Archive for the ‘拉康:精神疾病’ Category

精神病 351

April 27, 2014

精神病 351

How do we account for the intensity of the defense? Freud’s explanation
looks like it is contained entirely within the reference to narcissism. The
defence against the homosexual tendency begins with a narcissism under threat.
The megalomania represents that by which the narcissistic fear expresses itself.
The ego’s enlargement to the dimensions of the world is a fact of libidinal
economy which is apparently located entirely on the imaginary level. Making
himself the supreme being’s love object, the subject can henceforth abandon
that which, of all that he was going to save, initially seemed most precious to
him – namely the mark of his virility.


But ultimately, and I stress this, the pivot, the point of convergence of the
libidinal dialectic that the mechanism and development of neurosis refer to
in Freud, is the theme of castration. It’s castration that conditions the narcissistic
fear. To accept castration the subject must pay as elevated a price as
this reworking of the whole of reality.


Freud stuck by this prevalence. In the material, explanatory order of
Freudian theory, from beginning to end, this is an invariable, a prevalent
invariable. He never subordinated or even relativized its place in the theoretical
conditioning of the subjective interplay in which the history of any psychoanalytic
phenomenon whatsoever is inscribed. It was around Freud, within
the analytic community, that one wanted to give it symmetrical or equivalent
things. But in his work the phallic object occupies the central place in libidinal
economy, in both man and woman.


This is an altogether essential fact, characteristic of all the theorizing given
and maintained by Freud – whatever reworking he brought to his theorizing,
throughout all the phases of the schematization he was able to give of psychic
life, the prevalence of the phallic center was never modified.


If there is some truth in Mrs. Macalpine’s remarks – and this is however
the only thing that she doesn’t really make evident – it’s that, effectively, in
Schreber castration is never an issue. The Latin term that is used in German,
eviratio – Entmannung, means in the text transformation, with all that this
word conveys of transition, into a woman – it’s not castration at all.2 This
doesn’t matter, Freud’s analysis makes the entire dynamics of the subject
Schreber revolve around the theme of castration, of the loss of the phallic

假如在马卡派恩的谈论,有某个真理,这是唯一她没有确实明显表示的东西。实际上,那就是,许瑞伯的阉割从来就不是问题。在德文里被使用的拉丁文术语eviratio – Entmannung, 在文本里意思是「转变」。这个字词传达有关转换的一切,那就是,「转变成为女人」。它根本就不是阉割。这并不重要,弗洛依德的精神分析许瑞伯这位主体的整个的生命动力环绕阉割的主题旋转,阳具的客体的丧失的主题。


精神病 350

April 26, 2014

精神病 347

Before I finish I would like to draw your attention to the significant, indeed
unfortunate, words that Flechsig said to Schreber on the occasion of his relapse
when the latter arrived for his consultation in an extremely disturbed state.
Flechsig had already been elevated for him to the value of an eminent paternal
character. The function of paternity had previously already been put on
alert or in suspension. We know from his testimony that he had hoped to
become a father, that over the pecriod of eight years separating the first from
the second crisis his wife had had several spontaneous abortions. Now, Flechsig
said to him that since the previous occasion enormous progress has been
made in psychiatry and that they are going to give him one of those short
sleeps that will be very fertile.16


Perhaps this was just the thing not to say. From this moment our Schreber
no longer slept and that night he tried to hang himself.


The relation of procreation is in fact implicated in the subject’s relationship
to death. I shall keep this for next time.
27 June 1956


精神病 347

The phallus and the meteor



I’m not sure what to begin with to end this course. On the off chance, I’ve
put two small schemas on the board for you.


The first is an old one. It’s a sort of grid which I used at the start of this
year to try to show you how the problem of delusion is raised if we want to
structure it insofar as it appears to be a relation in some way linked to speech.
The second of these schemas is entirely new and I will have occasion to refer
to it shortly.

What I have put forward this year has been centrally concerned with placing
the emphasis back upon the structure of delusion. Delusion may be regarded
as a disturbance of the object relation and is therefore linked to a transference
mechanism. But I wanted to show you that all its phenomena, and I even
think I can say its dynamics, would be clarified in reference to the functions
and structure of speech. This will also free this transference mechanism from
all kinds of confused and diffuse object relations.


