Archive for the ‘精神分析的另一面’ Category

From the other to the Other 72

October 24, 2015

From the other to the Other

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

12.2 69 XI4
I think that I have sufficiently made you sense that by reason of the
(133) function,of the zeros that do not really form part of the results of
a wager that might be made against a partner, because it is precisely
the existence of the partner that is in question and that it is what you
have to wager on. In these conditions the two lines of possibility that
are offered to the gambler do not intersect with any line of possibility
that might belong to the Other, since one can not even be sure of the
existence of the Other. It is then at the same time on the existence or
non-existence of the Other, on what promises his existence and what
allows his inexistence, it is on this that the choice is brought to bear,
and in this case it is plausible – 1 am saying, it is plausible, of course if
one has a mathematical mind – to wager, and to wager in the sense that
Pascal proposes.


Only, you will not forget that I introduced at this state of the affair, in
order of course not to give rise to misunderstanding and the belief that
here I am lending myself to something which would be the indication
of the advantage of this solution, I effectively remarked the following.


7 . . . And in the very introduction to the reminder of the wager as it is
presented, much less than it is through the grid of the discussions that
have become classic, I pointed out that at this level one could
substitute for the choice to be made on the subject of the existence of
God, the remark that one would fulfil the function – which would
completely change its sense – this remark that what is at stake, that
what could be at stake, is this radical formulation which is that of the
real, in so far as we can conceive of it and as moreover we sometimes
put our finger on it, that it is not conceivable to imagine any other limit
of knowledge than this stopping point at which one has only to deal
with this, something unsayable and which either is or is not. In other
words something that is related to heads or tails.


This was of course to put you in tune with what is invo lved in not
losing the plot. Namely, that we are not amusing ourselves. We are in
the process of trying to give articulations of such a kind that there can
be played out for us the most important decisions that are to be taken.


As it happens our times mark more and more that these most important
decisions, in so far as they may be those of the psychoanalyst, may
(134) also coincide with those required at a key point in the social
body, namely, the administration of knowledge, for example.


But then, even though on this point it is well understood that I cleared
the board, that I am not doing history and that I do not see why such a
precise system, especially if we correctly conceive the joint at which it
is situated, that Pascal’s wager would have less resources for us than it
had for its author.


And we will indeed come back to this question of
the situation, all the better because we are going to illuminate it now. It
is therefore not, as you are going to see right away, doing history, to
remind you, as I recalled the last time to remind you that in Pascal’s
time, Revelation existed.


And I even stressed what was at stake with
these two levels, the word of the Church, and then Sacred Scripture,
and the function that Sacred Scripture played for Pascal. And it is
obviously not to remind you that Newton also, who had other things on
his mind, produced a big book — my hobby being bibliophilic, it
happens that I have it, it is superb – which is a commentary on the
Apocalypse and of Daniel’s prophecy. He gave just as much care – 1
mean in the calculation, in the manipulation of numbers that are
nevertheless extremely problematic as those that are at stake when it is
a matter of situating the reign of Nebuchadnezzar for example – as in
his study on the laws of gravity. This should be remembered then in
the margin, but it does nothing for us.


What is at stake at this stage, is to remark that at the level that Pascal
then proposes his wager to us, whatever may be the relevance of our
remarks about what is involved in it in the final term, namely, that such
a proposition can only be conceived of when the knowledge of science
is bom, it nevertheless remains that, for him, the wager reposes on
what we can call the word of the Other, and the word of the Other
naturally conceived of as truth.



从他者到大他者 71

October 22, 2015

From an other to the Other

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

12.2 69
Seminar 11: Wednesday 12 February 1969
(131) Very bored with everything that is happening, huh! You too I
think. One cannot all the same not notice it, because I am in the
process of asking myself whether I am here to do my usual thing or
whether I am occupying the place! Anyway! Some benevolent ears
were prepared to understand that some of the things that I put forward,
specifically during my second last seminar, had some relationship with
a science — who knows? With perhaps not a new science, but with a
bringing up to date of what is involved for the conditions of science.

/ ‘
Today I sense, for all sorts of reasons, even if it is only because we are
getting close to Mardi-Gras, so then it is appropriate, that I should
gently change the direction of things. I sense it, like that, after
balancing what I thought out this morning before seeing you. I am
going to bend myself a little bit towards something that you can call
whatever you want, but which is rather a moral note. How could one
moreover escape it, in the aura, in the margin, in the limits of that
through which I tackled something which is Pascal’s wager.


It is
certain that we cannot fail to recognise this incidence, even though, of
course, what inspired me to speak to you about it, is that Pascal’s
wager is at a certain joint, and this, all the same, I am going to recall,
But, like that, as a way of introducing things a little and of relaxing,
however little, the atmosphere – 1 told you that we were getting close
to Mardi-Gras — I am going to read you a letter that I received. I am
not going to tell you who sent it to me, nor even from what town it


“Dear Mr Lacan. We are students and we have read almost all o f your
Ecrits. We find a lot o f things in it. Obviously it is not always easy to
approach but this all the same deserves our congratulations….. ” I
don’t get those every day! “We would really like to know how one sets
about writing such difficult things…”


I am not sending anyone up,
and certainly not these chaps that I find really.. .anyway I will tell you
what I think about it; there must have been two of them to write that!


“… it would be useful to us in our examinations. We may well have a
degree in philosophy, but it is getting more and more complicated to
get through the selection. We think that it would be better to use
trickery and astonish the teachers rather than persisting in a style o f
banal down-to-earth discourse”. And they add “make no mistake.
Could you point us to some little fiddles in this direction?“’ That strikes
(132) me, because all I am saying is that, fundamentally, that is what I
am in the process of doing! “On the other hand, we would like again
to ask you something if it’s not too daring: Do you think you could
send us as a souvenir one o f your lovely bow ties? We would really
like that. Thanking you in advance, we say farewell, Mr Lacan, and
please receive our most respectful h o m a g e I am not going to leave
that lying around because .. .they are not really up to date. They do not
know that I have been wearing a polo neck for some time!


For me, that gives an echo, confirmation, a resonance to something that
moves me when I hear right minded people going on, like that, since
the month of May: ‘Things are no long the way they were”. I think
that where we are at, it is more than ever like it was before. And after
all, I am very far of course from limiting the phenomenon to this little
report that this letter gives of what is a comer of the affair. Obviously
there are many other things at stake.


