Archive for the ‘雅克 拉康’ Category

拉康:意义的解释

December 19, 2015

THE INTERPRETATION OF MEANING

意义的解释

From the mid-1950s Lacan started questioning the nature of meaning as
an effect of psychoanalytic interpretation. Locating the point of departure
for any type of analytic interpretation in The Interpretation of Dreams
(1900a) he insisted that Freud’s discovery of the meaning of a dream
always entails the revelation of the dream(er)’s unconscious wish (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:319–320). Therefore, the interpretation of dreams and,
by extension, of any formation of the unconscious, is focused on the
emergence of the repressed desire sustaining it.30

从1950年中业,拉康开始询问意义的特性,作为是精神分析的解释的影响。当他定位出发点的位置,作为任何种类的精神分析的解释,在弗洛伊德的“梦的结析”,拉康坚持,弗洛伊德的发现梦的意义,总是涵盖作梦者的无意识的愿望的启示。因此,梦的解析,延伸而言,就是无意识的任何形成的解析,都是以维持这个解析的被压抑的欲望的出现作为基础。

Because Freud had explained dreams, parapraxes and neurotic
symptoms as fulfilments of a repressed wish, Lacan contended that the
formations of the unconscious simultaneously conceal and satisfy a
particular desire, which can only be uncovered via a calculated use of
interpretations (ibid.: 326).

因为弗洛伊德已经解释梦,倒错行为,与神经症的症状。拉康主张,无意识的形成,既隐藏,又满足特殊的欲望。这个欲望仅能够被发现,经有估算地使用解释。

In other words, the meaning of a symptom
correlates with its underlying desire and this motive only becomes
apparent when the symptom has been properly interpreted. If
interpretation can be conceived as a process whereby meaning is accorded
to a certain phenomenon, the interpretation of meaning, the meaning to
be allocated to meaning, is that it coincides with the expression of a
desire. This is why Lacan, in his Seminar VI on Desire and its
Interpretation, portrayed the analyst as somebody who assists analysands
in giving birth to their desire (Lacan 1958–59: session of 1 July 1959).
This is also why he replied to the philosophical question as to the meaning
of meaning (what does meaning mean?) with the statement ‘meaning
escapes’ (Lacan 1975d[1973]:11).31

换句话说,症状的意义跟它的作为基础的欲望息息相关。这个动机变成明显,仅有当症状已经适当地被解释。假如解释能够被构想,作为是过程。在那里,意义被给予某个现象,意义的解释,意义被分配给意义是,它巧合与欲望的表达。这就是为什么拉康,在他的第6研讨班,“论欲望与其解释“,描绘分析家作为某个帮助分析者的人,当他们诞生他们的欲望。这也是为什么他回答哲学的问题,关于意义的意义(”意义“意味着什么?”用这个陈述:“意义闪躲不定”。

Like desire, meaning is constantly
shifting, and despite the fact that language always carries meaning, it is
incapable of fixating it. Inasmuch as the analysand’s demands are
embedded in language, their desire will always be articulated in these
demands (desire will speak through the verbalizations), but the demands
will never fully articulate their desire. ‘Although it always shows through
demand…desire is nonetheless beyond it’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:269).
Desire (meaning) is always articulated, but never fully articulatable (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:329–330). Or, as Lacan put it in 1973: meaning is always
fleeting from the cask of language (Lacan 1975d[1973]:11).

就像欲望,意义不断地转换。尽管这个事实:语言总是带着意义,语言并无法固定意义。因为分享者的要求被镶嵌于语言,他们的欲望将总是被表达在这些要求里(欲望将会言说,通过文辞表达)。但是要求将永远不会充分地表达他们的欲望。“虽然欲望总是通过要求显现,欲望仍然超越要求”。欲望(意义)总是被表达,但是从来没有充分地被表达。如同拉康在1973年表达它,意义总是从语言的棺材瞬间而过。

As his work progressed Lacan separated the effect of meaning (sens)
from the emergence of signification (signification). In ‘The Agency of
the Letter’ he hinted at this conceptual difference when stating that ‘the
value of the image [in Egyptian hieroglyphics, for instance] as signifier
has nothing whatever to do with its signification’ (1977g[1957]:159).

随着他的研究的进展,拉康将意义的影响,跟意义的出现分开。在“信息的代理”,他暗示,在他的观念的差异,当他陈述:意象的价值(譬如,埃及的象征文字),因为能指根本就没有任何关系,跟意义。“

Whereas the signification of a certain image may be ‘vulture’, its meaning
may be the letter ‘A’. Meaning is what results from the translation of
one text into another, whereas signification, in its dependence upon
common-sense understanding, does not require any form of transcription.
Convergent on the production of meaning (desire), and not on
signification, interpretation (deciphering) can therefore also be compared
to a process of translation.32 Moreover, once a message has been
deciphered, once its meaning has been revealed, one can still fail to
understand it.

无论某个意象的意义上多么的“贪心“,它的意义可能是”A”这个字母。意义就是从一个文本翻译成为另外一个文本的结果。虽然意义,由于依靠共同常识的理解,并没有要求任何铭记的形式。汇集在意义(欲望)的产生,而不是汇集在意义。解释(解析)因此也能够被比喻为翻译的过程。而且,一旦一个讯息被解析,一旦它的意义已经被揭露,我们依旧没有理解它。

Meaning does not necessarily give rise to signification,
although signification annihilates meaning. The Biblical story of Daniel’s
interpretation of the writing on the wall serves as a good example of
this.33 Daniel translated God’s Aramaic words ‘Mene, Mene, Tekel,
Upharsin’ as ‘Numbered, Numbered, Weighed, Broken’ but it did not
make the Babylonians any wiser.

意义未必要产生意涵。虽然意涵毁灭意义。丹尼尔的解释圣经的故事,书写在墙壁上,充当这个的很好的例子。丹尼尔的翻译阿拉梅克的文字“‘Mene, Mene, Tekel,
Upharsin’ ,翻译成为“被形成数目,被形成数目,被压倒,被破碎“。但是巴比伦人还是不清楚那是啥意思。

After Daniel had revealed to King
Belshazzar what the words represented, the Babylonians were still puzzled
about their significance.34 Hence, the revelation of the meaning of a coded
message does not eradicate the question as to what it refers to, or why it
has been produced in the first place. The acknowledgement of a desire
does not solve the mystery surrounding its origin and object. But finding
the signification of a message does imply that the meaning of that message
disappears, to the extent that it can no longer be interpreted in a variety
of ways.

在丹尼尔已经显露给贝萨扎国王知道这些字代表什么,巴比伦人依旧困惑,关于它们的意涵。因此,符码讯息的意义的启示并没有抹除这个问题,关于它提到什么,或是为什么它首先曾经被产生。欲望的被承认并没有解决环绕它的起源与客体的神秘。但是找到讯息的意涵确实暗示:那个讯息的意义消失。甚至,它不再能够用各色各样的方式被解释。

In relation to clinical practice Lacan was adamant that ‘interpretation
is on the side of meaning and goes against signification’ (Lacan 1973
[1972]:37). The analyst needs to ensure that the analysand’s messages
(dreams, symptoms, demands, etc.) are deciphered in such a way that
the elusiveness of meaning (the ethereal character of desire) is maintained.
Whereas meaning keeps desire open, signification kills it because there
is nothing left to desire anymore.

关于临床的实践,拉康坚决主张,解释在意义的这一边,而且违背意涵。分析家需要保证:分析者的讯息(梦,症状,要求,等等)都被解析,用这样的方式,以致意义的闪躲(欲望的空灵特性“被维持。虽然意义让欲望保持开放,意涵杀死它。因为没有任何东西被剩余下来可以欲望。

This idea was already present in Lacan’s works from the early 1950s,
when he pondered the value of ‘naming’ desire as a psychoanalytic action.
In Seminar I he was quite appreciative of Strachey’s idea (1934) that the
analyst’s interventions should be confined to naming the pervasive yet
inexpressible aspects of the analysand’s discourse (Lacan 1988b [1953–
54]:188).

这观念已经出现在拉康的著作,从1950年代开始。当他沉思“命名”欲望的价值,作为是精神分析的行动。在第一研讨班,他相当赏识史特拉奇的观念:分析家的介入不应该被限制于命名分析者的辞说的这个瀰漫而又无法表达的层面。

Yet one year later, in a discussion of The Interpretation of
Dreams, he claimed that ‘behind what is named, there is the unnameable’
and that everything ‘revealed as nameable is always on the level of the
dream-work’, ‘a symbolisation, with all its laws, which are those of
signification’ (Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:211). In other words, naming is
part and parcel of the psychic process that transforms a latent, unconscious
wish into a manifest dream-content: the dream-work proceeds from the
repressed (the unnameable) to the expressible (the nameable).35 Since
the interpretation of dreams follows the opposite route, from manifest to
latent, it is precisely the naming, the formulation of the wish that should
be unravelled.

可是,一年以后,在讨论“梦的解释”,他宣称:在被命名的东西的背后,有这个无法被命名的的东西,每样被显露作为可命名的东西,总是在梦的运作的层面。这样的象征化,具有它的一切法则,它们是意涵的法则。换句话说,命名心灵过程的部分与包裹,它转换一个潜在,无意识的愿望,成为是明显的梦的内容。梦的运作前进,从被压抑的东西(无法被命名的东西),到可表达的东西,(可命名的东西)。因为梦的解释遵相反的途径,从明显到潜在,它确实就是命名。应该被揭发的愿望的阐述。

Challenging his audience, Lacan accordingly averred:
‘[W]hat we are looking for in the interpretation of the dream, [is] this x,
which in the end is desire for nothing. I defy you to bring me a single
passage from the Traumdeutung which concludes—this is what the
subject desires’ (ibid.: 211). None the less, Lacan continued to use the
naming of desire as an interpretive act, yet changing the connotation of
naming from ‘defining’ and ‘designating’ (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:329)
to ‘creating’, ‘recognising’ ‘restoring’ and ‘bringing into existence’
(Lacan 1988c [1954–55]:228–229; 1958–59: session of 26 November
1958).

因为拉康挑战他的听众,他因此主张:“在梦的解析里,我们正在寻找的东西,是这个未知数x。最后,这个未知数x就是空无的欲望。我挑衅你们带给我作为结论的段落,从’梦的解析‘ –这就是主体的欲望。可是,拉康继续使用欲望的命名,作为是解释的行动,可是,改变命名的外延意义,从”命名“与”指明“,改变成为”创造“与”体认“,”恢复“,”使存在“。

To illustrate how his procedure differed from the prevalent tactics of
interpretation within ego-psychology Lacan intermittently referred to a
case-example adduced by Ernst Kris in an influential paper on interpretation
(Kris 1951). The case concerned an academic in his thirties who had come
to see Kris because he experienced great difficulty in publishing the results
of his researches, thus reducing his chances for promotion, due to the
belief that he was always copying other people’s ideas.36

为了解释他的程序的差别,跟自我心理学的盛行的解释的策略的差别。拉康不断地提的一个个案,由克利斯提出的个案,在具有影响力的论文,探讨解释。这个个案关系到他的三十年代的知识份子,他前来探望克利斯,因为他经历巨大困难,要出版他的研究的成果。因此,减少他被升级的机会。由于这个信仰:他总是处理其他人们的观念。

One day the patient
reported that just before he was about to embark on a new project for
publication he had discovered a book in the library containing a blueprint
of the thesis he was on the verge of publishing. When Kris compared the
text in the library with his patient’s views he concluded that, despite some
similarities, his analysand had projected his fantasy of plagiarism onto the
book. Kris told the man that he was not plagiarizing, that his anxiety was
completely unjustified, and that it originated in an infantile wish for a
successful father. Kris waited for the patient’s response and after a lengthy
silence the young man said:

有一天,病人报导说:就在他即将从事新的出版计划,他在图书馆发现一本书,包含他即将出版的一个论文的蓝图。当克利斯比较图书馆的文本,跟病人的观点,他下结论说:尽管某些的类似,他的分析者已经投射他的剽窃的幻想,进入这本书里。克利斯告诉这个人:他并没有剽窃,他的焦虑完全没有理由,他的焦虑起源于婴孩时的愿望,要成为成功的父亲。克利斯等待病人的回应,经过漫长的沉默后,年轻人说:

Every noon, when I leave here, before luncheon, and before returning
to my office, I walk through X street [a street well known for its small
but attractive restaurants] and I look at the menus in the windows. In
one of the restaurants I usually find my preferred dish—fresh brains.
(ibid.: 23)

每个中午,当我离开这里,在午餐之前,在回到我的办公室。我走过X街道,那个街道因为有小而迷人的餐厅著名。我观看窗户上的菜单。在其中一家餐厅,我通常找到我最喜欢的一道菜—新鲜的脑髓。

Kris did not elaborate on this peculiar testimony, but for Lacan it
signalled the analysand’s recourse to an acting-out as a result of Kris’
spurious interpretation. His verification of the analysand’s fear incited him
to interpret the problem as having no basis in reality: ‘You may think that
you are copying somebody’s ideas, but I can assure you that this is not the
case!’ In Lacan’s reading, this interpretation could be termed correct as
regards the factual reality of the analysand’s situation, but it simultaneously
suffocated the analysand’s desire to plagiarize.

他并没有建构这个特殊的证词。但是,对于拉康,它意味着分析者诉诸于行动演出,由于克利斯的假的解释。他的验证分析者的恐惧,刺激他解释这个难题,作为是没有现实的基础。“你可以认为,你正在抄袭别人的观念,但是我告诉你,情况并不是这样!“用拉康的阅读,这个解释可以被称为是正确,关于分析者的情境的实际上的现实。但是,它同时窒息分析者想要剽窃的欲望。

When resorting to the
consumption of fresh brains, the analysand tried to preserve his desire,
against his analyst’s demand that he exchange it for an acceptance of the
facts.37 By eating fresh brains the analysand addressed himself with his
desire to the analyst after the latter had neutralized it by his interpretation.38

当诉诸于新鲜脑髓的消费时,分析者尝试保留他的欲望,对抗他的分析家的要求:他应该交换他的欲望,交换对于事实的接纳。凭借新鲜的脑髓,分析者自己处理他对于分析家的欲望,经过分析家用他的分析,对于他的欲望保持中立。

Although Kris’ intervention was geared towards the analysand’s desire
(his wish), it was at once an attempt to efface it in favour of the young
man’s adaptation to the reality of his situation. As an alternative to Kris’
interpretation (‘Rest assured, you do not steal’) Lacan proposed in ‘The
Direction of the Treatment’ an intervention whereby the analysand would
come to avow his desire to steal whilst acknowledging that the object of
this desire is ‘nothing’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:239). Rather than an actingout,
this restoration of the analysand’s desire around the object ‘nothing’
would have triggered a further analytical exploration of its dialectical
relationship with the desire of the Other, and its continuous transitions
(metonymical) from one inadequate object to another.

在克利斯的介入触动朝向分析者的欲望(他的愿望),它既是一种想要抹除它的企图,以赞同年轻人的适应他的情况的现实。作为克利斯的解释的替代品,(请放心,你并没有剽窃)。拉康建议,在他的“治疗的方向“,分析者将会逐渐宣称他想要剽窃的欲望的介入。另一方面,他又承认,这个欲望的客体是空无。非但没有激情行动,分析者的欲望的恢复,环绕这个客体,”空无“本来会触发更进一步的精神分析的探索,对于它的辩证的关系,跟大他者的欲望,以及它的继续的转换,(换喻的转换),从一个不充分的客体,到另外一个不充分的客体。

Although it demonstrates on the one hand how the analyst smothers
the analysand’sdesire with ‘true’ interpretations and on the other how a
proper psychoanalytic intervention should operate, Lacan’s critique of
Kris’ case-example is also potentially misleading, as it may foster the
view that the analyst ought to tell the analysand what he believes he
desires or, even more radically, that he desires nothing.39 Because such
an inference contradicts Lacan’s ideas that the analysand is the chief
interpreter, that the analyst should not name the patient’s desire, and that
naming means restoring rather than defining, it should be avoided. But
how should the analyst facilitate the emergence of the analysand’s desire
and its interpretations? In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ Lacan
formulated the following abstruse guideline:

虽然它一方面证明,分析家如何窒闷分析者的欲望,用“真实“的解释。另一方面,它也证明,一个合适的精神分析的介入应该如何运作。拉康对于克利斯的个案的例子也是潜在地具有误导,因为它可能培养这个观点:分析家应该告诉分析者,他相信他欲望的东西,甚至更加强烈地,他欲望空无。因为这样的推理,抵触拉康的观念:分析者是主要的解释者,分析家不应该命名病人的欲望,命名意味著恢复,而不是定义。命名应该被避免。但是分析家如何方便分析者的欲望的出现与其解释?在”治疗的方向“,拉康阐述以下的奥秘的引导:

In order to decipher the diachrony of unconscious repetitions,
interpretation must introduce into the synchrony of the signifiers
that compose it something that suddenly makes translation possible…
(ibid.: 233)

为了解无意识的重复的二分法,解释必须介绍某件东西西,进入组成解释的这些能指共时性。突然让翻译成为可能的某件东西。

What Lacan called ‘the diachrony of unconscious repetitions’ in this
passage is nothing else than the mechanism controlling the changing
manifestations of a symptom over a certain period of time. For instance,
the academic described by Kris had regularly pinched sweets and books
during his adolescence, so that his current symptom of plagiarism was just
another avatar of an insistent unconscious core. Interpretation does not
entail finding and offering the signification of the analysand’s history of
symptoms, as in Kris’ explanation that all his symptoms were rooted in a
wish to incorporate his father’s penis (Kris 1951:23), but discovering the
representations (signifiers) that preside over each of the symptoms (‘the
synchrony of the signifiers’) and translating these representations in such
a way that the analysand’s desire becomes apparent.

当拉康在这个段落里,称为是“无意识的重复的二分法”的东西,实实在在就是控制症状的正在逐渐改变的展示,经过某个时间的时期。譬如,克利斯描述的学院人士曾经规律地盯着糖果与书籍,在他的青春期。这样,他目前的剽窃的症状,仅是一个坚持的无意识的核心的另外一次灵显现。解释并没有涵盖找到与发现分析者的症状的历史的意涵,如同在克利斯的解释:所有他的症状都根源于想要合并他的父亲的阴茎的愿望。而是涵盖要发现再现表象,操控每一个症状的能指,(各个能指的共时性),然后翻译这些再现表象,用这样一个方法,让分析者的欲望变得明显。

In the former case the
symptoms are regarded as representations whose signification should be
revealed, whereas in the latter the symptoms function as significations in
themselves, as products of a pathological interpretation whose principles
should be clarified. Unlike the traditional methods of interpretation, which
proceed from representation to signification, Lacan advocated an approach
proceeding from signification to representation and to desire.
More specifically, Lacan contended that the translation of the
synchronous signifierswill only occur if interpretation introduces
something into that synchrony.40 It is not enough for the analysand to
realize which set of representations has governed each of his symptoms
since the onset of his illness.

在前者的情况,症状被认为是再现表现,它们的意涵应该被显示。而在后者,症状发挥功能,作为本身就是意涵。如同病例的解释的产物。它们的原则应该被澄清。不像传统的解释的方法:从再现表现前进到意涵。拉康主张一个方法,从意涵前进到再现表象,然后到欲望。更加明确地说,拉康主张,共时性的能指的翻译会发生,仅是当解释介绍某件东西进入那个共时性。这并不足够让分析者体会到,哪一组再现表象曾经统辖他的每个症状,自从他的疾病的开始以来。

These representations need to be translated
into a desire (their meaning), and the analyst can only ensure that the
translation will not follow the same paths as those that have led to the
appearance of the symptoms if she intervenes in such a way that the set
is being reorganized. The process can be compared to the precipitation
of a substance in a saturated solution as a result of the addition of a
reacting agent.

这些再现表象需要被翻译成为欲望(它们的意义)。分析家仅是告诉,这个翻译将不会遵循相同的途径,跟那些曾经导致症状的出现的相同的那些途径。用这样的方式,以致这组症状正在被体认。这个过程能够被比喻成为在饱满的解决里,物质的突然产生,由于反应的代理者的增加的结果。

The analyst’s interpretation serves as a reacting agent
which facilitates the precipitation of the analysand’s desire out of the
saturated solution of her unconscious repetitions. Analytic interpretation
is what separates desire from a recurrent series of alienating symptomatic
demands, which prompted Lacan to designate its essential status as a cut
(coupure) (Lacan 1958–59: session of 1 July 1959; 1970:70). When and
how often this cut should be performed, and whether it should be
effectuated via a temporal or linguistic punctuation or via the introduction
of a signifier, is for the analyst to decide.41

分析者的解释充当是反应的代理者,让分析者的欲望的突然产生变得方便,从她的无意识的重复的饱满的解决。精神分析的解释,就是将欲望跟重现的系列的疏离的症状的要求,分离的东西。这引起拉康将它的基本的地位,指明作为是切割。这个切割何时及用何种方法应该被执行,以及它是否应该被实践,经由时间或语言的中断,或经由能指的介绍,这要由精神分析家作决定。

As Lacan pointed out in ‘The
Direction of the Treatment’, the analyst is free in the timing, frequency
and choice of his interpretations (Lacan 1977i[1958]:228).42
Being free in the timing also implies that the analyst does not have to
postpone his interpretations until the analysand has developed a
sufficiently strong transference.

如同拉康指出,在“治疗的方向“,分析家在他的解释的时机,频率与选择,可自由运用。在时机的自由运用暗示着,分析家并没有必要拖延他的解释,直到分析者已经发展充分的强烈的移情。

Against Freud’s recommendation in ‘On
Beginning the Treatment’ that not ‘until an effective transference has
been established in the patient, a proper rapport’, should the analyst
disclose ‘to him the hidden meaning of the ideas that occur to him’ (Freud
1913c: 139), Lacan underscored that such an adjournment of
interpretations will automatically reduce their impact, because once the
transference has been established the analysand will hear every
interpretation as coming from the person he has identified the analyst
with (Lacan 1977i[1958]:231).43

对抗弗洛伊德的推荐,在“论治疗的开始“:直到病人身上,有效的移情已经被建立,一个适当的关系,分析家才应该给他揭露他想到的隐藏的观念的意义。”拉康强调,这样的解释的拖延将会自动地减少他们的冲突。因为一旦移情已经被建立,分析者将会听见每个解释,作为是来自他认同为是分析家的这个人。

Supporting Freud’s early intervention
in his case-study of the Rat Man (Freud 1909d), Lacan maintained that
before the transference has been well established, the analyst should bring
about a rectification of the subject’s relations with the real, even if this
triggers an aggravation of the symptoms (Lacan 1977i[1958]:237). In
Lacan’s opinion Freud’s shocking interpretation of the Rat Man’s
compulsive fear as the derivative of an unconscious wish to harm his
father need not be dismissed as an indoctrination, but applauded as an
ingenious mapping of the Rat Man’s subjective position.

支持弗洛伊德的早期的介入,在他的“鼠人的个案研究,拉康主张,在移情确实被建立之前,分析家应该导致主体跟实在介的关系的矫正,即使这会触发症状的恶化。依拉康之见,弗洛伊德的令人震撼的解释”鼠人“的强迫性恐惧,作为是无意思的愿望的衍生物。为了伤害他的父亲。这种解释并没有需要被排斥为是灌输。而应该被称赞为是机智地描绘”鼠人“的主观的立场。

‘Rectification
of the subject’s relations with the real’ does not entail forcing the
analysand to face the reality of his condition, but it entails enabling him
to acknowledge the motive supporting the place he adopts in his speech.
If Freud had put himself on the side of reality, he would have told the
Rat Man: ‘Despite the fact that you think you are a criminal, I can tell
you that you have never committed a serious criminal offence’. Yet putting
himself on the side of the subject’s relations with the real, he said: ‘If
you think you are a criminal, you’d better start recognizing the nature of
the unconscious crimes you have committed’.

主体跟实在界的关系的矫正,并没有涵盖要强迫分析家面对他的情况的现实。但是,它涵盖让分析家能够承认这个动机,支持他在他的言说里採用的位置的动机。假如弗洛伊德当时曾经将他自己,放置在现实的这一边,他本来会告诉“鼠人“说:「尽管你认为你是罪犯的这个事实,我能够告须你,你从来没有犯过严重的刑罚的罪。」可是,假如弗洛伊德将他自己放置在主体跟实在界的关系的这一边,你最好开始体认出你曾经犯过的无意识的罪的特性。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

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拉康:解释的意义

December 15, 2015

THE MEANING OF INTERPRETATION
解释的意义

In the first sentence of the preface to his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan wrote
that the ‘surrounding circumstances’ of his text ‘had some effect on it’
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:30). He ensuingly revealed how the French
psychoanalytic community had recently split following the creation of a
training institute, the official party line preventing him and his followers
from speaking at a formal gathering of francophone psychoanalysts in
Rome.8 According to Lacan the dissension had occurred when certain
members of the French group had tried to impose a series of rigid training
rules, yet a Bulletin of the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA)
makes clear that in reality the debate hinged on the incompatibility
between Lacan’s habit of conducting sessions of variable length and the
existing professional standards (Eissler 1954:267–290).

在“罗马辞说”的序言的第一个句子,拉康书写到:他的文本的“周遭的环境”对它具有某些的影响“。拉康随后显示,法国的精神分析的社团最近分裂,跟随着训练的学院的创立之后。官方的学派阻止拉康与他的追随者不能在罗马的讲法语的正式的聚会里演讲。依照拉康的说法,这个异端争议会发生,是因为某些的法国团体的成员曾经尝试赋加一系列的严格的训练的规则。可是,国际精神分析协会的公告澄清:实际上,跟这个争议息息相关的是这个不合谐,拉康的习惯主导长短不一的咨商时间,与现存的专业的标准之间的不和谐。

Lacan’s unruly
behaviour constituted a thorn in the side of many an IPA council member,
the more so that he had apparently promised to abide by the deontological
code without effectively doing so (ibid.: 276).

拉康的粗鲁的行为构成一个眼中钉,在国际精神分析协会的成员的这一边。更加是如此,因为拉康明显地承诺要支持废除本体论的符码,虽然他并没有实际这样做。

In his ‘Rome Discourse’ Lacan minimized the historical controversy
surrounding his idiosyncratic technique in favour of a sustained theoretical
defence of its application, yet the vehemence with which he endorsed
the variable-length session, against the formalism advocated by the
establishment, indicates the issue’s crucial importance within
contemporary psychoanalytic circles. Lacan’s principal argument in
support of variable-length sessions was that the analyst’s manipulation
of time functions as an interpretive intervention in so far as it punctuates
the analysand’s speech. In the first chapter of the ‘Rome Discourse’ he
put it as follows:

在“罗马辞说“,拉康轻视环绕他的怪诞的技术的历史的争论,以赞同用理论持续地辩护他的怪诞的技术的运用。可是,他热烈地替他的长短不一的咨商时间背书。对抗精神分析体制所主张的形式主义。拉康指示这个议题的至关紧要,在当代的精神分析的内圈里面。拉康的主要的论点,支持长短不一的咨商时间,是因为分析家的对于时间的操控,充当是解释的介入。因为它中止分析者的言说。在”罗马辞说“的第一章节,拉康的表达如下:

It is therefore, a beneficent punctuation, one which confers its
meaning on the subject’s discourse. This is why the adjournment
of a session—which according to present-day technique is simply
a chronometric break and, as such, a matter of indifference to the
thread of the discourse—plays the part of a metric beat which has
the full value of an actual intervention by the analyst for hastening
the concluding moments.
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:44)

因此,这是一个有利的中止,赋予它的意义给主体的辞说的中止。这就是为什么咨商时间的中止扮演计时节拍的角色—依照目前的技术,仅是时钟的中止。作为这样的中止,对于辞说的脉络表示漠视。计时节拍扮演的角色,对于分析家的具有实际的介入的充分的价值,因为他可以加快作为结论的时刻。

Further in the text he added that analysands inevitably experience the
analyst’s suspension of the session as a punctuation of their discourse
(ibid.: 98). So if interpreting equals punctuating the analysand’s speech,
suspending the session will have effects similar to those induced by more
traditional forms of interpretation.

在文本里,更加深入地,拉康补充说:分析者无可避免地经验到分析家的悬置咨商时数,作为是他们的辞说的中止。所以,假如解释相等于是中止分析者的言说,悬置咨商时数将会具有影响,类似由更加传统的解释的形式产生的影响。

In Lacan’s view, professional
regulations about analytic time-keeping, such as ‘Every session lasts 50
minutes’, were just arbitrary rules imposed by anonymous authoritarian
bodies on both the analyst and the analysand, depriving the analyst of
the possibility to use the interpretive power of time in a responsible and
calculated fashion to the benefit of the analytic treatment.

从拉康的观点,专业的规范关于时间的长短,譬如“每个咨商时间延续50分钟“,那仅是任意性的规则,被匿名的权威的团体赋加在分析家与分析者身上。这些规则剥夺分析家的可能用时间作为解释的力量,用负责而经过估算的方式,结果有利于精神分析的治疗。

Complying
with a preset working-time is worse than manipulating it, because in the
former case it is impossible to control the effects of the session’s
interruption on the analysand’s condition (ibid.: 99). Partly because Lacan
transformed an agreed professional standard into a flexible technical tool,
partly because his innovation was perceived as stretching the limits of
the analyst’s power over the patient, high representatives of the IPA
considered his practice unacceptable, and refused to give way on this
point when Lacan’s group applied for a new official recognition during
the early 1960s.9

同意目前的工作时间,更加糟糕于操控工作时间。因为在前者的情况,我们不可能控制咨商时间的中断的影响,对于分析者的情况。部分是因为拉康转换一个共识的专业的标准,成为具有弹性的技术性的工具。部分是因为他的创新被感觉是延长分析家的对于病人的权力的限制。国际精神分析协会的高级代表都认为拉康的做法无法被接受。并且拒绝让步,针对这一点。当拉康的团体在1960年代早期,申请新的官方的承认。

Precision is not a liberating factor and conjecture does not pre-empt
rigour, Lacan argued (ibid.: 74, 98). No matter how rebellious to any type
of formalism, he believed that the analysts’ temporal interventions could
be presented in rigorous and unambiguous terms. For the development of
this new clinical formalization, Lacan took his lead from his own theory
of logical time, in which he had distinguished between the ‘instant of the
glance’, the ‘time for comprehending’, and the ‘moment of concluding’,
on the basis of an analysis of the sophism of the three prisoners (Lacan
1988a[1945]).10

拉康主张:准确性并不是解放的因素,推测并没有让严谨松绑。无论对于任何种类的形式主义的反叛,拉康相信,精神分析家的时间的介入能够被呈现,用严谨而不模糊的术语。对于这个新的临床的正式化的发展,拉康从他自己的逻辑时间的理论带头前进。在逻辑时间里,拉康区别“瞥见的瞬间“,”理解的时间“,与”作为结论的时间“,他以三位囚犯的诡辩的分析作为基础。

Because each prisoner’s freedom is dependent upon the
reduction of the time for comprehending, after the instant of the glance,
Lacan averred that the analyst’s suspension of the session should always
be geared towards the precipitation of the moment of concluding and thus
towards the reduction of the time for comprehending (Lacan
1977e[1953]:48).11 This is why, in the above citation, he described the
value of an analytic intervention as hastening the concluding moments.
With their interpretations analysts need to ensure that the amount of time
analysands spend on understanding, brooding and plotting is reduced to a
minimum.

因为每位囚犯的自由依靠理解时间的减少,经过瞥见的瞬间之后,拉康主张,分析家的悬置咨商时间应该总是被发动,朝向结论的时刻的突然来临,因此朝向理解的时间的减少。这就是为什么,在以上的引述里,拉康描述精神分析介入的价值,作为是加速结论时刻的来临。随着他们的解释,分析家需要保证:分析者花费在理解,沉思与计谋的时间的数量,被化减到最小量。

These mental activities are considered counter-productive
because just as in the story of the three prisoners they bar the roads to
freedom.12 To put Lacan’s principle in more psychological terms: through
her interpretations, including the suspension of the session, the analyst
has to facilitate and accelerate decision-making processes in the analysand;
he has to urge the analysand to make decisions about his life in line with
his desire, despite the fact that he does not master all the knowledge
necessary to be sure that these decisions are right.13

这些精神的活动被认为是跟生产相反,因为正如在三位囚犯的故事,他们阻碍了自由之路。用更加心理学的术语来表达拉康的原则:经由她的解释,包括悬置咨商时间,分析家必须方便而且加速做决定的过程,在分析者身上。分析家必须建议分析者从事决定,关于他的生活,以符合他的欲望。尽管这个事实:他并没有掌控所有必要的知识,以便确定,这些决的是正确的。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, compressing the time for
comprehending facilitates the moment of concluding because it stimulates
‘the meditation of the subject [the analysand] towards deciding the
meaning [sens] to attach to the original event’ (ibid.: 48).14 A necessary
mediating factor between the analyst’s interventions and the analysand’s
conclusions, the crystallization of meaning is the first corollary of an
appropriate analytic interpretation.15 Lacan accordingly underlined that
psychoanalysis is ‘an action whose effects are entirely dependent on
meaning’ (ibid.: 33).

用拉康的治疗的观念来说,将理解的时间压缩,有利于结论的时刻。因为它刺激主体(分析者)的沉思,朝向决定要跟原初的事件连系一块的意义。在分析家的介入与分析者的结论之间的必要的中介的因素,意义的具体化,就是合适的精神分析的解释的最初的结果。拉康因此强调:精神分析师一个行动,这个行动的结果完全依靠意义。

Yet, against all odds, he also intimated that this
dependency of the analytic effects on meaning does not imply that
analysts are expected to reveal the meaning of their analysands’ symptoms
through their interpretations. The content of the analyst’s interpretations
is not tailored to the meaning of what the analysand is suffering from.
When interpreting the analyst is not supposed to tell the patient what his
symptoms mean.

可是,即使面对不利情况,拉康也主张,精神分析的依靠意义的影响,并没有意味着:精神分析家被期望揭示他们的分析者的症状的意义,通过他们的解释。分析者的解释的内容并没有被附加在分析者的遭受痛苦的内容的意义。当从事解释时,分析家并没有被认为应该告诉病人,他的症状是什幺意义。

During the 1950s, Lacan stressed on numerous
occasions that symptoms are legible and need to be deciphered (Lacan
1977f [1955]:127, 133; 1977g[1957]:159–160; 1977h[1957–58]:184,
194), but this process of exegesis (Lacan 1977e[1953]:70) should not be
read as an activity whereby the analyst discovers or guesses the meaning
of the analysand’s symptoms and offers the results of his quest to the
patient.16 After all, were that to be a requirement it would be difficult to
see how the analyst’s suspension of the session could function as an
interpretation, since these scansions contain not a single meaningful detail
about the patient’s symptoms and life history.

在1950年代,拉康在许多场合强调:症状是可以理解的,并且需要被解释。但是解释学的这个过程,不应该被阅读作为是一个活动,凭借这个活动,分析家发现或猜测分析者的症状的意义,然后提供他的追寻的结果给病人。毕竟,假如那是成为一个要求条件,我们将会很困难看出,分析者的悬置咨商时间,发挥功能作为解释。因为这些审视并没有包含意义的细节,关于病人的症状与一生的历史。

The motive behind this precept revives the contentious relationship
between transference and suggestion I have discussed in the previous
chapter of this book. Despite his insistence on the importance of the
analyst’s exegesis of the patient’s formations of the unconscious Lacan
believed that detailing their meaning has an objectifying and alienating
effect on the analysand. If analysts were to disclose the meaning of the
analysands’ symptoms in their interpretations, they would convey
knowledge about the origin of these symptoms to their patients, implicitly
telling them that as analysts they are capable of understanding the
problems at hand. Long before the introduction of the supposed subject of knowing, Lacan criticized this interpretive style for its suggestive impact.

这个信条的背后的动机,重新唤醒移情与暗示之间的具有争议性的关系。我在本书的先前的章节曾经讨论过。尽管他坚持这个重要性:分析家对于病人的无意识的形成的信念。拉康相信,详细列出他们的意义,具有客观化与疏离的效果,对于分析者。假如分析家想要在他们的解释里,揭露分析者的症状的意义,他们将会传递关于这些症状对于他们的病人的起源的意义。分析家暗示地告诉分析者,作为分析家,他们能够理解手边的难题。在介绍被认为应该知道的主体之前,拉康早就批评过这个解释的风格,因为它具有暗示的影响。

In Seminar I, for instance, he underscored that interpretation,
despite its being predicated upon the action of speech, should not count
as an intellectual activity (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:274). He vilified Anna
Freud’s proposition to use interpretation as a means of educating the ego
for its hidden intellectualist tendencies, which can only be detrimental
to the advancement of the treatment (ibid.: 65–67).17 In ‘Variations of
the Standard Treatment’ he put it even more bluntly:

譬如,在第一研讨班,拉康强调:介入,尽管介入是根据言说的行动来陈述,介入不应该被认为是知识的活动。拉康抨击安娜 弗洛伊德的建议要使用解释,作为是教育自我的工具,以寻找它的隐藏的知识的倾向。这个建议是有害的,对于治疗的进展。在“标准治疗的变化“,拉康甚是更加坦直地表达:

This knowledge [of the analyst] has without doubt much increased
…but one must not pretend to have distanced oneself from an
intellectualist analysis in this way, unless one acknowledges that the
communication of this knowledge to the subject [the analysand] only
functions as a suggestion to which the criterion of truth is alien.
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:337)

分析家的这个知识无可置疑地已经大量增加,但是我们一定不要假装,用这个方式,我们已经让自己跟知识的精神分析保持距离。除非我们承认,这个知识的沟通给主体(分析者),仅是发挥功能,作为是建议。对于这个建议,真理的标准的外来的。

After his conceptualization of the supposed subject of knowing, Lacan
repeated his admonition in the phrase that the analyst is never to identify
with this supposed subject of knowing (Lacan 1961–62: session of 22
November 1961; 1966–67: session of 21 June 1967).18

经过他建构被认为是应该知道的主体的观念,拉康重复他的警告,用这个表达:分析家才从来就不应该认为被认为是应该知道的主体。

In a similar vein, Lacan disqualified all analytic attempts at
understanding the analysand’s problems. ‘To interpret and to imagine
one understands are not at all the same things. It is precisely the opposite’
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:73). Two years later, in Seminar III, he stated:
‘It’s always at the point where they [students] have understood, where
they have rushed in to fill the case in with understanding, that they have
missed the interpretation that it’s appropriate to make or not to make’
(Lacan 1993[1955–56]:22). An even more provocative assertion appeared
in Seminar IV, in the context of a discussion of Freud’s case of Little
Hans (Freud 1909b):

以同样的心情,拉康认为所有的精神分析的企图,并没有资格要理解分析者的难题。“解释与想像我们会理解,根本就不同一码事。它们确实是背道而驰。两年以后,在第三研讨班,拉康陈述:「总是在这个时刻,学生们已经理解,他们已经冲进来,要用理解填补这个个案,他们已经错过这个解释,从事这个解释或不从事这个解释,都是合适的。」一个更加挑衅的主张,出现在第四研讨班,在弗洛伊德的“小汉斯”的个案的讨论的内文:

This observation [of Little Hans] unfolds entirely within the register
of misunderstanding. I will add that this is the case with all types
of creative interpretation between two subjects. This is the way
one has to expect interpretation to develop, it is the least abnormal
of all, and it is precisely in the gap of this misunderstanding that
something else will develop, that will have its fecundity.
(Lacan 1994[1956–57]:341)

对于小汉斯的这个观察,完全展开,在误解的铭记的内部。我将补充说,两个主体之间,就各自的创造性的解释,都是这个情况。这就是这个方式,我们必须期望解释发展。这是最没有异常的东西。它确实就在这个误解的差距里,某件其他的东西将会发展,将会拥有它的成果。

Additional comments on the inherent dangers of understanding abound
in Lacan’s seminars from the 1960s and 1970s, and one of the reasons
why he eventually decided to dissolve his own school was that he believed
his pupils to be too convinced that they understood the meaning of his
words.19 As his work progressed, Lacan argued that apart from nurturing
suggestion and proceeding from the analyst’s own fantasies and
prejudices, understanding is a response to the analysand’s demands (to
be understood), whereas these demands need to be maintained (supported,
propped up) and questioned in their signifying structure (Lacan
1991b[1960–61]: 234–235; 1977i[1958]:255).

