Archive for the ‘精神分析的伦理’ Category

Ethics 40

July 11, 2015

Ethics 40
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

III
Rereading the Entwurf
第三章 重新阅读“规划”

AN ETHICS NOT A PSYCHOLOGY
伦理学,而非心理学
HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED
现实如何被构造
A TOPOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY
主体的拓扑学

You perhaps skipped a little quickly over the reference to the φ system and
the ψ system. If the one is related to exogenous stimulations, it isn’t enough
to say that the other is related to endogenous stimulations. An important part
of the φ system is, in fact, constituted of raw Q quantities from the outside
which are transformed into quantities that are by no means comparable to
those that characterize the φ system, among which the latter system organizes
whatever reaches it from the outside, and does so in a way that is clearly
expressed by Freud as apparendy being similar to Fechner’s theory – it is a
matter of the transformation of what is pure and simple quantity into “complication.”
Freud uses the same Latin term, complicationes.

你们或许跳过这个φ系统与ψ的系统的指称,稍微快速一点。假如前者跟内部的刺激息息相关,光是这样说是不足够的,后者跟外部的刺激息息相关。这个φ系统的重要的部分,实际上,由从外部而来的原料的Q数量所组成。这些数量被转换成为决非是可以比较的数量,跟作为这个φ 系统的特征的那些数量。其中,后者的系统组织任何从外部到达它的东西。并且这样做,用弗洛依德清楚表达的方式。它显而易见地类似于费奇尼的理论—问题是要转化纯粹而单纯数量的东西,成为“併发症”。弗洛依德使用相同的拉丁的术语,“併发症”。

Thus we have the following scheme. On the one hand is the φ system. On
the other is the φ system, which is a highly complex network capable of
shrinkage and of Aufbau, that is to say of extension. At this point of the
theory, there occurs between the two a crossing over, which is indicated in
Freud’s little diagram. Once a certain limit is passed, that which arrives as
quantity is completely transformed as far as its structure is concerned. This
notion of structure, of Aufbau, is represented by Freud as essential.

因此,我们拥有以下的计划。一方面是这个φ 系统。另一方面是这个φ系统。这个系统是一个相当复杂的会退缩的网络,属于Aufbow的网络,换句话说,延伸到网络。在理论的这个时刻,在这两个系统之间,发生一个跨越。这个跨越被指示,在弗洛依德的小图形里。一旦某个限制被通过,到达作为数量的东西完全被转化,就它的结构而言。结构的这个观念,Aufbou的这个观念,弗洛依德将它代表,作为基本。

He distinguishes
in the φ apparatus between its Aufbau, to retain quantity, and its
function, which is to discharge it, the Funktion der Abfuhr. The function isn’t
simply to circulate and discharge; it appears at this level as split.
One must realize that this apparatus is presented to us as isolated in a living
being.

在这个φ 系统里,他区别它的延伸,为了保留数量与它的功能。那就是要发泄它,“发泄的功能”。这个功能不仅流通而且发泄。它出现在作为分裂的这个层面。我们必须体会到,这个工具被呈现给予我们,作为是孤立出来,在活生生的人身上。

It is the nervous system that is being studied and the totality of the
organism. The latter is an extremely important point whose significance is to
my mind obvious. It affirms and sustains itself in a very different way from
the hypotheses that Freud evokes nicely when he says that if one has a taste
for them, one should only take them seriously once their arbitrary nature has
been attenuated – the Willkurlichkeit der Constructio ad hoc. It seems obvious
to me that this apparatus is a topology of subjectivity, of subjectivity insofar
as it arises and is constructed on the surface of an organism.

正在被研究的神经系统与有机体的完整性。后者是极端重要的点,依我之见,它的意义非常重要。它肯定并未维持它自己,用不同的方式,不同于弗洛依德巧妙召唤的假设,当他说,即使我们喜欢它,仅有当它们的任意的特性已经被强调时,我们才应该认真看待它们。我觉得显而易见地,这个工具是主体性的拓扑图型,因为它出现,并且被建构,在有机体的表面。

There is also in the Φ system an important portion that Freud distinguishes
from the part called the nucleus, namely, the Spinalneuronen, which are open
to endogenous stimulation, a stimulation on the side where there is no apparatus
transforming the quantities.

在这个Φ的系统,。也有一个重要的部分,弗洛依德区别跟所谓的脑神经细胞的部分的不同。这个脊柱脑神经细胞开放给外部的刺激,在这边的刺激,在那里,没有工具转化这些数量。

One finds there a wealth of material that, given your wholly legitimate
purpose to simplify, you failed to mention. By way of linking up with what I
will have to say next time, I will do so.

我们在那里发现有许多的材料。假如考虑到你们的整个的合理的目的,想要简化,你们没有提到。作为跟我下次将必须说的东西相连接。我将这样做。

There is, for example, the notion of Schlusselneuronen, which have a certain
function in relation to that part of the φ system which is turned toward endogeny
and which receives its quantities. The Schlusselneuronen are a particular
form of discharge that occurs within the φ system. Yet paradoxically that
discharge has as its function to increase the pressure. He also calls these
Schlusselneuronen, motorische Neuronen and I don’t think it is a mistake. They
provoke stimulations that occur within the φ system, a series of movements
which increase the tension still further and which as a result are at the origin
of current neuroses. And this is a problem which has been particularly
neglected, but that is for us of great interest.

譬如,并没有Schlusselneuronen(关键神经细胞) 的这个观念,拥有某种的功能,相关于φ 的这个系统的那个部分,它被转向外部。它接收它的数量。这个关键神经细胞是发泄的特殊形式,发生在这个φ 系统。可是,矛盾地,那个发泄拥有增加压力,作为它的功能。他也称这些关键脑神经细胞为“动力脑神经细胞”。我并不认为这是一个错误。它们激发这个刺激,发生在这个φ系统的刺激。一系列的运动更加深入地增加这个紧张。结果,它们处于目前神经症的起源。这是一个特别会被忽略的难题,但是对于我们,这非常引人興趣。

We will not go into that now, however. The important point is that everything
that happens here offers the paradox of being in the same place as that
in which the principle of articulation by the Bahnung reigns, the same place,
too, in which the whole hallucinatory phenomenon of perception occurs, of
that false reality to which, in brief, the human organism is predestined. It is
again in this same place that the processes oriented and dominated by reality
are unconsciously formed, insofar at least as it is a question of the subject
finding the path to satisfaction. In this instance satisfaction should not be
confused with the pleasure principle – this is a topic that emerges, oddly
enough, at the end of the third part of the text. You could not, of course,
lead us right through such a rich text.

可是,我们现在将不会探讨它。重要的是,在此发生的每样东西,提供这个悖论,它处于相同的位置,跟这个Bahnung(方便性)的表达原则统辖的那个位置。这也是相同的位置,在那里,感知的整个的幻觉的现象发生。虚假的现实,总之,人类的有机体预先注定的虚假的现实。而且,就在相同的位置,被现实取向与支配的过程,无意识地被形成。因为至少当它的问题是主体的问题,主体找到满足的途径。在这个例子里,满足不应该跟快乐原则混为一谈。这是出现的议题。耐人寻味地,在文本的第三部分的结束时。当然,你们不能够引导我们直接穿越如此丰富的文本。

When Freud sketches out what the
normal functioning of the apparatus might represent, he speaks not of specific
reaction but of specific action as corresponding to satisfaction. There is
a big system behind that spezifische Aktion, for it can only correspond, in fact,
to the refound object. We find here the foundation of the principle of repetition
in Freud, and it is something we will have to come back to. That
specific action will always be missing something. It is not distinguishable
from what takes place when a motor reaction occurs, for it is, in effect, a
reaction, a pure act, the discharge of an action.

当弗洛依德描绘这个工具的正常的功能可能呈现的东西,他没有谈论到明确的反应,而是对应于满足的明确的反应。有一个大的系统,在那个“明确的反应”的背后。因为实际上,它仅能对应于这个重新被找到的客体。我们在此发现到弗洛依德所谓的重复原则的这个基础。那是某件东西,我们将必须回头探讨。那个明确的反应将总是失落某件东西。它无法被区别,跟所发生的事情,当动力反应发生。因为实际上,它是一种反应,一个纯粹的行动,行动的发泄。

There is a very long passage that I will have occasion to come back to and
to distill for you. There is no more vibrant commentary on the gap that is
inherent in human experience, on the distance that is manifested in man
between the articulation of a wish and what occurs when his desire sets out
on the path of its realization. Freud expresses there the reason why there is
always something that is far from finding satisfaction and which doesn’t include
the characteristics sought in a specific action. And he concludes with the
words – I seem to remember that they are the last words of his paper –
“monotonous quality.” Compared with anything the subject seeks out, that
which occurs in the domain of motor discharge always has a diminished character.
We cannot avoid giving that remark the approbation of the most profound
moral experience.

有一个非常长的段路,我将有机会回头探讨,并且过滤给予你们。在这个差距,不再有共鸣的评论,在人类的经验里本质存在的这个差距。在人身上被维持的这个距离,处于愿望的表达与发生的东西,当他出发探讨它的实现的途径。弗洛依德在那里表达这个理由,为什么总是会有某件东西,根本就无法找到满足。某件东西并没有包含着明确的行动里寻求的那些特性。他用这些话作为结论—我似乎记得,它们是他的论文的最后的结论—“单调的特质”。跟主体寻找到任何东西比较起来,发生在动力发泄的领域的东西,总是拥有一个被减少的特性。我们无法避免会给予那个谈论,最深刻的道德的经验的认可。

By way of concluding these thoughts today, I will draw your attention to
the analogy that exists between, on the one hand, that search for an archaic
– one might almost say a regressive – quality of indefinable pleasure which
animates unconscious instinct as a whole and, on the other, that which is
realized and satisfying in the fullest of senses, in the moral sense as such.
That is far more than an analogy; it reaches a level of profundity which has
perhaps never previously been articulated as such.

今天,作为这些思想的总结,我将吸引你们注意这个类比,一方面,存在于那个对于过时的特质的寻求—我们几乎说一个退行—无法定义的快乐的特质,它激发作为整体的无意识的本能。另一方面,被实现与令人满意的东西,用最充实的意义,用道德意义的本身。那不仅仅是类同而已。它到达深奥的层面,或许以前从来没有被如此表达的层面。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 38

July 10, 2015

Ethics 38
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

III
Rereading the Entwurf
第三章 重新阅读“规划”

AN ETHICS NOT A PSYCHOLOGY
伦理学,而非心理学
HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED
现实如何被构造
A TOPOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY
主体的拓扑学

2
Last time I was pleased to hear an echo, a kind of response.
Two of you who for other reasons are involved in rereading the Entwurf –
because they are working on a lexicon and perhaps for personal reasons –
came to tell me after my seminar how happy they were with the way in which
I had discussed Freud’s text; it helped justify the interest of their own rereading.

上次,我很高兴听到一个迴响,一种回应。你们其中有两个人,因为其他理由,参与重新阅读弗洛依德的“规划”。因为他们正在研究一个词彙,或许因为个人的理由—在我的研讨班后,他们前来告诉我,他们多么满意我探头弗洛依德的文本的方式。这有助于他们产生興趣重新阅读它。

I, therefore, had no difficulty remembering – it is something of which I
am painfully aware – that this seminar is a seminar, and that it would be a
good idea if it were not simply the signifier “seminar” alone that maintained
its right to such a denomination. That is why I asked one of the two people
to come and tell us the thoughts inspired in him by the way in which I related
the subject of this seminar to the Entwurf. You will hear Jean-Bertrand Lefevre-
Pontalis, but his colleague, Jean Laplanche, and he are currently equally on
top of the Entwurf, a work that, as Valabrega noted just now, you really have
to have fresh in your memory, if you are to say anything valid about it. Is
that really true? I don’t know, for one ends up realizing that it’s not as complicated
as all that.

我因此很容易就回忆起—那是某件我痛苦地知道的事情—这个研讨班上是一个研讨班,最好它不仅是“研讨班”这个能指,维持它获得如此广大听众的权利。那就是为什么我要去这两个人的其中一位前来告诉我们,他身上被启发的灵感,由于我将这个研讨班的主体跟”规划“一书连接一块的方式。你们将会听见潘塔利斯,但是他的同事,拉普朗奇,他目前同样都是阅读”规划“的研读的参与名单上。如同瓦拉瑞嘉刚才注意到,你们确实必须要将记忆更新一下。假如你们想要说出任何关于它的正确的事情。那难道确实是真实的吗?我不知道,因为我们结果体会到,这并不像那一切那么复杂。

Mr. Lefevre-Pontalis: “There is a slight misunderstanding that I would
like to clear up. I am by no means a specialist of the Entwurf and I haven’t
reread it – I am in the process of reading it. Dr. Lacan asked me to go over
a number of points made in his seminar last week, including especially the
question of the relation to reality, that he described as particularly problematic,
if not downright paradoxical, in this early text of Freud.” (Mr. Lefevre-
Pontalis’s presentation followed.)

潘塔利斯:「有一个轻微的误解,我想要澄清。我决非是“规划“一书的专家。我还没有重新阅读它。我正处于阅读它的过程。拉康博士要求我温习许多的要点,上个星期他做的要点。包括特别是跟现实的关系的问题。他描述作为是特别的棘手,即使不是彻底的悖论,在弗洛依德的这个早期文本。(随着就是潘塔利斯的讲演。)

3
I would like to thank you for what you have done today. It will perhaps
enable us to introduce this year a way of dividing up the seminar that will
allow me to stop now and then, to take a rest, and at the same time have
another use.

我想要感谢你们,因为你们今天所做的事情。我们或许将能够在今年介绍一个方式来区分这个研讨班。这个研讨班让我能够有时停止,休息一下,同时又有另外的用途。

It seems to me that you presented with remarkable elegance the vital armature
of a problem where one risks getting lost in details that are, I must say,
extraordinarily tempting. I did occasionally regret that you didn’t enter into
the detail of the position of the Bahnung, on the one hand, and the Befriedigungserlebnis,
on the other. I also regretted that you didn’t remind us of the
topology that the system ψ , φ, ω, presupposes. All that might perhaps have
illuminated things. But it is clear that one could spend a whole term, indeed
a year, simply in the attempt to rectify the distortions of certain of the Entwurf’s
original intuitions, distortions caused by the English translation.

