Archive for the ‘精神分析词汇’ Category


June 17, 2013

Abstinence (Rule of)
= D.: Abstinenz (Grundsatz der).–Es.: abstinencia (regla de).–Fr.: abstinence (règle d’).–
I.: astinenza (regola di).–P.: abstinência (regra de).
Rule according to which the analytic treatment should be so organised as to ensure
that the patient finds as few substitutive satisfactions for his symptoms as possible. The
implication for the analyst is that he should refuse on principle to satisfy the patient’s
demands and to fulfil the roles which the patient tends to impose upon him. In certain
cases, and at certain moments during the treatment, the rule of abstinence may be given
explicit expression in the form of advice about the patient’s repetitive behaviour which is hindering the work of recollection and the working out*.


The justification for the rule of abstinence is of an essentially economic* order. The
analyst must make sure that the quantities of libido released by the treatment are not
immediately redirected towards a fresh cathexis of external objects; they must so far as
possible be transferred into the analytic situation. The libidinal energy is thus monopolised
by the transference* and deprived of any occasion for discharge other than through verbal


From the dynamic* point of view, the treatment relies basically on the existence of
suffering brought about by frustration – a suffering which tends to decrease as the symptoms
are replaced by more satisfying substitutive behaviour. The important thing, therefore, is to
maintain or to re-establish the frustration so as to assure the progress of the treatment.
Implicitly, the notion of abstinence is linked to the whole principle of the analytic
method, in that interpretation* is its fundamental aim–not the gratification of the patient’s
libidinal demands. It should come as no surprise that when Freud tackles the question of
abstinence directly, in 1915, it is apropos of a particularly pressing demand–the one
inevitably associated with transference-love: ‘I shall state it as a fundamental principle that
the patient’s need and longing should be allowed to persist in her, in order that they may
serve as forces impelling her to do work and to make changes, and that we must beware of
appeasing these forces by means of surrogates’ (1).


It was with Ferenczi that the technical problems posed by the observance of the rule of
abstinence were to come to the forefront of psycho-analytic debate. In certain cases, Freud
maintained, measures should be taken which tend to drive away the surrogate satisfactions
which the patient finds both within the treatment and outside it. In his concluding address to
the Budapest Congress of 1918, Freud approved such measures on principle and offered a
theoretical justification for them: ‘Cruel though it may sound, we must see to it that the
patient’s suffering, to a degree that is in some way or other effective, does not come to an end
prematurely. If, owing to the symptoms having been taken apart, and having lost their value,
his suffering becomes mitigated, we must re-instate it elsewhere in the form of some
appreciable privation’ (2).


The notion of abstinence is still the subject of debate. In our opinion, it is worth while
drawing a clear distinction here between abstinence as a rule to be followed by the analyst–a
simple consequence of his neutrality*–and those active measures* which he takes in order to
get the patient to abstain from certain things of his own accord. Such measures range from
interpretations whose persistent repetition makes them tantamount to injunctions, to
categorical prohibitions. The latter, when they are not designed to forbid the patient all sexual
relations, are usually directed against specific forms of sexual activity (perversions) or
specific manoeuvres of a repetitive character which seem to be paralysing the work of
analysis. The majority of analysts have serious reservations about recourse to active measures
of this type–notably on the grounds that in this way the analyst may with justice be accused
of expressing repressive authority.


(1) Freud, S., G.W., X, 313; S.E., XII, 165.
(2) 2 Freud, S. ‘Lines of Advance in Psycho-Analytic Therapy’ (1919a [1918]), G.W., XII,
188; S.E., XVII, 163.

actual neurosis

June 15, 2013

Actual Neurosis
= D.: Aktualneurose.–Es.: neurosis actual.–Fr.: névrose actuelle.–I.: nevrosi attuale.–P.:
neurose atual.
A type of neurosis which Freud distinguishes from the anxiety neurosis* and
neurasthenia* made up the actual neuroses, but he later proposed that hypochondria
should be counted among them.


