Archive for the ‘精神分析对象’ Category

自闭症与童年精神错乱 02

August 25, 2012

Autism and Childhood Psychosis 21

Lacan always insisted on the notion of the psychotic phenomenon as a production, a view taken already by Freud since the beginnings of psychoanalysis and the best example of which is Freud’s analysis of President Schreber’s psychotic productions.


A clinic of production, as opposed to a clinic of the deficit, necessarily requires a structural approach and a positive explanation for clinical phenomena which, in turn, is indispensable for any therapeutic intervention. A clinic of the deficit is content with verifying the presence of malfunction or disorder, and not interested in the order which exists, since psychosis is one of the possible organizations of the speaking being, including the cases in which the subject does not actually speak (catatonia, autistic mutism). Even in such cases the subject is subjected to language and, for instance, the absence of verbal productions is interpreted by those around the subject as a refusal to speak, rather than as an absolute inability to speak.

产物的临床,相对于这个缺陷的临床,必然会要求一种结构性的研究方法,及正面的解释,对于临床的各种现象。轮过来,对于任何治疗的介入,是无可免除的。缺陷的临床满足于证实功能不良或疾病的存在,并且对于存在的秩序不感興趣,因为精神错乱是作为言说主体的可能组织之一,包括这些情况,主体并没有实际在言说的情况(僵硬姿态,自闭症的沉默)。甚至在诸如其乐的情 ,主体还是隶属于语言,文辞产物的欠缺被环绕主体四周的那些人,解释为拒绝言说,而不是作为绝对没有言说的能力。

The following are the diagnostic categories generally accepted in the Freudian field, although there is no unanimity as to exact definitions:


1. Paranoia, whose existence as one of the psychoses of childhood is maintained, contrary to the opinion of non-psychoanalytic psychiatry. Les structures de la psychose, by Rosine and Robert Lefort (1988), contains a full account of the treatment of Robert, the Wolf Child, and a detailed comparison of Robert’s and President Schreber’s clinical presentations, which has led the authors to assert the structural identity of both cases. Paranoiac psychosis manifests clinically through delusional formations and hallucinations which are the spontaneous attempts at recovery on the part of the patient, an attempt to reconstruct a world that has collapsed and where it has become impossible to live.


2. Schizophrenia, which manifests itself through fragmentary delusional formations and hallucinations; incoherence of speech and thought; blunted or bizarre affective responses and catatonic behaviour, all of which represent the subject’s attempts to deal with a collapse of the representation of the body, or inability to construct that representation in a relation with the small other, i(o), the body thus becoming a place almost impossible to inhabit.


3. Melancholia, which has not received much attention but which appears during childhood, characterized by delusional feelings of worthlessness, insomnia or hypersomnia, poor appetite, failure to thrive, suicidal ideation and actions, and apathy (which may be interrupted by manic episodes). These phenomena represent an identification with the real lack in the Other, that is, the absence of the desire of the Other which remains as an unsymbolized nothingness, the locus of the suicidal identification. There remains an open question whether melancholia can be considered as a structure in its own right, or whether it is a variant of paranoia – and, in some cases, perhaps, of schizophrenia.


4. Autism, for which Leo Kanner’s (1973) original description of 1943 remains valid, characterized by inability to relate socially, aloneness, the failure to assume an anticipatory posture, the profound disturbance of language, the presence of excellent rote memory in many cases, echolalia and delayed echolalia, literal-ness and the mechanical repetition of pronouns, with onset within the first thirty months after birth. Such clinical features suggest an absence of the Other as the locus of the representation of both the world and the body. There is no unanimity as to the specificity of autism: whether it constitutes a structure in its own right, separate from the psychoses; or whether it is a variation and the earliest clinical version of schizophrenia. Current research by Lacanians who work with autistic and psychotic children deals with this question and the related issue of the evolution of the autistic subject, that is, what becomes of the autistic child when he/she enters adulthood.

1、 自闭症,李奥、康纳在1943年,对它的原先描述始终是有效。它的特征是没有能力跟社会联系,孤单,没有办法负起一种期望的姿态,语言深深受到困扰,优秀的背诵记忆,在许多情况存在,机械地重复他人语言或拖延重复他人语言,对于一些代名词实质认定及机械重复,在出生后前三十个月内开始。诸如其类的临床特征暗示大他者的欠缺,作为世界及身体的符号再现的轨迹。并没有一致共识,关于自闭症的明确内涵:它是否构成一种具有本身价值的结构,跟精神错乱分隔开来。或是它是否是一种变种及精神分裂症的早期临床变种。目前拉康派探讨自闭症及精神错乱儿童的研究,处理这个问题,及自闭症主体的进化的相关问题。换句话说,自闭症儿童的遭遇,他/她何时进入成年。



August 25, 2012

Autism and Childhood Psychosis

Specific references to autism and the psychoses of childhood in Lacan’s written works and seminars are scarce. Yet his theses on the structure of psychosis (see foreclosure; psychosis), have enlightened the clinical approach to those conditions and generated a wealth of research, theoretical developments and debate among psychoanalysts of the Lacanian orientation who work with children.


The topic is, however, of relevance for the theory and practice of all Lacanian analysts, as the psychoanalytic field is one, and interest in particular clinical or conceptual problems should not be understood as being the domain of only ‘specialized’ forms of psychoanalysis. Whether autistic, psychotic or neurotic, it is as a subject that the child (or the adult, for that matter) enters the psychoanalytic experience.


In Lacanian psychoanalysis, the child works in this experience as a subject in his/her own right and in the full sense of the term; this is so despite the fact that the psychotic or autistic subject is outside discourse (hors discours) and cannot therefore be considered to be a ‘subject of the unconscious’ constituted by the operations of alienation and separation. It is still the aim of the psychoanalytic experience that the psychotic or autistic subject establish a ‘workable’ link with discourse.

在拉康的精神分析,儿童在这个经验里,充当是主体,拥有他/她自己的权利,就那个术语的完整意义而言。这是如此,尽管这个事实: 精神错乱或是自闭症的主体,外在于辞说之外,并且因此无法被认为是一个「无意识的主体」,由异化与分离的各种运作所组成。这依旧是精神分析经验的目标,精神错乱或是自闭症的主体应该建立一个跟辞说「可运作的」的关联。

Within Lacan’s works, the main references that have inspired the psychoanalysts who work with psychotic and autistic children (leaving aside for the moment the distinction between the two terms) are:
• The doctoral thesis on paranoia (1932).
• The article on the family published in the Encyclopédie française (1938).
• The commentaries on the cases of Dick (treated by Melanie Klein; Klein 1930) and Robert (treated by Rosine Lefort; Lefort and Lefort 1988). Both are part of the 1953-54 seminar, or Seminar I.