By hypothesis, whenever one deals with a disturbance regarded overall as
immature, one refers to a linear developmental series derived from the immaturity
of the object relation. Now, experience shows that this unilinearity
leads to impasses, to inadequate, unmotivated explanations that superimpose
themselves on one another in a way that does not enable cases to be differentiated
and, first and foremost, obliterates the difference between neurosis
and psychosis. The mere experience of partial delusion mitigates against
speaking of immaturity, or even of regression or simple modification of the
object relation.


The same thing goes if one refers to the neuroses alone. Next year we shall
see that the notion of object relation isn’t univocal, when I begin by contrast-
ing the object of phobias with the object of perversions. This will be to take
up again, at the level of the category of object, the problem of the relations
between the subject and the other, two terms which, regarding the psychoses,
are opposed.


I left you last time with two opposed descriptions, Freud’s and that of a
psychoanalyst who is far from being without merit and, while representing
the most modern tendencies, has at least the advantage of doing so very intelligently.
Let’s briefly summarize Freud’s position on the subject of Schreber’s delusion
and the objections brought against him, and let’s see if anything like a
better solution has even begun to be outlined.


For Freud, we’re told, Schreber’s delusion is linked to the irruption of a
homosexual tendency. The subject negates it, defends himself against it. In
his case, which isn’t the case of a neurotic, this negation ends in what we
might call divine erotomania.


You know how Freud divides up the various denials [delegations] of the
homosexual tendency. He starts from a sentence that symbolizes the situation
– / love him, a man.1 There is more than one way of introducing denial into
this sentence. One may say for example, Its not I who love him or, Its not
him I love or again, Far me there is no question of love, I hate him. Moreover,
he tells us, the situation is never simple and isn’t limited to a simple symbolic
reversal. For reasons that he takes to be implied sufficiently, but upon which
as a matter of fact he doesn’t insist, an imaginary reversal of the situation
occurs in only a part of the three terms, namely / hate him is for example
transformed through projection into He hates me. In our case, Ifs not him I
love, its someone else, a big He, God himself, is inverted into He loves me, as
in all erotomania. It is clear that Freud is indicating that the final result of
defense against the homosexual tendency can’t be understood in the absence
of a very advanced reversal of the symbolic apparatus.


Everything may therefore appear to revolve around defence. It must
undoubtedly be very intense indeed to propel the subject into trials that extend
to nothing less than the derealization, not only of the external world in general,
but of the very people around him, even those he is closest to, including
the other as such. This necessitates an entire delusional reconstruction, following which the subject gradually resituates, though in a profoundly disturbed
way, a world in which he is able to recognize himself, in an equally
disturbed way, as destined – at a time projected into the uncertainty of the
future, at a date that is indeterminate but that certainly cannot be delayed –
to become the subject par excellence of a divine miracle, that is, to be the
support and feminine receptacle of the recreation of all humanity. Schreber’s
delusion in its final state presents with all the megalomaniacal characteristics
of delusions of redemption in their most highly developed form.



精神病 346

April 21, 2014

精神病 346

What we have just been emphasizing will enable us next time to see what
is lacking in each of the two points of view developed by Freud and Mrs. Ida


Freud posits a latent homosexuality that is supposed to imply a feminine
position – this is where the leap is. He speaks of a fantasy of fertilizing
impregnation, as if the thing were self-evident, as if every acceptance of the
feminine position implied in addition this register that is so developed in
Schieber’s delusion and that aids up making him into the wife of God. Freud’s
theory is that the only way for Schreber to avoid what results from the fear
of castration is Entmarmung, unmanning, or simply emasculation, transfor-
mation into a woman – but after all, as Schreber himself observes somewhere,
isn’t it better to be a spirited woman than a poor unfortunate man,
oppressed, or even castrated?13 In short, the solution to the conflict introduced
by latent homosexuality is found in an enlargement to the size of the