针对理解的本质上的危险的额外的评论,充斥在拉康从1960年代到1970年代的研讨班。其中一个理由,拉康为什么最后决的解散他自己的学派是,他相信他的学生太过于相信,他们理解他的话语的意义。随着他的研究的进展,拉康主张,除了滋养暗示与从分析家自己的幻想与偏见前进,理解是一种反应,对于分析者的要求(为了被理解)。而这些要求需要被维持,(被支持,被支撑),然后被质疑,在他们的成为能指的结构里。

But how are analysts supposed to interpret then if they ought to avoid
offering meaning, producing knowledge and conveying understanding?
What is left of the classic definition of interpretation as an act of translation
or explanation that facilitates insight into a certain matter through the
revelation of meaning?20 Although he retained the notion of meaning to
represent the proper effect of analytic interpretations, Lacan rejected all
the standard approaches to interpretation and presented an alternative
based on Hindu linguistic philosophy and Zen Buddhism.

但是,精神分析家如何被认为当时是解释,假如他们忘记避免提供意义,产生知识与传递理解?解释的古典的定义作为翻译的行的,剩余什么?或作为解释的行动,方便洞察力进入某个事件,通过意义的启示,剩余什么?虽然拉康保留意义的观念,为了代表精神分析解释的适当的影响,拉康拒绝所有的标准的接近解释的方法,并且呈现一个替代选择,以印度的语言哲学与佛教禅宗作为基础。

Through these two oriental traditions he discovered ‘resonance’ as a new feature of
speech. Due to this characteristic, speakers can say something without
effectively saying it on the level of the statement; they can induce ideas
in the mind of the listener which are the opposite of those included in the
text of the transferred message. This is how Lacan explained ‘resonance’
as an appropriate interpretive tool in his ‘Rome Discourse’:

通过这两个东方的传统,拉康发现“共鸣”,作为言说的新的特征。由于这个特色,言说者能够说某件东西,但是没有有效地说出它,在陈述的层面。他们能够诱导出观念,在倾听者的心里。这些观念是被包含在被传递的讯息的文本里。这是拉康解释“共鸣”的方式,作为合适的解释的工具,在他的“罗马辞说”。

There is…no doubt that the analyst can play on the power of the
symbol by evoking it in a carefully calculated fashion in the
semantic resonances of his remarks. This is surely the way for a
return to the use of symbolic effects in a renewed technique of
interpretation in analysis. In this regard we could take note of what
the Hindu tradition teaches about dhvani, in the sense that this
tradition stresses the property of speech by which it communicates
what it does not actually say. (Lacan 1977e[1953]:82)

无可置疑地,精神分析家能够扮演象征的力量,凭借召唤它,用仔细估算的方式,在他的谈论的语意的共鸣里。这确实就是这个方式,回转到象征的影响的使用,用精神分析里解释的更新的技术。关于这一点,我们能够注意印度传统教导我们的东西,关于dhvani,用这个传统强调言说的属性。凭借这样的言说,它沟通它没有实际说出的东西。

According to Pandey’s Indian Aesthetics, a volume from which Lacan
distilled most of his information on Hindu linguistics, dhvani is the power
of words to invoke something else than what they literally say. Pandey’s
example, which Lacan dutifully copied, runs as follows (Pandey 1950:
219–220; Lacan 1977e[1953]:82).21 A young courting couple agrees to
meet in a secluded garden on the bank of a river.

依照潘帖伊的“印度的美学”,从这一本书,拉康过滤大部分他的资讯,有关印度的语言学。Dhvani是文字的力量,召唤某件其他的东西,除了它们实质所说的内容。潘帖伊的例子,拉康按部就班地抄写,内容如下:一对年轻的求婚的伴侣同意在隐蔽的花园会面,在河流的堤岸。

Waiting for her boyfriend,
the girl notices how a religious man she knows is approaching their hideout.
For obvious she wants the man to disappear as quickly as
possible, yet she does not want to tell him off explicitly. Having decided to
drive him away without showing her true intentions, she says: ‘O religious
minded man! you can now roam freely over this place. For the dog, of
whom you were so afraid, has been killed today by the proud lion, who, as
you know very well, lives in the impervious thicket on the bank of Godavari’
(Pandey 1950:220).

正在等待她的男友时,这位女孩注意到,她认识的一位宗教僧侣正走靠近他们的隐藏处。因为很明显地,她想要这个僧侣尽快地消失。可是,她不想要明确地叫他走开。因为她已经决定要驱赶他走开,但是又不显露她的意图。她说:「哦,宗教心灵的人!你现在能够自由地漫游到这个地方。因为这条狗,你如此地害怕它,今天已经被高傲的狮子杀死。你清楚知道,这只高傲的狮子,居住在浓密的森林里,在高达凡立河的堤岸。

If the man, after hearing the girl’s words, decides to
run off as fast as he can, it is, Pandey argues, ‘because of the negative
meaning understood by him in a positive statement’ (ibid.: 220). In Lacan’s
reading of this passage, the man flees because he hears something the
girl’s words do not actually say. She says ‘You can now roam freely’, but
he hears ‘I need to get out of this place as soon as possible’.

假如这个人,听完女孩的话语后,决的尽快地跑开,潘帖伊主张,那是因为他理解的负面的意义,用正面的陈述。在拉康阅读这个段落时,这个人跑离开。因为他听见女孩的话语没有实际表达出的某件东西。她说:「你现在能够自由地漫游」。但是他听见:「我需要尽可能快速地离开这个地方。」

At the end of his ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]:106–107) Lacan
adduced another, slightly different example of the resonances of speech
from the teachings of the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, which he had
borrowed from T.S.Eliot’s The Waste Land (1974[1922]).22 When the
threefold offspring of Praja-pati had completed their training in sacred
knowledge with their father, they wanted him to say something. To the
gods (deva) Praja-pati responded with the syllable ‘Da’ and when asked
whether they had understood the gods said: ‘Yes, we have understood.
You said to us “control yourselves” (damyata)’.
在“罗马辞说”的结束,拉康补充另外一个稍微不同的例子,说明言说的共鸣。从“奥义书”的教导里。他从艾略特的“荒原”借用过来。当普拉杰-帕帝的三重后代已经完成他们跟父亲的训练,关于神圣的知识。他们想要他说出某件事情。普拉杰-帕帝回应众神,用这个音节“达”。当众神被问他们是否理解,众神说:「是的,我们已经理解。你跟我们说,控制你们自己“

Upon which Praja-pati
said: ‘Yes, you have understood’. To the men (manusya), Praja-pati replied
with the same syllable ‘Da’ and they too said they had understood: ‘You
said to us “give” (datta). Praja-pati replied: ‘Yes, you have understood’.
Finally, Praja-pati told the demons (asurah) ‘Da’ and they said: ‘We
have understood. You said to us “be compassionate” (dayadhvam)’.
Prajapati said: ‘Yes, you have understood’ (Radhakrishnan 1953:289–291).

听完这话,普拉杰 帕帝说:「你们已经理解。」对这些人们,普拉杰 帕帝回答,用相同的音节,“达“。他们也说他们已经理解。「你对我们说”给予“。普拉杰 帕帝回答:「是的,你们已经理解。」最后,普拉杰 帕帝告诉恶魔”达“,他们说:「我们已经理解。你跟我们说,“要悲悯!」普拉杰 帕帝说:「是的,你们已经理解。」

Like the previous example, this story shows how the addressees understand something the speaker has not actually said. In addition it demonstrates how
each of the three groups attach a different meaning to the same signifier, in
a way that is presumably concomitant with their different status as gods,
men and demons. However, in this example it is unclear what the speaker
wants his listeners to understand. Whilst the girl on the river bank evidently
wanted the religious man to disappear, Praja-pati’s intention remains a
mystery. Or rather it seems that whatever the meaning his children attribute
to his words, he is happy to go along with it.23

就像先前的例子,这个故事显示,被对谈者理解某件言说者并没有实际说出的东西。除外,它证明这三个团体的每一个都附属一个不同的意义,给相同的能指。用的方式被认为是伴随着他们不同的地位,作为众神,作为人,与作为恶魔。可是,在这个例子里,并不清楚的是,言说者想要听者理解什么。虽然河流堤岸的女孩显而易见是想要宗教僧侣消失,普拉杰 帕帝的意图始终是个神秘。或者说,似乎,他的小孩归属于他的话语的意义,他很乐意同意那个意义。

Neither in his ‘Rome Discourse’ nor in any other spoken or written
intervention did Lacan detail the implications of this passage from the
Upanisads for psychoanalytic practice. None the less, it appears to me
that Praja-pati’s response is more indicative of Lacan’s take on the analytic
employment of the resonances of speech during the early 1950s than the
parable of the girl and the religious man. In Pandey’ s illustration of dhvani
the girl knows perfectly well which meaning she wants to imbue the
religious man with, and unless he is stupid he will not hesitate to run.

无论是在他的“罗马辞说“或是任何其他的口说或文字的介入,拉康都没有详细说明从”奥义书“的这个段落的暗示,作文精神分析的实践。仍然地,我觉得,普拉杰 帕帝的回应更加是指示著拉康的从事精神分析的运用言说的共鸣,在1950年代期间。而不是指示著女孩与宗教僧侣的寓言。在潘帖伊的插图版的dhvani,这位女孩完全知道她想要给予宗教僧侣的意义。除非他愚蠢,他将毫不犹豫地跑开。

The girl is betting on the proverb that a nod is as good as a wink to a blind
horse, and if it had turned out that the man needed more than a word to be
wise, it is likely that she would have had recourse to a less subtle tactic for
making him leave. The meaning she wants him to acknowledge is
unambiguous, despite the fact that her words cover this meaning with the
veils of courtesy and modesty. Put differently, she does not want to impose
herself, but her words are nevertheless extremely suggestive.

这位女孩赌信这个格言:对于一匹瞎马,棍子跟眨眼一样有用。假如结果是,这个人需要的不仅是智慧之语,很可能,她本来想要诉诸于比较不那么含蓄的策略,用来让他离开。她想要他承认的意义上清楚明白。尽管这个事实:她的话语掩盖这个意义,用礼貌与谦虚的这个面纱。换句话说,她并不想要赋加自己,但是她的话语仍然极端具有暗示性。

In Praja-pati’s words, the resonances are much more obscure, and he
does not seem to expect his listeners to read his ‘Da’ in a particular way.
One could argue that his eternal wisdom allows him to know that the
three categories of his offspring will hear his ‘Da exactly as he wants
them to hear it. But we do not know whether this is indeed the case.
Perhaps he was sure about the effects of his words, perhaps he had no
intentions whatsoever, perhaps he just wanted his children to gain
understanding, regardless of its nature and consequences. In this respect,
Praja-pati’s intervention is much less suggestive than the girl’s response
to the religious man.

用普拉杰 帕帝的话来说,共鸣是更加模糊。他似乎并没有期望他的听众阅读他的“达“,用特殊的方式。我们能够主张,他的永恒的智慧让他能够知道,他的三个范畴的后代,将会听见他的”达“,确实依照他想要他们听见的。但是,我们并不知道这是否确实就是这个情况。或许,他确的他的话语的影响。或许,他根本就没有意图。或许,他刚刚想要他的小孩获得理解,尽管它的特性与结果。在这方面,普拉杰 帕帝的介入比较没有那么暗示性,比起女孩的回答宗教僧侣。

On the one hand Praja-pati satisfies his children’s
demand to tell them something, but when he starts to talk he does not
really say anything. The meaning of what he says is fleeting; it remains
‘in abeyance’ until it is pinned down by his listeners. This procedure
tallies with the Zen technique Lacan evoked in the opening paragraphs
of Seminar I:

一方面,普拉杰 帕帝满足他的小孩的要求告诉他们某件事情。但是当他开始谈论时,他并没有确实说出任何东西。他说的内容的意义是瞬间的,意义始终处于“悬置“,直到被他的倾听者钉住。这个程序跟禅宗的技巧不谋而合。拉康在第一研讨班的开头的段落,引用的禅宗的技巧:

The master breaks the silence with anything—with a sarcastic remark,
with a kick-start. That is how a buddhist master conducts his search
for meaning, according to the technique of zen. It behoves the students
to find out for themselves the answer to their own questions.
(Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:1)

大师用任何东西打破沉默—用嘲讽的谈论,用提醒。这就是佛教大师从事他对于意义的追寻。依照禅宗的技巧。学生有这个必要自己去找出他们的问题的答案。

Although analytic treatment is by no means a relationship between master
and student, the fact that the Zen-master believes that the students possess
all the knowledge necessary to answer their questions relieves him of
the task to produce that knowledge in a suggestive, objectifying fashion,
bringing his interventions very close to those Lacan described as analytic
interpretations. In sum, the meaning of interpretation, as Lacan conceived
it during the early 1950s, is that it sets meaning in motion on the side of
the analysand whilst being in itself a meaningless intervention.

虽然精神分析的治疗绝非是主人与学生之间的关系,禅宗大师相信:学生拥有所有的必要回答他们的问题的知识的这个事实,让大师免除这项工作,用暗示,客观化的方式,产生那个知识。并且将他的介入非常靠近拉康所描述的那些介入,作为是精神分析的解释。总之,依照拉康所构想的,在1950年代,解释的意义是:它触动意义,在分析者这一边。另一方面,它本身就是没有意义的介入。

The consequence of this approach is that interpreting, as an activity
by which meaning is accorded to a certain event, takes place in the analysand rather than the analyst.24 As Freud put it at the end of ‘On
Beginning the Treatment’, the analyst ‘supplies the amounts of energies’
and ‘shows him [the patient] the paths along which he should direct
those energies’ (Freud 1913c:143), but that is as far as the analyst’s
interventions go. In Lacan’s outlook of the 1950s the analyst supplies a
signifier, which is by its very nature meaningless, and facilitates the
analysand’s (re)integration of that signifier into an already existing series
of signifiers (a circuit of knowledge).

这个方法的结果,解释,作为活动。凭藉这个活动,意义被给予某个事件。发生在分析者,而不是分析家。如同弗洛伊德表达它,在“治疗的开始”,分析家供应大量的能源,并且跟病人显示这些途径。沿着这些途径,他应该引导那些能源。但是就分析家的介入而言,在拉康在1950年代的观点,分析家供应一个能指,这个能指绝非是无意义的,并且方便分析者的重新合并那个能指,进入已经存在的系列的能指(知识的循环)。

Consequently, a new meaning will
arise, which should encourage the liberating ‘moment of concluding’.
In setting out the coordinates of this new interpretive style, Lacan
also attacked the positions of his contemporaries. Despite its prominence
within mainstream psychoanalysis, he repudiated the analyst’s
interpretation of the patient’s ego-resistance, because he was convinced
that it transformed the analytic process into an imaginary struggle between
two parties striving for recognition (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:51).25 For
the same reason he rejected the analyst’s interpretation from ego to ego
in the here-and-now of the clinical setting.

结果,一个新的意义将会产生。这个新意义将会鼓励解放“结论的时刻”。当拉康安排这个新的解释的风格的座标时,他也攻击他的当代人的立场。尽管这个立场这主流精神分析里,占优势。拉康排斥分析家的解释病人的自我的抗拒。因为他相信,解释将精神分析的过程,转化成为想像的奋斗,处于两个伴侣奋斗要获得承认。因为同样的理由,拉康排斥分析家的解释,从自我到自我的解释,在临床的背景的此地此刻。

Taking his lead from a paper
by Margaret Little on countertransference (Little 1951) in which she
reported the instance of an analyst interpreting the analysand’s present
state of mind (a mixture of anxiety, confusion and depression) by referring
it back to the analyst’s own current interests (‘You think that I, your
analyst, am jealous of you’), Lacan argued that the ‘analyst here believes
himself authorised to offer …an interpretation from ego to ego, or from
equal to equal…whose foundation and mechanism cannot in any way be
distinguished from that of projection’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:32).26

从探讨小玛格丽特的讨论反-移情开始,在那篇文章里,她报导分析家解释分析者的目前的心灵状态作为例子(混合焦虑,混乱与沮丧),并且凭借回溯到分析家自己的目前的興趣(“你认为我作为分析家是妒忌你)。拉康主张,在此的分析家相信他自己被授权提供从自我到自我的解释,或是从对等者到对等者的解释。他们的基础与机制根本就无法被区别,跟投射的基础与机制。

Because they merely reflect the analyst’s presumptuous use of ‘inside
knowledge’, Lacan opposed even more vehemently all types of
interpretations that circumvent the analysand’s discourse. With biting
sarcasm he declared in ‘Variations of the Standard Treatment’ how it had
become ‘standard’ practice amongst analysts to seek out the analysand’s
truth by interpreting her gait, his grooming, her position on the couch, his
borborygmi, her way of shaking hands, etc. (Lacan 1966b[1955]:337).

因为他们仅是反映分析家的大胆的使用“内部的知识“。拉康甚至更加激烈地反对各种的解释,因为解释绕过分析者的辞说。尖刻嘲讽地,在”标准治疗的变化“,拉康宣称, 解释已经变成是标准的实践,在分析家当中,为了寻求分析者的真理,凭借解释她的态度,她的关注,她在躺椅上的立场,他的腹鸣音,她的握手的方式,等等。

As long as these behaviours operate beyond language, as long as analysands
do not give them a place within their discourse, the meaning ascribed to
them (resistance or compliance, denial or acceptance) simply mirrors the
analyst’s symptomatic use of his alleged clinical expertise. Finally, Lacan
also desacralized the popular idea of moving from ‘surface’ to ‘deep’
interpretations (Fenichel 1941[1938–39]:44–46). In his opinion, the
analysand’s speech is a multilayered surface showing traces of recent as
well as foregone conflicts on each level. Lacan did not believe one had to
remove the dust of everyday life in order to discover the repressed treasures.

只要这些行为运作超越语言,只有分析者并没有给予他们一个位置,在他们的辞说里,被归属于它们的意义(无论是抗拒或是顺从,否认或接受),仅是反应出分析家的症状地使用他被宣称的临床的专业。最后,拉康也亵渎通俗的观念:从“表面“到”深处“的解释。依照他的意见,分析者的言说是多重层面的表面,显示最近与以往的冲突,在每个层面。拉康并不相信,我们必须移除日常生活的灰尘,为了发泄被压抑的财宝。

He did not think the surface to be superficial, nor depth to be hidden beneath
the surface. This is why, in Seminar I, he advised his audience to take up
the study of geology: ‘My dear fellows, you wouldn’t believe what you
owe to geology. If it weren’t for geology, how could one end up thinking
that one could move, on the same level, from a recent to a much more
ancient layer?’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:74).27

他并不认为表面就是浮浅,深处也不隐藏在表面之下。这就是为什么,在第一研讨班,他劝告他的听众要从事地质学的研究。「亲爱的听众,你们将不会相信你们归功于地质学的东西。假如不是因为地质学,我们如何作为思维的结论:我们能够移动,在相同的层面,从最近移动到更加古代的层面?」

Lacan’s wrath was as much unleashed by the analysts’ interpretive tactics
as by the inappropriateness of their interpretations. For instance, in his
discussion of Little’s example, he admitted that the analyst’s interpretation
‘hadn’t failed to have some effect, since he [the analysand] had instantly
recovered his spirits’ (ibid.: 31).

拉康的愤怒同样无所忌惮,关于分析家的解释的策略,跟他们的解释的不合宜。譬如,在他讨论小玛格丽特的例子,他承认,分析家的解释并非完全没有某些效果,因为分析者曾经瞬间恢复他的精神)。

The analysand had accepted the analyst’s
intervention, it had effectuated a radical change in his condition and the
analysis had continued for another year. Yet to Lacan the clinical impact
of the interpretation did not prove that it was correct or, better, that it was
a precise evaluation of the source of the analysand’s problems. Little herself
conceded in her article that the interpretation may have been accurate in
terms of the analyst’s feelings towards the patient, but that it did not capture
the essence of the patient’s grief, his acceptance of it having been fostered
by his identification with the analyst (Little 1951:32).

分析者已经接纳分析家的介入,这已经造成强烈的改变,在他的情况。精神分析已经继续又另外一年。可是,对于拉康,这个解释的临床的冲突并没有证明:它是正确的。或者,更加贴切地说,它是准确地评估分析者的难题的来源。小玛格丽特的自己在她的文章里承认:解释可能已经是正确的,用分析家对于病人的感觉的术语来说。但是解释并没有捕获病人的痛苦的本质,他对于痛苦的接受已经被培养,由于他认同分析家。

Having observed that inappropriate interventions can have amazing
clinical effects, Lacan re-read an influential study by Glover on ‘The
Therapeutic Effect of Inexact Interpretation’ (1931) in order to ascertain
the status of true, correct interpretations.28 The most important conclusion
he drew from Glover’s article is that an interpretation can be analytically
correct without conveying the factual reality of an analysand’s condition,
and vice versa.

当拉康观察到,不适当的介入会令人惊奇的林场的影响,他重新阅读格洛维的具有影响力的研讨“论不明确的介入的治疗的影响”。为了确实,真实,正确的解释。最重要的结论,他从格洛维的文章获得的结论是,解释能够是精神分析是正确,但是没有传递实际上的现实,对于分析者的情况,等等。

In Little’s example, the analyst’s interpretation was
incorrect in spite of the fact that it may very well have been an adequate
representation of a present state of affairs. Conversely, Lacan assessed
Freud’s interpretations in the case of the Rat Man as factually inexact,
yet nevertheless correct with regard to the mental condition of his patient
and the overall progress of the treatment (Lacan 1977e[1953]:88;
1977i[1958]: 237).29

在小玛格丽特的例子,分析家的解释是不正确的,尽管这个事实:它很有理由曾经是充分的代表,对于目前的情况。相反地,拉康凭估弗洛伊德的解释,在“鼠人”的个案,作为是事实上是不确实的。可是,它仍然是正确,关于他的病人的精神的情况,与治疗的全面的进展。

To decide whether an interpretation is correct one
should not judge its correspondence with a factual reality. Nor can the
correctness of an interpretation be inferred from its immediate benefits
for the analysand, whether the disappearance of the symptoms, a general
change of attitude, or the emergence of new plans for the future. Hence,
the truth value of an interpretation depends neither on its relationship
with reality, nor on its healing power, even less on the analysand’s
acceptance or refusal.

为了决定解散是否正确,我们不应该判断它的是否跟实际是现实一致。解释的正确也不能够被推论,从它的当下对于分析者的利益,无论症状的消失,态度的一般的改变,或是新计划的出现到未来。因此,解释的真理的价值,既不是依靠跟现实的关系,也不是依靠它治疗的力量,甚至不是依靠分析者的接纳或拒绝。

Volunteering to formulate a different criterion for assessing the truth
(correctness) of an analytic interpretation, and relying on Freud’s exposition
of the topic in ‘Constructions in Analysis’ (1937d), Lacan stated in Seminar
I: ‘I consider the proof of the correctness of an interpretation to lie in the
confirmatory material the subject supplies.

拉康自愿去阐述不同的标准,为了评估精神分析的解释的真理(正确性),并且依靠弗洛伊德的说明这个议题“精神分析的建构”。拉康在第一研讨班陈述:「我认为解释的正确性的证据:在主体供应的证实的材料里说谎」。

And even that needs to be put
more subtly’ (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:31). In ‘The Direction of the
Treatment’ he subsequently confirmed the validity of his own interpretation
when writing that ‘it is not the conviction with which it is received that
matters, since the conviction will be found rather in the material that will
emerge as a result of the interpretation’ (Lacan 1977i[1958]:234). A more
‘subtle’ picture did not emerge until 1966, in Seminar XIV on The Logic of
the Fantasy (1966–67). Here Lacan argued that if an interpretation’s only
effect is the analysand’s production of more material it still falls under the
rubric of suggestion. For interpretations to be correct, he claimed, they
need to have an effect of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session of 14 December
1966; 1970–71: session of 13 January 1971).

甚至,那需要被表达得更加微妙些。在“治疗的方向”,他随后证实他自己的解释的正确性,当他写到,“重要的并不是它被接受的信念,由于解释的结果。直到1966年,一个更加”微妙“的画面才出现。在第14研讨班,”幻见的逻辑“。在此,拉康主张,假如一个解释的唯一的结果,是分析者产生更多的材料,它依旧失败,在暗示的组织下。为了让解释正确,他宣称,它们需要拥有真理的影响。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

超越移情的原则

December 4, 2015

BEYOND THE TRANSFERENCE PRINCIPLE
超越移情的原则

At the end of this chapter I feel obliged to say something about the
strategies of transference in psychotic and perverse patients, and their
proper management within the constraints of Lacanian psychoanalysis.
For the majority of the aforementioned conceptions apply to neurotic
(obsessional or hysterical) patients and cannot be extrapolated without
modification to other clinical structures. As I have already pointed out in
the two previous chapters, extensive theoretical discussion and concrete
technical advice on these matters must not be expected from the study of
Lacan’s works, the apparent standstill of his genius being even more
conspicuous in the playground of perversion than in the arena of
psychosis.

在这个章节的结束,我感觉有义务说某件事情,关于在精神病与倒错症的病人的移情的策略。以及他们的适当的治疗,在拉康的精神分析的约束之内的合适的管理。因为大多数以上提到的观念,适用于神经症者(妄想症或癔症)的病人。并且必须要有对于其他的临床的结构的修正,这些观念才能被列举。如同我已经指出,在这两个前述的章节,延伸的理论的讨论与对于这些事情的具体的技术的劝告,我们一定不要期望从拉康的著作的研究获得。他的天才的明星的停滞,甚至更加显而易见,在倒错症的游乐场域,比起在精神病的斗技场。

Scrutiny of Lacan’s Seminar III, The Psychoses (1993[1955–56]) and
its corollary, the ecrit ‘On a Question Preliminary to Any Possible Treatment
of Psychosis’ (1977h[1957–58]), suffices to observe his reluctance in
classifying the psychotic’s peculiar interactions with others as transference.
After having claimed in his ‘Rome Discourse’ (1977e[1953]:68) that the
psychotic’s freedom of speech, prevaricating recognition, poses an obstacle
to transference, Lacan described in Seminar III how Schreber’s paranoid
relations with all the masculine characters in his surroundings can be
regarded as transference, simultaneously indicating that the notion ‘is
undoubtedly not to be taken in quite the sense that we usually mean’ (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:31).

仔细审查拉康的第三研讨班,“精神病者”,以及它的发展的成果,“论文集”里的“精神病的可能治疗的基本问题”,我们充分观察到拉康很不愿意将精神病者跟别人的特殊的互动,归类作为移情。在他的“罗马辞说”,拉康曾经宣称,精神病的言说的自由,闪烁地难以体认,会形成移情的阻碍。拉康在第三研讨班描述,许瑞伯的妄想症他周遭环境的男性的人物的关系,能够被认为作为移情,同时又指示,这个观念无可置疑地不应该用我们通常的意涵看待。

Returning to the structure of Schreber’ s delusions at
the end of the seminar, he added that the disturbed relationships with others
within the delusional system are clearly connected to a transference
mechanism (ibid.: 310), which does not imply that the persecutory
relationships constitute a transference in themselves.63
Without resolving the issue Lacan simply referred to Schreber’s
‘delusional “transferences”’ [sic] in his seminal text on psychosis (Lacan
1977h[1957–58]:190), dismissing the bulk of the psychoanalytic
literature on transference and psychosis as an instance of the swiftness
with which ‘psychoanalysts claim to be able to cure psychosis in all
cases where a psychosis is not involved’ (ibid.: 192).64

在研讨班1的结束,当拉康回的许瑞伯的幻觉的结构时,他补充说,跟别人的受的困扰的关系,在妄想症的系统里,跟移情的机制确实明显地息息相关。这个移情的机制并没有暗示着,迫害的关系本身形成移情。拉康并没有解决这个问题,在他论精神病的研讨班的文本,他仅是提到许瑞伯的“幻觉的移情”。他将一大堆的精神分析论移情与精神病的文献,排斥作为是灵巧的例子。灵巧地,精神分宣称能够治疗精神病,在精神病其实并没有被牵涉在内的个案里。

At the very end of
his text, Lacan revealed that his preliminary question to any possible
treatment of psychosis introduced ‘the conception to be formed of the
handling, in this treatment, of the transference’, yet he refused to enter
that area of research because his aim had been to ‘return to’ and not to
go ‘beyond Freud’ (ibid.: 221). Lacan addressed the issue of psychosis
on a regular basis in later years, without gathering up the loose threads
of his previous explorations.

在他的文本的结束,拉康显示,他的最初的问题,针对任何可能的精神病的治疗,介绍即将被形成的观念,关于在这个治疗里的移情的处理。可是他拒绝进入这个研究的领域。因为他的目的一直是“回到”而不是去“超越弗洛伊德”。在晚年,规律地,拉康处理精神病的这个议题,但是,他并没有收集他先前的探索的松散的脉络。

The most oft-quoted and perhaps the only valuable statement on
psychosis and transference within Lacan’s later work is his 1966
introduction to the French translation of Schreber’s memoirs (Lacan
1996b[1966]).65 On a theoretical level Lacan instated a new opposition
between the subject that is represented by a signifier for another signifier,
i.e. the already conceptualized divided subject () of the unconscious,
and the subject of jouissance purportedly underpinning the structure of
paranoia (ibid.: 2).66

在拉康晚年的研究,最经常被引用,或许是唯一有价值的陈述,针对精神病与移情,是他1966年的介绍法文的翻译许瑞伯的回忆录。根据理论的层面,拉康开启一个新的对立,在被另外一个能指所代表的能指的主体,与欢爽的主体之间的对立。前者是无意识的已经被概念化的分裂的主体。后者是刻意作为妄想症者的结构的基础。

From a practical viewpoint he impelled
psychoanalysts working with psychotics to adapt themselves to a clinical
constellation which puts them ‘in the position of object of a sort of
mortifying erotomania’, similar to the place Schreber assigned to Flechsig
in his delusional constructions (ibid.: 4). The upshot of this constellation
would be that the psychoanalyst is not invested with a transference signifier supporting the supposed subject of knowing, but with an
imaginary ‘persona’ subjugated to the unsavoury intentions of an
infatuated stalker.

从实践的观点,拉康推动研究精神病者的精神分析适应临床的汇集,让精神病者处于某种令人羞辱的色情狂的客体的立场。类似于他的幻觉的建构里,许瑞伯指定给弗列西格的位置。这个汇集的结果将是,精神分析家并没有被投注赋有移情-能指,用来支持被认为是应该知道的主体。而是被投注赋有想像的“人格面具”,被隶属于著迷的潜行者的不良的意图。

142 Jacques Lacan and the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis
These scant indications conjure up the picture I outlined in the first
chapter of this book, of the psychotic patient whose lack of ignorance
excludes the supposed subject of knowing and prefigures a destructive,
competitive, imaginary bond. On the question of how to deal with this
type of transference, Lacanian psychoanalysts have formulated a plethora
of clinical guidelines, often based on what they have learnt from their
private experience with single case-studies. The following series of ideas
is a summary of what I consider to be the most important technical
features. The series does not pretend to be exhaustive, and clinicians are
encouraged to approach these ideas as recommendations and not as
established principles or hard-and-fast rules, in keeping with Freud’s
warning in the opening paragraphs of ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(1913c:123).

这些有限的指示让人想起我在本书的第一章节描绘的画面。关于精神病的病人,他的无知的欠缺排除被认为应该知道的主体,并且预先构想一位毁灭的,競争的,想像的默契。针对这个问题:如何处理这种移情?拉康派的精神分析已经阐释临床的指导方针的丰富内容。这些指导方针的基础是他们已经学习到的东西,从他们对于单一的个案研究的私人经验。以下的观念的系列,就是我认为是最重要的专业技术的特征的总结。这个系列并没有伪装穷尽一切。临床医生被鼓励探讨这些观念,作为是1推荐,并且并不是作为被建立的原则,或牢不可破的规则。以符合弗洛伊德的警告,在“论治疗的开始”的开头的段落。

It is first of all believed that analysts run the risk of invigorating the
‘mortifying erotomania’ when helping to disclose the signification of
the psychotic’s experiences. Like Schreber, who suffered immensely from
the realization that ‘All nonsense cancels itself out’ (Schreber 1988
[1903]:151–152), psychotics are engulfed by the significance of their
condition, and do not benefit from people who question or solidify this
significance. More radically than in the case of neurotics, the analyst
ought to abstain from being a mind-reader or seer, because this position
consolidates the psychotic’s mental state and seriously jeopardizes the
analytic setting (Alquier et al. 1992:171). By contrast, analysts are held
to offer an address (Broca 1984:50), a stable place at which the psychotic
patient can call, and which they occupy in the function of secretaries or
witnesses of the psychotic’s experiences (Soler 1987).

人们起初相信,精神分析家冒着这个危险:激发这个“令人羞辱的色情狂”,当他们帮忙显露出精神病的经验的意义。就像许瑞伯,他遭受巨大痛苦,由于体会到,“一切的无意义取消它的本身”。精神病者被他们的情况的意义吞没,并且没有获得利益,从那些质疑或巩固这个意义的人们。比起神经症的个案更加强烈地,分析家应该自我节制,不要成为是阅读心术者,或是预言家。因为这个立场巩固精神病者的精神状态,并且严重地危害精神分析的背景。对照起来,精神分析家被认为要提供一个地址,一个稳定的位置,让精神病的病人能够拜访。他们占据这个位置,以秘书的功能,或是作为精神病这的经验的见证者。

Additionally Lacanian psychoanalysts have reached an agreement on
the importance of the clinician’s calculated restrictiveness with regard
to the psychotic’s intrusive jouissance. Because symbolic castration does
not operate in psychotic patients, jouissance has not been severed from
the Other (Miller 1993:11), which compels psychotics to an existence as
mere objects for the whimsical jouissance of the Other.

除外,拉康派的精神分析家已经达成一个共识,针对临床医生的被估算的限制的重要性,关于精神病的闯入的欢爽。因为象征的阉割并没有运作,在精神病的病人。欢爽并没有被切除,跟大他者。大他者逼迫精神病者过著仅是客体的存在,以满足大他者的幻想的欢爽。

To counter this
painful situation, Lacanian analysts have attempted to regulate the Other’s
overwhelming jouissance by imposing a set of symbolic rules, through
which certain aspects of the psychotic’s jouissance, such as the recourse
to self-mutilation, are being prohibited, and others are being enforced.
In curtailing the psychotic’s jouissance analysts epitomize a semblance
of castration, which is meant to be conducive to the creation of an artificial
space of desire and a socially adapted lifestyle.

为了对付这个令人痛苦的情况,拉康派的精神分析家曾经企图要规范大他者的压倒性的欢爽,凭借赋加一套的象征的规则。通过这些规则,某些的精神病的欢爽的层面,诸如诉诸于自我-切除,是被禁止。还有其他的欢爽正在被执行。当精神分析家缩减精神病者的欢爽时,他描绘出一个阉割的类似物。这个阉割的类似物被用来导致创造人为的欲望的空间,以及适应社会的生活方式。

Strategies of transference 143

The semblance of
castration can be implemented via the analyst’s radical ‘No!’ as a response
to particular expressions of the psychotic’s jouissance (Silvestre 1984:56),
or it can be effectuated more surreptitiously through the analyst’s demand
that patients engage in new social bonds and make themselves accessible
to new encounters (Broca 1985, 1988).

阉割的类似物能够被利用,经由分析家的强烈的“不!”,作为回应精神病的欢爽的特殊的表达。或是,它能够更加秘密地被实现,通过精神分析的要求。这样,病人参与新的社会的默契,并且让他们自己可以接近新的遭遇。

As regards the encouragement of
specific outlets for the psychotic’s jouissance, Lacanians have valued
the analyst’s role as a clinical Maecenas for the artistic projects in which
patients may indulge (Soler 1987:31). Whether painting, writing or any
other type of creative activity, these forms of expression contribute to
the fixation of the psychotic’s jouissance, which in turn increases the
chances for developing social competence.

关于对于精神病者的欢爽,明确的发泄的鼓励,拉康派临床重视分析家的角色,作为是临床的马西纳,因为病人可能耽溺其中的艺术的计划。无论是绘画,写作,或任何其他种类的创造的活动,这些形式的表达,促成精神病者的精神分析的欢爽的固著。反过来,精神病这的欢爽的固著增加发展社交胜任能力的机会。

Finally, on the vicissitudes of the transference in cases of perversion,
even Lacan’s followers have maintained their silence. Relying on Lacan’s
1959 statement that perversion ‘is indeed something articulate,
interpretable, analyzable…on precisely the same level as neurosis’ (Lacan
1977a[1959]:16) and Andre’s argument that perverts approach their
analysts as supposed subjects of enjoying, presenting themselves as
supposed subjects of knowing (Andre 1984:18; 1993:56), I intimated at
the end of Chapter 1 that analysts will have the utmost difficulty in treating
perverse patients, because they somehow display an image of themselves.

最后,针对在倒错症者的个案,移情的起伏变化,即使是拉康的跟随者也主张他们的沉默。他们依靠拉康在1957年的陈述:倒错症确实是某件表达,可以解释,可以分析的东西,跟神经症处于完全相同的层面。安德鲁的主张:倒错症者接近他们的分析家,作为被认为应该享乐的主体,他们呈现自己,作为被认为应该知道的主体。我在第一章的结束时主张,精神分析家将会遭遇最大的困难,当他们处理倒错症的病人。因为他们用某种方式展示他们自己的意象。

Analysing the perverse patient on the same level as a neurotic would
imply that the analyst endeavours to twist the pervert’s fantasy in such a
way that it becomes reinvested with desire at the expense of jouissance.
This seems only feasible if analysts explicitly refuse the attributed position
of supposed subject of enjoying by avoiding any complicity with the
pervert’s strategies and (re)emphasizing their own desire to know, notably
about what the pervert so ardently pretends to know about jouissance.

