Archive for the ‘拉康被窃的信’ Category

sinthome 31

December 17, 2011

sinthome 31

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Le Sinthome
病征

It is certain that the fact that I draw it like that (VIII-2), you have seen sufficiently how it can be transformed, in a flash, into something which has the appearance of well, of better deserving the name of chain. Namely, of producing between the blue for example, and the red, something – here one no longer knows how to put it – which makes a chain or which makes a knot (VIII-3).

的确,我像那样画它这个事实,你们曾经充分见过,它如何能够在瞬间被转移成为很具有,或更具有锁链之名的外表。换句话说,具有产生某件东西的外表,譬如,蓝色及红色的东西。在此,我们不再知道如何表达它—这个东西成为一个锁链,或成为一个环结。

Because this is after all what most resembles – I inverted things but it doesn’t matter- what most resembles what one usually puts, what one usually considers to be a chain.

因为这毕竟是大部分东西类似的地方。我倒转东西,但是这没关系,跟我们通常所说的大部分类似的东西,我们通常都认为是一个锁链。

Which has the advantage, finally, of representing it like that (VIII- 4), normally representing the three rings in a way, in short, that must be called projective. This moreover is valid. It nevertheless remains that, that what is presented thus (VIII-5), will be, careful here, you see clearly that we are forced to place the three rings in a
way that respects the arrangement of what I first drew.

最后,这个锁链具有像那样代表它的利益,通常以某种方式代表这三个环圈,总之,那必须被称为「自我防卫机制」。而且,这是有效的。可是,问题仍然是,因此所被呈现的东西,请注意,你们将清楚地看出,我们不得不将这三个环圈,放置的方式,遵照我起初所画的安排。

As can be seen, the advantage which results from the way that I am thus presenting it, is that it simulates a sphere, as I pointed out to Dali with whom I talked to about that sometime or other. The difference there is between this Borromean chain and what is
always drawn in an armillary sphere when one has it, when one tries to make it travel on three levels, what can be called respectively transversal, vertical (sagittal), horizontal. We have never seen an armillary sphere being represented in the way in
which this knot, this Borromean knot, is presented.

你们看出,以我目前正在呈现它的方式,所造成的结果的好处是,它刺激一个球形,如我跟达利指出的。有某个时间,我跟他谈论到那件事情。有某个差异,在这个博罗米恩锁链及我们所拥有的手镯所画出的东西之间,当我们尝试让它越过三个层次,我们个别称为横斜面,垂直面,及水平面。我们从来没有见过手镯球形以这种方式被代表,一这个环结,这个博罗米恩环结被呈现的方式。

So then, this false sphere, this false sphere that I drew there on the extreme right, there is a way to manipulate it. To manipulate it as taken at the level of what constitutes an eighth of it, that consists there, this, because this sphere is supported by circles, there is a way to turn it inside out, to turn it back on itself.

所以,这个虚假的球形,这个虚假的球形,我在极端右边所画的球形,有某个方式来操控它。依照它的第八环结所形成的层次操控它,它在这里被组成,因为这个球形由圆圈所支持,总是有一个方式,将它由里面向外翻转,转回它自己。

A sphere, as such, it is difficult not to conceive that it is linked to the idea of All. It is a fact that the fact that one very easily represents a sphere by a circle links the idea of All, which is only supported by the sphere, links the idea of All to the circle. But it
is an error. And it is an error because the idea of All implies closure.

这是一个球形的本身,我们很难被构想,它跟「万有」的这个观念连接。这是一个事实:我们能容易用一个圆圈代表一个球形,这个事实跟「万有」的观念息息相关。这仅是由这个球形所支持,它连接「万有」的观念跟这个圆圈。但是这是一个错误。这是一个错误,因为「万有」的观念暗示着封闭。

If one can turn this All inside out, the inside becomes the outside. And this is what happens from the moment that we have supported the Borromean chain by circles, the fact is that the Borromean chain can be turned inside out. It can be turned inside out because the circle is not at all what is believed, what symbolises the idea of All, but that in a circle there is a hole. It is in the measure that beings are inert, namely, supported by a body, that one can, as has been done, under the initiative of Popilius, say to someone: You will not get out of there because I made a ring around you, you will not get out of there before promising me something or other.

假如我们能够将这个「万有」从里面翻转,内部就会变成外部。这就是从我们曾经用圆圈支持的博罗米恩环结的时刻开始,所发生的状况。事实上,这部博罗米恩锁链能够从里面翻转。它能够被从里面翻转,因为这个圆圈根本就不是所被相信的东西,不是「万有」的观念被象征的东西。而是在这个圆圈里,有一个空洞。随着人类的主体实存变成惰性,换句话说,受到一个身体的支持,如同曾经有过,在博皮力亚斯的创议之下,我们能够对某人说:「你无法逃离那里,因为我给你划定圆圈范围。除非你承诺我某件事情,你无法逃离那里。

雄伯说
所谓「博皮力亚斯的创议」,是指古代罗马人派博皮力亚斯Pppilius Laena,前往King Atiochos,要求归还以前侵占的土地,King Atiochos 藉口要与庭臣会商拖延。博皮力亚斯则愤怒地以权杖在king Atiochos 四周划一圆圈,谓要给予回答,才能离开这个圆圈。King Atiochos 立刻屈服。

拉康则是以这件轶事,比喻作为博罗米恩环结锁链的主体,本来拥有从里面向外翻转的可能,因为这个圆圈根本就不是所被相信的东西,不是「万有」的观念被象征的东西。而是在这个圆圈里,有一个空洞。问题是,主体的生命实存,若是要以身体的小客体,作为先决条件。那就除了屈服以外,别无选择。

这让我想到老子道德经第十三章所说的:「吾所以有大患者,为吾有身,及吾无身,吾有何患?」生命的实存一定要以身体的存在,作为先决条件吗?激情演出的情人,烈士,及殉道者,难道不是以牺牲肉身的存在,换取生命意义的真实存在吗?

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

sinthome 30

December 16, 2011

sinthome 30

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Le Sinthome
病征

VII. Seminar 8: Wednesday 9 March 1976
Good. Well here I am, here I am reduced to improvising. Not at all of course that I have not worked since the last time, and in full measure. But since I did not necessarily expect that I would have to speak since, in principle, we are on strike, here I am then reduced to doing what I all the same prepared a little, and even a lot.

呵呵。我现在在此,我现在的处境不得不即席演讲。当然根本不是因为我自从上次以来,都没有用功,彻底的没用功。而是因为我未必预期到我必须演讲,因为原则上,我们正在罷课期间。我在此因此处于在做我仍然要稍微准备,甚至充分准备。

Today I am going to, I hoped that you would be less numerous as usual, today I am going to show you something. It is not necessarily, what, what you are expecting. It is not unrelated.

今天,我将要,我希望你们像平常那样人数不要太多。今天我将要跟你们揭露某件事情。那未必是你们正在期盼的事情。它并非不相关。

But, I took along, before leaving, something that I really wanted to think about because I had promised the person who is not uninterested in it. This is what I would like you to get to know, or to recall for those who know it already, that there is someone that I am very fond of called Hélène Cixous.

但是,在离开之前,我推展某件我真的想要思考的事情,因为我曾经跟并非不感興趣的这个人承诺。这是我想要你们获知的事情,或是跟已经知道它的人提醒:有某位我非常喜欢的人,名字是海伦、西科斯。

This is written with a C at the beginning, and it ends with an S. Here it is pronounced
Cixous.

她的名字的字首是C,字尾是S。名字的发音是西科斯。

So then the aforesaid Hélène Cixous had already produced, it appears – for my part it had remained a little vague in my memory – had already produced, it appears in the out-of-print issue of Littérature, to remind myself of it, I was completely ignorant of it, that I had produced Litturaterre. In this out-of-print issue, which will not make it easy for you to rediscover it, except for those who already have it, she produced a little note on Dora.

所以,前述的海伦、西科斯似乎已经产生—就我而言,它在我的记忆里始终是有点模糊的。它似乎已经产生,它似乎出现在「文季」的绝版那一期,为了提醒我自己。我完全不知道它,我曾经出版「文季」。在这个绝版的这一期,你们将不容易找到它,除了那些已经拥有它的人。那一期对朵拉的个案,有一点评注。

And then, since that, she has made a play out of it, The Portrait of Dora. This is the title. A play that is on at the Petit Orsay. Namely, in an annex of the Grand Orsay. Everyone can easily imagine it. The Grand Orsay being occupied by Jean-Louis Barrault and Madeleine Renaud.

这一期对于「朵拉的肖像」,从事一些探讨。这就是标题。在奥色戏院上演的一部戏剧。换句话说,在豪华奥色戏院的旁楼。每个人都很容易想象它。豪华奥色戏院当时上演的是芭露特与雷纳。

(122) Now I did not find this Portrait of Dora too bad at all. I said what I thought of it to her that I have called Hélène, ever since I have known her, and I told her that I would talk about it. The Portrait of Dora, we are dealing with Freud’s Dora. And this
indeed is why, in short, I suspect that this may interest some people in going to see how it is produced. It is produced in a real way.