1、 对于偏执狂的博士论文 (1932)
2、 论家庭的文章,发表于法国百科全书(1938)
3、 有关个案的评论,对于笛克(梅兰妮、克莱恩所治疗:克莱恩,1930年)及罗伯特(由罗欣尼所治疗:雷弗特1988年)。两个个案都是1953-54的研讨班的部分,或是第一研讨班。


• The seminar on the psychoses of 1955-56.
• The now ‘classical’ 1959 paper on the treatment of psychosis included in the English-language selection of the Écrits (1977).
• The intervention at the conference on childhood psychosis organized by Maud Mannoni (1968).
• The note on the child addressed to Jenny Aubry (1969).
• The revision of the concept of the Name-of-the-Father and the function of the symptom developed in the seminars of 1974-75 (R.S.I.) and 1975-76 (Le Sinthome).
• The 1975 Geneva lecture on the symptom.

4、1955-1956 年的精神错乱的研讨班。
9、 1975年,在日内瓦演讲病正。

The first question that faces the practitioners in the field, both of practical and conceptual significance, is that of diagnosis which, from a Lacanian perspective is necessarily structural.
In his seminar on the psychoses, Lacan speaks of ‘the structure of the psychotic phenomenon’: the observable phenomena are moments of the structure, rather than epiphenomena.
From a clinical perspective, ‘observable’ phenomena are not perceived unless the clinician’s conceptual mapping is prepared to admit them; and this requires structural hypotheses.




In the Lacanian orientation, childhood and adult psychoses are identical from the viewpoint of their structure; this position contrasts with the view adopted by the authors of current psychiatric classifications. In making of psychosis a developmental disorder, what the psychiatric orientation represented by the D5M-IV causes is, in the first place, to consider the psychotic phenomenon as a deficit, rather than a production; and secondly, to define the deficits of the patient in terms of developmental norms external to the structure of the subject as such.


Diagnosis is thus established on the basis of what the subject has not achieved developmentally and his/her deviation from norms which combine medical and educational criteria, adaptation to conventional social demands being the central point of reference. This is a questionable criterion for clinical phenomenology, since the emphasis is placed on what is absent and not on what is phenomenologically observable, which is a production.


Object 23

February 10, 2012

Object 23

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

Must one see again here a striking feature of Judaism in the silence that it maintains
about the after-life? The two facts are perhaps linked. But in order to understand the
logic of the effacing of the trace, perhaps it will be necessary to have recourse to other
spatio-temporal categories than the ones that we know.


Perhaps it will be necessary to find here the structures of a time and a space only the pre-Socratics were able to reveal to us, directly or through the analyses of Vernant and Beaufret, the two in a very different way, but where we are surprised to note that the analytic treatment furnishes us with a privileged access to this time and space, these places and this memory in the sense of the Greeks.


The (o) is revealed under the structures of nosography as an episemantic organisation
and under the modes of the analysand‟s discourse in its semantophoric aspect. The
analysts here have to pass through a narrow gate. The approach to a structural
psychoanalytic technique appears to me to have to be based on the differentiation
between representatives and affect and on the differential distribution of


One is extremely stuck in reading works on psychoanalytic technique to note the total
absence about anything which concerns the modes of discourse of the analysand.
Nevertheless we all know the considerable difficulty of treatments which do not
conform to the model established by Freud of free association. What is most often
lacking is this differential distribution of modes of representation which bear witness
to the non-identity to itself of the signifier as a necessary condition of analysis. I am
only noting this point as a possible field of research without being able to dwell on it
any longer.


The essential difficulty of psychoanalytic investigation comes from the fact that it is a
constrained discourse : it is not simply a question of communicating but for the
analysand to say everything. On the side of the analyst, it is a fleeting word – verba
volant – that he is not able like the linguist or the ethnologist to lock up in a box. The
analyst runs after the word of the analysand.

精神分析研究的基本困难来自这个事实: 这是一种受到约束的论述。这不仅是沟通的问题,而且是对于分析者要说出一切的问题。在分析家这一边,这是一个瞬间的字词。他并不能够像语言学家或是人种学家封闭在一个盒子里。分析家追逐分析者的字词。

If the death drive infiltrates the word of the analysand, in the silence towards which it always pushes him, the analyst has to deal with a living word; living in its refusal to be reduced to silence, living in its character which is refractory to all embalming where the text finally conditioned lends itself to all the treatments to which men of knowledge submit it.


We will know precisely what the (o) is when we have gone completely round the field
of subjective positions. We will then have a vision which corresponds to that of the
philosopher who thinks about history and culture through the modes of discovery of
the movement of ideas, of art, of the science of his time but as a polymorphous,
heterogeneous milieu where there are illustrated different forms of alienation. One
should however not be deceived.


The psychoanalyst here is not disposed to abandon his priority to anyone in the examination of these facts. Even though he may be taxed with imperialism, he will always remain arrested before this affirmation by Freud that the religions of humanity represent obsessional systems, just as the different philosophies represent paranoiac systems.

在此,在这些事实的检视过程,精神分析并不倾向于放弃他的优先于任何其他人。即使他可能受到帝国主义的侵犯,他总是被弗洛伊德的这个肯定被吸引: 人类的各种宗教代表妄想症的系统,正如不同的哲学代表偏执狂的系统。

The one and the other are valorised in so far as they allow the subject to feel better, says Freud, by having thus escaped desire and succeeding in installing something else in its place. And we would have here, in the order of the projections of the functioning of the psyche, the first elements of a conception or of a mimetic theory of the functioning of the subject. Psychoanalysis has not yet exhausted the resources of mimesis.


It is insufficient to attribute to the psychoanalyst the function of demystification which would allow there to be preserved a purged and purified cogito. It is in fact because Freud begins from what is slag, waste, mistake, that he discovers the structure of the subject as a relationship to the truth. This is perhaps less close to the image of
Prometheus hunted for having stolen fire and than to that of Philoctetes abandoned by
his own on a desert island because of his stinking wound.


Dr Lacan: I want to thank Green very warmly for the admirable presentation that he
has just made to us on his position with respect to what I, as he recalled, patiently put
forward, constructed, produced and what I have not finished producing concerning the
o-object. He really showed very remarkably all the connections that this notion
involves. I would even say that he even left in the margin something he could have
taken further, I know, and specifically as regards the organisation of different types of
treatment and what constitutes properly speaking the function of the o-object as
regards the treatment.

拉康: 我想要深深感谢格林,因为他刚刚跟我所做的精彩演讲,有关他的立场,如他所说的,对于我耐心提出,建构,及产生的问题,以及我未完全产生的问题,关于这个客体。他确实很精彩地显示这个观念牵涉到各种的关联。我甚至要说,他甚至在边缘留下某件东西,他本来能够进一步探究的东西。我知道,很明确地,关于不同种类的治疗的组织,以及适当来说,组成这个客体作为治疗的功用。

I thank him for having given this clarification which is much more than a summary,
which is a genuine animating, an excellent reminder of different stages, I repeat, in
which one could specify my research or my discoveries.