分析倒错症的病人,根据跟神经症者相同的层次,将会意味著,精神分析家企图扭曲倒错症者的幻想,用这样一种方式,以致它变得被投注欲望,以欢爽作为代价。这似乎是行得通,条件是分析家明确地拒绝这个被归属的立场,作为被认为应该享乐的主体。凭借跟倒错症者的策略作为共谋。并且重新强调他们自己想要知道的欲望。特别是关于倒错症者如此热烈地伪装要知道欢爽。

Challenging the pervert’s knowledge, exposing its inadequacies,
incoherence and inconsistencies, may then lead to the pervert’s
acknowledgement that some knowledge does escape subjective mastery,
and the renewed installation of the supposed subject of knowing. Whereas
the supposed subject of knowing needs to fall at the end of the neurotic’s
analysis, the installation of this function may thus constitute the terminus
of the pervert’s analytic itinerary. In both cases the cure is indeed ‘effected
by love’ (McGuire 1974:12–13) and therefore situated ‘on precisely the
same level’ (Lacan 1977a[1959]:16), but whilst in the neurotic
compartment love needs to travel from necessity to contingency, in the
perverse arrangement it needs to emerge as a necessity. In other words, the analysis of a pervert may be regarded as finished if he manages to
comply with the necessities of love.

挑战倒错症者的知识,暴露这个知识的不足够,不一贯与不一致,可能会导致倒错症者的承认:某些知识确实是主体无法掌控的,并且重新安置被认为应该知道的主体。虽然被认为应该道的主体需要掉落,在神经症者的精神分析的结束。这个功能的安置因此可能形成倒错症者的精神分析的旅行的终点站。在两种情况,治疗确实是由于爱所造成,因此被定位在确实是相同的层面。但是,在神经症的间隔里,爱需要旅行,从必要性到偶然性。然而,在倒错症者的安排里,爱需要出现,作为是必要性。换句话说,倒错者的精神分析可能会被认为是被完成,假如他成功地同意爱的必要性。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

爱的知识与客体

November 29, 2015

KNOWLEDGE OF LOVE AND THE OBJECT a
爱与客体的知识

Thus far I have only examined the role of the analysand as a lover within
the transference. But what about the position of the analyst as a loved
object? Elaborating Socrates’ response to Alcibiades’ declaration of love
in the Symposium, Lacan stressed in Seminar VIII (1991b[1960–61]:185)
that the analyst ought to avoid entering the metaphor of love. Like
Socrates the analyst is approached as a loved object, invested with the
supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, yet she is not meant to
return the analysand’s love if the psychoanalytic process is to continue.
Needless to say that this guideline is but a reformulation of Freud’s
warning in ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]:165–166)
that the analyst who considers entering a love relationship with the
analysand is inevitably drawn into something else than psychoanalysis.

迄今,我仅是解释分析及作为爱人的角色,在移情里面,。但是关于分析家作为被爱的客体的立场又如何?建构苏格拉底的回应阿西比底斯的宣告爱,在“会饮篇”里,在第八研讨,拉康强调,分析家应该避免进入爱的隐喻。就像苏格拉底,分析家被接近,作为是被爱的客体,被投注作为应该知道的主体,这位阿加马。可是,分析家并没有被用来回因分析者的爱,假如精神分析的过程想要继续。自不待言,这个引导仅是重新阐释弗洛伊德的警告,在“论移情与爱的观察”:分析家若是考虑跟分析者进入爱的关系,他无可避免地会被扯进并非是精神分析的其他东西。

Even more important than the analyst’s avoidance of the metaphor of
love is her refusal to identify with the supposed subject of knowing.
When handling the transference the analyst should again follow Socrates’
example inasmuch as he incessantly impressed on his acolytes that he
knew nothing at all, his only objective in life being the ongoing evaluation
of what they themselves purportedly knew.

比起避免爱的隐喻更加重要的事情,就是分析家拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。当分析家处理移情时,他应该再次遵循苏格拉底的榜样。因为他不断地给予他的侍从这个印象:他根本什么都不知道,他一生的唯一的目标,就是正在进行的评估,他们自己被认为知道的事情。

When Lacan claimed that
analysts are supposed subjects of knowing in the transference, it is
therefore crucial to understand that this may be representative of how
analysands perceive their analysts, but not of how analysts should present
themselves vis-a-vis their patients. On numerous occasions Lacan
declared that analysts should refrain from incarnating the supposed
subject of knowing.

当拉康宣称,分析家是被认为知道的主体,在移情里。因此这是很重要的,要理解,这可能的这个代表,分析者如何感知他们的分析家,但是并不是代表分析家应该如何呈现他们自己,跟病人面对时。在无数的场合,拉康宣称:分析家应该自我节制,不要具体表现作为被认为是知道的主体。

As such, he warned in Seminar IX: ‘We need to
learn how to rid ourselves of this supposed subject of knowing at every
moment. We can never have recourse to it; that is excluded’ (Lacan 1961–
62: session of 22 November 1961). Six years later, in Seminar XIV, he
contended that analysts ought to know that they are not subjects endowed
with knowledge, and that one of the analyst’s main tasks consists in the
rectification of the effects of the analysand’s supposition (Lacan 1966–
67: session of 21 June 1967).

作为一位应该知道的主体,拉康在第九研讨班提出警告:「我们需要学习如何替我们自己摆脱这个随时被认为是知道的主体。我们永远无法诉诸于它。那是被排除的。」六年以后,在第14研讨班,拉康主张,分析家应该知道,他们并不是被禀赋具有知识的主体。分析家的主要工作之余,就是矫正分析者的假设的影响。

Taking this precept one step further, one could say that the analyst’s
identification with the supposed subject of knowing is as much a recipe
for the termination of psychoanalytic treatment as engaging in the metaphor
of love, with the caveat that in this case the relation between the analyst
and the analysand will be governed by objectification, suggestion and the
therapeutic abuse of power rather than the mutual sharing of losses and
gains. Not offering themselves as reservoirs of knowledge and not satisfying
the analysand’s demands—a venture in which they engage automatically
when they identify with the supposed subject of knowing— analysts are
expected to bring about a psychic transformation from demand to desire
in the analysand (Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:430; 1977i[1958]:269). In
Seminar XI Lacan put it as follows:

当我们讲这个教导更加深入探讨,我们能够说,分析的认同是应该知道的主体,同样是一个食谱,对于精神分析治疗的终止,作为是参与爱的隐喻。带着这个旦书:在这个情况,分析家与分析者之间的关系将会受到客体化,暗示,与治疗的濫用权力的统辖。而不是互相的分享损失与获益。分析家并没有提供他们自己,作为是知识的贮存所,也没有满足分析者的要求—分析者自动地参与这样的事业,当他们认同应该知道的主体。分析家被期望导致心灵的转变,从要求转变成为分析者身上的欲望。在第11研讨班,拉康表达它如下:

In so far as the analyst is supposed to know [according to the
analysand], he is also supposed [according to the ethics of
psychoanalysis] to set out in search of unconscious desire. This is
why I say …that desire is the axis, the pivot, the handle, the hammer,
by which is applied the force-element to the inertia that lies behind
what is formulated at first, in the discourse of the patient, as demand,
namely the transference.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:235, translation modified)53

因为分析家应该知道,(依照分析者的想法),也被认为应该出发寻找无意识的欲望(依照精神分析伦理学)。这就是我说的东西。欲望是轴心,枢纽,手把,铁锤。凭借它们,力量的元素比运用到惯性,隐藏在起初被阐释背后的惯性,在病人的辞说里,作为要求,换句话说,作为移情。
At the end of Seminar XI he reconstructed this mandatory analytic
transition from demand to desire—the only way out of the clinical impasse
of transference—in the so-called ‘schema of the interior eight’ (ibid.:
271):

在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重新建构这个义务的精神分析的转移,从要求转移到欲望—这是唯一的方式脱离移情的临床的僵局。这个所谓的“内部的8字形的基模”。

Figure 2 The interior eight
Source: J.Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis,
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1994, p. 271.

In this figure the outer line symbolizes the demands (D) verbalized by the
analysand during the initial stages of the analytic process. Through these
demands the analysand inevitably arrives at a point of transference (T),
notably when he bears witness to a belief in the supposed subject of
knowing. If this moment does not prompt the analysand to withdraw from
the treatment, it constitutes a nodal point where the trajectory of demand
bifurcates, continuing either via the line of identification or via desire.
On the one hand analysts can take advantage of their analysands’
transference to present themselves as ego ideals, proving to their patients
that they honestly care about them (thus fulfilling their demands), cultivating
a mutual working alliance, and facilitating processes of social and
behavioural modelling.

在这个图形里,外面的那条线象征要求(D),由分析者文词表达的要求,在精神分析的过程的最初的阶段。通过这些要求,分析者无可避免地到达移情的点(T).特别是当他见证一个信仰:分析家作为是应该知道的主体。假如这个时刻并没有激发分析者从治疗撤退,它会形成一个节点。在那里,要求的投射分叉出去,要就是经由认同的脉络,要不就是经由欲望的脉络。一方面,分析家能够利用他们的分析者的移情,来呈现他们自己,作为自我理想,对他们的病人证明:他们诚实地关心他们(因此,实践他们的要求),培养互相的工作的联盟,并且让社会与行为的模拟过程更加方便。

This is the approach Lacan situated on the
intersecting line of identification, and which he had designated earlier as
the hallmark of suggestion and the analytic abuse of power (Lacan
1998b[1957–58]:423–438; 1977i[1958]:270).54 When analysts opt for this
strategy of transference handling, analysands identify with their analysts
and enter an endless cycle of identical demands.55

拉康将这个方法定位在移情的脉络的互相交会。他早先曾经指明这个方法,作为是暗示与精神分析的滥用权力的标记。当分析家选择处理移情的策略,分析者认同他们的分析家,并且进入认同的要求的无穷尽的迴圈。

On the other hand,
however, the analyst can also halt before the pathway of identification and
direct the analysand towards the realm of desire (d), which Lacan depicted
as an interrupted line piercing the plane of demand at the point of
transference, thus circumventing the line of identification before rejoining
that of demand.56 To open this sequence, the analyst should neither satisfy
nor frustrate the analysand’s demands (Lacan 1977i[1958]:255), but use
them as launch pads for eliciting a series of questions in the analysand:
‘What do you (analyst) want (from me)?’, ‘What do others want (from
me)?’, ‘What is it that I want (others to want from me)?’, and ‘How is
what I want influenced by what others want (from me)?’.

可是,在另一方面,分析家也能够停止,在认同的途径面前,并且引导分析者朝向欲望(d)的领域。拉康描述欲望的领域,作为是被中断的线,贯穿要求的层面,在移情的点,因此绕过认同的线,在重新加入要求的线之前。为了打开这个系列,分析家既不应该满足,也不应该挫败分析者的要求。而是要使用分析者的要求,作为发达的垫板,召唤分析者的一系列的问题:「你作为分析家想要从我这里获得什么?」,「别人想要从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要别人从我这里获得什么?」,「我想要的东西,如何受到别人从我这里想要的东西的影响?」

Again the analyst
is not supposed to answer these questions, because that would only imply
his renewed identification with the supposed subject of knowing. Rather
he is expected to enable analysands to voice their own answers, which
normally leads to the (re)construction of their fantasies and, eventually, to
their realization that it is impossible to know for once and for all what it is
they want since they are human beings endowed with an unconscious. For
analysts the linchpin of this entire procedure is their constant refusal to
identify with the supposed subject of knowing.

而且,分析家并不认为应该回答这些问题。因为那将仅是暗示他的重新的认同作为应该知道的主体。相反地,分析家被期望让分析者能够表达他们自己的回答。分析者自己的回答正常来说,会导致他们的幻见的重新建构。最后,会导致他们的体会:这个不可能的,要一劳永逸地知道他们想要什么,因为他们是禀赋著无意识的人类。对于分析家,这整个过程的支撑就是他们固定地拒绝认同作为是应该知道的主体。

Does this mean that Lacanian analysts are entitled to ensconce
themselves in their comfortable seats without bothering too much about
the acquisition of psychoanalytic knowledge? Not at all. In his ‘Proposition
of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’, Lacan proclaimed:
‘It is clear that of the supposed knowledge he [the analyst] knows nothing
…This in no way authorises the psychoanalyst to be satisfied in the
knowledge that he knows nothing, for what is at issue is what he has to
come to know’ (Lacan 1995b[1967]:6).

这难道意味著,分析家有资格牢固他自己,于他们的舒适的座位,不必太过费心于精神分析知识的获得?绝非如此。在他的1967年的“建议”,论学院派的精神分析家,拉康宣称:「显而易见,关于这个被认为的知识,分析家一无所知。这让分析家根本就没有被授权,要满意于知识。分析家一无所知。因为受到争议的东西,是分析家必须逐渐知道。」

And in a contemporaneous
intervention on the relation between psychoanalysis and reality he declared:
‘Psychoanalysts are the wiseacres of a knowledge about which they cannot
converse with each other. This is something else than the mystagogy of
non-knowledge’ (Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). But what is this functional
knowledge analysts are asked to acquire and which is seemingly powerful
enough to guarantee their ignoring what they know?

在精神分析与现实之间的关系的当代的介入,拉康宣称:「精神分析师知识的嘲讽者。关于这个知识,他们彼此无法对谈。这是某件其他的东西,并非是非-知识的神秘学。」但是,分析家被要求去获得这个功能性的知识是什么?表面上似乎拥有足够力量保证他们忽略他们所知道的东西?

During the early 1950s
Lacan believed it was sufficient for analysts to know that their knowledge
is but a symptom of their ignorance, and that the success of their
interventions crucially depends on their ability to ignore what they know
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:349, 358). Yet from Seminar VIII he underscored
that analysts succeed in ‘knowing that they have to ignore what they know’
only if they know something about love (Lacan 1991b [1960–61]:135).

在1950年代的早期,拉康相信,这样是足够的,精神分析家只要知道,他们的知识仅是他们的无知的症状。他们的介入的成功主要依靠他们的能力,忽略他们所知道的东西。可是,从第八研讨班,拉康强调,精神分析家成功于“知道他们必须忽略他们所知道的东西”。只要他们知道有关爱的某件东西。

In
other words, knowing something about transference is a prerequisite for
suspending the knowledge one has accumulated from training sessions,
books and previous experience.

换句话说,知道关于移情的某件东西,是悬置这个知识的先决条件。我们曾开;累积这个知识,从训练的节数,书籍与先前的经验。

Once again Lacan referred to Socrates who, in spite of his incessant
confession of ignorance, did admit that he knew something about love.
Of course, when Socrates transmitted his knowledge about love he did
not speak in his own name, but through the mouth of a mysterious woman
named Diotima. Lacan interpreted this singularity of the Socratic
discourse as a move necessitated by the antagonism between Socrates’
dialectical method of inquiry and the epistemological status of the
knowledge in question.

再一次,拉康提到苏格拉底。尽管苏格拉底经常坦诚他的无知,他确实承认,他知道某件东西,关于爱。当然,当苏格拉底将他的关于爱的知识传递时,他并没有用他自己的名字谈论。而是通过一位名叫狄奥提玛的神秘的女人。拉康解释苏格拉底的辞说的独异性,作为是这个敌意必然需要的动作,苏格拉底的研究的辩证法,与受到置疑的知识的认识论的地位之间的敌意。

To Lacan knowledge of love escaped Socrates’
dialectical method, forcing him to rely on what he had learnt from the
common-sense opinions of Diotima (ibid.: 142–148). Socrates’
knowledge of love did not belong to the established realm of episteme, a
series of hard and fast scientific facts, but merely to the ethereal sphere
of doxa, the shared ideas of popular wisdom.

对于拉康,爱的知识是苏格拉底的辩证方法无法理解的。爱的这个知识强迫苏格拉底依靠他从狄奥提玛的常识的意见里学习来的东西。苏格拉底的爱的知识并没有属于认识论的已经建立的领域,那一系列的艰涩与快速的科学的事实。代替地,爱的知识仅是属于“共享观念”的空中的领域,那是通俗智慧的共享观念。

Analysts need to possess knowledge of love to be capable of ignoring
what they know and to ensure the maintenance of analytic standards, but
the knowledge of love itself constitutes a limit. This is the problem Lacan
set out to investigate in Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]), not so much
with the brief of enhancing our understanding of love, but more with the
aim of clarifying the rationale behind this limit of love and knowledge.
From the start of the seminar he informed his audience: ‘[W]hat I say of
love is assuredly that one cannot speak about it…I spoke of the love
letter, of the declaration of love—not the same thing as the word of love’
(ibid.: 12). Operating beyond the signifier, Lacan defined love as a sign,
and more specifically as a sign that one changes reason or discourse.

分析家需要拥有爱的知识,这样他才能够忽略他们所知道的东西,并且保证维持精神分析的标准。但是爱的这个知识本身形成一个限制。这就是拉康出发要研究的难题,在第20研讨班。他并没有带著强化我们对爱的理解的主题,而是目的在于澄清爱与知识的这个限制的背后的理性。从研讨班一开始,他告诉他的听众:「我所谈论的关于爱,确实就是,我们无法谈论它的东西。我谈论爱的信息,爱的宣告—这跟爱的话语,并不相同。拉康超越这个能指运作,他定义爱作为是一个讯息。更加明确底,作为我们改变理性或辞说的信息。

Unlike the signifier, love is unequivocal to the extent that it can always
be taken as indicating a transition from one discourse to another (ibid.:
16). However, love is at once the most awkward sign to recognize: neither
the jouissance of the Other, the sexual characters appearing on the surface
of the partner’s body, nor the receipt of love letters, nor the awareness
that the Other knows you so well that he can predict your whereabouts
offer reliable criteria for ascertaining the Other’s love.57 Lacan’s entire
Seminar XX hovered around an amazing paradox: love always constitutes
a sign, but nothing ever constitutes a sign of love. When love takes over,
it inevitably alters the course of human action, yet testimonies of love
are impossible to confirm by established facts.

不像能指,爱并非模棱两可,甚至爱总是能够被认为啥指示一个传递,从一个辞说传递到另一个辞说。可是,爱既是最笨拙的信息,要体认出来:爱既非是大他者的欢爽,性爱的人物出现在伴侣的身体的表面,也非是爱的信息的接收者,也非是这个知道:大他者对你甚为熟稔,以致他能够预测你的下落,提供可靠的标准,作为确的大他者的爱。拉康的整个的第20研讨班,萦绕一个令人惊奇的悖论:爱总是形成一个信息,但是没有任何东西,形成爱的一个信息。当爱接管时,爱一成不变地改变人类行动的途径,可1,爱的测试基石是不可能证实,凭借已经建立的事实。

A woman might be
convinced of her own love and the ravages it provokes, without ever
being able to prove her love to her partner and without ever being
successful in ratifying his own love for her. The crucial implication for
the analyst is that she must never take ostensible signs of love
(transference) in the analysand at face value, whilst acknowledging that
love dramatically changes the analytic picture. In addition, analysts ought
to realize that knowing everything about love is an illusion, and that
what knowledge they have must be subject to continuous revision.

女人可能相信她自己的爱与爱引起的破坏,但是女人从来就不能够证明她的爱,对她的伴侣,女人从来没没有成功地批准他对于她的爱。对于分析家的重要的暗示是,女人一定不要按照分析者身上的表面价值,接受爱的夸张的信息时。另一方面,女人必须承认,爱戏剧性地改变精神分析的画面。除外,分析家应该体会:知道有关爱的一切是一种幻觉。分析家所拥有的知识必须隶属于继续的修正。

Not complying with the metaphor of love and ignoring what he knows
on the basis of a (necessarily limited) knowledge of love, the analyst’s
task also consists in dismantling the ideals which the analysand has
conferred onto him. Whilst supporting the functions of the supposed subject
of knowing and the agalma in order to elicit the analysand’s fantasy, the
analyst needs to ensure that the transference can be analysed. Indeed, for
all his scepticism about the so-called ‘liquidation’ of the transference—
one of the pillars of mainstream French psychoanalysis during the 1950s—
Lacan never disputed the analyst’s duty of bringing about the fall (chute)
or the reduction (reduction) of the analysand’s transference (Lacan 1967–
68: session of 10 January 1968).58

分析家的工作并不是同意爱的隐喻,然后忽略他知道的东西,以爱的必然是有限的知识作基础。分析家的工作也是在于拆解这些理想,分析者给予他的这些理想。分析家一方面支持被认为是应该知道的主体与阿加马的功能,为了召唤分析者的幻见。另一方面,分析家也需要保证,这个移情能够被分析。的确,尽管分析家的怀疑主义,关于移情的所谓的“终止”–在1950年代期间,主流的法国精神分析的支柱之一。拉康从来没有争议分析家的责任,关于分析者的移情的化简的掉落。

Inducing the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing means that the analyst ought to lay bare its illusory character
after having exploited (but not identified with) its value for the construction
of the analysand’s fantasy. An elimination of the deceptive aspect of the
transference is the only meaning Lacan was willing to grant to the practice
of transference-liquidation (Lacan 1977b[1964]: 267). As such, the
Lacanian clinic does not dislodge the transference, the analyst cannot
prevent the unconscious from being re-enacted or closing up, yet the
analytic process does contribute to dissolving the dissimulation which the
supposed subject of knowing sustains.

化简被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,意味着,分析家应该揭露这种化简具有幻见的特性,当它已经利用(但并不是认同)它的价值,对于建设分析者的幻见。移情的欺骗的层面的减少,是拉康愿意给予的唯一的意义,给移情-终止的实践。作为这样的实践,拉康派的琳床并没有移除移情,分析家无法阻止无意识,不要被重新扮演,或封闭。可是,精神分析的过程确实促成这个欺骗,被认为应该知道的主体维持的欺骗。

In Lacan’s conception of the treatment, working towards the destabilization
of deceit equalled progressing towards the realization of truth. By contrast
with the established schools of psychoanalysis he did not flaunt the essential
replacement of (the analysand’s) transference with (the analyst’s) reality, even
less the slow maturation of the transference to the level of genital objectrelations,
defending instead the gradual substitution of truth for knowledge.59

用拉康的治疗的观念,朝向将欺骗的除掉稳定的工作,相等于是朝向体现真理的进展。跟精神分析的现存的学派对照起来,拉康并没有炫耀用基本上是分析家的现实,取代分析者的移情。甚至没有炫耀移情的缓慢地成熟到性器官的客体化的层次。代替的,拉康防卫真理逐渐被知识替换。

Saying that the analyst should act in the name of truth (Lacan 1966–67: session
of 21 June 1967) or that his feigning the position of supposed subject of knowing
is the only access to truth (Lacan 1967–68: session of 22 November 1967)
seemed even more conceited and presumptuous than proposing a
transformation of the ‘hysterical misery into common unhappiness’ (Freud
and Breuer 1895d:305) or staging a confrontation between the analysands’
pleasurable fantasies and the standard requirements of reality. Although
supported by Freud’s professed love of truth (Wahrhaftigkeit, Wahrheitsliebe)
(1915a[1914]:164; 1937c: 248), Lacan was vilified for his uncompromising
espousal of veracity as the ultimate goal of psychoanalysis, the more so after
launching statements such as ‘I, the truth, am speaking’ (Lacan
1977f[1955]:120–123; 1989b[1965]:15) and ‘I always speak the truth’ (Lacan
1990d[1973]:3).

说分析家应该行动,以真理之名,或是说,分析家伪装具有被认为是应该知道的主体,是接近真理的唯一的途径。这种说法是更加地自负与冒昧,比起建议将癔症的悲惨,转化成为共同的不快乐。或是展示一种冲突,在分析者的令人快乐的幻想,与现实的标准的要求之间。虽然受到弗洛伊德的宣称的真理之爱的支持,拉康被抨击,因为他毫不妥协地主张真理,作为是精神分析的最终的目标。他更加受的抨击,当他发动这些陈述,诸如,“我,作为真理,正在言说”,“我总是言说真理”。

But against the expectations Lacan’s notion of truth did not
signal the perfect match between reason and reality, the scientific
‘correspondence criterion’ of truth embedded in the medieval adage of
adaequatio rei et intellectus (an intellect that is in line with the thing).60 Neither
did it advance the traditional psychoanalytic goal of the analysand’s discovery
of a repressed unconscious representation, and its reintegration into a conscious
series of thoughts. The Lacanian truth emblematized no more no less than the
very absence of definitive truths within human existence, owing to the fact
that not all knowledge can be subjectified, that the enjoyment of fullness is
forever excluded, that the symbolic law of castration compels (neurotic) subjects
to desire until the end of their days.

但是对抗这些期望,拉康的真理的观念并没有指示理性与现实的完美的匹配。真理的科学的对应的标准,被镶嵌于中世纪的箴言:跟物象若合一契的知识。拉康的真理的观念也没有提升传统的精神分析的目标:分析者的发现被压抑的无意识的再现表象,以及这个被压抑的无意识的再现表象,被融化进入意识的思想的系列。拉康派的真理的具体标志,实实在在就是在人类的存在内部,明确的真理的欠缺。由于这个事实:并非所有的知识都能够被成为主体,充实的享受,。永远地被排除。阉割的象征的法则逼迫神经症的主体去欲望,直到他们的有生之年的结束。

In ‘Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire’ Lacan
decanted this truth (of an irreducible absence or lack) into the aphorism
‘There is no Other of the Other’, and its algebraical equivalent S(O),
carefully delineating its implications for analytic practice:
The lack referred to here is indeed that which I have already
formulated: that there is no Other of the Other.

在“主体的颠覆与欲望的辩证法1”,拉康倾注“无可化简的缺席或欠缺”的这个真理,成为这个警语:“没有大他者的大他者“。这句警语用代数公式等于:S(O) 。拉康仔细地描述这个警语对于精神分析的实践的重要性。在此被提到的欠缺确实就是我已经阐释的东西:大他者没有大他者。

But is this mark
made by the Unbeliever of the truth really the last word that is
worth giving in reply to the question, ‘What does the Other want
of me?’, when we, the analysts, are its mouthpiece? Surely not,
and precisely because there is nothing doctrinal about our office.
We are answerable to no ultimate truth; we are neither for nor
against any particular religion.
(Lacan 1977k[1960]:316)

但是真理的不信仰者发表的这句谈论,难道确实就是最后的断言,它值得给予这个回答吗?针对这个问题:“大他者想要我什么?”。当我们作为分析家,就是真理的代言人?当然不是,确实是因为关于我们提供的服务,并没有任何信条的东西。我们并不对任何最终的真理负责。我们既不赞同,也不反对任何特殊的宗教。

The impossibility to unearth the final truth about oneself should not
embolden the analyst to answer the analysand’s question—once the
fantasy has been constructed—of ‘What does the Other want from me?’
with stock expressions such as ‘You will never know’ or ‘This is
impossible to find out’. For these statements are as much tributary to a
definitive truth as their vexed counterparts (‘This is what the Other wants’,
‘I possess the solution to your problem’). Pontificating that it is impossible
to know for once and for all what the Other wants becomes a definitive
truth in its own right, which contradicts the principle that there is no
such thing as a final truth. It is therefore sufficient for analysands to
relativize their own time-honoured answers to what the Other wants from
them, that is to say to question the trust they had put in their fantasies.

不可能挖掘关于自己的最后的真理, 不应该因此让分析家大胆地回答分析者的问题: “大他者想要从我这里获得什么?”,一旦这个幻见已经被建构, 带着现存的表达,譬如, “你永远不会知道”, 或”这是不可能发现的” . 因为这些陈述同样都是归属于明确的真理,作为他们的感到懊恼的类同之物.(“这就是大他者所想要的是东西”, “ 我拥有你的难题的解答”) .武断地说, 我们不可能一劳永逸地知道大他者想要的东西, 这句话本身就形成一个明确的真理 .这句话抵触这个原则: 没有最后的真理的这样的东西存在 . 因此,分析者有充分理由将他们自己的自古以来的回答, 作为相对的价值, 回答大他者想要从他们获得什么.换句话说, 要质疑他们给予他们的幻见的信任.

Analysts should not (and cannot) prevent analysands from formulating
new answers and creating new fantasies, their only hope being that the
distrust they have developed towards the old ones affects their attitudes
towards the new versions. In his 1967 ‘Proposition’ Lacan described
this process, which coincides with the end of the transference relation,
as a subjective destitution (destitution subjective), issuing it as the
analysand’s entry ticket to the analytic profession (Lacan 1995b[1967]:8).

分析不应该(与不能够)阻止分析者不宜阐释新的回答与创造新的幻见。他们仅有希望,他们发展的不信任,朝向旧的答案的不信任,会影响他们朝向新的版本的态度。在他的1957年的“建议”,拉康描述这个过程,巧合于移情的关系的结束。作为是主体的匮乏,发表它,作为是分析者进入精神分析的专业的入场门票。

Lacan was adamant that the fall of the supposed subject of knowing
and its concurrent effect of subjective destitution on the side of the analysand
cannot be realized through an array of transference-interpretations, that is
to say interpretations whose object is the nature of transference itself. As
he had explained in Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:428) and ‘The Direction
of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:231), the analyst cannot construct a ‘neutral’
platform outside the analysand’s transference from which to operate on
this transference. If the analysand accepts the analyst’s interpretation of
the transference, this acceptance needs to be interpreted in its own right
because the analysand is bound to hear the interpretation as coming from
the supposed subject of knowing and thus from within the transference.
Giving meta-interpretations after the transference has been interpreted does
not make a difference, since these metainterpretations would also require
interpretation, ad infinitum. As Lacan put it in his 1969 summary of Seminar
XV: ‘

拉康坚决主张,被认为是应该知道的主体的掉落,与分析者这边的主体的匮乏的同时对影响,无法通过移情与独立的安排来体会。换句话说,解释的目标就是移情的特性本身。依照他在第四研讨班解释的,分析家无法建构一个“中立”的平台,。在分析者的移情的外面,来运转这个移情。假如分析者接受分析家的解释移情,这个接受需要在它自身之内被解释。因为分析者一定会听见这个解释,作为来自被认为是应该知道的主体。因此是来自移情。在移情被解释之后,给予形上的解释,并没有什么差别。因为这些形上的解释也要求解释,直到永远。如同拉康在他的1969年的“第14研讨班”的总结这样表达;

There is no transference of the transference’ (Lacan 1984[1969]:25).
Lacan’s solution to this deadlock lay in the deployment of a tactics of
interpretation which points towards the analysand’s desire rather than
the demands (for love) within the transference. The analyst makes clear
that she knows nothing about the analysand, that whatever knowledge
the analysand has assembled is futile, and that additional knowledge
(whether practical know-how or deep wisdom) is not what the analysand
can expect from the experience. On the contrary, if knowledge is at all
involved at the end of the psychoanalytic process it will appear as an
acknowledgement of the limit of the imperative to ‘Know Thyself!’
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 13 March 1968).

拉康对于这个僵局的解答在于运用解释的策略。这个解释的策略指向分析者的欲望,而不是移情之内的对爱的要求。分析家澄清,她对于分析者一无所知。无论分析者装配怎样的知识,都是徒劳的。那个额外的知识(无论是实践的技术手册,或深刻的智慧),都不是分析者能够从精神分析所期望的。相反地,假如知识在精神分析过程的结束时被牵涉进入,它将看起来像是承认“认识你自己”的命令的极限。

This tactics of interpretation
evidently challenges the meaning of analytic interpretation as such,
because the analyst neither explains the analysand’ s symptoms, nor
makes sense of what the analysand says, nor translates the analysand’s
actions into new significant units, etc. Vacillating between silence, the
punctuation of the analysand’s discourse and the formulation of oracular
sentences, the analyst cultivates the atopia of the Socratic position (Lacan
1991b [1960–61]:126–127). I will discuss the underlying principles of
these Lacanian tactics of interpretation at length in the following chapter
of this book.

解释的策略明显地挑战精神分析解释作为这种极限的意义。因为分析家既不解释分析者的症状,也没有理解分析者说的内容,也不是翻译分析者的行动,成为新的重要的单位,等等。分析家摇摆于沉默,分析者的辞说的标点,与侃侃而谈的阐述之间,分析家培养苏格拉底的立场的无边界国土。我将在这本书的下一个章节,详细讨论这些拉康学派的解释的策略的基本原则。

From the mid-1960s Lacan associated the fall of the supposed subject
of knowing with the analyst’s functioning as an object a, his disbeing
(desetre) the analysand’s cause of desire. For example, in Seminar XV
he stated:

从1969年代代中业,拉康将被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,跟分析家作为小客体a的功能,这个“非存在物”是分析者的欲望的原因。譬如,在第14研讨班,拉康陈述:

The end of analysis consists in the fall of the supposed subject of
knowing and its reduction to the accession of this object a, the
cause of the division of the subject, which replaces it. The only
thing the analyst, who fantasmatically plays the game with the
analysand as regards the supposed subject of knowing, supports at
the end of analysis is this rest of the known thing which is called
the object a.
(Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January 1967)

精神分析的目的,在于被认为应该知道的主体的掉落,以及它被化减到这个小客体a的让位,主体的分裂的原因。这个小客体a取代了主体。分析家幻见地跟分析者扮演这个游戏,关于被认为是应该知道的主体,分析家支持的唯一的东西,在精神分析的结束,就是这个已知之物的其余部分,被称为小客体a。

To understand the meaning of this proposition it suffices to look back at
what Lacan concluded at the end of Seminar VIII:

为了理解这个建议的意义,我们回顾一下,就足够理解拉康作为结论的东西,在第八研讨班的结束:

What Socrates knows, and what the analyst at least has to see, is
that on the level of the small a [the object a], the issue is completely
different from that of the access to an ideal. Love can only grasp
the field of being. And the analyst can only think that any object
can fulfil it. This is where we analysts are brought to balance, on
this limit where the question is raised of the value of any object
that enters the field of desire.
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:459–460)

苏格拉底知道的东西,分析家至少必须看见的东西,就是,在小客体a的层次,这个问题并没有完全不同于接近理想的问题。爱仅能理解生命实存的领域。分析家仅能够认为,任何客体都能够满足它。这就是我们作为分析家被迫要平衡的东西,在这个限制。在那里,问题被提出,针对任何客体的价值,在进入欲望的领域时。

Disbeing the object a involves encouraging analysands to realize that
the supposed subject of knowing and the agalma, whose brilliance once
reassured them in their love, are but replaceable objects a, semblances
of being whose power does not outmatch that of other potential objects
and whose promise of enjoyment is doomed to remain inadequate.61 The
result of this operation, which the analyst effectuates by reducing himself
to nothing but a gaze or a voice (Lacan 1995b[1967]:10; 1967–68: session
of 7 February 1968), is that the analysand can undertake a ‘crossing’
(traversee) (Lacan 1977b[1964]:273) or succeeds in dropping out (decoir)
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:8) of his fantasy.62 Again, this result correlates with
a moment of subjective destitution which, as mentioned on p. 136, Lacan
promoted as the precondition for entering the practice of psychoanalysis.

“非存在”这个小客体a,牵涉到鼓楼分析者体会到,被认为应该知道的主体与阿加马,他们的辉煌曾有一度让他们相信他们的爱。现在仅剩可被替换的小客体a,生命实存的类似物。它的力量并没有击败其他的潜在的客体的力量。它对于欢爽的许诺,注定始终不足够。这个运作的结果,分析家让它实现,凭借将他自己化减成为仅是凝视或声音。这个运作的结果是,分析者能够理解一个“跨越”,或是成功地抛掉他的幻见。而且,这个结果跟主体的匮乏的时刻息息相关。拉康
将它提升为进入精神分析的先决条件。

As I have indicated at the end of the previous chapter, during the early
1970s Lacan opened yet another new perspective on the goal of
psychoanalytic treatment, combining Freud’s idea that psychoanalysis
operates via the pathways of love (McGuire 1974:12–13) and his own
assertion that love is always a sign of changing discourses (Lacan
1998a[1972–73]: 16).

如同我曾经指示,在早先的章节的结束,在1970年代,拉康打开另外一个观点,针对精神分析治疗的目标。他将弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析经由爱的途径运作,跟他自己的主张:爱总是正在改变的辞说的讯号。

The theoretical framework for this new perspective
can be derived from a juxtaposition of two of Lacan’s numerous aphorisms
in Seminar XX and Television, statements produced in 1973 with an interval
of a mere six months. In the final pages of Seminar XX Lacan posited:
I incarnated contingency in the expression ‘stops not being written.’
For here there is nothing but encounter…

对于这个新观点的理论的架构,能够被获得,从拉康的无数的警语的其中两个警语的并列,在第20研讨班与“电视访谈“,在1973年产生的陈述,中间区隔仅六个月,在第20研讨班的最后几页,拉康提出:「我具体表现偶然性,在这个表达”停止不被书写“。因为在此,仅是存在着遭遇。

The displacement of the
negation from the ‘stops not being written’ to the ‘doesn’t stop
being written’, in other words, from contingency to necessity—
there lies the point of suspension to which all love is attached. All
love, subsisting only on the basis of the ‘stops not being written’,
tends to make the negation shift to the ‘doesn’t stop being
written’…Such is the substitute that…constitutes the destiny as
well as the drama of love.
(ibid.: 145)

从“听止不被书写“的否定,更换到”不要停止被书写“,换句话说,从偶然性替换到必然性—那里存在着悬置的点,所有的爱被连系到那个悬置的点。所有的爱,维持的基础仅是”停止不被书写“,它倾向于让这个否定转移到”不要停止被书写“。形成命运与爱的戏剧的替换就是如此。

This fragment loses much of its mysterious character if one exchanges
the notion of love for that of transference. For then it becomes clear that
Lacan hinted at the inauspicious transference situation Freud had held
responsible, in the letter to Flies from April 1900 quoted on p. 107, for
‘the apparent endlessness’ and the ‘asymptotic conclusion of the
treatment’ (Masson 1985:409): an accidental encounter (contingency)
which develops into an indispensable compulsive relationship (necessity).
The tenor of Lacan’s words at the end of Seminar XX chimed with his
oration on love in Television, although the latter concerned itself more
explicitly with the analyst’s coordination of its labours.

这个碎片丧失许多它的神秘的特性,假如我们交换爱的观念,跟移情的观念。因为那时,显而易见地,拉康暗示这个不吉祥的移情的情境,弗洛伊德要负责的移情的情境。在他写给弗利斯的信件,从1900年四月,“因为明显的没有终止“与”治疗的非症状的结论“:一个意外的遭遇(偶然性)发展成为无可免除的强迫的关系(必然性)。拉康的话语的主调,在第20研讨班的结束,跟他在”电视访谈“的侃侃而谈爱,互相共鸣。虽然后者更加明确地关注到分析家对于爱的劳苦的调和。

After having
expounded that the analytic discourse promises to introduce something
new within the field of love (Lacan 1990d[1973]:28), an arena marked
by the impasse (closure) of the unconscious, he contended that this novelty
requires only that somewhere the sexual relation stops not being
written, that contingency be established (what it comes down to),
so as to make headway on that which will later be completed by
demonstrating such a relation to be impossible, that is by instituting
it in the real.
(ibid.: 39, translation modified)

拉康解释,精神分析辞说承诺要介绍某件新的东西,在爱的领域里面。这一个斗技场被标识是无意识的僵局(封闭)。拉康主张,这个新奇仅是要求,某个地方,性的关系停止不被书写,偶然性应该被建立(它的总结),为了向前推进,后来将会被完成对东西,凭借证明这样的关系是不可能。也就是,凭借在实在界建立它。

This sentence contains first of all an argument to bring the necessity of the
analysand’s transference back to its underlying contingency. Chosen in an
unexpected, yet fortunate encounter and gradually transformed into a
standard feature of the analysand’ s life, the analyst tries to re-establish
her original position as an accidental, replaceable find. This restoration of
contingency is a prerequisite for the analysand’s discovery that everything
will fall short of the ‘perfect match’ or, to use Lacan’s words in the second
part of the above sentence, that the sexual relation is impossible.