On the whole, Freud’s theory is the one that best respects the balance of
the psychosis’s progress. It’s nevertheless certain that Mrs. Macalpine’s
objections are a worthy reply to Freud, even a worthy complement to a part
of his theory.14 She emphasizes, as being determinant in the process of psychosis,
a fantasy of pregnancy, thus evoking a rigorous symmetry between
the two great lacks that can manifest themselves as neuroticizing in each sex.
She goes a long way in this direction and says some very amusing things to
which the text lends support, including in the background the evocation of a
heliolithic civilization where the sun, regarded as feminine and incarnated in
stones, is said to be the fundamental symbol matching the promotion of the
phallus in classical theory. There is a correspondence in the very name of the
town in which Schreber is hospitalized, Sonnenstein.15


In the concrete analyses of the least neurotic of people we are constantly
encountering this mischievous mockery by the signifier, where unusual homonyms
from all the corners of the horizon strangely intersect and appear to
give a unity, sometimes ungraspable by any other means, both to the entire
destiny of a subject and to his symptoms. It’s surely less appropriate here
than elsewhere to retreat from this investigation where the moment of onset
of psychosis is concerned.



精神病 345

April 20, 2014

精神病 345

In short, this case demonstrates very well the connection between the register
of paternity and the blossoming of revelations, of annunciations regarding
generation, namely, precisely what the subject is literally unable to conceive
– and it’s not by chance that I use this word. The question of generation, a
term of alchemical speculation, is always there ready to emerge as a response
by detour, as an attempt to reconstitute what isn’t receivable for the psychotic
subject, for the ego whose power is invoked without his being strictly
speaking capable of a response.


Henceforth, beyond every signifier able to be significant for the subject,
the only response can be the permanent and, I would say, constantly sensitized
employment of the signifier as a whole. We can in fact observe that the
memorizing commentary accompanying all human acts immediately finds itself
revived, spoken out loud in the emptiest and the most neutral of forms, and
becomes the ordinary mode of relation of an ego unable to find its respondent
in the signifier at the level from which it’s interpellated.


Precisely because he is interpellated on terrain where he is unable to respond,
the only way to react that can reattach him to the humanization he is tending
to lose is to make himself permanently present in this slender commentary
on the stream of life that constitutes the text of mental automatism. The
subject who has crossed this limit no longer has the customary significant
security, except through the accompaniment of a constant commentary on
his gestures and acts.


These phenomena present an exceedingly rich character in the case of President
Schreber, but they are not specific to him since they enter into the very
definition of mental automatism. This justifies the use of the word automatism,
of which so much use has been made in mental pathology without one’s
really knowing what one was saying. The term has a fairly precise sense in
neurology where it characterizes certain phenomena of liberation, but its
employment by analogy in psychiatry remains problematic at the very least.


It’s nevertheless the most appropriate word in de Cllrambault’s theory if you think of the distinction, completely forgotten today, that Aristotle makes
between automaton and fortune.12 If we go straight to the signifier, that is to
say on this occasion with all the reservations that such a reference comprises,
straight to etymology, we see that automaton is what really thinks by itself
without any link to that beyond, the ego, which gives thought its subject. If
language speaks all alone, the occasion to use the term automatism is now or
never, and this is what gives the term de Cterambault used its resonance of
authenticity, its satisfying side for us.



精神病 344

April 19, 2014

精神病 344

This is precisely the point at which this so singular phenomenon is located
that has had all the commentators on President Schreber scratching their
heads – the puzzling soul murder, as he calls it.


This phenomenon, which for him is the signal of the onset of psychosis,
may for the rest of us, the commentator-analysts, adopt all sorts of meanings,
but it cannot be placed anywhere else than in the imaginary field. It relates to the short-circuiting of the affective relation, which makes the other a being
of pure desire who henceforth can only be, in the register of the human
imaginary, a being of pure interdestruction. There is a purely dual relation
here, which is the most radical source of the very register of aggressiveness.
Freud didn’t miss this, moreover, but he discussed it in the homosexual register.
This text offers us a thousand proofs of what I am putting forward, and
this is perfectly coherent with our definition of the source of aggressiveness
and its emergence when the triangular, oedipal relation finds itself to be shortcircuited,
when reduced to its dual simplification.



