病的崩塌,作为典范。因为它已经是他的企图的部分与包裹,企图要介绍某个秩序,虽然是幻觉的秩序,介绍进入他的混乱的经验里。可是,它确实指示他并没有担负起共享的社会与文化的系统,对于不同的性的认同。它屈从于性的基座。在这个基座里,范畴之间的边界已经变得模糊。

With regard to the psychotic’s relationships with others, Lacan drew
attention to the fact that the exclusion of the Other ushers the individual
into strange entanglements with others, which are continuously pervaded
by rivalry and competition. The divine agencies invade Schreber’s body
and mind as much as he invades their own substance, which indicates
that his relationship with his tormentors is marked by continuous rivalry.

关于精神病跟别人的关系,拉康注意到这个事实:大他者的排斥引导个人进入跟别人的奇异的纠缠。这些纠缠继续受到敌意与競争的瀰漫。神性的代理者侵入许瑞伯的身体与心灵。如同他侵人他们自己的物质。这指示著,他跟他的折磨者的关系,被继续的敌意标记。

Although Schreber has to comply with the divine bye-laws, the gods
bear witness to an incredible stupidity, through which their existence
depends as much on him as his existence depends on them. Schreber has
a mirror relationship with his world and his own bodily disintegration is
reflected in the fragmentation of the divine bodies (Lacan 1993[1955–
56]:97–101). It is as if Schreber’s persecutors were but the virtual images
of himself; figures that would not have existed without him, but whose
presence he was unable to plumb and control.

虽然许瑞伯必须同意神性的章程,众神见证一个匪夷所思的愚蠢。由于这种愚蠢,他们的存在同样依靠他,如同他的存在依靠他们。许瑞伯跟他的世界拥有一个镜像的关系。他自己的身体的瓦解被反映在神性的身体的碎片化。好像许瑞伯的迫害者仅是他自己的虚拟的意象,假如没有他,本来不会存在的人物,但是他们的存在,他不能够探索与控制。

This strictly imaginary relationship with others seriously affects
the psychotic’s position within the transference, which Freud (1916–
17a [1915–17]:431–447) defined as the patient’s emotional tie
(Gefuhlsbindung) with the analyst. Unlike Freud, Lacan did not rule
out the psychotic’s ability to develop a transference relationship with
the analyst, yet he distinguished this ‘psychotic transference’ from
the neurotic type, whereby he followed two separate directions.

跟别人的严格的想像的关系,严重地影响精神病的立场,在移情之内。弗洛伊德定义移情,作为是跟精神分析家的情感的关系。不像弗洛伊德,拉康并没有排除精神病者的能力,跟他的精神分析家发展移情的关系。可是,他区别这个‘精神病的移情“,跟神经症的移情的不同。从这里,他遵循两个不同的方向。

The first one was put into effect during the early 1950s, in the context of
his construction of the ‘L-schema’ as a dynamic model of the analytic
process.20 During this period Lacan distinguished between a symbolic
and an imaginary form of transference, the former being the
efficacious, beneficial type and the latter merely functioning as an
obstacle (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:109).

在1950年代,第一个方向被付诸实践。在建构“L-基模“,作为是精神分析过程的动态的模式的内文里。在这个时期,拉康区别象征与想像的移情的形式的差异。前者是有效的,有利益的种类。后者则仅是充当这个功能,作为阻碍的功能。

Symbolic transference
presupposes that the patient’s speech addresses itself to both the other
and the Other, which implies that the way in which somebody
approaches the analyst and speaks about himself involves a degree of
ignorance (the Other as unknown). At the end of Seminar I Lacan
even went so far as to say that ignorance is an essential condition for
(symbolic) transference to occur:

象征的移情预先假设,病人的言说针他者与大他者言谈。这暗示着这个途径,某个人接近精神分析家并且言谈关于他自己的途径。这牵涉的某个程度的无知,(大他者作为是没有被认识)。在第一研讨班的结束,拉康甚至过分到说出:无知是让移情发生的基本条件。

[I]f the subject commits himself to searching after truth as such, it
is because he places himself in the dimension of ignorance—it
doesn’t matter whether he knows it or not. That is one of the
elements making up what analysts call ‘readiness to the
transference’. There is a readiness to the transference in the patient
solely by virtue of his placing himself in the position of
acknowledging himself in speech, and searching out his truth to
the end, the end which is there in the analyst.

假如主体专注于寻找真理的本身,那是因为他将他自己放置在无知的维度。他是否知道并不重要。那是其中的一个因素,组成精神分析家所谓的“对于移情的准备“。在病人身上,有一个移情的准备,由于他放置他自己在这个位置,用言说承认他自己的位置。并且自始至终寻找他的真理。这个终点就在精神分析家那里。

(ibid.: 278–279)
The absence of ignorance on the side of the patient also opens the
gate to transference, albeit a style of transference that is imaginary,
rivalrous and potentially destructive. It is exactly this imaginary type
one can expect to find in psychotic people, governed as they are by an
exclusion of the Other and a vision of a transparent other. In general,
psychotics do not testify to a degree of ignorance about what is happening
to them or about what is going on in the world.