这个句子首先包含一个论点:要将分析者的移情的必要性,带回到它作为基础的偶然性。当分析家被选中,在出乎意外,可是有幸运的遭遇里,然后逐渐被转化成为分析者的生活的标准的特征,分析家尝试重新建立她的原初的立场,作为是偶然,可被替换的发现。偶然性的恢复是分析者的发现的先决条件:每件事情都无法符合“完美的匹配“,或是,用拉康的话语说,在以上的句子的第二部分:性的关系是不可能的。

If the analyst moves from contingency to necessity and back, then the
same could be said of the entire analytic process. Lacan’s words in
Television could indeed be read as also comprising an argument for
calibrating psychoanalytic practice around surprise, revelation, sudden
discovery, etc. Conceiving psychoanalytic treatment as a discipline of
contingencies could also solve the question as to how the discourse of
the analyst can subsist if it is predicated upon love and if love is the sign
of changing discourses.

假如分析家从偶然性移动到必然性,然后回转,然后相同的道路,对于完整的精神分析的过程而言,也是真实的。拉康在“电视访谈“的话语,确实能够被阅读为,也是包含一个论点,作为订定精神分析实践的标准,环绕着惊奇,启示,突然发现,等等。将精神分析的治疗构想为偶然性的专业,也能够解决这个问题,关于分析家的辞说如何能够存在,假如它是以爱作为陈述,假如爱是正在改变的辞说的讯息。

As I have mentioned before (see p. 134), Lacan
stipulated at the beginning of Seminar XX that the sign of love strikes
whenever a subject is moving from one discourse to another. But if
psychoanalysis is indeed effected by love, how is it possible to
institutionalize a discourse that is no more no less than the transition
from one discourse to another? One answer could be that the entire period
between the analysand’s entry into and departure from analysis represents
a transition from one discourse, say a deeply ingrained life-style, to
another. A second answer could be that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place every time an analysand has a session with the
analyst.

如同我以前曾经提到,拉康在第20研讨班的开始提出但书:爱的讯息打击,每当主体正在移动,从一个辞说到另外一个辞说。但是,假如精神分析确实是由爱造成结果,这如何是可能的?要将辞说形成体制?这个辞说实实在在就是从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说?其中一个答案可能是:整个时期,在分析家的进入,与从精神分析的出发之间的整个的时期,代表从一个辞说的转移,譬如,根深蒂固的生活-形态,转移到另外一个辞说。第二个答案可能是:从一个辞说转移到另外一个辞说会发生,每当分析者跟分析家进行咨商时。

Each of these answers is valid only if one forgets that analysands do
not immediately change their ways when entering psychoanalysis, neither
during individual nor over consecutive sessions. Despite the rule of free
association, analysands commonly fall back on their usual, current
discourse. Some analysands even believe that the day they will be able
to engage in free association will also constitute the end of their analysis.

这些回答的每一个都是正确的,只要我们忘记,分析者并没有立即改变他们的方式,当他们进入精神分析时,既不是在个人的咨商,也不是在连续性的咨商。尽管自由联想到规则,分析者通常依靠他们的寻常的目前的辞说。有些分析者甚至相信,他们将会从事自由联想到那一天,将也是形成精神分析结束。

My answer to the above problem is that the transition from one discourse
to another takes place at irregular moments, both during the course of
psychoanalytic treatment and outside a psychoanalytic setting. The only
difference between the emergence of these transitions is that within the
treatment they are consciously provoked by the analyst, whereas outside
they occur more or less haphazardly. When Lacan stated in Television
that conceiving something new requires contingency (what stops not
being written), this applies directly to how the analytic discourse affects
the analysand who is subjugated to the necessities of other discourses:
not the regular pattern of analytic sessions, but the unexpected appearance
of a new signifier governs the process of change.

针对以上的难题,我的回答是:从一个辞说转换到另外一个辞说发生在不规律的时刻。两者都在精神分析的治疗的过程,与外在于精神分析的背景。唯一的差异,在这些转换的出现之间的唯一的差异是,在治疗内部,他们意识方面受到分析家的激发。而在外面,他们相当偶然地发生。 当拉康在“电视访谈”陈述:构想某件新的东西,要求偶然性(停止不被书写的东西),这直接运用到精神分析的辞说如何影响分析者,隶属于其他的辞说的必然性的分析者:这并不是精神分析咨商的规律模式,而是新的能指的意外的出现,统辖改变的过程。

Since the destiny and drama of love hinges on a shift from contingency
to necessity, as Lacan put it in Seminar XX, the ultimate psychoanalytic
effect can only involve a reduction of the established necessity of the
analytic effects themselves to the status of simple contingency. This
process requires an analysis of the analytic experience, in which the
analysand can come to realize that it was no more than an accident on
his particular journey through life. The ultimate analytic effect thus
coincides with the termination of psychoanalysis, after which the
analysand will hopefully understand, at least if the treatment was
Lacanian, not the true signification but the nonsensicality of the entire
experience, not the necessity but the impossibility of finding definitive
answers to the questions of life.

既然命运与爱的戏剧都依附从偶然性的转变成为必然性。如同拉康在第20研讨班表达它。最后的精神分析的影响仅会牵涉到将精神分析的影响本身的已经建立的必要性,化减成为单纯的偶然性的地位。在那里,分析者能够逐渐体会到,那仅是一件意外,在他经历的人生的特殊的旅途。最后的精神分析的影响,因此巧合于精神分析的终止。在精神分析终止之后,分析家将会希望地了解,至少假如治疗是拉康学派的话,不是了解这个必然性,而是了解这个不可能:提人生的问题找到明确的答案的不可能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康:知识之爱与爱的标记

November 21, 2015

LOVE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE AGALMA
知识之爱与爱的标记

The intersubjective relationship between the analysand and the analyst,
and the analyst’s ineluctable involvement in the analysand’s transference
indicate that Lacan’s original outlook of transference singled out the
analytic situation as a constructive dialogue on the symbolic plane of
full speech or, better still, as an interaction between two subjective desires.

分析者与分析家之间的互为主体性关系,以及分析家的难以避免的牵涉分析者的移情,指示著,拉康对于移情的原初的观点,突显出精神分析的情境,作为是建设性的对话,在充分言说的象征的层面。或者,更好的是,作为两个主体的欲望之间的互动。

Many of Lacan’s glosses on transference from the 1950s could be
mustered to corroborate this picture and many of Lacan’s attacks on the
techniques of transference handling within ego-psychology could be read
as implicit arguments for the revival of psychoanalytic treatment as a
symbolic interaction between two subjects.36

从1950年开始,拉康对于移情的许多铨释能够被聚集来形成这个画面。拉康对于自我-心理学之内,处理移情的技术的许多攻击,能够被阅读作为是暗示的论点,赞同精神分析的治疗的复興,作为是象征的互动,处于两个主体之间。

Lacan’s post-1960 contributions cleared the way for a completely
different view. To see how radically his ideas on transference changed
over the course of a decade, it suffices to contrast a statement from his
1957 ‘The Agency of the Letter’ (1977g[1957]) with a passage from his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
(1995b[1967]).

拉康在1960后的贡献,替一个完全不同的观点,清理途径。假如我们看见,拉康在十年的过程当中,他对于移情的观念如何强烈地改变。这就足够将一个陈述,从1957年的“信息的代理者”,跟1967年10月的建议,针对学院派的精神分析家的一个段落,作为对照。

Referring again to Freud’s explanation of transference
in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900a), Lacan reported in the former
text that ‘transference…gave its name to the mainspring of the
intersubjective link between analyst and analysand’ (Lacan
1977g[1957]:170). Ten years later he shattered any remaining faith in
the value of this name, stating with undisguised disdain:
I am astounded that no-one has ever thought of objecting to me,
given certain of the terms of my doctrine, that the transference
alone is an objection to intersubjectivity. I even regret it, seeing
that nothing is more true: it refutes it, it is its stumbling block.
(Lacan 1995b[1967]:4)

拉康再次提的弗洛伊德对于移情的解释,在“梦的解析”里。拉康在先前的文本报导,移情给予它的名字,给分析家与分析者之间的互为主体的联接的动力。十年以后,他粉碎任何剩余的信仰,对于移情这个名字的价值。他带着毫不伪装的藐视陈述:「我大为吃惊,竟然从来没有人反对我。假如考虑到,我的信条的某些术语。光是移情就是互为主体间性的反对。我深知对它感到遗憾。因为没有一样东西比它更加真实,移情反驳互为主体间隙。移情是互为主体间性的绊脚石。」

Prepared in the course of his Seminar V (1998b[1957–58]:357–358) and
advanced more emphatically in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i
[1958]:229–230) and the ‘Remark on the Report by Daniel Lagache’
(1966e[1960]:655–656), Lacan’s self-criticism of intersubjectivity had
reached a first peak in Seminar VIII, On Transference (1991b[1960–
61]), which initiated a less homogeneous, more conflict-ridden version
of the analytic relationship.37

拉康对于互为主体间性的批评,在第四研讨班的过程已经准备。然后在“治疗的方向”,以及“拉噶奇的报告的谈论”,更加强调地提出。在第八研讨班,“论移情”,拉康对于互为主体间性的自我批评首次达到颠峰。第八研讨班,“论移情”开启一个比较没有那么同质性,更加充满冲突的说法,对于精神分析的关系。

Seminar VIII was strewn with references to the insuperable inequity
which the transference instates between the analysand and the analyst.
Sometimes Lacan designated this inequity as a ‘subjective disparity’
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233), at other times he qualified it as a
fundamental discordance or dissymmetry (ibid.: 53, 68). As I have pointed
out in the previous chapter (pp. 72–73), Lacan’s self-criticism had grown
out of the observation that intersubjectivity does not exclude the perils
of a reciprocal, imaginary ‘therapeutic alliance’ between the analysand
and the analyst.38

第八研讨班的内容散布著无法克服的不平等,移情安置的不平等,在分析者与分析家之间。有时,拉康指明这个不平等,作为是“主体性的差异”。还有些时刻,他将这个不平等赋予基本的不协调或不均称的特质。如同我曾经指出,在先前的章节,拉康的自我-批评是产生于这个观察:互为主体性并没有排除互惠的,想像的联盟的危险,在分析者与分析家之间。

In Seminar VIII he argued that intersubjectivity is an
altogether erroneous description of what takes place within the analytic
setting, quite simply because this setting is governed by transference,
which is in turn pervaded by love. To demonstrate that transference runs
counter to intersubjectivity Lacan thus rejuvenated his Freudian
equivalence of transference and love, initially adumbrated in Seminar I
(1988b[1953–54]:90), now showing that love entails everything but a
harmonious interaction between two complementary subjects.

在第八研讨班,拉康主张,互为主体性是一个完全错误的描述,对于发生在分析家的背景内部。这完全是因为这个背景受到移情的统辖,然后移情被爱所弥漫。为了证明,移情跟互为主体性并行不悖,拉康因此重新提醒他对弗洛伊德将移情与爱相提并论。在第一研讨班,首次被描绘轮廓。他现在则是显示,爱涵盖每样东西,除了在两个互补的主体之间的和谐的互动。

The conflict-ridden undertow of the psychoanalytic process also emboldened
him to criticize mainstream descriptions of the treatment as an analytic
‘situation’, a term which he preferred to replace by ‘pseudo-situation’
because ‘the position of the two subjects present is by no means
equivalent’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:11, 233).39

精神分析过程的充满冲突的暗流,也让拉康大胆地批评治疗的主流的描述,作为是精神分析的“情境”。他比较喜欢用“人为-情境”来取代“情境”这个术语。因为“两个主体的立场绝非是相等的。”

Taking his lead from the Symposium (Plato 1951), which he presented
as the minutes of a series of psychoanalytic sessions (Lacan 1991b [1960–
61]:38), Lacan identified the analysand with the lover, the analyst with
the beloved, and the resulting strategies of transference with the dynamics
of love. What characterizes the lover is an immanent feeling of lack.40
Although the lover is hardly aware of this lack, much less of its exact
nature, he none the less believes that the loved object possesses the means
to neutralize it, thus restoring a sense of completeness.41

拉康从探讨柏拉图的“会饮篇”作为开始,他呈现“会饮篇”的探讨,作为精神分析节数的系列的细节。拉康将分析者认同为情人,分析家认同是被爱者。移情的造成结果的策略,具有爱的动力结构。表现情人的特征的东西是欠缺的内在感觉。虽然情人自己几乎不知道这个欠缺,更不用说是欠缺的确实的特性。他仍然相信,这个爱的客体拥有这个工具,让这个欠缺保持中立,因此恢复一种完整的感觉。

To Lacan, the
fact that the lover lacks knowledge about the existence and the status of
this lack was sufficient proof to claim that the lack is unconscious.42
When the beloved recognizes the other’s love, the beloved reckons that
she must have something which provokes the other’s interest, yet she
does not have a clue as to what it is (ibid.: 52–53). Hence both the lover
and the beloved are in a position of partial ignorance, but their ignorance
is not the same.

对于拉康,情人欠缺这个知识,关于这个欠缺的存在与地位,就是充分的证据用来宣称,这个欠缺是无意识的欠缺。当被爱的人体认筹他者的爱,被爱的人认为,她一定拥有某件东西,引起他者的興趣。可是,她并没有线索,关于那是什么。因此,情人与被爱的人都处于部分无知的立场。但是他们的无知并不相等。

The lover does not know much about the immanent lack,
but does know the beloved can annihilate it; the beloved does not know
what he has, yet does know the lover wants it. The lover’s ignorance is
more related to an absence (what the lover misses), whereas the beloved’s
ignorance is more associated with a presence (what the beloved owns).
Relying on Ancient Greek mythology, Lacan stated that love reaches
its highest degree of expression when the beloved becomes a lover in
turn and starts returning the lover’s love. When this occurs the positions
within the relationship are no longer distributed according to who lacks
(the lover) and who possesses something (the beloved), since each partner
wants something from the other and also has something to offer.

情人对于这个内在性的欠缺,所知不多。但是,她确实知道这位被爱的人能够毁灭这个欠缺。被爱的人并不知道他拥有什么。可是他确实知道情人想要它。情人的无知,跟一个缺席(情人所错过的东西)更加息息相关。而被爱的人的无知则是跟一个存在(被爱的人拥有的东西),更加地联想一块。依靠古代的希腊文化,拉康陈述:爱到达它的最高的表达,当轮到被爱的人成为情人,然后开始回报情人的爱。当这样的事情发生,在关系之内的立场不再被分配,依照谁欠钱(情人),与谁拥有某件东西(被爱的人)。因为每一个伴侣都想要某件东西,从他者那里,并且也拥有某件给予东西。

Lacan designated the moment when the beloved becomes a lover as ‘the
metaphor of love’, and in accordance with his own definition of metaphor
he drew attention to its potential for revealing a new signification, notably
the genuine, true signification of love (ibid.: 49–64).43

拉康指明这个时刻,被爱的人成为爱人的时刻,作为是“爱的隐喻”。为了符合他自己对隐喻的定义,他提醒注意隐喻的潜力,作为显示新的意义。特别是真诚,真实的爱的意义。

For all its ostensible rosiness, the portrait of love Lacan painted in Seminar
VIII was of course predicated upon a tragic misunderstanding between the
partners. What the lover discovers in the beloved is no more no less than the
object of the lover’s own fantasy, and has nothing to do with what the beloved
really has to offer. Conversely, what the beloved believes she possesses as an
object for the lover, without knowing for sure what it is, equally relates to
the beloved’s fantasy and has no bearing whatsoever on what the lover really
lacks. Each of the partners mistakes fantasy for reality, adding error to error
when entering the metaphor of love.

拉康在第八研讨班描绘的爱的肖像,尽管过于绚丽灿烂,当然对于它的描绘是依靠一个悲剧的误解,在伴侣之间。爱人在被爱的人身上发现的东西,实实在在就是爱人自己的幻想的客体。跟被爱的人确实必须提供的东西,没有丝毫关系。相反地,被爱的人相信她拥有的东西,作为是爱的的客体,而没有确实知道那是什么东西,那同样是跟被爱的人的幻想息息相关。跟爱人确实欠缺的东西,根本没有丝毫关系。每一位伴侣都将幻见误认为是现实,将错误增加到错误,当他进入爱的隐喻。

Applying this picture to the analytic ‘pseudo-situation’, Lacan
compared the analysand to a lover because analysands generally expect
their analysts to possess the key to their difficulties—inhibitions,
symptoms and anxieties which they cannot understand, let alone solve.

拉康将这个画面运用到精神分析的”人为的情境“,并将分析者比喻为分析家,因为分析者通透期望她们的分析家拥有解决他们的困难的解答—压抑,症状,与焦虑的的困难的解答。那是分析者无法理解的,遑论解答。

In Seminar VIII Lacan described this key, as seen through the eyes of the
analysand, in two different ways. In the opening stages of the Seminar,
he cut the analyst’s key from the substance of knowledge:
The psychoanalyst is a human being one comes to see in order to
find the knowledge [science] of what is most intimate to oneself—
this is the state of mind in which one usually approaches him—
and thus of what we must assume to be initially most alien to him.
None-the-less, this is what we encounter at the start of
psychoanalysis; this knowledge [science] is what he is supposed
to have.
(ibid.: 81–82)

在第八研讨班,拉康描述这个解答,通过分析者的眼光可以看出,用两个不同的方式。在研讨班的开始的阶段,,拉康将分析家的解答,从知识的物质切割下来。我们逐渐将精神分析家看着是一个人,为了找到这个知识,跟我们自己最亲密的东西的知识。那就是心灵的状态,我们通常接近他的心灵的状态。因此,也是我们必须假定是对于他是最异化的的东西的状态。尽管如此,这就是我们遭遇的东西,在精神分析的开始。这个知识就是他被认为拥有的东西。

Lacan’s observation that analysands commonly regard their analysts as
experts of the human psyche whose specialized knowledge will dissolve
the symptoms ultimately crystallized into his concept of the ‘supposed
subject of knowing’, which continued to undergird his ideas on
transference until the end of his career.44

拉康观察到,分析者通常将他的分析家视为是人类心灵的专家。这位心灵的专家精通的知识将会化解症状。拉康的观察最后具体成为他的观念:“被认为是知道的主体“。这个观念继续作为他探讨移情的观念的的支撑,直到拉康的事业的结束。

Yet as his work progressed he underscored that this function of the
‘supposed subject of knowing’, the constitutive element of the
transference, does not imply that the analysand automatically perceives
the analyst as somebody who knows (Lacan 1977b[1964]:233; 1967–
68: session of 22 November 1967; 1971–72: session of 2 December 1971).
In his ‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’
he even went so far as to state:

可是,随着他的研究的进展,拉康强调,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个功能,移情的形成的元素,并没有暗示,分析者自动地感知这位分析家,作为是知道的某个人。在他的”1967年11月的建议“,针对学院派的精神分析家,拉康甚至过分地陈述:

We shall have to see what qualifies the psychoanalyst to respond
to this situation [of the supposed subject of knowing] which one
can see does not envelop his person. Not only is the supposed
subject of knowing not real in effect, but it is in no way necessary
that the subject who is active in the conjuncture, the
psychoanalysand (the only one who speaks initially), impose it
upon him. Not only is it not necessary, it is not usually true: which
is demonstrated in the initial stages of the discourse by a way of
assuring oneself that the suit does not fit the psychoanalyst—an
assurance against the fear that he will put, if I may say so, his
creases in it too soon.

(Lacan 1995b[1967]:5, translation modified)
我们将必须看出,为了回应这个情境,“被认为是知道的主体“的这个情境,我们能够看出,这个情境并没有涵盖精神分析家这个人的人格,他的特质。被认为是知道的主体不但实际上并非真实,而且活跃于这个关键联接的主体,也就是最初作为言说的唯一的人,分析者,根本也没有这个必要,将它赋加在他身上。这非但并非必要,它通常也并非是真实:在辞说的最初的阶段,被证明的东西,凭借让自己确信,这套西装并不适合精神分析家。他用这种确实来对抗这个恐惧:很快地,他将会让这套西装起皱纹,容我这样说。

Without devaluing the importance of the supposed subject of knowing
for the transference, Lacan relativized its impact as a truthful and honest
expectation with which most analysands approach their analysts, considering
the spurious relationship they have with knowledge professed by somebody
else. As I have explained in Chapter 1, it is not because people do not know
what is wrong with them, and, following their wish to know the truth, urge
professionals to tell them what they know, that they will be willing to accept
the professionals’ knowledge.

拉康并没有贬低被认为是知道的主体对于移情的重要性,他将它的影响相对化,作为忠实而诚实的期望。大部分的分析者都带着这个期望,接近他们的分析家,认为分析家具有跟某个人其他的人宣称的知识的似是而非的关系。如同我在第一章解释过程,这并不是因为人们不知道他们的问题出在哪里,当他们遵循他们的愿望要知道真理时,他们要求专业人员告诉他们他们所知道的事情,他们将会愿意接受专业人员的知识。

An analysand’s investment of her analyst with
the supposed subject of knowing is always relative: on the one hand she
wants her analyst to be wildly knowledgeable, whereas on the other she
already knows in advance that from the moment he will start professing his
knowledge, it will prove fatally flawed. Or, if the analysand has been
sufficiently hystericized, he will simultaneously expect his analyst to be
knowledgeable, to convey this knowledge, to admit it is inadequate, to seek
more knowledge, to allow him to find knowledge elsewhere, etc.45
None the less Lacan remained convinced that the supposed subject of
knowing constitutes ‘the pivot on which everything to do with the
transference is hinged’ (ibid.: 5).

分析者对于她的分析家投注被认为是知道的主体。这种投注总是相对的:一方面,她想要她的分析家成为知识广博。另一方面,她已经事先知道,从那个时刻开始,他将会开始宣称他的知识。那个知识将会证明致命地具有瑕疵。或者,假如分析者已经充分地成为癔症者,他将会同时期望他的分析家成为知识广博。传达这个知识,承认这个知识是不足够的,寻求更多的知识,让他能够在别的地方找到知识,等等。尽管如此,拉康始终相信,被认为是知道的主体形成“ 这个枢纽,依靠这个枢纽里,每件事情都跟移情有关联。

Even when analysands refuse to accept
their analysts as paragons of absolute knowledge, the supposed subject
of knowing (and transference) will continue to operate if only the
analysands believe that one day they will become masters in their own
house. In this sense Lacan’s supposed subject of knowing conveys nothing
more than the analysand’s opinion that all knowledge can be endowed
with a subject, i.e. that there is no such thing as a knowledge which has
to remain fundamentally subject-less. In more psychological terms, the
supposed subject of knowing refers to the individual’s belief that it is
possible to attain the climax of full self-realization, a status characterized
by the definitive cancellation of all nonsense, the complete understanding
of oneself and the discovery of the true signification of life.46

即使当分析者拒绝接受他们的分析家,作为是绝对知识的典范,被认为是知道的主体(与移情),将继续运转,只要分析者相信,有一天,他们将会成为大师,在他们自己的房屋里。从这个意义而言,拉康的被认为的知道的主体,传达的东西,仅仅是分析者的意见:所有的知识都能够被禀赋一个主体。譬如,并不存在着这种知识的东西,必须始终基本上是没有主体的知识。用更加是心理学的术语,被认为是知道的主体,提到个人的信仰:获得充分的自性的实现的高潮是可能的。这一种状态的特征是明确地取消一切的无稽之谈,完全理解自己,并且发现生命的真实的意义。

The supposed subject of knowing is evidently at odds with the divided subject
() of the unconscious, because it glorifies the transparency of all
knowledge and aims for the restoration of a psychic economy without
loss. The supposed subject of knowing ‘is the postulate of which it is the
case that it abolishes the unconscious’ (Lacan 1968c[1967]:46).
In his 1967 ‘Proposition’, Lacan formalized the installation of the
supposed subject of knowing in a new algorithm of transference (Lacan

1995b[1967]:5):被认为是知道的主体,跟无意识的分裂的主体,显而易见是互相抵触。因为它推崇所有的知识的透明化,并且目标朝着恢复心灵的活力,没有任何损失。被认为是知道的主体,就是这个假设,就在这个假设的情况里,它废除无意识。在他的1967年的“建议”,拉康正式将被认为是知道的主体,安置在移情的新的轨迹里。

The sequence under the bar represents the analysand’s assumption of an
agency controlling the signification of all knowledge (the undivided
subject of the unconscious, the thinker behind the unconscious thoughts),
whereby 5 stands for (undivided, present) subject and (S1, S2,…Sn) for
the unconscious thoughts (the symbolic network of signifiers). The S
above the bar is the so-called ‘transference-signifier’ (signifiant du
transfert) which, in its relation to any old signifier (Sa), makes the
supposition possible. The link between S and Sa is the connection between
two signifiers without which the supposed subject of knowing would
remain without signification for the analysand.47 Indeed the assumption
that all knowledge can be subjectified only becomes significant for the
analysand because he has ‘transferred’ one of the signifiers (ideas,
representations) in his psyche to a particular signifier belonging to another
subject, the analyst for that matter.48

在这个横杠底下的系列代表分析者的假设一个代理,控制一切知识的意义的代理(无意识的没有被分裂的主体,无意识的思想背后的思想家),S代表(没有被分裂,存在的)主体。(S1,、、、Sn)代表无意识的思想 (能指的象征的网络)。横杠以上的这个S 就是所谓的“移情-能指”。由于它跟任何旧的能指(Sa)的关系,这个“移情-能指”让这个假设成为可能。在S与Sa 之间的联接,就是两个能指之间的联接。假如没有这两个能指,被认为是知道的主体将始终保持是咩有意义,对于分析者。的确,所有的知识能够被形成主体,这个假设变得重要,对于分析者。因为他已经转移他的心灵里的其中一个能指(观念,再现表象),转移到一个特殊的能指,属于另外一个主体的能指,就这件事情而言,那就是分析家。

In Seminar XX Lacan translated this craving for complete knowledge
within the transference in the terminology of love, proclaiming that ‘love
is the desire to be One’, and that love proceeds from the belief ‘we are
but One’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:6, 47).49 Love (and transference) equals
believing that the other is not an Other affected by an irreducible lack,
but the incarnation of the perfect One, and it cherishes the hope that this
One will spill over onto one-self. Since the entrapment of love is part
and parcel of the neurotic’s psychic economy, it is by no means restricted
to the psychoanalytic setting, which again explains why transference
can easily exist outside the walls of the psychoanalytic cabinet.

在第20研讨班,拉康翻译对于完整知识的渴望,在移情之内,用爱的术语。拉康宣称,“爱是想要成为”一“的欲望。爱继续前进,凭借这个信仰:我们仅是“一”。爱(与移情)等于是相信:他者并不是受的无法还原的欠缺的影响的大他者,而是完美的“一”的具体化身。爱怀抱这个希望:这个“一”将会分撒在“作为自性的一”。因为爱的陷阱是神经症的心灵的活力的部分与包裹。爱绝非是被限制在精神分析的背景里。这再次解释为什么移情很容易存在于精神分析的咨商室的墙壁之外。

If the unconscious is a knowledge without a knowing agency (a
headless body so to speak) and the supposed subject of knowing correlates
with the complete mastery over knowledge, it is clear why Lacan
contended in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:130–133) that transference
involves a closure of the unconscious. In its striving for unity love favours
the redemption of the absent subject of the unconscious or, to use Lacan’s
terms in Encore, it aims at being, to be understood here as self-fulfilment
(Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:40). Once again this point repeated a feature
Freud had noted in his paper on transference-love and which he had
attributed to the influence of resistance:

假如无意识是没有知道的代理者的知识(也就是,没有头的身体),被认为是知道的主体,跟完整的掌控知识息息相关。显而易见地,拉康为什么在第11研讨班主张,移情牵涉到无意识的封闭。当无意识奋斗获得统一时,爱偏爱无意识的欠缺的主体的救赎。或者,用拉康在“再来”研讨班的术语说,爱的目标是生命实存,在此应该被理解为实践-自性。再次,这一点重复弗洛伊德没有注意到的一个特征,当他探讨移情与爱。弗洛伊德将这个特征归属于坚持的影响。

At a first glance it certainly does not look as if the patient’s falling
in love in the transference could result in any advantage to the
treatment. No matter how amenable she has been up till then, she
suddenly loses all understanding of the treatment and all interest
in it, and will not speak or hear about anything but her love, which
she demands to have returned. She gives up her symptoms or pays
no attention to them; indeed, she declares that she is well.
(Freud 1915a[1914]:162)

乍然一瞥,移情与爱看起来确实不像是:在移情里恋爱的病人能够造成任何的利益,对于治疗。无论她直到那时是多么的可被修正,她突然丧失所有的理解,对于治疗与治疗里的所有的興趣。她所言说,或所停到的事情,无非就是她的爱。她要求回到她的爱。她放弃她的症状,或并没有注意那些症状。的确,她宣称,她是健康的。

Alienated to the transference-signifier, analysands deceive themselves and
their analysts when supposing the subject of knowing, not only in their
sudden extirpation of the debilitating effects of the symptoms, but also in
the special demands they put upon their analysts. In the former case the
analyst runs the risk of losing his patient because she declares herself healthy
and cannot think of any good reason to continue the treatment.

当分析者针对移情的能指,表现异化时,分析者欺骗他们自己与分析家。当他们认为知道的主体,不但在他们的突然的移除症状的令人衰弱的影响,而且在他们对于分析家提出的特别的要求。在前者的情况,分析家冒着丧失他的分析者的危险。因为她宣称她自己是健康,并且无法想出任何好的理由,来继续这个治疗。

In the latter
case, a patient may consider breaking off the treatment because he feels
that the analyst is not paying enough attention to him, does not give enough
of her time, tends to run shorter sessions with him than with other
analysands, does not appreciate the (financial) effort he has put into the
whole enterprise, in short does not love him enough. Of course, the analyst
needs to ensure that the analysis does not come to a halt because the
analysand’s transference makes him feel ‘cured by magic’ or ‘just treated
like everybody else’. To solve this clinical problem, Lacan advised that
the analyst overturn the dead weight of the analysand’s demands within
the transference with the lever of desire, a recommendation to which I will
return in the following section of this chapter.

在后者的情况,病人可能考虑中断治疗,因为他觉得,分析家并没有给予他充分的注意,没有给予她充分的时间。分析家倾向于将她的咨商时数减短,比起他给予其他的分析者。分析家并没有赏识他付出的财政的努力,付给整个的企业。总之,分析家并没有充分地爱他。当然,分析家需要保证,精神分析并没有中止,因为分析者的移情让他感觉“被魔法治疗”。或“仅是像每一位其他的人一样被治疗”。为了解决这个临床的难题,拉康劝告,分析家应该推翻分析者的要求的僵化的重量,在移情之内,用欲望的杠杆。在这个章节的以下部分,我将回头谈论这一个建议。

As mentioned earlier, the analysand’s perception of the analyst as a
character equipped with knowledge of his most intimate experiences is
not the only factor Lacan distinguished in Seminar VIII to explain the
eruption of love. After having cut the analyst’s key to the analysand’s
problems, as seen through the latter’s own eyes, from the material of
knowledge, Lacan used the sparring match between Socrates and
Alcibiades at the end of the Symposium to delineate the function of the
agalma within the transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:163–195).

如同早先提到,分析者对于分析家的感觉,作为是装备他最亲近的经验的知识的人物。分析家的感觉并不是唯一的因素,拉康在第八研讨班区别出来。为了解释爱的发作。当拉康将分析家对于分析者的解答,跟知识的材料切割开始,依照从分析家自己的眼光来观看。拉康使用苏格拉底与阿西比底斯之间的拳击表演赛,在“会饮篇”的结尾,为了描述阿加马的功能,在移情之内。

Agalma is the term Alcibiades used to grasp the hidden, yet fascinating
object he believed to be enclosed in the depths of Socrates’ hideous body.
A mysterious gem whose preciousness he had savoured as a young man
during a privileged moment of revelation, the agalma had sparked
Alcibiades’ infatuation with Socrates and served to justify his eulogy of
Socrates’ attractiveness.

阿加马是阿西比底斯使用的术语,用来理解这个隐藏,可是令人著迷的客体。他相信这个客体被封闭在苏格拉底的令人厌憎的身体的深处。阿加马是一个神秘的珍宝,他年轻时曾经喜爱的珍宝的珍贵。当他处于接受启蒙的特权的时期,这个阿加马珍宝激发阿西底比斯对于苏格拉底的著迷。阿加马珍宝充当是对于苏格拉底的迷人的颂扬的理由。

In Seminar VIII Lacan surmised that the part played by the agalma in
the emergence of transference must be at least as important as that of the
supposed knowledge, yet his subsequent invocations of the topic were
rather disappointing. Apart from a small, yet valuable gloss in his
‘Proposition of 9 October 1967 on the Psychoanalyst of the School’ (1995b
[1967]:7), references were often limited to simple mentions of the term. It
is tempting to argue that Lacan gradually replaced the agalma with his
own concept of the object a, so that each passage on the function of the
object a in the transference would contain an implicit reference to the
agalma.

在第八研讨班,拉康推测,在移情出现时,阿加马的珍宝扮演的角色,至少是同样地重要,跟被认为的知识的出现扮演的角色。可是,拉康随后召唤的议题相当令人失望。除了将他在1967年,针对学院派的精神分析家的“建议”,稍作修改装饰外,拉康的指称经常被限制在简单地提到那个术语。我们忍不住地要争辩:拉康逐渐用他自己的小客体a的观念,取代阿加马。所以,在移情里的小客体a的功能的每个段落,都包含含暗示地提到阿加马。


I wish to challenge this idea, not so much because it is difficult to
entertain on the basis of Lacan’s own works, but mainly because the
equation of the agalma and the object a makes it extremely difficult to
comprehend some of Lacan’s later statements on the position of the analyst
in the treatment.50 For example, when Lacan argued in Encore that analysts
are ‘in the best position to do what should rightfully be done, namely to
investigate the status of the truth as knowledge’, when they put the object
a in the place of semblance, does this mean that the analyst is supposed to
sustain the analysand’s love in order to realize the analytic goals? For if
agalma (as the mysterious object triggering love) equals the object a and
the analyst is held to occupy the position of object a in the analytic discourse,
how can the transference ever be analysed?

我希望交换这个观念,倒不是因为很困难根据拉康自己的著作来怀抱这个观念。而是因为将阿加马跟小客体a相等,让某些拉康晚期的陈述的理解成为极端困难,当他探讨治疗时的分析家的立场。譬如,当拉康在“再来”研讨班主张,分析家“处于最佳立场,去做有权利应该被做的事情,也就是说,去研究真理作为知识的位置”,当他将小客体a 取代类似物。这难道是意味著:分析家应该维持分析者的爱,为了实践精神分析的目标?因为假如阿加马(作为触动爱的神秘的客体),相等于是小客体a,而分析家被认为是占据小客体a的位置,在精神分析的辞说里,移情如何能够被分析?

The conflation of the agalma and the object a also gives rise to a
confusion of love and desire in Lacan’s work, since the object a is
traditionally defined as the object cause of desire. Lacan himself to some
degree contributed to this confusion by using love and desire as
interchangeable terms in Seminar VIII, and by elucidating the metaphor
of love in his two subsequent Seminars as a substitution of the desiring
(le desirant) for the desirable (le desire).51 However, from the mid-1960s
he charted love and desire as two separate experiences on whose
distinction the entire progress of psychoanalytic treatment depends.

阿加马与小客体a的混合,也产生爱与欲望的混淆,在拉康的著作里。因为小客体a传统上被定义为欲望的客体的原因。拉康他自己有某个程度促成这种混淆。在第八研讨班,拉康使用爱与欲望,作为是可以交换的术语。他阐述爱的隐喻,在他随后的研讨班,作为是欲望者的替换被欲望者。可是,从1960的中叶开始,他描绘爱与欲望,作为两个分开的经验。精神分析的治疗的整个的进展,就依靠这个区别。

The
promotion of desire as the analyst’s lever to overturn the analysand’s
love in Seminar XI (1977b[1964]:235) can exemplify this. Hence the
agalma of love does not equal the object a of desire, because like the
supposed subject of knowing the agalma relates to the analysand’s
perception of the Other as a perfect being, containing the precious jewels
of happiness and salvation, whereas the object a is strictly situated within
the dimension of semblance. Whereas the agalma represents the ideal
stone of wisdom, the object a is but a partial, replaceable commodity.52

欲望的提倡,作为分析家的杠杆,推翻分析者的爱,在第11研讨班,能够作为这个的典范。 因此,爱的阿加马并没有相等于欲望的小客体a,因为就像被认为是知道的主体,这个阿加马跟分析者对于大他者作为是完美的人的感觉息息相关。它包含快乐与救赎的这个珍贵的珠宝。而小客体a 则是严格地被定位在类似物的维度里面。虽然阿加马代表理想的智慧的宝石,小客体a 仅是部分,无法取代的货物。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

拉康:移情的策略

November 13, 2015

Chapter 3
第三章
Strategies of transference
移情的策略
THE MANY FACES OF TRANSFERENCE
移情的众多面向

In a small, seemingly futile passage on the termination of analysis in
‘On Beginning the Treatment’, Freud confessed that since the start of his
psychoanalytic career he had noticed a remarkable change in his patients’
attitudes towards the progression of their analysis:

在“治疗的开始”,针对精神分析的终止的这篇简短,表现没有效用的段落里,弗洛伊德坦白承认,自从他的精神分析的事业的开始,他已经注意到一个明显的改变,在他的病人的态度,朝向精神分析的进展。

In the early years of my psychoanalytic practice I used to have the
greatest difficulty in prevailing on my patients to continue their
analysis. This difficulty has long since been shifted, and I now
have to take the greatest pains to induce them to give up.
(Freud 1913c:130)

在我精神分析实践的早年岁月,我常常遭遇极大的困难,要劝告我的病人继续他们的精神分析。这个困难长久以来已经改变。我现在必须花费巨大努力,才能劝导病人放弃。

Freud did not clarify the mainspring of this problem, but numerous
examples can be adduced to demonstrate that the entire issue was
dominated by the vicissitudes of transference.

