Archive for the ‘精神分析的伦理’ Category

Ethics 24

July 1, 2015

Ethics 24
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

One can say right off that the search for a way, for a truth, is not absent
from our experience. For what else are we seeking in analysis if not a liberating
truth?

我们能够立即说,对于道的寻求,对于真理的寻求,对于我们精神分析经验是不可或缺的。因为若不是在精神分析里,我们到什么地方寻求一个解放的真理呢?

But we must be careful. One must not always trust words and labels. This
truth that we are seeking in a concrete experience is not that of a superior
law. If the truth that we are seeking is a truth that frees, it is a truth that we
will look for in a hiding place in our subject. It is a particular truth.

但是我们必须小心。我们一定不要总是信任文字与标签。我们正在寻求的这个真理,在具体的经验里,并不是优秀法则的真理。假如我们正在寻求的真理是让人自由的真理,那是一个真理,我们将要寻找,在我们的主体的一个隐藏的地方。那是一个特殊的真理。

But if the form of its articulation that we find is the same in everyone
though always different, it is because it appears to everyone in its intimate
specificity with the character of an imperious Wunsch. Nothing can be compared
to it that allows it to be judged from the outside. The quality that best
characterizes it is that of being the true Wunsch, which was at the origin of
an aberrant or atypical behavior.

但是假如我们找到的表达真理的形式,跟在每个人身上找到的相同,通过一个总是不同的方式。那是因为对于每个人而言,这个真理以它的亲密的明确性出血,具有一个有害的的“愿望”的特性。没有任何一样东西能够跟它比拟,让它能够被判断,从外部。最能够表达它的特征的特质是成为真实的愿望的特质。这个真实的愿望处于一个偏离或非典型的行为的起源。

We encounter this Wunsch with its particular, irreducible character as a
modification that presupposes no other form of normalization than that of an
experience of pleasure or of pain, but of a final experience from whence it
springs and is subsequently preserved in the depths of the subject in an irreducible
form.

我们遭遇这个愿望,具有它的特殊,无法化简的特性,作为一种修正。这个修正并没有预想假设任何的其他的正常化的形式,除了就是快乐或痛苦的经验的形式。但是它是属于最后的经验,它起源于那里,并且随后被保留在主体的深处,以一个无法化简的形式。

The Wunsch does not have the character of a universal law but,
on the contrary, of the most particular of laws – even if it is universal that
this particularity is to be found in every human being. We find it in a form
that we have categorized as a regressive, infantile, unrealistic phase, characterized
by a thought abandoned to desire, by desire taken to be reality.

这个愿望并没有具有普遍性的法则的特性。而是相反地,它具有一个最特殊的法则的特性。即使普遍常见的是,这个特殊性能够在每个人的身上找到。我们发现它,以一个我们归类为退行的形式。婴孩,非现实的时期,表现的特征是纵溺于欲望的思想,是被认为是现实的欲望。

That surely constitutes the text of our experience. But is that the whole of
our discovery, is that the whole of our morality? That attenuation, that exposure
to the light of day, that discovery of the thought of desire, of the truth
of that thought? Do we expect that as a result of its mere disclosure the area
will be swept clean for a different thought? In one way, it is indeed so, it is
as simple as that. Yet at the same time if we formulate things thus, then
everything remains veiled for us.

那确实形成我们的精神分析经验的文本。但是我们的发现的整体,就是我们的道德的整体吗?那个缓和,那个暴露给白日阳光,欲望的思想的发现,思想的真理的发现?我们难道会期望,由于它的泄露的结果,这个地区将会被横扫乾净,给不同的思想?用某种的方式,它确实是如此。它就像那个那么简单。可是同时,假如我们以那种方式阐释事情,对于我们而言,那么每样东西都始终被遮蔽。

If the reward or the novelty of the psychoanalytic experience were limited
to that, it wouldn’t go much further than the dated notion that was born long
before psychoanalysis, namely, that the child is father of the man. The phrase
comes from Wordsworth, the English romantic poet, and is quoted respectfully
by Freud.

假如精神分析经验的这个酬劳,或这个新奇,被限制于那个,那它充其量将会更加深入的仅是这个被确定日期的观念。这个被确定的日期诞生,早先于精神分析。换句话说,小孩是成人的父亲。这个诗句来自华兹尔斯,这位英国的浪漫派诗人,弗洛依德表示尊敬地引述他。

It is no accident that we discover it in that period with its fresh, shattering,
and even breathtaking quality, bursting forth at the beginning of the nineteenth
century with the industrial revolution, in the country that was most
advanced in experiencing its effects, in England. English romanticism has its
own special features, which include the value given to childhood memories,
to the whole world of childhood, to the ideals and wishes of the child. And
the poets of the time drew on this not only for the source of their inspiration,
but also for the development of their principal themes – in this respect they
are radically different from the poets who preceded them and especially from
that wonderful poetry of the seventeenth and early eighteenth century, which
for a reason that escapes me is called metaphysical.

我们发现它并非偶然,在那个时期,具有它的新鲜,震撼,甚至令人叹为观止的特质,在19世纪的开始,突然暴发,跟随工业革命。在最进步的国家,但它经验到它的影响,在英国。英国的浪漫主义具有它的特殊的特征,这些特征包括被给予孩童时期的记忆的价值,被给予孩童的整个的世界,被给予孩童的理想与愿望。那个时代的诗人不但依靠这个来获得他们的灵感的来源,而且用来发展他们的主要的主题。在这方面,他们强烈地不同于在他们之前的诗人,特别是不同于17世纪与18世纪早期的那个奇妙的诗。因为我们无法理解的理由,它被称为是形上学。

That reference to childhood, the idea of the child in man, the idea that
something demands that a man be something other than a child, but that the
demands of the child as such are perpetually felt in him, all of that in the
sphere of psychology can be historically situated.

提到童年,在成年人身上的孩童的这个观念,某件东西要求,一个人应该成为某件跟小孩不同东西。但是孩童自身的要求在他的身上永恒地被感受到。所有这一切,在心理学的范围里,它能够从历史上定出位置。

Another man who lived in the first half of the nineteenth century, a Victorian
from the early period, the historian Macaulay, noted that at the time,
rather than call you a dishonest man or a perfect idiot, one preferred the
excellent weapon of affirming that your mind was not fully adult, that you
retained characteristics of a juvenile mentality. This attitude, which is historically
datable since you find no evidence of it in any previous history, is the
sign of an interval, a break in historical development. In Pascal’s time, when
one speaks of childhood, it is simply to say that a child is not a man. And if
one speaks of adult thought, it is in no way in order to discover there traces
of infantile thought.

另外一个人生活19世纪的前半叶,一位维多利亚早期的人,历史学家马考列注意到,在当时,非但不是称你为一位不诚实的人或一位完美的白痴,我们宁可这个优秀的武器,要肯定,你的心灵并不完全是成年人,你保留青少年的精神的一些特性。这个态度在历史上可找出资料,因为你找不到任何它的证据,在任何先前的历史。那是中间的讯息,历史发展的一个中断。在巴斯卡的时代,当我们谈论童年,那仅是说,小孩并非成年人。假如我们谈论成年人的思想,那丝毫不受为了发现婴孩思想的痕迹。

For us, the question is not posed in those terms. If we do nevertheless
constantly pose it thus, if it is justified by the contents and the text of our
relationship to the neurotic and by the reference in our experience to individual
genesis, this also disguises what lies behind it. For in the end, no matter
how true it may be, there is a very different tension between the thought that
we have to deal with in the unconscious and the thought that we characterize,
goodness knows why, as adult.

对于我们,这个问题并没有被提出,用那些术语。假如我们仍然不断地以这种方式提出它,假如它能够自圆其说,凭借着我们更神经症者的关系的内容与文本,凭借提到我们的跟个人的起源的精神分析经验。这也伪装著隐藏在它背后的东西。最后,无论它是多么的真实,有一个非常不同的紧张存在于我们在无意识里必须处理的理想,与我们表现特征作为成年人的思想之间的紧张。

We constantly come upon the fact that this
adult thought runs out of steam relative to the famous child’s thought that
we use to judge our adult. We use it not as a foil, but as a reference point, a
vanishing point, where unfulfillments and even degradations come together
and reach their end. There is a perpetual contradiction in the reference we
make to these things.

我们不断地遭遇这个事实:这个成年人的思想耗尽了精力,相对于著名的孩童的思想。我们用孩童的思想来判断我们的成年人。我们使用它,不是作为对照,而是作为一个指称点,一个消失点。在那里,没有满足,与甚至是堕落聚集一块,并且到达它们的结束。在我们提到这些事情时,有一个永恒的悖论。

Before coming here today I read in Jones a kind of celebration of the sublime
virtues of social pressure, without which our contemporaries, our fellow
humans, would be vain, egotistical, sordid, sterile, etc. One is tempted to
comment in the margin, “What are they but that?” And when we speak of
the adult human being, what is our reference? Where is this model of the
adult human being?

在我们今天来到这里之前,我从琼斯阅读到一种的庆祝,庆祝社会压力的崇高的品德。假如没有这个社会的压力的崇高品德,我们的当代人们,我们的同胞,都将会是虚荣,自我中心,卑贱,贫瘠,等等。我们忍不住要在边缘评论它。「除了那样,他们还剩什么?」当我们谈论成年的人类,我们的指称点是什么?成年人的人类的这个典范在哪里?

These considerations incite us to reexamine the true, solid backbone of
Freud’s thought. No doubt psychoanalysis has ended up ordering all the
material of its experience in terms of an ideal development. But at its beginning
it finds its terms in a wholly different system of references, to which
development and genesis only give intermittent support – this is, I believe,
something that I have made you appreciate sufficiently, even if I am obliged
on this occasion to refer to it only in passing. The fundamental reference is
the tension or, to designate it finally by its name, the opposition between the
primary process and the secondary process, between the pleasure principle
and the reality principle.

这些考虑激发我重新检视这个真实,牢固的弗洛依德的思想的支持。无可置疑地,精神分析结束时规范所有的材料的秩序,用一个理想的发展的术语,在精神分析的经验。但是在开始时,它找到它的术语,处于一个完全不同的指称的系统里。对于这个系统,发展与起源仅是给予中间的支持。我相信,这就是某件我让你们充分赏识的东西。即使我不得不在这个场合提到它,仅是顺便地。这个基本的指称就是这个紧张,或最后跟它指名道姓,处于原初过程与次级过程之间的对立,处于快乐原则与现实原则之间的对立。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 21

July 1, 2015

Ethics 21
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

Moral action is, in effect, grafted on to the real. It introduces something
new into the real and thereby opens a path in which the point of our presence
is legitimized. How is it that psychoanalysis prepares us for such action, if it
is indeed true that this is the case? How is it that psychoanalysis leaves us
ready, so to speak, to get down to work? And why does it lead us in that
way?

实际上,道德行动被接枝到实在界。它介绍某件新的东西,进入实在界。因此展开一条途径,在这个途径里,我们的存在的这个点合理化。精神分析如何跟我们准备这样的行动呢?假如情况确实是这样?精神分析如何让我们准备,也就是,专注下来工作?为什么精神分析以那种方式引导我们?

Why, too, does it stop at the threshold? That’s where one finds the
other pole on which I will focus what I hope to formulate here – it being
understood that what I pointed to last time constitutes the limits of the things
I have to say – and the extent to which we claim to be able to formulate an
ethics. I will say right off that the ethical limits of psychoanalysis coincide
with the limits of its practice. Its practice is only a preliminary to moral action
as such – the so-called action being the one through which we enter the real.

为什么精神分析面对这个门槛望门却步?那就是我们发现这个另外的极端,我将会专注我希望在此阐述的东西,于那个极端。大家理解到,我上次指出的东西,构成我必须说出的事情的极限。甚至我们宣称能够阐述的伦理学。我将会立即说,精神分析的伦理的限制巧合于精神分析实践的限制。精神分析实践仅是道德行动本身的初步。所谓的行动就是我们藉以进入实在界的行动。

Among all those who have undertaken the analysis of an ethics before me,
Aristotle is to be classed among the most exemplary and certainly the most
valid. Reading him is an exciting activity and I cannot recommend too highly
that by way of an exercise you find out for yourselves – you will not be bored
for a moment.

在我之前 曾经从事伦理学的分析的人们当中,亚里斯多德应该被归类为最具典范,的确最具正确性的其中一位。阅读他的著作是令人興奋的活动。我无论如何推崇他也不为过,凭借作为练习,你们自己将会发现—你们将会阅读得手不释卷。

Read the Nicomachaen Ethics, which of all his treatises scholars
seem to attribute to him with the least hesitation and which is certainly the
most readable. There are no doubt a number of difficulties to be found at the
level of the text, in its digressions and in the order of his arguments. But skip
over the passages that seem too complicated or acquire an edition with good
notes that refers you to what it is sometimes essential to know about his logic
in order to understand the problems that he raises.

请你们阅读“亚里斯多德的伦理学”。在他所有的论文当中,学者似乎毫不犹豫地归属给他,那确实是最值得阅读的著作。无可置疑地,许多的困难能够被找到,在文本的层次。在它的离题谈论与在他的争论的秩序。但是请你们跳过那些太过复杂的段落,或是要求详尽注释的版本,让你们有时可以找到基本需要知道的东西,关于他的逻辑,为了理解他提出的那些难题。

Above all, don’t overburden
yourself by trying to grasp everything paragraph by paragraph. Try instead
to read him from beginning to end and you will certainly be rewarded.

尤其重要的是,不要引起你们自己的过分负担,想要逐段地理解一切内容。代替的,假如你们尝试阅读他,从头到尾,你们的收获当然会很丰硕。

One thing at least will emerge, something that to some extent the work has
in common with all the other ethics – it tends to refer to an order. This order
presents itself first of all as a science, an επιστήμη, the science of what has
to be done, the uncontested order which defines the norm of a certain character,
ηθos.

至少有件东西将会出现。在某个程度上,这部著作跟所有的其他的伦理学共通的某件东西—它似乎提到一个秩序。这个秩序首先呈现它自己,作为一门科学,必须被处理的科学,这个没有被•测试过的秩序定义ηθos的某特特性的名称。

Thus the problem is raised of the way in which that order may
be established in a subject. How can a form of adequation be achieved in a
subject so that he will enter that order and submit himself to it?
The establishment of an ηθos is posited as differentiating a living being
from an inanimate, inert being. As Aristotle points out, no matter how often
you throw a stone in the air, it will never acquire the habit of its trajectory;
man, on the other hand, acquires habits – that’s what is meant by ηθos.