在病人这边,无知的缺席也展开到移情的大门。虽然移情的风格是想像的,敌意的,而且潜在具有毁灭性。这确实是想像的风范,我们能够期望找到的,在精神病的人们。虽然他们被统辖,被大他者的排除与透明的他者的幻景所统辖。一般来说,精神病者并没有证实到无知的程度,关于所正在发生的事情,对于他们,与关于在世界正在发生的事情。

On the contrary, they act
upon a firmly established knowledge, a deep-rooted conviction and a
massive certainty about the nature of their suffering. In Seminar XI, Lacan
argued that in psychotics ‘the phenomenon of the Unglauben’ (unbelief)
reigns (Lacan 1977b[1964]:238) because belief (whether positive or
negative) always includes an element of doubt, which is completely absent
in psychosis.21 The corollary of this deeply ingrained, solid psychotic
knowledge is that the other can only be approached as an alter ego, an
imaginary counterpart who supports, sustains and validates the
individual’s certainty.

相反地,他们的行为根据坚固被建立的知识,一个根深蒂固的信念与某个巨大的确定性,关于他们痛苦的特性。在第11研讨班,拉康主张,在精神病者,“没有信仰“的这个现象统辖一切,因为信仰(无论是正面或是负面的信仰),总是包括怀疑的元素。在精神病者,怀疑的元素是缺席。这个根深蒂固,牢固的精神病的知识必然结果是,他者被接近,仅能够作为替代-自我。这是一个想像的替身,他支持,维持并且证实个人的确定性。

The latter point leads to Lacan’s second criterion for distinguishing
between psychotic and neurotic transference. In Seminar XI, he grounded
transference in psychoanalysis on the installation of the function of the
sujet suppose savoir, that is to say of the ‘subject supposed to know’ or,
perhaps better, the ‘supposed subject of knowing’.22 As Lacan put it:
‘Whenever this function may be, for the subject, embodied in some
individual…the transference is established’ (ibid.: 233). Proceeding from
her own ignorance, a neurotic patient would thus come to an analyst in
order to interrogate him as a supposed subject of knowing, which signals
the start of transference.

后者的这点导致拉康的第二个标准,作为区别精神病与神经症的移情的差别。在第11研讨班,他将精神分析的移情的基础定位在sujet suppose savoir 的功能的安置。换句话说,“应该知的的主体“,或是更加贴切地,”被认为是知道的主体“。依照拉康的说法,”对于主体而言,无论这个功能何时被镶嵌在某个个人,移情就已经被建立。“当一位神经症的病人从他自己的无知,继续前进,他因此会来到精神分析家,为了询问他,作为被认为是知道的主体。这就意味着移情的开始。

Psychotic patients, however, have no reason
whatsoever to invest the analyst—nor somebody else for that matter—
with the function of the supposed subject of knowing, since they already
possess (and are possessed by) all there is to know. Whereas neurotics
are desperate to find somebody who masters the knowledge they
themselves lack, and to put that knowledge to the test, psychotics are
adamant that there is nothing more to discover than what they already
know. When they address themselves to an analyst, they are not supposing
her to be a subject of knowing, but rather someone who will understand
and authenticate their experiences. In short, they are trying to find a
‘witness for the persecution’.

可是,精神病的病人并没有丝毫理由将精神分析家—或就那件事情而言,某个其他的人—投注这个功能,被认为是知道的主体的功能。因为他们已经拥有(与被拥有)一切所需要知道的东西。虽然神经症者拼命地想要找出某个掌控这个知识的人,他们自己欠缺的知识。为了测试那个知识,精神病者坚定相信:他们已经知道的东西,就是他们所要发现的一切东西。当他们跟精神分析家对谈时,他们并没有假设她是知道的主体。相反地,而是某个将会理解与证实他们的经验的人。总之,他们正在尝试找的“迫害的见证者“。

Apart from the fact that they provide the analyst with a second,
fairly reliable diagnostic criterion (alongside the language disturbances),
these peculiarities of the psychotic transference cast a nasty chill over
the standard analytic techniques of interpretation and transference
handling. As Freud realized all too well, the orthodox analytic setting
cannot be used with psychotic patients, to which Lacan added that if
one takes prepsychotics (people with a psychotic structure but
untriggered ‘psychotic’ phenomena) into analysis, a full-blown
psychosis is likely to emerge (Lacan 1993[1955–56]:251). On the one
hand, these warnings make it all the more urgent for analysts to diagnose
psychotic patients correctly and at the earliest possible stage of the
analytic process, whereas on the other hand they also urge them to
reconsider their techniques when they venture to work analytically with
psychotics.

除了这个事实:他们供应精神分析家第二个非常可靠的诊断的标准(除了语言的困扰之外)。精神病移情的这些特殊性投下令让讨厌的寒颤,在标准的分析的解释技术与处理移情。如同弗洛伊德充分体会到,正统的精神分析的背景无法被使用在精神病的病人身上。拉康则是补充说:假如我们将精神病前期(拥有精神病的结构,但是还没有被触发的“精神病现象“的人们),带进精神分析,一个完全发展的精神病可能会出现。在一方面,这些警告让精神分析家更加迫切要正确地诊断精神病的病人,在尽可能的精神分析过程的早期阶段。另一方面,他们也建议他们要重新考虑他们的技术,当他们冒险以精神分析的方式研究精神病。

For Lacan (19771:12), it was imperative that the analyst does
not back away from psychosis, and in the following chapters I shall
give some indications of how Lacanian analysts have turned this
incentive into a score of technical modifications and
recommendations, often relying on minimal rules of thumb
suggested by Lacan himself.

对于拉康,应该要做的是,精神分析家不要从精神病者撤退。在随后的章节,我将给予某些的指示,关于拉康派的精神分析家如何将这个动机转变成为许多技术的修正与推荐。他们经常说依靠拉康自己建议的准则。

雄伯译
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