弗洛伊德并没有澄清这个难题的主要的动力。但是,无数的例子可以作为补充,用来证明整个的问题受到移情的起伏的支配。

For instance, shortly before publishing ‘On Beginning the Treatment’,
Freud had informed Sandor Ferenczi about his ticklish experience with
Elma Palos, whom he had agreed to treat for a short period of about
three months, until Easter 1912:

譬如,就在出版“治疗的开始”不久之前,弗洛伊德曾经告知费伦奇,关于他跟爱玛 帕洛思的神经质的经验。弗洛伊德曾经同意治疗帕洛思,经过大约三个月的简短时期。

With Elma things continue to go gloomily. She has brought out
several quite surprisingly intelligent insights, but she doesn’t want
to get into the experience with you and doesn’t seem to want to
finish with me; i.e., because of the transference she wishes to extend
her stay past Easter, which I don’t want to do. So I am cooling off
noticeably again.
(Brabant et al. 1993:362)

对于爱玛,事情继续阴暗地进行。她已经显露好几个相当令人惊奇的智慧的洞察力。但是,她并不想要跟你一起进入这个经验。并且似乎并不想要跟我一块完成这个经验。换句话说,因为移情,她希望延伸她的停留,超越复活节。我并不想要这样做。所以,我再次明显地冷却下来。

This was neither Freud’s first encounter with a patient reluctant to leave,
nor was it the first time he attributed the phenomenon to the power of
transference. In April 1900, at a moment when he was still groping his
way as to the nature and function of the transference, Freud had already
told Wilhelm Flies about its effect on the duration of his analysis of a
certain Mr E:

这既不是弗洛伊德的第一次遭遇病人不愿意离开,也不是他第一次将这个现象归属于移情的力量。在1900年4月,在这个时刻,他依旧正在模索他的途径,关于移情的特性与功能。弗洛伊德曾经告诉弗利兹,关于移情的影响,对于他对某位E先生的精神分析。

I am beginning to understand that the apparent endlessness of the
treatment is something that occurs regularly and is connected with
the transference…The asymptotic conclusion of the treatment
basically makes no difference to me, but is yet one more
disappointment to outsiders…Since he had to suffer through all
my technical and theoretical errors, I actually think that a future
case could be solved in half the time.
(Masson 1985:409)

我正在理解,治疗的明显的没有终止是某件规律发生的事情,并且跟移情息息相关。治疗的非症状的结论,对我而言,基本上没有任何差异。可是,对于外面的人而言,却是又一次的令人失望。
因为他必须承受痛苦,经历我的技术与理论的错误。我实际上认为,未来的个案,用一半的时间,就能够被解决。

Freud did not have to wait long to test the value of his assertion, for
some six months later an eighteen-year-old hysterical girl suffering from
a welter of psychic and somatic symptoms was referred to him by her
father (ibid.: 427). Compared to Mr E’s treatment, which lasted for more
than a year, Freud’s analysis of Dora (Freud 1905e[1901]) took a mere
three months. This could be seen as an even better result than that which
Freud had anticipated in his letter to Flies, were it not for the fact that
the girl herself decided to break off her analysis before reaching a
satisfactory solution of her problems.1

弗洛伊德并没有等待很久,他就测试他的主张的价值。经过大约六根月之后,一位十八岁的癔症的女孩,遭受心灵与肉体的症状的翻滚。她的父亲带她去就诊弗洛伊德。跟E 先生延续一年多的治疗比较起来,弗洛伊德对于朵拉的精神分析,仅是花费三个月。这能够被视为是具有更佳的结果,比起弗洛伊德曾经写信给弗利兹所预期的结果。假如不是因为这个事实:女孩自己决的要中断她的精神分析,这样,她才能获得她的难题的令人满意的解决。

Again Freud felt that he had made
a technical and theoretical error, and again he regarded his patient’s
behaviour as the corollary of her ‘transferences’ [sic], clinical phenomena
encompassing ‘new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and phantasies
which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of analysis’
whereby the patient replaces ‘some earlier person by the person of the
physician’ (ibid.: 116). On the one hand Freud conceded that he must
have been blinded by Dora’s diligence, not seeing that her identification
of him with the dreaded Mr K fuelled her desire to take revenge. On the
other hand he ventured the hypothesis that his technical mistake must
have been rooted in a failure to direct Dora’s attention to her unconscious
homosexual love for Mrs K.2 Whatever the nature of Freud’s mistake,
Dora’s transference did not catalyse an interminable analytic process,
but prompted her to finish the treatment prematurely.

而且,弗洛伊德感觉,他曾经犯了一个技术与理论的错误。再次,他将他的病人的行为,视为是她的 移情的必然结果。这些临床的现象涵盖冲动与幻想的新版的拷贝。在精神分析的进展期间,这些冲动与幻想被召唤出来,而且被知道。凭借精神分析,病人用医生这个人物,取代某位早先的人物。在一方面,弗洛伊德承认,他当时一定对于朵拉的勤勉视而不见,他才没有看见,她对他的认同,其实对可恨的K先生的认同。这激发起她想要报复的欲望。在另一方面,弗洛伊德冒险提出假设:他的技术性的错误当时一定是根源于他没有办法引导朵拉注意她的无意识的同性恋的爱,对于K太太。无论弗洛伊德的错误的特性是什么,朵拉的移情,并没有触发一个没有终止的精神分析的过程。而是激发她过早地结束这个治疗。

Years later, Freud applied what he had learnt from the Dora case in his
treatment of another eighteen-year-old girl (Freud 1920a). Like Dora, this
girl had expressed a desire to kill herself. Much like Dora’s, her parents
had become so upset with her demeanour that they decided to seek Freud’s
help. And in keeping with Dora’s erotic interest, albeit more overtly, this
girl’s homosexual orientation underpinned many of her symptoms. When
the girl produced a series of dreams in which she featured as a happily
married mother, Freud declared that she merely wanted to deceive him, in
line with her long-established habit of betraying her father.

几年以后,弗洛伊德运用他从朵拉的个案学习到的东西,远用到他对另外一位十八岁的女孩的治疗。就像朵拉,这位女孩曾经表达想要自杀的欲望。非常酷似朵拉,她的父母对于她的行为感到如此懊恼,所以他们决定寻求弗洛伊德的帮助。这位女孩的同性恋的定向,跟朵拉的性爱的興趣一样,虽然是更加明显,作为是许多她的症状的基础。当这位女孩产生一系列的梦。在梦里,她扮演一位快乐地结婚的母亲。弗洛伊德宣称,她仅是想要欺骗他,以符合她根深蒂固的习惯:背叛她的父亲。

Having
acknowledged the girl’s hostility towards her father and her concurrent
unconscious animosity towards himself as a father representative, Freud
subsequently ended the treatment on his own initiative, insisting that the
girl continue her analysis with a female analyst. By pinpointing the
deceitfulness of his patient’s productions and by effectively dropping his
patient before she had the opportunity to leave her analyst, Freud was
eager to avoid a retake of the Dora case. Yet once again the transference —
in this case an unconscious negative attitude towards the father—proved
decisive in light of the continuation of the analytic process.

弗洛伊德承认,这位女孩对于她的父亲具有敌意,同时对弗洛伊德自己作为父亲的代表,也无意识地具有敌意。弗洛伊德随后自己创议要结束这个治疗,他建议这位女孩应该找一位女性的分析家来继续她的精神分析。凭借有效地甩掉他的病人,在病人有机会离开她的分析家之前。弗洛伊德渴望避开朵拉个案的重演。可是,再一次,这个移情—在这个个案,对于父亲的无意识的负面的态度—证实是决定性关键,从精神分析过程的继续的观点。

A first conclusion to be drawn from Freud’s remarks on transference
is that its manifestation can lead to the analysis becoming either
unpursuable or interminable. Owing to this strong connection between
transference and the duration of psychoanalytic treatment, Lacan
proclaimed in Seminar I that ‘one can say that the transference is the
very concept of analysis, because it is the time of analysis’ (Lacan 1988b
[1953–54]:286).3

从弗洛伊德探讨移情的谈论能够被获得的最初的结论是,对于移情的展示会导致精神分析成为,要就是无法被追寻,要不就是没有终止。由于这个强烈的关联,处于移情与精神分析的治疗的期间,拉康在第一研讨班宣称:「我们能够说,移情就是精神分析的观念。因为移情就是精神分析的时间。」

Here the question emerges whether the analyst’s ‘management’ of
the transference or something in the nature of transference itself decides
over the continuation of the analytic process. Freud’s comments on his
technical mistakes in the Dora case strongly support the former option,
whereas his position in the treatment of the young homosexual woman
seems to endorse the latter. The same ambiguity pervades Freud’s
theoretical discussions of transference in his papers on technique and
the introductory lectures on psychoanalysis.

在此,这个问题出现,无论分析家的“管理移情”或某件事情,用移情本身的特性,是否决定,对于精神分析过程的继续。弗洛伊德的评论他的技术的错误,在朵拉的个案里,强烈地支持前者的选择。弗洛伊德的立场,在年轻同性恋的女人的治疗,似乎是证实后者:精神分析没有终止。相同的模糊嗳昧弥漫弗洛伊德的理论的讨论移情,在他探讨技术的论文与探讨精神分析的介绍性的演讲。

For example, in ‘The
Dynamics of Transference’ he noted: ‘Where the capacity for transference
has become essentially limited to a negative one, as is the case with
paranoiacs, there ceases to be any possibility of influence or cure’ (Freud
1912b:107). A different account, implicitly underscoring the analyst’s
power over the transference, appeared in the paper on transference-love:
‘No doctor who experiences this [the patient’s falling in love] for the
first time will find it easy to retain his grasp on the analytic situation and
to keep clear of the illusion that the treatment is really at an end’ (Freud
1915a[1914]:162, italics added).

譬如,在“移情的动力学”,他注意到:「当移情的能力已经变成基本上被限制于负面的移情。如同偏执狂的个案,那影响与治疗的任何可能性都停止存在」。一个不同的描述,暗示地强调分析家的移情的力量,出现在探讨“移情与爱”的论文:「当医生首次经验到这个移情与爱(病人的爱恋),他将会很容易保留他的理解,针对精神分析的情境,并且避开这个幻觉:治疗确实结束了」。

It seems that for Freud the clue to the entire question lay in the
differential faces of the transference. The mild positive, conscious face
of transference is beneficial for the continuation of analysis, whereas its
resistance face, epitomized by the analy sand’s unconscious negative,
hostile or intensely erotic feelings towards the analyst, is a recipe for
disaster, unless the analyst manages to explain their infantile origin to
the analysand (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:444; 1940a[1938]:174–177).

似乎,对于弗洛伊德,整个的问题的线索就在于移情具有不同的面貌。移情的温和,积极,有意识的脸孔是有利益的,对于精神分析的继续。另一方面,对于移情的抗拒的脸孔,由分析者的无意识的负面,敌意,或强烈性爱的感觉,朝向分析家,可看出轮廓。移情的抗拒的脸孔是形成灾难的要素。处非分析家成功地解释这些负面的移情起源于分析者的婴孩时期。

Because he regarded the analy sand’s feelings in the (hostile or erotic)
transference as a blueprint of a repressed unconscious pattern (Freud
1910a[1909]:50–51), Freud defined the analyst’s task accordingly as
overcoming the aspect of repetition controlling the transference and
opening the psychic avenues of remembering (Freud 1926e:226–228).4
In his re-reading of Freud’s technical papers during the early 1950s,
Lacan progressively exchanged the two constitutive axes (positive,
negative vs. conscious, unconscious) of Freud’s taxonomy of transference
for a structural classification embedded in his own distinction between
the imaginary and the symbolic (Lacan 1988b[1953–54]:284).

因为分析家将分析者在敌意或性爱的移情里的感觉,作为是被压抑的无意识的模式的蓝图。弗洛伊德定义分析家的工作,因此作为是克服重复的面向,控制移情与展开记忆的心灵的管道。当拉康重新阅读弗洛伊德的技术的论文,在1950年代期间,拉康逐渐交换这两个组成的枢纽,(积极,负面,对抗意识,无意识),这是弗洛伊德的移情的术语。拉康将它转换成我结构的分类,镶嵌于他自己的区别,处于想像界与象征界之间。
In
emphasizing the imaginary and symbolic dimensions of transference
Lacan at once endeavoured to solve the Freudian riddle why transference
is simultaneously the engine of psychoanalytic treatment and the strongest
weapon of resistance (ibid.: 284). To Lacan this clinical puzzle could
not be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by merely relying on the
faces of transference; it required entering into the dialectics of the
imaginary and the symbolic.

当拉康强调移情的想像与象征的维度,他立即尝试解决弗洛伊德的谜团: 为什么移情同时是精神分析治疗的引擎。而且是最强烈的抗拒的武器。对于拉康,这个临床的谜团无法被带到令人满意的结论,凭借仅是依靠移情的脸孔。它要求进入想像界与象征界的辩证法。

Consequently, whereas Freud had predicated
the continuation of analysis on the analyst’s ability to handle the
inherently detrimental faces of transference by exposing their roots in a
repressed, infantile conflict, Lacan emphasized that the analyst’s duty
consisted in guaranteeing that the transference does not disintegrate into
an imaginary relationship of jealousy, rivalry and competition. At the
same time Lacan did not discard the qualities of love and hate within the
transference. On the contrary, he argued that love and hate are the two
central constituents of both symbolic and imaginary transference, with
the caveat that they cannot operate without an additional, generally
neglected factor of ignorance

结果,弗洛伊德曾经描述精神分析的继续,根据分析家的能力,处理本质上具有伤害性的移情的脸孔,凭借揭露他们在被压抑的,婴孩的冲突里的根源。拉康强调,分析家的责任在于保证:移情没有瓦解成为想像的妒忌,敌意,与競争的关系。同时,拉康并没有抛弃在移情里,爱与恨的各种特质。相反地,他主张,爱与恨都是象征界与想像界的两个中心的组成成分。具有这个警示:每当爱与恨运作时,总是会有一个额外,通常被忽略的无知的因素。

Apart from the question as to how transference influences the
continuation of analysis (with respect to its differential form or in keeping
with the analyst’s handling of it), Freud was also intrigued by the origin
of transference. Is it a phenomenon elicited by the conditions of
psychoanalytic treatment or something proceeding from a natural
disposition in neurotic people? If it is triggered by psychoanalysis itself,
should it be attributed to the person of the analyst or to the singularity of
the analytic procedures? And if it can be explained through the analytic
procedures, which of its components are most significant?

除了这个问题,关于移情如何影响精神分析的继续,(关于它的差异的形式或为了符合分析家对它的处理)。弗洛伊德也被移情的起源所著迷。移情的现象是由于精神分析的治疗的情况所召唤?或是某件从神经症人们身上的自然的性情,继续下来。假如移情是受的精神分析本身的触发,它难道应该被归属于分析家这个人?或是应该被归属于精神分析的程序的独异性?假如移情能够被解释,通过精神分析的程序,那么,移情的成分里,哪一个最重要?

Freud broached these questions in many of his writings without
formulating consistent answers.5 In the Dora case he championed the
view that transference is ‘an inevitable necessity’, not created by
psychoanalysis but merely brought to light as part of the analytic
revelation of the patient’s unconscious tendencies (Freud
1905e[1901]:116–117).

弗洛伊德碰触这些•问题,在许多他的著作里,但是他没有铨释一贯的答案。在朵拉的个案,他扞卫这个观点:移情是一个“无可避免的必要性”,移情并不是被精神分析所创造。而仅是被启蒙,作为是病人的无意识的倾向的精神分析的启示部分。

He rehearsed this view in ‘The Dynamics of
Transference’, at once challenging the idea that transference is an
exclusively psychoanalytic phenomenon (Freud 1912b:101). Yet soon
after, in his essay on transference love, Freud balanced towards the other
alternative: ‘He [the analyst] must recognize that the patient’s falling in
love is induced by the analytic situation and is not to be attributed to the
charms of his own person’ (Freud 1915a[1914]: 160–161).

他排演这个观点,在“移情的动力学”,他立即挑战这个观念:移情是一个专门的精神分析的现象。可是,不久之后,在他的探讨移情的爱的论文,弗洛伊德的平衡朝向另外一个替代选择:分析家必须体认到,病人的掉入恋爱,是由于精神分析的情境所诱导,并且不能被归属于他自己的人格的魅力。

But the
explanation Freud had given in the Dora case resurfaced in his
‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis’: ‘[W]e must… recognize
that we are dealing with a phenomenon which is intimately bound up
with the nature of the illness itself…[W]e do not believe that the situation
in the treatment could justify the development of such feelings’, although
‘the opportunity offered by the analytic treatment’ enables the patient to
transfer these feelings onto the analyst (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:442).

但是,弗洛伊德在朵拉的个案里,给出的这个解释,重新出现在他的“精神分析的导论“:「我们必须体认到,我们正在处理一个现象,跟疾病的本身的特性息息相关的现象。我们并没有相信,在治疗的情境能够证实这些感觉的发展的正当性。虽然精神分析治疗提供的机会,让病人能够转移这些感觉,到分析家身上。

Compared to Freud’s, Lacan’s take on the source of transference was
at the same time less ambiguous and more radical. Reassessing Freud’s
conduct in the Dora case, Lacan averred that transference—here to be
understood in its pernicious, imaginary side—‘always has the same
direction, of indicating the moments of error and orientation of the
analyst’ (Lacan 1982a[1951]:72, translation modified).

跟弗洛伊德的观点比较起来,拉康对于移情来源的看法,既是比较不那么模糊,也更加积进。拉康确信弗洛伊德在朵拉个案的行为,他主张说:移情—在此应该被理解,用它有害的想像的面向—移情总是拥有相同的方向,移情具有害的想像的面向:指示著错误的时刻与分析家的定向。

Subsequently,
he also held the analyst to play a crucial part in the emergence of the
symbolic transference, not simply by allowing the analysand to mistake
him for somebody else, nor by introducing the rule of free association,
but by embodying the function of supposed subject of knowing.

随后,拉康也认为分析家应该扮演一个重要的角色,在象征的移情的出现。不仅是凭借承认分析者将他错认为某个其他的人。也不是介质自由联想的规则的这个观念。而且凭借具体表现被认为应该知道的主体的功能。

Repudiating the idea that transference is the spontaneous outcome of a
presumed neurotic disposition, Lacan thus argued that it is evoked by
the analytic setting, notably by the analyst’s own implication.6
Since the analyst is de facto implied in the transference, whatever its
form and structure, Lacan went on to state that countertransference is not
an analytic evil, but a necessary counterpart of the analysand’s transference
(Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:233).

因为拉康排斥这个观念:移情是被认为是神经症的性情的自动自发的结果。拉康因此主张,移情由分析家的背景所召唤。特别是分析家自己的暗示。因为分析家实际上在移情里被暗杀,无论它的形式与结构是什么,拉康继续陈述:反-移情并不是分析家的邪恶,而是分析者的移情的必要的对应物。

On Lacan’s account, the notion of
countertransference ought not be employed as an umbrella for the analyst’s
technical failures, but as a concept conveying the unavoidable implication
of the analyst in the analysand’s transference.7 Instead of assigning the
transference to the quirks of the neurotic condition or to the artificiality of
the analytic setting, Lacan defended the analyst’s responsibility within the
entire process, eventually summarizing his point provocatively in the
formula that there is only one transference in psychoanalysis, namely that
of the analyst (Lacan 1973–74: session of 19 March 1974).

因为拉康的缘故,反-移情不应该被运用,作为是分析家的技术的失败,而是作为一个观念,传递无法分析家的避免的暗示,在分析者的移情里。拉康并没有将移情指定给神经症的情况的诡计,或是归属于精神分析的人为的背景。拉康辩护分析家的责任,在整个的过程,最后他挑衅地总结他的观点,在这个公式里:在精神分析里,仅有一个移情。换句话说,分析家的移情。

The analyst’s essential share in the analysand’s transference also
emboldened Lacan during the early 1960s to reject Freud’s frequent
alignment of transference and repetition.8 Although he himself had
supported this equivalence during the 1950s, Lacan gradually realized
that seeing transference as a pure repetition of an ancient, repressed
infantile conflict, i.e. as something completely alien to the analyst’s
position, not only reduced the analyst’s responsibility for the direction
of the treatment, but also restricted her capacity for manipulating the
transference (Lacan 1962–63: session of 9 January 1963). As I will
demonstrate in the succeeding sections of this chapter, this inevitable
implication of the analyst in the analysand’s transference was not the
only factor motivating Lacan’s separation of transference and repetition,
but it was definitely the most clinically informed one.

分析家基本上分享分享者的移情,在1960年代期间,让拉康大胆地排斥弗洛伊德的经常地将移情与重复等同一块。虽然拉康自己做1950年代,曾经支持这种等同。拉康逐渐地体会到:将移情视为是纯粹地重复的旧时的被压抑的婴孩的冲突,譬如,作为是某件完全外在于分析家的立场。这不但将分析家的责任化简成为治疗的方向,而且限制分析家的能力,作为操控移情的能力。如同我将会证实的,在这个章节的接续的部分,分析家的这个无可避免的暗示,并不是唯一的因素,引起拉康的动机,将移情与重复分开。但是,这确实是最为临床的资讯的因素。

Thus far I have presented two series of questions emanating from
Freud’s scattered glosses on transference: ‘How does transference affect
the continuation (the time) of psychoanalytic treatment?’, and ‘Where
does transference stem from?’. A third, even more contentious issue can
be added to this list, that hinges on the differentiation of transference
and suggestion.

直到现在,我已经呈现两个系列的问题,从弗洛伊德的探讨移情的散开的文章:「移情如何影响精神分析治疗的继续时间?“与“移情从何产生?”第三个议题具有争议性,能够被增加到这个名单,这个议题跟移情与暗示的差异连接一块。

If the analysand’s mild positive transference constitutes
a guarantee for psychoanalytic success (at least in Freud’s conception of
the treatment), how can the effects of psychoanalysis be distinguished
from those obtained by suggestion within traditional forms of hypnosis
and other healing practices? And if analysts are supposed to take
advantage of the analysand’s mild positive transference, curbing all its
complementary forms of expression, in order to obtain the desired results,
to what extent do they act upon a position of power and what prevents
them from abusing the power relegated to them?

假如分析者的温和的正面的移情组成精神分析成功的保障,(至少在弗洛伊德的治疗的观念),精神分析的影响如何能够被区别,跟那些凭借暗示获得的区别,在传统的催眠的形式,与其他的治疗的实践?假如分析家被认为利用分析者的温和的正面的移情,控制所有它的辅助的表达的形式,为了获得渴望的结果。他们根据权力的立场行动,到什么程度?是什么阻止他们不会滥用分配给与他们的权力?

In ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ Freud did not eschew the proposition
that ‘the results of psychoanalysis rest upon suggestion’, if suggestion
means that one person is being influenced by another (Freud 1912b:106).

在“移情的动力学”,弗洛伊德并没有避开这个命题:「精神分析的结果依靠暗示“。假如暗示意味在,一个人正在被另外一个影响。

Developing this point further in his ‘Introductory Lectures on Psycho-
Analysis’, he impressed on his audience that a patient’s ‘tendency to
transference’ (Ubertragungsneigung) is synonymous with Bernheim’s
notion of suggestibility if only its realm of action is extended to include
negative feelings, and provided one is prepared to acknowledge the libidinal
engine of this suggestibility (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:446).9 Faced with
the objection that this inextricable link between transference and suggestion
undermines the originality of the psychoanalytic edifice and might
contribute to its deterioration, Freud subsequently nuanced his opinion,
drawing attention to a dual gulf separating direct hypnotic and
psychoanalytic suggestion.

拉康更进一步发展这一点,在他的”论精神分析的导论“。他给予他的听众这个印象: 病人的倾向于移情,等于是同义词,跟伯罕姆的暗示的观念,只是它的行动的领域被延伸到包含负面的感觉。只要我们准备承认这个暗示的力比多的引擎。当弗洛伊德面临这个反对意见:移情与暗示之间的这个可以挣脱的联结,逐渐损坏精神分析技术的原创性,并且可能促成它的恶化。弗洛伊德随后更详细说明这个意见,提醒注意有一个双重鸿沟,将直接的催眠与精神分析的暗示区分开。

First of all he claimed that contrary to hypnotic
procedures, the analytic modus operandi is not geared towards covering
up the patient’s problems with additional layers of mental strength, even
less towards the prohibition of symptoms. Instead it seeks to rid the
analysands of their symptoms by exposing their underlying conflicts (ibid.:
450–451).10 Second, and more importantly, Freud stressed that whatever
remains of the suggestive influence of the analyst’s interventions is bound
to perish under the weight of analysis itself: ‘In every other kind of
suggestive treatment the transference is carefully preserved and left
untouched; in analysis it is itself subjected to treatment and is dissected in
all the shapes in which it appears’ (ibid.: 453).

首先,他宣称,跟催眠的程序恰恰相反,分析的运作模式被启动,并不是朝向掩盖病人的难题,用额外的精神的力量的层级。甚至不是朝着症状的禁止。代替的,精神分析的运作模式尝试替分析者废除掉他们的症状,凭借揭露他们的作为基础的冲突。其次,而且更加重要地,弗洛伊德强调:任何分析家的介入的暗示的影响,所剩的东西,被发现会在精神分析本身的压力下消灭。「在每一种其他的暗示的治疗里,移情仔细被保留,并且被保存完整。在精神分析,移情本身隶属于治疗,而且被解剖,在它出现的各种形状里。

Not convinced by Freud’s arguments, Lacan remained adamant that
transference and suggestion ought to be kept separate if the analyst is to
steer away from a surreptitious abuse of power.11 In his Seminar V he
pointed out that analysts have an ever-looming suggestive influence over
their patients by virtue of their transference, which is being abused
whenever they take advantage of it, whether to satisfy their patients’
demands, to force an interpretation, or to present themselves as reliable,
competent analysts with whom it is worth identifying (Lacan 1998b
[1957–58]:427–428).

由于拉康并不相信弗洛伊德的论点,拉康始终态度坚定:移情与暗示应该被保持分开。假如分析家想要避免权力的秘密滥用。在他的第四研讨班,拉康指出,分析家拥有越来越明显的暗示的影响,对于他们的病人,凭借病人的移情。病人的移情正在被滥用,每当他们利用它。无论是满足他们的病人的要求,强迫给予解释,或呈现他们自己作为可靠,胜任的分析家。认同这些分析家是值得的。

Of course, the upshot of Lacan’s idea was that
psychoanalytic interventions which do not encompass an element of
suggestion are extremely difficult to define, especially when taking into
account that the analysts’ mere presence could be regarded as a suggestive
fulfilment of the analysands’ demand that they be there. Lacan tried to
escape this clinical impasse for each of the three levels in his schema of
the direction of the treatment: the politics of the analyst, the strategies of
transference and the tactics of interpretation (Lacan 1977i[1958]).12

当然,拉康的观念的结果是,精神分析的介入,并没有涵盖暗示的元素。这种介入是极端难以定义。特别是当我们考虑到,光是精神分析家的存在,就能够被认为是分析者的要求的暗示的满足:分析家应该在那里。拉康尝试逃避这种临床的僵局,因为这三个层次的每一个,在他的治疗的方向的基模里:分析家的政治学,移情的策略,与解释的技术。

First, as I have explained in the previous chapter, he intimated that
the analyst’s position must be characterized both by the death of the ego
and the disbeing of the object a. Second, with respect to the contents of
an interpretation, Lacan replaced the analyst’s mandatory full speech
with the essential ambiguity and nonsensicality of his expressions.13
Finally, on the level of transference, he exposed the widespread analytic
practice of interpreting the transference, whereby its infantile sources
are revealed to the analysand, as a vicious circle:

首先,如同我曾经解释,在先前一章。拉康主张,分析家的立场的特征,必然是自我的死亡与小客体的没有生命实存。其次,关于解释的内容,拉康取代分析家的义务的充分的言说,带有基本的模糊与他的表达的非理解性质。最后,在移情的层次,拉康揭露广泛的精神分析的解释移情的实践。凭借移情,移情的婴孩的来源被揭示给分析者,反过来说,也是一样。

[T]his interpretation, if he [the analyst] gives it, will be received as
coming from the person that the transference imputes him to be. Will
he [the analyst] agree to benefit from this error concerning his person?
Analytic morals do not contradict this, on condition that the
analyst interprets this effect, otherwise the analysis will
amount to little more than a crude suggestion. An
incontestable option, except that the analyst’s words will still
be heard as coming from the Other of the transference, the
subject’s way out of the transference thus being postponed
ad infinitum.
(ibid.: 231, translation modified)

假如分析家给予这个解释,它将会被接收,作为是来自移情灌输给他要成为的那个人。关于这个人,他将会同意从这个错误里获得利益吗?精神分析的道德并没有反驳这一点,只有分析家解释这个效果。否则,精神分析将会等于是仅是粗略的暗示。这个一个无可争议的选择,除了就是,分析家的话语将依旧会被听见,当著是从移情的大他者而来。主体的避开移情的途径因此无限地被拖延。

Transcending the inappropriate, inherently suggestive interpretation of
the transference, Lacan ensuingly deployed the principles of a genuine
analysis of and interpretation within the transference, predicated on its
calculated manipulation by the analyst in light of the downfall of the
supposed subject of knowing (Lacan 1967–68: session of 10 January
1968).

拉康超越这个不合适,本质上具有暗示的移情的解释。他随后运用“移情的真诚的精神分析的原则与移情之内的解释”,并且根据分析家对于移情的审慎的操控作为陈述,从作为应该知道的主体的沦落为分析者欲望的客体的原因的观点。

The above three issues, which cover the relationship between
transference and the continuation of the treatment, the origin of
transference, and the relation between transference and suggestion, arise
from three clinical problems in Freud’s oeuvre and represent three central
concerns within Lacan’s theory of transference. Although continuously
in touch with the letter of Freud’s writings, Lacan sought to advance the
founder’s theory of transference by reformulating these problems and
introducing new concepts.

以上的三个议题涵盖移情与治疗的继续之间,移情的起源,移情与暗示之间的关系。这三个议题的产生,是因为三个临床的难题,在弗洛伊德的著作里。它们代表三个中心的关注,在拉康的移情的理论。虽然拉康继续跟弗洛伊德的著作的信息保存联络,他尝试提升这位创办者的移情的理论,凭借重新阐释这些难题,并且介绍新的观念。

In the following sections of this chapter I will
detail these reformulations and new concepts, mapping the evolution of
Lacan’s own views between the early 1950s and the late 1960s, when
his exploration of transference reached its zenith.14 In this way, I hope to
show that Lacan’s theory of transference is neither ‘characterized by
obscurity and linguistic play’, nor ‘leaves one uncertain as to his actual
technical approach’ (Esman 1990:12).

在这个章节的随后的部分,我将详细列出这些重新的阐释与新的观念。并且描绘出拉康自己的观点的进化,在1950年代早期跟1960年代晚期。当时,拉康的对于移情的探索登峰造极。用这个方式,我希望显示:拉康的移情的理论,既不是以模糊嗳昧与语言的游戏作为特征,也不是让我们狐疑不定,关于他实际的技术的方法。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

精神分析的不可能的艺术

November 6, 2015

THE IMPOSSIBLE ART OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

精神分析的不可能的艺术

Once the purity of the analyst’s desire had exploded at the end of Seminar
XI, Lacan started to investigate the analyst’s relation with the object a
(the cause of the analy sand’s desire), which the analyst was expected to
support in order to elicit (rather than mould or dampen down) the desire
of the analysand.

一旦精神分析家的欲望的纯粹性在第11研讨班的结束时爆发开来,拉康开始研究分析家跟小客体的关系 (分析者的欲望的原因)。分析家被期望要支持这个小客体,为了召唤(而不是塑造或淡化)分析者的欲望。

What could it possibly mean to be the support of object
a? Lacan rejected vigorously all the obvious solutions: analysts must try
to understand what the cause of the analysand’s desire is and convey
their understanding, analysts must interpret this cause, analysts must
incarnate it. As the only possible alternative, he eventually came up with
the idea that the analyst’s desire must be to ‘disbe’ the object a, i.e. to be
a semblance of the object a.

成为小客体的支持,可能是什么意思?拉康强烈地拒绝所有表面的解决:分析家必须尝试理解分析者的欲望的原因是什么,并且传递他们的理解;分析家必须解释这个原因,分析家必须具体表现这个原因。作为唯一可能的替代,拉康最后获得这个观念:分析家的欲望必须是要“剥除生命实存”,剥除小客体的生命实存。也就是说,分析家的欲望是要成为小客体的类似物。

In 1967, Lacan admitted that this is not exactly a tenable position
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59). Yet he recalled that at the end of his career the
founder of psychoanalysis had described his invention as an impossible
profession too. For in ‘Analysis Terminable and Interminable’, Freud
had written:

在1967年,拉康承认,这并不是确实能自园其说的立场。可是,他提醒,在事业的结束时,精神分析的创办者曾经描述他的发明,作为也是不可能的专业。因为在“终止与没有终止的精神分析”一文,弗洛伊德写到:

[L]et us pause for a moment to assure the analyst that he has our
sincere sympathy in the very exacting demands he has to fulfil in
carrying out his activities. It almost looks as if analysis were the
third of those ‘impossible’ professions in which one can be sure
beforehand of achieving unsatisfying results. The other two, which
have been known much longer, are education and government.
(Freud 1937c:248)

让我们暂停一下,为了要让分析家确实,他获得我们诚恳的同情,对于他必须实践的这个严酷的要求,当他实现他的活动时。看起来好像是,精神分析是那些“不可能的”的专业的第三个。在这些“不可能”的专业里,我们能够预先确实获得的结果是不令人满意的。其他两个不可能的专业,大家知道的时间较长,那就是教育与政府。

This gloss on the three impossible professions should not be read as a
statement in which the notion of impossibility covers a specific
psychoanalytic meaning. For impossibility is not a Freudian concept.
Moreover, from Freud’s reference to the ‘impossible professions’ in his
preface to August Aichhorn’s Wayward Youth (Freud 1925f), it can be
inferred that the entire expression constituted some kind of German
commonplace rather than a Freudian invention in its own right. In this
preface Freud had conceded: ‘From an early period on, I have adopted
the joke of the three impossible professions—as there are: educating,
healing and governing —and I was also greatly preoccupied with the
means of these assignments’ (ibid.: 273).

这三个不可能的专业的虚饰外表不应该被阅读为这个陈述。在这个陈述里,不可能的这个观念掩盖明确的精神分析的意义。因为不可能并不是弗洛伊德的观念。而且,从弗洛伊德的提到’不可能的专业“,在他写的序文,给艾奇封的“迷失的青春”。我们可以推论,整个的表达构成某种的德国的公共场域,而不是弗洛伊德学派自己拥有的发明。在这篇序文,弗洛伊德承认:「从早期开始,我就採用“三个不可能的专业”的这个笑话。这三个专业就是教育,治疗,与统治。我也非常专注探讨这些行业的工具。

A comparison between this mention and the 1937 one reveals that
Freud at one stage substituted the analytic profession for the healing
profession while keeping the two other professions unaltered. This
substitution may be interpreted in at least two different ways. First, one
could argue that in 1937 Freud ultimately acknowledged that healing
and analysing are the same, that nobody is healed if not subjected to the
process of analysis, although both practices are fundamentally impossible.
Second, it could be said that Freud finally considered healing to be an
altogether possible achievement and therefore out of place within the
series of impossible professions, filling the empty space with
psychoanalysis. Contrary to the first interpretation, healing is here
essentially different from analysing, the former being possible and the
latter impossible.

比较一下这次的提到跟1937年的提到,我们发现,弗洛伊德在一个阶段,用精神分析的专业,来替换治疗的专业。另一方面,他又保持这两个其他的专业原封不动。这样的替换可能被解释,用至少是两个不同的方式。首先,我们能够争论,在1937年,弗洛伊德最后承认,治疗与精神分析是相同的。没有人被治疗好,假如他没有被承受过精神分析的过程。虽然两个行业的实践基本上都是不可能的。其次,我们能够说,弗洛伊德最后认为治疗是一个完全可能的成就,因此并不适合被归纳到不可能的专业的系列之内,作为是填补精神分析的空虚的空间。跟第一个解释恰恰相反,治疗在此基本上是不同于精神分析,治疗是可能的,而精神分析则是不可能。

Proceeding from Lacan’s conclusion concerning the untenable position
of the analyst and his formalization of the analyst’s discourse during the
late 1960s, I shall argue in favour of yet a third interpretation, saying
that healing and analysing are both impossible, but that the impossibility
is not the same due to a different position of the agencies. It will appear
then that the impossibility of psychoanalysis is highly specific and more
related to the position of the analyst than to the analytic process as such.
Impossibility gained momentum in Lacan’s works from the mid-1960s
onwards.

从拉康的结论继续前进,关于精神分析家的这个难以自圆其说的立场,以及精神分析家的辞说的的正式化,在1960年代期间。我将主张,赞同还有第三种的解释,并且说:治疗与精神分析两者都是不可能的。但是,这个不可能并不相同,由于代理者的不同的立场。因此,看起来,精神分析的不可能是非常明确的,而且跟分析家的立场更加息息相关,而不是由于精神分析的过程的本身。在拉康的著作里,从1960年代开始,不可能就获得强调的力量。

After its initial alignment with the real in Seminar XI (1977b
[1964]:167) the impossible gradually achieved currency as a central
Lacanian concept, defined in Seminar XX as ‘what does not stop not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:59, 94). Although the notion had
figured in Freud’s ‘joke’ of the three professions, Lacan did not revive
‘impossibility’ through the centralization of a marginal Freudian term,
as he had done previously with the notion of foreclosure (Verwerfung),
but by introducing the categories of modal logic into psychoanalytic
theory.66

经过最初的认同实在界,在第11研讨班,这个不可能逐渐获得流通,作为是中央的拉康派的观念。在第20研讨班,这个不可能被定义为“不停止不被书写的东西”。虽然这个观念已经包含在弗洛伊德的三个专业的笑话里,拉康重新主张“不可能”的观念,并不是经由将边缘的弗洛伊德的术语,拿来作为中心,如同拉康先前曾经做过的,对于“除权弃绝”的观念。相反地,拉康是重新主张不可能,是凭借将模态逻辑的范畴,介绍进入精神分析理论。

One of the seminal texts in which Lacan defined psychoanalytic
practice on the basis of an impossibility is the transcript of the opening
session of Seminar XIII, The Object of Psychoanalysis (1965–66), which
was published separately as ‘Science and Truth’ (1989b[1965]). Here
Lacan readdressed the vexed issue with which he had opened and closed
his Seminar XI in 1964: ‘Is psychoanalysis a science?’ (Lacan 1977b
[1964]:7, 264).

在其中一个研讨班的文本,拉康定义精神分析的实践,根据不可能作为基础。那就是第13研讨班,“精神分析的目标”的开始的几堂的录音稿。这个研讨班分开被出版,标题是“科学与真理”。在此,拉康重新处理这个感到懊恼的问题。他用这个问题来开始与结束他在1964年的第11研讨班:精神分析是一门科学吗?