我觉得,你们优秀高雅地讲演这个难题的重大的线圈,在那里,我们冒著迷失于细节的危险。我必须说,这些细节特别引人入胜。我有时确实感到遗憾,一方面,你们并没有进入“Bahnung, “另一方面,也没有进入Befriedigungserlebnis, 位置的细节。我也遗憾,你们并没有提醒我,ψ , φ, ω,的这个系统预先假设的拓扑位置。所有那一切或许本来可以启蒙许多事情。但是显而易见地,我们可能耗费整个学期,的确是一年,仅是企图要矫正这些曲解,对于”规划“的某些原初的直觉的曲解,由于英文翻译导致的曲解。

I notice an example of this more or less at random. Bahnung is translated
into English by “facilitation.” It is obvious that the word has an exactly opposite
meaning. Bahnung suggests the creation of a continuous way, a chain,
and I even have the feeling that it can be related to the signifying chain
insofar as Freud says that the development of the φ apparatus replaces simple
quantity by quantity plus Bahnung, that is to say its articulation. The English
translation, “facilitation,” slides over the thing.

我注意到这个相当任意性的一个例子。“Bahnung“被翻译成为英文的” facilitation“(方便性)。显而易见,这个字词拥有确实相符的一样。Bahnung暗示着连续性的创造,一个锁链,我甚至拥有这种感觉,它跟成为能指的锁链有关。因为弗洛依德说,这个φ 的工具的发展取代单纯的数量,用加上Bahnung的数量。换句话说,它的表达。英文的翻译“facilitation”(方便性)忽略这件事情。

The French translation was modeled on the English text. As a result, all
its mistakes have been multiplied, and there are even cases where its text is
absolutely unintelligible compared to a simple German text.

法文的翻译模拟英文的文本。结果,所有它的错误加倍起来。甚至有些情况,它的文本绝对无法可以理解,跟单纯的德文的文本比较起来。

Nevertheless, I do believe that you emphasized the points that our following
discussions will take up, discussions that will lead us back to the relationship
between the reality principle and the pleasure principle.

可是,我确实相信,你们强调这些要点,我们随后的讨论从事的要点。我们的讨论将会引导我们回到这个关系,现实原则与快乐原则之间的关系。

You showed the
paradox involved by indicating that the pleasure principle cannot be inscribed
in a biological system. Yet, my goodness, the mystery isn’t so great if we see
that this state of affairs is supported in the following way, namely, that the
subject’s experience of satisfaction is entirely dependent on the other, on the
one whom Freud designates in a beautiful expression that you didn’t emphasize,
I am sorry to say, the Nebenmensck. I will have the opportunity to proffer
a few quotations so as to show that it is through the intermediary of the
Nebenmensck as speaking subject that everything that has to do with the thought
processes is able to take shape in the subjectivity of the subject.

你们显示这个牵涉到的悖论,凭借指示,快乐原则无法被铭记在生物的系统。可是,我的天,这个神秘并没有那么强烈,以致于假如我们看,事情的状态受到以下的方式的支持,也就是说,
主体的满足的经验完全依赖他者,依赖弗洛依德指明的这个他者,用一个你们没有强调的美丽的表达,我很抱歉说,这个Nebenmensck.。我将拥有这个机会提供一种引言,为了显示,通过这个Nebenmensck.的中介,作为言说的主体,跟思想过程有关的每件事情,能够成形,在主体的主体性那里。

I ask you to refer to the double column table that I drew for you last time.
This diagram will be of use to us until the end of our presentation and will
enable us to conceive of the pleasure function and the reality function in a
relationship that we will have to bind together more and more closely. If you
approach them in another way, you end up with the paradox that you perhaps
overemphasized today, namely, that there is no plausible reason why reality
should be heard and should end up prevailing. Experience proves it to be
overbundant for the human species, which for the time being is not in danger
°f extinction. The prospect is exactly the opposite. Pleasure in the human
economy is only ever articulated in a certain relationship to this point, which
is no doubt always left empty, enigmatic, but which presents a certain relationship
to what man takes to be reality. And it is through this that we manage
to approach ever more closely that intuition, that apperception of reality
which animates the whole development of Freud’s thought.

我要求你们参照这双重的栏格,我上次跟你们画的的栏格。这个图形将会非常有用,直到我们的讲演结束。并且将会让我们能够构想快乐原则的功能与现实原则的功能,我们将会将它们的关系绑在一块,越来越加密切地。假如你们用另外一个方法接近它们,你们结果将会具有这个悖论,你们或许今天过分强调的悖论。换句话说,并没有似乎合理的理由,为什么现实应该被听见,结果现实应该佔上风。经验证明对于人类的种族而言,现实的负担过程沉重。暂时,人类的种族并没有滨临灭亡的危险。远景的展位恰恰相反。在人类的生命活力里,快乐仅是被表达,用跟这一点的关系,无可置疑地,这一点总是被留在空无当中,谜团当中。但是,这一点呈现某种的关系,跟人类认为是现实的东西。通过这一点,我们成功地更加密切地靠近那个直觉。对于现实的感知触动弗洛依德的思想的整个发展的活力。

Freud posits that the φ system must always contain a certain level of Qή
quantity, which will play to the end an essential role. The discharge cannot,
in effect, be complete, reach a zero level, after which the psychic apparatus
achieves a final state of rest. The latter is certainly not the plausible goal or
end of the functioning of the pleasure principle. Freud wonders, therefore –
and this is something that the translation misses – how one can justify that it
is at such a level that the quantity which regulates everything is maintained.

弗洛依德假设,这个φ 系统必须总是包含某个层次的Qή 的数量。这个Qή 的数量将会以基本的角色扮演到最后。事实上,这个发泄无法是完整,到达零的层次。在这个零的层次之后,心灵的工具完成最后的休息的状态。后者确实并不是快乐原则的似乎合理的目标,或是目的。因此,弗洛依德想要知道,这是某件翻译错过的东西:我们如何能够自圆其说,在这一的层次,规范每件东西的数量维持?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 35

July 9, 2015

Ethics 35
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

III
Rereading the Entwurf
第三章 重新阅读“规划”

AN ETHICS NOT A PSYCHOLOGY
伦理学,而非心理学
HOW REALITY IS CONSTITUTED
现实如何被构造
A TOPOLOGY OF SUBJECTIVITY
主体的拓扑学

I have up till now taken account of a number of points in Freud’s work. And
last time you saw how I was led in particular to refer to that curiously situated
work, the Entwurf.

迄今,我曾经考虑到弗洛依德著作里的许多观点。上次,你们看见我如何被引导,特别地提到那个耐人寻味地被定义的著作们“规划”。

You are aware of the reservations that one might have relative to the correspondence
with Fliess. It is not a work as such; the text we have isn’t
complete. But it is certainly extremely valuable, and especially its supplementary
material, among which the Entwurf has a special place.

你们知道我们可能会有所保留,关于弗洛伊德跟弗利斯的通信。这并不是著作本身,而是我们拥有的文本并不完整。但是这确实极端有价值的。特别是它的补充的材料。其中,“规划”具有特别的地位。

1
The Entwurf is very revealing of a kind of substructure of Freud’s thought.
Its obvious relationship to all the formulations of his experience that Freud
was led to offer subsequently makes it especially precious.

在弗洛依德的思想的同类的的次级结构,“规划”非其具有启示作用。它更弗洛依德随后被引导提供的他的经验的所有的阐述,具有明显的关系。这让它特别珍贵。

What I had to say about it last time expressed well enough the way in
which it will appear in my commentary this year. Contrary to received opinion,
I believe that the opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality
principle or between the primary process and the secondary process concerns
not so much the sphere of psychology as that of ethics properly speaking.

上次,我必须谈论到它,足够清楚地表达这个方式,它在我今年的评论出现的方式。跟通俗的意见恰恰相反,我相信,快乐原则与现实原则之间的对立,或原初过程与次级过程之间的对立,牵涉到的并不是心理学的领域,恰当而言,而是伦理学的领域。

There was in Freud the perception of the proper dimension in which human
action unfolds. And in the appearance of an ideal of mechanistic reduction
acknowledged in the Entwurf, one should simply see a compensatory movement
or the other face of Freud’s discovery of the fact of neurosis, which is
from the beginning seen in that ethical dimension where it is, in effect, situated.

在弗洛依德,存在着恰当维的的感知,在那里,人类的行动展开。在“规划”一书里,被承认的简化成为机械的理想的出现。我们应该仅是看见一个补偿的运动,或是另外一个脸孔,当弗洛依德发现神经症的事实。从一开始,神经症就被看待,从伦理学的维度。实际上,神经症就被定位在伦理学的维度。

The proof of this is in the fact that conflict is in the foreground, and
that from the outset this conflict concerns the moral order in what we might
call a massive way.

这个论点的证据在于这个事实:冲突在于前景。从一开始,这个冲突就牵涉到道德秩序,用我们所谓的巨大的方式。

That’s not such a novelty. Every builder of an ethics has had to face the
same problem. It is, in fact, in this connection that it is interesting to write a
history, or a genealogy, of morals. Not in Nietzsche’s sense, but as a series
of ethical systems, i.e., of theoretical reflection on moral experience. That
way one understands the central significance of problems that have been posed
since the beginning and that have been pursued with a notable constancy.

那并不足以如此新奇。伦理学的每位建构者都曾经必须面对相同的难题。实际上,就是关于这一点,书写道德的历史,或系谱学,是多么有趣。不是尼采所谓的“道德系谱学”,而是一系列的伦理学的系统。譬如,理论的反思道德的经验。以那种方式,我们理解到从一开始曾经被提出的那些难题的中心的意义。这些难题曾经被探寻,特别是持续不断地。

After all, why is it necessary that thinkers in the field of ethics always
return to the ethical problem of the relation of pleasure to the final good,
whenever the guidance of human action from a moral point of view is concerned?
Why do they always return to this same theme of pleasure?

毕竟,为什么这是必要的?在伦理学的领域的思想家总是回转到伦理学的难题,对于快乐跟最后的善的关系。每当人类行动的引导被牵涉到,从道德的观点。为什么他们总是回转到快乐的相同的主题?

How
does one explain that internal demand which constrains the ethical philosopher
to try to reduce the antimonies associated with this theme? – from the
fact that pleasure appears in many cases to be the end which is in opposition
to moral effort, but that the latter has nevertheless to locate its ultimate point
of reference there, a point of reference to which the good that is supposed to
orient human action is finally reduced.

我们如何解释,内部的要求限制伦理学的哲学家去尝试简化跟这个主题息息相关的对立?根据这个事实,快乐出现在许多状况里,成为跟道德对立的东西。但是道德的努力却仍然必须定位它的最后的指称点的位置在快乐那里。被认为是定向人类的行动的善,最后还是简化成为一个快乐的指称点。

That’s an example, and by no means
the only one, of the kind of knot which one comes upon in solutions to the
problem. It is instructive for us to see the constancy with which the problem
of conflict is posed within every discussion of morals.

那是这种环结的一个例子,而且决非是唯一的例子。我们遭遇的这种环结,当我们解决这个难题时。让我们看出这个经常次数具有启发性,冲突的这个难题经常次数地被提出,在道德的每次的讨论里。

Freud in this respect appears as no more than a descendent. Yet he contributes
something unmatched in significance, something that has changed
the problems of the ethical perspective for us to a degree that we are not yet
aware of. That is why we need reference points, and I have already alluded
to some of those that we will need to take account of this year.

从这个观点,弗洛依德出现,作为仅是一位传承者。可是,他贡献某件在重要性无与伦比的东西,这个东西改变我们对于伦理学的观点的难题,甚至,我们还没有知道的程度。那就是为什么我们需要许多指称点。我已经提到有一些的指称点,我们今年将需要考虑到的指称点。

One has to choose, since I don’t intend to highlight all those writers who
have discussed morals. I have discussed Aristotle because I believe that the
Nicomachean Ethics is properly speaking the first book to be organized around
the problem of an ethics. As you know, there are plenty of others around,
before, after, and in Aristotle’s work itself, who focus primarily on the problemn
of pleasure. I will not be referring to Epictetus or Seneca here, but I
will be discussing utilitarian theory insofar as it is significant for the new
direction which culminated in Freud.

我们必须选择,因为我并没有意图要强调所有那些曾经讨论过道德的作者。我曾经讨论过亚里斯多德,因为我相信,“亚里斯多德伦理学”恰当而言,是环绕伦理学的难题组织的第一本书。你们知道,以前或以后,还有许多其他的书环绕伦理学的这个难题。在亚里斯多德的著作本身,他最初专注于快乐的难题。我在此将不提到伊壁鸠鲁或西尼卡。但是我将讨论的功利主义的理论,因为这是非常重要的,对于在弗洛依德那里登峰造极的方向。

I will indicate today the interest of the analysis I will be giving of certain
works in the same terms that Freud used in the Entwurf, when he designated
something which, to my mind at least, is close to the language that I have
taught you over the years to pay attention to in the functioning of the primary
process, namely, Bahnung or facilitation.

今天,我将指示分析的这个興趣,我将给予某些著作的分析,用跟弗洛依德在“规划”里使用的相同的术语,当他指明某件东西。至少依照我的想法,这个东西靠近我过去几年来我曾经教导你们要密切注意的语言。在原初的过程的功能,换句话说,实用性或方便性。

As far as the statement of the problem of ethics is concerned, Freud’s
discourse facilitates something that allows us to go further than anyone has
gone before in a domain that is essential to the problems of morality. That
will be the inspiration for our discussion this year; it is around the term
reality in the true meaning of the word – a term we always use in such a
careless way – that the power of Freud’s conception is situated. And it is a
power that one can measure through the persistence of Freud’s name in the
development of our analytical activity.