Only what is striking, is that from a certain point of view, this letter in
my eyes may very well sum up the way people have listened to me, but
in a zone that is not at all as distant from me as this town which is all
the same a good distance away. As you see, they are not very up to
date! But in any case, it is an aspect of the way that teaching is


And then I do not see why one would blame them for the
bow tie. Because there is someone who played a pivotal role in a
certain examining board, like that, that a certain British Society sent us
a long time ago, who put that down as a point that was quite worthy of
putting in the scales with the rest of my teaching. I mean that that was
how it was, this was on one pan and on the other, my bow tie.


with the help of this accessory the identification of those who
presented themselves at that time as my pupils was supposed to be
possible. So then you see that this is not limited to the level of these
little dears, nice naive people. They are perhaps not so naive as that
because, as they told you, you have to be a little tricky. We will come
back to it.

So then we will take things up where we had dismantled them a little,
namely, in the table of the wager. On the left – the blue lines are made
to show where the limits of each one of these schemas stop, so that,
they do not overlap one another, either really or in your minds – so.
then the one on the left is the one with which I believed I should
complete the matrix in which, in imitation of what is practised in
games theory, one could schematise what was effectively discussed
throughout the whole of the nineteenth and even during a good part of
the beginning of our century around Pascal’s wager. Namely, the way
of demonstrating how, in a way, Pascal was trying to swindle us.



从他者到大他者 70

October 20, 2015

From the other to the Other 70

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
5.2.69 X 11

You make a list of fifteen quotations. And I must say that here I am being humorous. But he is reaching out to help me. Because of course Bergler has read Freud, anyway I
like to imagine it! But all the same he admits that in order to write this chapter, he
wrote to H H Heart to give him quotations about the superego. The result is that he
can obviously clearly mark, exactly at the same level that all the existing
psychoanalytic reviews are at, except mine, of course, the degree to which it is
incoherent. It begins with the censor at the level of dreams; people believe that the
censor is an innocent, as if it were nothing precisely to have the pair of scissors with
which one subsequently constructs the theory.


And after all, this becomes something
that titillates you. And then afterwards it becomes a big bad wolf. And then after
that, there is nothing more. And after that, Eros is evoked, Thanatos and the whole
caboodle! Thanatos is going to have to find its place there. And then, I make
arrangements with this superego; I bow and scrape to it.


Ah! Dear little superego!
Good. Thanks to this presentation, of course, you get something it must be said that is
rather laughable. You really have to be in our epoch for no one to laugh. No one
laughs. Even a professor of philosophy. It must be said that they have got to a point,
(128) in our generation! Even a professor of philosophy can read this stuff without

不错。当然由于这个呈现,你们获得某件东西。我们必须说,这个东西是相当可笑的。你们确实必须在外面的时代,才有人忍住不笑。没有笑。即使是哲学教授。我们必须说,他们已经到达某个点,在我们的世代! 甚至连哲学教授阅读这个材料,也没有笑!

They have been checkmated! There was all the same a time when there
were people who were not especially intelligent, a chap called Charles Blondel, who
shouted and roared about Freud. At least it was something. Nowadays even the
people least in a position to imagine what is involved in a psychoanalysis read these
absolutely astounding things without complaint. No. Everything is possible |
everything is accepted. We are — moreover things are showing their lineaments
elsewhere than in the real before descending into it — really in a regime of intellectual segregation.

他们都遭受围攻!仍然有一段时间,当有些人们并没有特别聪明,有一位名叫布兰德尔,他大力抨击与咆哮弗洛伊德。至少当时是个事件。现在,即使是那些根本就没有资格想像精神分析牵涉什么的人们,当他们阅读这些令人惊奇的事情,他们也没有抱怨。没有。每样事情都是可能的!每样事情都被接受。我们确实处于知识隔离的体制—而且,事情正在显示它们的发展,在别的地方,而不是在实在界, 在他们前来探讨它之前。

Well then, this chap has noticed a whole lot of things. When something is there,
under his nose, he understands it. And I would say that this is what is sad because he
understands it at the level of his nose, which cannot of course be absolutely like that;
it is necessarily pointy. But he sees a tiny little thing. He notices that what is
explained to him, like that, in the quotations from Freud, as being the superego, he
notices, that this ought to have a relationship with what he sees all the time. So then
he begins by noticing, but like that in an intuitive way, at the level of sensation, that
what is called Durcharbeitung, I ‘elaboration as it is translated in French – people
spend their time noticing that it is untranslatable. Durcharbeitung, is not elaboration,
we can do nothing about it; since there is not in French a word to say “work through”,
drilling, it is translated as elaboration; everyone knows that in France, people
elaborate; it is something like smoke.

呵呵,这个人已经注意到整堆事情。当某件东西在那里,在他面前,他理解它。我不妨说,这是悲哀的事情,因为他理解它,在他的面前的层次。当然,事情根本就不是那个样子。事情必然是很锐利的。但是他看见一件小小的事情。他注意到,,对他被解释的东西。像那样,从弗洛伊德的引文,作为是超我。他注意到,这应该拥有一个关系,跟他始终看见的东西。所以,他开始注意到,但是像那样,用直觉的方式,在感官的层次。所谓的Durcharbeitung, ,如同法文的翻译I ‘elaboration。人们花费时间注意到,Durcharbeitung 并不是I ‘elaboration。 我们无法翻译它,因为在法文,没有一个字词说“工作彻底”的錾孔。它被翻译成为elaboration;(建构)。众所周知,在法国,人们建构,那是某件像是抽烟的东西。

Analytic elaboration is not at all like that. People on the couch see that it consists in
coming back the whole time to the same thing. At every turn one is brought back to
the same thing. And it is necessary for that to last in order to get precisely to what I
have explained to you, to the limit, to the end, naturally when one is going in the right
direction, when one encounters a limit. He says ‘That’s an effect of the superego”.


Namely, he notices that this kind of big wicked thing that nevertheless is supposedly
extracted from the Oedipus complex, or again from the devouring mother, or from
anyone of these see-saws. He notices that this has a relationship with this exhausting,
boring, necessary, especially repeated aspect by which one arrives at something that,
in effect, sometimes, has an end. How does he not see that this has nothing in
common with this kind of picture of a scenario where the superego is, as people say,
an agency, which would be nothing, but where people make it live like a person.
Because, people have not well understood what an agency is, we attach the idea to the


All of this must happen not on the other stage, the one that Freud spoke about, the one
that functions in dreams, but in a kind of little play, where what is called analytic
(129) teaching makes you play with puppets. The superego is the police
superintendent and he hits the Guignol, which is the ego, on the head. Why, by
simply seeing this rapprochement that he senses so well from the clinical point of
view, with elaboration, Durcharbeitung, does this not suggest to him that the
superego may well be found in something that would not require, like that, the
multiplication of agencies in the personality. And then at every instant he lets it slip,
he admits it, namely, that people have clearly mapped out, he says, that this has a
relation with the ego ideal. But it must be admitted that absolutely nothing is known
about it; no one has yet put things together.