因此,这个难题被提出,他在主体身上建立的那个秩序的方式的难题。在一位主体身上,充分胜任的形式如何被获得?这样他才会进入那个秩序,并且让自己承受那个秩序。Ηθos的这个名称的建立,被假设作为区别活生生的人跟无生物的不同。依照亚里斯多德指出的,无论你多么经常朝空中丢石头,石头永远不会获得它的投射的习惯。另一方面,人会获得习惯。那就是ηθos这个名称的意义。

And
this ηθos has to be made to conform to the ηθos, that is to an order that from
the point of view of Aristotle’s logic has to be brought together in a Sovereign
Good, a point of insertion, attachment or convergence, in which a particular
order is unified with a more universal knowledge, in which ethics becomes
politics, and beyond that with an imitation of the cosmic order. The notions
of macrocosm and microcosm are presupposed from the beginning in Aristode’s
thought.

Ηθos的这个名称必须被形成,为了符合这个ηθos,也就是符合一个秩序。从亚里斯多德的逻辑的观点,那个秩序必须被聚集一块,在统辖的善,插入,连系或汇集的点。在那里,一个特殊的秩序被统合,跟更加普遍性的知识。在那里,伦理学变成政治学。除此而外,它具有宇宙秩序的模拟。大宇宙与小宇宙的观念从一开始就被建议,在亚里斯多德的思想。

It is then a question of having a subject conform to something which in the
real is not contested as presupposing the paths of that order. What is the
problem constantly taken up and posed within Aristotelian ethics? Let us
start with him who possesses this science. Of course, the one whom Aristotle
addresses, that is the pupil or disciple, by the very fact that he listens is
supposed to participate in this scientific discourse.

因此,问题是要拥有一个主体符合某件东西,在实在界没有被测试过的东西,作为预先假定那个秩序的途径。那个难题是什么?在亚里斯多德的伦理学里面被从事与被提出的难题?让我们跟拥有这个科学的人一起开始。当然,亚里斯多德对话的这个人,那是他的学生,或门徒。凭借这个事实:他倾听的这个事实被认为参与这个科学的辞说。

The discourse in question,
the ορθός λόγος, the right discourse, the appropriate discourse, is therefore
already introduced by the very fact that the ethical question is posed. In that
way the problem is clearly returned to the point where Socrates had left it
with an excessive optimism that did not fail to strike his immediate successors
_ if the rule of action is in ορθός λόγος, if there can be no good action except
in conformity with the latter, how is it possible that what Aristotle calls
intemperance can survive? How is it possible that a subject’s impulses draw
him elsewhere? How is that to be explained?

受到质疑的这个辞说,这个正确的辞说,这个合宜的辞说,因此已经被介绍,根据伦理学的问题被提出的这个事实。以那种方式,这个难题清楚地被回转到这个点,苏格拉底留下它,用过分的乐观主义。这个乐观主义必然会引起他的当选的连续反应。假如行动的规则是在正确的途径,假如并不存在着好的行动,除了跟后者一致。这如何是可能的?亚里斯多德所谓的放纵如何存活下来?这如何是可能的?一位主体的冲动吸引他到别的地方?那应该如何被解释?

However superficial this demand for an explanation may seem to us, since
we believe we know so much more about the matter, it nevertheless constitutes
the greater part of the substance of Aristotle’s thought in the Ethics. I
will come back to this later in connection with Freud’s reflections on the same
topic

对于我们而言,要求解释无论的多么表面,因为我们相信我们如此清楚知道关于这件事情,它仍然形成亚里斯多德的伦理学的思想的物质的大部分。我以后将会回头谈论它,关于弗洛依德对于相同议题的反思。

For Aristotle the problem is delimited by the conditions imposed by a
certain human ideal that I already briefly referred to in passing as that of the
master. It is a question for him of elucidating the relationship that may exist
between ακολασία, intemperance, and the fault revealed relative to the essential
virtue of the master, that is of the man whom Aristotle is addressing.

对于亚里斯多德,这个难题被除掉限制,由某个人的理想所赋加的各种情况除掉限制。我已经顺便提到这些人类的理想,作为主人的理想。对于主人,问题是要阐释这个关系,可能存在于放纵,与被启示的错误,相对于主人的品德的基本的东西。换句话说,亚里斯多德正在对话的这个人。

I think I indicated enough last time that the master in antiquity isn’t exactly
the heroic brute who is represented in the Hegelian dialectic, and who functions
for Hegel as an axis and turning point. I will not elaborate here on what
is representative of the type; it is enough to know that it is something that
enables us to appreciate properly the contribution of Aristotle’s ethics. This
comment undoubtedly causes us to set limits on the value of his ethics, to
historicize them, but one would be wrong to assume that that is the only
conclusion to draw. From an Aristotelian perspective, the master in antiquity
is a presence, a human condition joined in a much less narrowly critical way
to the slave, than Hegel’s perspective affirms. In fact, the problem posed is
one that goes unresolved from an Hegelian perspective, that of a society of
masters.

我认为我上次已经充分指示,在古代的主人并不确实是英雄般的残暴的人,由黑格尔的辩证法代表的英雄般的残暴的人。对于黑格尔,这个功能作为是枢纽与转捩点。我将把在场建构这种类型代表的东西。我们只要知道一下就足够了,只要知道那是某件东西让我们能够恰当地评估亚里斯多德的伦理学的贡西。无可置疑地,这个评论引起我们对于他的伦理学的价值竖立限制,让它们成为历史。但是我们将会是错误,假如我们认为那是唯一的获得的结论。从亚里斯多德的观点,古代的主人是一种存在,一种人类的状况,以比较不是那么狭隘的方式,跟奴隶连接一块,比黑格尔的观点肯定的方式更加狭隘的方式。事实上,被提出的难题是无法被解决的难题,从黑格尔的观点。那就是主任的社会的难题。

Other comments, too, may contribute equally to limit the significance for
us of Aristotle’s ethics. Note for example that the ideal of this master, like
that of god at the center of an Aristotelian world governed by νονς, seems to
be to avoid work as much as possible. I mean to leave the control of his slaves
to his steward in order to concentrate on a contemplative ideal without which
the ethics doesn’t achieve its proper aim. That tells you how much idealization
there is in the point of view of Aristotelian ethics.

其他的评论也可能同样地促成限制亚里斯多德的伦理学对于我们的意义。譬如,请你们注意,这个主人的理想,像神的理想,在亚里斯多德的世界的中心,受到νονς,的统辖。它似乎是要尽可能地避免工作。我打算将他的奴隶的控制,留给他的管家,为了专注探讨一个沉思的理想。假如没有这个沉思的理想,伦理学似乎没有获得它的合宜的目的。那告诉你们,从亚里斯多德的伦理学的观点,是多么的理想化。

Consequently, his ethics is localized, I would almost say limited to a social
type, to a privileged representative of leisure – the very term σχολαστικός
suggests it. Yet, on the other hand, it is all the more striking to realize how
an ethics articulated within such specific conditions still remains full of resonances
and lessons. The schemas it proposes are not useless. They may be
found in partially unrecognizable forms at the level of our approach to Freud’s
experience. These schemas may be recomposed or transposed in such a way
that we will not be putting our new honey into the same old containers.

结果,他的伦理学被定位,我几乎要说,被限制于一个社会的种类,被限制于特权的休闲阶级的代表。Σχολαστικός 的这个术语暗示它。可是,在另一方面,更加引人注意的是,要体会到,在如此明确的情况里被表达的伦理学如何依旧保持充满回响与教导。它建议的基模并非是无用的。它们可能被找到,在特别无法被体认的形式,在我们的接近弗洛依德的经验的层面。这些基模可能重新被组成,获被调换,以这样一种方式,我们将不会将我们的新蜂蜜,放置在相同的旧容器里。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 19

June 29, 2015

Ethics 19
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

Honey is what I am trying to bring you, the honey of my reflections on
something that, my goodness, I have been doing for a number of years and
which is beginning to add up, but which, as time goes by, ends up not being
that much out of proportion with the time you devote to it yourselves.

蜂蜜是我正在尝试带给你们的东西,我的沉思的蜂蜜,我的天,针对我好几年来一直从事的事情,这件事情现在才逐渐累积。但是,随着时间过去,这件事情的结果,相当不成比例,跟你自己专注于它的时间。

If the communication effect here sometimes presents difficulties, reflect on
the experience of honey. Honey is either very hard or very fluid. If it’s hard,
it is difficult to cut, since there are no natural breaks. If it’s very liquid, it is
suddenly all over the place – I assume that you are all familiar with the
experience of eating honey in bed at breakfast time.

假如沟通的效果在此有时呈现困难,反思蜂蜜的经验。蜂蜜要就是非常粘固,要不就是非流质。假如蜂蜜非常粘固,那就很困难切割,因为没有自然的裂口。假如蜂蜜非流质,它会突然的流遍各地。我认为,你们对于在早餐时床上吃蜂蜜的经验已经司空见惯。

Hence the problem of pots. The honey pot is reminiscent of the mustard
pot that I have already dealt with. The two have exactly the same meaning
now that we no longer imagine that the hexagons in which we tend to store
our harvest have a natural relationship to the structure of the world. Consequently,
the question we are raising is in the end always the same, i.e., what
is the significance of the word?

因此,这个壶的难题。蜂蜜壶让人想起我已经处理过的芥末壶。这两种壶现在确实拥有相同的意义,我们不再想像我们倾向于用力贮藏农作物的六边形,跟世界的结构具有自然的关系。结果,我们正在提出的这个问题,最后总是相同。譬如,这个字词的意义是什么?

This year we are more specifically concerned with realizing how the ethical
question of our practice is intimately related to one that we have been in a
position to glimpse for some time, namely, that the deep dissatisfaction we
find in every psychology – including the one we have founded thanks to
psychoanalysis – derives from the fact that it is nothing more than a mask,
and sometimes even an alibi, of the effort to focus on the problem of our own
action – something that is the essence and very foundation of all ethical
reflection. In other words, we need to know if we have managed to do anything
more than take a small step outside ethics and if, like the other psychologies,
our own is simply another development of ethical reflection, of the
search for a guide or a way, that in the last analysis may be formulated as
follows: “Given our condition as men, what must we do in order to act in the
right way?”

今年,我们更加明确地关注到要体会出,我们的实践的问题如何密切地关联,跟我们有段时间来一直能够瞥见的东西。换句话说,我们在每个心理学发现的这种深度不满,包括我们已经根据精神分析创办的这个心理学。这种深度的不满来自这个事实:它仅是个面具,有时甚至是一个藉口,我们努力要专注于我们自己的行动的难题的藉口。这个东西是所有伦理学的反思的本质与基础。换句话说,我们需要知道我们是否成功地做出任何事情,而不仅在伦理学的外面跨出一小步。就像所有的其他心理学,我们自己的心理学仅是伦理反思的另外一个发展,但是被阐述如下:「假如考虑到我们作为人的情况,为了要以正确的方式来行动,我们必须怎么做?

This reminder seems to me difficult to disagree with, when every day of
our lives our action suggests to us that we are not far removed from that. Of
course, things present themselves differently to us. Our way of introducing
this action, of presenting and justifying it, is different. Its beginning is characterized by features of demand, appeal and urgency, whose specialized
meaning places us closer to earth as far as the idea of the articulation of an
ethics is concerned. But that does not change the fact that we may in the end,
or at any point whatsoever, discover such an articulation once again in its
completeness – the kind of articulation that has always given both meaning
and arguments to those who have reflected on morals and have tried to elaborate
their different ethics.

我觉得这个提醒很困难让人不同意。当我们生活的每一天,我们的行动跟我们建议,我们距离那个提醒并不遥远。当然,事情以不同的方式呈现它们自己给我们。我们介绍这个行动的方式,呈现它,并且为它自圆其说,我们的方式是不同的。它的开始的特征是要求,诉求与迫切的各种特色。它们的专业的意义让我们更加靠近现实,就伦理学的表达的观念而言。但是,那并没有改变这个事实:我们最后或在任何其他时刻,我们可能再次发现这样的表达,处于它的完整性。这种表达总是给予意义与争论,给那些反思道德的那些人们,他们曾经尝试建构他们不同的伦理学。
1
Last time I sketched an outline of what I wish to cover this year. It extends
from the recognition of the omnipresence of the moral imperative, of its infiltration
into all our experience, to the other pole, that is to say, the pleasure
in a second degree we may paradoxically find there, namely, moral masochism.
In passing, I pointed out the unexpected and original approach I intend to
develop with reference to those fundamental categories of the symbolic, the
imaginary, and the real, that I use to orient you in your experience. My
thesis, as I already indicated – and don’t be surprised if it first appears confused,
since it is the development of my argument that will give it weight –
my thesis is that the moral law, the moral command, the presence of the
moral agency in our activity, insofar as it is structured by the symbolic, is
that through which the real is actualized – the real as such, the weight of the
real.

上次,我描绘我希望今年希望涵盖的内容的钢要。这个钢要从道德的命令的无所不在的体认延伸出去,从道德命令的渗透进入我们的一切经验,一直到另外一个极端。换句话说,我们可能悖论地在那里找到的处于第二程度的快乐。顺便地,我指出这个意料之外与原创性的方法,我打算发展的方法,关于那些象征界,想像界,与实在界的基本的范畴。我用它们来让你们在你们的经验里找到定向。我的议题—如同我已经指示的。请你们不要大吃一惊,假如它起初看起来乱七八糟。因为我的主题的发展将会给予它具有重要性。我的议题是:道德的法则,道德的命令,在我们的行动里,道德代理者的存在,因为它作为象征的结构,就是实在界被实践的东西,实在界的自身,实在界的重要性。

A thesis that may appear to be both a trivial truth and a paradox. My thesis
involves the idea that the moral law affirms itself in opposition to pleasure,
and we can sense that to speak of the real in connection with the moral law
seems to put into question the value of what we normally include in the
notion of the ideal. Thus for the moment I will not attempt to polish further
the blade of my argument, since what will likely constitute the thrust of my
purpose has precisely to do with the meaning to be given to the term real –
within that system of categories that I profess as a function of our practice as
analysts.