I will not answer him now because we have a programme. I think that he will be prepared to collaborate in the closest possible fashion with what has been put together in order that the text of what he gave to day and which marks a date and which can serve as a reference for what will be developed and I hope completed or increased this year, I think that it is an excellent work-base especially for those who will form part of this closed seminar.

我将不会现在回答他,因为我 们另有行程。我认为他将会准备以最亲密的方式,跟所被提出的问题合作,为了让他今天提出的这个文本,它标示一个日期,也充当一种指称,因为所被发展的东西。我希望在今年,它们将会被完成或增加。我认为,这是一个优秀的工作团队,特别对于那些将会形成这个圈内的研讨班的部分成员。

(28) Thank you very much, Green. You have filled your hour with an exactness that I
cannot compliment you on too much. So then. I give the floor to Conté who is going
to propose a certain presentation about what is involved in the articles by Stein that
are going to be questioned today. Nevertheless, I take advantage of the interval to let
you know the following, which is that a study and work circle which is called the
epistemology circle and which belongs to this school whose guests we are here, this
epistemology circle has been constituted in the course of the cartel: theory of the
discourse of the Ecole Freudienne and is going to publish Cahiers pour l’analyse.


The very title of these cahiers requires no further commentary. But I will give you all
the same its direction and what it is open to, what it may possibly welcome. These
cahiers will be put at your disposal of course here at the entrance to the seminar but at
the Ecole Normale in a permanent fashion and also at the Sorbonne in a place that I
will designate for you later. I gave to these cahiers, which appear to me to be
animated by the most fruitful spirit and this for a long time, I mean that the circle
which is going to edit them appears to me to merit the attention of all of us, I gave my
first lecture this year which as you saw was written out, so that it could be published
in the first number. There will be other things. So you will see.



Object 22

February 8, 2012

Object 22

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965


IV. 认同与非认同自己:死亡冲动

The signifier reveals the subject while effacing its trace, says Lacan. It is here, I
believe, that there is situated the divorce with all non-psychoanalytic structuralist
thinking: in the visible/invisible opposition, in the perceived/ known opposition, we
bring into play the order of truth, but in so far as this truth always passes by way of the problem of the effacing of the trace.

能指显示主体,当它抹除它的痕迹,拉康说。 就在这里,我相信,这这个分离被定位在这里,跟一切所有非精神分析的结构主义,他们以可见与不可见的对立,及可感觉与可知道的对立等方式来思考。我们运作真理的这个秩序,但是因为这个真理总是凭借抹除痕迹的问题来通过。

Freud says in Moses and monotheism (1938): “In its consequences, the distortion of a
text is like a murder, the difficulty is not to commit the act but to get rid of its traces”.
Now, it is this process which, starting from traces, makes it possible to go back to
their cause in which we find the very process of paternity.


In Moses and monotheism, again, taking up a remark already made at the time of the Ratman, he recalls that maternity is revealed by the senses while paternity is a conjecture based on deductions and hypotheses. The fact of having thus given priority to cogitative processes over sensorial perception “was heavy with consequences for humanity”.

而且,在「摩西与一神教」,从事一种在「鼠人」的时候已经开始的谈论,弗洛伊德提醒: 虽然父权是一种根据推论及假设的推想,母权则是凭借感官而显示出来。因此将认知的过程,给予优先顺序,超过感官的感觉,对于人类而言,这个事实形成各种的结果。

I point out here that if Freud established a very close link between the phallus and
castration, between sexual curiosity and procreation, it seems curious to me that he
never in an explicit fashion related the role of the phallus in procreation, in the child‟s
desire for a child or in sexual curiosity.


What functions as cause in the subject (in the search for truth in so far as it is a
question of origins, a relationship to the begetter) functions as Law at the socio-anthropological level. Here also the combinatorial only comes into action through the compulsion of a rule.

作为主体的原因,发挥功用的东西,( 在对于真理的追求,因为这是起源的问题,跟父亲的关系),在社会与人类学的层次,发挥功用,作为法则。在此,这个组合也仅是通过一种规则的驱动,才开始运作。

To the prohibition of incest, the interdiction to the sight and to the knowledge of all
which removes the mother and the sister from choice in order to designate other
objects in their place, there is added the funeral ritual which establishes the presence
of the absent one, of the dead Father.


A double process, let us note, of cutting and of suturing. Among the living, a cutting off of the mother and a suturing by her substitutes, among the dead a suturing of the disappearance of the father by the ritual or the totem which is consecrated to him, a cutting off from him through the inaccessible beyond where he henceforth holds himself.


We have here a striking example of the cut between Lévi-Strauss and Freud which is
illustrated in an unexpected encounter.


In connection with the mask Lévi-Strauss insists on its function as being at once
negative (of dissimulation) and positive (the accession to another world). But what
seems to be involved for him is a homology, a correspondence such that in this twofaced reality nothing is in any way lost on the way. One might pose the question :


“What is it that necessitates dissimulation, what is it that requires this two-planed


Lévi-Strauss speaks about a mask (Hamshamtses) among the Kwakiutl Indians made
up of several articulated shutters which allows there to be unveiled, to be “unmasked”
(sic) the human face of a God hidden under the outer form of a crow. We are in
agreement with him in concluding “that one masks not in order to suggest, but finally
in order to unveil”, now when this mask is deployed it makes appear the human face
in what could be taken to be the back of crow‟s throat.

列文、史特劳斯谈论到,科瓦丘族的印度人用好几层连接的帘幕制成的一种面具,隐藏在乌鸦的外在形状之下,容许神祗的人类脸孔被揭露,被揭开「面具」。我们同样他的这个结论: 「我们用面具遮蔽,不是为了暗示,而是最后为了揭露。」现在,当这个面具被运用时,它让人类的脸孔出现,,以被人认为是乌鸦的喉咙的背后。

We do not have to force the facts very much to say that the figure presented here makes there appear the four semi-halves of the beak (two upper ones and two lower ones) as the four members of a character whose trunk is represented by the face of a God. The analogy between this representation and the one Freud notes in an extremely short text – A mythological parallel to a visual obsession – is striking. He describes in it an obsessional representation which haunts the patient under the name Vater Arsch in which there is imagined a character constituted by a trunk and the lower part of this, its four members, with the genital organs missing and the head, the face drawn on the stomach.


And Freud concludes to the link between the Vater Arsch the father‟s arse, and the
patriarch, this subject possessing of course a quite filial veneration for the author of
his days, like any obsessional.


It seems to me that what Lévi-Strauss misses is this sacrifice of the head and of the
genital organs represented by the Kwakiutal mask which goes beyond the relationship
of what is shown to what is hidden but reveals a relationship of the unveiled to the
effaced, to the barred, to the lack.