In ‘Science and Truth’, his answer to this question was
not only much more elaborate than in Seminar XI, it also left little doubt
as to the exact position of psychoanalysis vis-a-vis science. Whereas in
Seminar XI Lacan had drawn attention to the ‘ambiguity that persists in
the question as to what in psychoanalysis is or is not reducible to science’
(ibid.: 265), in ‘Science and Truth’ he distinguished sharply between
psychoanalysis and science on the basis of their differential relation to
the function of truth as cause. Finding support, once again, in the second
book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:38–42), Lacan argued that science is
predicated upon truth as a formal cause, whereas psychoanalysis
encompasses truth as a material cause.67

在“科学与真理”,拉康对于这个问题的回答,不但更加地复制,比起第11研讨班。这个回答也留下几乎无可置疑,关于精神分析家的确实的立场,跟科学面对面。在第11研讨班,拉康已经注意到“关于在精神分析什么可化简,什么不可化简成为科学的这个问题,其间持续存在的模糊嗳昧”。在“科学与真理”,拉康锐利地区别精神分析与科学,根据它们的差异的关系,跟真理的功能,作为原因。拉康再次找到支持,在“亚里斯多德的物理学”的第二册。拉康主张,科学并不是以真理的述语,作为是正式的原因。而精神分析则是涵盖真理,作为物质的原因。

In science, Lacan intimated, the nature of a process and its various
components is represented in a formal law, such as E=mc2 , which is
itself the result of extensive empirical research or experimental testing.
Scientists use these formulas to explain why certain things happen the
way they do, which tallies with Aristotle’s description of a formal cause:
A second way in which the word [cause] is used is for the form or
pattern (i.e. the formula for what a thing is, both specifically and
generically, and the terms which play a part in the formula). For
example, the ratio 2:1, and number in general, cause the octave.
(Aristotle 1996:39)

拉康主张,在科学,过程的特性与过程的各种不同的成分被代表,作为是正式的法则,譬如,爱因斯坦的能源公式E=mc2,跟亚里斯多德的描述正式的原因不谋而合。第二个方式,真理(原因)被使用的方式,是为了形式或模式之用。(譬如,作为某件东西存在的内容的公式,不论述明确地或一般地。还有,在公式里扮演角色的术语)。譬如,2 :1 的比例,与一般的数字,会引起程式语言。

Lacan proclaimed that in science truth functions as a formal cause because
truth is the quality assigned to properly developed scientific laws (Lacan
1989b[1965]:22). Scientific formulas stemming from controlled
observations or carefully conducted experiments are believed to be true
(generally or under specific circumstances), and their truth value indicates
the extent to which they can be used to explain certain events. Put
differently, the extent to which a formula explains (causes) a certain
phenomenon provides an indication of the formula’s truth.

拉康宣称,在科学,真理发挥功能,作为是正式的原因,因为真理作为特质,是被指定给合适发展的科学的法则。科学的公式,起源于被控制的观察,或仔细主导的实验。这些公式被相信是真实的(一般性或在明确的环境之下)。它们的真理的价值指示著这个程度。它们被使用来解释某些事件的程度。换句话说,一个公式解释(或引起)某个现象的程度,提供公式的真理的一个指示。

In psychoanalysis, however, truth functions as a material cause and
the materiality is conditioned by the signifier (ibid.: 22–23). To understand
Lacan’s point, one should note that for Aristotle the material cause was
an answer to the question ‘What is this thing made of?’ rather than ‘Why
and how has this thing come about?’. In claiming that psychoanalytic
truth functions as a material cause by means of the signifier, Lacan thus
argued that in psychoanalysis the truth of an event (say, a symptom) is
always embedded in the symbolic order; it is made of signifiers, so to
speak.

可是,在精神分析,真理发挥功能,作为是材料的原因。这个材料受到能指的制约。为了理解拉康的要点,我们应该注意到,对于亚里斯多德,材料真理并没有解答这个问题:「这个东西由什么组成?」而是要解答这个问题:「这个东西为什么发生,如何发生?“当拉康宣称,精神分析的真理发挥功能,作为凭据能指的材料的原因。拉康因此主张,在精神分析,事件的真理(譬如,症状),总是被镶嵌在象征的秩序里。也就是说,它由能指组成。

As he had already tried to demonstrate via the rhetorical figure of
a prosopopea (‘I, truth, will speak’) to a bemused audience of Viennese
psychoanalysts in 1955 (Lacan 1977f[1955]:121–123), Lacan contended
that psychoanalysts could only proceed from the idea that the truth is
something which speaks internally and not, as scientists claim, something
‘out there’ which is silent and simply waiting to be laid down in formal
knowledge.68 Yet assuming that the truth speaks implies that it is
impossible to develop a knowledge which represents this truth fully and
adequately, for knowledge also takes root in language and there is no
language through which the truth does not speak.69

如同在1955年,针对维也纳的精神分析家的感的困惑的听众,拉康已经尝试过证明,凭借作为客观的第三者的修词的人物,(我,真理,将言说)。拉康主张,精神分析的前进,仅能从这个观念:真理是某件从内部言说的东西。真理并不是某件“外在于那里“的东西,如同科学家所宣称的。这个”外在于那里“的东西沉默,而且仅是等待着被正式的知识宣告出来。可是,假定真理会言说,暗示着,要发展充分而且充足地代表这个真理的知识是不可能。因为知识也生根于语言。然而,却没有一种语言,这个真理不经由它来言说。

Hence the first and foremost impossibility in psychoanalysis: it is
impossible to cover truth by relying on knowledge, whether the
knowledge is that incorporated and acted on by the analyst or that
produced by the analysand. In yet another piece of bravado, Lacan
summarized his thesis as follows in the opening paragraph of Television:
I always speak the truth. Not the whole truth, because there’s no
way, to say it all. Saying it all is literally impossible: words fail. Yet
it’s through this very impossibility that the truth holds onto the real.
(Lacan 1990d[1973]:3)

因此,在精神分析最初与最重要的不可能是:要依靠知识来涵盖真理是不可能。无论这个知识是被分析家融合或诉诸行动的知识,或是被分析者产生的知识。在另外一篇虚张声势的文章,在“电视“访谈的开头的段落,拉康总结他的主题如下:

我总是言说真理。不是完整的真理。因为要说出全部真理是不可能的。全部说出真理实质上是不可能的:因为话语做不到。可是,就是要通过话语失败的方式,真理才掌握到实在界。

Due to this epistemological impossibility, psychoanalysis is more akin
to art than science. Freud would have been quite reluctant to accept such
a designation, because in his view psychoanalysis had to be based on
truthfulness and the eradication of semblance and deceit—art only
generating illusions.70 Lacan however had favoured a conception of
‘psychoanalysis as art’ from the very start of his teachings. For instance,
in the 1953 lecture ‘The Neurotic’s Individual Myth’, he prepared his
audience of philosophers for his new interpretation of the Rat Man by
broaching the contentious issue as to whether psychoanalysis is a science.
His answer could not have been more categorical:

由于认识论的不可能,精神分析更加类似于艺术,而不是科学。弗洛伊德本来会相当不愿意接受这样的指称。因为在他的观的,精神分析的基础必须是真理,与抹除类似物与欺骗。艺术仅是产生幻觉。可是,拉康则是赞同“精神分析作为艺术“的观念,从他的教学的开始。譬如,在1953年的演讲”神经症者的个人神话“,他让他的哲学家们的听众,准备接纳他对于”鼠人“的新的解释。他装饰这个具有争议的议题,关于精神分析是否是一门科学。他的回答当时完全是范畴的观念。

It is often said that psychoanalysis is not, strictly speaking, a science,
which seems to imply by contrast that it is quite simply an art.
That is erroneous if one takes it to mean that psychoanalysis is
only a technique, an operational method, an aggregate to formulas.
But it is not erroneous if you use this word art in the sense in
which it was used in the Middle Ages to speak of the liberal arts—
that series going from astronomy to dialectic by way of arithmetic,
geometry, music, and grammar.
(Lacan 1979[1953]:406)

经常有人说,精神分析严格来说并不是一门科学。这似乎对照地暗示着:精神分析仅仅是一门艺术。那是错误的观念,假如我们将它意思解释为:精神分析仅是一门技术,一个运作的方法,各种公式的聚集处。但是,这样的解释不算是错误,假如你们使用“艺术“这个字词,如同它在中世纪所使用的意义,当提到liberal arts (通识技艺)。那个系列包含天文学,到辩证法,经由算术,几何,音乐,与文法。

Lacan claimed that the medieval ‘liberal arts’ distinguish themselves
from the sciences due to their ‘fundamental relation to human proportion’,
a relation which is ‘implied pre-eminently in the use of speech’ (ibid.:
406). His ensuing assertion on the singular status of psychoanalysis as a
fundamental art clearly foreshadowed his formulation on psychoanalytic
truth as a material cause in ‘Science and Truth’:

拉康宣称,中世纪的“通识技艺“区别它们自己跟理科的科学的不同,是由于它们跟人类的属性具有基本的关系。这个关系被暗示出了,特别是在对于言说的使用。拉康随后的主张,针对精神分析的独特的地位,作为是一门基本的艺术,由他对于精神分析的真理的阐述清楚地看出端倪,作为是”科学与真理“的研讨班的材料的原因。

It is in this respect that analytic experience is not definitively
objectifiable. It always implies within itself the emergence of a
truth that cannot be said, since what constitutes truth is speech,
and then you would have in some way to say speech itself which is
exactly what cannot be said in its function as speech.
(ibid.: 406)

在这方面,精神分析的经验并没有明确地可以被形成客体。它总是暗示着,在精神分析经验的内部,会有无法被说出的真理的出现。因为那是组成真理作为言说的东西。然后,你们将必须用某个方式说出言说的本身。那确实是无法被说出的东西,在它作为言说的功能。

With the concept of the impossible established, Lacan returned to Freud’s
three impossible professions, in order to situate them with regard to his
theory of the four discourses. In 1970 Lacan was interviewed on the
topic of his theoretical contributions to psychoanalysis by the academic
Robert Georgin, whom he described contemptuously as ‘a funny Belgian
who has asked me some questions’ (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:213).71 Part
of the interview was first broadcasted by the French-speaking official
Belgian radio station and afterwards also by the official French station.
‘Radiophonie’ (1970), the text of Lacan’s carefully prepared answers,
constitutes one of his most important later works.72 Lacan’s answer to
Georgin’s seventh question, which was never on the air, is of particular
significance here. The question ran as follows:

随着这个不可能的观念被建立,拉康回到弗洛伊德的三个不可能的专业,为了定位它们,关于他的“四个辞说“的理论。在1970年,拉康接受学院派的罗伯 乔金的访谈,针对这个议题:他对于精神分析的理论的贡献。拉康藐视地描绘罗伯 乔金,作为1”滑稽的比利时人,他询问我一下问题“。访谈的部分内容首先被播放,由说法语的官方的比利时的无线电台,随后,由官方的法语电台”Radiophnie“。拉康这次的仔细准备的回答的文本,构成他晚期的最重要的著作之一。拉康对于乔金的第七个问题的回答,从来没有播放过,在此具有特殊的意义。这个问题内容如下:

Governing, educating and psychoanalysing are three untenable
challenges. None the less, it is necessary for the psychoanalyst to
commit himself to this perpetual dispute of every discourse,
especially his own. The psychoanalyst clings to a knowledge—the
analytic knowledge—which he disputes by definition. How do you
solve—or not—this contradiction? Status of the impossible? The
impossible, is it the real?
(ibid.: 96)

统治,教育,与精神分析是三个无法自园其说的挑战。可人,精神分析家仍然有必要奉献他自己,对于日常辞说的这个永久的争论,特别是他自己的辞说.精神分析紧捉住一门知识—精神分析的知识。他用定义来争论的精神分析的知识。你如何解决,或不解决这个悖论?不可能的状态的悖论?不可能界,那是实在界吗?

Endorsing the equivalence of the impossible and the real, Lacan
emphasized that it is rather premature to state that the three Freudian
challenges are impossible and therefore real. Instead of defining the
practices of government, education and psychoanalysis as equally and
indistinctively impossible, Lacan posited that they each comprise a
specific impossibility, based on a specific impotence, as illustrated in his
formulas of the four discourses.73

拉康替不可能界等于是实在界背书,并且强调说这是为时过早,假如我们还不能陈述:三个弗洛伊德的挑战都是不可能,因此都是实在界。拉康并没有定义政府,教育与精神分析的实践,作为是同样而且模糊地不可能。拉康假设,它们每一个都包含一个明确的不可能性。以明确的无能为力作为基础。如同他的四个辞说的公式所说明。

To substantiate these differing impossibilities, he pointed out that the
discourse of the analyst transforms the impossibility of the discourse of
the master into impotence (impuissance), and its impotence into
impossibility. This transformation becomes clear when comparing the
formulas of the discourse of the master and the discourse of the analyst,
which Lacan introduced in the first session of Seminar XVII (1991 a
[1969–70]:9–27).

为了将这些不同的不可能性具体表现,拉康指出,精神分析家的辞说转化主人辞说的不可能性,转化成为无能为力。并且将主人辞说的无能为力,转化成为不可能性。这种转化变得清楚,当他比较主人辞说的公式,与精神分析家的辞说。

In Lacan’s formulas of discourse, impossibility always directs the
relationship between the two upper terms (represented by an arrow),
whereas impotence is characteristic for the relationship between the two
lower terms (represented by a double slash). As such, it can be verified
that the impossibility between S1 and S2 in the master’s discourse becomes
an impotence in the analyst’s discourse, whereas the impotence between
a and becomes an impossibility. In this way, the discourse of the master
reveals itself as the opposite of the discourse of the analyst, or, in other
words, governing is the reverse of psychoanalysing.74

在拉康的辞说的公司,不可能总是引的这两个上方的术语之间的关系(由箭头代表)。无能为力力的特征则是这两个下方的术语之间的关系(由双重的划杠代表)。作为这样的公式,我们可以验证:在主人辞说里,在S1 与 S2 之间的不可能,在分析家的辞说里,变得无能为力。在小客体与被阉割的主体之间的无能为力,则是变成不可能。用这个方式,主人辞说显示它自己,作为是精神分析辞说的对立。或者,换句话说,统治就是精神分析的相反。

But how are impossibility and impotence to be interpreted here? What
does it mean for the impossibility of the master’s discourse to be
transformed in impotence in the analyst’s discourse, and vice versa? In
‘Radiophonie’ Lacan divulged that in the master’s discourse, the
impossibility signifies the failure of the agency

但是,不可能与无能为力在此如何能够被解释?那是什么意思,让主人辞说的不可能,被转化成为精神分析辞说的无能为力?反过来说,也是一样?在“电台广播访谈”,拉康详述:在主人辞说理,这个不可能意味着代理者能指S的无法命令主体S的知识。

Whether a socially identified ruler or the psychic mastery of each and every individual, no matter how hard a master (S) tries to govern and control knowledge (S), the latter will always partially escape.

无论他说一位被社会认同的统治者,或们每个个人的心灵的掌控者,无论一位主人多么努力尝试要统治与控制主体的知识,后者将总是部分地逃避。

The reason for this lack of control is to be found in the impotence which
characterizes the relationship between the two lower terms of the formula.
Governing produces a result (the object a), but this result is powerless in
relation to the truth of the whole process. The truth of the master’s
discourse is that knowledge is partly unconscious and that this
unconscious part does not comprise a subject ().

控制的这个欠缺的理由能够被找到,在这个无能为力里。因为无能为力的特征就是公式的两个下方的术语之间的关系。统治产生一个结果(小客体a),但是这个结果是无能为力,当它与整个过程的真理的关系。主人的辞说的真理是,知识部分是无意识的,而且这个无意识的部分,并没有组成一个被阉割的主体S。

Unconscious knowledge
is not known by a particular agency; the only thing that can be said about
this knowledge is that it works and that it knows itself. Unconscious
knowledge is strictly self-contained and organizes the life of human
beings without they themselves knowing it. At the level of unconscious
knowledge there is a lack of agency, which is just another way of saying
that in the realm of unconscious knowledge the subject is barred (). The
product of the master’s discourse is not capable of reducing this lack,
for this product, which Lacan calls object a, is but a substitute stopgap—
not at all adequate for annihilating the lack () and for producing
some kind of jouissance. Therefore it is impossible to command
knowledge. Whatever the result of governing, the lack remains, due to
the barrier of jouissance on the level of impotence.

无意识的知识并没有根据一个特殊的代理者来认识。关于这个知识,唯一能够被说的事情是,它运转,它知道它自己。无意识的知识是严格地自我包容,并且组织人类的生命,但是他们自己却不知道它。在无意识的知识的层面,有一个代理者的欠缺。这是另外一种方式来说:在无意识的知识的领域里,主体是被划杠。主人辞说的产物并不能化减这个欠缺。因为这个产物,拉康称为是小客体a,仅是一个替代的替身—它根本就不足够来消灭这个欠缺,也不足够来产生某种的欢爽。因此,这是不可能,要命令知识。无论统治的结果是什么,这个欠缺始终存在。由于在无能为力的层面,欢爽的受到阻碍。

In the analyst’s discourse, the impossibility between S and S
2
of the master’s discourse becomes itself an impotence. This implies that the
discourse is based on the powerlessness of a signifier (S1) to control an existing frame of knowledge. The master signifier (S 1) is unable to organize the body of signifiers (S
2 ) for once and for all, and to reveal the definitive
signification of knowledge. In terms of what I have explained above (see
p. 87) within the context of the analyst’s task to dissolve coagulated centres
of signification in light of the analysand’s avowal of desire, the impotence
of the analyst’s discourse rests upon the unavoidable production of new
master signifiers, new loci of control whose power does not extend beyond
the reorganization of the symbolic order.

在精神分析家的辞说,能指1与能指2之间的不可能本身就变成无能为力。这暗示著,这个辞说的基础上能指1的无能为力,无法控制知识的现存的架构。主人能指(S1)没有能力一劳永逸地组织能指们(S2)的身体,也无法显示知识的明确的意义。用我以上刚刚解释的术语,在分析家的工作的内文里,要溶解意义的被凝固的中心,从分析者的宣称欲望的观点,分析家的辞说的无能为力,依靠无可避免的新的主人的能指的产生,新的控制的轨迹,它的力量并没有延伸超越象征的秩序的重新组织。

This specific impotence of the
analyst’s discourse is responsible for a specific impossibility, which I wish
to designate here as the impossibility to analyse what is merely a lack. If
the process of analysis were to enable the analysand to make sense of all
(conscious and unconscious) knowledge, the analysand would become
the material agent of his condition and ‘complete analysis’ would be
possible.

精神分析家的辞说的明确的无能为力,要替明确的不可能负责。我但愿能够在此将这个明确的不可能,指明是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。假如精神分析的过程要是让分析者能够理解所有的知识(无论是意识或是无意识的知识)。分析者将会变成是他的条件的物质代理者。那时,“完整”的精神分析将是可能的。

But as it happens, the patient remains a barred subject and the
only thing that can ever follow is her acceptance of this position. Rather
than effects of signification, the analyst’s discourse has effects of nonsense,
in so far as meaning is always fleeting, elusive.75 This seems to me
the reason why Lacan said in Seminar XXII that ‘The effect of meaning
required of the analytic discourse is not imaginary. It is neither symbolic.
It has to be real.’ (Lacan 1975c[1974–75]:4/96).

但是,偶然地,病人始终是一个被划杠阉割的主体。唯一可能跟随而来的东西,是病人接受这个立场。分析家的辞说并不是意义的效果,而是拥用无意识作为效果。因为意义总是瞬间消失,闪烁不定。我觉得这似乎就是这个理由,为什么拉康在第22研讨班会说:对于精神分析辞说所要求的意义的效果,并不是想像界。它也不是象征界。它必须是实在界。

The critical importance of Lacan’s point of view cannot be overrated,
especially when compared to what many psychoanalysts have done and
some continue to do. Instead of acknowledging the barrier their discourse
imposes on the process of ‘sense-making’, they radically eliminate it.
Many analysts indeed only try to make sense of other people’s lives and
of a whole range of sociocultural phenomena. The analyst’s job allegedly
consists in making sense where all others have failed; if nobody is capable
of making sense of what happens, there is still the analyst who can. Here,
the analyst is convinced that the master signifiers of his discourse do
control knowledge and he is obviously enjoying it.

拉康的观点具有关键的重要性,无论如何高估也不为过。特别是当我们比较他的观点,跟许多精神分析家已经做过,还有一些分析家继续在做的事情比较起来。他们非常没有承认他们的辞说赋加的阻碍,给予“理解意义”的过程。他们反而强烈地减少它。许多精神分析家确实仅是尝试理解别人的生活,以及仅是理解社会与文化的现象的整个范围。精神分析家的工作被宣称就是在于理解所有的其他分析家失败的地方。即使没有人能够理解所发生的事情,依旧还有分析家能够理解。分析家相信:他的辞说的主人能指,确实控制知识,他显而易见地正在享受知识。

Alongside the aforementioned situation (see p. 78) of analysts advocating a discourse
of the right to jouissance, this could be a second instance of a surreptitious
lapse of the analyst’s discourse into the realm of perversion.
When the analyst’s discourse is supported by the enjoyment of making
sense it cannot possibly be analytic anymore, because in Lacan’s
representation of the analyst’s discourse, the barrier between S
1 and S 2 is insuperable. The whole Lacanian dynamics of the analyst’s discourse
can thus be reduced to a single formula, which could serve as a rewording
of the ‘paradox of the position of the analyst’: one cannot enjoy being an
analyst and continue to be one.

除了精神分析家的以上提到解决,他们主张拥有欢爽的权利。还可能有第二个例子,精神分析家的辞实秘密地掉入倒错症的领域。当精神分析家的辞说受的理解的欢爽的支持,它就不再可能是精神分析。因为在拉康对于精神分析辞说的再现,在能指1与能指2之间的阻碍是无法克服的。整个的拉康的精神分析辞说的动力学,因此能够被化简成为单一个公式。这个公式可以充当是重新描述“精神分析家的立场的悖论”。我们无法享受成为一位分析家,又继续成为一位分析家。

The corollary of this paradox should not come as a surprise anymore.
After excluding the jouissance of the analyst, Lacan re-emphasized the
desire of the analyst. In relation to the formula of the analyst’s discourse
this desire comprises two aspects. First, it is a desire to put knowledge in
the place of truth. Indeed, in the analyst’s discourse knowledge (S
2) is situated in the lower left-hand corner, which Lacan defined as the place
of truth (Lacan 1991a[1969–70]:106).

这个悖论的必然结局不应该再引人惊奇。拉康将分析家的欢爽排除在外后,他重新强调,分析家的欲望,跟分析家的辞说的公式息息相关。这个欲望包含两个层面。首先,那是一个欲望,要将知识取代真理。的确,在精神分析家的辞说,知识(S2)被定位在下方的左手边的角落。拉康定义它,作为真理的位置。

On first sight, this could be seen
as contradicting the impossibility between knowledge and truth. Yet Lacan
argued that knowledge functioning on the place of truth has nothing to
do with knowledge being used as unquestionable truth. When analysts
are expected to use their knowledge as a manifestation of truth, they
should let their knowledge speak within everything they say, whilst
realizing that its base does not contain all the answers to the analysand’s
problems.

乍然一看,这可以被视为是反驳这个不可能,知识与真理之间的不可能。可是,拉康主张,在真理的位置发挥功能的知识,跟被使用作为无可置疑的真理的知识,并没有丝毫关系。当分析家被期待要使用他们的知识,作为真理的证明。他们不应该让他们的知识言说,在他们所说的一切事情之内。另一方面,他们体认到,知识的基地并没有包含所有的答案,针对分析者的难题的答案。

This point is similar to what I have discussed above (see p.
75) apropos of the analyst’s ignorance and the paradox of stupidity.76
Second, the desire of the analyst is evidently related to ‘disbeing’, to
making oneself appear as the cause of the desire of the analysand, even
to making the analysand believe that the analyst is the cause of her desire.

这一点类似我以上讨论的东西,关于精神分析家的无知与愚蠢的悖论。其次,精神分析家的欲望显而易见地跟“没有生命实存”息息相关,跟让自己出现,作为是分析者的欲望的客体的原因息息相关,甚至跟让分析者相信,分析家说她的欲望的原因。

This entails a second impossibility, although it is essentially the same as
the one described above (see p. 95) as ‘the impossibility to analyse what
is merely a lack’. It is impossible for the analyst to cause the desire of
the other through being the object a, because the object a is not something
a human being can identify with, and in so far as the analyst would try to
confront the analysand directly with the cause of his desire the analysand
is likely to experience anxiety.77

这涵盖第二个不可能,虽然它基本上是相同的,跟以上被描述的这个不可能,作为是不可能分析仅是属于欠缺的东西。精神分析家不可能引起他者的欲望,凭借充当小客体a。因为小客体a并不是某件人类能够认同的东西。因为精神分析家将会尝试让分析者直接面对欲望的原因,分析者很可能经验到焦虑。

Hence, the desire of the analysand can
only be invoked if it is sustained by an object which the analysand assigns
to the analyst, but of which the analyst knows nothing about. In Seminar
XVII, Lacan described the ensuing impossibility in the following terms:

因此,分析家的欲望能够被召唤的条件,仅是当它受到客体的维持,分析者指定给分析家的客体。但是,对于这个客体,分析家一无所知。在第17研讨班,拉康描述随之而来的不可能,用以下的术语:

‘what is at stake in the position of the analyst [is] this seduction of truth
he presents, insofar as he would know something about what he
principally represents. Do I emphasize enough the relief of the
impossibility of his position?’ (ibid.: 205). So, if the enjoyment of the
analyst is excluded, it appears that the desire of the analyst harbours a
double impossibility: an impossibility between truth and knowledge and
an impossibility to cause the desire of the analysand. The counterpart of
the above formula on the enjoyment of the analyst could therefore read:
one cannot adopt the desire of the analyst and also analyse.

「分析家的立场岌岌可危的地方,就是他呈现的真理的诱拐。因为他将会知道某件东西,关于他主要代表的东西。我充分强调过分析家的立场的不可能的这个解除吗?假如分析家的欢爽被排除,似乎,分析家怀抱著双重的不可能:一是真理与知识之间的不可能。另外一个不可能是要引起分析者的欲望。分析家的欢爽的的以上的公式的对应物,因此能够被阅读成为:我们无法採用分析家的欲望,也还能够分析。

In Lacanian theory, psychoanalysis is not simply an art; it is a real art.
This implies that it is an impossible art, but also that it is unrealized.

用拉康的理论,精神分析不但是一门艺术,它而且是实在界的艺术。这暗示着,精神分析是不可能的艺术,而是是无法被实现的艺术。

Psychoanalytic organizations tend to transform the practice of
psychoanalysis into a respectful profession, but in this way, the ontological
impossibilities of psychoanalysis are remodelled into the various
necessities of science: knowledge has to be true, the position of the
researcher-agent has to be well defined, results have to be validated,
intentions have to be clarified, the whole process has to be (quality)
controlled.

精神分析的组织倾向于将精神分析的实践,转化成为令人尊敬的行业。但是,用这个方式,精神分析的本体的不可能,被重新修改成为是科学的各色各样的需要:知识必须是真实,研究员-代理者的立场必须被清楚定义,结果必须是能够被验证,意图必须明朗,整个的过程必须被品质管控。

Lacan’s itinerary contains an implicit argument against the
professionalization of psychoanalysis, if professionalization means that
those who practice psychoanalysis can become authorized clinicians when
they are able to prove that the effects they produce are valuable to their
analysands and to society in general.78 However, Lacan also constructed
an argument substantiating psychoanalysis as an impossible profession,
not reading Freud’s joke as a demand to overcome a deplorable social
condition, but as an accurate assessment of a complicated practice which
must be maintained as such.79

拉康的旅行路线包含一个暗含的论点,反对精神分析变成专门职业。假如专门职业的意思是,那些作为精神分析的执业者,能够成为是被授权的临床医生,当他们能够证明,他们产生的效果是有价值的,对于他们的分析者,以及对于一般的社会。可是,拉康也建构一个论点:他让精神分析实质表现,作为是不可能的专业。他阅读弗洛伊德的笑话,不是作为要求克服令人哀叹的社会的情况,而是作为正确的评估复杂的执业实践,它必须被维持作为这样一个令人哀叹的情况。
But if psychoanalysis is a real art and as such twice as impossible,
and if it should remain that way, what can stop us from abolishing it
altogether? If there is only psychoanalytic impossibility and an argument
in favour of its necessity is not psychoanalytic, where does psychoanalysis
derive its raison d’etre from? To these questions, there is only one possible
answer: because of contingency, or what Lacan dubbed ‘what stops not
being written’ (Lacan 1998a[1972–73]:94).

但是,假如精神分析是实在界的艺术,作为这样的艺术,精神分析成为双倍的不可能。假如精神分析始终保持是那个方式,有什么能够阻止我们,不去完全地废除它?假如存在的仅是精神分析的不可能,赞同这种不可能的必要性的论点,并不是精神分析。那精神分析要从哪里获得它的“存在的理由“?针对这些问题,仅有一个可能的解答:因为偶然性,或拉康所谓的”没有停止被书些的东西“。

As Freud himself advocated
in his metaphor of archaeological sleuthing, psychoanalysis is geared
towards making discoveries, towards the creation of wonder and surprise
at the revelation of the unexpected, in short towards the crystallization
of new signifiers that reduce the painful necessity of repetition and are
therefore able to change the analysand’s life. In this sense, the Lacanian
practice of psychoanalysis is a genuine labour of love—not a love which
turns the contingency of an encounter into the necessity of a relationship,
but a love which cherishes both the marvel and the uncertainty of the
first accidental meeting (ibid.: 145).

如同弗洛伊德他自己主张,在他的考古学的技艺的隐喻,精神分析被发动,朝向要从事发现,朝向创造惊奇与神奇,在意料之外的启蒙处,总之,朝向新的能指的具体成形。这些新的能止减少重复的令人痛苦的必要,并且因此能够改变分析者的一生。就这个意义而言,拉康派的精神分析的执业实践,是真诚的爱的劳苦。这个爱的劳苦,并不是将遭遇的偶然性转变成为关系的必然性。而是珍惜首次的偶然的邂逅的惊奇与不确定。

Since Lacan conceived his practice
as radically Freudian, the inspiration for this idea had evidently come
from the founder. ‘Essentially, one might say, the cure is effected by
love’, Freud had written to Jung in December 1906 (McGuire 1974:12–
13), repeating his phrase to a group of followers in January 1907 as ‘Our
cures are cures of love’ (Nunberg and Federn 1962:101).

因为拉康构想他的执业实践,作为是强烈的弗洛伊德学派,作为这个观念的启发显而易见是来自创办者。「基本上,我们可以说,治疗是由爱所造成的。」弗洛伊德曾经写信给荣格,在1906年的12月。在1907年,他重复他的词语,对于一群的跟随者,作为是“我们的治疗是爱的治疗)。

In a sense, what Freud defined as love in these passages concerned
the analysand’s transference more than the analyst’s clinical intentions.
This evidently stirs the question as to how analysts, inasmuch as their
practice is inhabited by love, should deal with the transference-love on
the side of their patients. Freud formulated a tentative, quite unsatisfactory
answer in his ‘Observations on Transference-Love’ (1915a[1914]),
whereas Lacan explored the issue in his year-long Seminar VIII on
transference (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]). It is to these clinical vicissitudes
of transference that I will direct my attention in the following chapter.

从某个意义来说,弗洛伊德定义作为爱的东西,在这些段落里,跟分析者的移情的关联,远胜过跟分析家的临床的意图的关联。这显而易见地触动这个问题,关于分析家应该如何处理移情与爱,在病人的这边,既然他们的执业实践就是被爱所驻居。弗洛伊德阐述一个尝试性,相当不令人满意的回答,在他的“针对移情与爱的观察”。拉康则是探索这个问题,在他长达一年的第八研讨班,“论移情”。在以下的章节,我将引导我的注意力,朝向移情在临床的起伏变化。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

逻辑时间机器

November 5, 2015

LACAN’S LOGICAL TIME MACHINE
拉康的逻辑时间机器

At this stage, it is necessary to return to the Freudian goals of
psychoanalysis and their associated deadlock, in order to show how Lacan
reformulated these goals following his own changing perspectives on
the position of the analyst.

在这个阶段,我们有必要回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的目标,与目标息息相关的僵局。为了显示拉康重新阐释这些目标,遵循他自己的逐渐改变的观的,针对分析家的立场。

In the third session of Seminar XI, within the context of an inquiry
into the ontological status of the unconscious, Lacan revealed what he
believed to be a contradiction in Freud’s description of the unconscious
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:31–32).

在第11研讨班的第三堂,在探讨无意识的本体的地位的内文里,拉康显示他相信的一种悖论,在弗洛伊德的描述无意识。

On the one hand, Freud had stressed on
various occasions (Freud 1912b:108; 1915e:187; 1920g:28) that
unconscious processes are not structured according to a temporal order
(Zeitlosigkeit), whereas on the other hand he had noted that repressed
unconscious impulses do not change over time (Freud 1920g:28;
1933a[1932]:73–74).

在另一方面,弗洛伊德曾经在各个场合强调:无意识的过程并不是依照时间的秩序来建立架构。在另一方面,弗洛伊德已经注意到,被压抑的无意识的冲动,并没有随着时间而改变。

To Lacan, Freud’s second statement implied that a
repressed unconscious impulse, which he dubbed ‘desire’, does function
according to a particular temporal order, notably the order of unvarying
duration, which evidently contradicts the first claim on the absence of
time in the unconscious. To solve this problem, Lacan proposed a
distinction between two kinds of temporal processes: a modality
according to which objects are characterized by duration—a short or
prolonged existence over time—and a logical modality, in which the
existence of an object can only be established with hindsight, as an
inference from the logical succession of two moments (Lacan
1977b[1964]:32).

对于拉康,弗洛伊德的第二个陈述暗示着:被压抑的无意识的冲动,他命名为“欲望”,确实是依照特殊的时间的秩序发挥功能。特别是依照一成不变的期间的秩序。这个一成不变的时间显然互相抵触最初的宣称:在无意识里,时间的缺席。为了解决这个难题,拉康建议区别两种的时间的过程:依照其中一个模式,客体由期间来表现特征,随着时间的简短或延长的存在。另外一个模式则1逻辑的模式。在那里,客体的存在仅能靠着后见之明来建立。作为是从两个时空的逻辑的连续来推论。

To illustrate how this modality of logical time functions, Lacan referred
to a puzzle he had analysed in an article of 1945 (1988a[1945]). The
story runs as follows. A prison governor explains to three prisoners that
he wants to set one of them free without taking responsibility for who it
shall be. He shows the inmates three white and two black disks, telling
them that he will pin one of these five disks between their shoulders, so
that each will be able to see the colour of the disk on the back of the two
others, but not the colour of his own. He also emphasizes that they are
not allowed to mirror themselves nor to engage in conversation, the latter
activity running counter to their own interest. The first prisoner who
thinks he has figured out the nature of his colour and who can explain
how he has arrived at the conclusion will be released.54

为了解释逻辑时间的这个模式如何运作,拉康提到他曾经分析过的一个谜团,在1945年的一篇文章。故事的内容如下:一位监狱的典狱长对三位囚犯解释,他想要释放他们其中的一位,但是他不负责决定是哪一位。他给这些犯人观看三个白色与两个黑色的园盘。他告诉他们,他将这些园盘的每一个挂在他们的肩膀背后。这样,每一位都将会看见前面两位其他犯人的背后的园盘的颜色。但是看不见他自己的背后的园盘的颜色。他也强调,他们不被容许反映他们自己,也不许参与谈话。后者的行动跟他们自己的利益相违背。第一位认为他已经想出他的颜色的特色的人,以及第一位能够解释他如何获得这个结论的犯人,将会被释放。

It goes without saying that the evil governor attaches a white disk to
each prisoner’s back, thus putting them in the same position.55 From the
moment the exercise starts, each prisoner sees two white disks, which is
likely to stir bewilderment, confusion and anxiety. This is what Lacan
called ‘the instant of the glance’ (l’instant du regard) (ibid.: 206). What
happens next is difficult to grasp, yet the prisoner who succeeds in
deducing the colour of his disk correctly—‘the moment of concluding’
(le moment de conclure) in Lacan’s terminology—can claim, in retrospect,
that the time between these two moments (of seeing and concluding)
was taken up by a fruitful ‘time for comprehending’ (temps pour
comprendre). Not until the final assertion (‘I am black’, ‘I am white’)
can the existence of genuine understanding be substantiated and measured
in its quality of understanding.56

自不待言的是,邪恶的典狱长附加一个白色的园盘到每位犯人的背上,然后将他们放置相同的位置。从这个运用开始,每位犯人看见两个白色园盘,很可能引起困窘,困惑与焦虑的园盘。这就是拉康所谓的”瞥见的瞬间“,可是,成功于正确推论出他的园盘的颜色的这位犯人,”结论的时刻“—能够宣称,回顾地,处于这两个时刻的时间(看见与下结论),被接续而来的具有成果的”理解的时刻“。直到最后的主张(”我是黑色“”我是白色“),真正的理论的存在才会成为具体,根据它的理解的品质来测量。

Consequently, the ontological status of what is situated between the
instant of the glance and the moment of concluding is highly peculiar.
As long as the moment of concluding has not occurred, one cannot be
sure that comprehending (the fruitful production of knowledge) exists at
all, whereas from the moment a conclusion is reached, comprehending
exists no more, relegated as it is to a past experience.

结果,被定位在瞥见的瞬间与下结论的时刻之间的本体的地位,非常特殊。只要下结论的时刻还没有发生,我们无法确定,理解会不会存在(具有成功的知识的产物。另一方面,从结论的时刻被到达时,理解就不再存在,因为它分配给过去的经验。

To Lacan, logical time offered a new explanation of how the unconscious
operates temporally. Disputing Freud’s claim that the unconscious is not
marked by a temporal order, he argued that it may be impossible to
‘measure’ the unconscious in terms of duration over time, but that its
existence can be substantiated as a logical inference. Like the time for
comprehending in the story of the three prisoners, the unconscious thus
acquired the peculiar ontological status—although Lacan preferred to call
it ‘pre-ontological’ or ‘ontic’—of neither being, nor non-being (Lacan
1977b[1964]:29, 31).

对于拉康,逻辑时间提供一个新的解释,对于无意识如何时间地运转。当拉康争论弗洛伊德的主张:无意识并没有被时间的秩序。拉康主张,要凭借时间里的期间,来“测量“无意识是不可能的。但是无意识的存在能够被具体表现,作为是逻辑的推论。就像作为理解的时间,在三位犯人的故事里,无意识因此获得特殊的本体的地位—虽然拉康宁可称它为”前-本体“或”本体的“,既不是”生命实存“,也非”非生命实存“。

Throughout Seminar XI he launched a range of terms
to capture this status, from the unrealized to the function of limbo (ibid.:
30). In ‘Position of the Unconscious’, a text con temporary to Seminar XI,
he even compared the unconscious to a cave where one can never arrive
before closing-time and whose gate only opens when somebody knocks
from the inside (Lacan 1995a[1964]:267).