这个主题表面看起来既是琐碎的真理,又是悖论。我的主题牵涉到这个观念:道德的法则肯定它自己,跟快乐对立。我们能够理解,谈论关于道德法则的实在界,似乎是质疑我们正常地包括在理想的观念的东西的价值。因此,目前我将不企图更加深入地修饰我的主题的锋锐。因为很可能形成我的目的地冲力的东西,跟应该被给予“实在界”这个术语的意义,确实有关联。在范畴的那个系统里,我宣称它们作为我们精神分析家的实践的功能。

That meaning isn’t immediately accessible, although those among you who
have wondered about the final significance I might give the term will nevertheless
have already noticed that its meaning must have some relationship to
that movement which traverses the whole of Freud’s thought. It is a movement
which makes him start with a first opposition between reality principle
and pleasure principle in order, after a series of vacillations, oscillations and
imperceptible changes in his references, to conclude at the end of the theoretic
formulations by positing something beyond the pleasure principle that
might well leave us wondering how it relates to the first opposition. Beyond
the pleasure principle we encounter that opaque surface which to some has
seemed so obscure that it is the antimony of all thought – not just biological
but scientific in general – the surface that is known as the death instinct.

这个意义并没有当下就能够被接近。虽然你们中间有些人们想要知道,关于我可能给予这个术语的最后的意义,可是,他们将会已经注意到,它的意义必然会有些关系,跟那个运动,瀰漫弗洛依德的思想的全部。这一个运动让他开始时,用一个最初的对立,现实原则与快乐原则之间的对立,为了要在理论的阐释的结束时作为结论,经过一系列的摇摆,在他的指称里的摇摆与不知不觉的改变。他提出某件超越快乐原则的东西。这个东西很有理由让我们想要知道,它如何跟起初的对立有关联。在超越快乐原则时,我们遭遇到模糊的表面,对于某些人们,这个表面似乎是如此模糊,以致它是一切思想的对立—不仅是生物学的思想,而且是一般的科学的思想—这个表面就是众所周知的死亡冲动。

What is the death instinct? What is this law beyond all law, that can only
be posited as a final structure, as a vanishing point of any reality that might
be attained? In the coupling of pleasure principle and reality principle, the
reality principle might seem to be a prolongation or an application of the
pleasure principle.

死亡本能是什么?超越所有的法则的这个法则是什么?那个法则仅能够被提出,作为是最后的结构,作为是任何可能被获得的现实的消失的点?在快乐原则与现实原则的配对里,现实原则似乎是快乐原则的延长或运用。

But, on the other hand, this dependent and limited position
seems to cause something to emerge, something which controls in the
broadest of senses the whole of our relationship to the world. It is this unveiling,
this rediscovery, that Beyond the Pleasure Principle is about. And in this
process, this progress, we see before our eyes the problematic character of
that which Freud posits under the term reality.

但是在另一方面,这个依赖而且受到限制的立场好像引起某件东西出现。广义来说,这个东西控制我们跟世界的整个的关系。就是这个揭开遮蔽,这个重新发现,“超越快乐原则”所关注的。在这个过程,这个进展,我们在我们眼前看见这个棘手的特性,弗洛依德用“现实”这个术语提出的东西的特性。

Is it a question of daily reality, of immediate, social reality? Of conformity
to established categories or accepted practices? Of the reality discovered by
science or of the one which is yet to be discovered? Is it psychic reality?
It is on the road to the investigation of this reality that we find ourselves as
analysts, and it leads us a long way from something that can be expressed
under the category of wholeness. It leads us into a special area, that of psychic
reality, which presents itself to us with the problematic character of a previously
unequaled order.

这难道就是日常的现实,当下,社会的现实的问题?这难道就是符合于已经建立的范畴,或已经被接纳的行为的问题?这难道就是科学所发现的现实的问题?或是有待发现的科学的问题?这难道是心灵的现实?我们发现我们自己作为精神分析家,就在这个现实正在被研究的途中。它引导我们远离能够被表达的东西,在完整性的范畴之下。它引导我们进入特别的领域。心灵现实的领域。这个心灵现实呈现给与我们,具有先前无与伦比的秩序的棘手的特性。

I will, therefore, begin by attempting to explore the function that the term
reality played in the thought of the inventor of psychoanalysis and, at the
same time, in our own thought, the thought of those of us who have followed
in his path. On the other hand, I will straight away point out to those who
might be inclined to forget it, or who might think that I am following in this
direction only by referring to the moral imperative in our experience – I will
point out that moral action poses problems for us precisely to the extent that
if analysis prepares us for it, it also in the end leaves us standing at the door.

我因此将开始,凭借探讨“现实”的这个术语的功能,在精神分析的发明者的思想里。同时,这我们自己的思想里,我们那些人们的思想里,我们追随弗洛依德的途径。在另一方面,我将立即指出,对于那些倾向于忘记它的人们。或可能认为我正在朝着这个方向,仅是凭借提到道德的命令,在我们的精神分析的经验里。我将指出,道德的行动对于我们确实形成难题,甚至,假如精神分析替我们准备它,最后,它也让我们望门却步。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 7

June 29, 2015

Ethics 7
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

Will it or will it not submit itself to the duty that it feels within like a
stranger, beyond, at another level? Should it or should it not submit itself to
the half-unconscious, paradoxical, and morbid command of the superego,
whose jurisdiction is moreover revealed increasingly as the analytical exploration
goes forward and the patient sees that he is committed to its path?

这个“我”会不会让自己承受这个责任?它内部感受到的责任,就像一位陌生人,来自超越界,在另外一个层面。这个“我”应该或不应该让自己承受超我的这个半意识,悖论的,病态的命令?而且,这位超我的统辖权逐渐被显示出来,随着精神分析的探险前进,病人看见,他专注于超我的统辖的途径?

If I may put it thus, isn’t its true duty to oppose that command? One finds
here something which belongs to the givens of our experience as well as to
the givens of preanalysis. It is enough to see how the experience of an obsessional
is structured at the beginning to know that the enigma concerning the
term “duty” as such is always already formulated even before he formulates
the demand for help, which is what he goes into analysis for.

因此请容许我这样表达。这难道不是真实的吗?这个“我”的真实的责任就是要反对那个命令?我们在此发现某件属于我们精神分析经验的特定的东西,以及前分析的特定的东西。我们只要看出就足够了,只要看出,一位妄想症者的经验开始时如何被架构,为了要知道这个关于“责任”自身的术语的谜团,总是已经被阐释,甚至在他阐释呼救的要求。那就是为什么他前去做分析.

In truth, although the response to the problem that we are proposing here
is obviously illustrated in the conflict of an obsessional, it nevertheless has a
universal validity; that is why there are different ethics and there is ethical
thought. It is not simply the philosopher’s thought alone that seeks to justify
duty, that duty on which we have shed a variety of light – genetical and
originary, for example. The justification of that which presents itself with an
immediate feeling of obligation, the justification of duty as such – not simply
in one or other of its commands, but in the form imposed – is at the heart of
an inquiry that is universal.

实际上,虽然对于这个难题的回应,我们在此正在建议的难题,显而易见地被阐述在妄想症者的冲突。它仍然具有普世的正确性。那就是为什么会有不同的伦理学,会有伦理学的思想。不光是有哲学家的思想尝试证明责任,对于这个责任,我们已经给予各色各样的启明—譬如,基因的责任,针对祖先的责任。呈现它自己具有当下的义务的感觉的理由,责任本身的理由—不仅是在它的其中一个命令,而且在被赋加的形态—它处于普世的研究的核心。

Are we analysts simply something that welcomes the suppliant then, something
that gives him a place of refuge? Are we simply, but it is already a lot,
something that must respond to a demand, to the demand not to suffer, at
least without understanding why? – in the hope that through understanding
the subject will be freed not only from his ignorance, but also from suffering
itself.

我们精神分析家难道仅是某件欢迎这个恳求者吗?给予恳求者一个避难所的东西吗?我们难道仅是必须回应要求的东西吗?但是这已经是很大的负担。我们难道仅是回应不要受苦的要求的东西吗?回应至少不要受苦而不理解为什么的东西吗?希望通过理解,这位主体将可以不但免除无知,而且免除痛苦的本身。

Isn’t it obvious that analytical ideals are normally to be found here? They
are certainly not lacking. They grow in abundance. The evaluation, location,
situation, and organization of values, as they say in a certain register of moral
thought, that we propose to our patients, and around which we organize the
assessments of their progress and the transformation of their way into a path,
is supposed to be pan of our work. For the moment I will mention three of
these ideals.

这难道不是显而易见?精神分析的理想正常应该在这里被找到。它们确实并不欠缺。它们大量地增长。各种价值的这个评估,位置,情况,与组织,如同人们所说,在道德思想的某个铭记。我们对我们的病人建议的道德思想的铭记,环绕这些铭记,我们组织我们的评估,对于他们进展与他们进入途径的转化的评估。这被认为是我们的工作的范围。目前,我将提到三个的这些理想。

The first is the ideal of human love.
第一个理想是人类爱的理想。

Do I need to emphasize the role that we attribute to a certain idea of “love
fulfilled”? That is an expression you must have learned to recognize and not
only here, since, in truth, there is hardly an analyst who writes who has not
drawn attention to it. And you know that I have often taken aim at the
approximative and vague character, so tainted with an optimistic moralism,
which marks the original articulations taking the form of the genitalization
of desire. That is the ideal of genital love – a love that is supposed to be itself
alone the model of a satisfying object relation: doctor-love, I would say if I
wanted to emphasize in a comical way the tone of this ideology; love as hygiene,
I would say, to suggest what analytical ambition seems to be limited to here.

我需要强调这个角色吗?我们归属于某种的“爱的实践”的观念?你们一定已经学习到那个表达,为了体认,而且不仅在此体认,因为事实上,凡是会写作的精神分析家没有不提醒注意这个“爱的实践”的观念。你们知道,我经常针对那个近似而模糊的特性,它如此沾染乐观的道德主义。这个乐观的道德主义标识著原初的表达,採用欲望的性器官化的形式。那就是性器官之爱的理想。这一个爱光是本身就被认为是令人满足的客体关系的模式:医生之爱。我不妨说,假如我想要用滑稽的方式强调,这个意识形态的品味,作为健康的爱,我不妨说,因为它暗示着精神分析的企图心在此似乎受到限制的东西。

It is a problem that I will not expand on indefinitely, since I have not
stopped making you think about it since this seminar began. But so as to give
it a more marked emphasis, I will point out that analytical thought seems to
shirk its task when faced with the convergent character of our experience.

这一个难题,我将不会不明确地扩充。因为我从未停止要求你们继续思维它,自从这个研讨班开始。但是为了给与它一个更加明显的强调。我将指出,精神分析的思想似乎逃避它的工作,当它面临我们精神分析经验的汇集到特性。

This character is certainly not deniable, but the analyst seems to find in it a
limit beyond which it is difficult for him to go. To say that the problems of
moral experience are entirely resolved as far as monogamous union is concerned
would be a formulation that is imprudent, excessive, and inadequate.

这个特性确实无法被否认,但是精神分析家似乎在它里面发现一个限制,他很困难要超越这个限制。说道德经验的难题完全被解救,就一夫一妻制的婚姻而言,那等于是一个不谨慎,过分与不足个的阐述。

Analysis has brought a very important change of perspective on love by
placing it at the center of ethical experience; it has also brought an original
note, which was certainly different from the way in which love had previously
been viewed by the moralistes and the philosophers in the economy of interhuman relations
Why then has analysis not gone further in the direction of
the investigation of what should properly be called an erotics? That is something
that deserves reflection.

针对爱,精神分析曾经带来重要的观点的改变。精神分析将爱放置在伦理经验的中心。它也带来一个原创的语调。这个原创的语言确实不同于爱先前曾经被看待的方式,被道德家与哲学家看待的方式,在人际关系的活动里。那么,为什么精神分析家朝着这个研究的方向深入探索?贴切而言,那应该是所谓的性爱的方向?那是某件值得我们深思的东西。

In this connection the topic I have placed on the agenda of our forthcoming
conference, namely, feminine sexuality, is one of the clearest of signs in the
development of analysis of the lack I am referring to with regard to such an
investigation. It is hardly necessary to recall what Jones learned from a source
that to my mind is not especially qualified, but which, believe it or not, is
nevertheless supposed at the very least to have transmitted in his exact words
what it heard from Freud’s own mouth. Jones tells us that this person told
him confidentially that one day Freud said something like “After some thirty
years of experience and thought, there is still one question to which I am still
unable to find an answer; it is ‘Was will das Weib?’ ” What does woman
want? Or more precisely, “What does she desire?” The term “will” in this
expression may have that meaning in German.

关于这个方向,我已经将这个议题放在我们即将举行的议程。换句话说,女性的性,是其中最清楚的指标,在我正提到的欠缺的精神分析的发展,关于这一个研究。我们几乎不需要提醒,琼斯所学习到的东西,从一个来源,我认为并没有具有特质的来源。但是,无论你相信与否,这个来源仍然被认为至少是用他确实的词语曾经传递它从弗洛依德的嘴中听到的东西。琼斯告诉我们说,这个人私下秘密地告诉他,有一天,弗洛依德说了某件像是「经过差不多30年的经验与思想之后,依旧有一个问题,我仍然无法找到答案。那就是“女人想要什么?“或者更加确实地说,”女人欲望什么?“在这个表达里,”想要“这个术语具有德文的“欲望”的意义。

Have we gone much further on that subject? It will not be a waste of time
if I show you the kind of avoidance that the progress of research in analysis
has practiced in answering a question that cannot be said to have been invented
by it. Let us just say that analysis, and the thought of Freud in particular, is
connected to a time that articulated this question with a special emphasis.

针对那个主体,我们更加深入些吗?这会不会是浪费时间?假如我跟你们显示精神分析的研究的进展曾经实践的那种避免,当它回答一个询问。虽然这个询问不能够说是精神分析自己杜撰。让我们仅是说,精神分析,特别是弗洛依德的思想,跟这样一个时代息息相关。这个时代用特别的强调表达这个询问。

The Ibsenian context of the end of the nineteenth century in which Freud’s
thought matured cannot be overlooked here. And it is, in brief, very strange
that analytical experience has if anything stifled, silenced, and evaded those
areas of the problem of sexuality which relate to the point of view of feminine
demand.