就伦理学的难题的陈述而言,弗洛依德的辞说让某件东西成为方便,这个东西让我们能够更加深入,比起先前曾经进入的任何人,这个领域基本上是道德的难题。那将会是我们今年的讨论的启发。就是环绕“现实”的这个术语,在这个字词的真实的意义—我们总是用粗心的方式使用这一个术语—弗洛依德的观念的力量被定位在那里。我们能够测量这一个力量,凭借弗洛依德的名字持续存在于我们精神分析活动的发展里。

It is obvious that it is not the poor little contribution to a physiology of
fantasy involved, which explains the passionate interest we might take in
reading the Entwurf.

显而易见,并不是这个可怜的小贡献,对于牵涉到的幻想的生理学的贡献,解释这个激情的興趣,我们对于阅读“规划”的产生的興趣。

You will no doubt be told that this text is difficult, but it is also exciting.
Not so much in French as in German, for the French translation is extraordinarily
awkward. It is wanting in precision, emphasis, and resonance
throughout. In brief, I am obliged to evoke or to provoke at this point the
sense of regret some of you may have that you don’t know German.

你们无可置疑地将会被告上,这个文本是困难的,但是这个文本也令人興趣盎然。不是法文版,而是德文版。因为法文版的翻译特别笨拙。从头到尾欠缺准确性,强调与共鸣。总之,我不得不在这一点召唤,或提醒遗憾的感觉,你们有些人们可能会有的遗憾,你们不懂德文。

In German
it is a brilliant, pure text; it suggests a virgin source and is altogether
remarkable. The outlines of the French translation obliterate that and make
it grey. Make the effort to read it and you will realize how true my comment
is that one finds there something very different from a work constructed of
hypotheses. It is Freud’s first skirmish with that hyperbole of reality he had
to deal with in his patients.

在德文版,这是辉煌,纯粹的文本。它暗示一个原初的来源,它完全引人注意。法文版的翻译的钢要抹除那种辉煌,让它黯然无光。假如你们努力阅读它,你们将会体会到我的评论是多么真实。我们在那里发现某件非常不同的东西,跟用假设建构的著作。这是弗洛依德的首次伏击,用现实的那个夸张,他在病人身上必须要处理的现实的夸张。

There we have it; around forty years old he
discovers the true dimensions, the profoundly meaningful life, of that reality.
It is not out of a vain concern to refer you to a text that I draw your
attention to the Entwurf. Yet why not, after all? You all know that on occasion
I know how to take liberties with Freud’s texts and affirm my distance.

在那里,我们拥有它。大约四十岁时,弗洛依德发现这个真实的维度,深刻具有意义的生活,那个现实的生活。我跟你们提到一个文本,动机并不是出于徒劳的关心,我提醒你们注意“规划”这个文本。可是,有何不可呢?毕竟?你们都知道,有时,我知道如何大胆使用弗洛依德的文本,并且肯定我的距离。

If for example I have taught you the doctrine of the dominance of a signifier
in a subject’s unconscious chain, it is so as to emphasize certain characteristics
of our experience. By virtue of a distinction that I don’t fully agree with,
a distinction that does nevertheless express something, the paper we heard
last night called the above “the experience of the content.” And it affirmed
in opposition to it the scaffolding of concepts. Well now, this year I am proposing
not simply to be faithful to the text of Freud and to be its exegete, as
if it were the source of an unchanging truth that was the model, mold and
dress code to be imposed on all our experience.

譬如,我曾经教导你们,在主体的无意识的锁链,能指作为统辖的信条。那是为了强调我们的精神分析经验的某些的特性。凭借这个区别,我并不完全同意的区别。可是,这一个区别确实表达某件东西。昨天晚上,我们听见的那篇论文称呼以上的东西为“内容的经验”。跟它对立地,它肯定观念的基架。呵呵,今年,我正在建议,不仅是要忠实于弗洛依德的文本,而且要忠实于它的正版诠释。好像那是永远不会改变的真理的来源,作为榜样,模式与服装尺码,应该被赋加于我们所有的经验上。

What are we going to do? We are going to look for the phylum and the
development of the concepts in Freud – in the Entwurf, in Chapter VII of
the Traumdeutung – where he publishes for the first time the opposition between
the primary and the secondary processes, and his conception of the relationship
between the conscious, the preconscious and the unconscious – in the
introduction of narcissism into this economy; then in what is called the second
topic, with its emphasis on the reciprocal functioning of the ego, the
superego and the outside world, which gives a complete expression to things
that we may have glimpsed as new shoots in the Entwurf; and finally in the
later texts that are still centered around the same theme, “How is reality
constituted for man?”, namely, in the 1925 article on Vemeinung, which we
will look at again together, and in Civilization and Its Discontents, the discontents
of man’s situation in the world. The German term is Kultur, and we
will perhaps have to try to define its exact meaning in Freud’s writings. He
never takes over concepts in a neutral, conventional sense; a concept has
always for him a fully assumed significance.

我们将要如何做?我们将要寻找弗洛依德的观念的相关来源与发展。在“规划”,在“梦的解析”的第七章—在那里,弗洛依德首次出版原初与次级过程的对立,以及意识,前意识,与无意识之间的关系的观念。他将自恋介绍进入这种经济活力。然后,在所谓的第二个议题,它强调自我,超我,与外在世界的互惠的功能。这给予完整地表达那些事情,我们曾经瞥见的事情,作为是“规划”一书的新的观念。最后在后来的文本,依旧专注于相同的主题。「对于人,现实如何被构成?」换句话说,在1925年论“否定”的文章,我们将再次阅读那篇文章。然后在“文明及其不满”,人对于世界的情况的不满。德文的版本是Kultur 。我们或许将必须尝试定义它的确实的意义,在弗洛依德的著作里。他从来没有接管这些观念,用中立,传统的意义。这一个观念对于他而言,总是拥有意义。

It turns out then that if we are following so closely the development of
Freud’s metapsychology this year, it is in order to uncover the traces of a
theory that reflects an ethical thought. The latter is, in fact, at the center of
our work as analysts, however difficult it may be to realize it fully, and it is
also the latter which holds together all those who constitute the analytic community
– that dispersion, which often gives the impression of being a mere
scattering, of a fundamental intuition that is taken up by each one of us from
one perspective or another.

因此,结果证明是,假如我们今年,正在如此仔细地追寻弗洛依德的形上心理学的发展。那是为了挖掘反映伦理学的思想的痕迹。实际上,后者处于我们作为精神分析家的工作的核心,无论要彻底实现它是多么的困难。也是后者将所有那些人们聚集一块,那些形成精神分析社团的那些人们。那种扩散经常给予这个印象,仅是散开的印象,基本的直觉的印象,被我们每个人从事的基本的直觉,被我们每个人,从某个观点。

If we always return to Freud, it is because he started out with an initial,
central intuition, which is ethical in kind. I believe it essential to emphasize
that, if we are to understand our experience and animate it, and if we are not
to lose our way and allow it to be degraded. That’s the reason why I am
tackling this subject this year.

假如我们总是回答弗洛依德,那是因为他开始具有一个最初,中心的直觉,属于伦理学的直觉。我相信这是非常重于的,要强调那一点,假如我们想要理解我们的精神分析经验,并且激发它的生命力。假如我们并不想要迷失我们的途径,并且让它堕落下去。那就是这个理由,为什么今年我正在克服这个主题。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 82

July 8, 2015

Ethic 82

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

VI
第五章

THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
实践理性的批判

PHILOSOPHY IN THE BOUDOIR
闺房哲学

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
十戒

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
致罗马人的使徒书

Putting the wife between the house and the donkey has given rise to more
than one idea that one can recognize there the exigences of a primitive society—
a society of Bedouins, “wogs,” and “niggers.” Well, I don’t agree.
The law affirmed there, the part concerning one’s neighbor’s wife at least,
is still alive in the hearts of men who violate it every day, and it doubtless has
a relationship to that which is the object of our discussion today, namely, das
Ding.

将妻子摆在房屋与驴子之间,产生不仅一个观念,我们在那里体认筹原初社会的迫切性—一个贝多恩的社会,“ 房屋”与“奴仆”的社会。「呵呵,我不同意。」法则在那里肯定,至少关于邻居的妻子,以旧活生生地在那些男人的心中,他们每天违背它。无可置疑地,它跟属于我们今天讨论的这个客体并没有关系,换句话说,“物象”。

It is not after all a question of just any good here. It is not a question of
that which creates the law of exchange and covers with a kind of amusing
legality, a kind of social Skherung, the movements, the impetus, of human
instincts. It is a question of something whose value resides in the fact that
none of these objects exists without having the closest possible relationship
to that in which the human being can rest as if it were the Trude, das Ding –
not insofar as it is his good, but insofar as it is the good in which he may find
rest. Let me add das Ding insofar as it is the very correlative of the law of
speech in its most primitive point of origin, and in the sense that this Ding
was there from the beginning, that it was the first thing that separated itself
from everything the subject began to name and articulate, that the covetousness
that is in question is not addressed to anything that I might desire but
to a thing that is my neighbor’s Thing.

毕竟,这并不仅仅是在此地任何的善的问题。这并不是创造交换法则的东西,并且涵盖某种有趣的合法性的问题,这是一种社会的运动,人类本能的动机的问题。这是某件东西的价值在于这个事实的问题,这些东西的存在必然会有密切的关系,跟人类能够依靠的东西,好像那是真理,“物象”。不是因为那是他的善,而是因为在那个善里,他可以找到依靠。让我们补充这个“物象”,因为物象是言说的法则的相关因素,处于它最原初的起源点。开一开头,这个物象在那里的意义是,物象是最早将它自己分开,跟每一样主体开始命名并且表达的东西分开。受到质疑的垂涎并不是针对任何东西言说,我可能欲望的东西,而是针对属于我的邻居的“物象”的东西。

It is to the extent that the commandment in question preserves the distance
from the Thing as founded by speech itself that it assumes its value.
But where does this take us?

甚至受到质疑的这个戒令,跟这个“物象”保持这个距离,作为是言说自身的基础。这样,它具有它的价值。但是这会引导我们前往哪里?

Is the Law the Thing? Certainly not. Yet I can only know of the Thing by
means of the Law. In effect, I would not have had the idea to covet it if the
Law hadn’t said: “Thou shalt not covet it.” But the Thing finds a way by
producing in me all kinds of covetousness thanks to the commandment, for
without the Law the Thing is dead. But even without the Law, I was once
alive. But when the commandment appeared, the Thing flared up, returned
once again, I met my death. And for me, the commandment that was supposed
to lead to life turned out to lead to death, for the Thing found a way
and thanks to the commandment seduced me; through it I came to desire
death.

法则就是“物象”吗?当然不是。可是,我知道这个物象,仅是凭借着法则。实际上,我本来不会拥有垂涎它的这个想法,假如法则当时没有明说:「汝勿垂涎它!」但是,这个物象找到一个途径,作为在我身上产生各色各样的垂涎,由于这个戒令。因为假如没有这个法则,物象是死亡。但是即使没有法则,我再次活着。但是当戒令出现,这个物象突然燃烧起来,再次回来。我遭遇我的死亡。对于我而言,被认为导致生命的这个戒令,结果是导致死亡,因为物象找到一个途径。并且由于这个戒了,物象诱拐我,经由这个戒令,我逐渐欲望死亡。

I believe that for a little while now some of you at least have begun to
suspect that it is no longer I who have been speaking. In fact, with one small
change, namely, “Thing” for “sin,” this is the speech of Saint Paul on the
subject of the relations between the law and sin in the Epistle to the Romans,

我相信,有段时间,至死你们一些人们开始怀疑,一直在言说的这个人并不是我。实际上,具有小小的改变,也就是以“物象”取代“原罪”。那就是圣保罗的言说,讨论法则与原罪之间的关系,在“致罗马人的使徒书”。

Whatever some may think in certain milieux, you would be wrong to think
that the religious authors aren’t a good read. I have always been rewarded
whenever I have immersed myself in their works. And Saint Paul’s Epistle is
a work that I recommend to you for your vacation reading; you will find it
very good company.

无论有些人们在某种情况会怎样地认为,你们将是错误,假如你们认为,这些宗教的作者并不值得阅读。我总是收获丰硕,每当我陶醉于他们的作品。圣保罗的使徒书是我推荐给于你们暑期阅读的一本著作,你们将发现它是很好的伴随。

The relationship between the Thing and the Law could not be better defined
than in these terms. And we will come back to it now. The dialectical relationship
between desire and the Law causes our desire to flare up only in
relation to the Law, through which it becomes the desire for death. It is only
because of the Law that sin, αμαρτία – which in Greek means lack and nonparticipation in the Thing – takes on an excessive, hyperbolic character. Freud’s
discovery – the ethics of psychoanalysis – does it leave us clinging to that
dialectic?

这个“物象“与法则之间的关系用这些术语来定义是最贴切不过。我们现在将回头谈论它。处于欲望与法则之间的这个辩证的关系引为我们的欲望燃烧起来,仅是跟法则的关系。经由这个法则,它变成是追求死亡的欲望。仅是因为这个法则,原罪αμαρτία,这个希腊字词典意思是”欠缺“与”不参与物象“。”原罪“具有一个过渡,夸张的特性。弗洛依德的发现—精神分析的伦理学—它让我们紧捉住那个辩证法吗?

We will have to explore that which, over the centuries, human
beings have succeeded in elaborating that transgresses the Law, puts them in
a relationship to desire that transgresses interdiction, and introduces an erotics
that is above morality.

我们将必须探索过去几世纪来,人类曾经成功地建构来逾越法则的东西,让他们处于一种跟逾越禁令的欲望的关系,并且介绍一种超越道德的情爱。

I don’t think that you should be surprised by such a question. It is after
all precisely something that all religions engage in, all mysticisms, all that
Kant disdainfully calls the Religionsschwarmereien, religious enthusiasms –
it’s not an easy term to translate. What is all this except a way of rediscovering
the relationship to das Ding somewhere beyond the law? There are no
doubt other ways. No doubt, in talking about erodes, we will have to talk
about the kind of rules of love that have been elaborated over the centuries.