All the same, in order that these discourses should be something other than memoirs
of the psychoanalyst, namely, evoking the case of a young woman who, in this
connection, one sees clearly that it was a guilt feeling that made her come into
psychoanalysis. Let us hope that it was the same thing that made her get out of it!
You can perhaps all the same note that, for example, this kind of little manoeuvre of a
measure that is precisely the measure of what cannot be measured because it is the
starting bet.


This can in effect in some cases be represented with the greatest
precision and be written on the board. It is in the manner of a certain way of regularly
balancing that one manages to fill up this something that can in certain cases be
represented as the One. You can all the same see that there is some interest in
articulating in a way that is really precise something that allows it to be conceived that
it is not at all in effect an abuse of terms to bring together, even in the name of a
minimal intuition like that, the elaboration, the Durcharbeitung in the treatment, with
the superego.


So then you have to choose. You cannot tell us that the superego is the big bad wolf
and rack your brain to see whether it is not in the identification that I have with some
person that this severe superego is bom. That is not how questions should be put. It
is like the people who tell you that if so-and-so is religious, it is because his
grandfather was. That is not enough for me, because even if you had a religious
grandfather you may also perhaps see that it is stupidity, is that not so?


It is necessary all the same to distinguish the direction of identification as compared to
other things It is necessary to know whether identification in analysis is the goal or is
the obstacle. But this might well perhaps be the means by which one engages people
precisely no doubt to do it, but by the same fact, it is abolished. And it is in the fact
that it is abolished precisely because one has done it that they can appear something
else that we can call the hole on this occasion.


I am going to leave you there today. I tried at the end of this discourse, to show you
that it is a discourse that is of direct importance to bring some fresh air into our
(130) practice. By that I mean that by using what were certainly not experiments in
smell, it was not by following his nose that Freud advanced, one can in effect see in it,
in the development of a function through his thinking, the framework that allows its
consistency to be given. But it is indispensable if one wants to advance with
something other than little stories, to assemble this coherence and to give it
consistency and solidity. This would perhaps allow there to be seen quite different
facts than simply analogical facts.


What I am saying does not take anything away from the importance of detail,
precisely as Bergler insists. But read this chapter to see that even something that is
relevant, well oriented, but oriented like particles of iron filings when you tap into a
field already magnetised, contains no kind of true motivation for the power and the
importance of detail. And why in effect it is only the details, it is quite true, that
interest us. Again it is necessary to see in every case what is interesting. Because if
one does not know it, one brings together disparate details in the name of pure and
simple resemblance, while this is not what is important. We will take it up the next
time at the level of the third figure.



从他者到大他者 69

October 16, 2015

From an other to the Other 69

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

But he did not need to think to be fixed as o. It is already done, contrary to what can
be imagine^ precisely because of the lamentable shirking, of the more and more
striking futility of all philosophy, namely, that you can upset the gaming table. I can
upset this one, of course, and blow up the tables at Vincennes and elsewhere, but that
does not prevent the read table, the gaming table from being still there. It is not the
university table that is at stake! The table around which the boss is reunited, whether
with the pupils in a pretty little interior, when this interior is his own, nice and warm
and grandfatherly, or the one in which it is framed in model nurseries!


This precisely is where the question is. That is why I allowed myself, in a scribbling
that I do not know whether you will see appearing or not – it is not at all a scribbling,
I spent a lot of time on it the day before yesterday — anyway I do not know whether
you will see it appearing, because it will appear in only one place or it will not appear
at all, and I am interested in whether it will appear or not appear! In short I went as
far as this delusional exorbitance — because for some time I have been deluding in my
own heart, these things always come out one day, in one form or another — I would
like it to be noticed, this is my delusion or not, that it is no longer possible to play the
role that is necessary for the transmission of knowledge if it does not involve the
transmission of value, even though now this is inscribed in the registers of credits
(unite de valeur), but to grasp what can be called a formation effect.


This is why, in
any case, whoever in the future, precisely because something has happened to this
value o f knowledge., wants to occupy a place that contributes in any way to this place
of formation, even if it is mathematics, biochemistry or anything else whatsoever,
would do well to be a psychoanalyst, if this is how there must be defined someone for
whom there exists this question of the dependence of the subject with respect to the
discourse that holds him, and not that he holds.


So then it is worth saying, since you see that I have just avoided something because of
the fact that you are all products of the school, namely, of philosophical teaching. I
know that I cannot tackle in too abrupt a fashion what is involved in terms of the
change that is written in the second matrix, namely, pose the question of what is
meant by the fact that here it is not o or zero because it has never been o or zero as I
have just indicated it to you and as Pascal says. But since it is only ever philosophers
that have read him, everyone has remained deaf. He said o is zero, which means that
(126) o is the bet. It was nevertheless clearly specified in games’ theory. No, that
changed nothing, they remained deaf!


And zero is zero with respect to infinity.
Rubbish! What is changed by the fact that there is now not, as has been vainly said,
in an imaginary fashion o or zero, but o or -o. And if-o effectively means what it
seems to say, namely, that it is inverted, what can this thing be? And then also that in
one case, whatever happens, even if it is at the cost of something that to be inscribed,
appears to need to be costly, what again is this correlation, this equivalence that
perhaps allows us to put elsewhere, to perceive that our connecting signs are upset. In
any case here are two links that appear to me to be worth questioning. You see that
they are not classified quite like the earlier ones.


Here, I regret not being further on than what I already, but too quickly, articulated in
the last minutes of the last time. Namely, that I recalled that to start from the figure
that is indicated here in Pascal’s scribbling, the first link, this horizontal line from
small o to -oo, we say, is hell. I shouted it out to people who were already making
for the exit. But, on the whole, I pointed out to you that hell is something we know.
It is everyday life. A curious thing, people know it, people say it, people say nothing
but that But it is limited to discourse and to some symptoms of course. Thank God,
if there were no symptoms, it would not be noticed! If neurotic symptoms did not
exist, there would not have been Freud! If the hysterics had not already opened up the
question, there is no chance that even the truth would have show the tip of its ear!