The cause of desire is here. The metonymy is highlighted by Freud in the representation of the substitutive body for the lack of one of its parts, the genitals. All of this takes on its value because it exposes to us the interest taken by Freud at the end of his life in Moses, not simply because of his quality as a Jew, but also because monotheism appears there to be closely linked to the interdiction of idolatry and to the total effacing of every sign of the presence of God otherwise then under the form of names of the father (Yahve, Elohim, Adonai). Let us note here again the duplication of the non-identity to oneself.


The work of the death drive which always operates in silence can be noted in this
reduction – the word is to be taken in all its dimensions – which forces itself always to
reach this point of absence where the subject rejoins its dependency on the Other, to
identify itself to its own effacing. The mutation of the signifier, its epiphany in its
polymorphous and distributed shapes, indicates the startled response that it intends to
oppose – as in the dream – to this annihilation and the effort to which it perdures
profoundly disguised and modified, as a witness.

在这个还原里,总是默默运作的死亡冲动发挥的功用能够被注意到,(字词应该从它所有的维度来看待)。死亡冲动强迫它自己,总是为了到达欠缺的这个点。在这里,主体重新加入对于大他者的依靠,将它自己认同于对他自己的抹除。 能指的这个变种,它的多样形态及分布的形状的神性显现,指示著它打算要反对的这个感到惊吓的回应,(如同在梦里),回应这个毁灭,与它以深刻伪装与修正的持续的努力,作为见证者。


Object 21

February 6, 2012

Object 21

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

B – The problem of the differential distribution of the mode of representation

B. 再现的模式的不同分配的问题

Another type of differentiation interests us here, that of representations of words and
representations of things, a distinction which is not contingent. I am only recalling
this, which is already known, in order to put forward that: if there is a theory of the
signifier in Freud it cannot avoid passing through the perceived. This is tangible in
the organisation of discourse. In the narrative of the analysand, the secondary
elaboration of the dream, the present or revived phantasy, the image are renewed
testimonies to it in the text of our sessions. The question is whether all of this is really
of the order of the perceived.


This representative of representation shows that one cannot reduce its status to that of
perception. Let us note once again that it is never a question of a presentation but of a
representation. The perceived only represents the point of fascination, the centring
effort of specularisation as Lacan would say. What allows a functioning at the level of
zero, is of the order of the subject, but what is going to emerge and take the place of
the one is here the o-object, on condition that one considers it in this differential
distribution, where the non-identity to itself is manifested in this disparity.

这种再现的代表显示, 我们无法将它的地位还原成为感觉的地位。让我们再一次注意,这从来就不是呈现的问题,而是再现的问题。受到感觉者仅是再现著迷的这个点,自我理想魅影化的核心努力,如拉康所言。容许在零度的层次发挥功用,是属于主体的秩序,但是所正要出现及代替这个自我理想的魅影化的,在此是这个小客体,只要我们认为它,在这个差异的分配。在那里,这个对于它自己的非认同,在这个差异性里,被证明出来。

The economic point of view is illustrated here not simply by being put in question
when it is a matter of the quantitative evaluation of the processes, but because it can
be identified in this differential distribution. It is the damming effect which weighs on
discourse which compels not alone the combinatorial, but again the changes of
register, of materials and of the modes of representation of the signifier. These
mutations have as object the accentuation of non-identity to itself not alone in the
resurgence of the signifier but in its metonymical metamorphoses. The metaphor is
infiltrated even into the metonymical enchaining.


It is not for nothing that Freud opposes two systems: what functions at the level of the
one is the identity of perceptions and in the other the identity of thoughts. It is in so
far as both have a relationship with truth that they form part of our concepts. But the
disturbing and fascinating point comes from the fact that perception can be seen as a
field of identity while identity operates there in accordance with a register which is not that of the perceived.


It is this identity which abolishes difference as sustained by lack and which finds itself
being materialised in the perceived, in the same way as the identity of thoughts in the
order of thinking only become operational after the loss of the object.


Lacan did not seem to me to be quite right to have so severely criticised the works
dealing with negative hallucinations.


At the very most one can only deplore their imprecise reference points. If negative hallucination is this emergence of the zero in so far as it has absolutely nothing to do with representation, is of the order of the representative of representation. Its value is to give support to the notion of aphanisis which has played such an important role for Lacan after Jones.


One must also remember the alternative picked out by Lacan in Jones‟ work on
feminine sexuality, whose importance is probably greater: either the object, or the
desire. Negative hallucination would thus give the model of a subjective structure in
so far as it implies the mourning of the object and the advent of a negated subject thus
rendered apt for desire.


Might one not recall here that the first modes of representation of the subject – the first i(o) – is precisely the product of a representation that is homologous with negative hallucination: the negative hand of the artist appearing in the contour of the painting which delimits its shape.


One sees then how the phantasy is placed, since it is the function that Lacan assigns to it of rendering pleasure apt for desire. Here then there appears a form of emergence of a subject which escapes the annihilation of the signifying power in aphanisis, since the negative hallucination manages to be produced but as a specular lack. It seems to me to be the inaugural relationship of narcissistic identification in the sense conceived by Freud as a relationship to the mourning of the primordial object. It is the meeting
point of the cut and of the suture.


It becomes clear that this process is the same as the one which grounds desire as the
desire of the Other, since mourning is interposed in the relationship of the subject to
the Other and of the subject to the object.


If the (o) operates between all these forms (one could say that it plays with the
fascination of the perceived in running through these registers), it is indeed because it
is, not as perceived, but as the trajectory of the subject, the circuit of discourse. I will
give an example of it taken from Othello. In Othello it is the handkerchief which
might appear as (o).


In fact it is here that we are witnesses to the fascination effort of the perceived, the truth is that it is not so much the handkerchief which is important as the circuit that it goes through from the magician who gave it to Othello‟s mother or her father (both versions are in Othello) until it ends up on the bed of Bianca, the whore, in order finally to reveal Othello to his desire, “my mother is a whore”. This must be demonstrated with the help of knowledge, for Othello like every jealous person wants an avowal more than the truth.


Is this not the way then that one must listen to his soliloquy, when he enters the
nuptial chamber where he is going to kill Desdemona to make of her wedding night a
night of mourning.


“It is the cause, it is the cause my soul
Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars.
It is the cause.”
(Act 5, Scene 2.)


The function of the cause is here what orders the indubitable perception of his
mother‟s handkerchief in the hands of a whore.