在第11研讨班,拉康发动一连串的术语来捕捉这个地位,从没有被实现的地位,到力比多的功能。在“无意识的位置“,跟第11研讨班同时的文本,拉康甚至将无意识比喻为一个洞穴。在洞穴那里,我们永远无法在结束时间以前到达。这个洞穴的大门仅有当某个人东里面敲门,它才会打开。

With this definition of the unconscious as an elusive, unrealized
structure in mind, Lacan returned to the clinical impasse of Freudian
analysis. To Freud, remembering reached its limit in the unconscious
striving for repetition; a process inherent to the unconscious vehemently
opposes the analytic retrieval of repressed impulses and the ensuing
reduction of their pathogenic influence. In Lacan’s reinterpretation of
these dynamics, repetition did no longer constitute an insuperable problem
for the progression of psychoanalytic treatment, or a factor whose
influence psychoanalysts should try to neutralize. Whereas Freud had
argued that repetition symbolizes the inertia of unconscious processes
and the imminent failure of the analytic enterprise, Lacan refused to
conceptualize repetition as the evil counterpart of remembering. For
example, in Seminar XI he pointed out:

当无意识的定义,作为是闪烁,没有被实现的心灵的结构,拉康回到弗洛伊德的精神分析的临床的僵局。对于弗洛伊的,回忆到达它的极限,在无意识的追寻重复。作为无意识本质具有的过程,强烈地对立于被压迫的冲动的精神分析的复得,以及随之而来的化简他们的病因的影响。当拉康解释这些动力时,重复并不再形成一个无法被克服的难题,对于精神分析的治疗的进展,或是一个因素。这个影响精神分析的因素应该尝试保持中立。虽然弗洛伊德曾经主张,重复象征无意识的过程的惰性,以及精神分析事业的逼近的失败。拉康拒绝将重概念化,作为是记忆的邪恶复本。譬如,在第11研讨班,拉康指出:

Remembering always involves a limit. And, no doubt, it can be
obtained more completely by other ways than analysis…It is here
that we must distinguish the scope of these two directions,
remembering and repetition. From the one to the other, there is no
more temporal orientation than there is reversibility. It is simply
that they are not commutative—to begin by remembering in order
to deal with the resistances of repetition is not the same thing as to
begin by repetition in order to tackle remembering.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:40)

记忆总是牵涉到限制。无可置疑,记忆能够更加完成地被获得,凭借除了精神分析以外的其他方法。就在这里,我们必须区别这两个方向的范围,记忆与重复。从记忆到重复,除了逆转之外,不再有时间的定向。这仅是因为记忆与重复并没有互相沟通—凭借记忆开始,为了处理重复的抗菌,并不相同于,凭借重复开始,为了克服记忆。

In highlighting the non-commutativity of the relationship between
remembering and repetition, Lacan claimed that repetition is an essential
feature of the unconscious whose power cannot be diminished by
encouraging the analysand to remember, although a momentary standstill
of the repetitive cycle may induce recollection.57

当拉康强调记忆与重复之间的关系的非-沟通时,拉康宣称,重复是无意识的一个基本的特征。无意识的力量无法被减少,凭借鼓励分析者记者。虽然重复的循环的暂时的停顿可能引起回忆。

Lacan had already extrapolated Freud’s thesis that repetition is inherent
to the unconscious, despite being beyond the pleasure principle, in Seminar
II, in which he had broached the linguistic organization of the unconscious:

拉康已经列举弗洛伊德的主题:重复说无意识本质具有。尽管无意识超越快乐原则。在第二研讨班,拉康曾经将无意识的语言的组织粗略描绘。

[T]he unconscious is the discourse of the other. This discourse of
the other is not the discourse of the abstract other, of the other in the
dyad, of my correspondent, nor even of my slave, it is the discourse
of the circuit in which I am integrated. I am one of its links. It is the
discourse of my father for instance, in so far as my father made
mistakes which I am absolutely condemned to reproduce…That’s
what the need for repetition is, as we see it emerge beyond the
pleasure principle. It vacillates beyond all the biological mechanisms
of equilibration, of harmonisation and of agreement. It is only
introduced by the register of language, by the function of the symbol,
by the problematic of the question within the human order.
(Lacan 1988c[1954–55]:89–90)

无意识是大他者的辞说。大他者的辞说并不是抽象的大他者,二元的大他者,我的对应者的辞说,甚至也不是我的奴隶的辞说。大他者的辞说是循环的辞说,我被合并在那个循环里。我是其中一个连接。譬如,我的父亲的辞识,因为我的父亲犯下错误,我绝的被注意要复制的错误。那就是重复的需要,如同我们看见它出现,超越快乐原则。它摇摆于超越所有生物的平衡,和谐与同意的机制。重复的需要被介绍,仅是凭借语言的铭记,凭借象征的功能,凭借这个问题的难题,在人类的秩序里。

Repetition appears not as an obscure unconscious mechanism which puts
human beings continuously under the infernal spell of pain, ultimately
driving them towards self-destruction, but as an irreducible aspect of the
symbolic embodment of the unconscious. Like the transmission of signals
within an electronic circuit, signifiers circulate within the symbolic network
of the unconscious, which is what Lacan dubbed ‘repetition automatism’
(automatisme de repetition) (Lacan 1972[1956]:39).

重复出现,并不是作为一个模糊的无意识的机制。这个无意识的机制让人类继续承受内部的痛苦的压力,最后逼迫人类朝向自我毁灭。重复出现,作为无法无意识的象征的具体化身的化简的层面。就像在电子的循环迴路里,讯号的传递,能指在无意识的象征的网络里循环1。这就是拉康所谓的“重复的自动机制”。

The replacement of
Freud’s ‘compulsion’ with the new ‘automation’ signals the self-regulating
quality of the process.58 The pre-eminent clinical implication of this idea
is that every analytic attempt at countering repetition unavoidably runs
aground on the durability of the unconscious. Since repetition is part and
parcel of the symbolically structured unconscious and psychoanalysis
cannot lay claim to eradicating the unconscious, the reign of repetition
must remain unblemished. This insight prompted Lacan to take issue with
the envisaged reintegration of the patient’s life history via an induced
verbalization of its censored chapters, notably Freud’s own view on the
goal of psychoanalysis which he himself had embraced during the early
1950s (Lacan 1977e[1953]:46–48).

弗洛伊德的“冲动”被替换为新的“自动机制”,意味着这个过程的自我-规范的特质。这个观念具有优先的临床的暗示是,每个精神分析的企图反对重复,无可避免地失败,在无意识的期间。因为重复是做为象征的结构的无意识的部分与包裹。精神分析无法宣称抹除无意识,重复的统治必须始终没有瑕疵。这个洞见激发拉康主张病人的一生的历史被构想地重新融合,经由它的被审查的章节的文辞表达。特别是弗洛伊德自己的观点,针对精神分析的目标。他自己在1950年代主张的精神分析的目标。

In Seminar XI, Lacan re-examined these dynamics, relativizing his own
previous propositions on the signifier as object of repetition. Two central
issues were at stake. First, what is the nature of the event that is being
repeated? And second, what is responsible for the process of repetition
itself? To answer these questions, Lacan mustered the notions of tuche
and automaton from the second book of Aristotle’s Physics (1996:42–
48).

在第11研讨班,拉康重新检查这些动力,将他自己先前的主张相对化,针对将能指视为重复的客体。两个主要的命题岌岌可危。首先,正在被重复的事件的特性是什么?其次,是什么负责重复本身的过程?为了回答这些问题,拉康聚集“邂逅”与“自动机制”的观念,从亚里斯多德得到“物理学”。

Tuche literally means ‘accident’ or ‘chance’, as in ‘something which
happens by accident’ or ‘a chance encounter’, yet the term also conveys
‘luck’ and ‘fortune’, as in ‘I was lucky enough to escape’ or ‘I was fortunate
to have him around’. Each of these meanings points towards uncontrollable
circumstances, events which a human being cannot foresee.59 Lacan
redefined tuche in his own nomenclature as an encounter with the real,
and designated it as the object of repetition (Lacan 1977b[1964]:69).

“邂逅”实质上意味着“意外”或“偶然”,作为是某件偶然发生的事情,或“偶然的遭遇”。可是,这个术语也传达“运气”与“幸运”,如同“我足够幸运逃避出来”或是“我足够好运拥有他作伴”。这些意义的每一个都指向无法控制的环境,人类无法预先看见的事件。拉康重新定义“邂逅”,用他自己的专业术语,作为是“与实在界遭遇”,并且指明“邂逅”,作为是重复的客体。

Whereas Lacan’s concept of the real had scarcely outweighed that of
common-sense reality during the first ten years of his seminar, he now
considered it to be the equivalent of the impossible (ibid.: 167). As an
encounter with the real, an accident always entails the emergence of the
impossible, because the subject never expects the event in question to
happen. Since it is impossible to prepare oneself for what happens by
accident, Lacan also claimed that encounters with the real are inherently
missed and inescapably traumatic (ibid.: 55). The event itself can be either
pleasurable (eutuchia, good fortune) or unpleasurable (dustuchia, bad
fortune), but this has no bearing whatsoever on its devastating impact.
Encounters with the real therefore operate beyond good and bad or, in
Freudian terms, beyond the pleasure principle (ibid.: 53–54).

虽然拉康对于实在界的观念几乎没有超过共同常识的现实,在他研讨班的前十年。他现在则是认为实在界是相等于是不可能界。作为跟实在界遭遇,一个意外事件总是意味着不可能界的出现。因为主体从来没有预期这个受到质疑的事件会发生。因为要意外发生的事件有心理准备是不可能的。拉康也宣称,跟实在界的遭遇本质上会被错过,并且无可逃避地形成创伤。这个事件本身要就是令人愉快(好运),要不就是令人不愉快(坏运)。但是,这跟它的毁灭性的影响并没有丝毫的关系。跟实在界的遭遇,运作超越善与恶。或者,用弗洛伊德的术语来说,超越快乐原则。

Having defined the object of repetition as tuche, an essentially
traumatic encounter with the real, Lacan then employed Aristotle’s term
automaton to describe the ‘engine’ of repetition (ibid.: 52). Automaton
is usually rendered as ‘spontaneity’ in English translations of Aristotle’s
Physics, a term whose meaning is not too far removed from that of the
transliteration ‘automatism’. Both ‘spontaneous’ and ‘automatic’ indicate
that something in the nature of the event itself triggered its occurrence,
as in ‘spontaneous combustion’. In Lacan’s discourse automaton
coincided with the insistence of the network of signifiers and with Freud’s
pleasure principle (ibid.: 54).

拉康将重复的客体定义为“邂逅”,基本上是跟实在界的创伤的遭遇。然后,拉康运用亚里斯多德的术语“自动机制”来描述重复的“引擎”。自动机制automaton通常被翻译成为啥“自动自发’, 用英文翻译亚里斯多德的物理学来说。这一个术语的意义,跟实质翻译的automatism(自动机制),意思相差不远。”自动自发” 与“自动的”都指示著,某件事情,具有事件的特性,触动它的发生。如同在“自动自发的冲动”。在拉康的辞说“自动机制”,巧合于能指的网络的坚持,也恰合于弗洛伊德的快乐原则。

This seemingly abstruse connection is fairly
easy to understand when taking into account that the transition from
‘chance encounter’ to ‘repetition’ involves a transformation of
‘contingency’ into ‘necessity’. Such a transformation can only take place
if a de-randomizing operator is capable of reducing the chance element.
In other words, for an (unfortunate or lucky) accident to leave an indelible
mark, for a trauma to induce ineradicable mental and or physical scars,
something must have transformed the missed encounter into unavoidable
destiny. Lacan believed that the symbolic order, the network of signifiers
functioning in the unconscious, constitutes the powerhouse of this
transformation. Without a symbolic structure, however simple or
complicated it may be, fate will never catch up with people after they
have been the victim of an encounter with the real.60

表面上是抽象的关联,则是非常容易理解。假如我们考虑到,从“偶然的遭遇”到“重复”的转变,牵涉到“偶然性”的转化成为“必要性”。这样的转化的发生,仅有当一个除掉-任意性的运作者能够减少偶然的元素。换句话说,为了让一个(不幸或幸运)的意外,留下无法抹灭的记号,为了让一个创伤减少无法抹除的精神与生理的疤痕。某件东西必须已经将错过的遭遇,转化成为无法避免的命运。拉康相信,象征的秩序,在无意识里运作的能指的网络,组成转化的发电所。假如没有象征的结构,无论多么简单或复制,命运将永远追赶不上人们,在他们已经成为跟实在界遭遇的受害者之后。

Lacan’s analysis of the object and engine of repetition defied Freud’s
own views on repetition in at least four respects. First, whereas repetition
had appeared to Freud as a stubborn resistance to remembering, in Lacan’s
theory it followed an ‘automatic’ process based on a real encounter and
a symbolic machinery. Second, whilst Freud had situated repetition
entirely beyond the pleasure principle, Lacan only assigned the object
of repetition to this ‘beyond’, situating the engine firmly within the
boundaries of the pleasure principle.

拉康对于重复的客体与引擎的分析,挑衅到弗洛伊德自己对重复的观点,至少有两个层面。第一,对于弗洛伊德,重复出现作为是顽固的抗拒记忆;在拉康的理论,重复则是遵循一个“自动机制”的过程,以跟实在界遭遇与象征的机器作为基础。其次,弗洛伊德曾经将重复定位,完全超越快乐原则之外;拉康则仅是将重复的客体指定给这个“超越”,将引擎牢固的定位快乐原则的边界内部。

Third, whereas Freud had studied
repetition mainly on the level of behavioural acts (as opposed to verbal
productions), Lacan conceived repetition as a process strictly belonging
to the network of signifiers and thus to the structure of language. In
Lacan’s account, every repetitive event, whether verbal (digital) or
behavioural (analogous), had a symbolic status. Fourth, whilst Freud
had remained convinced that the stream of repetition could be embanked,
igniting a partial liberation of the pathogenic impulses and their
reintegration into the patient’s history as past events, Lacan posited that
repetition, being an essential function of the symbolic order, cannot be
cancelled out.

第三,弗洛伊德曾经研究重复,主要是指行为的行为的层面(跟文辞的产生相对立);拉康则是构想重复,作为是严格属于能指的网络的过程,因此属于语言的结构的过程。在拉康的描述里,每个重复的事件,无论是文词(数位)或行为的(类似的)的事件,它们都有象征的地位。第四,弗洛伊德始终相信,重复的水流能够用堤岸拦住,触发病因的冲动的部分解放;拉康则是假设,重复,由于是象征的秩序的基本的功能,无法被完全取消。

This does not imply that psychic change is altogether impossible within
Lacan’s conception of analytic treatment. It simply means that psychic
change needs to be situated on an entirely different level. Whereas Freud
believed he could dismantle the unconscious machinery of repetition
with the lever of remembering, Lacan set out to bring the endless
circulation of traumatic events within the machine’s memory to a halt by
modifying the structure of the machine itself. Indeed, if we accept that
the unconscious operates as a pre-ontological, permanently inchoate
structure, in accordance with the principle of logical time, and if we also
acknowledge that repetition is governed by the network of signifiers, a
huge arsenal of new opportunities for psychic change is opened.

这并不意味着,心灵的改变是完全不可能,在拉康的精神分析的治疗的构想里面。它仅是意味着,心灵的改变需要被定位在完全不同的层面。虽然弗洛伊德相信,他能够拆解重复的无意识的机器,用记忆作为杆杠。拉康则是出发,将机器的记忆里,创伤事件的无穷尽的循环,让它停止,凭借修改机器本身的结构。的确,假如我们接受,无意识运作作为前-本体的,永远是未完成的结构,以符合逻辑时间的原则。假如我们也承认,重复被能指的网络所统辖,作为心灵改变的新的机会,就像巨大军火库被打开。

Starting with the threefold structure of logical time, the story of the
three prisoners makes clear that the moment of concluding, through which
the preceding ‘time for comprehending’ becomes meaningful, is not a
moment of certainty. When one of the prisoners finally decides that he is
white, the only criterion he can rely on for making that decision is the
hesitation, or perhaps the indecisiveness of the two other prisoners, which
is of course not a reliable criterion. Hence, on the basis of what he has
concocted during the interval, the prisoner cannot be absolutely certain
about the truth of his decision. At the moment of concluding, he can
only anticipate its truth value. When the director eventually reveals to
the prisoner that his disk is white, it will prove to him that he has been
correct in assuming that the hesitation of the other prisoners was proof
of his being white. In case his disk turns out to be black, it will prove to
him that he had erroneously interpreted the hesitation of the others, or
that his time for comprehending was not about comprehending at all.

从逻辑时间的三重结构开始,这三位犯人清楚显示,通过结论的时刻,先前的“理解的时间”才变得具有意义。这个结论的时刻并不是确定的时刻。当其中一位犯人最后决的,他背后的盘子是白色,他做那个决定所依靠的唯一的标准,就是犹豫,或者说是前两位其他犯人的不作决定。这当然并不是一个可靠的标准。因此,根据在过程期间,他所编造的东西,作为基础。这位犯人无法绝对确定关于这个决定具有真理的价值。当导演最后给这位犯人显示,他背后的园盘是白色,这将跟他证明:他已经正确地假定,前两位犯人的犹豫证明他背后的园盘是白色。万一他背后的园盘是黑色,或是他错误地解释其他两位犯人的犹豫,或是他的理解的时间,根本就不是关于理解。

As formations of the unconscious, symptoms are also structured along
these lines of logical time. Rather than being controlled by a historical
event, the truth of a symptom—including its very status of symptom—
is pending, which encouraged Lacan to produce the pun that the reality
of the subject is always en souffrance, that is to say both ‘in a state of
suffering’ and ‘in abeyance’ (ibid.: 56). Due to the fact that the truth of
a symptom depends on something occurring in the future, Lacan
exchanged the Freudian ‘present perfect tense’ for a ‘future perfect tense’
(futur anterieur). The gist of this idea was already contained in a paragraph
from his ‘Rome Discourse’:

作为无意识的形成,症状也是沿着逻辑时间的脉络作为结构。征状的真理并没有受的历史事件的控制。症状的真理,以及症状的真理的地位,都拖延来临。这鼓励拉康产生这个双关语,主体的现实总是“en souffrance,”(尚未被接收),换句话说,“处于遭受痛苦的状态”与悬置当中。由于这个事实:症状的真理依靠某件未来发生的事情。拉康将弗洛伊德的“现在完成式”,改换成我“未来完成式”的时态。这个观念的要点已经被包含在他的“罗马辞说”的一个段落里。

What is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was,
since it is no more, or even the present perfect of what has been in
what I am, but the future perfect of what I shall have been for what
I am in the process of becoming.

在我的历史中被实现的东西,并不是过去明确地存在过的东西。因为它目前并不再存在,或甚至是在我的生命实存里,曾经存在过的事情的现在完成式。而是未来完成式,对于我未来将已经形成的事情,针对我在生成的过程里,我的生命实存。
(Lacan 1977e[1953]:86, translation modified)

Instead of the classical analytic question ‘What has happened to me (during
my childhood) that could possibly explain my present misery?’, the
Lacanian analyst ushers the patient to ask ‘What is going to happen to me
that will explain both my current situation and my life-history?’.

并非是古典的精神分析的问题:「我曾经发生什么事(在我的童年),可以用来解释我的目前的悲惨?」拉康派的精神分析家引导病人询问:「我将会发生什么事,将会解释我的目前的情境,与我的一生的历史?」

For the
analysand, this Lacanian strategy implies that he is freed from the
deterministic historical truth and introduced into a new realm of freedom.
Whereas in a Freudian setting analysands cannot alter the pathogenic impact
of the circumstances they have been subjected to, Lacanian analysands
are being given the keys to their own destiny, since the pathogenic impact
of an event is dependent upon the future, whose face has evidently not
been decided upon. Rather than reducing the impact of traumatic events
by liberating them from their historical dungeons and relocating them into
a remote, innocuous past, the Lacanian analyst is thus held to liberate
history as such by ensuring that its meaning can depend on the future.

对于分析者,这位拉康派的策略暗示着:他被免除这个命定论的历史的真理,并且被介绍进入自由的新的领域。虽然在弗洛伊德学派的背景,分析者无法改变环境的病因的影响,他们一直被隶属于的环境。拉康派对分析者正在被给予他们自己的命运的钥匙。因为事件作为病因的影响依靠着未来,未来的脸孔显而易见地还没有被决定。非但没有减少创伤的事件的影响,凭借解放它们,从历史的地牢,并且重新分派它们进入遥远,而无害的过去。拉康派对分析家因此被认为是将历史本身解放出来,凭借保证,历史的意义依靠未来。

A further possibility of change resides in Lacan’s assertion that
repetition is part and parcel of the network of signifiers. As an organization
of innumerable discrete elements, the symbolic order does not represent
a closed circuit characterized by stability, inertia and linear causality.
Each signifier can contribute to the organization of the symbolic order, a
particular series of signifiers can spark off a whole range of subsequent
signifiers, one signifier can originate in a variety of previous signifiers,
and there is a continuous effect of ‘retro-version’ (feedback) whereby
every signifier is simultaneously the cause and the effect of another
signifier (Lacan 1977k[1960]:306).

一个更进一步的改变的可能性驻居在拉康的主张:重复苏能指的网络的部分与包裹。作为无数的众多的元素的组织,象征的秩序并没有代表一个封闭的循环,具有稳定,惰性,与直线的因果律特色。每个能指都能够贡献象征秩序的组织,特殊的系列的能指能够激发整个范围的随后的能指,一个能指能够起源于各色各样的先前的能指,并且存在着“反向逆转”的连续的影响(回馈),在那里,每个能指既是另外一个能指的原因,又是结果。

The rise and development of
cybernetics during the 1950s inspired Lacan to model this functioning
of the symbolic order on the patterns of interaction within natural and
artificial systems as described by Norbert Wiener, Ludwig von Bertalanffy
and others. The results of cybernetics informed Lacan’s Seminar II
(1988c[1954–55]: 294–308), especially his reading of the itinerary of
the letter in Poe’s story of ‘The Purloined Letter’ (1972[1956]), but they
continued to support his descriptions of the symbolic order, as well as
his graphical representations of unconscious processes.61

在1960年代,网际网络的興起与发展,启发拉康模拟象征秩序的功能,针对自然与人为的系统的内部,互相运作的模式。如同诺博特 温纳,范 博塔坦非与其他人们所描述的。网际网络的结果告知拉康的第二研讨班,特别是他阅读爱伦坡的故事“被偷窃的信”,信的流落途径。但是他们无法继续他的描述象征的秩序,以及无意识的过程的画面式的再现。

Because the symbolic order operates according to the principles of an
open system, its patterns of repetition are not inherently durable. When
durable patterns do occur, it is due to an installed impermeability, an inflexible
obduracy, or what could perhaps also be dubbed ‘network sclerosis’. Hence,
enduring patterns of repetition only come into operation when something
(an accident, an encounter with the real) has been sedimented into a sclerotic
nucleus. Countering these sclerotic nuclei implies that their force is being
weakened to the point where their constitutive parts re-enter a relationship
with the other components of the network.

因为象征的秩序运作,依照开放的系统的原则,它的重复的模式并没有本质上的持续期间。当持续期间确实发生,那是由于被安置的不可穿透性,一种没有弹性的不受劝告,或许可能被称为是“网络的硬化症”。因此,仅有当某件事情(意味,跟实在界的遭遇),已经被沉淀成为硬化症的核心,重复的持久的模式才会发生。反抗这些硬化症的核心暗示着:他们的力量被在被减弱,甚至他们的形成的部分重新进入关系,跟网络的其他成分的关系。

Strange as it may seem, this is exactly what the Lacanian analyst is
held to do, at least with neurotics and perverts.62 Dissolving coagulated
centres of signification, undermining the vicious circle of recurrent
combinations of signifiers, opening up a space of desire between ageold
patterns of demand and complaint, and urging the analysand to avow
this desire, the Lacanian analyst operates on the network of signifiers in
light of the production of something new. Unlike the Freudian analyst,
the Lacanian practitioner does not engage in archaeological sleuthing.
Within a Lacanian analytic format, change is not to be expected from
plumbing the depths of the psyche—as Freud himself was forced to
confess now and again—but only from the reorganization of the symbolic
system.

虽然听起来似乎古怪,这确实就是拉康派的精神分析家被认为要做的事情,至少就神经症者与倒错症者而言。拉康的分析家瓦解被凝固的意义的中心,逐渐损坏各种能指的反复的组合的恶性循环,打开处于要求与抱怨的古老的模式之间的欲望的空间,并且建议分析者宣称这个欲望。拉康派的分析家运作能指的网络,从某件新的东西的产生的观点。不像弗络伊德的分析家,拉康派的实践者并没有参与考古学的专业技术。在拉康派的精神分析的格式里,改变并没有被期望,从探索心灵的深处。如同弗洛伊德自己被迫要一再地坦白承认,但是仅是从象征系统的重新组织。

To the extent that Freudian analysis can be associated with ‘depth
psychology’, Lacanian practice is therefore extremely ‘superficial’.63
When faced with psychotic patients, whether in a residential setting or
in private practice, Lacanian analysts have also espoused the ethical
principle according to which their clinical practice is governed by a desire
to obtain absolute difference, and not by the imposition of rules or the
promise of happiness. Their strength of purpose reflects a strict adherence
to the idea that a treatment can only be called psychoanalysis if its
fundamental ethical principle is acknowledged.

因为弗洛伊德学派的精神分析家能够跟“深度心理学”联想一块,拉康派的实践因此是极端表面。当拉康派的精神分析家面对精神病的病人时,无论是住宅的背景或是私人诊所,分析家也主张伦理学的原则。依照这个伦理学的原则,他们的临床的实践,受到获得绝对差异的欲望的统辖,并且并不是凭借赋家规则或许诺给予幸福。他们的目的的力量反映出一个严格的坚持这个观念:仅有当它的基本的伦理的原则被承认时,治疗才能够被称为是精神分析。

As far as the analysand’s
‘avowal of desire’ is concerned—the envisaged goal of a Lacanian analytic
process—psychotic patients are not regarded as being capable of achieving
this aim, owing to the fact that desire is an outcome of the psychic integration
of the symbolic order, an effect of the symbolic castration which the
psychotic, according to Lacanian theory, has not undergone. Since the
three mental structures of psychosis, neurosis and perversion are defined
as mutually exclusive categories, trying to neuroticize psychotics by
stimulating this symbolic castration is a futile enterprise.

就分析者的“宣称欲望”而言—拉康派的精神分析的过程的被拟想的目标—精神病的病人并没有被认为是能够达到这个目标。由于这个事实:欲望是象征秩序的心灵的融合的结果,是象征阉割的影响。依照拉康的理论,精神病者并没有经历象征的阉割。因为精神病,神经症,与倒错症的三个精神的结构,被定义为互相排斥的范畴。尝试让精神病者成为神经症,凭借刺激这个象征的阉割,是件失败的事业。

None the less, Lacanian analysts have deployed a plethora of alternative
strategies to relieve psychotic suffering, encouraged by Lacan’s directive
that the analyst must not back away from psychosis (Lacan 19771:12). In
this way, Lacanians have, for example, argued that an analyst working
with psychotics should adopt the position of a detached secretary (Lacan
1993[1955–56]:206) or a silent witness who registers the patients’ words
whilst prompting them to elaborate their visions of the world, in order to
accelerate their construction of a solid and stable delusion (Soler 1987).

可是,拉康派的精神分析家曾经运用大量的替代的策略,来解除精神病的痛苦,由拉康的指令所鼓励。分析家一定不要看见精神病者就撤退。用这个方式,譬如,拉康学派主张,从事治疗精神病者的分析家,应该採有中立的秘书的立场,或是沉默的见证人,铭记病人的话语。另一方面,激励他们建构他们对于世界的幻景。为了加速他们的建构牢固而稳定的幻觉。

In keeping with Freud’s propositions on the stabilizing function of Schreber’s
delusion (Freud 1911c[1910]:71), these Lacanians believe that the
construction of a balanced delusional system has a tranquillizing effect on
the patient’s mind, facilitating reintegration into society. Relying on Lacan’s
promotion, in his year-long seminar on Joyce (Lacan 1976–77 [1975–
76]), of the term ‘suppletion’ (suppleance) as an umbrella for a variety of
phenomena preventing the outbreak of psychosis or stabilizing the
psychotic breakdown,

这些拉康学派分析家为了符合弗洛伊德的命题,针对许瑞伯的幻觉的具有稳定的功能。他们相信,一个平衡的幻觉的系统的建构具有稳的效果,对于病人的心灵,有利于重新融合进入社会。依靠拉康的提倡,在他一年之久的探讨乔伊斯的研讨班。拉康提倡这个术语“异根补充”,作为是各式各样的现象的雨伞,阻止精神病的暴发,或是稳的精神病的崩溃。

Lacanian analysts have also advocated the
installation and/or maintenance of suppletions as a possible analytic goal
in the treatment of psychotics (Brousse 1988; Liart 1988; Stevens 1988).
These suppletions can be imaginary (in the form of identifications leading
to the formation of a new ego), symbolic (through writing and fine art) or
real (via so-called psychosomatic phenomena). In general they serve as
limitations of the psychotic’s overwhelming intrusive enjoyment, enabling
him to lead a relatively decent social life, whether before the psychosis
has become manifest or after the actual outbreak.64

拉康的精神分析家也主张“异根补充”的安置与(或)维护,作为是精神病的治疗的可能的精神分析的目标。这些异根补充有时是想像界(以认同的形式,导致新的自我的形成),有时是象征界(经有写作与精美的艺术),或有时是实在界(经由所谓的心理与生理的现象)。一般说来,它们充当限制精神病的压倒性的侵凌的享乐,让他能够过着比较正常的社会的生活。无论是精神病已经变得明显之前,或实际的崩溃之后。

In trying to overcome the deadlock of Freudian analysis Lacan thus
developed a clinical framework that is less deterministic, for including
more radical options of freedom, less historical, for strictly future orientated,
and less restrictive, for also accommodating psychotic
patients.65 Does this make the analyst’s task easier, or less impossible
than that of the Freudian clinician? Does Lacan’s logical time-machine
make analysts feel more at home within the constraints of their clinical
practice? In order to answer these questions we must return to the concepts
Lacan coined during the late 1960s as the theoretical cornerstones of the
analyst’s position: the desire of the analyst, object a and disbeing.
What does the analyst want? 89

当拉康尝试克服弗洛伊德的精神分析的僵局时,拉康因此发展一个临床的架构。这个临床的架构比较不那么命定论,因为包含更多的强烈的选择的自由,也比较不那么历史性质,因为它严格地以未来为定向。也比较不那么具有限制,因为它也接纳精神病者。这种临床架构难的让精神分析家的工作变得比较容易吗?或是比较不可能,比起弗洛伊德学派的临床医生?拉康的逻辑时间机器让精神分析家在他们的临床实践的约束里面,会感觉更加地自在吗?为了回答这些问题,我们必须回到拉康铸造的观念,在1960年代晚期。作为是精神分析家的立场的理论的基石;精神分析家的欲望,作为小客体与没有生命实存。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家的欲望

November 2, 2015

分析家作为欲望的客体

Loaded with the question as to what an analyst is, Lacan embarked
on an investigation of what could possibly lie beyond the technique of
psychoanalysis. For what analysts are supposed to say and do in the
context of interpretation and transference handling, some technical
guidelines can be formulated, yet when it comes to describing what an
analyst should be, technical rules are fundamentally inadequate. As I
pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, Freud sought solace in a
plead of imaginative metaphors to answer the question ‘What is an
analyst?’, singling out that of the archaeologist as the most representative
trope.

关于精神分析家的生命实存,充满各种问题,拉康开始从事研究在精神分析的技术之外,可能隐藏什么东西。因为在解释与处理移情的内文里,精神分析家应该要说与要做的事情,某些的技术的引导方针能够被说明。可是,当提到描述精神分析家应该做什么时,技术性的规则基本上是不足够的。如同我在这个章节的开始指出,弗洛伊德寻求安慰,诉诸于想像的隐喻来回答这个问题:“精神分析家是什么?”弗洛伊德挑选出考古学家,作为是最具代表性的团体。

Rather than espousing Freud’s metaphors, Lacan, for his part, tried
to capture their signification within the realm of desire.42 Not satisfied
with the analyst as a clinical archaeologist or a mental health sleuth,
Lacan began to explore what really animates these people, adding new
and different metaphors to the Freudian list as he went along. In this
way, Lacan’s concept of the desire of the analyst was born, alongside a
profound reflection upon the ethics of psychoanalysis as the necessary
counterpart to clinical technique. By situating the most fundamental of
analytic policies within the realm of desire and ethics, he at once solved
the impasse of reciprocal demands within an intersubjective relationship:
the analyst was no longer simply an Other subject but a figure imbued
with a specific desire.

拉康并没有铨释弗洛伊德的隐喻。就拉康而言,他尝试捕捉这些隐喻的意义,在欲望的领域之内。因为拉康并不满意精神分析家作为是临床的考古学家,或是精神健康的专家。他开始探索确实激发这些人们的动机是什么。随着他的进展,他补充新鲜而且不同的隐喻,到弗洛伊德的名单。用这个方式,拉康对于精神分析的欲望的观念诞生,伴随着深刻的反思,对于精神分析伦理学,作为是临床技术的必要的对应之物。凭借将精神分析策略的最基本的东西定位在欲望与伦理学的领域之内,他立即解答在互为主体性的关系里面,互惠的要求的僵局。精神分析家不再仅是大他者的主体,而是充满明确欲望的人物。

But what is this desire of the analyst? Where does it come from and
what is it aimed at? If it involves a judgement on the nature of analytic
action, what kind of judgement is it? Does the analyst communicate this
judgement to the analysand and, if so, how? And how does a concrete
analyst experience and sustain this desire during psychoanalytic
treatment?

但是精神分析家的这个欲望是什么呢?分析家的欲望从何而来?分析家的欲望目标朝着什么?这牵涉到对于精神分析的行动的特性的判断。它是什么性质的判断?精神分析家会跟分析者沟通这个判断吗?假如会,要如何沟通?一位具体的精神分析家如何经验与维持这个欲望,在精神分析的治疗的期间?

Apropos of the first question, Lacan responded initially, and in his
customary mode, by saying what the desire of the analyst should not
encompass. Some of these negative definitions followed directly from
his previous elaborations. As such, he argued that the desire of the analyst
is not a desire to understand the analysand, because the analyst’s
understanding will always be illusory and it will inevitably dampen down
the production of speech on the side of the patient. In ‘The Direction of
the Treatment’ he wrote: ‘To think, it is often better not to understand,
and one can gallop through miles of understanding without the least
thought being produced’ (ibid.: 252).

关于这个最初的问题,拉康最初回应。用他的习惯的模式,拉康说,精神分析家的欲望不应该涵盖什么。有些的负面的定义直接从先前的建构推衍而来。作为这样的定义,拉康主张,精神分析家的欲望并不是想要理解分析者的欲望。因为精神分析家的理解将总是一种幻觉,它无可避免地会浸湿病人这边的言说的产物。在“治疗的引导”,拉康写道:「想想看!不去理解往往还比较好些。我们理解了好半天,其实什么思想也没产生。」

The corollary of this first admonition
was that the desire of the analyst should neither be a desire to fulfil the
analysand’s demands—whatever they are and whether implicit or
explicit—because responding to these demands can only proceed from
an understanding of what they convey (ibid.: 254). In light of this ethical
principle of non-understanding Lacan later rejuvenated Freud’s idea that
analysts should suspend their previous knowledge and experience, each
time they are confronted with a new case, in order to recognize and reveal
its singularity (Freud 1912e:114; 1933a[1932]:173–175).

这个最初的警告的必然的结果是,精神分析家的欲望,既不应该是满足分析者的要求—无论这些要求是什么,无论是暗示或明确的要求—因为回应这些要求仅是从理解它们传递的东西前进。从非理解的伦理的原则的观点,拉康后来重新更新弗洛伊德的观念:精神分析家应该悬置他们的先前的知识与经验,每当他们面对新的个案。为了要体认而且显示这个个案的独异性。

Lacan fully
endorsed Freud’s opinion, stating that one of the most important matters
for psychoanalysis is ‘the intentional consolidation in him [the analyst]
of his ignorance of each subject who comes to him for analysis, of an
ever renewed ignorance that prevents anyone becoming a “case”’ (Lacan
1977k[1960]:322).

拉康充分认同弗洛伊德的意见。他陈述:对于精神分析,最重要的事情之一精神“精神分析家意图跟他对每个主体的无知团结一块,每个前来跟他就诊的主体。这种无知永远在更新当中,阻止任何人成为”个案“。

To the analysand’s ignorance, which undergirds both her desire to
know the truth about her symptoms and her investment of the analyst
with the function of supposed subject of knowing, the analyst is thus
held to respond with ignorance too!43 This idea tallies with Lacan’s
advocacy in Seminar I of the analyst’s ignorantia docta (wise ignorance)
as an alternative to the clinical proclamation of knowledge, and follows
directly from Freud’s observation in ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(1913c:141–142) that it is counter-productive to imbue hysterics with
the knowledge they consciously lack. However, it is not because the
analyst and the analysand proceed from ignorance that their attitude to
that ignorance is the same.

对于分析者的这个无知,支持她想要知道真理的欲望,关于她1的症状与她对于精神分析的投注具有应该知道的主体的功能。精神分析家因此被认为也用无知来回应。这个观念符合拉康的主张,在第一研讨班,谈论到精神分析家的“大智若愚“,作为是替代临床具有知识的宣称。拉康从弗洛伊德的观察,在”治疗的开始“,直接推论出来:让癔症者充满他们在意识层面欠缺的知识,并没有正面产生的效果。可是,精神分析家与分析者虽然都从无知前进,他们对于那种无知的态度,并不一样。

As Lacan explained in the opening session of
Seminar XX (1998a[1972–73]:1–2), the analyst’s ignorance, his ‘I don’t
want to know anything about it’, is perfectly adequate to him, whereas
the analysand experiences his ignorance as a burden whose weight can
only be reduced by the acquisition of additional knowledge. Moreover,
it is not because the analyst refrains from producing knowledge that the
analysand will automatically perceive him as stupid, i.e. that he will loose
his status as supposed subject of knowing.

如同拉康在第20研讨班的开始的一堂解释说,精神分析家的无知,他的“我不想要知道关于它的任何东西“。这对精神分析家而言是相当足够的。但是分析者经验他的无知,则是作为一种负担。这个负担的重量,仅能凭借获得额外的知识,才能够被减少。而且,分析者并不会因为分享家的节制不产生知识,就因此自动地将分析家视为是愚笨。他仍然没有放松他的地位,作为是应该知道的主体。

On the contrary, the analyst
hails ‘the sublimity of stupidity’ (ibid.: 13) because he can maintain his
position of supposed wisdom more effectively by the enunciation of
ostensibly stupid sentences, than by the proclamation of rocket science.
This paradox of stupidity (the more one expresses knowledge, the more
one is regarded as stupid, and vice versa) and its relation to the
maintenance of transference emboldened Lacan on numerous occasions
to portray the analyst as a latter-day Socrates or a Western Zen-master.44

相反地•精神分析家欢呼“愚笨的升华“。因为他能够更加有效地维持他具有被认为的智慧的地位,凭借发表表面上是愚蠢的句子。比起凭借宣称具有火箭的科学。愚笨的这个悖论(我们越是表达知识,我们越是被认为是愚笨。)以及它跟维持移情的关系,让拉康在许多的场合,大胆地描绘精神分析家,作为是晚年的苏格拉底,或西方的禅宗大师。

Even more provocatively, Lacan stated that the desire of the analyst should
not be geared towards the advancement of the patient’s well-being, let alone
the promotion of happiness. Much more than ‘The Direction of the Treatment’
this theme pervaded Lacan’s Seminar VII, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, in
which he claimed that analysts who promise their patients a full restoration
of their mental, physical and social happiness are simply deluding them
with false hopes, despite the fact that happiness may be their patients’ one
and only demand.