我并不认为,你们应该对这样的问题大吃一惊。毕竟,这确实就是所有的宗教,所有的神秘主义参与的东西。所有康德藐视地称为是“宗教狂热主义“的东西—要翻译这个术语并不容易。所有这一切难道不就是重新发现跟”物象“的关系?在超越法制则的某个地方?无可置疑地,还有其他的方式。无可置疑地,当我们谈论腐蚀物时,我们将必须谈论有关爱的这些法则,过去几世纪来,曾经被建构的爱的法则。

Freud said somewhere that he could have described his doctrine as an erodes,
but, he went on, “I didn’t do it, because that would have involved giving
ground relative to words, and he who gives ground relative to words also
gives ground relative to things. I thus spoke of the theory of sexuality.”

弗洛依德在某个地方说过,他本来会将他的信条描述为一种“腐蚀物“,但是他继续说:「我没有这样描述,因为那本来将会牵涉到要退让跟文字相关的立场。而退让跟文字相关的立场的人,也等于是退让跟事物相关的立场。我因此谈论到性的理论。」

It’s true: Freud placed in the forefront of ethical inquiry the simple relationship
between man and woman. Strangely enough, things haven’t been
able to move beyond that point. The question of das Ding is still attached to
whatever is open, lacking, or gaping at the center of our desire. I would say
– you will forgive the play on words – that we need to know what we can do
to transform this dam-age into our “dame” in the archaic French sense, our
lady.

的确,弗洛依德在伦理学研究的前景,放置男人与女人之间的这个单纯的关系。耐人寻味地,事情始终不能个移动超越那个时刻。“物象“的这个问题依旧连接,跟任何开放的东西连接,跟任何在我们的欲望的中心分开的东西连接。我不妨说—你们将原谅这些文字遊戏。我们需要知道,我们能够做什么,为了将这个“dam-age”(水坝-时代),转化成为我们的”dame”, 法文古义是“我们的女士”。

Don’t laugh at this sleight of hand; it was in the language before I used it.
If you look up the etymology of the word “danger,” you will see that exactly
the same ambiguity exists from the beginning in French: “danger” was originally
“domniarium,” domination. The word “dame” gradually came to contaminate
that word. And, in effect, when we are in another’s power, we are
in great danger.

请你们不要嘲笑这种文字遊戏的花样。我使用它之前,它就存在于语言里。假如你们查阅“danger”(危险)这个字的字源学,你们将会看出,从一开头,在法文的“danger“,存在着确实相同的歧义性:”danger“原先的意思是”支使“。而”dame“这个字则是逐渐污染那个字词。实际上,当我们受到另外一个力量的掌握,我们处于危险当中。

Therefore, next year we will try to advance still further into these incontestably
perilous waters.
December 23,1959

因此,明年,我们将会尝试更加深入地进入这些无法测试的危险的水域。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 80

July 7, 2015

Ethic 80

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

VI
第五章

THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
实践理性的批判

PHILOSOPHY IN THE BOUDOIR
闺房哲学

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
十戒

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
致罗马人的使徒书

3
We are then brought back again to the moral law insofar as it is incarnated
in a certain number of commandments. I mean the ten commandments, which
in the beginning, at a period that is not so remote in the past, were collected
by a people that sets itself apart as a chosen people.

我们因此再次被带回到道德法则,因为它以某些的戒律作为具体表现。我指的是十戒。刚开始,在并不是那么遥远的过去的时期,十戒被一个民族收集。这个民族自视不同于其他民族,作为上帝的选民。

As I said, it is appropriate to reconsider these commandments. I noted last
time that there is a study to be done for which I would gladly call upon one
of you as the representative of a tradition of moral theology. A great many
questions deserve our attention. I spoke of the number of commandments.
There is also the matter of their form and the way in which they are transmitted
to us in the future tense. I would be glad to call upon the help of
someone who knows enough Hebrew to answer my questions. In the Hebrew
version is it a future tense or a form of the volitive that is used in Deuteronomy
and Numbers, where we see the first formulations of the Decalogue?

如无所说,重新考虑这十戒是合宜的。我上次注意到,有一个能够被从事的研究,我将很乐意邀请你们其中一位,作为道德神学的传统的代表。许多问题应该值得我们注意。我谈论到十戒的数字。也存在着它们的形式与它们被传递给有我们的未来时态度方式的问题。我将会很乐意恳请某个人的帮助,假如他懂得希伯来文,可以回答我的问题。在希伯来文的版本,这是一个选择意愿的未来时态或形式吗?在“法则与数字”里被使用的选择意愿?在那里,我们看见“十戒”的最早的说明。

The issue I want to raise today concerns their privileged structure in relation
to the structure of the law. I want today to consider two of them.
I must leave to one side the huge questions posed by the promulgation of
these commandments by something that announces itself in the following
form: “I am what I am.” It is, in effect, necessary not to draw the text in the
direction of Greek metaphysics by translating as “he who is,” or “he who
am.” The English translation, “I am that I am,” is, according to Hebrew
scholars, the closest to what is meant by the formulation of the verse. Perhaps
I am mistaken, but since I do not know Hebrew and while I wait on further
information on the subject, I rely on the best authorities, and they are of one
mind on the question.

今天我想要提出的这个议题跟它们的特权的结构息息相关,关于法则的结构。我今天想要考虑其中的两个法则。我必须将这些巨大的问题留在一边,这十戒的阐述提出的问题,由某件宣称它自己,用以下的方式:「我是我的本质的样子」。实际上,这是必要的,不要将这个文本朝希腊形上学的方向,翻译成为「我就是他的本质的样子」,或「他是我的本质的样子」。在英文的翻译,「我是我的本质的样子」,依照希伯来文学者,最靠近这句诗句的阐述的意义。或许我错误,但是因为我并不懂得希伯来文,当我从事研究这个议题的更进一步的资讯。我依靠最好的权威,他们对于这个问题答案一致。

That “I am what I am” is announced first of all to a small people in the
form of that which saved it from the misfortunes of Egypt, and it begins by
affirming, “You will adore no God but me, before my countenance.” I leave
open the question of what “before my countenance” means. Does it mean
that beyond the countenance of God, i.e., outside Canaan, the adoration of
other gods is not inconceivable for a believing Jew? A passage from the second
Book of Samuel, spoken by David, seems to confirm this.

这个「我就是我的本质的样子」,首先被宣布,对于少数民族,使用的方式是拯救他们免于埃及的灾难。这个民族开始宣称:「你们将不崇拜别的神,除了我,在我的面前」。我展开这个问题;“在我的面前“是什么意思?它难道意味着,在上帝的面孔之外,譬如,在迦拿之外,还有其他的众神的崇拜?对于信仰的犹太人并非没有构想到?从萨谬尔的第二书,大卫所言说的,似乎肯定这一点。

It is nevertheless the case that the second commandment, the one that
formally excludes not only every cult, but also every image, every representation
of what is in heaven, on earth, or in the void, seems to me to show that
what is involved is in a very special relationship to human feeling as a whole.
In a nutshell, the elimination of the function of the imaginary presents itself
to my mind, and, I think, to yours, as the principle of the relation to the
symbolic, in the meaning we give that term here; that is to say, to speech. Its
principal condition is there.

这仍然是这个情况,第二戒不但正式排除每个信仰,而且排除每个意象,每个属于天上,地上,或空无里的表象。我觉得它们显示,所被牵涉的东西,处于跟人类的整体的特别的关系。总之,想像界的功能的减少呈现它自己在我的心里,与你们的心理,作为是跟象征界的关系的原则。从我们给予在此的这个术语的意义。换句话说,给予言说。它的主要的情况在那里。

I leave aside the question of rest on the sabbath day. But I believe that that
extraordinary commandment, according to which, in a land of masters, we
observe one day out of seven without work – such that according to humorous
proverbs, the common man is left no happy medium between the labor
of love and the most stultifying boredom – that suspension, that emptiness,
clearly introduces into human life the sign of a gap, a beyond relative to every
law of utility. It seems to me, therefore, that it has the most intimate relationship
to something that we are on the track of here.

我将安息日的休息放在一边。但是我相信,依照那个特殊的十戒,在众多主人的土地,我们观察,七天有一天没有工作。依照幽默的格言,这位普通的人在爱的劳苦与最令人窒闷的无聊之极,并没有留有快乐的媒介—那个悬置,那个空虚,清楚地将一个差距的讯息介绍进入人的生活,一个相对于每个功利的法则的超越。因此,我觉得它具有最亲密的关系,跟某件我们在此追踪的东西。

I leave aside the prohibition on murder, for we will have to come back to
that in connection with the respective significance of the act and its retribution.
I want to take up the prohibition on lying insofar as it is related to what
presented itself to us as that essential relationship of man to the Thing, insofar
as it is commanded by the pleasure principle, namely, the lie that we have
to deal with every day in our unconscious.

我将谋杀的禁令放在一边。因为我们将会回到那个问题,关于行动与行动的惩罚的个别的意义。我想要探讨禁止谎言的禁令。因为它跟呈现它自己给予我们的东西息息相关。作为是人跟“物象“的基本的关系。因为它受到快乐原则的命令。换句话说,我们必须处理的每天的谎言,在我们的无意识里。

“Thou shalt not lie” is the commandment in which the intimate link between
desire, in its structuring function, with the law is felt most tangibly. In truth,
this commandment exists to make us feel the true function of the law. And I
can do no better than to place it beside the sophism in which is manifested
most strikingly the type of ingenuity that is furthest from the Jewish or talmudic
tradition, namely, the paradox of Epimenides, he who affirmed that
all men are liars. What am I saying, in proposing the articulation of the
unconscious that I gave you; what am I saying, responds the sophism? –
except that I, too, lie, and, consequently, I can affirm nothing valid concerning
not simply the function of truth, but even the significance of lying.

「你们不可说谎」,是这个戒令。在这个戒令里,处于欲望与法则之间的这个亲密的连接,在欲望的作为结构的功能,非常具体地被感觉到。实际上,这个十戒存在,仅是让我们感觉法则的真实的功能。我所能够做充其量仅是将它放置在诡辩主义的旁边,在那里。这种的机智非常引人注意地被展现出来。这种机智根本就不是犹太人或塔木德的传统。换句话说,那是依皮米尼底思的悖论。他肯定说:「每个人都是说谎者」。我正在说的东西,当我建议我给于你们的无意识的表达,我正在说的东西,回应这个诡辩主义吗?除了,我也是说谎。结果,我不能够肯定任何正确的东西,关于不仅是真理的功能,而且甚至说谎的意义。

“Thou shalt not lie” as a negative precept has as its function to withdraw
the subject of enunciation from that which is enunciated. Remember the
graph. It is there that I can say “Thou shalt not lie” – there where I he,
where I repress, where I, the liar, speak. In “Thou shalt not lie” as law is
included the possibility of the lie as the most fundamental desire.

「汝不可说谎」,作为一个负面的教训,必须将表述的主体撤退,作为它的功能。从被表述的内容撤退。请你们记住这个图形。就在那里,我能够说「汝不可说谎」。在我说谎的地方。在我压抑的地方,在我作为说谎者言说的地方。在「汝不可说谎」,当法则,这个谎言的可能性被包括在内,作为是最基本的欲望。

I am going to give you a proof that is to my mind nevertheless valid. It
concerns Proudhon’s famous phrase: “Property is theft.” Another proof is
that of the cries of anguish lawyers emit whenever it is a question, in some
more or less grotesque and mythical form, of using a lie detector. Must we
conclude from this that the respect of the human person involves the right to
he? Surely, it is a question and not an answer to reply “yes, certainly.” One
might say, it’s not so simple.

我将要给予你们一个我认为是正确的证据。这个证据关系的普鲁东的著名的词语:「财产是偷窃」。另外一个证据是,痛苦的律师们的喊叫发出的证据,每当问题是使用测谎器的问题,用相对古怪而神秘的形式。我们必须根据这个下结论吗?对于人权的尊重牵涉到说谎言的权利?这是一个问题,回答并不是“是的,当然是”。我们不妨说,这问题不那么简单。

What is the source of that rebellion against the fact that something exists
which may reduce the question of the subject’s speech to a universally objectified
application? The point is that speech doesn’t itself know what it is
saying when it lies, and that, on the other hand, in lying it also speaks some
truth. Moreover, it is in this antinomic function between the law and desire,
as conditioned by speech, that resides the primordial authority which makes
this commandment among all ten one of the cornerstones of that which we
call the human condition, to the extent that that condition merits our respect.

那个反叛的来源是什么?反叛这个事实,某件东西存在,可能会化减主体言说的这个问题,化减到普遍性成为客体的运用。重点是,言说本身并不知道当它说谎时它说些什么。在另一方面,当说谎时,它也言说某个真理。而且,就在这个对立的功能,处于法则与欲望之间的功能,作为被言说所制约,这个原始的权威存在着。这个原始的权威让十戒中的这个戒令,成为我们所谓的人类的情况的东西的基础。甚至,那个情况获得我们的尊敬。

Since time is getting on, I will skip quickly forward to the issue that is the
object of our discussion today relative to the relationship between desire and
the law. It is the famous commandment that affirms the following – it makes
one smile, but when one thinks about it, one doesn’t smile for long: “Thou
shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife,
neither his man servant, nor his maid servant, neither his ox, nor his ass, nor
anything that belongs to thy neighbor.”