现在,我发现这齣「朵拉的肖像」演得还不错。我跟她谈论到我对戏剧的看法。我曾经打电话给海伦娜,因为我认识她,我告诉她我想要评论它。「朵拉的肖像」,我们正在探讨弗洛伊德的朵拉。这确实是为什么,总之,我怀疑有些人可能会感興趣,他们前往观赏演出的情况,它以真实的方式演出。

I mean that reality is what, the reality of rehearsals, for example, is what at the end of the day, dominated the actors. I do not know how you will appreciate it. But what is sure is that there is here something quite striking. What is at stake is hysteria, Dora’s hysteria, precisely, and it happens that she is not the best hysteric in the cast. She who is the best hysteric is playing a different role, but she does not show at all her hysterical virtues.

我的意思是,现实就是排演时的现实。譬如,那天结束时演员的演出状况。我不知道你们如何来欣赏它。但是确定的是,有某件事情相当引人注意。岌岌可危的是歇斯底里。确实是朵拉的歇斯底里。在演员阵容上,她并不是最佳的歇斯底里者。演最佳的歇斯底里者的那个人,正在演一个不同的角色。但是她根本就没有演出她的歇斯底里的优点。

Dora herself, anyway, the one who plays her role, shows them not badly; at least this is my feeling. There is also someone in it who acts, who plays the role of Freud. He is, of course, very embarrassed.

无论如何,朵拉自己是扮演她的角色。她演出的效果还不差。至少这是我的感觉。也有某个人在里面演,扮演弗洛伊德的角色。当然,他非常尴尬。

And he is very embarrassed and, and this can be seen, in short, he tackles it with great precaution. And it is all the less successful, at least for him, because he is not an actor, he offered himself up to do that. So then, he is afraid the whole time of charging Freud. Anyway, this can be seen in his delivery.

她非常尴尬,总之,我们能够看得出来,他小心翼翼地扮演这个角色。这仍然是不成功,至少对于他而言,因为他并不是演员。他自告奋勇来扮演。所以,扮演弗洛伊德的全程,他很担心。无论如何,从他的表现上可以看出。

Anyway, the best thing I can tell you, is to go and see it. What you will see is something that, all the same, is marked by this precaution of Freud, of the actor Freud.

无论如何,我充其量能够告诉你们,就去看演出吧。你们将会看到的,仍然是弗洛伊德,作为演员的弗洛伊德小心翼翼所标示的东西。

18.11.75 VII-139
So then, there results, on the whole, in short, something which, which is quite curious when all is said and done. One has there hysteria – I think that this will strike you, but after all, perhaps you will appreciate it differently- we have here hysteria which I could describe as incomplete. I mean that hysteria, has always been, anyway since Freud, has always been two.

然后,总之大体上,当一切结束后,结果会有某事情颇耐人寻味。我们在那里看到歇斯底里—我认为你们将会印象深刻,但是毕竟,或许你们将会以不同方式欣赏它。我们在此看到我能够描述为「不完整的」歇斯底里。我的意思是,自从弗洛伊德以来,歇斯底里总是有两个。

And there, one sees this hysteria being in a way reduced to a state that I would call –
and that is why moreover that in short this will not go too badly with what I have to explain to you – in a way to its material state.

在那里,我们看到这位歇斯底里者以某种的方式,处于我所谓的这个状态。而且,这是为什么,总之,这恰好可以用来排配合我必须跟你们解释的东西—某方面处于它的具体状态。

It lacks this element which has been added on for some time, and since before Freud, when all is said and done, namely, how it ought to be comprehended. This produces something very striking and, and very instructive. It is a kind of rigid hysteria.

它缺乏这个有段时间曾经被增添的要素。因为在弗洛伊德之前,当一切都说都做了,换句话说,它应该如何被理解。这产生某件引人注意的东西,非常具有启发性。那是一种僵化的歇斯底里。

You are going to see, because I am going to show you what is meant on this occasion by the word rigidity. Because I am going (123) to talk to you about a chain which is what I happen to have put forward for your attention, the chain, to call it like that, the
Borromean chain. And it is not for nothing that it is called a knot.

你们将会看出,因为我将要跟你们显示,在这个场合,「僵化」这个词语是什么意思。因为我将跟你们谈论有关一个锁链。那就是我刚好提出要你们注意的这个锁链。我称它为博罗米恩结锁链。它被称为一个环结,不是没有意义的。

Because it slides towards the knot. I am going to show you that right away. But, but there what you will see, is a sort of implanting of rigidity before this something from which it is not ruled out that the word chain representifies it for you, as one might
say.

因为它朝向这个环结滑溜。我立刻将要跟你们显示。但是,你们在那里将会看出的,是某件东西之前的一种僵化的深植。它并不排除,「锁链」这个词语对于你们而言,是具体表现它,我们不妨这样说。

Because a chain is rigid all the same. The trouble is that the chain in question can only be conceived of as very supple. It is even important to consider it as completely supple. That to, I am going, I am going to show you.

因为一个锁链仍然是僵化的。麻烦的是,受到质疑的这个锁链,仅能够被构想为非常柔软。将它认为是完全柔软,是非常重要的。我将跟你们显示。

Anyway, I will not tell you any more, then, about the Portrait of Dora. I hope, I hope what? To have some echo of it from people who, for example, come to see me. That happens. Good, so then, let us talk about what is at stake: the chain, and the chain that I was led to articulate, indeed to describe, by joining to it as I was led to do, the Symbolic the Imaginary and the Real.

无论如何,我将不会再告诉你们,关于「朵拉的肖像」。我希望,我希望什么?我希望拥有那些人的迴响。譬如,前来看我的那些人。就发生那样的事。呵呵,那么就让我们谈论岌岌可危的地方:这个锁链,我不得不给予表达的锁链,确实是为了描述,符号界,想像界,与实在界,我被引导这样做的过程,我加入这个锁链。

What is important, is the Real.

重要的是这个实在界。

After having spoken at length about the Symbolic and of the Imaginary, I was led to, to ask myself what the Real might be in this conjunction. And the Real, it is clearly understood that it cannot be a single one of these rings of string. It is a way of, of
presenting them in their knot of a chain which by itself entirely makes up the Real of the knot. So then I ask you to pardon me for stepping away from the microphone. You should all the same already have copped on a little to what I, that with which I try to
support the Borromean chain.

详细地谈论过符号界及想象界后,我不得不询问我自己,在这个连接里,这个实在界是什么。这个实在界,我们清楚地了解,它无法是绳的这些环圈的一个单一的环圈。它以它们作为一个锁链的环圈来呈现它们。这个锁链的本身完全组成这个环结的实在界。所以,我要求你们原谅我,因为离开这个麦克风太远。你们应该仍然会稍微体认到,我尝试用来支持博罗米恩环结的东西。

Here in short is what this is like (VIII-1), something that would be (124) a little like that. I was not inclined to complete it. But it is obvious that it must be completed to sense what is at stake. Here is the typical chain.

总之,这就是这个环结的样子,某件有点像这样的东西。我当时并无意要完成它。但是显而易见的,它必须被完成,我们才能感觉到,什么岌岌可危。这就是歇斯底里的锁链。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

sinthome 29

December 16, 2011

sinthome 29

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Le Sinthome
病征
VI. Seminar 7: Wednesday 17 February 1976

The nature of this difference is the following. It is that between this and this, namely, the sinthome and the loop which is made here, as I might say, spontaneously, can be inverted from this to that, namely, let us say the red eight and the green ring, is strictly equivalent.

差异的特性如下。就在这个与这个之间,换句话是,圣征与在此被形成的圈套之间,我不妨说,这个圈套是自动自发形成,能够从这里被倒转到那里。让我们说,这红色的八跟绿色的环圈,是完全相等的。

Inversely, you only have to take a knot of eight, made thus, you will obtain very easily the other shape. There is nothing simpler.

倒转过来说,你只必须拿这个八如此被形成的这个环结,你就会很容易获得另外一种形状。没有比这个更简单的事了。

It is even imaginable. It is enough for you to imagine that you pull things in such a way, I mean on the red, in such a way as to ensure that the red here makes a ring.

这甚至能够被想象。你们只要想象,你们以这样的方式将事情拉紧,我的意思是对红色的环结,以这样一种方式,才能确定,在这里的这个红色环圈,成为一个环结。

Nothing easier than to see, to sense that there is every chance that what is then at first a green ring will become a green eight. And with use, you will see that it is an
eight exactly of the same shape, of the same dextrogyratoryness.

我们最容易看到,感觉到,拥充分的机会,让起初是一个绿色的环圈,将会变成一个绿色的八环组。随着这种运用,你将会看出:那确实是相同形状的八环组,相同的向右旋转。

There is then strict equivalence and it is not, after what I have (118) opened up about the sexual relationship, it is not difficult to suggest that, when there is equivalence, it is indeed in that there is no relationship.

因此有一个完全相等的状态,而且经过我有关性的关系的展开发挥,我们不难建议,当相等存在时,性的关系确实不存在那里。

If, for a moment, we suppose that what is involved in what henceforth is a failure of the knot, of the knot of three, this failure is strictly equivalent, there is no need to say it, in the two sexes.

假如我们暂时认为,在这个环结的失败处,三个环圈的这个环结,在这两性里的这个失败完全是相等的。我们没有必要去说它。

And if what we see here as equivalent is supported by the fact that, just as much in one sex as in the other, there was a failure, a failure of the knot, it is clear that the result is that the two sexes are equivalent.