Undoubtedly we lack the elements in the text that would enable us to get
a better grasp of Schreber’s relations with his father, with a certain presumed
brother, whom Freud also makes a great deal of. But we don’t need anything
more to understand that it’s necessarily via the purely imaginary relation that
the register of the you must pass at the moment at which it’s evoked, invoked,
interpellated from the Other, from the field of the Other, by the emergence
of a signifier that is primordial but excluded for the subject. I named this
signifier last time – Thou art the one who is, or who will be, a father. As a
signifier it can in no way be received, insofar as the signifier represents an
indeterminate support around which there is grouped and condensed a number,
not even of meanings, but of series of meanings, which come and converge
by means of and starting from the existence of this signifier.


Before the Name-of-the-Father there was no father, there were all sorts of
other things. If Freud wrote Totem and Taboo, it was because he thought he
could glimpse what there was, but before the term father was instituted in a
certain register historically there was certainly no father. I am only giving
you this perspective as a pure concession, for it interests me in no manner or
degree. I’m not interested in prehistory, except to indicate that it’s fairly
likely that Neanderthal man lacked a certain number of essential signifiers.
There’s no point in searching so far back, for we can observe this lack in
subjects within our reach.


Observe this crucial moment carefully and you will be able to pick out this
passage in the onset of every psychosis – it’s the moment at which from the
Other as such, from the field of the Other, there comes the interpellation of
an essential signifier that is unable to be received.


In one of my case presentations I happened to show a West Indian whose
family history brought out the problematics of the original ancestor. This
was a Frenchman who had gone and introduced himself over there, a sort of
pioneer, who had led an extraordinarily heroic life, involving all sorts of high-
points and lowpoints in his fortunes, and who had become an ideal for the
entire family. Our West Indian, extremely deracinated from the region of
Detroit where he had been leading quite a comfortable life as a craftsman,
found himself one day in possession of a woman who announced to him that
she was going to have a baby. It wasn’t known whether it was his or not, but
nevertheless within several days his first hallucinations declared themselves.
Barely had it been announced to him, You are going to be a father when a
character appeared to him telling him, You are Saint Thomas. It must have
been, I think, Saint Thomas the Doubter and not Saint Thomas Aquinas.
The annunciations that followed leave no room for doubt – they came from
Elizabeth, the one to whom it was announced very late in life that she was
going to bear a child.



精神病 342

April 6, 2014

精神病 342

Let’s take the next step. It concerns the other’s being recognized as an
other. What, then, is required for the other to be recognized as an other?
What is this other? He is the other insofar as he figures in a sentence of
mandate. We have to pause at this for a moment.


Recognition of the other doesn’t constitute an unattainable limit, since we
have also seen that the disappearing otherness of the ego’s imaginary identification
only encounters the you at an extreme point at which neither is able
to subsist together with the other. The Other, with a big O, has to be recognized
beyond this relationship, even reciprocal relationship, of exclusion. It
has to be recognized in this disappearing relation as being just as elusive as I.
In other words, it must be invoked as what it is unaware of about itself. This
is indeed the sense of Thou art the one who wilt follow me.


If you examine this closely, if Thou art the one who wilt follow me is a
delegation, indeed a consecration, then it’s insofar as the response isn’t a play
on words but an I follow you, I am,91 am what thou hast just said. There is a
usage of the third person that is absolutely essential to discourse in that it
designates what its very subject matter is, that is, what has been said. Je le
suis, ce que tuviens de dire, I am it, what thou hast just said, which as it happens
means exactly -I am very precisely what I am ignorant of, since what thou hast
just said is absolutely indeterminate, I don’t know where thou wilt lead me. The
full response to the Thou art the one who wilt follow me is I am it.