因为时间过得很快,我将快速地跳到这个议题:我们今天探讨的目标,相对于欲望与法则之间这个关系。这个著名的戒令肯定以下:它让我们会心一笑,但是当我们思考到它,我们微笑不了多久:「汝不可垂涎邻人的房屋,汝不可垂涎邻人的妻子,男仆人或女仆人,牛羊或任何属于邻人的东西。」

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethic 77

July 6, 2015

Ethic 77

The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

VI
第五章

THE CRITIQUE OF PRACTICAL REASON
实践理性的批判

PHILOSOPHY IN THE BOUDOIR
闺房哲学

THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
十戒

THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS
致罗马人的使徒书

Let us be clear about this: when we reflect on the maxim that guides our
action, Kant is inviting us to consider it for an instant as the law of a nature
in which we are called upon to live.

让我们澄清这点:当我们反思引导我们的行动的公理,康德正在邀请我们将它认为是自然的法则,我们被召唤生活其中的自然的法则。

That is where one finds the apparatus
that would have us reject in horror some maxim or other that our instincts
would gladly lead us to. In this connection he gives us examples that are
worth taking note of in a concrete sense, for however obvious they may seem,
they perhaps suggest, at least to the analyst, a line of reflection.

这就是我们发现这个工具,这个工具本来会要我们因为恐惧而排斥某个公理。这样,我们的本能将会高興地引导我们到那个公理。关于这点,他给予我们例子,值得注意的例子,以具体的意义而言,因为无论这些例子是多么的明显,它们或许暗示着反思的脉络,至少对于精神分析家而言。

But note that
he affirms the laws of nature, not of society. It is only too clear that not only
do societies live very well by reference to laws that are far from promoting
their universal application, but even more remarkably, as I suggested last
time, these societies prosper as a result of the transgression of these maxims.

但是,请你们注意,他肯定自然的法则,而不是社会的法则。这是非常清楚的,不但社会凭借提到这些法则,。生活得颇为顺利。这些法则根本就没有提升它们的普世的应用,而且更加引人注意的,如同我上次建议,这些社会的繁荣,是由于这些公理的逾越的结果。

It is a matter then of a mental reference to a nature that is organized according
to the laws of an object constructed at the moment when we raise the question
of our rule of conduct.

事情因此就算要在精神方面提到自然,这个自然被组织,依照客体的法则。这个客体被建造,当我们提出我们的行为的规范的问题。

So as to produce the kind of shock or eye-opening effect that seems to me
necessary if we are to make progress, I simply want to draw your attention
to this: if The Critique of Practical Reason appeared in 1788, seven years after
the first edition of The Critique of Pure Reason, there is another work which
came out six years after The Critique of Practical Reason, a little after Thermidor
in 1795, and which is called Philosophy in the Boudoir.

为了产生某种的震撼或开眼界的效果,我觉得这是必要的,假如我们想要有所进展。我仅是想要吸引你们注意这个:假如“实践理性批判”出现在1788年,比“纯粹理性批判”的第一版晚了七年。还有另外一本著作出现,比“实践理性批判”晚六年。比起1795年的“社米德”,就是所称道“在博德尔的哲学”.

As, I suppose, you all know, Philosophy in the Boudoir is the work of a
certain Marquis de Sade, who is famous for more than one reason. His notoriety
was accompanied from the beginning by great misfortunes, and one
might add by the abuse of power concerning him – he did after all remain a
prisoner for twenty-five years, which is a long time for someone who, my
goodness, as far as we know, never committed a serious crime, and who in
certain of our modern ideologies has been promoted to a point where one can
also say that there is at the very least some confusion, if not excess.

我认为,众所周知,“在博德尔的哲学“是某位萨德的著作。萨德的著名不仅一个理由。他的恶名昭著从一开始就伴随极大的不幸。我们不妨补充说,凭借关于他的权力的烂用。二十五年来,他毕竟始终是一位囚犯。二十五年是一段长的时间,对于某位据我们所知,其实从来没有犯过严重的罪的人。在我们现代的意识形态里,他已经被提升到这个程度,我们也能够说,至少会有些混乱,虽然还不是很过分。

Although in the eyes of some the work of the Marquis de Sade seems to
promise a variety of entertainments, it is not strictly speaking much fun.
Moreover, the pans that seem to give the most pleasure can also be regarded
as the most boring. But one cannot claim that his work lacks coherence. And,
in a word, it is precisely the Kantian criteria he advances to justify his positions
that constitute what can be called a kind of anti-morality.

虽然在某些人们的眼中,萨德的著作似乎承诺各色各样的娱乐。严格来说,那并不十分有趣。而且,似乎给予最大快乐的双关语,也能够被认为是最枯燥无聊的。但是我们无法宣称,他的著作欠缺一贯性。总之,他确实提升康德的标准,为了替他的立场自圆其说。他的立场构成所谓的某种的违背-道德。

The paradox of this is argued with the greatest coherence in the work that
is entitled Philosophy in the Boudoir. A short passage is included in it that,
given the number of attentive ears here, is the only one that I expressly recommend
you read – “Frenchmen, one more effort to become republicans.”

在“博德尔的哲学“里,这个违背-道德的悖论强烈一贯地被主张。在里面包含一个短的段落,假如考虑到在此有那么多么多人专注倾听,这是唯一的一段,我强烈地推荐你们阅读—“法国人,再次成为共和党人的努力”。

As a result of this appeal, which supposedly came from a number of cells
that were active at that time in revolutionary Paris, the Marquis de Sade
proposes that, given the ruin of those authorities on which (according to the
work’s premises) the creation of a true republic depends, we should adopt
the opposite of what was considered up to that point as the essential minimum
of a viable and coherent morality.

由于这个呼吁的结果,那个呼吁被认为来自许多的活跃的组织,在革命时期的巴黎的当时。萨德建议,假如考虑到那些权威(依照作品推测),一个真正的共和国的创建要依靠的权威。我们应该採用相反的东西,直到那时,被认为是至少是实用而一贯的道德。

And, in truth, he does quite a good job in defending that proposal. It is no
accident if we first find in Philosophy in the Boudoir the praise of calumny.
Calumny, he writes, can in no sense be injurious; if it imputes to our neighbor
worse things than one can justifiably impute to him, it nevertheless has
the merit that it puts us on guard against his activities. And the author proceeds
in like manner to justify point by point the reversal of the fundamental
imperatives of the moral law, extolling incest, adultery, theft, and everything
else you can think of. If you adopt the opposite of all the laws of the Decalogue,
you will end up with the coherent exposition of something which in
the last instance may be articulated as follows: “Let us take as the universal
maxim of our conduct the right to enjoy any other person whatsoever as the
instrument of our pleasure.”

事实上,他尽心尽力地辨护那个建议。这个并非是偶然,假如我们首先在“博德尔顿哲学”里发现到,对于诬告的赞赏。他书写到,诬告根本就无伤大雅。假如诬告跟我们的邻居灌输更加糟糕的东西,我们能够振振有理地灌输给他。诬告仍然具有这个优点, 它让我们警觉防卫他的行动。作者继续以同样的方式逐项地自圆其说,对于道德法则的基本命令倒转。他称赞乱伦,通奸,偷窃,以及每样你想得到的东西。假如你们採用所有的法则的相反,十日谈的所有的法则。你们结束会有事情的一贯陈述。以最后的一个例子,它可以被表达如下:「让我们接受这个权利,享受另外一个人的权利,作为是我们的行为的普世的公理,作为我们快乐的工具。」

Sade demonstrates with great consistency that, once universalized, this law,
although it gives libertines complete power over all women indifferently,
whether they like it or not, conversely also liberates those same women from
all the dudes that civilized society imposes on them in their conjugal, matrimonial
and other relations. This conception opens wide the flood gates that
in imagination he proposes as the horizon of our desire; everyone is invited
to pursue to the limit the demands of his lust, and to realize them.

萨德强烈一贯地证明,一旦成为普世标准,这个法则虽然给予花花公子以不同方式完全掌控所有的女人,无论他们喜欢与否。反过来说,这个法则也让那些相同的女人获得自由,免除文明社会赋加在她们身上的所有那些公子少爷,在她们的婚姻,家庭与其他关系里。这个观念大大打开洪水闸门。在想像里,他建议作为我们的欲望的水平线,每个人都被邀请将他的欲念的要求彻底追求,并且实现它们。

If the same opening is given to all, one will be able to see what a natural
society is like. Our repugnance may be legitimately related to that which
Kant himself claims to eliminate from the criteria of the moral law, namely,
to the realm of sentiment.

假如相同的机会给予大家,我们将会能够看见自然的社会像是什么样子。我们的厌恶可能跟康德自己宣称的东西合理地息息相关。为了减少,从道德法则的标准,到情感的领域。

If one eliminates from morality every element of sentiment, if one removes
or invalidates all guidance to be found in sentiments, then in the final analysis
the Sadian world is conceivable – even if it is its inversion, its caricature – as
one of the possible forms of the world governed by a radical ethics, by the
Kantian ethics as elaborated in 1788.

假如我们从道德减少情感的每个因素,假如我们移除或让所有在情感里能够被发现的引导成为无效,那么,追根究底,萨德的世界是可以构想的。即使萨德的世界是它的倒转,它的嘲讽—作为是其中一个可能的世界,被强烈的伦理学统辖的世界,被康德的伦理学,在1788年建构的伦理学。

Believe me, there is no lack of Kantian echoes in the attempts to articulate
moral systems that one finds in a vast literature that might be called libertine,
the literature of the man of pleasure, which is an equally caricatural form of
the problem that for a long time preoccupied the αnciéη regime, and from
Fenelon on, the education of girls. You can see that pushed to its comically
paradoxical limit in The Raised Curtain by Mirabeau.

请你们相信我。并不欠缺对于康德的迴响。由于企图要表达道德的系统,我们在各种各样所谓“风流文学”发现的道德系统,那些寻欢作乐的人们的文学。那是那个难题的同样具有嘲讽的形式,长久以来,这个难题专注于αnciéη regime,(古代政权),从风尼龙开始,就从事对女孩的教育。你们能够看见那个教育被推到它猾就的悖论的极限,在米拉保的“窗帘拉起”一书里。

Well now, we are coming to that on account of which, in its search for
justification, for a base and support, in the sense of reference to the reality
principle, ethics encounters its own stumbling block, its failure – I mean
there where an aporia opens up in that mental articulation we call ethics. In
the same way that Kantian ethics has no other consequence than that gymnastic
exercise whose formative function for anyone who thinks I have called
to your attention, so Sadian ethics has had no social consequences at all.

呵呵,我们正要谈论那个,因为那个极限,当它寻求自圆其说时,作为基础与支持,提到这个现实原则,伦理学遭遇它自己的绊脚石,它的失败。我在那里指的是,在我们所谓的伦理学的精神表达,一个难题展开的东西。同样地,康德的伦理学并没有其他的结果,除了将是运动练习,对于任何认为我提醒他们专注的人们而言,那个运动的练习的形成的功能。所以萨德的伦理学根本就没有任何的社会的结果。

Understand that I don’t know if the French have really tried to become
republicans, but it is certain that just like all the other nations of the world,
including those who had their revolutions after them – bolder, more ambitious,
and more radical revolutions, too – they have left what I will call the
religious bases of the ten commandments completely intact, even pushing
them to a point where their puritan character is increasingly marked. We’ve
reached a situation where the leader of a great socialist state on a visit to other
contemporary cultures is scandalized to see dancers on the Pacific coast of
the noble country of America raising their legs a little too high.

请你们理解,我并不知道法国人是否确实尝试成为共和国人。但是确定的是,就像世界的所有的其他国家一样,包括那些背后有革命可能的那些国家。更加大胆,更加具有企图心,更加强烈的革命。他们都将我所谓的十戒的宗教的基础保存相当完整,甚至将它们推到某个程度,他们的清教徒的性格逐渐被标识出来。我们已经到达一个情况,在那里,伟大的社会国家队领导者访问其他当代的文化,传出丑闻,因为他们在美国这个高贵的国家的太平洋海岸,观赏跳舞女郎将她们的大腿举得太高。

We are thus faced here with a question, that is to say, the question of the
relationship to das Ding.

我们因此面对一个问题。也就是说,跟“物象”的关系的问题。

This relationship seems to me to be sufficiently emphasized in the third
chapter of The Critique of Practical Reason concerning the motives of practical
pure reason. In effect, Kant acknowledges after all the existence of one sentient
correlative of the moral law in its purity, and strangely enough, I ask
you to note, it is nothing other than pain itself. I will read you the passage
concerned, the second paragraph of the third part: “Consequently, we can
see a priori that the moral law as the determining principle of will, by reason
of the fact that it sets itself against our inclinations, must produce a feeling
that one could call pain. And this is the first and perhaps only case, where
we are allowed to determine, by means of a priori concepts, the relationship
between a knowledge, which comes from practical pure reason, and a feeling
of pleasure or pain.”

我觉得这个关系似乎充分地被强调,在“实践理性的批判”的第三章,关于实践的纯粹理性的动机。实际上,康德毕竟承认一个“情感”的存在,相对应处于它的纯净状态的道德法则。耐人寻味地,我要求你们注意,那个情感实实在在就是痛苦的本身。我将跟你们朗读这个相关的段落,第三部分的第二段:「结果,我们能够看出一个难题,道德法则,作为意志的决定的原则。凭借这个事实:道德法则竖立它自己对康我们的倾向,道德法则一定会产生我们所谓的痛苦的感觉。这就是第一个,或许是唯一的个案。在那里,我们被容许决定,凭借“难题”的观念,决定这个关系,知识与快乐或痛苦的感觉之间的关系,因为知识来自实践纯粹理性。

In brief, Kant is of the same opinion as Sade. For in order to reach das
Ding absolutely, to open the flood gates of desire, what does Sade show us on
the horizon? In essence, pain. The other’s pain as well as the pain of the
subject himself, for on occasions they are simply one and the same thing. To
the degree that it involves forcing an access to the Thing, the outer extremity
of pleasure is unbearable to us. It is this that explains the absurd or, to use a
popular expression, maniacal side of Sade that strikes us in his fictional constructions.
We are aware at every moment of the discomfort in living constructions,
the kind of discomfort that makes it so difficult for our neurotic
patients to confess certain of their fantasms.