十九世纪末代易卜生的文本,是让弗洛依德的思想成熟之书,在此不能够被忽视。总之,耐人寻问的是,精神分析经验曾经让性的难题的那些领域,保持窒闷,沉默不语而且被逃避,而性的那些难题却是跟女性的要求的观点息息相关。

The second ideal, which is equally as remarkable in analytical experience,
is what I shall call the ideal of authenticity.

第二个理想,在精神分析经验同样引人注意。那就是,我将所谓的”真诚“的理想。

I do not think I need to emphasize it particularly. It will not have escaped
you that if psychoanalysis is a technique of unmasking, it presupposes such
a point of view. But, in fact, it goes further than that.

我并不认为我需要特别强调它。你们将无法逃避这个“真诚“的理想,假如精神分析是一个揭发虚假面具的技术。它预先假设这样的一个观点。但是,实际上,它将探索得比那个真诚更加深入。

It is not simply as a path, stage, or measure of progress that authenticity
suggests itself to us; it is also quite simply as a certain norm for the finished
product, as something desirable and, therefore, as a value. It is an ideal, but
one on which we are led to impose clinical norms that are very precise.

“真诚“不仅作为一个途径,舞台,或进步的衡量。”真诚“对于我们暗示它自己。”真诚“也确实作为某个已经完成的产品的名称,作为某件被欲望的东西,因此,作为一种价值。”真诚“是一种理想,但是我们被引导将非常明确的临床的名称,赋加在这个理想之上,

I will
illustrate the point in the very subtle observations of Helene Deutsch concerning
a type of character and of personality that one cannot describe as
maladjusted or as failing to meet any of the norms demanded by social relations,
but whose whole attitude and behavior are visible in the recognition –
of whom? – of the other, of others, as if marked by that note that she calls in
English “as if,” and which in German is “als ob.” I am touching here on the
Point that a certain register – which is not defined and is not simple and
cannot be situated other than from a moral perspective – is present, controling, insisted on in all our experience, and that it is necessary to calculate to
what extent we are adequate to it.

我将阐述这个观点,用海伦尼 杜奇的非常微妙的观察,关于一种性格与人格,我们无法描述它,作为适应不良,或无法满足社会关系要求的名称。但是它整个的态度与行为在这个体认当中看得见。什么的体认当中?他者的体认,别人的体认,好像它被那个语调标识著。在英文里,她称之为“好像“,在德文里,它的意思是”似乎“。我在此探讨这个观点,某个铭记―它并没有被定义,并不是单纯,而且无法被定位在并非是从道德的观点来看,它存在,控制,在我们所有的经验里被坚持。有必要评估一下,我们能够胜任处理它到什么程度。

That something harmonious, that full presence whose lack we as clinicians
can so precisely gauge – doesn’t our technique stop half-way toward what is
required to achieve it, the technique that I have christened “unmasking”?
Wouldn’t it be interesting to wonder about the significance of our absence
from the field of what might be called a science of virtues, a practical reason,
the sphere of common sense? For in truth one cannot say that we ever intervene
in the field of any virtue. We clear ways and paths, and we hope that
what is called virtue will take root there.

某件和谐的东西,充分存在的欠缺,我们作为临床医生能够如此确实地衡量的欠缺-我们的精神分析技术难道不是正处于半途,朝向为了获得它而被要求的东西?我已经将这个技术命名为“揭发虚假面具“?这难道不是耐人寻味吗?当我们想要知道,我们的缺席的意义,对于所谓的品德的科学的领域缺席,那是实用的理由,共同常识的领域?实际上,我们无法说,我们曾经介入于任何品德的领域。我们清理道路与途径,我们希望,所谓的品德将会在那里生根。

Similarly, we have recently forged a third ideal, which I am not sure belongs
to the original space of analytical experience, the ideal of non-dependence or,
more precisely, of a kind of prophylaxis of dependence.

同样地,我们最近铸造第三个理想。我并不确实,这第三个理想属于精神分析经验的原初的空间。“非-依赖“的理想,更加明确地说,是预防依赖的理想。

Isn’t there a limit there, too, a fine boundary, which separates what we
indicate to an adult subject as desirable in this register and the means we
accord ourselves in our interventions so that he achieves it?

在那里,难道不是有一个限制?一个清楚的边界?它分开我们指示灯东西,对于一位成年人的主体,作为可被欲望,处于我们给予我们自己的这个铭记与工具,在我们的介入当中。这样,他才获得这个“非-依赖“。

It is enough to remember the fundamental, constitutive reservations of the
Freudian position concerning education in the broad sense. There is no doubt
that all of us, and child analysts in particular, are led to encroach on this
domain, to practice in the space of what I have called elsewhere an orthopedics
in its etymological sense.

我们只有记得这个基本的结构本质的保留就足够了。弗洛依德关于教育的立场,广义来说。无可置疑地,我们所有的人,特别是针对小孩的精神分析家,都被引导要侵入这个领域,要实践在我在别的地方称之为整形外科的东西的空间,以它的字源学的意义。

But it is nevertheless striking that both in the
means we employ and in the theoretical competence we insist on, the ethics
of analysis – for there is one – involves effacement, setting aside, withdrawal,
indeed, the absence of a dimension that one only has to mention in order to
realize how much separates us from all ethical thought that preceded us. I
mean the dimension of habits, good and bad habits.

但是仍然引人注意的是,在我们使用的工具,与我们坚持的理论的胜任,精神分析伦理学――因为存在一个精神分析伦理学――它牵涉到抹除,摆放一边,撤退,的确,欠钱某个维度。我们只要提到的这个谓度的欠缺,为了体会到,它如何地将我们精神分析区隔开来,跟存在于我们之前的所有的伦理学的思想区隔开来。我指的是习惯的维度,好的习惯与坏的习惯的维度。

It is something we refer to very little because psychoanalytic thought defines
itself in very different terms, in terms of traumas and their persistence. We
have obviously learned to decompose a given trauma, impression, or mark,
but the very essence of the unconscious is defined in a different register from
the one which Aristotle emphasizes in the Ethics in a play on words,ίθος /ήθος

这是我们很少提到东西。因为精神分析的思想定义它自己,用非常不同的术语。用创伤与创伤的持续的术语。我们显而易见地学习如何瓦解某个特定的创伤,印象或标记。但是无意识的本质被定义,用不同的铭杰,跟亚里斯多德强调的这个铭记,在“伦理学“,在探讨文字的运作。

There are extremely subtle distinctions that may be centered on the notion
of character. Ethics for Aristotle is a science of character: the building of
character, the dynamics of habits and, even more, action with relation to
habits, training, education. You must take a look at his exemplary work, if
only to understand the difference between our modes of thought and those
of one of the most eminent forms of ethical thought.

有好几个极端微妙的区别,可以专注于人格的这个观念。对于亚里斯多德,“伦理学“是一门人格的科学:人格的培养,习惯的动力结构,甚至,有关习惯,训练与教育的行动。你们必须阅读一下他的典范的著作。即使仅是为了理解那些差异,处于我们的思想的模式,与其中最著名的伦理学的思想的形式之间的差异。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 11

June 28, 2015

Ethics 11
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

3
So as to emphasize what today’s premises are leading us toward, I will simply
note that although the topics on which I have attempted to open up different
perspectives are varied, I will try next time to start from a radical position.
In order to point out the originality of the Freuthan position in ethical matters,
I must underline a slippage or a change of attitude relative to the question
of morality as such.

为了强调今天的主题正在引导我们朝向的东西,我将仅是提醒,虽然我曾经尝试展开不同的观点的议题种类不同,我下次将尝试从一个强烈的立场开始。为了指出弗洛依德的立场的原创性,在伦理学的事物,我必须强调一个失误,或态度的改变,跟道德自身相关的态度。

In Aristotle the problem is that of a good, of a Sovereign Good. We will
have to consider why he emphasized the problem of pleasure, its function in
the mental economy of ethics from the beginning. It is something that we
cannot avoid, not least because it is the reference point of the Freuthan theory
concerning the two systems φ and ψ, the two psychical agencies that he called
the primary and secondary processes.

在亚里斯多德,这个难题是善的难题,统辖的善的难题。我们将必须考虑为什么从一开始,弗洛依德就强调快乐的难题,快乐的功能,在伦理学的精神的活力里。快乐是某将我们无法避免的东西。倒不是因为快乐是弗洛依德的理论的指称点,关于φ 与 ψ,的两个系统,这两个心灵的代理者,他称之为原初与次级的过程。

Is the same pleasure function at work in both of these articulations? It is
almost impossible to isolate this difference if we do not realize what took
place in the interval. Even if it is not my role and if the place I occupy here
doesn’t seem to make it obligatory, I will not, in fact, be able to avoid a
certain inquiry into historical progress.

相同的快乐发挥功能,运作在φ 与 ψ的这两个表达吗?我们几乎无法将这个差异孤立出来,假如我们并没有体会到在中间发生的事情。即使这并不是我的角色,即使我在此佔据的位置似乎并没有让它成为义务,事实上,我将不能够避免某种的探索,对于历史的进展。

It is at this point that I must refer to those guiding terms, those terms of
reference which I use, namely, the symbolic, the imaginary, and the real.
More than once at the time when I was discussing the symbolic and the
imaginary and their reciprocal interaction, some of you wondered what after
all was “the real.” Well, as odd as it may seem to that superficial opinion
which assumes any inquiry into ethics must concern the field of the ideal, if
not of the unreal, I, on the contrary, will proceed instead from the other
direction by going more deeply into the notion of the real. Insofar as Freud’s
position constitutes progress here, the question of ethics is to be articulated
from the point of view of the location of man in relation to the real. To
appreciate this, one has to look at what occurred in the interval between
Aristotle and Freud.

就在这个时刻,我必须提到那些引导的术语,我使用的那些指称的术语。也就是说,象征界,想像界,实在界。不仅一次,当我正在讨论象征界与想像界,与它们彼此的互动时,你们有些人们想要知道,毕竟什么是实在界。「呵呵,虽然听起来古怪,对于那个浅薄的意见,它假定任何对于伦理学的探讨必然会关注到理想的领域,即使不是关注到非实在的领域。相反地,我将替代地从另外一个方向前进,更加深入地探讨实在界的观念。因为弗洛依德的立场在此构成进步,伦理学的问题应该被表达,从人与实在界的关系的位置的观点来表达。为了评估这点,我们必须观看亚里斯多德与弗洛依德之间的这段期间,发生什么事。

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, there was the utilitarian conversion
or reversion. We can define this moment – one that was no doubt
fully conditioned historically – in terms of a radical decline of the function
of the master, a function that obviously governs all of Aristosle’s thought and
determines its persistence over the centuries. It is in Hegel that we find
expressed an extreme devalorization of the position of the master, since Hegel
turns him into the great dupe, the magnificent cuckold of historical development,
given that the virtue of progress passes by way of the vanquished,
which is to say, of the slave, and his work. Originally, when he existed in his
plenitude in Aristotle’s time, the master was something very different from
the Hegelian fiction, which is nothing more than his obverse, his negation,
the sign of his disappearance. It is shortly before that terminal moment that
in the wake of a certain revolution affecting interhuman relations, so-called
utilitarian thought arose, and it is far from being made up of the pure and
simple platitudes one imagines.

在19世纪开始,有功利主义的转变或倒转。我们能够定义这个时刻—无可置疑,这个时刻在历史上是充分地被制约—用主r的功能的强烈衰微的术语。主人的功能显而易见地统辖所有的亚里斯多德的思想并且决定它持续存在经过好几个世纪。就在黑格尔那里,我们发现一个极端的贬抑主人的立场被表达。因为黑格尔将主人转变成为伟大的木偶,历史发展的辉煌的通奸者。假如考虑到进展的品德凭借被征服者前进。换句话说,凭借奴隶与奴隶的工作前进。起初,在亚里斯多德的时代,当主人存在于他的丰富充足,主人是某件不同于黑格尔的想像。黑格尔的想像仅是主人的倒转,主人的否定,主人消失的迹象。就在那个终结的时刻之前,随着某个革命的来到,影响到人际之间的关系,所谓的功利主义的思想的興起。主人根本就不是由我们想像纯粹而单纯的丰富充足组成。

It is not just a matter of a thought that asks which goods are available on
the market to be distributed and the best way to effect the distribution. One
finds there an investigation of something of which Mr. Jakobson, who is here
today, first found the key, the little latch, in a hint he gave me concerning
the interest of a work of Jeremy Bentham’s that is ordinarily neglected in the
summary of his contribution traditionally given.

这不仅是思想的事情,这个思想询问有怎样的善在市场上可使用,能够被分配,以及从事这种分配的最佳方法。我们在那里发现某件东西的研究,杰克森先生今天在现场,他首先发现这个东西的解答,这个小小的门闩。在他给予我们的暗示,关于杰瑞米 边沁的著作感到興趣。边沁的著作通常被忽略,当总结传统给予他的贡献的评价。

This personage is far from meriting the discredit, indeed the ridicule, which
a certain critical philosophy might formulate concerning his role in the history
of the development of ethics. We will see that it is in relation to a critical
philosophy or, more properly, a linguistic one that his thought is developed.
It is impossible to measure so well anywhere else the emphasis given in the
course of this revolution to the term real, which in his thought is placed in
opposition to the English term “fictitious.”3

边沁这个人物可是毁誉交加。的确,那些嘲讽,某个批判断哲学可能形成这种嘲讽,关于边沁的角色,在伦理学的发展的历史的角色。我们将会看见,就在跟批判哲学的关系,或者,更加贴切地说,跟语言的哲学的关系,他的思想被发展。在别的地方,我们不可能如此清楚地测量这个被给予的强调,在“实在界”的这个术语的革命的过程。在边沁的思想里,“实在界”这个术语被放置在跟英文的“想像”的术语对立。

“Fictitious” does not mean illusory or decepdve as such. It is far from
being translatable into French by “ficdf,” although this is something that the
man who was the key to his success on the continent, Etienne Dumont, did
not fail to do – he was also responsible for popularizing Bentham’s thought.
“Ficddous” means “ficdf” but, as I have already explained to you, in the
sense that every truth has the structure of fiction.