The term ‘actual neurosis’ appears for the first time in Freud’s work in 1898, when it is
used to denote anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia (1a). The idea that these conditions were to
be set apart from the other neuroses had been developed much earlier, however, during his
researches into the aetiology of the neuroses, as can be seen from both the correspondence
with Fliess (2) and the writings of 1894-96 (3).


a. The opposition between the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses is essentially
aetiological and pathogenic: the cause is definitely sexual in both these types of neurosis, but
in the former case it must be sought in ‘a disorder of [the subject’s] contemporary sexual life’
and not in ‘important events in his past life’ (4). The adjective ‘actual’ is therefore to be
understood first and foremost in the sense of temporal ‘actuality’ (1b) [a sense which has
largely been abandoned by modern English usage–tr.]. In addition, this aetiology is somatic
rather than psychical: ‘… the source of excitation, the precipitating cause of the disturbance,
lies in the somatic field instead of the psychical one, as is the case in hysteria and obsessional
neurosis’ (5). In anxiety neurosis, this precipitating cause is considered to be the nondischarge
of sexual excitation, while in neurasthenia it is the incomplete satisfaction of it, as
in masturbation, which is held to be responsible.

1、 真性神经症与心理神经症的对立,基本上是病因学与病原学。在这两种神经症,原因却是是性。但是在前者的原因必须被寻找,在「主体的当代性生活的疾病」,而不是在「他过去生活的重要事件」。「真性」这个形容词因此应该被了解,首先而且重要地,以「时间的真性」的意义。除外,这个病因学是身体的,而不是心理的:「興奋的来源,困扰的突然原因在于身体的领域,而不是心理的领域,如同歇斯底里症与妄想症的神经症。在焦虑神经症,突发的原因被认为是性的興奋没有被发泄,而在麻痹神经症,原因是性的興奋的满足不完整,如同在手淫,它被认为要负责任。
Lastly, the mechanism of symptom-formation* is taken to be somatic in the actual
neuroses (as when there is a direct transformation of the excitation into anxiety); so that
‘actual’ connotes the absence of the mediations which are to be encountered in the symptom formation
of the psychoneuroses (displacement, condensation, etc.).


From the therapeutic standpoint, the upshot of these views is that the actual neuroses
cannot be treated psycho-analytically because their symptoms do not have a meaning that can
be elucidated (6).


Freud never abandons this position in respect of the actual neuroses. He puts it forward
on a number of occasions, remarking that the explanation of the mechanism of symptomformation
in these cases can be left to the chemical sciences (intoxication of the sexual
substances by products of the metabolism) (7).


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– 10 –
b. There is, in Freud’s view, more than an overall antithesis opposing the psychoneuroses
to the actual neuroses: he attempts several times to establish a thoroughgoing isomorphism
between neurasthenia and anxiety neurosis on the one hand and the various paraphrenias* or

3、 从弗洛依德的观点,将心理神经症与真性神经症相提并论的的全面的对立,不仅只有一个。 他好几次企图建立一个彻底应用的辨明,在麻痹神经症与焦虑神经症之间。
2 Cf. Freud, S. Fliess papers, Drafts B and E, Anf., 76-82 and 98-103; S.E., I, 179-84 and
3 Cf. for example Freud, S.: ‘The Psychotherapy of Hysteria’, in Studies on Hysteria (1895d);
‘On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under the
Description “Anxiety Neurosis”’ (1895b); ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the
Neuroses’ (1896a).
4 Freud, S. ‘Heredity and the Aetiology of the Neuroses’ (1896a), G.W., I, 414; S.E., III, 149.
– 11 –
5 Freud, S. ‘On the Grounds for Detaching a Particular Syndrome from Neurasthenia under
the Description “Anxiety Neurosis”’ (1895b), G.W., I, 341; S.E., III, 114.
6 Cf. Freud, S. ‘The Psychotherapy of Hysteria’, in Studies on Hysteria (1895d), G.W., I,
259; S.E., II, 261.
7 Cf. for example Freud, S. ‘Contributions to a Discussion on Masturbation’ (1912f), G.W.,
VIII, 337; S.E., XII, 248. And Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-17), G.W.,
XI, 400-4; S.E., XVI, 385-89.
8 Cf. Freud, S. ‘On Narcissism: An Introduction’ (1914c), G.W., X, 149-51; S.E., XIV, 82-
9 Freud, S. Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis (1916-17), G.W., XI, 405; S.E., XVI,
10 ‘Types of Onset of Neurosis’ (1912c), G.W., VIII, 322-30; S.E., XII, 231-38.