You know the fable of the tortoise and the two ducks.I0 The tortoise turns
up at the crucial moment when the ducks have offered to take him with them
to America, and everybody is waiting to see this little tortoise stuck onto the
traveler’s staff – The Queen? says the tortoise, Oui, vraiment, je la suis, Yes,
really, I am she. Pichon asks himself huge questions to discover whether it’s
a question of a queen in the abstract or a concrete queen and speculates, in a
disconcerting way for someone who had a bit of finesse in grammatical and
linguistic matters, on the question of whether she ought not to have said, Je
suis elle. Had the tortoise been speaking of an existing queen, she could have
said any number of things, for example, Je suis la reine, I am the Queen, but
since she saysje la suis, in referring to what you have just spoken of, there
is no distinction to be made, it suffices to know that this la, her, concerns
what is implied in the discourse.

你们知道乌龟与两隻鸭子的寓言。乌龟出现在重要的时刻,当两隻鸭子曾经承诺要带他们去美国。每个人都等待要看见这隻乌龟被塞进旅客的行李里。「皇后?」乌龟说,「我就是她。」皮琼询问他自己巨大的问题,为了发现是否这是皇后的问题,无论是抽象或具体的皇后,并且沉思,狼狈不堪地,对于文法与语言的问题能稍微细腻分辨的人而言。他沉思这个问题:她是否本来不应该说:「我就是她 」。假如乌龟当时谈论到一个现存的皇后,它本来可以说出一些事情。譬如,「我就是皇后」。但是因为她说「我就是她」,提到你们刚刚谈论到事情,并没有任何区别能够被分辨。我们只要知道,这个「她」,跟辞说所暗示的东西息息相关。

What is implied in the discourse is indeed what is at issue. We must pause
for a moment at this inaugural speech of the dialogue and take stock of the
enormity of the Thou art the one who wilt follow me. It’s to the thou itself, as
the unknown, that we address ourselves. This is what gives it its naturalness,
and its force as well, and also what makes it pass from thou art into the wilt
follow of the second part, where it persists. It persists there precisely because
in the meantime it may decline there. In this formula it’s therefore not an I,
insofar as I cause it to be seen, that I address myself to, but all the signifiers
that make up the subject opposite me. I say all the signifiers he possesses, his
symptoms included. We address ourselves both to his gods and to his demons,
and for this reason this way of stating the sentence I have until now been
calling the mandate I shall now call the invocation, with this term’s religious


An invocation isn’t an inert formula. It’s that by which I get that faith
which is mine to pass into the other. In good authors, perhaps in Cicero, an
invocation in its original religious form is a verbal formula by means of which,
before combat, one tries to make favorable to oneself what I was just calling
the gods and demons, the enemy’s gods, the signifiers. It’s to them that the
invocation is addressed, and this is why I think that the term invocation is
suited to designate the most elevated form of the sentence, where all the
words I pronounce are true words, evocative voices to which each of these
sentences must reply, the insignia of the veritable other.


You have just seen how it is that the you depends upon the signifier as
such. It’s on the level of the vociferated signifier that depend the quality and
the nature of the thou that is interpellated to respond. Henceforth, when the
latter lacks the signifier that carries the sentence, the I am the one that replies
to you can only play the part of an eternal interrogation. Thou art the one who
. . .what? The limiting case is the reduction to the preceding signifier -Thou
art the one who.. . , thou art the one who.. . , etc., Thou art the one who . . .
kilst me.11 The thou reappears indefinitely. This is how it is whenever, in the
appeal proffered to the other, the signifier falls into the field which for the
other is excluded, verworfen, unattainable. The signifier at this point produces
a reduction, but an intensified one, to the pure imaginary relation.



精神病 341

April 2, 2014




We have come to the point at which there is no common measure between

ourselves and this you such as we have brought it out. There is ostension

necessarily followed by reabsorption, injunction followed by disjunction. In

order to have an authentic relationship with the other at this level and on this

plane, he must answer, Thou art the one wham I follow. Here we are on his

wavelength, and it’s he who guides our desire.