5.2.69 X 10

So then here, we must make a short halt. Someone that I thank – because you should
always thank people through whom presents arrive – reminded me for external
reasons about the existence of the chapter of Bergler called “The underestimated
superego”, it is in the famous Basic neurosis that explains everything. You are not
going to tell me that I explain everything. I explain nothing, precisely. This is even
what interests you! I try at different levels, not simply here, to ensure that there are
(127) psychoanalysts who are not imbeciles.


My operation is an advertising
operation, not to draw people into the hole of a school, but to try to give the
equivalent of what psychoanalysts ought to have to people who have no means of
getting it. It is a despairing enterprise. But experience proved that the other also, that
of teaching it to psychoanalysts themselves, seems destined to fail, as I already wrote.
Imbeciles, I mean as subjects, because as regards getting on in their practice, they are
pretty smart! And it is precisely a consequence of what I am in the process of stating
here. It is in conformity with the theory.


This is what proves not alone that there is
no need to be a philosopher but that it is much better not to be one. Only that has a
consequence, which is that one understands nothing. Hence what I also spend my
time stating, that it is much better not to understand. Only the problem is that they
understand all kinds of little things, so it is swarming.


For example ‘The
underestimated superego” is a brilliant chapter, first of all because it collects together
all the ways in which the superego has been articulated in Freud. Since he is not a
philosopher, he absolutely does not see that they all hang together. Moreover he is
charming, and he admits it. That is what is good about psychoanalysts, they admit
everything! He admits that he has written to a gentleman, it is in a note, Mr H H
Heart, who was making extracts from Freud. So then he wrote to him: “Send me
some quotations about the superego”. After all that can be done; it is moreover also in
conformity with the theory; you can take things like that, with a pair of scissors, if
writing is so important, everywhere there is superego, snip, snip, you cut it out!


5.2.69 X 11


October 9, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and

So how does the analyst actually arrive at a diagnosis? In ‘On Beginning
the Treatment’, Freud was not very forthcoming about how to distinguish
practically neurosis from psychosis, yet he did warn his readers about
the deceitfulness of the clinical picture:


Often enough, when one sees a neurosis with hysterical or
obsessional symptoms, which is not excessively marked and has
not been in existence for long—just the type of case, that is, that
one would regard as suitable for treatment—one has to reckon with
the possibility that it may be a preliminary stage of what is known
as dementia praecox (‘schizophrenia’, in Bleuler’s terminology;
‘paraphrenia’, as I have proposed to call it), and that sooner or
later it will show a well-marked picture of that affection.


(Freud 1913c:124)
8 Jacques Lacan and the Freudian practice of psychoanalysis
Freud contended that ostensibly neurotic symptoms (such as elusive
bodily pains and compulsive behaviours) should not be taken as
unambiguous signs of an underlying neurotic illness, however
conspicuous they may be.


A psychosis can hide under the mask of a
neurosis, and the analyst should not be misled by the colours of the clinical
guise.2 To many of his contemporaries, Freud’s admonition must have
seemed odd, used as they were in privileging strict relationships between
certain symptoms and certain disorders. Yet it may also surprise those
contemporary clinicians who still believe that hallucinations are sufficient
for diagnosing psychosis or that persistent offending is pathognomonic
for psychopathy.


None the less, Freud’s first, negative diagnostic rule
read that one should not take symptoms at face value. Mental organization
had to be dislodged from observable phenomena, and analysts were urged
to suspend their judgement and to look for more reliable criteria.
Defining such criteria proved more onerous than exposing the
misleading ones though.


Freud was adamant that the psychoanalytic
process is unpredictable and that the analyst’s initial diagnosis can always
be disproved by the vicissitudes of the treatment, in which case analysts
should be willing to change their minds about the patient’s psychic
economy. Paradoxically, the most correct analytic diagnosis would be
that which the analyst is able to formulate at the end of the treatment,
which is unfortunately a point of no return. The whole diagnostic
enterprise reminded Freud (1933a[1932]:155) of the medieval ordeal by
water, albeit with the analyst rather than the patient in the position of the


Despite these problems, and despite his advocacy of a ‘dynamic
diagnosis’, Freud did suggest at least two positive diagnostic criteria.
The first criterion can be inferred from his alternative tabulation of
neuroses and psychoses as transference neuroses and narcissistic neuroses
respectively. On the one hand, Freud classified anxiety hysteria (phobia),
conversion hysteria and obsessional neurosis as transference neuroses,
because the emotional tie connecting the patient to the analyst acquires
in these cases an ‘extraordinary, and for the treatment, positively central,
importance’ (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:445).


On the other hand, patients
suffering from a narcissistic neurosis—dementia praecox, paranoia or
melancholia—‘have no capacity for transference or only insufficient
residues of it’ (ibid.: 447). When faced with the task of distinguishing
between neurosis and psychosis, the analyst should thus investigate
whether the patient is capable of developing and maintaining an emotional
tie, the absence of such an ability indicating psychosis and giving the
analyst enough reason to rule out psychoanalytic treatment.


Here Freud
exchanged the objective diagnosis based on ‘symptoms interpreted as
signs’ for an intersubjective diagnosis, resting on the evaluation of a


However, transference was not the only and perhaps not even the most
significant criterion Freud employed to discriminate between neurosis
and psychosis. In his metapsychological paper ‘The Unconscious’
(1915e), he opposed schizophrenia to hysteria and obsessional neurosis
on no other grounds than the patient’s speech. According to Freud, a
schizophrenic patient’s speech bears witness to a remarkable
meticulousness, with expressions often displaying a degree of artificiality,
sentences becoming disorganized and words getting strangely mixed up
with the body.


Schizophrenic patients appear to be using ‘condensed
speech’, because whole series of thoughts find an outlet in single words,
which consequently acquire massive meaning and become linked to a
bodily organ or process.3 Freud attributed these extraordinary
schizophrenic speech characteristics to the prevalence of wordconnections
over thing-connections in psychosis. In psychotic patients,
the relationship between what Freud called ‘word-presentations’
(Wortvorstellungen) and ‘thing-presentations’ (Sachvorstellungen) has
been severed, resulting in a closed circuit of symptomatic wordconnections.
Patients are no longer concerned about the actual ‘things’
that words represent in a particular language; they merely relate to their
verbal content.4


A clear illustration of this radical inertia of thing-presentations in
psychosis is offered by a girl who complains that her eyes have been
twisted—an example Freud borrowed from Victor Tausk (1919) —
because her lover is a genuine eye-twister (Augenverdreher). In German,
an Augenverdreher is an arrant deceiver, and although the woman is aware
of this meaning (the thing-presentation), she is unable to assimilate it.
She can only relate to the literal meaning (the word-presentation) of
Augenverdreher, through which she is forced to conclude that her lover
has twisted her eyes physically.5 The woman’s conviction that she is
suffering from twisted eyes (her symptom) is determined by the broken
connection between the word-presentation and the thing-presentation.
Although she knows the thing-presentation, it is impossible for her to
use this meaning in order to relativize the literal one.