Freud underlines in An outline of psychoanalysis that we live in the hope that with a
refining of our instruments of perception we may finally accede to certainty about the
sensible world. In fact he accentuates once more the affirmation that reality is
unknowable and that we can only allow ourselves a deduction of the truth from the
connections and the interdependencies existing between different orders of the
perceived. This is obviously to affirm the pre-eminence of the symbolic, if it were


But his originality was to introduce at the level of the perceived an order, an
organisation, which allows him to get out of the dilemma of appearance and reality, in
order to substitute for it that of the ideal (Idealfunktion) and the truth, this couple
functioning moreover in the order of the perceived and of the thought. The confusion
repeated more than once between the symbol and the symbolic ought to make us more
attentive not to take one for the other.


What then becomes then of the o-object? It exists as a structure of transformation
where the object of desire takes on a new mutation in which it is the desire that
becomes the object. Through what operation is the cross-checking (recoupement)
through the non-identity to themselves of these enumerated forms accomplished? I
think that one can grasp them in accordance with the two major axes of synchrony and diachrony taking Freud‟s theorisation as a reference.


1 – In the axis of synchrony we have a series formed by thoughts in so far as they are
thoughts of the unconscious (and where it is necessary to distinguish between
representations of words and representations of things), affects (as secondary
signifiers) and two other categories which it seems to me must come into
consideration in so far as we observe them in the analytic situation and not outside it;

其一,这同时性的枢纽,我们拥有由思想形成的一连串,因为它们是无意识的思想 (在那里,文字的再现与冲动的再现需要被区别出来),情感(作为次级的能指),及其他两个范畴,我觉得它们必须被考虑到,因为我们观察它们,是在精神分析的情境里面,而不是在情境的外面。

I am thinking about states of one‟s own body – depersonalisation or hypochondria,
etc…- and all the manifestations which relate to what the English authors call
paraparaxes as expressions of the register of the act (acting-in and not acting-out).

我正在思考我们的身体的状态—除掉个体化,或是忧郁症,等等,以及跟英国作者所谓的「口误」息息相关的证明,作为是这个行动的铭记 (在里面的演出,而非是外面的演出)。

2 – But we can also map out another series on the axis of diachrony which is the axis
of the succession of oral anal phallic objects etc… I wonder whether the scopic object
and the auditory object that Lacan brings into this register gain from being included in
this series and whether they do not rather form part of the register of transmission
between synchrony and diachrony that one can pick out in discourse in the diverse
forms of the dream and its secondary elaboration, of phantasy, of memory, of
reminiscence, in short of all the ways which make synchrony and diachrony function.


It is upon this sampling that there operates the creation of the o-object in which desire
becomes the object and accounts for subjective positions. This non-identity to oneself
which the blank images is linked for me to the processes of the effacing of the trace.


This is what compels this system to be transformed.



Object 20

February 5, 2012

Object 20

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

A -The problem of the distinction between the representative of the drive and

A. 冲动的重现与情感之间的区别的问题

The distinction between the representative and the affect is conjectural in Freud‟s
work as we know. Often the drive is confused with the representative and visa versa.
But at the end of his work, we know that a further distinction that is more and more
marked is established where – this is what I propose should be taken into consideration- the affect takes on the status of signifier.


The proof of this is that from 1924 on, the use of Verleugnung which it has been proposed to translate by déni (denial) is more and more specific; it finds its most precise formulation in the article on fetishism (1927) to which Lacan refers so frequently, the article on the splitting of the ego (1938) and finally in chapter VIII of the Outline of psychoanalysis (1939). Freud‟s thesis then becomes that perception falls under the influence of Verleugnung, whilst affect falls under the influence of the Verdrangung.


The possibility in the alternative of acceptance-refusal of a global functioning or one
impacting simply on one of the terms (perception and affect) is the condition for the
differentiated suturing of certain conflictual organisations.


It is here, it is starting from this distinction that Freud sees this splitting of the ego: the
Entzweiung that Lacan highlights. Now if Freud creates a term equivalent to
repression, denial, which has the same semantic value, it must probably be concluded
that if only a signifier can undergo this destiny, the fact is that affect enters into this
same category.


I even think that the definition of the signifier would gain perhaps by being completed
in the light of what is being said: the signifier would then be that which, under pain of
disappearing, must in order to subsist enter into a system of transformations where it
represents a subject for another signifier falling under the effect of the bar of
repression or denial which constrains it to a fall in its status as being in its relationship
with the truth, a fall through which it exceeds or it comes to the rank of signifier in its


There would be a certain interest in underlining the correlation of these two modes of
signification, each one englobing the two mechanisms. The affect is only seen as a
discharge, even though it is – Freud says it for anxiety – a signal (a signifier for us), the representative is only seen as a signifier while it is (in the Freudian theory) the
generation of a certain mode of production, therefore of discharge (engendered by the impossibility of this).


In the Ego and the Id Freud takes up the question already evoked, not without
difficulty in his article on the unconscious, about the difference between the
representative and the affect. What qualifies the affect is that it cannot enter into any
combinatorial. It is repressed but its specificity qua signifier is to be expressed
directly, and not pass through the connecting links of the preconscious.


In his seminar on anxiety, Lacan elucidated and demonstrated what unleashes anxiety,
the fashion it operates when there is anxiety. But I would ask myself if he has really
taken into account what anxiety is in the sense of the status that it has in the theory.


I believe that there is an interest in considering affect as an original semantic form
alongside the primary semantides – terms borrowed from the vocabulary of molecular
biology – which are the representatives; it would function then in a secondary position
which would allow it to acquire the status of a secondary semantide of a different
nature to that of the representative and reduplicating the Entzweiung in this difference.
There would be a reduplication of non-identity to itself through this disparity of the
two registers of the signifier.


Contrary to received opinion, it is very curious to see that Freud makes of language
what transforms internal processes into perception and not as might be imagined what
detaches itself from the perceptive plane, and which would belong to the order of
thought. With affect we are in the presence of an effect of the effacing of the
perceived trace restored under the form of discharge.


What about the representative? Considerations of terminology are not useless here. It
is not for nothing that it has long being discussed whether the
Vorstellungrepräsentanz, the representative representating, the representative of
representation, what takes the place of representation. We know that it enters into the

那冲动的再现是什么?术语的考虑在此并非没有用途。这并非毫无意义,长久以来大家一直在讨论,Vorstellungrepräsentanz, 是否翻译为冲动再现的符号再现,再现符号的冲动再现,是什么代替再现冲动?我们知道,冲动再现进入符号组合。

This is where the ambiguity begins. It does not enter into it as a homogeneous unit identical to itself. The clairvoyance of Freud in his domain was to make from the start this exclusive distinction present to all your memories between perception and memory. Let us recall the role that he makes reminiscence play in so far as it is supposed to be, as one might say, memory in the locus of the Other but which preserves the trace before it not without losing its quality of memory if it comes to be lived out in actuality.



Object 19

February 4, 2012

Object 19

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

This is where we encounter the function of cause developed by Jacques Lacan. If,
with Frege, the identity to oneself has allowed the passage from the thing to the
object, may we not think that what we have just shown may function as a relationship
of the object to the cause?