总之,康德持跟萨德相同的意见。为了绝对到达“物象”,为了打开欲望的洪水闸门,萨德在地平线跟我们显示的是什么?本质上,就是痛苦。他者的痛苦以及主体的痛苦。因为有时,他者的痛苦与主体的痛苦是同一件回事。甚至它牵涉到强迫进入到“物象”。快乐的外在的极端,对于我们而言,是无法忍受的。就是这个无法忍受解释这个荒谬,或者用通俗的话来说,萨德的疯狂的一面,在他的幻想的建构里,让我们印象深刻。我们在活生生的建构里,在不舒适的时刻,我们知道,这种的不舒适会让我们的神经症者很困难告白他们的某些的幻想。

In fact, to a certain degree, at a certain level, fantasms cannot bear the
revelation of speech.

事实上,某个程度,在某个层面,幻想似乎无法忍受言说的启示。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 32

July 4, 2015

Ethics 32
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

Of what else but movements that belong to the unconscious? Freud tells
us that the thought processes are only known to us through words, what we
know of the unconscious reaches us as a function of words. The idea is articulated
in the most precise and the most powerful of ways in the Entwurf.

除了在属于无意识的那些运动那里,还会在其它什么地方?弗洛依德告诉我们,思想的过程仅是凭借文字让我们知道。我们所知道的东西,关于无意识,到达我们,作为是文字的功能。这个观念的被表的,用最精确与最有力量的方式,在“筹划”一书里。

For
example, without the cry that it elicits, we would only have the most confused
notion of an unpleasant object, a notion that would indeed fail to detach
it from the context of which it would simply be the evil center, the object
would instead be stripped of the particularity of its context. Freud tells us
that a hostile object is only acknowledged at the level of consciousness when
pain causes the subject to utter a cry.

譬如,假如没有它召唤的的这个呼唤,我们仅是拥有最混乱的观念,对于不愉快的客体。这一个观念确实没有办法将它跟文本内容区隔开。那仅会上这个文本的邪恶的中心,代替地,这个客体将会被剥夺它的文本的特殊性。弗洛依德告诉我们,一个敌意的客体仅是被承认,在意识的层面,当痛苦引起主体发出喊叫。

The existence of the feindlicher Objekt
as such is the cry of the subject. This notion is expressed in the Entwurf. The
cry fulfills the function of a discharge; it plays the role of a bridge where
something of what is happening may be seized and identified in the consciousness
of the subject. This something would remain obscure and unconscious
if the cry did not lend it, as far as the conscious is concerned, the sign
that gives it its own weight, presence, structure.

这个邪恶-客体自身的存在,就是主体的喊叫。这个观念被表的,在“筹划”里。这个喊叫实践了发泄的功能。它扮演桥梁的角色。在桥梁那里,正在发生的事情的东西可能被掌握,并被辨认,在主体的意识里。这个某件东西将始终是模糊而且是无意识,假如这个喊叫没有帮助它,就意识而言,这个符号给予它自己的重量,存在,与结构。

It gives it as well a potentiality
due to the fact that the important objects for a human subject are
speaking objects, which will allow him to see revealed in the discourse of
others the processes that, in fact, inhabit his own unconscious.

它也给予它一个潜力,由于这个事实:作为一位人类主体的重要的客体是言说的客体。这个言说的客体让他能够看见在别人的辞说里,这些过程被显示出来。事实上,这些过程驻居在他自己的无意识里。

We only grasp the unconscious finally when it is explicated, in that part of
it which is articulated by passing into words. It is for this reason that we have
the right – all the more so as the development of Freud’s discovery will
demonstrate – to recognize that the unconscious itself has in the end no other
structure than the structure of language.

我们仅是理解这个无意识,最后当它被说明时,在无意识的那个部分,凭借进入文字而被表达。因为这个理由,我们拥有这个权利—更加具有这个权利,作为弗洛依德的发现的发展将会展示的。体认出无意识自身最后并没有拥有其他的结构,除了就是语言的结构。

It is this that gives value to atomistic theories. The latter do not cover any
of those things they claim to cover, namely, a certain number of atoms of the
neuronic apparatus, supposedly individualized elements of the nervous system.
But, on the other hand, the theories of relations of contiguity and continuity
illustrate admirably the signifying structure as such, insofar as it is
involved in any linguistic operation.

就是这个语言结构给予价值,给原子论的理论。后者并没有涵盖任何这些东西,它们宣称涵盖的的东西。换句话说,脑神秘工具的某些的原则,被认为是脑神经系统的个体化的元素。但是,在另一方面,偶然性与连续性的关系的理论又令人赞赏地说明这个成为能指的本身。因为它被牵涉到任何的语言的运作。

What do we see offered with this double intersection of the respective effects
of the reality and pleasure principles on each other?
The reality principle controls what happens at the level of thought, but it
is only insofar as something emerges from thought which can be articulated
in words in interhuman experience that it is able as a principle of thought to
come to the knowledge of the subject in his consciousness.

我们看见什么被提供出来?用这个双重的交会,现实原则与快乐原则各别地互相影响的交换?现实原则控制思想的层次所发生的事情,但是那仅是因为某件东西从思想出现。这个东西能够用文字被表达,在人际关系的经验里,它能够作为是思想的原则,来获得主体的知识,在他的意识里。

Conversely, the unconscious itself is to be situated at the level of elements,
of logical components which are of the order of λόγος, articulated in the form
of an ορθός λόγος hidden at the heart of the spot where the transitions, the
transferences motivated by attraction and necessity, and the inertia of pleasure
occur for the subject, those operations, in short, which cause one sign
rather than another to be valorized for him – to the extent that this sign may
be substituted for the earlier sign or, on the contrary, have transferred to it
the affective charge attached to a first experience.

相反地,无意识自身应该被定位在元素的层面,在属于λόγος的逻辑成分的层面,用“逻辑时间”的形式被表达,这个“逻辑时间”被隐藏在这个地点的核心。在那里,那些转换,由于吸引力与必要性激发的那些移情,快乐的惯性发生,对于主体,那些的运作,总之,引起某个讯息,而不是另外一个讯息被推崇,为了他。甚至这个讯息可能被替换成为早先的讯息。或相反地,这个讯息被移情给它。这个情感的发泄跟一个最初的经验连接一块。

Thus at these three levels we see three orders emerge as follows.
First, let us say, there is a substance or a subject of psychic experience,
which corresponds to the opposition reality principle / pleasure principle.
Next, there is the process of experience, which corresponds to the opposition
between thought and perception. And what do we find here? The process
is divided according to whether it is a question of perception, and,
therefore, linked to the activity of hallucinating, to the pleasure principle, or
to a question of thought.

因此,在这三个层次,我们看见三个秩序出现,如下:
首先,让我们说,有一个心灵经验的物质,或主体,它对应于这个对立党现实原则与快乐原则。其次,有经验的这个过程,这个过程对应于思想与感觉的这个对立。我们在此发现什么?这个过程被区分,依照它是否是感知的问题,因此它更幻觉的活动息息相关,跟快乐原则,或跟思想的问题息息相关。

This is what Freud calls psychic reality. On one
side is the process as fictional process. On the other are the processes of
thought through which instinctual activity is effectively realized, that is to
say, the appetitive process – a process of search, of recognition and, as Freud
explained later, of recovery of the object. That is the other face of psychic
reality, its unconscious process, which is also its appetitive process.

这就是弗洛依德所谓的心灵的现实。在一方面是这个过程,作为幻想的过程。在另一方面,是思想的过程。通过这个过程,本能的活动有效地被实践。换句话说,这个欲望的过程—寻求的过程,体认的过程,如同弗洛依德后来解释,这个客体的发现的过程。那就是心灵现实的另外一面,它的无意识的过程。这个无意识的过程也是它的欲望的过程。

Finally, on the level of objectification or of the object, the known and the
unknown are in opposition. It is because that which is known can only be
known in words that that which is unknown offers itself as having a linguistic
structure. This allows us to ask again the question of what is involved at the
level of the subject.

最后,在客体的成为客体的层面,已经知道的东西与没有被知道的东西处于对立。那是因为已经被知道的东西,仅是凭借文字被知道。而没有被知道的东西则是提供它自己,作为是拥有语言的结构。这让我们能够再次询问这个问题,在主体的层面牵涉的东西的问题。

Consequently, the oppositions fiction / appetite, knowable / unknowable
divide up what takes place at the level of the process and of the object. What
is involved at the level of the subject? We need to ask ourselves, what is the
division of the two sides between the two principles at this level?

结果,幻想与欲望的对立,可知之物与不可知之物的对立,区分所发生的事情,在客体的过程。在主体的层面,被牵涉的东西是什么呢?我们需要询问自己,这两边的区分是什么?在这个层次的这两个原则之间的两边的区分?

I would propose the following. As far as the pleasure principle is concerned,
that which presents itself to the subject as a substance is his good.

我将提出以下。就快乐原则而言,呈现它自己给予主体,作为物质的东西,就是他的善。

Insofar as pleasure controls subjective activity, it is the good, the idea of the
good, that sustains it. That is why ethical thinkers have at all times not been
able to avoid trying to identify these two terms, which are after all fundamentally
antithetical, namely, pleasure and the good.

因为快乐原则控制主体的活动。就是这个善,善的观念,维持著它。那就是为什么伦理学的思想家始终无法避免要尝试辨明这两个术语。这两个原则毕竟基本上是对立的,换句话说,快乐与善。

But over and against that, how does one qualify the substratum of reality
of subjective activity?

但是超越并对抗这点,我们如何给予主体的活动的现实的物质层面的品质?

What is the new figure that Freud gave us in the opposition reality principle/
pleasure principle? It is without a doubt a problematic figure. Freud
doesn’t for a moment consider identifying adequacy to reality with a specific
good. In Civilization and Its Discontents he tells us that civilization or culture
certainly asks too much of the subject. If there is indeed something that can
be called his good or his happiness, there is nothing to be expected in that
regard from the microcosm, nor moreover from the macrocosm.
It is with this question mark that I will end today.

弗洛依德给予我们的这个新的人物是什么?在现实原则与快乐原则的这个对立?无可置疑地,这是一个问题重重的人物。弗洛依德根本就没有考虑,要将胜任于现实的认同是明确的善。在“文明与其不满”一书,弗洛依德告诉我们,文明或是文化确实对主体要求太多。即使确实有某件东西能够被称为是他的善,或他的幸福,可是并没有任何东西被预期,关于那点,从小宇宙,或从大宇宙。今天,我就用这个疑问号来作为结束。

雄伯译
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Ethics 30

July 3, 2015

Ethics 30
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

3
From a Freudian point of view, the reality principle is presented as functioning
in a way that is essentially precarious.

从弗洛依德的观点,现实原则被呈现作为功能,採用基本上是不稳定的方式。

No previous philosophy has gone so far in that direction. It is not that
reality is called into question; it is certainly not called into question in the
way that the idealists did so. Compared to Freud the idealists of the philosophical
tradition are small beer indeed, for in the last analysis they don’t
seriously contest that famous reality, they merely tame it. Idealism consists
in affirming that we are the ones who give shape to reality, and that there is
no point in looking any further. It is a comfortable position. Freud’s position,
or that of any sensible man for that matter, is something very different.
Reality is precarious.

没有任何其他先前的哲学曾经如此深入地探讨那个方向。倒不是因为现实受到质疑。现实受到质疑的方式,确实不是像理型主义者受到质疑的方式那样。跟弗洛依德比较起来,哲学传统的理型主义者确实仅是小儿科。因为追根究底,他们并没有认真地测试那个著名的现实。他们仅是驯服现实。理型主义者主要在于肯定:我们是给予现实的形状的那些人们。再深入探讨是没有意义的。这是一个舒适的立场。弗洛依德的立场则是某件不同的东西,就那件事情而言,弗洛依德的立场上明理的人的立场。现实是不稳定的。

And it is precisely to the extent that access to it is so
precarious that the commandments which trace its path are so tyrannical. As
guides to the real, feelings are deceptive. That intuition which animates the
whole auto-analysis of Freud expresses itself thus concerning the approach
to the real. Its very movement can only begin to occur by means of a primary
defense. The profound ambiguity of this approach to the real demanded by
man is first inscribed in terms of a defense – a defense that already exists
even before the conditions of repression as such are formulated.

确实是接近现实时是如此的不稳定,以致于追踪它的途径的命令是如此的暴虐。作为实在界的引导,那些感觉是欺骗性。触动弗洛依德的整个的自动-精神分析的直觉,因此表达它自己,关于接近实在界。它的行动仅是凭借原初的防卫开始发生。接近实在界的这个深奥的模糊暧昧,受到人的要求,它首先被铭记,用防卫的术语。这一种防卫甚至已经存在于压抑的本身的情况被阐述之前。

In order to emphasize what I am calling the paradox of the relationship to
the real in Freud, I will put this on the board – the pleasure principle on the
one hand and reality principle on the other. Once you have been gently reassured
by these two terms, things seem to go along by themselves. Speaking
broadly, one can say that the unconscious is on one side and the conscious
on the other. Please bear that in mind in your attempt to follow the points I
am trying to bring out.

为了强调我正在所谓的在弗洛依德,跟实在界的关系的悖论。我将这个悖论写在黑板上。一方面是快乐原则,另一方面是现实原则。一旦你们已经对这两个术语稍微确定,事情似乎自己会一路前进。广泛地说,我们能够说,一方面是无意识,另一方面是意识。请你们记在心理,当你们企图要遵循我正在揭露的这些要点。

What are we led to articulate the apparatus of perception onto? Onto reality,
of course. Yet, if we follow Freud’s hypothesis, on what theoretically is
the control of the pleasure principle exercised? Precisely on perception, and
it is here that one finds the originality of his contribution. The primary process,
as he tells us in the seventh part of the Traumdeutung, tends to be exercised
toward an identity of perception. It doesn’t matter whether it is real or
hallucinated, such an identity will always tend to be established. If it isn’t
lucky enough to coincide with reality, it will be hallucinated. The risk is in
the possibility of the primary process winning out.