在精神病,物表象的这个强烈的贯性,有一个清楚的例子,由一位女孩提供。她抱怨她的眼睛已经被障眼—弗洛伊德从维克多 陶斯特借用的一个例子—因为她的爱人是一位真诚的障眼术者。在德文,障眼术者是一位声名狼藉的欺骗者。虽然这位女人知道这个意义(物表象),她不能够接受它。她仅是描述障眼术者的字面意义(词表象)。通过这个意义,她被迫下结论说,她的爱人已经在生理方面障眼她的眼睛。这位女人确信,她正在遭受被障眼的痛苦(她的症状),是由于字词表象与物表象之间的关联度中断所造成。虽然她并不知道物表象,她不可能使用这个意义,为了将字面意义相对化。

Another example of this linguistic mechanism, reported to me by a
colleague, concerns a man who threatens to sabotage the central heating
of the psychiatric clinic where he was based, and even to set the whole
building on fire, in order to take revenge on those members of staff who
have left him out in the cold. Like the female patient, this man is incapable
of assimilating the thing-presentation of the expression ‘to be left out in
the cold’, i.e. to be left behind, although he is perfectly aware of it. To
him, ‘to be left out in the cold’ means that some people have tried to
lower his body temperature, and therefore he feels that these scoundrels
deserve tit for tat.


On the surface, neurotic patients can suffer from the same kinds of
symptoms (twisted eyes, physical coldness) as psychotics, which is
exactly what Freud intended to demonstrate, but the neurotic symptoms
respond to an entirely different psychic economy. In neurosis, the wordpresentation
has not been cut off from the thing-presentation, but the
word-presentation has been repressed. It has been driven out of the
patient’s consciousness into the unconscious. The upshot is that the wordpresentation
exercises its influence without the patient being aware of
what has produced the symptoms.


In neurosis, symptoms are determined
by a repressed, unconscious representation and it is the analyst’s task to
bring the patient to the point where this hidden factor can be retrieved.
Put differently, neurotic patients somehow suffer from a ‘lacking word’,
which the analytic process can help to recover. In psychosis, matters are
completely different. Although symptoms are also determined by wordpresentations,
the latter are not repressed and neither are the thingpresentations.


Whereas a neurotic patient fails to find the building blocks
of her symptoms, a psychotic patient has nothing to hide. All the materials
are out in the open. This is why Freud, talking about the schizophrenic
woman, observed: ‘The patient’s comments…have the value of an
analysis…They throw light at the same time on the meaning and the
genesis of schizophrenic word-formation’ (Freud 1915e:198). Of course,
the drama is that in psychosis the ‘analytic’ value of the patient’s
utterances has no bearing whatsoever on the destabilization of the


Freud’s considerations on differential diagnostics form the nucleus
of Lacan’s distinctions between neurosis, psychosis and perversion.
Within a Lacanian orientation, psychic structures do not differ as far as
the clinical picture is concerned, but on the basis of speech and language,
and with respect to the subject’s relationships with his peers, family
members, colleagues, lovers, therapists, etc.


Lacan had already drawn
attention to both these criteria in his earliest writings on paranoia (Lacan
1975a[1931]; 1975b[1932]; 1988d[1933]), but they did not start to gain
momentum until the 1950s, as part of his ‘return to Freud’ and his
aspiration to restore the value of speech and language in psychoanalysis.
Perhaps as a result of his own training as a clinical psychiatrist working
with psychotic patients, Lacan detailed these criteria most emphatically
for the psychic structure of psychosis and he was least explicit concerning


Moreover, in his discussion of the various psychic structures
he usually highlighted the speech and language features, the nature of
the transference being regarded as an effect of these characteristics.
In the subsequent sections of this chapter, I will follow a similar
trajectory, from psychosis to neurosis and perversion, and from speech
to transference. As Lacan’s comments on perversion are less elaborated
and coherent than those on psychosis and neurosis, the section on
perversion will necessarily be more tributary to others’ and my own
interpretations of Lacan’s works than the preceding ones.




October 8, 2015

Jacques Lacan and the Freudian Practice of

雅克 拉康与弗洛伊德的精神分析实践
Dany Nobus
丹尼 诺布斯

Chapter 1
Diagnosis via speech and

Throughout his works, Lacan insisted on the differences between various
mental organizations, on the analyst’s need to recognize these differences,
and on the mandatory adoption of a differential treatment approach in
the light of the psychic economy the analyst has acknowledged in the
patient. The ‘Lacanian analyst’ has to bear in mind some basic nosological
categories and is held to diagnose patients at the earliest stage of the
clinical process, because her position within the treatment should differ
according to the psychic structure of the patient. Hence, the initial
assessment of the patient is not merely a matter of registration, due to
the fact that it has major clinical consequences.


Like so many other aspects of Lacan’s clinical theory, the importance
of a correct diagnosis prior to the beginning of psychoanalytic treatment
is rooted in Freud’s papers on technique. In ‘On Beginning the Treatment’
(Freud 1913c), Freud argued in favour of a trial period (Probezeit,
Erprobung, Sondierung) of one or two weeks before the start of the
treatment, for which he adduced the necessary, yet laborious diagnostic
procedure as one of the main reasons.


Until the end of his career, Freud
remained convinced that the standard method of psychoanalysis was of
no use to people suffering from paraphrenia—or some other form of
psychosis—which prompted him to demand that the analyst recognize
this contraindication during the trial period (ibid.: 124).1 Failure to do
so, or making a diagnostic mistake, would be disastrous as some patients
(neurotics wrongly diagnosed as paraphrenics) would be unjustly
excluded from treatment, whereas others (paraphrenics erroneously
qualified as neurotics) would be unjustly admitted.