Tu e$ celui queje suis lends itself to a play on words.5 It’s the relationship

of identification with the other that is involved, but if we in fact guide one

another in our reciprocal identification towards our desire, we shall necessarily

encounter one another there, and we shall encounter one another in an

incomparable way, since it’s insofar as I am you that I am – here the ambiguity

is complete. Je suis isn’t only to follow, it’s also Je suis, et toi, tu es, I

am and thou art, and also, toi, celui qui, thou, the one who, to the point of

encountering, me tueras, wilt kill me. When the other is captured as an object

in the relation of ostension, we can only encounter this relation as a subjectivity

equivalent to our own on the imaginary plane, the plane of the mot ou

toi, I or thou, one or the other, all confusion is possible concerning the object

relation. The object of our love is only ourselves, it’s the tu es celui qui me

lues, thou art the one who kilst me.


Tu e$ celui queje suis有助于玩文字遊戏。“Thou art the one whom I follow,” “Thou art the one who I am,” “Kill theone whom I follow,” and “Kill the one who I am.”你是我跟随的这个人」,你是我存在的这个人」,请你杀死我跟随的这个人」,请你杀死我存在的这个人」。被牵涉到的是跟大他者的认同的关系。但是,假如我们事实上互相引导,在互惠的认同,朝向我们的欲望。我们将必然会在那里互相邂逅。我们将以无与伦比的方式互相邂逅。因为我是你,故我存在。在这种暧昧的完整的。Je suis并不是仅要跟随,它也是Je suis, et toi, tu es,我存在与你存在。也是toi, celui qui, thou,你」这个人,甚至邂逅时,会杀死我的人。当他者被捕获,作为处于伪装关系的客体。我们仅能邂逅这个关系,作为是在想象的层次相等我们自己的主体性。我或你的层次,此在与他在的层次。关于这个客体关系,可能会有各种混淆。


Observe the fortunate opportunity that the signifier offers us in French,

with the different ways of understanding tu es.6 One can make use of it indefinitely.


请你们观察这个幸运的机会,能指用法文提供给我们的机会,用不同的方式来理解tu es.。我们能够任意地使用它。


If I were to say to you that we do this all day long – instead of saying,

To be or not… to be or. .. ,7 one may say, Tu es celui quime. . .tues.. .,

Thau art the one who. . . me. . . thou art.. . , etc. This is the foundation of

the relationship with the other. In all imaginary identification, the tu es, thou

art, ends in the destruction of the other, and vice versa, because this destruction

is simply there in the form of transference and hides itself in what we

shall call thouness.




In this respect I could have brought you a particularly disheartening and

stupid analysis of the type to be found in the famous Meaning of Meaning,

which elevates this kind of drivel to giddy heights.8 Similarly for this famous

passage in which it’s a matter of urging people who have the beginnings of

virtue to have at least the consistency to finish the job. One of them says

something like this – Toi quinepeux supporter le tu, tue-moi, Thou who canst

not bear the thou, kilst me. This is a reasonable idea – if you can’t bear the

truth of the thou, you can always be designated for what you are, namely a

scoundrel. If you want your neighbors’ respect, raise yourself to the notion

of normal distances, that is, to a general notion of the other, the order of the

world, and the law. This thou seems to have disconcerted commentators, and

as a matter of fact I think that today’s thouness will familiarize you with the register in question.






精神病 340

March 30, 2014

精神病 340

Thou art the one who will follow me presupposes, I am saying, the imaginary
assembly of those who are the supports of the discourse, the presence of
witnesses, indeed, of the tribunal before which the subject receives the warning
or the opinion that he is called upon to reply to. As a matter of fact,
unless he replies I follow you, that is, unless he complies, there is at this level
no other response open to the subject than to maintain the message in the
very state in which it was sent to him, at the very most modifying the person,
than to inscribe it as an element of his internal discourse, which whether he
likes it or not is what he has to reply to in order not to follow it. It would
strictly speaking be necessary that he precisely not follow this indication at
all onto the terrain where it calls on him to reply, that is, that he refuse to
hear. He is taken there as soon as he hears. The refusal to hear is a force that
no subject, without special gymnastic training, is really capable of. It’s in this
register that the particular force of discourse becomes apparent.


In other words, at the level we have come to the .you is the other such as I
cause him to be seen [lefais voir] by means of my discourse, such as I designate
him or denounce him, he is the other insofar as he is captured in ostension
in relation to this everybody that the universe of discourse presupposes.
But by the same token I bring the other out of this universe, I objectify him
within it, I may even designate his object relations for him, should he so
much as ask me to, as is characteristic of the neurotic. That may go quite a
long way.