“想像”并不意味着幻觉或欺骗的本身。“想像”根本就无法被翻译成为法文的“”ficdf”。虽然这是阿提尼 杜曼一定会这样翻译。他在欧洲大陆获得成功的这个人。他也负责让边沁的思想受到通俗欢迎。”Ficddous” 的意思是 “ficdf”,如同我已经跟你们解释的。从这个意义而言,每个真理都具有想像的结构。

Bentham’s effort is located in the dialectic of the relationship of language
to the real so as to situate the good – pleasure in this case, which, as we will
see, he articulates in a manner that is very different from Aristotle – on the
side of the real. And it is within this opposition between fiction and reality
that is to be found the rocking motion of Freuthan experience.

边沁的努力被定位在语言更实在界的关系的辩证法,为了定位善—在这个情况,快乐即善。我们将会看见,边沁表达这个善,用的方式不同于亚里斯多德。他在实在界的这边。就在幻想与现实之间的这个对立,弗洛依德的精神分析经验的摇晃动作,能够被找到。

Once the separation between the fictitious and the real has been effected,
things are no longer situated where one might expect. In Freud the characteristic
of pleasure, as that dimension which binds man, is to be found on the
side of the fictitious. The fictitious is not, in effect, in its essence that which
deceives, but is precisely what I call the symbolic.

一旦幻想与实在界之间的这个分隔被形成,事情就不再被定位在我们可以期望的地方。在弗洛依德,快乐的这个特性,作为约束人的那个维度,能够被找到,在幻想的这边。实际上,幻想在它的本质上并非是欺骗的东西,而确实是我所谓的象征界的东西。

That the unconscious is structured as a function of the symbolic, that it is
the return of a sign that the pleasure principle makes man seek out, that the
pleasurable element in that which directs man in his behavior without his
knowledge (namely, that which gives him pleasure, because it is a form of
euphony), that that which one seeks and finds again is the trace rather than
the trail – one has to appreciate the great importance of all of this in Freud’s
thought, if one is to understand the function of reality.

无意识作为象征界的功能来架构。无意识是快乐原则让人寻求的迹象的回转。令人快乐的因素,在引导人的行为而人却不知道的东西那里,(换句话说,给予他快乐的东西,因为它是一种委婉语的形式)。我们寻求并且再次找到的东西是痕迹,而不是轨迹—我们必须评估,在弗洛依德的思想里,所有这一切具有的重要性。假如我们想要理解现实的功能。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 7

June 28, 2015

Ethics 7
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

Will it or will it not submit itself to the duty that it feels within like a
stranger, beyond, at another level? Should it or should it not submit itself to
the half-unconscious, paradoxical, and morbid command of the superego,
whose jurisdiction is moreover revealed increasingly as the analytical exploration
goes forward and the patient sees that he is committed to its path?

这个“我”会不会让自己承受这个责任?它内部感受到的责任,就像一位陌生人,来自超越界,在另外一个层面。这个“我”应该或不应该让自己承受超我的这个半意识,悖论的,病态的命令?而且,这位超我的统辖权逐渐被显示出来,随着精神分析的探险前进,病人看见,他专注于超我的统辖的途径?

If I may put it thus, isn’t its true duty to oppose that command? One finds
here something which belongs to the givens of our experience as well as to
the givens of preanalysis. It is enough to see how the experience of an obsessional
is structured at the beginning to know that the enigma concerning the
term “duty” as such is always already formulated even before he formulates
the demand for help, which is what he goes into analysis for.

因此请容许我这样表达。这难道不是真实的吗?这个“我”的真实的责任就是要反对那个命令?我们在此发现某件属于我们精神分析经验的特定的东西,以及前分析的特定的东西。我们只要看出就足够了,只要看出,一位妄想症者的经验开始时如何被架构,为了要知道这个关于“责任”自身的术语的谜团,总是已经被阐释,甚至在他阐释呼救的要求。那就是为什么他前去做分析.

In truth, although the response to the problem that we are proposing here
is obviously illustrated in the conflict of an obsessional, it nevertheless has a
universal validity; that is why there are different ethics and there is ethical
thought. It is not simply the philosopher’s thought alone that seeks to justify
duty, that duty on which we have shed a variety of light – genetical and
originary, for example. The justification of that which presents itself with an
immediate feeling of obligation, the justification of duty as such – not simply
in one or other of its commands, but in the form imposed – is at the heart of
an inquiry that is universal.

实际上,虽然对于这个难题的回应,我们在此正在建议的难题,显而易见地被阐述在妄想症者的冲突。它仍然具有普世的正确性。那就是为什么会有不同的伦理学,会有伦理学的思想。不光是有哲学家的思想尝试证明责任,对于这个责任,我们已经给予各色各样的启明—譬如,基因的责任,针对祖先的责任。呈现它自己具有当下的义务的感觉的理由,责任本身的理由—不仅是在它的其中一个命令,而且在被赋加的形态—它处于普世的研究的核心。

Are we analysts simply something that welcomes the suppliant then, something
that gives him a place of refuge? Are we simply, but it is already a lot,
something that must respond to a demand, to the demand not to suffer, at
least without understanding why? – in the hope that through understanding
the subject will be freed not only from his ignorance, but also from suffering
itself.

我们精神分析家难道仅是某件欢迎这个恳求者吗?给予恳求者一个避难所的东西吗?我们难道仅是必须回应要求的东西吗?但是这已经是很大的负担。我们难道仅是回应不要受苦的要求的东西吗?回应至少不要受苦而不理解为什么的东西吗?希望通过理解,这位主体将可以不但免除无知,而且免除痛苦的本身。

Isn’t it obvious that analytical ideals are normally to be found here? They
are certainly not lacking. They grow in abundance. The evaluation, location,
situation, and organization of values, as they say in a certain register of moral
thought, that we propose to our patients, and around which we organize the
assessments of their progress and the transformation of their way into a path,
is supposed to be pan of our work. For the moment I will mention three of
these ideals.

这难道不是显而易见?精神分析的理想正常应该在这里被找到。它们确实并不欠缺。它们大量地增长。各种价值的这个评估,位置,情况,与组织,如同人们所说,在道德思想的某个铭记。我们对我们的病人建议的道德思想的铭记,环绕这些铭记,我们组织我们的评估,对于他们进展与他们进入途径的转化的评估。这被认为是我们的工作的范围。目前,我将提到三个的这些理想。

The first is the ideal of human love.
第一个理想是人类爱的理想。

Do I need to emphasize the role that we attribute to a certain idea of “love
fulfilled”? That is an expression you must have learned to recognize and not
only here, since, in truth, there is hardly an analyst who writes who has not
drawn attention to it. And you know that I have often taken aim at the
approximative and vague character, so tainted with an optimistic moralism,
which marks the original articulations taking the form of the genitalization
of desire. That is the ideal of genital love – a love that is supposed to be itself
alone the model of a satisfying object relation: doctor-love, I would say if I
wanted to emphasize in a comical way the tone of this ideology; love as hygiene,
I would say, to suggest what analytical ambition seems to be limited to here.

我需要强调这个角色吗?我们归属于某种的“爱的实践”的观念?你们一定已经学习到那个表达,为了体认,而且不仅在此体认,因为事实上,凡是会写作的精神分析家没有不提醒注意这个“爱的实践”的观念。你们知道,我经常针对那个近似而模糊的特性,它如此沾染乐观的道德主义。这个乐观的道德主义标识著原初的表达,採用欲望的性器官化的形式。那就是性器官之爱的理想。这一个爱光是本身就被认为是令人满足的客体关系的模式:医生之爱。我不妨说,假如我想要用滑稽的方式强调,这个意识形态的品味,作为健康的爱,我不妨说,因为它暗示着精神分析的企图心在此似乎受到限制的东西。

It is a problem that I will not expand on indefinitely, since I have not
stopped making you think about it since this seminar began. But so as to give
it a more marked emphasis, I will point out that analytical thought seems to
shirk its task when faced with the convergent character of our experience.

这一个难题,我将不会不明确地扩充。因为我从未停止要求你们继续思维它,自从这个研讨班开始。但是为了给与它一个更加明显的强调。我将指出,精神分析的思想似乎逃避它的工作,当它面临我们精神分析经验的汇集到特性。

This character is certainly not deniable, but the analyst seems to find in it a
limit beyond which it is difficult for him to go. To say that the problems of
moral experience are entirely resolved as far as monogamous union is concerned
would be a formulation that is imprudent, excessive, and inadequate.

这个特性确实无法被否认,但是精神分析家似乎在它里面发现一个限制,他很困难要超越这个限制。说道德经验的难题完全被解救,就一夫一妻制的婚姻而言,那等于是一个不谨慎,过分与不足个的阐述。

Analysis has brought a very important change of perspective on love by
placing it at the center of ethical experience; it has also brought an original
note, which was certainly different from the way in which love had previously
been viewed by the moralistes and the philosophers in the economy of interhuman relations
Why then has analysis not gone further in the direction of
the investigation of what should properly be called an erotics? That is something
that deserves reflection.

针对爱,精神分析曾经带来重要的观点的改变。精神分析将爱放置在伦理经验的中心。它也带来一个原创的语调。这个原创的语言确实不同于爱先前曾经被看待的方式,被道德家与哲学家看待的方式,在人际关系的活动里。那么,为什么精神分析家朝着这个研究的方向深入探索?贴切而言,那应该是所谓的性爱的方向?那是某件值得我们深思的东西。

In this connection the topic I have placed on the agenda of our forthcoming
conference, namely, feminine sexuality, is one of the clearest of signs in the
development of analysis of the lack I am referring to with regard to such an
investigation. It is hardly necessary to recall what Jones learned from a source
that to my mind is not especially qualified, but which, believe it or not, is
nevertheless supposed at the very least to have transmitted in his exact words
what it heard from Freud’s own mouth. Jones tells us that this person told
him confidentially that one day Freud said something like “After some thirty
years of experience and thought, there is still one question to which I am still
unable to find an answer; it is ‘Was will das Weib?’ ” What does woman
want? Or more precisely, “What does she desire?” The term “will” in this
expression may have that meaning in German.

关于这个方向,我已经将这个议题放在我们即将举行的议程。换句话说,女性的性,是其中最清楚的指标,在我正提到的欠缺的精神分析的发展,关于这一个研究。我们几乎不需要提醒,琼斯所学习到的东西,从一个来源,我认为并没有具有特质的来源。但是,无论你相信与否,这个来源仍然被认为至少是用他确实的词语曾经传递它从弗洛依德的嘴中听到的东西。琼斯告诉我们说,这个人私下秘密地告诉他,有一天,弗洛依德说了某件像是「经过差不多30年的经验与思想之后,依旧有一个问题,我仍然无法找到答案。那就是“女人想要什么?“或者更加确实地说,”女人欲望什么?“在这个表达里,”想要“这个术语具有德文的“欲望”的意义。

Have we gone much further on that subject? It will not be a waste of time
if I show you the kind of avoidance that the progress of research in analysis
has practiced in answering a question that cannot be said to have been invented
by it. Let us just say that analysis, and the thought of Freud in particular, is
connected to a time that articulated this question with a special emphasis.

针对那个主体,我们更加深入些吗?这会不会是浪费时间?假如我跟你们显示精神分析的研究的进展曾经实践的那种避免,当它回答一个询问。虽然这个询问不能够说是精神分析自己杜撰。让我们仅是说,精神分析,特别是弗洛依德的思想,跟这样一个时代息息相关。这个时代用特别的强调表达这个询问。

The Ibsenian context of the end of the nineteenth century in which Freud’s
thought matured cannot be overlooked here. And it is, in brief, very strange
that analytical experience has if anything stifled, silenced, and evaded those
areas of the problem of sexuality which relate to the point of view of feminine
demand.

十九世纪末代易卜生的文本,是让弗洛依德的思想成熟之书,在此不能够被忽视。总之,耐人寻问的是,精神分析经验曾经让性的难题的那些领域,保持窒闷,沉默不语而且被逃避,而性的那些难题却是跟女性的要求的观点息息相关。

The second ideal, which is equally as remarkable in analytical experience,
is what I shall call the ideal of authenticity.

第二个理想,在精神分析经验同样引人注意。那就是,我将所谓的”真诚“的理想。

I do not think I need to emphasize it particularly. It will not have escaped
you that if psychoanalysis is a technique of unmasking, it presupposes such
a point of view. But, in fact, it goes further than that.

我并不认为我需要特别强调它。你们将无法逃避这个“真诚“的理想,假如精神分析是一个揭发虚假面具的技术。它预先假设这样的一个观点。但是,实际上,它将探索得比那个真诚更加深入。

It is not simply as a path, stage, or measure of progress that authenticity
suggests itself to us; it is also quite simply as a certain norm for the finished
product, as something desirable and, therefore, as a value. It is an ideal, but
one on which we are led to impose clinical norms that are very precise.

“真诚“不仅作为一个途径,舞台,或进步的衡量。”真诚“对于我们暗示它自己。”真诚“也确实作为某个已经完成的产品的名称,作为某件被欲望的东西,因此,作为一种价值。”真诚“是一种理想,但是我们被引导将非常明确的临床的名称,赋加在这个理想之上,

I will
illustrate the point in the very subtle observations of Helene Deutsch concerning
a type of character and of personality that one cannot describe as
maladjusted or as failing to meet any of the norms demanded by social relations,
but whose whole attitude and behavior are visible in the recognition –
of whom? – of the other, of others, as if marked by that note that she calls in
English “as if,” and which in German is “als ob.” I am touching here on the
Point that a certain register – which is not defined and is not simple and
cannot be situated other than from a moral perspective – is present, controling, insisted on in all our experience, and that it is necessary to calculate to
what extent we are adequate to it.

我将阐述这个观点,用海伦尼 杜奇的非常微妙的观察,关于一种性格与人格,我们无法描述它,作为适应不良,或无法满足社会关系要求的名称。但是它整个的态度与行为在这个体认当中看得见。什么的体认当中?他者的体认,别人的体认,好像它被那个语调标识著。在英文里,她称之为“好像“,在德文里,它的意思是”似乎“。我在此探讨这个观点,某个铭记―它并没有被定义,并不是单纯,而且无法被定位在并非是从道德的观点来看,它存在,控制,在我们所有的经验里被坚持。有必要评估一下,我们能够胜任处理它到什么程度。

That something harmonious, that full presence whose lack we as clinicians
can so precisely gauge – doesn’t our technique stop half-way toward what is
required to achieve it, the technique that I have christened “unmasking”?
Wouldn’t it be interesting to wonder about the significance of our absence
from the field of what might be called a science of virtues, a practical reason,
the sphere of common sense? For in truth one cannot say that we ever intervene
in the field of any virtue. We clear ways and paths, and we hope that
what is called virtue will take root there.