One might conclude that the object is the signifying relationship which can link the two terms of the thing and of the cause. We would here perhaps have one of the examples spoken about in this still contested article by Freud on the antithetical sense of primitive words since we know that chose (thing ) and cause (cause) have a common root, the mediation here being found to pass through the object.


In short, we would be present at the passage from “the indeterminate” to “the state of
what is or works”, from “what is in fact” to “what is of the order of reason, of the
subject, or of the motive” through the intermediary of the object in so far as its
definition is: “what presents itself to sight or affects the senses” (Littré).


B – The problem of representation

B. 符号再现的问题

Here there is posed then our second problem, namely that of representation. It seems
to me that Miller paid little attention to all the references to representation used by
Frege. Nevertheless he preserved in the passage quoted above the notion of an
alternative movement of a representation and of an exclusion. The function of
gathering together, of subsumption is solidary with the notion of a power which puts
things together and which at the cost of a cut (that of the power of gathering together
presented to the thing, represented). It is the cut which allows the representation.


Now here the number zero figures as object under which there falls no representation.
It is by the very operation of the cut that there comes, that there is accomplished the
subject I would say on the back of, at the expense of the object. As if one could say:
what does the cut (of the subject) matter since there remains the suture (of the oobject).


This is what the sacrifice of the object by desire in a way realises. What
matter the loss of the object if the desire survives and outlasts it. Something also
which would be of the order of: the object is dead, long live the desire (of the Other).
The demand becomes what assures the renewed resurrection of desire in the case
where it might happen to be lacking; it is formulated through the o- object.


The demand which is sustained by no cause, a cause whose effect is the hole, through
which the remainder is confused with the demand, is this not the way that the fool –
the buffoon, Polonius – sees the fool – Hamlet in love with his daughter and an
uncertain avenger of the dead Father – which will make another father perish, that of
the object of his desire (Polonius) after a tragic mistake.


“That I have found
the very cause of Hamlet‟s lunacy
I will be brief. Your noble son is mad
mad call I it; for to define true madness
what is it but to be nothing else but mad.”


And further on:


“That we find out the cause of this effect,
or rather say the cause of this defect,
for this effect defective comes by cause
thus it remains, and the remainder thus.


Hamlet Act 2, Scene 2.




Lacan insists forcibly on the fact that the o-object is not specularisable, the reference
to the specular image is neither the image of the object nor that of representation, it is,
says Lacan in his seminar on Identification (1962) another object which is not the
same. It is caught up in the framework of a relationship where there comes into play
the narcissistic dialectic whose limit is the phallus which operates there under the
form of a lack.


Now we have just seen the non-depictable object represented by the number zero.
What does Freud have to say about it? By considering the problem uniquely from the
angle of the narcissistic dialectic one short-circuits in my opinion the problem of
representation which refers to the object of the drive. Freud designates it as eminently
substitutable and interchangeable, which might perhaps appear to be a compensation
for the impossibility of flight before internal stimuli, an intermediary procedure, I
would say between a limited exchange and a generalised exchange.


It is necessary that there should participate in this exchange as an exchanged term an
object of the drive, thereforee it is not any object whatsoever that is involved in the


Two problems here present themselves before us. The first is that of the distinction
between the representative of the drive and affect, the second is that of the differential
distribution of the mode of representation.



Object 18

January 17, 2012

Object 18

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

A – The problem of the suture 缝合的问题

Leclaire protested against this suturing inferred by Miller. The question remains: is
there or is there not a suture? Is not what designates the position of the psychoanalyst
with respect to the truth precisely the privilege that he does not have to suture? How
can one deny that there is a suture if there is a concatenation?


I would take as proof this argument of Freud that is too often forgotten on the
consequences of castration. If it is possible, if the threat has been executed, it does not
simply deprive the subject of masturbatory pleasure, but it has, the henceforth
definitive impossibility for the castrated subject of a union with the mother.


That castration is seen here as the collapse of the whole system of the signifier by the
rupture of any possibility of concatenation, explains why Freud compares it to a
disaster whose costs are immeasurable. In any case the penis plays here the role of
mediator of the cut and of the suture.


How can this be sutured? Jacques-Alain Miller, as I have just said, has shown the
assenscion of the number zero its transgression of the bar under the form of one, its
vanishing in the passage from n to n‟ which is n +1. But one would not be wrong
either to highlight the fact that the logic of an unconscious concept has requirements
that are internal to its formation.

这如何能够被缝合呢?如我刚刚说的,雅克、米勒,曾经显示,零这个数字汇集划槓禁制的侵犯在「一」的形式之下,它的消失,在这个过程,从n 到n加1的次方。但是我们假如强调这个事实:无意识的逻辑观念,拥有它的内在形成的这个要件,我们也不算错误。

Here let us quote Freud (with Leclaire): “faeces”, “child”, “penis” thus form a unity, an unconscious concept (sit venia verbo). The concept specifically of a little thing which can be separated from one‟s own body.

在此,我们引述弗洛伊德(跟雷克莱): 「粪便」「小孩」「男根」,因此形成一个统一,这是一种无意识的观念。这个明确是一个小东西的观念,它会跟它自己的身体分开。

To an opposition of a binary type, the one that linguistics offers us, that of phonology
where relationships are always posed in terms of an antagonistic couple and the one
that is put at the basis of all information, there is substituted here an operational
process with three terms (n, +, n‟) with the vanishing of a term as soon as it is
manifested . We find here a sort of paradigm which can give us the path of what may
be involved in the cutting up of the signifier.

对于一种双极种类的对立,语言学提供给予我们的这个「一」,语音学的这个「一」,关系总是被提出,以一种敌意的配对。这个被提出的一,作为所有资讯的基础,在此有一个运作的过程被替代,使用三个术语 (n + n)的次方,由于一种术语的消失,当它被证明。我们在此发现一种典范,能够给予我们这条途径,在能指的切割牵涉的东西。

In effect the linguists show themselves to be extremely embarrassed when it is a
matter of the cutting up of the signified while the cutting up of the signifier does not
present us with any kind of difficulty it seems. If for example I can believe Martinet,
I read: “ As regards semantics, if it has acquired the sense which interests us, it is
nonetheless derived from a root which evokes not at all a psychic reality but rather the
processes of meaning which are implied by the combination of the signifier and of the
signified”. “A seme in any case can be nothing other than a two faced unit.”


The embarrassment comes here from the fact that any direct reference to the signified
would ruin the structuralist approach, since its accession by way of the signifier
creates the necessary detour for an indirect, relative and correlative apprehension.
Moreover, and above all, the tracing out of relevant traits leaves us here in perplexity.
Definitively, what lacks a consistent support here is the structure of the body. Does
not the assurance of holding as firm the relevant traits in phonology repose
definitively on the functioning of the vocal apparatus?