Compared to Freud’s dual opposition of neurosis and psychosis,
Lacan’s nosological framework is slightly more sophisticated and its
categories more mutually exclusive. Whereas Freud also designated the
psychoses as narcissistic neuroses (and the neuroses proper as
transference neuroses) (Freud 1916–17a[1915–17]:420), Lacan defined
neurosis and psychosis as fundamentally different psychic structures with
separate causalities.


To the Freudian neurosis/psychosis dualism he also
added the distinct psychic structure of perversion, which Freud chiefly
addressed on a purely phenomenological level—as sadism, masochism,
exhibitionism, voyeurism, etc. Indeed, Freud never sharply discriminated
between psychosis and perversion, and his only formal distinction
between perversion and neurosis resides in his thesis that the latter is the
negative of the former, which he defended for example in ‘Three Essays
on the Theory of Sexuality’ (1905d:165). Lacan rationalized and
systematized Freud’s diagnostic categories, ultimately constructing the
triptych of neurosis, psychosis and perversion, in which each of the terms
represents a separate clinical entity.


Furthermore, the clinical impact of these categories within Lacanian
analysis no longer concerns the patient’s possible entry to the treatment,
but rather the analyst’s prescribed position within the treatment and his
preferable handling of transference. Unlike Freud, Lacan did not regard
psychotics as unsuitable candidates for analysis. This does not imply
that for Lacan the Freudian dispositions remain valid under all
circumstances, but that the clinical premises of Freudian psychoanalysis
can and should be modified, without therefore losing their vigour, to
accommodate different types of patients.



From an other to the Other 68

October 8, 2015

From an other to the Other 68


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

(123) After all, since nothing forces us to precipitate any movement, because it is
precisely in these/precipitations that errors are produced, we can indeed abstain from
justifying this zero in a way that is symmetrical to what is involved in the other.
Because we have something that appears sufficiently in the discussion that the
philosophers have had about Pascal’s montage.


Namely, that it appears in effect that
the zero represents not the constitutive loss of the bet but, at least in the dialogue
between Pascal and Mere which is not unimportant for the way Pascal writes and at
the same time leads us astray – it is never, of course, without our collaboration –
about the interest of the montage itself.


Namely, that what dominates, is in effect that
this zero can be the inscription of one of the choices that are offered which is not to sit
down at this table. This is what is done by the person who, in this not simply ideal
but effective dialogue, the one to whom there is addressed this schema o f the wager.
The zero does not mean the constitutive loss of the bet, but inscribes on the table the
“no bet”, namely, the one who does not sit down at the gaming table.
3 aac oo
0 — ‘JCA’O


It is starting from there that we have to question what is produced in the second
matrix to see how, in it, there can be divided up what is involved in the game. In
effect, I already indicated the last time the representations that can be given in the text
of our practice. In truth, I was able to indicate it as rapidly as I did because already a
certain graph of it had been constructed with what I recalled earlier at the beginning of my articulation.


Namely, not the hypothesis, but what can be inscribed and hence the
tangible. This means that o itself may well be only the effect of the entry of the life of
man into the game. Pascal warns us about it in these terms no doubt not explicitly
formulated, I mean in the very one that I am going to state: “You are engaged”, he
tells us, and it is true. It does not seem necessary to him, because he grounds himself
on the word, on the word that for him of course is that of the Church.


It is curious that
he does not distinguish from it what — this is the blind point of centuries that were not
for all that obscurantist — nevertheless provides him with a lot. It is assuredly because of the uneliminatable character of Holy Scripture throughout centuries of thought, that the most radical writing that, for us, appears in it in filigree is not really


But if I go looking for the weave of this writing in mathematical logic,
this leaves my position homologous to his, except that, for us, we can no longer avoid
(124) posing the question whether the stake itself is not as such essentially dependent
on this function of writing. Let us observe yet another difference, the one that I put as
an exergue in the first phase of my statements this year and which can be expressed,
since it is not the exact formula, as simply: what I prefer, is a discourse without
words, which means nothing other than this discourse that writing supports.

Here a little time to measure the import, the line, the absolutely solidary character of
what I am stating at this point this year, with everything that I began to announce
under the triad of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. Note carefully, and this
is something that should be insisted on, the difference between philosophical
discourse, whatever it may be, and what we are introduced to by this nothing other
that is distinguished by starting from repetition.


Philosophical discourse, whatever it may be, always ends up by detaching itself from
what it nevertheless brandishes as a system in the material of language. The whole
philosophical tradition comes up against the refutation by Kant of the ontological
argument; in the name of what? Of the fact that the forms of pure reason, the
transcendental analytic, fall under the influence of an imaginary suspicion, and this
moreover is what constitutes the single objection, it is philosophical, to Pascal’s


“This God whose existence you may conceive to be necessary, says Kant, it
nevertheless remains that you only conceive o f him in the framework o f a thinking that is only based on the prior suspense from which there comes the aesthetic” qualified on this occasion as transcendental. This means nothing other than: you cannot state anything, state anything in words, except in the time and in the space whose existence, by philosophical convention, we put in suspense in so far as it is supposed to be radical.


Only there is a problem, and this is what gives Pascal’s wager its interest. That is why
I will permit myself, whatever people may think about having recourse to outworn
ideas, to find in it an exemplary turning point. The fact is that in no case is the God of
Pascal to be put in question on the imaginary plane because it is not the God of
philosophers; it is not even the God of any knowledge. We do not know, writes
Pascal, either what he is, of course, or even if he is. This indeed is why there is no
way of leaving Him in abeyance by means of any philosophy, because it is not
philosophy that grounds him.


Now what is at stake and what my discourse in particular means, when I take up again
that of Freud, is very precisely that in grounding myself on what this discourse has
opened up, it is essentially distinguished from philosophical discourse, in the fact that
it is not detached from what we are caught up and engaged in, as Pascal says. But
tha^ rather than making use of a discourse, when all is said and done, to fix its law to
the world, its norms to history or inversely, it puts itself at this place where first of all
(125) the thinking subject perceives that he can only recognise himself as an effect of
language. In other words that before being thinking, to go quickly, to pinpoint in the
shortest possible way what I am in the process of saying, once you set up the gaming
table, and God knows if it has already been set up, he is first of all o. And it is
afterwards that the question is posed of harmonising with it the fact that he thinks.