某件和谐的东西,充分存在的欠缺,我们作为临床医生能够如此确实地衡量的欠缺-我们的精神分析技术难道不是正处于半途,朝向为了获得它而被要求的东西?我已经将这个技术命名为“揭发虚假面具“?这难道不是耐人寻味吗?当我们想要知道,我们的缺席的意义,对于所谓的品德的科学的领域缺席,那是实用的理由,共同常识的领域?实际上,我们无法说,我们曾经介入于任何品德的领域。我们清理道路与途径,我们希望,所谓的品德将会在那里生根。

Similarly, we have recently forged a third ideal, which I am not sure belongs
to the original space of analytical experience, the ideal of non-dependence or,
more precisely, of a kind of prophylaxis of dependence.

同样地,我们最近铸造第三个理想。我并不确实,这第三个理想属于精神分析经验的原初的空间。“非-依赖“的理想,更加明确地说,是预防依赖的理想。

Isn’t there a limit there, too, a fine boundary, which separates what we
indicate to an adult subject as desirable in this register and the means we
accord ourselves in our interventions so that he achieves it?

在那里,难道不是有一个限制?一个清楚的边界?它分开我们指示灯东西,对于一位成年人的主体,作为可被欲望,处于我们给予我们自己的这个铭记与工具,在我们的介入当中。这样,他才获得这个“非-依赖“。

It is enough to remember the fundamental, constitutive reservations of the
Freudian position concerning education in the broad sense. There is no doubt
that all of us, and child analysts in particular, are led to encroach on this
domain, to practice in the space of what I have called elsewhere an orthopedics
in its etymological sense.

我们只有记得这个基本的结构本质的保留就足够了。弗洛依德关于教育的立场,广义来说。无可置疑地,我们所有的人,特别是针对小孩的精神分析家,都被引导要侵入这个领域,要实践在我在别的地方称之为整形外科的东西的空间,以它的字源学的意义。

But it is nevertheless striking that both in the
means we employ and in the theoretical competence we insist on, the ethics
of analysis – for there is one – involves effacement, setting aside, withdrawal,
indeed, the absence of a dimension that one only has to mention in order to
realize how much separates us from all ethical thought that preceded us. I
mean the dimension of habits, good and bad habits.

但是仍然引人注意的是,在我们使用的工具,与我们坚持的理论的胜任,精神分析伦理学――因为存在一个精神分析伦理学――它牵涉到抹除,摆放一边,撤退,的确,欠钱某个维度。我们只要提到的这个谓度的欠缺,为了体会到,它如何地将我们精神分析区隔开来,跟存在于我们之前的所有的伦理学的思想区隔开来。我指的是习惯的维度,好的习惯与坏的习惯的维度。

It is something we refer to very little because psychoanalytic thought defines
itself in very different terms, in terms of traumas and their persistence. We
have obviously learned to decompose a given trauma, impression, or mark,
but the very essence of the unconscious is defined in a different register from
the one which Aristotle emphasizes in the Ethics in a play on words,ίθος /ήθος

这是我们很少提到东西。因为精神分析的思想定义它自己,用非常不同的术语。用创伤与创伤的持续的术语。我们显而易见地学习如何瓦解某个特定的创伤,印象或标记。但是无意识的本质被定义,用不同的铭杰,跟亚里斯多德强调的这个铭记,在“伦理学“,在探讨文字的运作。

There are extremely subtle distinctions that may be centered on the notion
of character. Ethics for Aristotle is a science of character: the building of
character, the dynamics of habits and, even more, action with relation to
habits, training, education. You must take a look at his exemplary work, if
only to understand the difference between our modes of thought and those
of one of the most eminent forms of ethical thought.

有好几个极端微妙的区别,可以专注于人格的这个观念。对于亚里斯多德,“伦理学“是一门人格的科学:人格的培养,习惯的动力结构,甚至,有关习惯,训练与教育的行动。你们必须阅读一下他的典范的著作。即使仅是为了理解那些差异,处于我们的思想的模式,与其中最著名的伦理学的思想的形式之间的差异。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 5

June 27, 2015

Ethics 5
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

2
We are faced with the question of what analysis allows us to formulate concerning
the origin of morality.

我们正在面临这个问题:关于道德的起源,精神分析让我们能够说明什么?

Is its contribution limited to the elaboration of a mythology that is more
credible and more secular than that which claims to be revealed? I have in
mind the reconstructed mythology of Totem and Taboo, which starts out from
the experience of the original murder of the father, from the circumstances
that give rise to it and its consequences. From this point of view, it is the
transformation of the energy of desire which makes possible the idea of the
genesis of its repression. As a result, the transgression is not in this instance
just something which is imposed on us in a formal way; it is instead something
worthy of our praise, felix culpa, since it is at the origin of a higher
complexity, something to which the realm of civilization owes its development.

精神分析的贡献仅是被限制于建构神话?比起宣称被启示的神话更加可信,更加世俗化?我在心里曾经重新建构“图腾与禁忌”的神话。这个神话开始于原初的弑父的经验,开始于产生弑父的环境。从那个观点,欲望的精力的转化让欲望的压抑的起源的观念成为可能。在这个例子里,
逾越并不是以正式的方式赋加在我身上的东西。代替的,逾越是某件值得我们赞美的东西。因为它处于较高的复杂性的起源,焉知非福的东西,文明的领域将它的发展归功于的东西。

In short, is everything limited to the genesis of the superego whose description
is formulated, perfected, deepened, and made more complex as Freud’s
work progresses? We will see that this genesis of the superego is not simply
a psychogenesis and a sociogenesis. Indeed, it is impossible to articulate it by
limiting oneself merely to the register of collective needs. Something is imposed
there whose jurisdiction is to be distinguished from pure and simple social
necessity – it is properly speaking something whose unique scope I am trying
to make you appreciate here in terms of the relation to the signifier and to
the law of discourse.

总之,随着弗洛依德的研究的进展,每样东西都被限制于超我的创世纪。超我的描述被说明,被改善,被深化,然后被弄得更加复杂吗?我们将会看见,超微的这个创世纪并不仅是心理病因学与社会起源学。代替的,我们表达它时,不可能仅是限制于我们自己,于集体需要的铭记。某件东西被赋加在那里,它的统辖应该被区别出来,跟纯粹与单纯的社会的需要的不同。贴切地说,某件东西的独特的范围,我正在尝试让你们在此赏识,用跟能指的关系的术语,跟辞说的法则的关系的术语。

We must maintain the autonomy of this term if we want
to be able to locate our experience precisely or simply correctly.
Here no doubt the distinction between culture and society contains something
that might appear new or even divergent in comparison with what is
found in a certain kind of teaching of the analytical experience. I hope, in
fact, to point out to you the references to such a distinction and the scope
they occupy in Freud himself, a distinction whose authority I am far from
alone in promoting or emphasizing the need for.

我们必须维持这个术语的自主权,假如我们想要能够定位我们的经验,确实或仅是正确地。在此,无可置疑地,文化与社会的这个区别,包含某件可能显得新奇,甚至的多样化的东西。跟某种的精神分析经验的教学里被发现的东西比较起来。实际上,我希望跟你们指出这些指称,对于它们在弗洛依德本身所佔据点地位与范围。这个地位的权威,我并是仅有的一人,提倡或强调这个地位具有权威的需要。

And in order to draw your attention immediately to the work in which we
will take up the problem, I refer you to Civilization and Its Discontents, published
in 1922 and written by Freud after the working out of his second topic,
that is to say after he had placed in the foreground the highly problematic
notion of the death instinct. You will find expressed there in striking phrases
the idea that what, in brief, happens in the progress of civilization, those
discontents that are to be explored, is situated, as far as man is concerned,
far above him – the man involved here being the one who finds himself at
that turning point in history where Freud himself and his work are situated.

为了当下吸引你们注意这个工作,我们将会探讨这个难题的工作。我推荐你们阅读“文明及其不满”,它出版于1922年,弗洛依德所写,就在解决他的第二个议题之后。换句话说,就在他将死亡本能的这个问题重重的观念,放置在前景之后。你们将会发现这个观念用引人注意的词语表达。总之,文明的进展过程发生的事情,应该被探讨的那些不满–就人而言,应该被定位在他之上,-在此被牵涉的这个人就是发现他自己处于历史的转捩点的这个人。在那里,弗洛依德自己及其研究被定位。

We will come back to the significance of Freud’s formula and I will draw
your attention to its significance in the text. But I believe it to be important
enough for me to point it out to you right away, and already sufficiently
illuminated in my teaching, where I show the originality of the Freudian
conversion in the relation of man to the logos.

我们将回头谈论弗洛依德的公式的意义。我将吸引你们的注意力,到这个公式在文本里的意义。但是我相信这个公式对于我们充分重于,所以我跟你们立即指出。在我的教学里,它已经充分地被阐明。在那里,我揭示弗洛依德转变的原创力,在人跟理性的关系。

This Civilization and Its Discontents that I invite you to get to know or to
reread in the context of Freud’s work is not just a set of notes. It is not the
kind of thing one grants a practitioner or a scientist somewhat indulgently,
as his way of making an excursion into philosophical inquiry without our
giving it all the technical importance one would accord to such a thought
coming from someone who considers himself to belong to the category of
philosopher. Such a view of this work of Freud’s is widespread among psychoanalysts
and is definitely to be rejected. Civilization and Its Discontents is
an indispensable work, unsurpassed for an understanding of Freud’s thought
and the summation of his experience.

我邀请你们认识的这个“文明与其不满”,或重新阅读,在弗洛依德的研究的文本,并不仅是一套笔记。我们如此偏爱地给予精神分析执业者与科学家的,并不是这种东西。作为弗洛依德前进到哲学的研究的方式。我们没有给予它这种专业的重视,我们习惯给予如此的思想的专业的重视,这种的思想来自于认为他自己属于哲学的范畴的某个人。对于弗洛伊德的这个著作的这种看法非常普遍,在精神分析家当中。这种观点明确地应该被排斥。“文明与其不满”是一部不可或缺的著作,为了要理解弗洛依德的思想,与他的经验的融会贯通。

It illuminates, emphasizes, dissipates
the ambiguities of wholly distinct points of the analytical experience and of
what our view of man should be – given that it is with man, with an immemorial
human demand, that we have to deal on a daily basis in our experience.

“文明与其不满”启蒙,强调,并驱散那些模糊暧昧,精神分析经验的扬名立万产生的模糊暧昧,以及我们对于人的观点应该是如何产生的模糊暧昧。假如考虑到,它跟人息息相关,跟永恒的人的要求息息相关,我们必须要处理的,根据我们的精神分析经验的日常的基础。

As I have already said, moral experience is not limited to that acceptance
of necessity, to that form in which such experience presents itself in every
individual case. Moral experience is not simply linked to that slow recognition
of the function that was defined and made autonomous by Freud under
the term of superego, nor to that exploration of its paradoxes, to what I have
called the obscene and ferocious figure in which the moral agency appears
when we seek it at its root.

如同我已经说过,道德的经验并不是限制于那个必要性的接受,并不是限制于那个形式,如此的经验呈现它自己的形式,在每个个人的个案。道德的经验并不仅跟那个功能的缓慢的承认息息相关,被弗洛依德定义并具有自主权的功能,在超我的术语之下。道德的经验也不仅是跟探索它的悖论息息相关,跟我所谓的卑鄙与残暴的人物息息相关。在那里,道德的代理者出现,当我们在它的根源寻找它。

The moral experience involved in psychoanalysis is the one that is summed
up in the original imperative proposed in what might be called the Freudian
ascetic experience, namely, that Wo es war, soll Ich werden with which Freud
concludes the second part of his Vorlesungen (Introductory Lectures) on psychoanalysis.
The root of this is given in an experience that deserves the term
“moral experience,” and is found at the very beginning of the entry of the
patient into analysis.

在精神分析牵涉到道德的经验就是这个被总和的经验,在这个原初的命令,在所谓的弗洛伊德的禁欲的经验里被建议的原初的命令。换句话说,那是“他我所在,自我必将回归”。弗洛依德用这个原初的命令作为他的“论精神分析导论”的第二部分。这个的根源被给予,在应该获得“道德经验”的这个术语的经验里,在病人进入精神分析的开始被给予。

That “I” which is supposed to come to be where “it” was, and which
analysis has taught us to evaluate, is nothing more than that whose root we
already found in the “I” which asks itself what it wants. It is not only questioned,
but as it progresses in its experience, it asks itself that question and
asks it precisely in the place where strange, paradoxical, and cruel commands
are suggested to it by its morbid experience.

那个“我”被认为来的“它”的以前所在地地方。精神分析教导我们要评估的那个“我”,仅仅就是我们已经找到的那个根源,在这个“我”,询问它自己它想要什么的这个“我”。这个“我”不但被质疑,而且当它在它的经验里前进时,它询问它自己那个问题,并且明确地询问它,在这个地方,陌生,悖论,与残酷命令被建议给它的地方,被它的病态的经验。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 3

June 26, 2015

Ethics 3
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

A certain philosophy – it immediately preceded the one which is the nearest
relative to the Freuthan enterprise, the one which was transmitted to us
in the nineteenth century – a certain eighteenth-century philosophy assumed
as its task what might be called the naturalist liberation of desire. One might
characterize this thought, this particularly practical thought, as that of the
man of pleasure. Now the naturalist liberation of desire has failed. The more
the theory, the more the work of social criticism, the more the sieve of that
experience, which tended to limit obligation to certain precise functions in
the social order, have raised in us the hope of relativizing the imperative, the
contrary, or, in a word, conflictual character of moral experience, the more
we have, in fact, witnessed a growth in the incidence of genuine pathologies.

某个哲学,它是弗洛依德的企业的近亲。这个哲学在19世纪被传递给我们—某种18世纪的哲学担负起所谓的自然主义的解放,作为它的职责。我们可以将这种思想的特征,这种特殊实用的思想的特征,作为是快乐的人都特征。现在,自然主义对于欲望的解放已经失败。理论越多,社会批判的工作越多,那个经验的筛选就越多,倾向于限制义务,于某些明确的功能,在社会的秩序。它们在我们身上唤起这个希望,希望将这个指令成为相对,相反地,或换言之,让道德经验的冲突的特征成为相对,实际上,我们就越加见证到真诚的病理的意外的增长。

The naturalist liberation of desire has failed historically. We do not find ourselves
in the presence of a man less weighed down with laws and duties than
before the great critical experience of so-called libertine thought.