我们被引导要将感知的工具表达成为什么?当然是表达成为现实。可是,假如我们遵循弗洛依德的假设,对于快乐原则的控制理论上要根据什么来运作?确实是根据感知。而且这感知这里,我们发现弗洛依德的贡献的原创性。依照弗洛依德这“梦的解析”的第七部分,原初的过程倾向于被运用,朝向感知的认同。至于感知的认同是真实或是幻觉,并不重要。这样的认同将总是倾向于被建立。假如它没有足够幸运跟现实巧合一致,它将会是幻觉。这个冒险是在逐渐战胜的原初的过程的可能性。

On the other hand, what does the secondary process tend toward? Once
again you should look at Chapter VII, but it is already articulated in the
Enrumrf. It tends toward an identity of thought. What does that mean? It
means that the interior functioning of the psychic apparatus – I will discuss
next time how it might be represented schematically – occurs as a kind of
groping forward, a rectifying test, thanks to which the subject, led on by the
discharges that follow along the Bahnungen already established, will conduct
the series of tests or of detours that will gradually lead him to anastomosis
and to moving beyond the testing of the surrounding system of different
objects present at that moment of its experience. One might say that the
backcloth of experience consists in the construction of a certain system of
Wunsch or of Erwartung of pleasure, defined as anticipated pleasure, and which
tends for this reason to realize itself autonomously in its own sphere, theoretically
without expecting anything from the outside. It moves directly toward
a fulfillment highly antithetical to whatever triggers it.

在另一方面,这个次级过程倾向于什么?再次地,你们应该观看第七章,但是它已经被表达,在“筹划”一书。它倾向于思想的认同。那是什么意思?它的意思是,心灵的工具的内部的功能—下次我将讨论它如何用基模方式来代表—这个功能的发生,作为一种向前模索,一种矫正的测试。由于这个矫正的测试,主体将会主导这一系列的测试或一系列的迂迴。因为它被这些发泄所引导,遵循Bahnungen (方便途径)已经建立的发泄所引导。这一系统的测试或一系列的迂迴逐渐引导他到汇集一块,引导他到移动超越过周围系统的测试,出现在它的经验的那个时刻不同的客体的周围系统。我们可以说,经验的背景主要是在于建立某个愿望的系统,或快乐的期望。它被定义为被预期的快乐。因为这个理由,它倾向于自动自发地实践它自己,在它自己的范围里。理论上,它并没有从外部期望任何东西。它直接地朝向满足前进。这个满足跟任何触发它的东西高度地对立。

In this preliminary approach, thought ought to appear to be on the level
of the reality principle, in the same column as the reality principle. But it is
by no means the case, since as described by Freud, this process is in itself
and by nature unconscious. Understand that unlike that which reaches the
subject in the perceptual order from the outside world, nothing that takes
place at the level of these tests – thanks to which, by means of approximations
in the psyche, the facilitations are realized that enable the subject to
make his action adequate – is perceptible as such. All thought by its very
nature occurs according to unconscious means. It is doubtless not controlled
by the pleasure principle, but it occurs in a space that as an unconscious space
is to be considered as subject to the pleasure principle.

在这个初级的接近实在界,思想应该出现在现实原则的层面,在跟现实相同的栏框。但是它绝非是这个情况,因为依照弗洛依德所描述的,这个过程本身及其本质是无意识。请你们理解,不像从外部世界的感知的秩序到达主体的东西,发生在这些测试的层面的东西,没有一样可依照本身被感知。由于这次测试,凭借心灵的接近,有些方便途径被体会到,让主体能够使他的行动胜任。所有的思想由于它自己的特性,依照无意识而发生。无可置疑地,它并没有受到快乐原则的控制,但是它发生在一个空间。作为无意识的空间,这个空间应该被认为隶属于快乐原则。

Of everything that occurs at the level of inner processes, and thought itself
is such a process, according to Freud, the only signs of which the subject is
consciously aware are signs of pleasure or pain. As with all the other unconscious
processes, nothing else reaches the level of consciousness but those
signs there.

关于每样发生在内部过程的层面的东西,思想本身并不是这样的过程。依照弗洛依德,这个过程的唯一的讯息,主体在意识上是知道。这些讯息是快乐或痛苦的讯息。如同所有的其他无意识的过程,没有别的东西到底意识的层面,除了在那里的那些讯息。

How then do we have some apprehension of those processes of thought?
Here again Freud responds in a fully articulated way – only insofar as words
are uttered. An idea that, with the tendency to facility characteristic of all
thought that in spite of itself is tainted by a kind of parallelism, is commonly
interpreted as follows: “It is, of course, clear that what Freud is telling us
there is that words are that which characterizes the transition into the preconscious.”
But the transition of what precisely?

那么我们如何理解思想的这些过程?在此,弗洛依德再次回应,用充分被表达的方式,仅是就文字被表达的方式。一个观念具有方便一切思想的特性的倾向,尽管它的自身沾染一种的并列对比,它通常被解释如下:「当然,显而易见的是,弗洛依德正在告诉我们的东西就是:表现这个转换成为前意识的特性的文字。」但是那确实是什么的转换:

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Ethics 28

July 3, 2015

Ethics 28
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

That attempt at a hypothetical formulation is offered in a way that is unique
in Freud’s extant writings. And one shouldn’t forget that he came to dislike
it and didn’t want to publish it. No doubt he wrote it in response to certain
demands for coherence he made of himself when confronted by himself. But
it must be said that this formulation apparently makes no reference to the
clinical facts, which doubtless constituted for him the whole force of the
demands he had to deal with. He discusses those questions with himself or
with Fliess, which under the circumstances comes to the same thing. He
presents himself with a probable and coherent representation, a working
hypothesis, in order to respond to something whose concrete, experimental
dimension is masked and avoided here.

想要从事假设的阐述的企图被提供,以独特的方式,在弗洛依德的残存的著作里。我们不应该忘记,他逐渐变得不喜欢它,并且不想要出版它。无可置疑地,他书写它,回应某些的要求,他解释他自己的一贯性的要求。当他面临他自己的时候。但是我们必须说,在这阐述显而易见地并没有提到临床的事实。无可置疑地,临床的事实对于他而言形成他必须要处理的要求的整个的力量。他讨论那些问题,跟他自己或跟弗利斯。在这种情况下,这等于是相同的事情。他呈现他自己一个难题,与一贯的再现,一个运作的假设,为了回应某件东西,这个东西的具体,试验的维度被遮蔽与被避免。

He claims it is a question of explaining a normal functioning of the mind.
In order to do this he starts with an apparatus whose basis is wholly antithetical
to a result involving adequation and equilibrium. He starts with a system
which naturally tends toward deception and error. That whole organism seems
designed not to satisfy need, but to hallucinate such satisfaction. It is, therefore,
appropriate that another apparatus is opposed to it, an apparatus that
operates as an agency of reality; it presents itself essentially as a principle of
correction, of a call to order. I am not exaggerating things. Freud himself
insists that there must be a distinction between the two apparatuses, although
he admits he can find no trace of them in the anatomical structures sustaining
them.

他宣称问题是要询问心灵的正常的功能。为了这样做,他开始用一个工具,这个工具的基础完全相反于这个结果,牵涉到胜任与体内平衡的结果。从一个系统开始,这个系统自然地倾向于欺骗与错误。整个有机体似乎被设计,不是为了满足需求,而是为了产生那种满足的幻觉。因此,另外一个工具跟他对立,是合宜的。这一个工具运作充当现实的代理。它代表它自己,基本上作为改正的一个原则,要求秩序的原则。我并没有夸张这些事情。弗洛依德自身坚持,必须要有一个区别,在这两个工具之间。虽然他承认,他不能够找到任何的其他痕迹,在维持它们的解剖的结构里。

The reality principle or that to which the functioning of the neuronic apparatus
in the end owes it efficacy appears as an apparatus that goes much
further than a mere checking up; it is rather a question of rectification. It
operates in the mode of detour, precaution, touching up, restraint. It corrects
and compensates for that which seems to be the natural inclination of the
psychic apparatus, and it radically opposes it.

现实原则似乎是作为一个原则,这个原则不仅仅是作为抑制的功能而言。脑神经的工具的这个功能最后将有效性归功于现实原则。相反地,现实原则是矫正的问题。现实原则运作,用的模式是迂迴,预警,修补,约束。现实原则改正并且补偿心灵工具的似乎是自然的倾向,现实原则强烈地跟这个倾向对立起来。

The conflict is introduced here at the base, at the origins of an organism
which, let us say, seems after all to be destined to live. Nobody before Freud,
and no other account of human behavior, had gone so far to emphasize its
fundamentally confhctual character. No one else had gone so far in explaining
the organism as a form of radical inadequation – to the point where the duality
of the systems is designed to overcome the radical inadequation of one of
them.

这个冲突在此被介绍,在基础的地方,在有机体的起源处,我们不妨说,毕竟这个有机体注定要活下去。在弗洛依德之前,没有任何人,也没有任何有关人类行为的记载,曾经如此深入地解释有机体,作为是一种强烈的不能胜任的形式。甚至,这些系统的双重性被设计要克服其中一个系统的强烈的不能胜任。

This opposition between the φ system and the ψ system, which is articulated
throughout, seems almost like a wager. For what is there to justify it,
if it isn’t that experience of ungovernable quantities which Freud had to deal
with in his experience of neurosis? That is the driving imperative behind the
whole system.

在φ 系统与 ψ系统之间的对立无所不在地被表达,似乎就像个赌注。因为让存在那里自圆其说的东西,难道不就是无法被统辖的数量的那个经验吗?弗洛依德必须处理那个经验,在他的神经症的经验里?那是整个的系统背后的驱动的命令。

We sense directly that the justification for giving such prominence to quantity
as such has nothing to do with Freud’s desire to bring his theory into
conformity with the mechanistic ideas of Helmholtz and Brucke. For him it
corresponds rather to the most direct kind of lived experience, namely, that
of the inertia which at the level of symptoms presented him with obstacles
whose irreversible character he recognized.

我们直接感觉到,给予数量本身如此显著的地位的正当理由,跟弗洛依德的欲望没有丝毫关系,弗洛依德欲望要将他的理论保持一致,跟黑赫兹与布鲁克的机械论的观念保持一致。相反地,对于弗洛依德,他的理论对应于最直接的那种生活过的经验。换句话说,惰性的经验,在病症的层次,这个惰性呈现给他各种的阻碍。他体认出这些阻碍的无法逆转的特性。

It is here that one finds his first
advance in darkness toward that Wirklichkeit, which is the point to which his
questioning returns; it is the key, the distinctive feature of his whole system.
I ask you to reread this text, without wondering along with the annotators,
commentators and connotators who have edited it whether this or that is
closer to psychological or physiological thought, whether this or that refers
to Herbart, Helmholtz, or anyone else. And you will see that beneath a manner
that is cool, abstract, scholastic, complex and arid, one can sense a lived
experience, and that this experience is at bottom moral in kind.

就在此,我们发现他第一个进展,在朝向Wirklichkeit,的黑暗中。这个Wirklichkeit,就是他的询问的回转的点。这就是解答,整个的系统的不同的特征,我要求你们重新阅读这个文本,不要去想要知道这个注释或那个注释比较靠近心理学或生理学的思想,或这个注释或那个注释提到赫伯特,黑赫兹,或任何其他人,虽然这些注释家,评论家,与注疏家曾经编辑他们。你们将会看见,在冷静,抽象,学术,复杂与枯燥的形态之下,我们感觉到活生生的经验。这个经验追根究底是属于道德的种类。

People play the historian on this topic, as if to explain an author like Freud
in terms of influences had any value, to explain him by means of a greater or
lesser similarity between one of his formulas and those which had been used
by some previous thinker in a context that was different. But since it is an
exercise that people engage in, why shouldn’t I do the same, in my own way?
Isn’t the functioning of the apparatus that supports the reality principle
strangely similar to what one finds in Aristotle?

针对这个议题,人们扮演历史学家。好像是,解释一位像弗洛依德这样的作者,用影响的术语,就具有任何价值似的。解释弗洛依德,凭借或多或少的类似,在他的其中一个公式与某位先前的思想家曾经用过的公式的类似,在不同的文本那里。但是这是人们从事的做法,为什么我不如法泡制,用我自己的方式?难道不是这个工具的功能支持著现实原则?它奇异地类同我们在亚里斯多德发现的东西?

Freud’s task is to explain how the activity of review and restraint functions
or, in other words, how the apparatus which supports the secondary processes
avoids the occurrence of catastrophes that would inevitably follow the
lapse of too much or too little time or the abandonment to its own devices of
the pleasure principle. If the latter is released too soon, the movement will
be triggered simply by a Wunschgedanke; it will necessarily be painful and
will give rise to unpleasure. If on the other hand the secondary apparatus
intervenes too late, if it doesn’t give the little discharge required to attempt
the beginning of an adequate solution through action, then there will be a
regressive discharge, that is to say, an hallucination, which is also a source of
displeasure.

弗洛依德的工作是要解释评论与约束的功能的活动,或换句话说,支持次级的过程的工具,如何避免灾难的发生?这些灾难将一成不变地遵循过多或多少时间的失误,或是放纵于它自己的快乐原则的设计。假如后者太早被释放出来,这个运动将会被触发,仅是凭借Wunschgedanke欲望的观念,它将必然是令人痛苦,而且将会产生不愉快。假如另一方面,这个次要的工具介入得太晚,假如它没有给予这个小小的发泄,被要求要企图通过行动来获得充分解决的开始,那么将会有一个退行的发泄。换句话说,一个幻觉,这个幻觉也是不愉快的来源。

Well now, this theory is not unrelated to Aristotle’s ideas concerning the
question of how it is that someone who knows may be intemperate. Aristotle
offers several solutions. I will skip the earlier ones, which introduce syllogistic
and dialectical elements that are relatively remote from our concerns here.
He also attempts a solution that is not dialectical but physical – he nevertheless
advances it in the form of a syllogism of the desirable.