更加具有挑衅地,拉康陈述:精神分析家的欲望不应该被发动朝向提升病人的幸福,更不用说是朝向快乐的提升。比起“治疗的方向“更加过分,这次的主题弥漫着第七研讨班,”精神分析的伦理学“。在那里,拉康宣称:假如精神分析家给他们的病人承诺,要完全恢复他们的健康,生理与社会的快乐,他们是在欺骗分析者,用虚假的希望。尽管这个事实:快乐是他们的病人的仅有的一个要求。

To Lacan, the analyst not only does not ‘have that Sovereign
Good that is asked of him, but he also knows there isn’t any’ (Lacan
1992[1959–60]:300). Happiness was only one amongst a multitude of values
Lacan felt obliged to discard as fraudulent ‘analytic ideals’—a proliferous,
yet prolific list including also the moral goals of genital sexuality, authenticity,
independence and temperateness. This perspective matched Lacan’s deeprooted
contempt for the preferential therapeutic goals of psychoanalysis, a
view which he deemed fully compatible with that of the founder. For instance,
in his 1955 ‘Variations of the Standard Treatment’ he had argued that the
analyst is better off without therapeutic ambitions, designating ‘health’ as a
bonus of psychoanalytic treatment:

对于拉康,精神分析家不但没有人家对他要求的“拥有那个统辖的善“,而且分析家也知道,并没有任何统辖的善。快乐仅是众多的价值中间的一个。拉康觉得有这个义务,要抛弃这些价值,作为是欺骗的”精神分析的理想“—这个增加,可是又多产的名单,包括性器官交媾的道德目标,真诚性,对立与中庸。跟这个观点相匹配的是拉康根深蒂固地藐视精神分析的被偏爱的治疗的目标。他认为这个观点跟创办者的观点是完全和谐的。譬如,在1955年的”标准治疗的各种类型“,他主张,假如没有治疗的企图心,分析家的情况会好些。拉康指明”健康“作为是精神分析治疗的额外收获。

Thoroughly warned by Freud to look closely at the effects in his
[the analyst’s] experience of that whose danger the term furor
sanandi sufficiently draws the attention to, after all he [the analyst]
does not really care to keep up its appearances. If he thus accepts
healing as a supplementary benefit of the psychoanalytic treatment,
he guards himself against any abuse of the desire to heal…
(Lacan 1966b[1955]:324)

弗洛伊德彻底警告要仔细看待这些影响,在精神分析家经验到“治疗激情”这个术语提醒我们注意的危险。毕竟,精神分析家并没有确实想要维持“治疗的激情”的外表。假如精神分析因此接受治疗,当著是精神分析治疗的辅助的利益,他也警戒他自己,不要过分使用“治疗的欲望”。

In scorning the analyst’s ‘healing fury’ Lacan clearly recalled Freud’s
assertion in his paper on transference-love (1915a[1914]:171) that a
human society needs furor sanandi as little as any other type of fanaticism.
Applying this principle to his own practice, Freud had actually repeated
on various occasions, in private correspondence as well as published
writings, that he was not possessed with a desire to heal.45

拉康藐视精神分析家的“治疗的狂热”。在他探讨移情与爱的论文,拉康清楚地提醒弗洛伊德的主张:人类的社会很少需要“治疗的激情”,如同很少需要任何其他种类的狂热主义。弗洛伊德将这个原则运用到他自己的实践,他实际上在好几个场合重复说,在私人的通信与出版的著作里,他并没有著魔于治疗的欲望。

‘At every moment’, Lacan contended in Seminar VII, ‘we need to know
what our effective relationship is to the desire to do good, to the desire to
cure’ (Lacan 1992[1959–60]:218). But is there a positive way to define this
relationship? After having designated what the desire of the analyst is not, is
it possible to name its essential qualities? ‘Desire must be taken literally’,
Lacan proclaimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ (1977i[1958]:256),
which seemed to imply that the desire in question must be contemplated as
a restless, objectless yearning, a relentless striving to obtain nothing. So
much was at least confirmed in Seminar VII, where Lacan compared the
analyst’s desire to that of Antigone in Sophocles’ eponymous play: it concerns
a pure desire, a desire for nothing, even a desire for death inasmuch as death
is the ultimate non-object (Lacan 1992[1959–60]: 282–283).

拉康在第七研讨班主张:「在每个时刻,我们需要知的我们有效的关系,是跟行善的欲望的关系,跟治疗的欲望的关系」。但是,有一个积极的方式来定义这个关系吗?当拉康指明精神分析家的欲望的负面本质后,命名分析家的欲望的基本的特质是可能的吗?“欲望必须被实质地看待”,拉康在“治疗的方向”一文里宣称。这句话似乎暗示着:受到质疑的欲望必须被沉思,作为是一种没有休止,没有目标的渴望,无情地奋斗,想要获得空无。在第七研讨班,如此多的欲望至少被证实。在那里,拉康将精神分析家的欲望比喻为索福克利斯的同名标题“安提戈涅”戏剧里的安提戈涅:这个戏剧关注一个纯粹的欲望,追寻空无的欲望,甚至是追寻死亡的欲望。因为死亡是最后的非-客体。

In Lacan’s interpretation, Antigone had succeeded in ridding her desire of all the worldly
objects and concerns which foul human desire, in order to follow the course
of her desire as a formal ethical duty. Antigone’s desire had acceded to the
level of a Kantian categorical imperative, with which one complies for no
other reason than the naked fact of its imposition.46 In his ethics of
psychoanalysis Lacan accordingly propagated the analysts’ mandatory
involvement in their practice as categorically desiring beings. The ethical
judgement with which analysts have to pay in order to direct their treatment
properly concerns the acknowledgement that their action is inhabited by an
absolute desire and not, for that matter, by the formulation of demands or
the promulgation of moral goals.

用拉康的解释,安提戈涅已经成功地将她的欲望,解除卑下人类所欲望的所有的世界的客体与关注。为了遵循她的欲望的途径,作为正式的伦理的责任。安提戈涅的欲望认同康德的范畴的命令的层次。她同意康德的范畴的命令,没有任何其他理由,除了就是范畴命令的赋加的这个赤裸的事实。在他的精神分析伦理学,拉康因此主张精神分析家的强迫性地参与,在他们的实践里,作为是具有范畴方面的欲望的生命人物。精神分析家必须用伦理学的判断来付出代价,为了恰如其分地引导他们的治疗。这个伦理的判断关注到这个承认:就那件事而言,他们的行动充满绝对的欲望,而不是要求的说明,或道德目标的宣扬。

Needless to say that an analyst is not born with such a pure desire; his
desire is as much governed by ‘pathological’ objects (in the Kantian
sense) and vivid fantasies as that of the majority of people. The analyst’s
is an ‘experienced desire’ (ibid.: 300–301) which is the result of a
fundamental ‘mutation in the economy of desire’ (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:220–221) that has occurred during her training analysis. With this
‘mutation in the economy of desire’, Lacan pointed towards the necessary
reduction of the status of the object as a mesmerizing, fascinating
otherness in the analysand’s fantasy.

自不待言,精神分析家并没有诞生时就具有纯粹的欲望。他的欲望同样“受到污染的”客体的污染(用康德的意义来说),同样具有生动的幻想,跟大多数的人们的欲望一样。精神分析家的欲望是一个“被经验过的”欲望,是欲望的经济活力的基本的切割的结果,这个基本的切割发生在她的精神分析训练的期间。拉康用这个“欲望的活力的切割”来指出,朝向将客体的地位的必要的化减成为是在分析者的幻见里的纠缠而令人著迷的他者。

Since ‘being an analyst’ also
occupies the place of such an object, the upshot was that the candidate
who desired to be an analyst was supposed to perform a mutation of that
object too, even to the point where it lost all its seductive colours, before
he could have access to the pure desire of the analyst.

因为“成为分析家”也占有如此一个客体的地位,结果是,欲望成为分析家的候选人,被认为是也是执行那个客体的切割,甚至它丧失所有的客体的诱拐的颜色。这样,他才能够得以进入分析家的纯粹的欲望。

As Lacan conceived
it, the desire to be an analyst was as much a hindrance to the emergence
of the desire of the analyst as any other ‘pathological’ desire.47
Prima facie, this renewed picture of the analyst seemed to substantiate
the popular image of the analyst as somebody who has realized the Stoic
ideal of apathy.

如同拉康构想它,成为分析家的欲望同样是一种阻碍,对于分析家的欲望的出现,如同任何的“受到污染”的欲望。乍然看来,分析家的这个更新的画面似乎具体表现分析家的通俗的意象,作为是某位已经实践禁欲学派的冷漠的理想的人。

Stoic wisdom, as exemplified in the works of Epictetus
and Seneca, demands sustine et abstine (people should endure what they
are supposed to do and refrain from doing anything else) whilst
simultaneously exonerating people from all blame when they exercise their
power or express their desire.48 Isn’t this an accurate representation of the
analyst acting upon pure desire? Aren’t analysts indeed expected to fulfil
their duty without reproaching their patients for indulging in the satisfaction
of their unconscious desires?

禁欲学派的智慧,以伊壁鸠鲁与西尼卡的著作作为榜样。他们要求“人们应该忍受他们被认为应该要做的事情,并且自我节制,不要做任何其他事情”。另一方面,他们同时也让人们免除所有的责备,当他们运用他们的力量,或表达他们的欲望。这难道不就是分析家根据纯粹的欲望来行动的正确的表象吗?分析家难道不确实就是被期望要实践他们的责任,但是又没有谴责他们的病人,因为耽溺于他们的无意识的欲望的满足?

At the end of Seminar VII Lacan suggested,
albeit implicitly, that the philosophical position of Stoicism cannot be
brought in line with the ethics of psychoanalysis. In Stoically tolerating
the Other’s betrayal of confidence, or the mere whimsicality of the Other’s
desire, analysts give ground relative to their own desire, in which case
they do not act in accordance with the ethical standards of their practice
(Lacan 1992[1959–60]:320–321).

在第七研讨班的结束时,拉康建议,虽然是暗示地建议,禁欲学派的哲学的立场无法被带来符合精神分析的伦理学。当分析家以禁欲学派的方式容忍大他者的背叛的信任时,或是大他者的欲望的怪异想像时,分析对于他们自己的欲望,相对地退让。在那样的情况,分析家并不是遵照他们的实践的伦理的标准来行动。

More fundamentally, Lacan intimated
that analysts who adopt the Stoic ideal of apathy silently associate
themselves with the morality of the master/tyrant and, more generally,
with the reigning discourse of power.49 This does not mean that they agree
with the Other’s limitless enjoyment; they merely believe that once the
Other has discovered the meaning of its action, it will automatically repent.
Remarkably, this principle is quite similar to Freud’s conviction that
recovery will follow spontaneously once the patient’s historical truth
(the true meaning of the symptoms) has been excavated, according to
the paradigm of archaeological sleuthing. Yet Lacan was deeply sceptical
about the expected outcome:

更加基本地,拉康暗示说,採用禁欲学派的的冷漠的分析家,沉默地将他们自己,跟主人与暴君的道德联想一块。更加通俗地说,跟统辖的权力的辞说联想一块。这并不意味着,他们同意大他者的无限的享乐。他们仅是相信,一旦大他者已经发现它的行动的意义,它将会自动地後悔。明显地,这个原则跟弗洛伊德的信念相当一致:一旦病人的历史的真理(症状的真实的意义)已经被挖掘出来,康复将会自动自发地跟随而来,依照考古学专业的典范。可是,拉康表示深深地怀疑,对于这个被期望的结果。

The question is, once it is over, once the return to the meaning of
an action has been accomplished, once the deep meaning has been
liberated—that is to say, separated out through a catharsis in the
sense of decantation—will everything work out right by itself? Or,
to be more precise, will there be nothing but goodness?
(ibid.: 312)

问题是,一旦它已经结束,一旦回归到行动的意义已经被完成,一旦深层意义已经被解放出来—换句话说,一旦它经由分离意义的心理倾注而被分离开来—每样东西都会自动自发地获得恰当的解决吗?或者,更加确实地说,存在的将仅就是善意吗?

Whatever their philosophy may dictate, Stoics should not rest assured
that their apathy will have a redemptive effect, partly because the Other
might just sustain its jouissance, partly because the Other might try to
eradicate its repentance by neutralizing the one who instilled it.50 In
refusing to be the guarantees of the jouissance of the Other, in declining
to provide their patients with the satisfaction they desperately miss,
analysts at once refrain from adopting the position of the pervert, to
which the nature of their practice surreptitiously invites them. Put
differently, to the extent that analysts neither advocate, nor condone a
‘discourse of the right to jouissance’, they withstand the looming threat
of becoming institutionalized perverts. This is a decisive criterion for
differentiating between an analyst and a pervert, whose positions with
respect to the fantasy are otherwise remarkably similar.51

无论他们的哲学指示什么,禁欲学派不应该满意确定:他们的冷漠将具有救赎的效果。部分是因为大他者可能刚刚维持它的欢爽,部分是因为大他者可能尝试抹除它的后悔,凭借将灌输后悔观念的人保持中立。当分析家拒绝大他者的欢爽的保证,当分析家婉拒供应给病人,用病人迫切想要的满足,分析家立即自我节制,不採用倒错症者的立场。分析家的实践的特性秘密地邀请他们採取倒错症者的立场。换句话说,甚至,分析家既没有主张,也没有宽恕获得欢爽的权利的辞说。分析抵挡这个隐隐在现的威胁:成为被体制同化的倒错症者。这是一个决定性的标准,用来区别分析家与倒错症者。关于幻见,他们两者的立场在其他方面非常酷似。

During the early 1960s, Lacan realized that grounding the desire of
the analyst merely in Kant’s categorical imperative clears the path for its
return as a ruthless, moral tyranny of power. As he demonstrated in ‘Kant
with Sade’ (1989a[1962]), the Sadian universe of radical evil is strictly
congruent with the Kantian universe of detached morality.52 At the end
of Seminar XI, Lacan reiterated that for Kant ‘the moral law…is simply
desire in its pure state’, yet now adding that:

在960年代早期,拉康体会到,将分析家的欲望的基础,仅是定位在康德的范畴命令,替它清理途径,可以回转,作为权力的无情的道德暴君。如同拉康在“康德与萨德”一文里证明,萨德的强烈邪恶的宇宙,跟康德的保持中立的道德的宇宙,严格地不谋而合。在第11研讨班的结尾,拉康重复强调:对于康德,道德的法则仅是纯粹状态的欲望。可是,现在,拉康补充说:

[it] culminates in the sacrifice, strictly speaking, of everything that
is the object of love in one’s human tenderness—I would say, not
only in the rejection of the pathological object, but also in its
sacrifice and murder. That is why I wrote ‘Kant avec Sade’.
(Lacan 1977b[1964]:275–276)

道德的法则以牺牲来获得高潮,严格地说,就是以牺牲人的温柔里一切属于爱的客体的东西,来获得高潮。我不妨说,道德法则不但拒绝受到世俗污染的客体,而且拒绝这个客体的牺性与谋杀。那就是为什么我书写“康德与萨德”。

Because the desire of the analyst cannot possibly coincide with an
institutionalized, systematic extermination of all goods, Lacan was forced
to modify his earlier view on the purity of the analyst’s desire. Once the
obscene underside of Kant’s moral law exposed, he ended his Seminar
XI with the statement: ‘The analyst’s desire is not a pure desire. It is a
desire to obtain absolute difference’ (ibid.: 276).

因为分析家的欲望不可能巧合于被体制同化的系统的毁灭所有的善,拉康被迫修改他较早期的观点,对于分析家的欲望。一旦康德的道德的法则的卑下的阴谋被揭露,他结束他的第11研讨班,用这个陈述:分析家的欲望并不是纯粹的欲望。分析家的欲望是想要获得绝对差异的欲望。

Compared to previous
definitions, the analyst’s desire emerged here not as a desire for nothing,
but as a structural, symbolic force which recognizes and sustains the
other as Other. Instead of manoeuvring the analysands into a situation
where they can identify with their analyst, analysts had to manoeuvre
themselves into a position which enabled their analysands to dis-identify,
to discover their desire in its modulation by the desire of the Other, and
to avow that desire in its essential nothingness. Lacan believed that this
process would only unfold if the analyst puts himself into the position of
the support of object a, not an object with which the analysands can
satisfy their desire, but an object which causes it (ibid.: 273).

跟先前的定义比较起来,分析家的欲望出现这里,并不是作为追寻空无的欲望,而是作为结构的,象征的力量。这个力量体认而且维持他者作为大他者的地位。分析家并没有将分析者操控进入这么一个情境,让他们能够认同分析家的情境。代替的,分析家必须操控他们自己进入这么一个立场,让他们的分析者能够解除-认同,能够发现他们的欲望,在分析者的基本的空无里。拉康相信:仅有当分析家将自己放进小客体的支持的立场,这个过程才会展开。这个小客体并不是分析者能够用来满足他们的欲望的客体,而是引起他们的欲望的客体。

The difference between Lacan’ s 1964 conception of the position of
the analyst and his earlier view on the topic could not have been more
radical. Here the analyst was no longer expected to act as an Other subject
in an intersubjective relationship with the analysand, but as an objectcause
within a bond marked by subjective disparity. As the support of
object a within this new bond, the analyst was neither expected to
understand the analysand’s desire, nor to think about what could possibly
be causing it, to the extent that such thinking could only proceed from
the illusory constraints of the analyst’s own fantasy.53

在拉康1964年的分析家的立场的观念,与他较早前针对这个主题的观点之家的差异,在这个地方表现最为强烈。在此,分析家不再被期望行动,作为一个大者的主体,跟分析者处于互为主体性的关系。而是作为分析者的欲望的客体的原因,这个盟约的特征是主体性的差异。分析家作为在这个新的盟约内部的小客体的支持,分析家既没有被期望要理解分析者的欲望,也没有被期望要思维是什么引起分析者的欲望。甚至,这样的思维的前进,仅是由于分析家自己的幻见的幻觉的自我约束。

If thinking about the cause of the analysand’s desire was not an
appropriate solution, then perhaps being this cause was a better one, but
how could an analyst ever incarnate an object devoid of substance?
Furthermore, being an object a, in so far as it is fully achievable, seemed
to coincide with a state of jouissance, which one could hardly deem
compatible with the desire of the analyst. In a small yet instructive text
from the late 1960s, Lacan explained the difficulty of the analyst’s
position in the following terms:

假如思维到分析者的欲望的原因,并不是适当的解决。那么,或许成为分析者的欲望的原因是较恰当的解决。但是,分析家如何能够具体表现一个没有物质的客体?而且,成为小客体,就它所能够被充分完成而言,似乎是巧合于欢爽的状态。我们很少将这种欢爽的状体,认为是跟分析家的欲望互相和谐。在一篇从1960年代晚期的简短而且有启发的文本,拉康解释分析家的立场的困难,用以下的术语:

The analysand is the one who manages to realize that his ‘I think’
is an alienation, that is to say who discovers the fantasy as the
motor of psychic reality, that of the divided subject. He can only
do that by granting the analyst the function of (a), which he [the
analyst] would not be capable of being without vanishing
immediately.

分析者是这个人,他成功地体会到这一点:他的”我思“是一种异化。换句话说,分析者发现这个幻见,作为是心灵现实的动力,作为分裂的主体的动力。分析者要先承认分析家具有小客体的功能,他才能够那样做。分析家若是能够成为小客体的功能,他必然立即消失。

Hence, the analyst ought to know that, far from being
the measure of reality, he only clears the ground for the subject’s
truth by offering himself as support of this disbeing [desetre]…Well
then, this is where the psychoanalyst finds himself in an untenable
position: an alienation conditioned by an ‘I am’ whose own
condition…is an ‘I am not thinking’, reinforced by the addition
that…he [the analyst] knows it.
(Lacan 1968a[1967]:59)

因此,分析家应该知道,他根本就不是现实的测量者。他仅是清理作为主体的这个场地,他提供他自己,作为这个“没有生命实存“的支持。呵呵,这就是这个地方,精神分析家发现他自己处于无法自园其说的立场:由”我具有生命实存“所制约的异化。这个”我具有生命实存“的自己的情况是:”我并没有在思维“。这个情况的更加强化的补充是:他(分析家)知道这个情况。

As one can derive from this paragraph, Lacan’s answer to the question
as to what analysts should do or be with regard to their supporting of the
object a highlighted the analysts’ disbeing (desetre), their semblance of
being object a. This position allows them to function as object a for the
analysand whilst retaining their desire as analysts. Contrary to what he
had claimed in ‘The Direction of the Treatment’, Lacan now stressed
that analysts should not act with their being, but with their ‘disbeing’,
and it is easy to see that this guideline did not make the analyst’s position
more feasible. I will explore the issue further in the final part of this
chapter, when discussing Freud’s take on psychoanalysis as an impossible
profession and Lacan’s integration of this impossibility in his formula
of the discourse of the analyst.

如同我们能够从这个段落获得,拉康对于这个问题的回答,关于分析家应该做什么,或关于分析家作为小客体的支持。拉康的回答强调:分析家并没有生命实存,分析家类似小客体。这个立场让分析家能够发挥作为小客体的功能,针对分析者。 另一方面,这个立场保留分析家的欲望,作为分析家的欲望。跟拉康在“治疗的方向“里所宣称的恰恰相反,拉康现在强调,分析家不应该用他们的生命实存来行为,而是要用他们的”没有生命实存“。我们很容易看出,这个引导方针并没有让分析家的立场更加具有实用性。在这个章节的最后的部分,我将更加深入地探索这个议题。我将讨论弗洛伊德的看待精神分析,视为是不可能的专业。以及拉康将这个不可能,融合在他的公式,分析家的辞说的公式。

雄伯译
32hsiung@cphome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

分析家作为欲望的客体

October 29, 2015

THE ANALYST AS OBJECT OF DESIRE
分析家作为欲望的客体

Lacan’s rekindling of Freud’s ‘rule of abstinence’ as a symbolic,
intersubjective relationship between the subject of the analysand and the
analyst as Other subject subsisted until the late 1950s. It gave way to an
entirely different conception of the analyst’s position when Lacan realized
that the analyst’s functioning as Other subject is not a sufficient guarantee
for excluding the occurrence of identifications between analyst and
analysand, or for preventing the deterioration of the analytic treatment
into a reciprocal working alliance. The following passage from Seminar V
betrays Lacan’s mercurial self-criticism concerning the symbolic
relationship between the subject and the Other:

拉康重新启示弗洛伊德的“节制的规则”,作为是象征,互为主体性的关系,处于分析者的主体,与作为大他者主体的分析家之间的关系。这个重新启示一直维持到1950年代,才被取代,由分析家的地位的具有完全不同的观念取代。当拉康体会到,分析家的充当大他者主体的功能,并不是充分的保证,作为排除认同的发生,处于分析家与分析者之间的认同的发生。或作为阻止精神分析的关系的恶化成为互惠的运作的联盟。从第四研讨班的以下的段落,显露出拉康的敏捷的自我批判,关于主体与大他者之间的象征的关系。

[T]he distinction between the Other and himself [the subject] is
initially the most difficult distinction to make…These two modes
of ambiguity, these two limits—that which is situated on the
imaginary level and the one belonging to the symbolic order,
through which desire is founded in the speech of the Other—these
two modes of crossing which imply that the subject alienates
himself, do not coincide…Yet there is always the question as to
what happens when these subjects are two of a kind, that is to say,
when the subject is supporting itself in the presence of the Other.
(Lacan 1998b[1957–58]:357–358)

大他者与他自己(主体)之间的区别最初是最困难作的区别。这两个模糊嗳昧的模式,这两个限制—被定位在想像的层次与属于象征秩序的层次—这两个交会的模式暗示着,主体异化他自己,并没有巧合。可是,总是存在着这个问题,关于发生的事情,当这两个主体是属于相同种类的主体。换句话说,当主体正在支持它自己,在大他者的面前。

Here Lacan acknowledged that a relationship between two subjects,
despite one of them being in the position of Other, is as much open to
reciprocal solidarity as an imaginary bond between two egos. Although
the result may be a symbolic instead of an imaginary identification, it is
much the same problem.32 The issue is illustrated by a common experience
of analysts who insist that the patient comply with the rule of free
association.

在此,拉康承认,处于两个主体之间的关系,尽管其中一位处于大他者的立场。这个关系同样开发给互惠的团聚,如同想像的盟约,处于两个自我之间。虽然这个结果可能是象征,而不是想像的认同。这是相同的难体。这个问题由精神分析家的共同经验来说明。这位精神分析家坚持,病人应该同意自由联想的规则。

The more they demand that the patient comply with the
ground rule the more they encounter ‘resistance’, in the form of a
reciprocal demand of the patient that the analyst speak, or a general
unwillingness to cooperate.33 In Seminar V Lacan exemplified this by
referring to what happens when a mother (as Other subject) demands
something of her child (as subject). Before long, the child discovers that
its possession of what the Other is asking for equips it with the power to
return the question: You want me to give what I have, but I will only give
it to you if you are willing to give me what you have first. ‘On the level
of demand’, Lacan stated, ‘the subject and the Other are in a situation of
reciprocity’ (ibid.: 359). Seeking to overcome this deadlock, Lacan started
to insist on the crucial importance of the Other’s desire:

分析家越是要求病人应该同意这个基本规则,他们越是遭遇到“抗拒”,用病人的互惠的要求的形式,病人要求精神分析家言说,或病人通常不愿意合作。在第四研讨班,拉康提到一个发生的例子说明。当一位母亲(作为大者主体),要求某件属于小孩的东西(作为主体)。不久,小孩发现,它拥有大他者要求的东西,让它具有这个权力来回应这个问题:你要我给予我拥有的东西,但是我将仅是给出它,假如你愿意给予我,你首先拥有的东西。“在要求的层次”,拉康陈述,“主体与大他者处于互惠的情境”。当拉康尝试克服这个僵局时,他开始坚持大他者的欲望的这个关键的重要性。

What I would like to draw your attention to, is the function of this
desire of the Other, insofar as it makes it possible for the distinction
between the subject and the Other to establish itself once and for
all …What needs to be introduced and what is there from the start,
latent from the beginning, is that, beyond what the subject demands
and what the Other demands from the subject, there is the necessary
presence and dimension of what the Other desires.
(ibid.: 359, italics added)

我想要吸引你们注意的东西是,大他者的欲望的这个功能。因为它让这个区别成为可能,主体与大他者之间的区别,为了一劳永逸地建立它自己。所需要被介绍的东西,与从一开始就存在那里的东西,从一开始就潜在的东西是:超越主体的要求的东西,与大他者从主体要求东东西,必然存在着大他者欲望的东西的维度。

In Lacan’s theory of the late 1950s, desire originated in the human
being’s incapability to express its vital, biological needs through the
linguistic function of demand. Because human beings grow up in a
symbolic world, they are pushed to employ language as a means for
conveying their needs to others. A child does not simply act upon its
bodily processes when it is hungry, it makes its need clear to an Other by
demanding food—whether intentionally and independently, or primarily
through the Other’s reading of the child’s conduct. The same holds for
the Other, who does not merely supply the food the child is asking for,
but who demands that the child allow itself to be fed (Lacan 1991b[1960–
61]:238).

在拉康1950年代晚期的理论,欲望起源于人类的没有能力表达它的生命的生物的需要,凭借要求的语言的功能。因为人们成长于象征的世界里,他们被迫运用语言,作为工具,来传达他们的需要给别人。小孩并不仅根据它的身体的过程来行动,当它饥饿时。小孩让它的需要让大他者知道,凭借要求食物—无论是意图地与独立地,或是主要是经由大他者阅读小孩的行为。相同的道理适用于大他者。大他者并不仅是供应小孩正在要求的食物,而且大他者要求,小孩应该容许它自己被餵食。

Yet when a subject raises its biological need to the level of
demand, the need cannot be articulated fully in the signifiers of the
subject’s language, for language can only inappropriately represent that
which is essentially beyond it. Lacan put this discordance between need
and demand on a par with Freud’s concept of primal repression (Freud
1915d) arguing, in accordance with Freud’s idea of the dynamic
unconscious, that the repressed inarticulate part of the need will put out
a new sprout (rejeton), which ‘presents itself in man as desire’ (Lacan
1977j[1958]:286). Hence, desire is what stems from the leftover need
after it has been articulated in the signifiers of a demand.34

可是,当主体将它的生物的需要提升到要求的层次,这个需要无法充分地被表达,用主体的语言的能指。因为语言仅能够不合适地代表基本上是超越它的东西。拉康将需要与要求之间的不协调,跟弗洛伊德的原初的压抑的主张相提并论。以符合弗洛伊德的动力结构的无意识。需要的被压抑的无法表达的部分将产生一个新的奔放。这个新的奔放呈现它自己,在人的身上,作为欲望。因此,欲望就是起源于这个残存的需要,在需要已经被表达之后,在要求的能指里。

As if this explanation proved unsatisfactory, Lacan revealed yet another
source of desire.35 Probing further into the nature of human demand,
Lacan arrived at the conclusion that a vital need is not the only factor
triggering it.

好像这个解释证明并不令人满意,拉康揭露欲望的另外一个来源。当拉康更加深入地探索人类要求的特性时,他获得这个结论:生命的需要并不是触动需要的唯一的因素。

Apart from specific objects which can satisfy their primary
physiological necessities, people also demand something much more
insubstantial, which can be called ‘love’. In this case, the object becomes
less important than the Other’s act of giving it, which the subject perceives
as an indication of the Other’s affection. When demanding something, a
subject is thus not only pressing for the satisfaction of its needs, it is also
questioning the love of the Other, even to the extent that the subject will
be happy to accept anything as long as it testifies to the Other’s loving
concern. In this way the subject’s demand for what the Other possesses,
an object that is capable of satisfying the subject’s needs, is transformed
into a demand for what the Other does not possess as an exchangeable
object.36

除了能够满足他们的原初的生理的需求的明确的客体之外,人们也要求某件更加是抽象的东西,它可以被称为是”爱“。在这个情况,客体变得不像大他者的给予它的行动那么重要。主体感知大他者给予它的行动,作为是大他者的情感的指示。当主体要求大他者时,主体因此不但强迫要求它的欲望的满足,它也询问大他者的爱。甚至,主体将会快乐地接受任何东西,只有它证实是大他者的爱的关心。用这个方式,主体要求大他者所拥有的东西,能够满足这主体的需要的的客体,被转化成为是要求大他者并没有拥有的东西,作为是可以被交换的客体。

Similar to the residue produced by the transformation of a need into a
demand, Lacan believed that the transition from the demand for a material
object to the demand for love generates a rest. In the demand for love the
particularity of the object is annihilated, but the object itself does not
disappear.37 When the demand for an object becomes a demand for love
(and, in a sense, demand always already includes this dimension), the object
is no longer appreciated for its intrinsic qualities or its use value, but acquires
a higher status, incorporating a surplus value.38 The object in an exchange
governed by a demand for love might be something completely useless,
indeed it can be ‘a piece of shit’, but for the partners involved this essentially
worthless object will be invaluable as a proof of love. Whereas the demand
for love appears to relinquish the objects that feature prominently in the
demand for the satisfaction of a need, the former is not a pure negation of
the latter, but rather an obliteration (ibid.: 287). According to Lacan, the
residue of the object, after the annulment of its particularity by the demand
for love, constituted the ‘absolute condition’ for desire:

类似于这个残渣,需要转化成为要求所产生的残渣,拉康相信:从要求物质的客体,转换成为爱的要求,产生一个停顿。在对爱的要求里,客体的特殊性被毁灭。但是客体的自身并没有消失。当对于客体的要求变成熟对爱的要求(从某个意义言,要求总是已经包含这个维度)。客体不再是被欣赏,因为它的内在的品质,或是它的使用价值。客体获得更高的地位,合并一个剩余价值。在交换里被爱的要求统辖的客体,可能是某件完全没有用途的东西。的确,它可能是一件“无拥之物”,但是对于被牵涉的伴侣,这个基本上没有价值的客体,将是无价之宝,作为是爱的证明。虽然爱的要求似乎放弃这些客体,主要是作为特征的客体,在要求需求的满足。前者并不是纯粹否定后者。相反地,前者抹除后者。依照拉康,客体的残渣,经过它的特殊性的宣告无效,被爱的要求,则是组成对于欲望的“绝对的条件”。

[T]his condition indeed brings to a denouement the aversion which
the proof of love has to the satisfaction of a need. Thus desire is
neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but
the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the
second, the phenomenon of their splitting (Spaltung).
(ibid.: 287, translation modified)

这个绝对条件确实造成这样的结局:爱的证据厌恶需要的满足。因此,欲望既不是对于满足的欲望,也不是对于爱的要求。而是从欲望的满足,扣除爱的要求的差异,欲望的满足与爱的要求之间的分裂的现象。

The crucial point of this paragraph is that desire, unlike need and demand,
never balances towards an object, whether a concrete object of satisfaction
or the ‘anything and nothing’ of love. Contrary to need and demand, desire
derives its power from the priceless remainder of an object after it has been
accommodated within the symbolic register. In the context of Seminar V
(1998b[1957–58]), Lacan expressed the same idea when he said that desire
is born from the (object of) jouissance that is lost through symbolic
castration.39 Objects functioning in the realms of need and demand have an
assuaging, quenching effect, whilst objects in the realm of desire only serve
to sustain it. With this conceptualization of desire, as a power beyond need
and demand, Lacan revised his original schema of analytic intersubjectivity,
newly designating the relationship between patient and analyst as a ‘subjective
disparity’ which revolves around the desire of the analyst.

这个段落的关键重点是,不像需要与要求,欲望从来不是朝向客体的平衡。无论是满足的具体的客体,或是爱的任何东西与爱的空无。跟需要与要求恰恰相反,欲望获得它的力量,从客体的珍贵的残余物,在欲望欲望已经被接纳在象征的铭记内部之后。在第四研讨班,拉康表达相同的观念,当他说,欲望诞生于欢爽的这个客体,由于象征的阉割而失落的欢爽的客体。在需要与要求的领域发挥功能的那些客体,具有舒缓,止渴的效果。而在欲望的领域的那些客体,仅是充当维持欲望的功能。拉康将欲望如此构成观念,作为是超越需要与要求的力量时,他重新订正他的原先的”互为主体性“的基型。他重新指明病人与精神分析家之间的关系,作为是”主体的不一致“。这个主体的不一致环绕精神分析家的欲望旋转。

Lacan’s promotion of ‘subjective disparity’ within analytic treatment
coincided with his discussion of transference in Seminar VIII. In the
opening lesson of this Seminar he explained his decision to introduce
the notion of ‘subjective disparity’ by disclosing his eagerness to find a
proper term to describe the opposite of intersubjectivity. Although he
himself had advocated intersubjectivity time and again as the only way
forward in psychoanalysis, now he could only see the drawbacks of his
former prodigy (Lacan 1991b[1960–61]:20–22, 233).

在精神分析的治疗,拉康的提倡“主体的不一致“,恰合于在第八研讨班,他对于移情的讨论。在这个研讨班的开始的几堂,拉康解释他的决定,要介绍”主体的不一致“的观念。他显露他的渴望,要找到一个合适的术语,来描述互为主体性的这个对立。虽然拉康自己经常主张互为主体性,作为是唯一前进的途径,在精神分析里。现在,拉康则仅是看出他先前的宏观的挫折。

As described on
p. 70, Lacan had already broached the pitfalls of intersubjectivity in
Seminar V within the context of a critical discussion on reciprocity. Now,
in Seminar VIII, he added that transference itself runs counter to
intersubjectivity, inasmuch as the position of those involved in a
transference relationship is by no means equivalent (ibid.: 233).40 In the
‘pseudo-situation’ of the analytic treatment—as Lacan described it in
Seminar VIII—subjective disparity reigns because the patient’s demand
(for help, advice, happiness, etc.) does not meet a reciprocal demand
(for letting oneself be cured) in the analyst. The analyst’s policy does
not hinge on a demand, but on a specific desire.

如同在第10页所描述的,拉康已经将第四研讨班时的互为主体性的陷阱粗略描绘,在批判地讨论互为主体性的内文里。现在,在第八研讨班,他补充说:移情的本身跟互为主体性并行不悖。因为牵涉到移情关系里的那些人们的立场,绝非是平等的。在精神分析治疗的“虚假-情境”—如同拉康在第八研讨班描述它—主体的不一致统辖一切,因为病人的要求(帮助,劝告,快乐,等等),并没有满足在精神分析家身上的互惠的要求(要求让自己被治疗)。精神分析家的政策并没有悬置在要求,而是悬置在明确的欲望。

The concept of the desire of the analyst appeared for the first time in
‘The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power’
(1977i[1958]:252), one of Lacan’s most clinically informed writings from
the 1950s. Fulminating, yet again, against the deplorable clinical conduct
of his contemporaries, Lacan underscored that analysts should be
concerned with the direction of the treatment and not with the direction
of their patients (ibid.: 227).

精神分析家的欲望的观念,首次出现在“治疗的方向与治疗的力量的原则”。那是一篇最具有临床资讯的著作,从1950年代开始。拉康再次猛烈抨击他的当代的精神分析家的令人悲叹的临床行径。拉康强调,精神分析家应该关注治疗的引导,而不是关注他们的病人的引导。

Directing the treatment implied that besides
the patient, the analyst too has to pay for what is happening, notably in a
triple fashion. First of all, the analyst has to pay the analysand with words
taking the form of analytic interpretations.41 Second, analysts must tolerate
their being invested by analysands with all the strengths and weaknesses
of the significant others in the analysand’s experience. This is what Freud
described in ‘The Dynamics of Transference’ (1912b) as the libidinal
cathexis of the analyst by the analysand, through which the analyst is
inscribed, qua form and contents, within one of the analysand’s psychic
series.

治疗的引导暗示着,除了病人之外,精神分析家也必须付出代价,对于正在发生的事情。特别是用三重的形式。首先,精神分析家必须付给分析者,使用精神分析的解释的形态。其次,精神分析家必须容忍他们自己被分析者投注所有的力量与弱点,在分析者的经验里,她的重要的他人的力量与弱点。这就是弗洛伊德所描述的,在“移情的动力结构”,作为是精神分析家的生命的力比多受到分析者的倾注。经有这个力比多的倾注,精神分析家被铭记,作为形式与内容,被铭记在分析者的心灵的感觉内部。

In Lacan’s terminology, it meant that an analysand’s transference
dispossesses the analyst of his identity, and that the analyst’s proper
handling of the transference entails that he is willing to pay for analysis
with his person. Finally, and most significantly, Lacan was also convinced
that analysts have to pay with a judgement on the nature of their action,
all the more so that to them the precise nature of analytic effectiveness
generally remains a mystery too. In ‘The Direction of the Treatment’ he
explained that whereas the first two payments relate to what the analyst
says and does, the third corresponds to what the analyst is, i.e. to the
analyst’s being (Lacan 1977i[1958]:227–228, 250–256).

使用拉康的术语来说,这个力比多的倾注意味著,分析者的移情,替精神分析家剥除他的身份。精神分析家的合适的处理移情意味著,精神分析家愿意用他的个人生命付出精神分析的代价。最后,而且最重要地,拉康也相信,精神分析家必须付出代价,用对于他们的行动的特性的判断。更加是如此的状况,这样,对于他们,精神分析的有效性的明确的特性,通常始终也保持是神秘。在“治疗的引导”一文,拉康解释,虽然前两个付出,跟精神分析家的所说所为息息相关,第三个付出,则是对应于精神分析家的生命实存,也就是,对应于精神分析家的生命的本质。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com