自然主义对于欲望的解放从历史而言是功败垂成。我们并没有发现我们自己处于这么一个人的面前,他比较不受法则与责任的重担,比起在所谓的解放的思想的壮烈的经验之前。

If we find ourselves led to consider even in retrospect the experience of
that man of pleasure – through reflection on what psychoanalysis has contributed
to the knowledge and the circumstances of perverse experience – we
will soon see that in truth everything in this moral theory was to destine it to
failure.

假如我们发现我们自己被引导去认为,甚至以回顾方式去认为快乐的那个人的经验—通过对于精神分析对于倒错经验的认识与环境的反思—我们不久将会看见,实际上,在这个道德理论的一切事情都将它预先注定失败。

In effect, although the experience of the man of pleasure presents itself
with an ideal of naturalist liberation, one has only to read the major authors
-I mean those who in expressing themselves on the subject have adopted the
boldest approaches to libertinage, and even to eroticism itself- to realize that
this experience contains a note of defiance, a kind of trial by ordeal in relation
to that which remains the terminal point of this argument, an undoubtedly
diminished but nevertheless fixed term. And that is nothing less than the
divine term.

实际上,虽然快乐的人的经验呈现它自己,带着自然主义的解放的理想,我们只要阅读主要的作者—我指的是那些当他们在表达他们自己,针对这个议题,他们採有最大胆的到达解放的途径,甚至到达性爱的本身—我们就会体会到,这个经验包含挑衅的意味,一种经历磨难的考验。跟这个磨难的考验息息相关的始终是这个争论的终端,一个无可置疑地被减少,但是仍然被固执的术语。那实实在在就是这个神性的术语。

As the creator of nature, God is summoned to account for the extreme
anomalies whose existence the Marquis de Sade, Mirabeau, and Diderot,
among others, have drawn our attention to. This challenge, this summoning,
this trial by ordeal ought not to allow any other way out than the one that
was, in effect, realized historically. He who submits himself to the ordeal
finds at the end its premises, namely, the Other to whom this ordeal is
addressed, in the last analysis its Judge. That is precisely what gives its special
tone to this literature, which presents us with the dimension of the erotic
in a way that has never been achieved since, never equaled. In the course of
our investigation, we definitely must submit to our judgment that which in
analysis has retained an affinity with, a relationship to, and a common root
with, such an experience.

作为自然的创造者,上帝被召唤来解释这些极端的异常行为。这些极端的异常行为,诸如萨德,马拉宝,与狄特罗等人们,他们吸引我们的注意。这个挑战,这个召唤,这个磨难的考验,不应该容许有任何其他的解决方式,除了就是这个方式,实际上,就是历史上被实践的方式。将他自己承受这种考验的这个人,最后发现它的各种前提。也就是说,针对他处理的大他者,追根究底,就是它的裁判者。那确实就是为什么要给予它的特别的强调,对于这些文学,呈现给与我们性爱的维度的这种文学,它们使用的方式,自此之后,就无法被获致,无与相伦比。在我们研究的过程,我们明确地必须将在精神分析里,保留关联性的东西,提交给予我们作判断。这样一种关系,一种共同的根源,跟这样一种经验。

Here we are touching on a perspective that has been little explored in analysis.
It seems that from the moment of those first soundings, from the sudden
flash of light that the Freuthan experience cast on the paradoxical origins of
desire, on the polymorphously perverse character of its infantile forms, a
general tendency has led psychoanalysts to reduce the paradoxical origins in
order to show their convergence in a harmonious conclusion. This movement
has on the whole characterized the progress of analytical thought to the point
where it is worth asking if this theoretical progress was not leading in the end
to an even more all-embracing moralism than any that has previously existed.

在此,我们碰触到一个观点,在精神分析罕见被探讨的观点。似乎,从那些最初的迴响的时刻开始,从光的突然闪现开始,弗洛依德的精神分析经验投射给欲望的这个悖论的起源,投射给欲望的婴儿的形态的各种各样的倒错的特征。一般性的倾向已经引导精神分析,将这些悖论的起源,化简,为了显示它们的汇集于和谐的结论。这个时刻大体上表现精神分析思想的进展的特色。甚至值得询问的是,这个理论的进展是否最后会导致更加全面性地拥抱道德主义,比起先前存在过的道德主义。

Psychoanalysis would seem to have as its sole goal the calming of guilt –
although we know well through our practical experience the difficulties and
obstacles, indeed the reactions, that such an approach entails. This approach
involves the taming of perverse jouissance, which is assumed to emerge from
the demonstration of its universality, on the one hand, and its function, on
the other.

精神分析似乎将会拥有罪恶感的平抚,作为是它唯一的目标。虽然我们清楚知道,经由我们的实践的精神分析经验,知道这些困难与阻碍,的确,知道这些反应,如此的方法所涵盖的反应。这个方法牵涉到对于倒错的欢爽的驯服。这个倒错的欢爽被认为一方面从它的普遍性的展示出现。另一方面,从它的功能出现。

No doubt the term “component,” used for designating the perverse drive,
is in this situation given its full weight. Last year we explored the expression
“component drive”; in a whole section of our remarks we were concerned
with the insights that analysis affords concerning the function of desire and
with the deep finality of that really remarkable diversity, which explains the
value of the catalogue of human instincts that analysis has allowed us to draw
up.

无可置疑,“成分”这个术语被使用来指明这个倒错的冲动,在这个情况,它被给予它的充分的重量。去年,我们探索“成分冲动”的表达.在我们谈论的整个的部分,我们关注的是这些洞见,精神分析提供的洞见,关于欲望的功能,以及深层的终极,会有那种确实值得注意到多样化。这种多样化解释人类的本能的目录的价值,精神分析让我们能够拟定的人类的本能的目录。

Perhaps the question will only be seen in sharp relief, when one compares
the position that our point of view of the term desire has led us to, with that
which is, for example, articulated in the work of Aristotle in connection with
ethics. I will give him an important place in my discussion, including particularly
that work which lays out Aristotelian ethics in its most elaborate form,
the Nicomachean Ethics. There are two points in Aristotle’s work in which he
shows how a whole register of desire is literally situated by him outside of the
field of morality.

或许,仅是从锐利的突显,这个问题才能被看见,当我们比较这个立场,我们对欲望的这个术语的观点曾经引导我们来到的立场。譬如,在亚里斯多德的著作里,被表达的东西,包括特别是那个著作,规划亚里斯多德伦理学的著作,处于它最精致的形式,“尼各马可伦理学”。在亚里斯多德的著作,有两点,他显示,欲望的铭记如何实质上被他定位在道德的领域的外面。

Where a certain category of desires is involved, there is, in effect, no ethical
problem for Aristotle. Yet these very desires are nothing less than those
notions that are situated in the forefront of our experience. A whole large
field of what constitutes for us the sphere of sexual desires is simply classed
by Aristotle in the realm of monstrous anomalies – he uses the term “bestiality”
with reference to them. What occurs at this level has nothing to do with
moral evaluation. The ethical questions that Aristotle raises are located altogether
elsewhere – I will give you an idea later of their thrust and essence.
That is a point of special importance.

就欲望的某个范畴而言,实际上,对于亚里斯多德,并没有伦理的难题。可是,这些欲望实实在在就是那些观念,被定位在我们精神分析经验的前景。对于我们,形成性的欲望的范围的整个大领域,被亚里斯多德仅是归类于怪诞的异常行为的领域。他使用这个术语“兽性”,提到它们。发生在这个层次的东西,跟道德的评估没有丝毫的关系。 亚里斯多德提出的伦理学的问题,完全被定位在其他地方。以后,我将让你们明白,它的冲动与本质的观念。那是特别重要的一点。

On the other hand, if one believes that the whole of Aristotle’s morality
has lost none of its relevance for moral theory, then one can measure from
that fact how subversive our experience is, since it serves to render his theory
surprising, primitive, paradoxical and, in truth, incomprehensible.
But all that is just a stop on our journey. What I really want to do this
morning is to give you an outline of this seminar.

另一方面,假如我们相信,整个的亚里斯多德的道德完全没有丧失它跟道德理论的相关性。那么,我们能够根据那个事实衡量,我们的精神分析经验的颠覆性有多强。因为它充当将他的理论让人惊奇,原始,悖论,实际上,是无法理解。但是所有那一切仅是我们旅途的一个停顿点。今天早上,我确实想要做的是给予你们这个研讨班的钢要。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 1

June 26, 2015

Ethics 1
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Outline of the seminar
研讨纲要
THE ATTRACTION OF TRANSGRESSION
逾越的吸引力

FROM ARISTOTLE TO FREUD
从亚里斯多德到弗洛依德
THE REAL
实在界
THE THREE IDEALS
三个理想

I announced that the title of my seminar this year was The Ethics of Psychoanalysis.
I do not think that this is a subject whose choice is in any way
surprising in itself, although it does leave open for some of you the question
of what I might have in mind.

我宣布,我今年研讨班的标题是“精神分析伦理学”。我并不认为,这一个题目的选择本身有任何值得惊奇的地方。虽然这个题目确实让你们有些人展开我心目中构想的这个问题。

It was certainly not without some hesitation and even trepidation that I
decided to tackle it. I, in fact, decided to do so because the subject follows
directly from my seminar of last year, if it is true that we can consider that
work as completely finished.

我决定克服这个问题,确实并非没有一些犹豫,甚至是但书。实际上,我决定这样做,是因为这个主题直接从去年的研讨班延续而来。假如我们确实能够将那个工作认为是完全结束。

In any case, we must move forward. Given all that is implied by the phrase,
the ethics of psychoanalysis will allow me, far more than anything else, to
test the categories that I believe enable me, through my teaching, to give you
the most suitable instruments for understanding what is new both in Freud’s
work and in the experience of psychoanalysis that derives from it.

无论如何,我们必须前进。假如考虑到,这个词语所暗示的东西,精神分析伦理学将会让我们能够,远超过其他东西,让我们能够测试那些目录,我相信那些目录让我们能够凭借教学,给予你们最合适的工具,作为理解新奇出胜地地方,在弗洛依德的研究与从这个研究获得的精神分析的经验。

New in relation to what? In relation to something that is both very general
and very specific. Very general to the extent that the experience of psychoanalysis
is highly significant for a certain moment in the history of man,
namely, the one we are living in, although this does not imply we are able –
far from it – to specify what the collective work we are engaged in means.
Very specific, on the other hand, like our daily work, namely, in the way in
which we have to respond in experience to what I have taught you to articulate
as a demand, a patient’s demand, to which our response gives an exact
meaning. And in our response itself we must maintain the strictest discipline,
so as not to let its deeply unconscious meaning be adulterated by that demand.

在什么地方新奇出胜?在某件既是一般性又是非常明确的东西。非常一般性的程度是,精神分析的经验非常重要,对于人的历史的某些时刻。换句话说,我们正在生活其中的这个时刻。虽然这并不暗示着,我们能够—根本就不能够—指明我们正在参与的这个集体的研究意味着什么。另一方面,非常明确地,就像我们的日常的工作,也就是说,在精神分析经验里,我们必须回应我曾经教导你们的东西,为了表达作为要求,病人的要求。我们对于病人的要求的回应,给予一个确实的意外。在我们的回应本身,我们必须维持那个最严格的纪律,为了不要让它的深层无意识的意外受到那样要求的掺杂。

In speaking of the ethics of psychoanalysis, I chose a word which to my
mind was no accident. I might have said “morality” instead. If I say “ethics,”
you will soon see why. It is not because I take pleasure in using a term that
is less common.

当我们谈论精神分析伦理学时,我选择我并觉得是偶然的一个字词。代替地,我本来可以使用“道德”一词。假如我说“伦理学”,你们不久将会明白为什么。那不仅是因为我很乐意使用一个比较不那么普遍的术语。
1
Let us begin by noting this – something that, in a word, makes the subject
eminently accessible and even tempting. It is my belief that no one who is
involved with psychoanalysis has not been drawn to treat the subject of its
ethics. I am not the one who created the expression. Moreover, it is impossible
not to acknowledge that we are submerged in what are strictly speaking
moral problems.

让我们开始时,注意到这个—总之,某件东西让主体明显地可以接近,甚至具有诱惑力。我相信,参与精神分析的人们,没有人不被吸引来处理它自己的伦理的主体。我并不是创造这个表达的人。而且,这是我们不可能不承认:我们被潜藏在严格所说的道德的难题的东西里。

Our experience has led us to explore further than has been attempted before
the universe of transgression. That is the expression which, with an extra
adjective, my colleague Hesnard uses. He refers to the morbid universe of
transgression. And it is doubtless from this morbid point of view that we
approach it at its highest point.

我们的精神分析经验引导我们更加深入地探索逾越的宇宙,比起以前所曾经尝试的。那就是我的同事黑纳德所使用的词语,具有特殊的形容词。他提到逾越的病态的宇宙。无可置疑地,从这个病榻的观点,我们接近它,处于它最高的点。

In truth, that point of view is impossible to dissociate from the universe of
transgression as such. And the link between transgression and morbidity has
not failed in our time to mark with its seal all thought about morals. It is
even strange sometimes – something I have drawn your attention to before
in my asides – to see in religious circles a certain vertigo seize those who are
engaged in thinking about moral questions when they come face to face with
what our experience has to offer. It is remarkable to see how they, as it were,
give in to the temptation of an excessive and even comic optimism, and start
to think that a decline of morbidity might lead transgression to vanish.
In fact, what we are dealing with is nothing less than the attraction of
transgression.

实际上,那个观点,跟逾越的宇宙自身,不可能形影分离。逾越与病态之间的关联,在我们的时代,必然会用它的封印标识所有关于道德的思想。有时,甚至耐人寻味的是,我以前曾经吸引你们注意的某件东西,在我的离题旁白里—在宗教的圈子里,看见某些的晕眩让那些人们著魔,那些参与思维道德问题的人们,当他们面对我们精神分析经验所提供的东西。值得注意的是,看见他们如何屈服于这个诱惑,过分放纵,甚至夸大滑稽的诱惑。然后开始思维,病态的衰亡可能会让逾越消失。实际上,我们正在处理的东西,实实在在就是逾越的吸引力。

And what is this transgression? It is certainly not the same as the one the
patient commits with the expectation of being punished or punishing himself.
When we speak of the need for punishment, we are certainly referring
to a transgression which is on the path of this need and which is sought out
to obtain this punishment. But that way we are only carried a litte further
toward some yet more obscure transgression which calls for punishment.