假如我们在此所看到作为相等的东西,由这个事实来支持。在其中一个性与其它一个性,有一个失败,这个环结的失败。显而易见的,结果是,这两个性别是相等的。

Except for this nevertheless, that if the fault is repaired at the very place (VII-8) two sexes, here symbolised by the two colours, the two sexes are no longer
equivalent. For you see here what corresponds to what I earlier called equivalence (VII-9), what corresponds to it is this which is far from being equivalent (VII-7).

可是除了这个,假如失败在由这两个颜色所象征的两性的这个地方被修复,这两性就不再相等。因为你们在此看出,跟我早先所谓的相等相一致。跟它相一致的东西,就是这个根本就不相等的东西。

If here, one colour can be replaced by the other, inversely here (VII-7) you see that the green (119) ring is, as I might say, internal to the totality of what is here
supported by the double red eight and which, here, is found again in the double green eight.

假如在此,一种颜色能够被另外一种颜色取代,你们看到,这个绿色的环圈,我不妨这样说,这个双重的红色八环圈所支持的东西的集体性的内部。它在这个双重绿色的八环圈再一次被找到。

These, and I intentionally inscribed them in this way, so that you would recognise them as such, the green is internal to this double eight, here, the red is external (VII-7). This is even what I made my dear Jacques-Alain Miller work on while he was at my country house, at the same time as I was cogitating this. I put forward to him quite rightly, contrary to what I told him, this form while asking him to discover the equivalence that might have been able to be produced.

我刻意以这种方式铭记这些,所以你们将会体认出,绿色的本身,是这双重八环圈的的内部。在此,这个红色是外部(VII-7).。这甚至少我让亲爱的亚伦、米勒去研究的,当他在我的乡间房屋,当我正在仔细构想这个的时候。我相当合宜地跟他提出这个形式,跟我告诉他的内容相反,当我正在要求他发现这个本来能够产生的相等物。

But it is clear that the equivalence cannot be produced as there appears from the following. That the green, with respect to the double eight and the red eight, is something which cannot break through, as I might say, the external strip of this
double red eight (VII-10).

但是显而易见的,这种相等无法被产生,因为从这底下出现的东西。这个绿色,关于这个双重的八环圈及这个红色的八环圈,是某件无法被突破的东西。我不妨说,这个双重的红色八环圈的外部这个环带。

Thus there is not at the level of sinthome, there is no equivalence of relationship between the green and the red, to content ourselves with this simple designation. It is in the measure that there is a sinthome that there is no sexual equivalence, namely, that there is a relationship.

因此,并不是在圣征的这个层次,在绿色与红色之间,并没有关系的相等,为了满足我们自己,对于这个简单的指称。随着圣征存在,没有性的相等。换句话说,有一个关系。

For it is quite sure that if we say that the nonrelationship stems from the equivalence, it is in the measure that there is no equivalence that the relationship is structured. There is then at once sexual relationship and non-relationship. Except for
the fact that where there is relationship, it is in the measure that there is sinthome. Namely where, as I said, it is from the sinthome that the other sex is supported.

这是相当确定的,假如我们说,没有关系是起源于这个相等。随着没有相等,这个关系被建立结构。因此,同时有的性的关系,也同时没有性的关系。除了这个事实,在有关系的地方,随着有圣征。换句话说,如我所说的,另外一个性别,是从圣征获得支持。

I allowed myself to say that the sinthome, is very precisely the sex to which I do not belong, namely, a woman. If a woman is a sinthome for every man, it is quite clear that there is a need to find (120) another name for what is involved in the case of a man for a woman; since precisely the sinthome is characterised by non-equivalence.

我容许我自己说:圣征确实是我并没有属于的这个性别,换句话说,女人。假如女人对于男人而言,是一个圣征,显而易见地,我们有需要找出另外一个名称,给对于女人而言,男人的状况所牵涉的东西。因为确实地,圣征的特性是没有相等物。

One may say that man is for a woman anything you please, namely an affliction, worse than a sinthome, you may well articulate it as you please, a devastation even, but, if there is no equivalence, you are forced to specify what is involved in the
sinthome.

我们可以说,对于女人而言,男人是任何你喜欢的东西。换句话说,痛苦,必圣征还要糟糕。你很有理由表达它,随你高兴的,甚至说是毁灭。但是假如没有相等物,你被迫明确指出圣征会牵涉到什么。

There is no equivalence, it is the only thing, it is the only redoute where there is supported what is called in the speaking being, in the human being, the sexual relationship. Is this not what is demonstrated by what is called, it is a different use of the term, the clinic, make no mistake, the bed (lit)?

没有相等物存在,这是唯一的事情,在言说的主体,在人类身上,所谓的性的关系被支持的地方。这难道不是由所谓的诊所来证明吗?诊所的一个不同用途,没有错,就是床。

When we see people in bed, it is there all the same, not simply in hospital beds, it is all the same there that we can form an idea for ourselves of what is involved in this famous relationship.

当我们看到人们躺在床上,都是大同小异,不仅是在医院的床。在那里都是一样,我们能够替我们自己形成一个观念,关于这个著名的关系会牵涉的东西。

This relationship is linked (se lie), make no mistake, l-i-e this time, this relationship is linked to something about which I could not put forward, and this indeed is what results, good God, from everything that I hear on another bed, on the famous couch where I am told things at length. The fact is that the link, the close link of the sinthome, is this something that it is a matter of situating in terms of what it has to do with the Real, with the Real of the Unconscious, if it is indeed the case that the Unconscious is real.

这个关系是连接的,没有错误,这一次,这个关系跟某件事情连接。关于这件事情,我无法提出。我的天,这确实是我在另外一张床上听来的一切,在这个著名的长榻,分析者详细地告诉我。事实是,这个连接,用它跟实在界,跟无意识的实在界的关系的术语而言,假如在这个情况,无意识是真实的话。

How know whether the Unconscious is real or imaginary? This indeed is the question. It shares in an equivocation between the two, but from something in which, thanks to Freud, we are henceforth engaged, and engaged under the title, under the title of
sinthome. I mean that henceforth, it is with the sinthome that we have to deal in the relationship itself, held by Freud to be natural, which means nothing, the sexual relationship.

我们如何知道,无意识是真实,还是想象?这确实是这个问题。无意识处于实在界与想象界两者之间的模糊地带。但是从某件事情,由于弗洛伊德,我们因此从事与这件事情,以这个题目,以圣征的这个题目。我的意思是,因此,在关系的本身,我们必须处理这个圣征,被弗洛伊德被认为是很自然的关系。这意味着,没有性的关系。

It is on this that I will leave you today, since moreover I must mark in some way or other my disappointment at not having encountered fewer of you here.

今天我将在此告一段落。因为我必须以某种方式表示我的失望,因为在此的人数过于拥挤。

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

Encore 407

December 16, 2011

Encore 407
再来一次

Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉岡

On the Baroque 07
论巴洛克风格

To once and for all put end to this business about the true religion, I will while there is still time, point out that God is manifested only in writings that are said to be sacred. Sacred in what respect? In that they don’t stop repeating the failure—read Salomon, the master of masters, the master of feeling, someone of my own like—the failure of the attempts made by a wisdom tradition to which being is supposed to testify.

为了一劳永逸地解决真实宗教的事情,趁还有一点时间,我先指出,上帝存在的证明,只出现在据说是神聖的着作里。在哪一方面神聖?在於,他们从来没有停止重复失败。请阅读「索罗门王书」,这位主子中的主子,这位真情洋溢的主子,这位我的难兄难弟,智慧的传统屡次使他成为失败者,这样被认为是在考验他的真实生命。

雄伯说
「上帝存在的证明,只出现在据说是神聖的着作里。」这句话的意思是:上帝的存在并不是那么天经地义,不证自明,而是根据基督教或天主教的新约与旧约圣经的记载。问题是,圣经的记载难道不是人的记载,拉康提出的问题是:上帝创造人类,还是人类的想象力创造上帝存在的世界?

旧约描述的索罗门王,是绝顶聪明智慧的国王,他的几个贤能的判决流传迄今。譬如,两位母亲争夺一位亲生小孩。索罗门判决将小孩分割,各分一半。亲生母亲不忍放弃,反而证明具有爱心的母亲,才是真实的母亲。以及如何分辨人工仿制的酷似的假花与真花,他则以蜜蜂作为区别的工具。他是主人的主人,也就是国王中的国王,比喻其贤明智慧。他有一阵子迷恋莎芭女王Sheba 的情色的那段时间,荒废国政,几遭倾覆,以传统的智慧来说,他是失败者。可是,拉康却认为这样的失败,其实是他真实生命的展现,他是他自己情感的主人the master of feeling。拉康还以索罗门比喻自己,跟他是难兄难弟。也就是,真实的生命的主体是情感的主人,而非主人的主人。

None of that implies that there weren’t things from time to time thanks to which jouissance—without it, there could be no wisdom—could believe that it had reached the goal of satisfying the thought of being. But that goal has never been satisfied, except at the price of a castration.