From an other to the Other 67

October 7, 2015

From an other to the Other

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康


o o 0
What I am pointing out here is the fragile character of this sort of writing, inasmuch as by following games’ theory, the conjunctures can only be determined from the
intersection of the play of two adversaries. Namely, that the subject ought to be in
this position, while the enigmatic Other, the one involved in short as to whether he
holds the wager or not, ought to find himself in that place, God exists or does not

/ o
•3*0.0 o O

But God is not involved. In any case, nothing allows us to affirm it. It is from this
fact that it paradoxically results that face to face with him, on the table, as I might say,
there is not man but the subject defined by this wager. The stake is confused with the
existence of the partner, and that is why the signs written on this table have to be
reinterpreted. The choice is made at the level of God exists or God does not exist.


The formulation of the wager starts from that. And starting from there, only from
there, it is clear that if there is no reason to hesitate, namely, that what you may win
by wagering that God exists is not comparable to what you can certainly win, even
though this certainty can easily be questioned. Because what will you win? o is
precisely not defined.


o OO
It is here that I open the question – not at the level of a formula that has nevertheless
the interest of taking at its source the question of the intervention of the signifier, of
what is involved in any act of choice whatsoever. This is where I pointed out the
inadequacy of a table that is incomplete because it does not highlight that in taking
things at the second stage, the one, perhaps, that restores the correct position of what
the matrix involves as it is used in games’ theory, is where there should be placed
what I distinguish from the subject, the subject that is purely identical to the
inscription of the stakes as well as the one that can envisage the case where even if
God exists, he wagers against, namely, chooses o to his cost.


Namely, knowing what
this choice involves, that he positively loses the infinite, the infinity of happy lives
that is offered him, so that there is reproduced in the two boxes that are marked here
what first of all occupied the first matrix, there still remains this fourth to be filled.
Namely, that it can be supposed that, even if God does not exist, the o as holding the
(122) place that you see it occupying in the first box can be abandoned, this time in an
explicit way. And because of this fact it appears in the negative, the subtraction of o
with what we are writing here without any further commentary.


And you see that
even though it appears to be self-evident as zero, in effect it still constitutes a problem
ao 9 , – o °
– 0, 0,


In effect, let us now extract in order to isolate it simply in a new matrix something
added on by our second composition, namely, 0,-oQ, – o, zero. To be honest, I
explicitly mark what I have just indicated in passing in this very discourse, that this
zero takes on the value of a question.

O — cx->
– Q 3*oo ?
In effect, if the zeros were able to be thus posited in the first matrix, this is something
that deserves to hold our attention, because what did I say earlier if not that in truth
the only thing that counts in this position of the gambler, of the subject who alone
exists, the only thing to be taken into account is the infinite and the finite o.


What do
these zeros designate if not that by putting some stake on the table, as Pascal
underlined in introducing the theory of gaming, nothing correct can be stated about a
game unless you start from this, unless by having a beginning and an end fixed in the


What is put on the table, what is called the bet, is lost from the start. The game
only exists starting from the fact that it is on the table, as one might say, in a common
mass. What the game is is implied and therefore from its constitution the game can
here only produce zero. This zero only indicates that you are playing; without this
zero, there is no game.


Assuredly you could say the same thing about the other zero,
namely, this one, that it represents the loss to which the other player resigns himself
by bringing this infinity into play. But since precisely what is at stake is the existence
of the other player, it is here, in the first matrix, that the zero qua sign of the loss
becomes problematic.



Collected 7 集体无意识的原型104

September 27, 2015

Collected 7
Analytical Psychology
Carl Jung
卡尔 荣格



In these associations the patient is describing a very impor-
tant experience of his childhood. As in nearly all cases of this kind, he had a particularly close tie with his mother. By this we are not to understand a particularly good or intense conscious relationship, but something in the nature of a secret, subterra-nean tie which expresses itself consciously, perhaps, only in the retarded development of character,.i.e., in a relative infantilism. The developing personality naturally veers away from such an unconscious infantile bond; for nothing is more obstructive to development than persistence in an unconscious-we could also say, a psychically embryonic-state. For this reason instinct seizes on the first opportunity to replace the mother by another object.


If it is to be a real mother-substitute, this object must be, in some sense, an analogy of her. This is entirely the case with our patient. The intensity with which his childish fantasy seized upon the symbol of Cologne Cathedral corresponds to the strength of his unconscious need to find a substitute for the mother. The unconscious need is heightened still further in a case where the infantile bond could become harmful. Hence the enthusiasm with which his childish imagination took up the idea of the Church; for the Church is, in the fullest sense, a mother.


11 The idea of compensation has already been extensively used by Alfred Adler.

of the Ch
We speak not only of Mother Church, but even of the Church’s womb. In the ceremony known as the benedictio fontis) the bap¬tismal font is apostrophized as “immaculatus divini fontis uterus”-the immaculate womb of the divine font. We naturally think that a man must have known this meaning consciously be¬fore it could get to work in his fantasy, and that an unknowing child could not possibly be affected by these significations. Such analogies certainly do not work by way of the conscious mind, but in quite another manner.


172 The Church represents a higher spiritual substitute for the
purely natural, or “carnal,” tie to the parents. Consequently it frees the individual from an unconscious natural relationship which, strictly speaking, is not a relationship at all but simply a condition of inchoate, unconscious identity. This, just because it is unconscious, possesses a tremendous inertia and offers the utmost resistance to any kind of spiritual development. It would be hard to say what the essential difference is between this state and the soul of an animal.


Now, it is by no means the special prerogative of the Christian Church to try to make it possible for the individual to detach himself from his original, animal¬like condition; the Church is simply the latest, and specifically Western, form of an instinctive striving that is probably as old as mankind itself. It is a striving that can be found in the most varied forms among all primitive peoples who are in any way developed and have not yet become degenerate: I mean the in• stitution or rite of initiation into manhood. When he has reached puberty the young man is conducted to the “men’s house,” or some other place of consecration, where he is system• atically alienated from his family.

现在,这决非是基督教教堂的特权,尝试让个人有可能将自己更他的原初的像动物一样的情况隔离开来。教堂仅是最近,明确是西方的形式,作为本能的追寻的形式。这个形式可能更人类本身一样的古老。这一种追寻能够被找到,以各色各样的形式,在原始的民族当中。他们以任何方式被发展,而且还没有变得恶化。我指的是由入会到成年的体制与仪式。当他到达青春期时,年轻柔被引导到” 成年人之屋“,或是某个奉献的地方。在那里,他跟他的家庭制度方面被隔离。

At the same time he is initi¬ated into the religious mysteries, and in this way is ushered not only into a wholly new set of relationships, but, as a renewed and changed personality, into a new world, like one reborn (quasimodo genitus). The initiation is often attended by all kinds of tortures, sometimes including such things as circumci• sion and the like. These practices are undoubtedly very old. They have almost become instinctive mechanisms, with the re¬sult that they continue to repeat themselves without external compulsion, as in the “baptisms” of German students or the even more wildly extravagant initiations in American students’ fraternities. They are engraved on the unconscious as a primor¬dial image.