这个逾越是什么?它确实跟病人所犯的这个逾越并不相同,病人带着被惩罚或惩罚自己的这个逾越。当我们谈论惩罚的需要,我们确实提到正处于这个需要途中的逾越,这个逾越被寻求,为了获得这个惩罚。但是以那种方式,我们仅是稍微被带朝向某个更加模糊的逾越,要求惩罚的逾越。

Is it the transgression that Freud’s work points to from the beginning, the
murder of the father, the great myth that he places at the origin of the development
of civilization? Or is it that even more obscure and original transgression
for which he finds a name at the end of his work, in a word, the death
instinct, to the extent that man finds himself anchored deep within to its
formidable dialectic?

这难道不是弗洛伊德从一开始就指向的逾越吗?弑父,这个伟大的神话,弗洛依德将它放置在文明的发展的起源。或者,这难道不是,甚至更加模糊与原初的逾越,弗洛依德在他的研究结束时,找到一个名称,总之,死亡本能。甚至人类发现他自己深深地被锚定在里面,跟它的可怕的辩证法锚定一块?

It is between these two terms that one finds in Freud a body of thought, a
development whose precise significance it will be our task to determine. But
it is not, in truth, in the sphere either of practice or of theory that is to be
found all that which makes me emphasize the importance of the ethical
dimension in my experience and my teaching of Freud. In effect, as has been
quite properly pointed out, not everything in ethics is simply related to the
sense of obligation.

就在弑父与死亡本能这两个术语之间,我们在弗洛依德身上找到一个思想体系。我们的工作就是要决定这个思想体系的发展的确是意义。但是,实际上,在实践或理论的范围里,我们都无法找到让我能够强调伦理学的维度的重要性的东西,在我的精神分析经验与弗洛依德的教学里。如同相当贴切被指出的,并不是伦理学的一切东西都仅仅跟义务的意义有关联。

Moral experience as such, that is to say, the reference to sanctions, puts
man in a certain relation to his own action that concerns not only an articulated
law but also a direction, a trajectory, in a word, a good that he appeals
to, thereby engendering an ideal of conduct. All that, too, properly speaking
constitutes the dimension of ethics and is situated beyond the notion of a
command, beyond what offers itself with a sense of obligation. That is why I
believe it necessary to relate the dimension of our experience to the contribution
of those who have attempted in our time to advance moral thought –
I am, in fact, alluding to Fritz Rauh, whom we will be concerned with as one
of our reference points in this exercise.

换句话说,道德经验的自身,提到各种的认可,将人处于跟他自己的行动的关系。他自己的行动不但跟被表达到法则,而且跟方向,跟投射,息息相关。总之,跟他诉求的善息息相关。因此产生行为的理想。贴切而言,所有组成伦理学维度的东西,被定位在超越命令的观念之外的东西,超越用义务的意义提供自己的东西。那就是为什么我相信这是必要的,将我们的精神分析的经验的维度,跟那些人们的贡献联接一块。他们曾经尝试在我们的时代提出道德的思想。实际上,我正提到弗利兹 劳斯。我们将会关注他,作为是我们在这个运用的指称要点。

But I am certainly not one of those who gladly sets the sense of obligation
aside. If there is, in fact, something that psychoanalysis has drawn attention
to, it is, beyond the sense of obligation properly speaking, the importance, I
would even say the omnipresence, of a sense of guilt. Certain internal tendencies
of ethical thought attempt to evade what it must be said is this disagreeable
aspect of moral experience. If I am certainly not one of those who attempt
to soften, blunt, or attenuate the sense of guilt, it is because in my daily
experience I am too insistently brought back to it and reminded of it.

但是我确实并不那些人们的其中一位,他们很乐意将义务的意义放置一旁。实际上,假如有某件东西,精神分析曾经关注的东西,那就是,超越义务的意义,贴切地是,就是超越这个重要性,我甚至说,超越这个无所不在,超越罪恶感的意义。伦理学的思想的某些内部的倾向企图逃避它必须被说出的东西。这就是道德经验的令人不愉快的层面。假如我确实并不是那些人们的其中一位,他们企图将罪恶感软化,麻木,或减弱。那是因为在我的日常的精神分析经验里,我也持续不断地被带回到这个罪恶感,并且提醒它。

It nevertheless remains true that analysis is the experience which has restored
to favor in the strongest possible way the productive function of desire as
such. This is so evidently the case that one can, in short, say that the genesis
of the moral dimension in Freud’s theoretical elaboration is located nowhere
else than in desire itself. It is from the energy of desire that that agency is
detached which at the end of its development will take the form of the censor.
Thus something is enclosed in a circle that was imposed on us, deduced
from what is most characteristic in our experience.

这仍然是真实的,精神分析的经验曾经将欲望的生产的功能本身恢复受人欢迎,以尽可能强调的方式。这是如此显而易见的情况,总之,我们能够说,道德维度的创世纪,在弗洛依德的理论的建构里,被定位的地方,实实在在就是欲望。就是从欲望的这个能源,那个代理者被隔离开来。在它发展的结束,这个代理者会採用审查的形式。因此,某件东西被封闭在被赋加在我们身上的一个圆圈里,从我们的精神分析经验,最具特色的东西推论出来。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 68

June 24, 2015

Ethics 68
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Das Ding (II)
物象

THE INTERSAID OF VERNEINUNG
“否认”的内部命令
MOTHER AS DAS DING
母亲作为物象

However negative the ten commandments may seem, I will not linger long
over their character as prohibitions – we are always being told that morality
doesn’t only have a negative side, it also has a positive side – but I will note,
as I have before in this place, that they are perhaps only the commandments
of speech. By that I mean they clarify that without which no speech is possible
– notice that I did not say discourse.

无论十戒看起来是多么负面,我将不再详述它们作为禁忌的特性。我们总是被告上,道德并不仅具有负面的影响。道德也具有正面的影响。但是,我将注意到,如同我以前在这个位置注意到,它们或许并不是言说的十戒。我的意思是,它们澄清那个正面,假如没有那个正面影响,没有言说是可能。请你们注意,我并不是说没有辞说是可能。

I just gave you an indication there, since I could hardly go any further,
and I pick up the trail again here. This is what I want to point out. In the ten
commandments, which constitute almost everything that, against all odds, is
accepted as commandments by the whole of the civilized community – civilized
or not, or almost civilized, but since we only know the other, uncivilized
part by means of a number of cryptograms, let us limit ourselves to the
so-called civilized portions – in the ten commandments, it is nowhere specified
that one must not sleep with one’s mother. I do not think that the command
“to honor” her should be considered as the least suggestive of this,
either negatively or positively – in spite of what in the Provencal tales of
Marius and Olive is known as “performing honorable service.”4

我在那里仅是给予你们一个指示,因为我几乎无法再深入前进。我再次在这里接续这个追踪。这就是我想要指出的东西。在十戒里,它们形成几乎是一切东西,面对各种不利,这一切东西被接受,作为是整个的文明社会的十戒,无论文明与非,或几乎就是文明的社会。但是因为我们仅是知道另外一个,不文明的部分,凭借许多的密码。让我们限制自己到所谓的文明的部分。在十戒里,并没有明确指明,我们一定不能跟母亲睡觉。我并不认为,“遵敬”母亲应该被认为是稍微具有这个暗示,不论是负面或正面。尽管在马力思与奥力维的通俗故事里,众所周知的“执行荣誉的服务”的东西。

Couldn’t we next time try to interpret the ten commandments as something
very close to that which effectively goes on in repression in the unconscious?
The ten commandments may be interpreted as intended to prevent
the subject from engaging in any form of incest on one condition, and on one
condition only, namely, that we recognize that the prohibition of incest is
nothing other than the condition sine qua non of speech.

下一次,我们难道不能解释这个十戒,作为是某件非常靠近在无意识的压抑里有效地进行的东西?这个十戒可以被解释,作为被设计来阻止在某个情况,主体不能参与任何的乱伦的形式。而且仅是在某个情况。换句话说,我们体认出,乱伦的禁忌实实在在就是作为言说的情况。

This brings us back to questioning the meaning of the ten commandments
insofar as they are tied in the deepest of ways to that which regulates the
distance between the subject and das Ding – insofar as that distance is precisely
the condition of speech, insofar as the ten commandments are the condition
of the existence of speech as such.

这引导我们回到十戒的这个意义。因为它们跟这些深层的方式息息相关,规范这个距离的方式,在主体与物象之间的距离。因为那个距离确实就是言说的这个情况。因为十戒就是言说的存在自身的情况。

I am simply on the point of broaching this topic, but I beg you right away
not to stop at the idea that the ten commandments are, so to speak, the
condition of all social life. For from another point of view, how can one not
in truth see, when one merely recites them, that they are in a way the chapter
and verse of our transactions at every moment of our lives? They display the
range of what are properly speaking our human actions. In other words, we
spend our time breaking the ten commandments, and that is why society is
possible.

我仅是即将提出这个话题。但是我立即请求你们不要对这个观念浅尝辄止。也就是,十戒就是所有的社会的生活的情况。因为从另外一个观点,我们如何能够实际上没有看见,当我们仅是引述它们。以某种方式,他们就是我们的生活的每个时刻的运作的章节与诗篇?它们展示这个范围,恰当而言,属于我们人类的行动的范围。换句话说,我们花费我们的时间违背这个十戒。那就是为什么社会是可能的。

I do not for all that have to push the paradox to its extreme, like Bernard
de Mandeville in The Fable of the Bees, when he demonstrates that private
vices constitute public wealth. It is not a question of that, but of seeing what
kind of preconscious immanence the ten commandments correspond to. I
will take up the question there next time – not, however, without making a
detour through that fundamental reference I evoked when I spoke to you for
the first time of what might be called the real.

尽管那样,我并没有必要将这个悖论推到极端,就像曼德维尔在“蜜蜂的寓言”。当他证明,私下的邪恶组成公共的财富。问题并不是那样,而是要看就是这个十戒对应于什么种类的前意识的内在性。我下次将探讨这个问题。可是,还是会有个迂迴,穿过那个被召唤的基本的指称,当我跟第一次你们谈论,关于所谓的实在界。

The real, I have told you, is that which is always in the same place. You
will see this in the history of science and thought. This detour is indispensable
if we are to reach the great revolutionary crisis of morality, namely, the
systematic questioning of principles there where they need to be questioned,
that is, at the level of the imperative. That is the culminating point for both
Kant and Sade with relation to the Thing; it is there that morality becomes,
on the one hand, a pure and simple application of the universal maxim and,
on the other, a pure and simple object.

我告诉过你们,实在界总是属于相同的地方的东西。你们将会看见这个实在界,在科学与思想的历史。这个迂迴是无可避免的,假如我们想要到达道德的那个伟大的革命的危机。换句话说,系统地质疑那里的原则。在那里,那些原则需要被质疑。换句话说,在命令的层面。那就是高潮的部分,对于康德与萨德,相关于这个物象。就在那里,道德一方面成为纯粹而单纯地应用普世的公理;另一方面,又成为纯粹而单纯的客体。

This point is essential if one is to understand the step taken by Freud. By
way of conclusion today I would just like to bring to your attention something
that a poet, who happens to be a friend of mine, once wrote: “The problem
of evil is only worth raising as long as one has not fixed on the idea of transcendence
by some good that is able to dictate to man what his duties are.
Till that moment the exalted representation of evil will continue to have the
greatest revolutionary value.”

这个点是基本的点,假如我们想要理解弗洛依德採取的步骤。作为今天的结论,我想要提醒你们注意某件东西,一位诗人恰好是我的一位朋友,他写到:「邪恶的难题仅是值得提出,只要我们还没有专注超验的观念,被某些的善。这个善能够跟人们指示他的责任是什么。直到那个时刻,邪恶的崇高的再现将会继续拥有最大量的革命的价值。

Well now, the step taken by Freud at the level of the pleasure principle is
to show us that there is no Sovereign Good – that the Sovereign Good, which
is das Ding, which is the mother, is also the object of incest, is a forbidden
good, and that there is no other good. Such is the foundation of the moral
law as turned on its head by Freud.

呵呵,弗洛依德採取的步骤,在快乐原则的层面,就是要跟我们显示,没有统辖的善。统辖的善,那就是das Ding,那就是母亲,也是乱伦的目标。统辖的善是一个被禁止的善。而且没有其他的善。被弗洛伊德翻转过来的道德法则的基础就是这样。

Now we have to consider where the positive moral law comes from that has
remained quite intact, and that we are literally capable of “banging our heads
against the wall for,” to borrow an expression made famous by a film, rather
than see it overturned.5

现在,我们必须考虑,始终保持相当完整的正面的道德的法则从何而来。我们实质上能够“因为这些法则而头撞墙壁”,借用一部影片所做的表达,而不是看见它被推翻。

What does this mean? It means, and this is where I am leading you, that
what you were looking for in the place of the object that cannot be found
again is the object that one always finds again in reality. In the place of the
object impossible to find again at the level of the pleasure principle, something
has happened that is nothing more than the following: something which
is always found again, but which presents itself in a form that is completely
sealed, blind and enigmatic, the world of modern physics.

那是什么意思?它意味着,这就是我正在引导你们去的地方。你们正在寻找的东西,在我们在现实界再次找到的客体。代替这个不可能再次找到的客体,在快乐原则的层面,某件东西已经发生。那实实在在就是如下:某件东西总是再次被找到,但是这个东西呈现它自己,用完全被封闭。,盲目而谜团的形式 现代物理的世界。

You will see that it is in relation to this that the crisis of morality was
played out at the end of the eighteenth century at the time of the French
revolution. And it is to this that Freud’s doctrine constitutes an answer. It
sheds a light on the subject that, I hope to be able to show you, has not yet
yielded up all its implications.
December 16, 1959

你们将会看见,就是跟这个的关系,道德的这个危机,总是被演出,在十八世纪末,在法国大革命的时代。弗洛依德的教条组成对于这个危机的回答。它启蒙这位主体,我希望能够跟你们显示,这位主体还没有呈现出它所有的暗示。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com