June 15, 2013

= D.: Abreagieren.–Es.: abreacción.–Fr.: abréaction.–I.: abreazione.–P.: ab-reação.
Emotional discharge whereby the subject liberates himself from the affect*
attached to the memory of a traumatic event in such a way that this affect is not able to
become (or to remain) pathogenic. Abreaction may be provoked in the course of
psychotherapy, especially under hypnosis, and produce a cathartic* effect. It may also
come about spontaneously, either a short or a long interval after the original trauma*.


The notion of abreaction can only be understood by reference to Freud’s theory of the
genesis of the hysterical symptom, as set out in his paper ‘On the Psychical Mechanism of
Hysterical Phenomena’ (1893a) (1a, α). The persistence of the affect attached to a memory
depends on several factors, of which the most important is related to the way in which the
subject has reacted to a particular event. Such a reaction may be composed of voluntary or
involuntary responses, and may range in nature from tears to acts of revenge. Where this
reaction is of sufficient intensity a large part of the affect associated with the event
disappears; it is when the reaction is quota of affect*. For the reaction to be cathartic,
however, it has to be ‘adequate’.


Abreaction may be spontaneous; in other words, it may come about fairly shortly after
the event and prevent the memory from being so burdened with a great quota of affect that it
becomes pathogenic. Alternatively, it may be secondary, precipitated by a cathartic
psychotherapy which enables the patient to recall the traumatic event, to put it into words and
so deliver himself from the weight of affect which has been the cause of his pathological
condition. As early as 1895, in fact, Freud noted that ‘language serves as a substitute for
action; by its help, an affect can be “abreacted” almost as effectively’ (1b).


A massive abreaction is not the only way for a subject to get rid of the memory of a
traumatic event; the memory may be integrated into a series of associations which allows the
event to be corrected–to be put in its proper place. From the Studies on Hysteria (1895d)
onwards, we find Freud speaking on occasion of the actual effort of recollection and mental
working out* as a process of abreaction in which the same affect is revived at the memory of
each of the different events which have given rise to it (1c).


The effect of an absence of abreaction is the persistence of the groups of ideas* which lie
at the root of neurotic symptoms; they remain unconscious and isolated from the normal
course of thought: ‘… the ideas which have become pathological have persisted with such freshness and affective strength because they have been denied the normal wearing-away processes by means of abreaction and reproduction in
states of uninhibited association’ (1d).


Breuer and Freud were concerned to identify the different sets of conditions which
prevent the subject from abreacting. They felt that in certain cases these sets of conditions
were related not to the nature of the event, but rather to the mental state of the subject at the
moment of its occurrence: fright*, autohypnosis or hypnoid state*. Alternatively, their origin
was sometimes to be found in the circumstances–usually of a social nature–which oblige the
subject to restrain his reactions. A final possibility was that there were ‘things which the
patient wished to forget, and therefore intentionally repressed from his conscious thought and
inhibited and suppressed’ (1e). These three different sets of conditions defined the three types
of hysteria: hypnoid hysteria*, retention hysteria* and defence hysteria*. It was immediately
after the publication of the Studies on Hysteria that Freud abandoned the first two of these
three types.


The exclusive emphasis on abreaction as the key to psychotherapeutic effectiveness is
above all typical of the period in Freud’s work which is known as the period of the
cathartic method. Yet the notion is retained in the later theory of psycho-analytic treatment.
There are empirical reasons for its survival, for every cure involves manifest emotional
discharge, though to varying degrees according to the type of patient. There are theoretical
reasons too, in so far as every theory of the cure must take into account repetition* as well as
recollection. Concepts such as transference*, working-through* and acting out* all imply
some reference to the theory of abreaction, even though they also lead us to more complex
conceptions of treatment than the idea of a pure and simple elimination of the traumatising


(α) The neologism ‘abreagieren’ seems to have been coined by Freud and Breuer
from the verb reagieren in its transitive use and the prefix ab-, which has several
meanings, particularly distance in time, the fact of separation, diminishment,
suppression etc.

这个新词「清涤」abreagieren 似乎是弗洛依德与布鲁尔自创,根据这个动词reagieren,具有及物的用途与字首ab—它具有好几个意义,特别是时间上的距离,分开,减少,压抑等等的事实。
(1) Breuer, J. and Freud, S.: a) Cf. G.W., I, 81-9; S.E., II, 3-10. b) G.W., I, 87; S.E., II, 8. c) G.W., I, 223-4;
S.E., II, 158. d) G.W., I, 90; S.E., II, 11. e) G.W., I, 89; S.E., II, 10.