没有一样智慧的传统暗示着,有时候,会有一些事情,让欢爽能够相信,它已经达到满足存在生命的思想,因为假如没有欢爽,就不可能有智慧。问题是,那个目标从来没有被达到,除了以被阉割作为代价。

雄伯说:
「假如没有欢爽,就不可能有智慧。」这个前提意味着:智慧是要寻求生命的欢爽jouissance,而不是寻求成为主人的主人。让自己活得不快乐,活得不自在,功成名就又有什么意义呢?除外,「满足生命实存的想法的目标」,为什么那么难以达成?为什么一定要以阉割作为代价?原因是我们生活其间的符号界,有其理性逻辑的意识,对于我们欢爽的本源的无意识,本质上就是潜抑,就是阉割。被潜抑或阉割之后的主体,仅拥有身体小客体的剩余欢爽surplus jouissance。真实的生命欢爽在实在界的无意识那里。纵使能够达到,也回不到符号界来言说。

In Taoism, for example—you don’t know what it is, very few do, but I have worked at it, by reading the texts, of course—this is clear in the very practice of sex. In order to feel good, one must withhold one’s cum. Buddhism is the trivial example by its renunciation of thought itself. What is best in Buddhism is Zen, and Zen consists in answering you by barking, my little friend. That is what is best when one wants, naturally, to get out of this infernal business, as Freud called it.

例如,在真理之道里,你不知道那是什麽,也很少人知道那是什麽。但是我曾经从事这个研究,当然是以阅读文本的方法,在性爱的实践方面,这是显而易见的。为了修心养性,我们必须戒除性的妄念。佛教是最常见的例子,它甚至自己的思想都要摒弃。佛的最高境界是禅,禅甚至学狗吠叫来回答你,我的朋友。那是最佳的表现,当我们很自然想要摆脱炼狱一般的烦恼,如佛洛伊德所说。

雄伯说:

Toism指的应该是老子的道德经,但是道德经谈的「性」,应该是「人的本性」,而不是「性爱的实践」,不知是英译或是拉康自己混淆了。要获得生命的欢爽,并不是将作为阳具的小客体的剩余欢爽,发挥到极点。而是「必须戒除性的妄念」,佛教「甚至自己的思想都要摒弃。」这时的性的妄念及思想,被视为等同「炼狱一般的烦恼」。摒弃烦恼,生命的真实欢爽,才能获得。这是道教,佛教的禅宗教导我们的智慧,拉康的精神分析显然也认同这一点。

至于学狗吠的禅宗典故,网络有这么一个诠释,请参考一下:
佛家禅语:禅师同弟子外出,见一犬嫌骡子拉车慢,在旁吠叫,被骡子一脚踢开。禅师:不要自以为是,做超越自己范围的事,会招人厌。 
  
佛家禅语:去除杂念,心静如水,人的天性便会出现。不求得心的平静,却一味追寻人的天性,那就像拨开波浪而去捞水中的月亮一样。 

The fantasizing of antiquity, mythology as you call it—Claude Levi-Straus also called it by that name—of the Mediterranean region—which is precisely the one we don’t touch because it’s the most profuse and, above all, because such a big to-do has been made of it that one no longer knows by what strand to approach it—mythology has also come to something in the form of psychoanalysis.

地中海地区的古代的幻想,或如你所称呼的神话,列文、史特劳斯也这样称呼,那确实是我们没有碰触到,因为内涵极其丰富,因为各家的解释纷纭,所以我们不知道根据怎样的脉络去接近它。神话的形式跟精神分析学有几分类似。

雄伯说:
拉康将地中海地区的古代的幻想或列文、史特劳斯所谓神话,跟精神分析的无意识形态相提并论,意味着,精神分析具有古代幻想,神话的不可思议的奥秘的一面,不完全是一门理性的科学。

There were shovelfuls of gods—all one had to do was find the right one. Which led to this contingent thing that is such that sometimes, after an analysis, we manage to achieve a state in which a guy correctly fucks his “ one gal”. They were gods all the same, that is, rather consistent representations of the Other. Let us pass over here the weakness of the analytic operation.

神话里的神的名称很多,我们只必须做的就是选择合适的一位。这导致因缘的机契,以致於有时候,经过精神分析後,我们成功地发现到一种状态,有人在跟他的「心目中的神作爱交会」。他们仍然都是神,换句话说,他们是大他者的长驻的代表。在此,我们暂且不去论述精神分析经验所发现的人性的弱点。

雄伯说:
拉康研究神秘主义mysticism的经典时,发现修行僧侣的记载:我正在与上帝作爱sexual intercourse, 而获得最崇高的生命的欢爽jouissance。我们後生有为者亦应若是,不论我们信仰的是上帝,佛陀,阿拉,或是拉康的无意识的大他者。

Oddly enough, that is so completely compatible with Christian belief that we saw a renaissance of polytheism during the era known by the same name.

怪異的是,那跟基督教的信仰是完全和谐的,我们看到一种多神教的复兴,在我们知道的那个时代。

雄伯说:
基督教是信仰上帝的一神教,希腊神话是多神教,两种截然不同的文化,拉康却看出它们彼此的和谐的可能。因为拉康认为信仰的原动力,都是起源于寻求实在界的大他者,只是大他者的名称不同而已。上帝,佛陀,阿拉,或是希腊神话里的各种天神,从精神分析论述来看,都是无意识的主体的在想象界与符号界的响往。

I am telling you all that precisely because I just got back from the museums, and because the Counter-Reformation was ultimately a return to the sources and the baroque the parading thereof.
The baroque is the regulating of the soul by corporal radioscopy.

我现在告诉你们这些,主要是因为我刚刚从博物馆回来,也因为反对宗教改革的风潮,最后回答那些嘉华年会般的巴洛克浮誇的风格及来源。 巴洛克风格以肉体的细微内部检视,来规范灵魂。

雄伯说:
巴洛克的建筑不仅以外部的轮廓的典雅高贵见称,连内部的迴廊曲角,都极尽细腻地讲究。哲学家德勒兹曾著有「褶叠」The Fold一书,从巴洛克的建筑美学,引申到人作为主体,从外在的浮华追求,回归肉体与灵魂的内部的细腻检视,从而透过多重褶叠的创造,开启生命的喜悦与充实。宗教改革与反宗教改革,乍然看来是针锋相对,其实是殊途同归。同样都是要回到灵魂的喜悦的问题。

I should sometime—I don’t know if I’ll ever have the time—speak of music, in the margins. For the time being, I am only speaking of what we see in all the churches in Europe, everything attached to the walls, everything that is crumbling, everything that is delirious. It is what I earlier called obscenity, but exalted.

不知道我是否还有足够时间,但是我应该有时候也顺便谈一下音乐。目前,我只是谈到我们在欧洲的各个教堂的目睹,跟教堂壁画有关的一切,跟逐渐没落的一切,跟令人興奮的一切。这就是我早先所称呼的低俗,但是又令人狂喜。

I wonder what effect this flood of representations of martyrs must have on someone who comes from backwoods China. That formulation can be revered—those representations are themselves martyrs. You know that “ martyr” means witness—of a more or less pure suffering. That was what our painting was about, until the slate was wiped clean when people began to seriously concern themselves with little squares.

我想要知道,这种殉道者的风潮对於来自偏远的中国的某个人,会有怎样的影响。那种构想是值得崇敬的,那些本身就是殉道者的符号象征。你们知道,「殉道者」的意思是,亲眼见证到相当纯洁的痛苦。那就是我们的图画的意涵,一直到人们开始认真地关心到小壁画方块,版画才被清除乾净。

雄伯说:
音乐跟生命的狂喜,当然有密切的关系。不过拉康先谈教堂的壁画,殉道者的壁画。那种纯洁的痛苦,会是一种崇高的生命的狂喜吗?那种狂喜怎么可能会是低俗呢?耶稣被钉上十字架的场面,让俗人观看,一定是不忍卒睹的悲惨与痛苦,但是在文艺复兴时的「圣殇图」pieta,躺在圣母玛丽亚怀抱里的耶稣,神态是那样地安详平和,甚至还透露着狂喜满足的神情。

There is a reduction of the human species here—that word, “ human”, resounds like “ unhealthy humor”, and there is a remainder that creates “ misfortune”. That reduction is the term by which the Church intends to carry the species—that’s the word for it—right up to the end of time. And it is so well grounded in the gap peculiar to the sexuality of speaking beings that it risks being at least as well grounded, let’s say—because I don’t want to give up on anything—as the future of science.

在此,人类的种族被大为化简。「人」这个字,听起来像是「心态很不健康」,宛似都是一些創造「不幸」的剩余的人。那种削减,就是教堂打算用来传递种族的术语。就是那个用词,一直到那个世纪末。它是如此的根深砥固,在人作为言说的生命主体的性爱,所特有的鸿沟那里,以致於它自己作为科学的未来,也有因此根深砥固的危险,容我们这样说,因为我不想要规避任何问题。

雄伯说:
Reduction 一词有三个意涵,由多减少,由繁化间,及还回原来状态。「人类」这字迴响着「不健康的心态」,是可悲的,而是还是创造「不幸」的剩余价值。拉康则是把这种还原于受到基督教会的教义制约染污,以及作为性化的人,本质上特哟的缺口。拉康很担心科学的未来,也是以这性化的缺口作为基础,那人类的未来,可不令人乐观了。

The Future of Science is the title of a book by that other priestling named Ernest Renan, who was also an all-out servant of the truth. He only required one thing of truth—but it was absolutely capital, failing which, he panicked—that it have no consequence whatsoever.