No doubt it is under the command of the nervous system, which explains the fascination of linguists for cybernetics. The psychoanalyst is here the only one who tries to listen to the sense, at its level, namely to consider, while respecting the same requirement of indirect reference, that the cutting up passes to the level of the signified and that it is this cutting up itself which will imply a cutting up of the signifier which renders the signified intelligible.


Here there is located the ambiguity that must be raised between the linguistic concept of the signifier and its psychoanalytic formulation as Lacan conceives of it. But is it the same thing?


You have no doubt recognised in this two-faced unity the theorisation of the Moebius
strip by Lacan. But can one not consider that the cutting up of the signified in this
metonymical series of different partial objects is represented by the phallus precisely
in so far as it has appeared in the form of (-phi) in its different partial objects whose
diachronic succession you know well: oral object, anal object, phallic object, etc. these terms only representing their mapping-out with respect to the erogenous zones,
leaving a place for more complex forms.


This could reconcile a choice between a strict binary system which refers to options
which do not allow us ternary mediation, and another system where causality is
developed in a network, a type of reticular system which makes disappear any
functioning of an oppositional type.


Finally it clearly appears that the minimal form of this reticular structure is the
triangular structure where the third is vanishing. It is, I believe, the operation
illuminated by Miller‟s commentary.


This may evoke for us diverse forms of relationships with which we have to deal in
the Oedipus complex where an opposition, that of the difference between the sexes, in
so far as it is supported by the phallus is in fact inserted into a triangular system which
is never apprehended except in two by two relationships; where the phallus constitutes
the standard of exchange, its cause.


Saussure had the merit of placing at the beginning of the tongue as system, value,
outlining in this respect the comparison with political economy. But even though he
separated it out here, he scarcely went any further and did not pose himself the
question of what has value for the speaking subject. Thus the suture is accomplished
by allowing value to be seen as a cause without telling us anything about it.



Object 17

January 17, 2012

Object 17

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

F – The (o), product of work 这个客体,运作的产物

One might think, even though Lacan does not say it expressly, that the progression regression dimension might constitute a plane that is correlative to those of conjunction- disjunction and of suture-cut. The developments generated on the plane of knowledge are to be taken in their negative perspective, referring back to the plane of miscognition where they are organised in the approach of the processes of meaning – which ceaselessly tend to cancel out or to nullify the loss of the object – to what was signified around this loss, by the traces left of this work, of which the o-object is the surest reference point, the index of truth pointed towards the subject. Freud insists, in his final works on the historical truth at which the construction of the analyst aims.


The channel of demand constitutes the guiding thread of this access to the truth. Its
function is not alone to serve as a guide, but to form the very outline of this itinerary
of the paths of truth.


This reminder in which we have only wanted to keep the indispensable minimum for
the development which is going to follow is going to allow us to pose some problems.


a – Given the relationship of the o-object to representation it would be well to ask
oneself what are the relationships between it and the signifying chain. Does the lack
represent some relationship with the word as concatenation.

1、 假如考虑到这个客体跟符号再现的关系,我们最好询问自己,在它与能指化的锁链之间的这个关系是什么。这个欠缺难道代表某种跟文字的关系,作为结合。

b – Must one accord – in turning towards Freud – the status of the signifier to the
Vorstellungrepräsentanz alone? What about affect?

2、当我们回转朝向弗洛伊德,我们必须同意能指仅是跟这个「再现符号的再现」 的地位吗?情感的地位怎么说?

c – is there not in the work of Freud a point about representation which has not found
an echo in Lacan: the distinction between different types of representation (of words
and of things for example) which might lead us to differentiate still more, in order to
underline the original character of the Freudian concatenation.


d – If knowledge is what comes in the place of truth, after the loss of the object, would
it not be appropriate to link one to the other by the traces of this loss and the attempt
to efface them.


These are questions which will allow the o-object to be considered less as a support of
the partial object than as the pathway of a hand tracing, the inscription, the letter, o.


THE o-OBJECT 能指的缝合,它的符号再现及这个小客体

I come now to what is going to constitute another axis of my presentation, namely the
relationship between (o) and the cut and the suture, and I will refer to the presentation
by J A Miller concerning the theorisation, starting from the work of Frege, of the logic of the signifier.


This in order to situate correctly the position of the number zero in the measure in which it is going to have an impact on the destiny of (o).


In virtue of the principle according to which, in order that the truth may be saved,
everything is identical to itself and zero is the number assigned to the concept “not
identical to itself”, there is no object which falls under this concept.


But, says Miller, speaking about Frege, “it was necessary, in order to exclude any
reference to the real, to evoke at the level of the concept an object that is non-identical
to itself – subsequently rejected from the dimension of the truth”.

The zero (O) which is inscribed at the place of the number consummates the exclusion of this object. As for this place designated by subsumption where the object is missing, nothing can be written and if it is necessary to trace a O, it is only to picture a blank in it, to make the lack visible”.


There is here therefore on the one hand the evocation and the exclusion of the object which is not identical to itself and on the other hand this blank, this hole in place of this subsumed object.


The notion of unity is given by the concept of identity, the concept of the subsumed
object. But the place of one, no longer qua unity but qua number one, remains
problematic as regards its place as the first, as regards its primordiality, as I might say.


It is not legitimate, Miller remarks, to count the number zero as nothing, and logic
demands then that one should confer on this number zero the role of first object.


The consequence of this is the identity to the concept of the number zero which
subsumes the object number zero in so far as it is one object. The primordiality, in
short, cannot be established under the sign of unity, but of number starting from which the one is possible, the number zero. Thus a double register overlaps a functioning which must be unfolded in order to understand the ambiguity of the number zero in so far as it includes :


– the register of the concept of not identical to itself
– the register of the object, matrix of the one, the object permitting the assignation of the number one.


Thus there is uncovered the double operation:
-The evocation and the elision of the non-identical to itself, with a blank at the
level of the object subsumed permitting the number zero
– The introduction of zero as a number, that is as a signifying name and as an


This situation has an interest for us above all in so far as it specifies the structure of
the concatenation. Not only does the subject exclude himself from the scene and from
the signifying chain by the very fact that he constitutes it as subject in its structure of
concatenation, but the first of these objects operates at once as a concept and as an
object, not represented but named unary object and concept on the non-identical to
itself, a concept that is a threat to the truth and this all the more so because it is out of
play, or hors-je (out of I).

这个情况尤其让我们感到興趣,因为它指明结合的这个结构。主体不仅是从这个场景及从这个能指化的锁链,排除他自己,根据这个事实: 他组成它作为一个主体,在它作为结合的结构。而且,这些客体的第一个同时运作,作为一个观念,也作为一个客体,不是被代表,而是被命名为单一的客体及对于非认同于它自己的观念。这一种观念是对这个真理的一种威胁。这更加是如此,因为它无法运作,它是「非我」。

This concept of the threat to the truth is for us a concept which emerged from the
encounter with the truth, in so far as it dissociates not alone the truth from its
manifestation (identity to itself) but designates here its place, through the blank or the
trace which negates it. It is insufficient to see in this, (it has to be said) only a simple
relationship of absence. It is also necessary that there should be circumscribed here its
relationship of lack of truth.