Notice that it’s not entirely useless to give people what they ask for. It’s
just a question of whether it’s beneficial. In fact, if this has any incidental
effect, it’s insofar as it helps him to complete his vocabulary.

Those who
operate with object relations believe they are actually designating them, and
consequently it’s only rarely, and then by pure chance, that any beneficial
effect is produced. Completing his vocabulary may enable the subject to extract
himself from the signifying entanglement that constitutes the symptomatology
of his neurosis.


This is why things worked better whenever this addition
to the vocabulary, this Nervenanhang, to use the vocabulary of our delusional,
had still retained some of its freshness. Since then, what we have at our
disposal in our little exercise books as has greatly fallen in
value and doesn’t quite fill the function that one might hope for concerning
the resubjectification of the subject, by which I designate the operation of
extracting oneself from this signifying entanglement in which we have out-
lined the essence and very forms of the neurotic phenomenon.


To handle this
object relation correctly, one would need to understand that in this relation
it’s the neurotic who is ultimately the object. It’s even for this reason that he
got lost as subject and seeks himself as an object.



精神病 339

March 29, 2014





We can’t exhaust everything proposed to us concerning the analysis of this

 verb to be by the philosophers who have centered their meditation on the

question of Dasein, and especially Mr. Heidegger, who has begun to consider

it from the grammatical and etymological angle in texts that are quite faithfully

expounded in several articles that Monsieur Jean Wahl has recently

devoted to them.




Mr. Heidegger attaches a great deal of importance to the signifier at the

level of the analysis of the word and of conjugation, as it’s usually called –

let us more accurately say declension. In German as in French this famous

verb to be is far from being a simple verb and even from being one single





It’s evident that the form suis, am, doesn’t come from the same root as

e$, art, est, is, Stes, [you] are, and as fut, [it] was, nor is there any strict equivalence

to the form iti, been. Whereas fut has an equivalent in Latin, as does

suis and the series of est, iti comes from another source, from stare. The

distribution is equally different in German where sind, [they] are, is grouped

with bist, art, whereas in French the second person is grouped with the third.


显而易见,am 的这个形式,并不是来自跟 is arewas  相同的字根。也没有任何严格的相等语,跟been 的这个形式。虽然 fut 在拉丁文有一个相等语,如同suis est 的系列,来自于另外一个来源,来自stare。在德文,这个分佈同样地不同。在德文,sind are),跟bistart 聚拢一块。虽然在法文,第二人称跟第三人称聚拢一块。


Three roots have been more or less uncovered for all the European languages,

those that correspond to sommes, [we] are, est and fut, which has been compared

with the root phusis in Greek, which is related to the idea of life and

growth. As to the others, Mr. Heidegger insists upon the two aspects, Sten

which would be closer to stare, to stand alone, and Verbahen, to last, to endure,

this sense being nevertheless attached to the source phusis. According to Mr.

Heidegger, the idea of standing erect, the idea of life and the idea of lasting,

enduring, is therefore what an etymological analysis combined with a grammatical analysis yields, and it’s out of a kind of reduction or of indeterminationcast over these senses as a whole that the notion of being emerges.


对于所有的欧洲的语言,三个字根曾经被揭露得差不多。对应于sommes, [we] are, est and fut,的那些字根,曾经被拿来跟希腊文的phusis的字根作比较。它跟生命与成长的观念息息相关。至于其他的字根,海德格坚持两个层面,比较靠近stare,单独存在的sten。而Verbahen是延续,持久。这些意义仍然跟phusis的来源息息相关。依照海德格,挺直站立的观念,生命的观念,延续,持久的观念,因此就是字源的分析跟文法的分析产生的东西。生命实存的观念的出现,就是这些时态作为整体投射的不确定的还原。


I summarize, so as to give you some idea of the thing. I must say that an

analysis of this order is rather inclined to elide, to mask, what Mr. Heidegger

is trying to initiate us into, namely that which is absolutely irreducible in the

function of the verb to be, the copulatory function pure and simple. One

would be mistaken to think that this function is disclosed through a gradual

shift in direction of these various terms.