「科学的未来」是另一位名叫欧尼、惹安的牧师所写的一本书的书名、他也是一位对於真理的信仰虔诚贯注的奴僕。他对於真理只要求一件事,但那绝对是非常重要的事。那件事一但崩塌,他会陷入驚慌。但是这件事根本也没有什麽结果。

雄伯说:
「科学的未来」的作者是牧师,他绝对服膺真理,而且他对真理仅要求一件事:欢爽。这个欢爽若是根本没有结果,也等于宣告他的真理根本没有结果。

The economy of jouissance is something we can’t yet put our fingertips on. It would be of some interest if we managed to do so. What we can see on the basis of analytic discourse is that we may have a slight chance of finding out something about it, from time to time, by pathways that are essentially contingent.

欢爽的流动是我们目前还不能够掌握的东西。假如我们有朝一日能够掌握,那该是多麽有趣的事。根据精神分析真理论述的基础,我们所能够看到的是,有时候,我们可能会有一点希望,找出它的奥妙,经由本质上是巧合的途径。

雄伯说:
真理的欢爽的流动,宗教制约己染污它,科学则是将它视为客体研究,精神分析则是从分析者的病征当中看出端倪。

If my discourse today hadn’t been absolutely and entirely negative, I would tremble at having lapsed into philosophical discourse. Nevertheless, since we have already seen several wisdom traditions that have lasted quite a while, why shouldn’t we find, with analytic discourse, something that gives us a glimpse of something precise? After all, what is energetics if it is not also a mathematical thing? The analytic thing will not be mathematical. That is why the discourse of analysis differs from scientific discourse.

即使我今天的真理论述不是绝对及全然的悲观,我还是不免震惊,自己滔滔不绝地陷入这种哲学的真理论述。可是,因为我们已经见识过好几个历史悠久的智慧的传统,我们难道不是也应该用我们精神分析的真理论述,找到某件可以让我们瞥见準确的方向?畢竟,什麽叫着生命精力学?难道它就不能像数学般一清二楚吗?精神分析学就是无法像数学一般地公式化。那就是为什麽,精神分析的真理论述不同於科学的真理论述。

Well, let us leave that chance to lady luck—encore.

让我们将那个几会留给女性的偶然的高潮,再来一次!

雄伯说:
拉康将真理论述,区分为以权力为主导的主人论述,作为病征的歇斯底里论述,以科学与理性为基础的大学论述,及以无限的爱及真理欢爽为己任的精神分析论述。这个真理的欢爽,他以女人作爱时的高潮比喻:继续再来!

雄伯译
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

主体的颠覆 404

December 15, 2011

主体的颠覆 404

Will we weigh this being against the being Hegel as subject forged Hegel
being the subject who, regarding history, adopts the discourse of
absolute knowledge? We recall that Hegel admitted to having experienced
the temptation of madness. Isn’t our path the one that overcomes that, by
going right to the truth of the vanity of this discourse?

我们将要衡量这个生命实存,对照于黑格尔作为主体所铸造的生命实存吗?黑格尔的生命实存,处理绝对知识的真理论述的历史。我们回想到,黑格尔承认曾经经验到疯狂的诱惑。我们精神分析的途径不就是要克服疯狂诱惑的这条途径。因为疯狂深入到这个论述的徒劳无功的真理。

雄伯说:
黑格尔的理性辩证法的主体,以正positive反negative合synthesis的方式一直辩证下去,最后会获得理性的「绝对知识」absolute knowledge。拉康的精神分析论述则是主张主体的「欲望的辩证法」dialectic of desire,最后会获得「绝对的差异」absolute difference,也就是分析家的「无限的爱」endless love。

,黑格尔承认曾经经验到疯狂的诱惑,是指黑格尔认为,疯狂仅是表达人类普遍地欲望,想要回到人类天性的本能的的原始的一致性,那是灵魂的无意识领域,黑格尔认为,那就是所有的意识的生命原先的预先假设。黑格尔如果真的顺从这个疯狂的诱惑,那跟精神分析的无意识,倒是有几分神似。

但是黑格尔的理性意识在此悬崖勒马,因为从理性意识来从事疯狂的真理论述,势必是徒劳无功。

I will not expound my doctrine on madness here. For I have included this
eschatological excursion only to designate the gap that separates the two
relations-Freudian and Hegelian-between the subject and knowledge.
And to show that there is no surer root of these relations than the different
ways in which the dialectic of desire is distinguished in them.

我在此就不诠释我对于疯狂的信念了。因为我曾经包括这末世审判论的偏离主题,为了要指明隔开弗洛伊德与黑格尔之间的两个关系的这个差距,处于主体与知识之间的差距。为了要显示,这些关系的根源,最确实的莫过于:欲望的辩证法,以这些不同的方式,在里面被区别出来。

For in Hegel’s work it is desire (Begierde) that is given responsibility for
the minimal link the subject must retain to Antiquity’s knowledge [conna£l’sance] if truth is to be immanent in the realization of knowledge. The “cunning of reason” means that, from the outset and right to the end, the subject knows what he wants.

因为在黑格尔的著作,欲望被赋予责任,对于主体必须保留给最基本的连系,给古代的知识,假如在知识的实现时,真理想要内化。这个「理性的狡狯」意味着,从一开始,一直到最后,主体知道他要什么。

雄伯说:
所谓黑格尔的「理性的狡狯」是指,人类的发展与自由,是凭借事件进行,却往往引起紧张及广泛的痛苦。结果提升自由的行动,结果却理性地造成自由的结束。黑格尔的主体是具有理性意识,因此他显然始终知道自己要什么。

It is here that Freud reopens the junction between truth and knowledge
to the mobility out of which revolutions arise. In this respect: that desire becomes bound up at that junction with the Other’s desire, but that the desire to know lies in this loop.

就在这里,弗洛伊德重新开启真理与知识之间的衔接,让它活跃起来。各种的颠覆就从这种活跃种出现。在这方面,欲望跟大他者的欲望,在那个衔接紧密相连,但是想要知道的欲望则是在这个圈套。

雄伯说:
这个圈套指的是:真理与知识之间运作的圈套,真理是欲望的真理,跟大他者的欲望紧密相连。大他者的欲望是拉康的术语,弗洛伊德谈的是在无意识的欲望。另外,知识则是想要知道真理的欲望,了解欲望,不仅是性与爱的欲望,更深一层的,是对于真理的欲望。至于各种颠覆,指的是真理与知识的启蒙,必然会带来各种原有的旧的观念的倾覆,譬如黑格尔的作为主体的意识,会被弗洛伊德的无意识取代。

Freud ‘s biologism has nothing to do with the preachy abjection that
wafts up to us from psychoanalytic headquarters.

弗洛伊德的生物主义,跟那种说教似的低劣实践没有丝毫关系。那种说教似的低劣是从精神分析总部飘浮到我们这里。

雄伯说:
「精神分析总部」指的大概是当时的国家精神分析协会,拉康因为主张精神分析并非是心理学或心理治疗学,而被开除会籍,拉康愤忿不平之馀,则是以天主教的所谓「被教会开除」excommunication自况。认为精神分析总部的诠释是「说教似的低劣」,并非是弗洛伊德的嫡传。

And you had to be made to experience the death instinct, which is held in such abomination there, to get on the true wavelength of Freud ‘s biology. For to evade the death instinct in his doctrine is not to know his doctrine at all.

为了要接收到弗洛伊德的生物学的真实的波长讯息,你们必须被迫要经验到死亡本能,尽管死亡本能的观念让人深痛恶绝。对于弗洛伊德的学说,若是逃避这个死亡本能,等于是对他的学说,根本就不了解。

雄伯说:
弗洛伊德的死亡本能,不仅是一种生物主义,而是跟生命对于永恒不朽的追求驱力息息相关。要了解弗洛伊德,岂能忽诸。

On the basis of the approach I have prepared for you, you should recognize
in the metaphor of the return to the inanimate–which Freud ascribes
to every living body–the margin beyond life that language assures the
human being of due to the fact that he speaks, and which is precisely the
margin where this being places in signifying position, not only those parts
of his body that lend themselves to this because they are exchangeable, but
the body itself.

根据我跟你们准备的这个方法,在回归这个无生命物的比喻,(这是弗洛伊德归属于每一个活生生的身体), 你们应该体认出这个超越生命的边缘空间,语言保证给予人类的超越生命的边缘空间,由于人是他言说的这个事实。这确实是在超越生命的这个边缘空间,这个生命实存在能指化的立场,不但放置有助于能指化的他的身体的那些部分,而且放置身体的本身。

雄伯说:
弗洛伊德认为每个人的身体,最后终需回归死亡本能的这个无生命物。通俗地说,就是有生必有死,圣贤与凡夫都一样。但是人既然作为言说的主体,语言也会赋予主体一种超越生命的边缘空间。生命的实存就存放在这个边缘空间,作为生存实存的部分客体或身体本身,也随之在这里。

Thus it becomes apparent that the object’s relation to the body can in no way be defined as based on a partial identification that would have to be totalized there, since, on the contrary, this object is the prototype of the body’s signifierness as the human being’s ante.