173 When his mother told him as a little boy about Cologne Ca-
thedral, this primordial image was stirred and awakened to life. But there was no priestly instructor to develop it further, so the child remained in his mother’s hands. Yet the longing for a man’s leadership continued to grow in the boy, taking the form of homosexual leanings-a faulty developmeJ;1t that might never have come about had a man been there to educate his childish fantasies.

作为小孩时, 当他的母亲告诉他关于科伦尼大教堂,这个原初的意象被触动,并且甦醒复活。但是,并没有僧侣的教师来更加深入地发展它。所以,小孩始终留在他的母亲的手中。可是,对于男人的领导的渴望继续在男孩身上成长,採取同性恋的习性的形式—错误的发展。假如当时有人在那里教育他的童年的幻想,这样的错误的发展本来可能不会发生。

The deviation towards homosexuality has, to be sure, numerous historical precedents. In ancient Greece, as also in certain primitive communities, homosexuality and education were practically synonymous. Viewed in this light, the homosex¬uality of adolescence is only a misunderstanding of the otherwise very appropriate need for masculine guidance. One might also say that the fear of incest which is based on the mother-complex extends to women in general; but in my opinion an immature man is quite right to be afraid of women, because his relations with women are generally disastrous.


174 According to the dream, then, what the initiation of the
treatment signifies for the patient is the fulfilment of the true meaning of his homosexuality, i.e., his entry into the world of the adult man. All that we h<l¥e been forced to discuss here in such tedious and long-winded detail, in order to understand it properly, the dream has condensed into a few vivid metaphors, thus creating a picture which works far more effectively on the imagination, feeling, and understanding of the dreamer than any learned discourse.


Consequently the patient was better and more intelligently prepared for the treatment than if he had been overwhelmed with medical and pedagogical maxims. (For this reason I regard dreams not only as a valuable source of in¬formation but as an extraordinarily effective instrument of edu¬cation.)



From an other to the other 66

September 26, 2015

From an other to the Other 66

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康
Seminar 10: Wednesday 5 February 1969
I am going to restart from where I left you the last time. I said a lot of things the last
time, and in particular I succeeded in touching some people by the mathematical
evidence that I believe I succeeded in giving of the genesis of what is involved in o,
through the simple virtue of the One qua mark.


This depends on this factum, this
fabrication that results from the simplest use of this One in so far as it multiplies once
it is repeated, since it is only posited in order to attempt the repetition of, to rediscover
enjoyment in so far as it has already fled. The first One, by rediscovering what was
not marked at the origin, already alters it, since at the origin it was not marked. It is
already posited then by grounding a difference that it does not constitute as such but
in so far as it produces it. This is this original point that makes of repetition the key of
a process about which the question is posed, once it has been opened up, of whether
or not it can find its term.


You see that we are immediately brought to the question that is only terminal when
applied to a single career, that of Freud, in so far as subject on the one hand, he was
also a man of action, let us say a man who inaugurated a path. How did he inaugurate
it? This is something that is worthwhile recalling perhaps at a detour in what I will
say to you today. But every man’s career is committed to something that has death as
its limit, and it is only from this point of view that we can find the term of the path
traced by Freud in the question that he poses, of the end of analysis, terminable or


This only marks the phase of the question that I am opening up in
saying: is what is engaged for the subject by the fact of repetition as origin, itself a
process that has its limit or not? This is what I left open, in abeyance, but
nevertheless advanced, by showing on the board the last time in the clearest possible
fashion what I was able to express as the division, the bi-partition of two infinities,
marking that this is what is fundamentally in question in Pascal’s wager. The infinity
on which it is based is the infinity of number. Now, by taking this infinity, as I might
say, by further accelerating by setting up the Fibonacci series, which it is easy to show
is exponential, that the numbers that it generates grow not arithmetically but


This is the very thing that generates, and precisely in the measure that
we are more distant from its origin, the proportion articulated in o. In the measure
that these numbers grow, o intervenes there under its inverted form in a more
circumscribed and constant fashion. This is all the more striking in that it ties the 1 to
o, that it is l/o, that this proportion of one number to another ends up in the more and
more rigorous constant of this l/o, in the measure that the numbers increase.
I also wrote, taking it at its origin, the series that results from taking things in the other sense.


There, because of the fact that o is less than 1, you see the process ends up not
simply in a proportion but in a limit. Whatever you add of what is produced,
inversely, by proceeding through subtraction, in such a way that it is always true that,
in this chain, by taking things in an ascending way, each term is the sum of the two
preceding ones, you will find again the function of o in so far as this time it reaches a
limit That in whatever numbers you add these terms, you will not go beyond 1 + o,
which seems to indicate that by taking things in this direction, what repetition
generates has a term.

这是因为这个事实:0少于1. 你们看见这个过程结果,不仅是一个比例,而是一个限制。关于所被产生的东西,无论你们增加什么,逆转地,凭借扣除继续前进,用它总是真实的这样的方式。在这个锁链里,凭借以上升的方式接纳事情。每个项目都是前面的两个项目的总和。你们再次发现0的这个功能。因为在这个时候,它到达一个限制。不管用什么数字,你们增加这些项目。你们将不会超越1+0.那似乎指示,凭借朝这个方向接纳事情,重复产生的东西拥有一个项目。

This is where there intervenes the well known table in which those, in short, who miss
what is involved in Pascal’s wager, write what is involved in terms of games*theory.
Namely, in a matrix that is constructed from distinct boxes, formulate what is
involved, if God exists, and write as zero what results from the observation of these
commandments, confused here with the renunciation of something. Whether we call it
pleasure or something else, it nevertheless remains that here, in appreciating it by a
spontaneity whose astonishing aspect we will see, that they write what is left in this
life for believers as zero.


As a result of which a future life is marked by the term
infinity, an infinity of lives promised to be infinitely happy. In other words, by
supposing that God does not exist, the subject, which we write as o, is presumed to be
still caught up in the game, make no mistake, literally to know the limited and
moreover problematic happiness that is offered him in this life. It is not groundless to
choose this if, since God does not exist, it seems clear that there is nothing to expect
from the other life.