呵呵,这个理论跟亚里斯多德的观念,并非没有关联。关于这个问题:某位知道的人如何会是放纵,亚里斯多德提供好几个解决。我将跳过早先的几个解决,它们介绍逻辑三段论法与辩证法的因素。这些因素跟我们在此的关注比较遥远。他也企图从事非辩证法,而是生理的解决—他仍然主张它,用可被欲望物的三段论法的形式。

I believe that Chapter V of Book VII on pleasure is worth reading in its
entirety. Beside the major premise – one must always taste what is sweet –
there is a particular, concrete minor premise, i.e., this is sweet. And the
principle of wrong action is to be found in the error of a particular judgment
relative to the minor premise. Where is the error found? Precisely in the
circumstance that the desire which is subjacent to the major premise causes
the wrong judgment to be made concerning the reality of the supposed sweetness
toward which the action is directed.

我相信第七册第四章“论快乐”是值得完整地阅读。除了主要的假设之外—我们总是品尝甜美的东西–有一个特殊,具体的次要的假设,这是甜美的东西。错误行动的原则能够被发现,在特殊判断的错误理,相对应这个次要的假设。这个错误在哪里被发现?确实是在这个环境里,邻接于主要的假设的欲望,引起错误的判断被做,关于这个被认为是甜美的现实,行动被引导朝向这个被认为的甜美。

I can’t help thinking that Freud, who had attended the lecture series given
by Brentano on Aristotle in 1887, is transposing here the properly ethical
articulation of the problem on to a hypothetical, mechanistic point of view.
And he does so in a way that is purely formal and gives the question a completely
different accent.

我忍不住地认为,弗洛依德曾经参加过那些演讲的系列,1887年布仁塔诺的“亚里斯多德的演讲”。弗洛依德在此将这个难题的合乎伦理的表达,调换成为一个假设的机械论的观点。弗洛依德这样做,採有非常正式的的方法,并且给予这个问题,一个非常不同的强调。

In truth, it is no more of a psychology than any other of those that were
devised at the time. Let us have no illusions; as far as psychology is concerned,
nothing has been achieved so far that is superior to Freud’s Entwurf.
Everything that has been devised concerning the functioning of the psyche
under the assumption that the mechanisms of the nervous system can account
for what is concretely perceived by us as the field of psychological action has
a similar air of fanciful hypothesis.

事实上,它不再属于心理学,也不再属于任何其他当时被设计的学科。让我们不要存著幻想。就心理学而言,迄今还没有成就任何东西,超越过弗洛依德的“筹划”。每样曾经被设计的东西,关于心灵的这个功能,在这个假设之下:脑神经系统的机制能够解释具体被我们感知的东西,如同心理的活动具有类似的幻想的假设的气氛。

If Freud returns to the logical and syllogistic articulations, which have
always been used by ethical philosophers in their field, it is in order to give
them a very different meaning. We must remember that in interpreting the
true content of his thought, which is to say what I have taught you. The
ορθός λόγος that concerns us here are not simply major premises; they concern
rather the way in which I have taught you to articulate what goes on in
the unconscious; they concern the discourse that is employed on the level of
the pleasure principle.

假如弗洛依德回到逻辑与三段论房的表达,它们总是被这个领域的伦理哲学家所使用。那是为了给予它们一个非常不同的意义。我们必须记得,当我们解释弗洛依德的思想的内容,也就是说,为曾经教导你们的东西。ορθός λόγος “正确的辞说”在此跟我们息息相关,它们并不仅是主要的假设。相反地,它们跟我曾经教导你们的方式息息相关。我曾经教导你们表达无意识里正在进行的东西。它们跟这个辞说息息相关。在快乐原则被使用的辞说。

It is in relation to this ορθός, ironically highlighted by inverted commas,
that the reality principle has to guide the subject in order for him to complete
a possible action.

就是跟这个ορθός(正确)的关系,用倒转的引号反讽地强调的东西,现实原则必须引导主体,为了让他完成一个可能的行动。

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Ethics 26

July 2, 2015

Ethics 26
The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
精神分析伦理学
Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Pleasure and reality
快乐与现实
THE MORAL AGENCY ACTUALIZES THE REAL
道德代理者实践实在界
INERTIA AND RECTIFICATION
堕性与矫正
REALITY IS PRECARIOUS
现实不稳定
OPPOSITION AND INTERSECTION OF THE PRINCIPLES
两种原种的对立与交会

2
Freud in the course of his so-called auto-analysis writes in a short letter, it is
number 73: “Meine Analyse geht wetter, my analysis continues. It is my principal
interest, meine Hauptinteresse. Everything remains obscure, even the
problems involved, but there is a feeling of comfort. It is as if,” he writes,
“one had only to reach into a larder and take what one wanted. The unpleasant
thing,” he says, “are the Stimmungen,” in the most general sense we can
give to that word, which has a special resonance in German, namely, moods
or feelings, which by their very nature cover, hide – what precisely? the
Wirklichkeit, reality.

在他所谓的自动-精神分析里,弗洛依德以一封短信写到,那是编号第73封信:「我的精神分析继续。那是我的主要的興趣。每样事情始终模糊,即使被牵涉的难题,但是有一种舒适的感觉。他写到,那好像是「我们只有伸手进入厨柜,拿出我们想要的东西。」他说,「不愉快的事情是
Stimmungen」。我们能够给予这个字最通俗的意义。在德文,这个字具有特别的迴响,也就是心情或感觉。由于它们的特性,它们涵盖,或隐藏—确实是什么东西?现实。

It is in terms of Wirklichkeit that Freud questions what presents itself to
him as a Stimmung. The Stimmung is that which reveals to him what he has
to look for in his auto-analysis, what he is questioning, the moment when he
has the feeling of having, as in a dark room, in a larder or Vorratskammer,
everything he needs, and that it is waiting there for him, in store for him.

用Wirklichkeit t这个术语,弗洛依德询问是什么东西呈现它自己给他,作为心情。这个心情就是跟他显示他必须寻找的东西,在他的自动-精神分析里。他所询问的东西,当他拥有他所需要的每样东西的感觉,如同在黑暗的房间,在厨柜里或Vorratskammer里。那个东西正在那里等待他,等候他。

But he isn’t led toward it by his Stimmungen. Such is the meaning of his
sentence – the most unpleasant experience, das Unangenehmste, is the Stimmungen.
Freud’s experience begins with the search for the reality that is
somewhere inside himself. And it is this that constitutes the originality of his
point of departure. Moreover, he adds in the same vein that “even sexual
excitement is for someone like me unusable in this approach. Even there I
do not trust myself to see where are the final realities.” And he adds, “I
maintain my good humor in this whole business.” Before achieving results,
we must be patient a little longer.

但是他没有被引导朝向它,被他的心情。他的句子的意义是如此明显—即使是最不令人愉快的经验,也是心情。弗洛依德的精神分析经验就从寻求现实开始,这个现实就在他的内部的某个地方。就在这个地方形成他的出发点的原初性。而且,他以相同心情补充:“即使是性”的興奋,对于像我这样的某个人,在这个方法是不温定的。即使在那里,我并没有信任我自己,为了看见最后的现实在哪里。他补充说,「我主张我的好心情,在这整个的事情里。」在获得结果之前,我们必须耐心稍微久一点。

I bring to your attention in passing a recent little book by Erich Fromm
that I won’t say I recommend to you, since it is a strangely discordant, almost
insidious work, that is close to being defamatory. It is called Sigmund Freud’s
Mission and it makes insinuating points that are not without interest and that
concern the special traits of Freud’s personality, invariably seen from an
obviously belittling point of view. In particular, he selects from the text Freud’s
sentences on sexual excitation in order to have us draw the conclusion that
by the age of forty Freud was already impotent.

我顺便提醒你们注意最近一本小书,弗洛姆所写的一本小书。我不说我跟你们推荐,因为那是一本非常不协调,陷阱重重的书。近似亵渎。书名是“弗洛依德的使命”。它发表嘲讽的观点,这些观点颇耐人寻味,并且关系到弗洛依德的人格的特征。一成不变地从显然是轻蔑的观点。特别是,他从文本选择弗洛依德的句子,探讨性的興奋,为了让我们获得这个结论:在四十岁之前,弗洛依德已经性无能。

We are now in a position to analyze Freud’s 1895 manuscript concerning
his fundamental conception of the structure of the psyche, a manuscript that
chance has placed in our hands. He had thought of calling it Psychology for
the Use of Neurologists. Since he never published it, the draft remained attached
to a packet of letters to Fliess, and it is available to us thanks to the acquisition
of these collections.

我们现在处于这个立场,要分析弗洛依德在1895年的原稿,关于他的基本的观念,对于心灵的结构。这一个原稿凑巧我们拿到。他曾经想到要称它为“心理学对于脑神经学家的使用”。因为他从来没有出版它,这个草稿始终跟给予弗利斯的信件的包裹连系一块。由于这些文集的获得,我们才得到它。

It is, therefore, not only proper but necessary that we begin at that point
our analysis of the meaning in Freud’s thought of the “.hematics of the reality
principle in opposition to the pleasure principle. Is there or is there not something
distinctive relative to the development of his thought there, and at the
same time to the directions taken by our own experience? It is here that we
may find that hidden backbone which, I believe, is required on this occasion.

因此,这不但是合适而且需要,我们应该在那个时刻开始我们的分析这个意义,在弗洛依德的现实原则的主题的思想的意义,跟快乐原则对立。相对应于他的思想在那里的发展,是否存在着某件不同的东西?同时,又相对于在我们自己的精神分析经验採取的方向?就在这里,我们可能发现那个隐藏的支持,我相信,那个隐藏的支持在这个场合被要求。

The opposition between the pleasure principle and the reality principle was
rearticulated throughout Freud’s work – 1895, the Entwurf (Project for a
Scientific Psychogy); 1900, Chapter VII of the Traumdeutung, with the first
public rearticulation of the so-called primary and secondary processes, the
one governed by the pleasure principle and the other by the reality principle;
1914, return to the article from which I selected the dream that I discussed
at length last year, the dream of the dead father, “he didn’t know”; the article,
“Formulieringen iiber the Zwei Prinzipen des Psychischen Geschehens,”
that one might translate as “Of the Structure of the Psyche”; 1930, that Civilization
and Its Discontents which, I promised you, we will get to by way of
conclusion.

在快乐原则与现实原则的这个对立,重新被表达,在弗洛依德的所有的著作里。在1895年,“科学心理学的企划”,1900年,“梦的解析第七章”,第一次公开地重新表达所谓的原初与次级的过程。快乐原则统辖的这个过程,与现实原则统辖的过程,在1914年,请你们回到我从那里选择梦的那篇文章,我去年详细讨论的文章,死去的父亲的梦。“他并不知道”。这篇文章,
“Formulieringen iiber the Zwei Prinzipen des Psychischen Geschehens,” 我们可以翻译为“心灵的结构”。在1930年,“文明与其不满”,我答应你们,我们将探讨作为结论。

Others before Freud spoke of pleasure as a guiding function of ethics. Not
only does Aristotle set great store by it, but he finds it impossible not to place
it at the center of his ethical teaching. What is happiness if it doesn’t contain
the bloom of pleasure? A significant part of the discussion of the Nicomachaen
Ethics is designed to restore the true function of pleasure to its proper place;
strangely enough it is introduced in such a way that it is given a value that is
not merely passive. Pleasure in Aristotle is an acdvity that is compared to the
bloom given off by youthful activity – it is, if you like, a radiance. In addition,
it is also the sign of the blossoming of an action, in the literal sense of
ένέργεια, a word that expresses the true praxis as that which includes its own
end.

在弗洛依德之前,还有其他的人们谈论快乐,作为是伦理学的引导功能。亚里斯多德不但非常重是快乐,而且他还发现不可能不将快乐放在他的伦理学的教导的中心。幸福难道不就是包含快乐的春花怒放的东西吗?亚里斯多德的伦理学的讨论的重要的部分被设计,就是要恢复快乐的真实的功能,回到它应得的地位。耐人寻味地,快乐以这样的方式被介绍,以致它被给予一种价值,不仅是被动的价值。在亚里斯多德,快乐是一种活动,可比喻为青春的活动焕发出来的春花怒放。你们不妨说是辉煌灿烂。除外,快乐是一种行动的春花怒放的迹象。用ένέργεια实质的意义来说,这是一个表达真实的本体的字词,作为是包含它自己的目的的东西。

Pleasure has no doubt been given other modulations down through the
ages as sign, stigmatum, reward, or substance of the psychic life. But let us
consider the case of the man who quesdons us direcdy, of Freud.

无可置疑地,自古以来,快乐曾经被给予其他的调节,作为心灵的迹象,献身,酬劳,与物质。 但是让我们考虑这个人的情况,他直接询问我们关于弗洛依德。

What cannot fail to strike us right away is that his pleasure principle is an
inertia principle. Its function is to regulate by a kind of automatism everything
that comes together through a process that, in his first formulation,
Freud tends to present as dependent on a preformed apparatus that is stricdy
limited to the neuronic apparatus. The latter regulates the facilitations that it
retains after having suffered their effects. It is essentially a matter of everything
that results from a fundamental tendency to discharge in which a given
quantity is desdned to be expended. That is the point of view from which
the functioning of the pleasure principle is first articulated.

我们立即必然会感到印象深刻的事情是,他的快乐原则是一种惰性原则。快乐原则的功能是凭借一种自动心理机制,用来规范一切聚集一块的东西,通过一个过程,在他最初的形成时,弗洛依德倾向于呈现作为依靠一种被完成的心理机制。这个心理机制严格地被限制于神经症的心理机制。后者规范它包留的方便,在它已经遭受他们的情感的痛苦。基本的事情是,每一样从基本的倾向于发泄所造成的东西,在那里,某个特定的数量注定会被消耗掉。就是从这个观点,快乐原则的这个功能首先被表达。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com