因此,变得显而易见的是,跟身体的客体关系,根本不能被定义为,是以在那里必须被集体化的部分的认同作为基础。因为相反地,这个客体是典型的身体的「所指」,作为人类的最先的睹注。

雄伯说:
拉康对于克莱恩Melanie Klein 等客体关系学派的主张的不同是:客体关系说,是以必须被集体化的部分客体,作为认同基础。拉康则是认为身体作为客体的「能指」signifer ,需以「所指」signified,作为最先的睹注。

「睹注」ante 一词,颇有不确定及冒险睹运气的意涵。毕竟,对于人的能指的身体死亡后,作为无意识的「所指」是否仍然会存在,只有亲身经历者到时才能验证。拉康也仅能根据精神分析理论,凭借信念推测及睹注其有无。

人生的抉择,不论是哈姆雷特的To be or not to be,其实都带有耶非耶的赌博成份。这使我想到哲学宗教界脍炙人口的「帕斯卡尔的骰子」Pascal’s Throw of Dice:若上帝不存在,一切可为,人类的发展具有无限的可能性。反过来说,若上帝存在,你们这些妄自尊大的人类,只有下地狱让炼火焚烧的命运。
问题是上帝存在不存在,由谁来举证?民主国家的法律有所谓的「无罪推定」的观念Give the benefit of doubt. 但是在神学及生命哲学的信仰上,信者恒信,不信者恒不信,举证的责任在何方?帕斯卡尔最后选择了赌知性的独立自由,放手抛开骰子。万一骰子尘埃落定,果真上帝存在,地狱炼火正熊熊燃烧地等着他死后的灵魂的苦刑折磨,那也只有走着瞧地认了。这就是人,这就是人生。

Here I will take up the challenge made to me when people translate as
“instinct” what Freud calls Trieb–which “drive” would seem to translate
quite well into English, but which is avoided in the Standard Edition. In
French, my last resort would be derive [drift], if I were unable to give the
bastardized term pulsion [drive or urge] its point of impact.

在此,我将从事被赋加于在我身上的挑战,当人们将弗洛伊德所谓的「驱力」或「冲动」翻译成为「本能」。这个驱力或冲动,翻译成为英文时,似乎恰到好处,但是在对弗洛伊德的标准翻译版本,则是被避免。在法文,我若是没有办法给予「悸动」这个减损意义的术语,作为它的影响点,我最后诉诸于「飘移」这个词语,

雄伯说:
拉康将弗洛伊德的「本能」,翻成英文的「驱力」或「冲动」,法文则翻译为「飘移」derive 或「悸动」pulsion。

「飘移」derive一词意味着被淘尽的波涛或气流,当水中的船或空中的飞机经过后遗留的痕迹。拉康用来比喻人的主体活过一生后,欲望进入死亡时遗留的痕迹。倒是有几分神似。

「悸动」pulsion一词,拉康倒是蛮常使用。对于「悸动」这个词语,雄伯也是心有戚戚焉,曾经在雄伯手记里,有过两次记述:

「今天早晨重新翻阅「拉康」的The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis。主体跟精神分析师的移情transference 有正面及负面两种:前者牵涉到跟真爱real love与假爱false love如何分别,后者牵涉到爱恨交加ambivalence的情感发挥到极致,会不会发展换喻成为「开始是崇拜,结果却是谋杀」What began in admiration ends up in murder?
「分析师存在的本身就是无意识的显示。」拉冈语重心长地说:「但是主体以一种若隐若现的悸动方式,展现一下随又再关闭。这种悸动比激发动机的意符的插入更为积极,但是又不是本质的根本所在。」The subject opens up only to close again in a certain temporal pulsation—a pulsation I regard as being more radical than the insertion in the signifier that no doubt motives it, but is not primary to it at the level of essence.

这种心灵的悸动产生的移情究竟是真爱还是假爱,「拉冈」还是语焉不详地闪烁其词。的确,假如主体对于自己真实生命本质的展现是乍现即隐地蒙眬,也就是说假如主体在「既知以心为形役,奚惆怅而独悲」的现实劳碌中,连自己是何许人的人生定位都不甚了然,他或她如何去判断偶尔乍现即隐所产生的心灵的悸动,是他或她一生该拼命追求的真爱或仅是一时的心血来潮?」

***

「在海螺沟攀登千年冰川参差错落的岩礁遗迹时,大概步履有点恍惚不稳,仰起头看到一位妙龄少女兴高采烈奔跳过来,伸手拉我上去。下山时头晕发烧,只好搭坐人力竿轿,在转弯处又邂逅那位少女。她一看到我,又是一阵兴高采烈跟我招呼。当时使我印象深刻的倒不完全是她及时的帮助或温馨的关怀,而是人与人之间,正如人与自然之间,都存在心灵互相悸动的可能性。」

And so I insist on promoting the idea that, whether grounded or not in biological observation, instinct–among the modes of knowledge [connaissance] required by nature of living beings so that they satisfy its needs—is defined as a kind of [experiential] knowledge [connaissance] we admire because it cannot become [articulated] knowledge [un sa voir] .

因此,我坚持要提升「本能」这个观念:无论它是否根据生物学的观察,在生物的天性所要求的各种知识模式,以便这些知识模式满足它的需要里,「本能」被定义为一种我们崇敬的知识,因为这种知识具有令人惊奇的特性:它无法成为一门知识。

But in Freud’s work something quite different is at stake, which is a savoir certainly. but one that doesn’t involve the slightest connaissance, in that it is inscribed in a discourse of which the subject who, like the messenger slave of Antiquity, carries under his hair the codicil that condemns him to death–knows neither the meaning nor the text, nor in what language [langue] it is written, nor even that it was tattooed on his shaven scalp while
he was sleeping.

但是在弗洛伊的著作,某件相当不同的东西岌岌可危。那个东西确实是一门知识,但是这门知识丝毫没有牵涉到体认。因为它被写入在主体的论述里。这种论述,犹如古代的「信使奴隶」的用途,被铭记于信使奴隶的头发底下的头皮里,里面的讯息是要将他处死刑,但是信使奴隶既不知道讯息文字的意义,也不知道用什么语言被写,甚至不知道,这个讯息在他睡觉时被刺青在他剔掉头发的头皮上。

雄伯说:
拉康对死亡驱力的定义是:一种我们崇敬的知识,因为这种知识具有令人惊奇的特性:它无法成为一门知识。而弗洛伊德的定义是:那个东西确实是一门知识,但是这门知识丝毫没有牵涉到体认。因为主体自己不知道;

This apologue barely exaggerates just how little the unconscious has to do with physiology.

这个故事的寓意,实实在在地道出:对于无意识而言,生理的客体并无足轻重。

This can be gauged by crosschecking the contribution made by psychoanalysis to physiology since its inception: its contribution has been nil, even as far as the sexual organs are concerned. No amount of fabulation will prevail against this balance sheet.

对于这一点,我们只要仔细检视自从精神分析学开始以来,它对于生理学所做的贡献之少,即可看出端倪。即使从性的器官而言,精神分析的贡献也是微不足道。对于这种平衡结算表,无论你怎么虚构粉饰都无法改变。

For, of course, psychoanalysis concerns the reality [reel] of the body and
of its imaginary mental schema. But to recognize their import in the perspective authorized by “development,” we must first realize that the more
or less fragmented integrations that seem to account for the order of development, function first and foremost like elements of a heraldry, a heraldry
of the body. This is confirmed by the use that is made of them in reading
children’s drawings.

当然,精神分析会关心到,身体及身体作为想象的精神模式的这个现实性。但是为了从「身体成长」所授权的这个观点,体认出它们的意义,我们必须首先体认到: 似乎用来解释身体成长过程的这些各个局部的统合,最重要的功用,是作为纹章信物的成分,就像是身体的佩饰。当我们观看小孩的图时,我们用来解释图画的东西,可作为佐证。

雄伯说:
正如心理谘商师常凭借孩童的图画来了解他们心理的异常状态,对于精神分析,身体的客体仅是被用来了解其无意识的讯息。精神分析关心的是无意识,而非身体。

This is the crux-to which I shall return later-of the paradoxical privilege
the phallus continues to have in the unconscious dialectic, the theory
of the part-object not sufficing to explain it.

这就是在无意识的辩证法,阳具继续拥有的矛盾的特权的原则,(我以后再回头谈论它)。部分客体的理论并不足够解释它。

雄伯说:
拉康认为阳具绝非仅是身体的一个部分客体,而是人的无意识,彰显在主体身上的表征。所谓「矛盾的特权」,指的是前面所说的传递无意识界的「信使奴隶」,传递着生命的欢爽jouissance与死亡的讯息。

Need I now say–if one understands the kind of support I have sought in
Hegel’s work by which to criticize a degradation of psychoanalysis that is
so inept that it has no other claim to fame than that of being contemporary-
that it is inadmissible that I should be accused of having been lured
by a purely dialectical exhaustion of being, and that I can but hold a particular
philosopher responsible for authorizing this misunderstanding?

我有需要这样说吗?假如我们了解我在黑格尔的著作,寻求这种支持,用来批评精神分析学的一种堕落。这种精神分析学是如此的漠然无感,以致于它沾沾自喜的興趣,就是赶上现代潮流。我竟然会被控诉,说我被引诱以纯粹的辩证的方式,去对于生命实存,从事上穷碧落下黄泉地探究。当某位特别的哲学家认同这样的误解时,我不得不认为他的误解是很不负责任。

雄伯说:
这位哲学家,拉康既然姑隐其名,我们也没有必要去考据。问题是拉康以无意识作为精神分析得论述,确实会涉及到人的生命实存问题。被人拿来跟当时盛行的存在主义哲学或现象学,作牵强附会的诠释,也是难免的事。

For far from giving myself over to some logicizing reduction where desire
is at stake, I detect in desire’s irreducibility to demand the very mainspring of
what also prevents it from being reduced to need. To put it elliptically: it is
precisely because desire is articulated that it is not articulable-by which I
mean in the discourse that suits it, an ethical, not a psychological discourse.