对于真理的威胁的这个观念,对于我们而言,是一个从跟真理遭遇而出现的观念,因为它不仅中断真理跟它的展现(认同于它自己),而且在此指明它的位置,通过这个空白,这个否定它的痕迹。在这里,并不足以看出 (我们必须说)仅仅是一个欠缺的关系。这也是需要的,在此,它跟真理的欠缺的关系应该被界定范围。

The interest taken by us in this confrontation with Frege read by Miller is to link the
subject to the signifier. The subject is identified to the repetition which presides over
each of the operations through which concatenation is knotted together, in the hold on
each fragment by the one which precedes it and by the one which succeeds it: at the
same time and in the same movement the subject sees itself so many times rejected
outside the scene – and from my chain – which thus constitutes itself. Now if the
operation excludes at every stage, the nullifying does not suppress the having which
subsists for us, on condition of being able to recognise it under the form of (o).


The effect of concatenation rejoins the definition by Lacan of the signifier: “the
signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier”.


There is thus clarified what is involved in the relationships of the subject and of the o-object in their relationships of suture and of cut. “If the succession of numbers, metonymy of zero begins by its metaphor,” says Miller, “if the number O of the sequence as number is only the suturing substitute for the absence (of absolute zero) which is carried underneath the chain following the alternative movement of a representation and of an exclusion – what creates an obstacle to recognising in the restored relationship of the zero to the sequence of numbers the most elementary articulation of the relationship that the subject has with the signifying chain?”.


I leave here the question of the relationship of the subject to the big Other by the effect of the zero but I am going to raise two problems, that of the suture and that of


Object 16

January 16, 2012

Object 16

The Object of Psychoanalysis

Jacques Lacan

15.6.66 XXII 49
Seminar 4: Wednesday 22 December 1965

C – The o, object of desire 欲望的这个客体

In effect, Lacan postulates the existence of an ideal ego as a precocious form of
identification of the ego to certain objects which operate both as love objects and
objects of identification, but in so far as they are extracted, cut out, taken from a series
which makes the lack appear. I who am speaking identify you to the object which you
yourself are lacking, says Lacan.


The relationship between (o) and O is therefore clearly shown. If O only reaches its full meaning by being sustained by the Name of the Father which is not, is it necessary to specify, either a name or a God, it passes as we have seen through the maternal defile and is only reached when the cut between the subject and maternal object irremedially separates him from the aforesaid object.


Or again when there is revealed the lack which affects the primordial object, in the
experience of castration. The series of castrations postulated by Freud: weaning,
sphincter training, castration properly speaking, renders this experience in its
repetition, in its recurrence, signifying and structuring.


The o-object will then be that which through these experiences, is going to fall, as
Lacan says, from its position of being “exposed to the field of the Other” but in order
to attain the status of object of desire. The tribute paid to this accession is to exclude
the desiring subject from saying, from naming the object of desire.


Having being situated in the field of the Other now allows there to be conceived the
function of mediation such an object plays less between the subject and the Other but
in their relationship: my desire enters the Other where it is expected from all eternity
in the form of the object that I am in so far as it exiles me from my subjectivity by
resuming all the signifiers to which this subjectivity is attached.


We know that phantasy allows the establishment of this formula of relationship, in so
far as it reveals here the subject in effacing his trace. The phantasy as a structure
constitutive of the subject, where the latter is imprinted in the hollow, through which
fascination operates, opens the relationship of the o-object to the ideal ego.


D – The (o) as fetish 客体的物神化

This formulation indicates everything that separates the theorisation of Lacan from
that of other authors. Let us say schematically that while the latter are above all going
to mark the positive aspect of the qualities of the object Lacan valorises the negative


A clear example shows us this. Before the image of the phallic mother the
post-Freudian authors will say that she is terrifying because she is phallic. Because
the phallus can be a maleficent instrument, a destructive weapon, etc… . Freud said
that the bewilderment produced by Medusa‟s head took place because the reptiles
which took the place of hair for her denied, as many times as there were serpents,
castration and by this reversal it was recalled in a multiplied way to the one who
wanted to cancel it out.


Lacan is happier to follow this path. The case of fetishism to which he gives a lot of attention is the apologue of this reflective mode. The object of the fetish will be the witness, the veil of the castrated sexual organ – of the lack in the field of the Other.


E – The (o) object of lack, cause of desire 欠缺的客体,欲望的原因

In connection with his seminar on the Symposium there appears with a particular force
the metonymical and metaphorical structure of the o-object in the mapping out that
Lacan gives in Plato‟s text about the particular position of the agalmata, in the
discourse of Alcibiades where the latter depicts Socrates: “He is just like the silenuses
that one sees in sculptors‟ lofts which the artist represent as holding a pipe or a flute;
if you open the middle of them you see that within they contain little figurines of


We are dealing both with fragments of the body, with a part of the body and its
symbolisation and this is to be taken literally, in the form of a divine figurine.
It is precisely in so far as this o-object is going to emerge as objective lack that it is
going to be deployed in a double register which will be at once the revelation of the
lack of the Other and also of the lack as it appears in the process of meaning.


What is lacking to the Other is what cannot be conceived of. The (-phi) which is introduced here in the shape of what does not appear – it is the Nothing which cannot be pictured – in which there is ordered the encounter with castration as unthinkable, whose hiatus is filled with the processes of meaning, by the mirage of knowledge. I quote again: “(o) symbolises that which in the sphere of the signifier as lost is lost to meaning. What resists this loss is the subject designated once the processes of knowledge come into play, once that is known, there is something lost.”


It is this apparition in the shape of the object of lack which specifies what our presentation is going to revolve around, namely the non-specularisable nature of the (o).


Everything happens as if the barred subject takes on the function of i(o) as Lacan puts it or again as if, shortcircuiting the impossible specularisation of lack, the subject thus identifies himself to knowledge, coming to the locus and the place of the loss which stimulates its promotion, covering over this loss to the extent of forgetting its


Starting from this appearance of lack, there is going to come into play the function of
the remainder issuing from the desire of the other, the function of the remainder which is manifested as a residue left by the bar, which affects the big Other and whose homologue in the subject interests him in knowledge. Here again Lacan makes a distinction of a logical order where nullifying does not suppress having, which
precisely makes the remainder appear.


The function of the remainder is what is saved from the menace which weighs on the
subject; “desire is constructed on the path of a question: not to be”. The o-object is
the cause of desire.