我总结一下,为了让你们稍微理解这个物象。我必须说,这个秩序的分析相当倾向于闪躲,遮蔽。海德格尝试启发我们进入,也就是,绝对无法还原的东西,在to be这个动词的功能,纯净而简单的交媾的功能。假如我们认为,这个功能的显露,是通过缓慢的转变,朝著这些各式各样的术语的方向,那你们就错误了。


We raise this question – at what moment and by what mechanism does the

you, such as we have defined it as a form of punctuation, as an indeterminate

signifying mode of hooking on, achieve subjectivity? Well then, I believe that

it’s essentially when it’s taken in the copulatory function in pure form and in

the ostensive function. And it’s for this reason that I chose the exemplary

sentences that we started with – thou art the one who. . . .




Which element is it that, elevating the you, makes it go beyond its indeterminate

function of boredom and begins to turn it, if not into subjectivity,

then at least into something that constitutes a first step towards the Thou art

the one who wilt follow me? It is the It i$ thou who will follow me. This is

ostension, which in fact implies the presence of the assembly of all those who,

whether or not united into a community, are supposed to form its body, to

be the support of the discourse in which ostension is inscribed. This it is thou

corresponds to the second formula, namely, thou art the one who will follow







精神病 336

March 24, 2014

精神病 336

Let’s begin by pausing first at this thou, making the remark, which looks
self-evident but is rather rare, that the said thou has no literal meaning.
This isn’t merely because I address it indifferently to everyone – as a matter
of fact I address it to myself as well as to you, and virtually to all kinds of
things, I may thou something that is as foreign as is possible to me, I can say
thou to an animal, I can say thou to an inanimate object – this isn’t the point.


Look closely at the formal, grammatical aspect of the thing. This is, moreover,
what every kind of usage of the signifier comes down to for you. You
will place meanings there despite yourselves. One may say that you believe
in grammar! Your entire schooling amounts, as intellectual gain, to your having
been made to believe in grammar. To be sure, you weren’t told as much,
since the aim would not have been achieved.


Let’s therefore pause at some sentences like the following – If you poke
your nose outside you’ll get shot down. Or again – When you see the bridge you
turn right.1 Here the .you doesn’t have the subjective value of any reality of the
other whatsoever, it’s entirely equivalent to a site or a point – it introduces a
condition or temporality, it has the value of a conjunction.


This may seem rash to you, but I assure you that if you spoke a bit of
Chinese you would be convinced of it. One can have a lot of fun with Chinese
characters, with this one for example, which is the sign for a woman and the
sign for a mouth. The you is someone one addresses oneself to in giving him
an order, that is, as befits speaking to women. One may say a thousand other
things, so let’s not delay, and let’s stay with the you. The .you may be used in
this form to formulate the expression as if and in another form it’s used
unambiguously to formulate a when or an if, introducing a conditional.


If this thing is less apparent in our languages, and if we have some resistance
to understanding it and to acknowledging it in the examples I’ve just
given, this is solely a function of the prejudices of grammar, which prevent
you from hearing. The artifices of etymological and grammatical analysis force
you to insert the second person singular into this you. Of course, it is the
second person singular, but it’s a matter of knowing what it’s used for. In
other words, our you is related to elements existing in languages that are
described as having no inflection and that for us have the advantage of serving
to open up our minds a bit. They do in fact have particles at their disposal,
which are the curious signifiers whose usage, like that of our you, is singularly
multiple and sometimes so broad as to create a degree of confusion in our
descriptive grammars.


Moreover, one would only need to write the least bit
phonetically to observe that differences in tonality or accent of the signifier
you have effects that go entirely beyond the identification of the person and
are completely different from this from the point of view of meaning.


Attributing autonomy to the you as signified isn’t without its difficulties.
Let’s say that in general it has the value of an introduction, of a protasis as
we say, that which is placed before. This is the most general way of designating
what precedes the statement [£nonc£\ of what it is that gives the sentence
its importance.