在欲望岌岌可危的地方,我丝毫没有想要屈从于逻辑化的简化还原。在欲望的不可简化还原成为要求demand里,我觉察出这个原动力:欲望也被阻止无法被简化还原成为需要need。简单扼要地说,确实就是因为欲望被表达,它变成无法被表达。我的意思是,在最适合于欲望的论述里,这个论述是一种伦理,而非是心理的论述。

雄伯说:
欲望无法简化还原成为要求demand,也无法简化还原成为需要need。「要求」处于符号界the symbolic,「需要」属于实在界the Real。这里的欲望不是指主体的生物上的生理欲望,而是指主体刚一诞生,从无意识进入意识领域,被符号界的「要求的法则」the law of the demand,潜抑的原初欲望primordial desire,诸如乱论等禁忌。

「确实就是因为欲望被表达,它变成无法被表达」的意思是,在伦理的论述里被表达出来的欲望,是通过「要求的法则」的合乎伦理要求的欲望,而在实在界的「需要」的心理的欲望,则是无法在符号界被表达。故说这种欲望的论述,是一种伦理,而非是心理的论述。

主体的颠覆 404

December 14, 2011

主体的颠覆 404
The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in Freudian unconscious
弗洛伊德的无意识:主体的颠覆与欲望辩证法

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

Once the structure of language is recognized in the unconscious, what
sort of subject can we conceive of for it?

我们一但从无意识体认出语言的结构,我们能够替它构想人是怎样一个主体?

In a concern for method, we can try to begin here with the strictly linguistic
definition of 1 as signifier, where it is nothing but the shifter* or
indicative that, qua grammatical subject of the statement, designates the
subject insofar as he is currently speaking.

以「朝闻道,夕死可矣」的热诚,我们能够从语言学出发,将「我」严格定义为能指。在能指里,只有「转换」或指示。就陈述的主体而言,那指明主体的意义是:他正在言谈。

That is to say, it designates the enunciating subject, but does not signify
him. This is obvious from the fact that there may be no signifier of the
enunciating subject in the statement-not to mention that there are signifiers
that differ from 1, and not only those that are inadequately called cases
of the first person singular, even if we add that it can be lodged in the plural
invocation or even in the Self [Soi] of auto-suggestion.

换言之,那指明人是一个表达的主体,但是表达并没有使主体就具有意义。这显而易见,因为表达的主体的每一个能指,在陈述时,可能是一个欠缺,遑论还有那些跟我不同的表达的主体。我作为第一人称的名词变化是单数,即使愿望实现,名词变化添增为复数,或即使自动膨胀成为「自我」,主体未必就具有意义。

I believe, for example, that I have detected the enunciating subject in the
French signifier ne, said by grammarians to be “expletive,” a term that
already prefigures the incredible opinion of those among the best who
regard its form as subject to sheer whimsy.

譬如,我相信,我已经从法文的能指「ne」,觉察出这个表达的主体。文法家将这个「ne」说成是一个「虚词」,这一个术语已经预先想象:那些人的匪夷所思的意见,那些人认为这个虚词的形式,纯粹属于完全的幻想。

Would that the weight I give it make them think twice, before it not but become obvious they have missed the point [avant qu ‘il ne soit avere qu ‘ils ny comprennent rien]–take out that “not but” [ne] and my enunciation loses its force as an attack, 1 eliding me in the impersonal.

但愿我对于这个虚词的重视,能说服他们再三思维。因为显而易见地,他们已经误解了这个要点。拿掉「ne」那个虚词,我的表达就失去了它作为攻击性的力量。这个「我」在客观的陈述中,将我删除。

Yet I fear that in this way they could not but come to vilify me [Mais je crains ainsi qu ‘ils n’ en viennent a me honnir]-skip that “not but” [n’] and its absence, toning down my alleged fear to declare my repugnance to a timid assertion, reduces the emphasis of my enunciation by situating me in the statement.

可是我恐怕,以这种方式,他们不得不诬蔑我—删掉那个「ne」的虚词以及它的不存在,用来减弱我宣称的担心,因为我宣称厌恶作为一个怯生生的主张,他们将我定位在这个陈述当中,来减弱我表达的强调,

But if I say “we” (kill), because they are killing me, where am I situating
myself if not in the tu on the basis of which I glare at them [tOlse]?

但是假如我说「杀掉使其闭嘴」,因为他们正在杀死我。那我的位置会那里,难道不就是在这个「杀死使其闭嘴」当中?我根据那个基础,对他们怒目而视。

Don’t sulk–I am merely referring obliquely to what I am reluctant to cover over with the inevitable map of clinical work.

别郁郁不乐。我仅是拐弯抹角地提到我很不愿意掩盖的东西,根据临床经验必然会描绘的图形。

Namely, the right way to answer the question “Who is speaking?” when
the subject of the unconscious is at stake. For the answer cannot come from
him if he doesn’t know what he is saying, or even that he is speaking, as all
of analytic experience teaches us.

换句话说,这是当无意识的主体岌岌可危时,恰如好处地回答这个问题:「谁正在说话?」因为这个回答不是来自他作为主体,假如他不知道他正在说什么,或甚至他不知道他正在说话,依照精神分析经验所教导我们的。

雄伯说:
拉康的精神分析论述颠覆怎样的主体呢?这样比喻吧!

黑格尔这样说:「我现在冒著生命的危险跟你们呼吁:人是作为理性意识的精神主体!」拉康的回答是:你黑格尔本身难道不也是人吗?你冒着生命危险还是呼吁,你还算是作为理性意识的精神主体吗?你在对人的客观论述里,把你自己抹除掉了吗?」

科学的试验主义者,或行为主义的心理学家说:「在科学家的眼里,人是由各种生物机能构成的客体。可经由科学的研究,将人的心理及精神的意识的反应,完全客观化地操控。」拉康的质疑是:「科学家,你自己难道不也是人吗?你表达这个真理的陈述时,你是意识客观化地被操控的客体?还是具有自由人的无意识的主观性的主体?」

Hence the place of the “inter-said” [inter-dit]’ constituted by the “intrasaid”
[intra-dit] of a between-two-subjects, is the very place at which the
transparency of the classical subject divides, undergoing, as it does, the
effects of fading* that specify the Freudian subject due to its occultation by
an ever purer signifier; may these effects lead us to the frontiers where slips of the tongue and jokes become indistinguishable in their collusion, or even where elision is so much more allusive in driving presence back to its lair,
that we are astonished the hunt for Dasein hasn’t made any more of it.

因为,这个「交谈言说」的位置,是由处于两个主体之间的「内部言说」所构成。就是在这个位置,清清楚楚的古典的主体开始分裂,经历所谓的「消隐」的效应。由于受到一个越来越纯粹的能指,对它的遮蔽,这种消隐的效应明确指出这个弗洛伊德的主体。但愿这些消隐的效应引导我们来到这些边界,在这里,口误与笑话由于秘密结合,而无法区别。或是刻意闪躲,反而欲盖弥彰地让生命的实存被追踪到源头。我们不禁惊奇:生命的实存的寻求,从来没有注意到它。

雄伯说:
人际之间的「交谈言说」的位置,应该被定位在两个主体之间的「内部言说」intrasaid,也就是实在界的无意识的大他者,在互相交谈言说。那时,生命实存的意义才会彰显出来。否则逢场作戏般地虚与委蛇,有无数的情人及朋友,等于是一个也没有。

Lest our hunt be in vain, we analysts must bring everything back to the
cut qua function in discourse, the most significant being the cut that constitutes
a bar between the signifier and the signified. Here we come upon the
subject who interests us since, being bound up in signification, he seems to
be lodging in the preconscious.

唯恐我们对于生命实存的寻求功亏一篑,我们精神分析家必须将一切东西,都带回到真理论述作为功用的这个「断裂」最重要的是这个「断裂」形成一种所指与能指之间的这个禁止的横槓。在此,我们邂逅到这位让我们感到興趣的主体,这位主体跟意义息息相关,他似乎存在于前意识。

雄伯说:
人作为能指signifier的主体,其生命意义的实存,要在「所指」signfied处寻求。问题是能指与所指之间,偏偏就是被被划上横槓阻隔。我们若是习焉不察,误将能指当著就是生命的实存,而不懂得跟能指断裂地去前意识的「所指」处,寻找真实的生命实存,则主体的迷失而不知还!

This would lead us to the paradox of conceiving that discourse in an analytic session is worthwhile only insofar as it stumbles or even interrupts itself—were not the session itself instituted as a break in a false discourse, that is, in what discourse realizes when it becomes empty as speech, when it is no more than the worn coinage Mallarme speaks of that is passed from hand to hand “in silence.”

这将引导我们获得这个悖论:精神分析谘商时的真理论述,仅有在它迟疑或中断自己的时刻,才是具有价值的。假如在谘商时的本身的形成,并不是作为一个虚假真理论述的中断,换句话说,在真理论述所体认出来的东西,当它变成是空无的言说,当它仅是诗人马拉美所提到的「在沉默」里被辗转经手的「磨损的钱币」。

雄伯说:
「精神分析谘商时的真理论述,仅有在它迟疑不决或中断自己的时刻,才是具有价值的。」如何解释呢?既然精神分析论述认为,一切真理论述在层层转述过程,会像磨损的钱币般,仅剩方便交换的实用价值,而让其原有的质料价值抹除不见。,精神分析对于自己的真理的迟疑或中断,给自己也会有犯错的可能保留一点余地。

马拉美区别日常语言与诗的语言的不同,前者像钱币一样,大家辗转经手,仅在乎语言陈腔滥调的实用的交换价值。但是诗的语言不同,诗人凭借丰富的想象力,让语言文字,焕发具有生命力的光辉。精神分析的真理论述,固然应该以诗的语言自我期许,但也应该以磨损钱币般的日常语言,作为自我警惕。

The cut made by the signifying chain is the only cut that verifies the
structure of the subject as a discontinuity in the real. If linguistics enables us
to see the signifier as the determinant of the signified, analysis reveals the
truth of this relationship by making holes in meaning the determinants of
its discourse.

这个能指化的锁链所形成的这个「断裂」,是唯一的断裂,它证实主体的结构,作为在实在界的一种不连续性。假如语言学家让我们能够看出:这个能指,是作为是受到所指所决定的因素,精神分析则是让它的真理论述的决定的因素,成为意义的空无,而显示出能指与所指之间的这个关系的真理。

雄伯说:
「精神分析则是让它的真理论述的决定的因素,成为意义的空无」,这句话颇有大乘佛教「法不可执,何况非法」的意涵。既然万法皆空,你精神分析论述难道不就是万法之一,岂能执著?岂能不空呢?

This is the path by which an imperative can be fulfilled, the imperative
Freud raised to the sublime stature of a pre-Socratic gnome in his formulation,
“Wo Es war, solI Ich werden,” which I have commented upon more
than once, and which I am now going to inflect differently.

这就一种命令能够赖以实践的途径,弗洛伊德在他的诠释里,将这个命令提升到前苏格拉底的箴言的崇高地位:「我们必须回到它原来所在地地方」。这个箴言,我曾经再三评论过。现在我将以不同方式给予反思。

I will limit myself to examining one step in its grammar: “where it
was . . . ” [fa OU ce fut . . .]- what does that mean? If it were but this [fa]
that might have been (to use the aoristic form), how to come to the same
place in order to make myself be there, by stating it now?

我将仅限制于检视在它的文法的一个步骤:「它以前的所在…」那是什么意思?假如那仅是原本会存在的这个地方,(用过去的不定完成式时态来说),我们如何光是凭借现在陈述它,能够来到相同的地方,为了让我自己在那里?

But the French translation says: “La ou c ‘itait . . .” Let us take advantage
of the distinct imperfect it provides. Where it was just now, where it was for
a short while, between an extinction that is still glowing and an opening up
that stumbles, I can [peut] come into being by disappearing from my statement
[dit] .

但是法文的翻译说:「它曾经存在的地方」。让我们利用它所提供的这个清楚的不定完成式。在它刚才所在地方,它曾经有短暂时间存在的地方,在依旧照耀的辉煌与闪烁的开启之间,我从我的陈述里消失而获得生命的实存」。

雄伯说:
「我从我的陈述里消失而获得生命的实存」,这句话真是耐人寻味。这样的「我」,必然是一种分裂的「我」。也就是实在界的无意识的我,在符号界的意识里长久受到遮蔽,从那里消失,这个「我」反而在实在界的无意识那里,获得生命的实存。

An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself,
an ignorance that sweeps itself away, an opportunity that self-destructs what
remains here if not the trace of what really must be in order to fall
away from being?

一个抨击自己的表达,一个摒弃自己的陈述,一种横扫一切的无知,一个自己毁灭在此仅的剩余物的机会,难道不就是真正必须具有的生命实存,为了要从存在里掉落出来?

雄伯说:
「为了要从存在里掉落出来」的这个「存在」,指的是符号界的意识的存在,而「真正必须具有的生命实存」,则是实在界的无意识的生命实存。有破有立,破掉符号界的意识的存在,实在界的无意识的生命实存,才会彰显出来。

A dream related by Freud in his article, “Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning,” gives us a sentence, related to the pathos with which the figure of a dead father returning as a ghost would be invested: “He did not know he was dead.”

在他的文章「精神功用的两个原则的构想」,弗洛伊德描述的一个梦,给予我们一个句子,跟死去的父亲的以一个鬼魂形态回来,所带给人们的悲痛有关。「他不知道他已经死了。」

雄伯说:
莎士比亚的悲剧「王子复仇记」的开头一幕:死去的国王以鬼魂的形态在夜间出现,跟王子哈姆雷特描述他被人用毒药灌耳致死的悲惨经过。哈姆雷特能够採用这样的控词,来从事复仇的行动吗?从理性的立场来看,那会不会就是一种疯狂?希区考克的经典影片「精神病患」The psycho,描述凶手的杀手动机,是由于他死去多年的母亲,声色俱厉地在命令他。他不得不从。你不要以为这是戏剧或的电影里,才会出现的行径。我们不妨冷静回想一下。我们死去多年的父母,朋友,或情人,不也常在我们的梦里出现,谴责我们没有尽到我们该尽的职责,甚至命令我们去从事一些补偿性的举动。你从还是不从?

I have already used this sentence to illustrate the subject’s relation to the
signifier–through an enunciation that makes a human being tremble due
to the vacillation that comes back to him from his own statement.

我曾经使用这个句子来诠释主体与能指的关系—这一个关系被镶嵌在让人不寒而栗的表达,由于从他自己的陈述回转到他自己身上的犹豫不决。

If this figure of the dead father subsists only by virtue of the fact that one
does not tell him the truth of which he is unaware, what then is the status of
the 1 on which this subsistence depends?

假如死去的父亲的这个人物,仅是凭借这个事实存在:我们没有告诉他,关于他自己并不知道的真相。那么这种生存所依靠的这个「我」的地位是什么?

雄伯说:
很多行尸走肉的人,并不知道自己的灵魂及良心已经死了,却还义正词严地夸夸而谈。面对这样的理性怪物,我们如何跟他沟通交流呢?对于一个从来不作梦的人,你如何能够让他明白,他的真实的「我」在无意识的梦那里?

He did not know . . . He was to know a bit later. Oh! may that never happen!
May I die rather than have him know. Yes, that’s how I get there, where it was (to be): who knew, thus, that I was dead?

他并不知道….他应该晚一点才会知道。哦! 但愿这样的事永远不要发生?我宁可死掉,也不要让他知的。是的,那就是我到达那里的方式,在以前生命实存所在地方:因此,天晓得,我是死了?

雄伯说:
这段哀叹的的惊呼,说得有点玄奥。我是活著?还是死了?端看我们从符号界,还是从实在界的立场来说。在符号界的生者,对于死者,往往委婉语地说:死者往生去了。这句话反面的意思难道不是:我们的符号界是死亡之域吗?

Being of non-being, that is how I comes on the scene as a subject who is
conjugated with the double aporia of a veritable subsistence that is abolished
by his knowledge, and by a discourse in which it is death that sustains
existence.

非存在的存在,那就是我作为主体来到现场的方式,作为跟这个双重的僵局结合的主体。这是一种真实的存在,但是由于他不知道,由于这是依靠死亡来维持的存的论述,这个存在宛如不存在。

雄伯说:
「非存在的存在」说得也是很玄奥。我不存在,故我存在。真是阴魂不散啊!吾乃阴魂乎?哪一种真理的论述是依靠死亡来维持?仔细想一想,应该是每一种真理论述都是。如同法国文学家维克、雨果Victor Hugo 所说:每个人出生都判处死刑,只是给予不定期的缓刑。Men are all condemned to death with indefinite delays. 我们生活在世间会有有一段时间,然后就在这个世间销声匿迹。有些人劳劳碌碌地度过这段期间,有些人则是激情狂飙,智慧者则是陶醉于艺术跟诗。因为我们仅有的可能是,对于这段缓刑期间,尽可能扩展,尽可能获得更多心灵的悸动。激情狂飙让人生命的感觉激励起来,爱的狂喜与悲哀,政治或宗教的狂热,或是对于人类的热爱。只是务必就是要激情狂飙,因为它才会激励产生多重意识。至于这个智慧,诗的激情,美的欲望,为艺术而艺术的热爱,最为崇高。因为艺术降临你的身上,坦诚地宣称,仅是给予最高的品质,当你生命的时刻消失过去,仅仅就是为了那些时刻的缘故。

雄伯译注
32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

December 12, 2011

The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis
言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

In the case of the psychopathology of everyday life, another field consecrated
by another text by Freud, it is clear that every bungled action is a successful,
even “well phrased,” discourse, and that in slips of the tongue it is the
gag that turns against speech, and from just the right quadrant for its word to
the wise to be sufficient.

在日常生活的病理学的情况,这是弗洛伊德的另外一个文本贡献的另一个领域。显而易见的,每一个搞砸失败的行动, 都是一种成功的真理论述,甚至是「恰到好处」的真理论述。在说溜嘴的口误当中,这是防止言说口无遮拦的阻拦物。心照不宣地让它的文字恰如其份地点到为止。

雄伯说:
「每一个搞砸失败的行动,都是一种成功的真理论述,甚至是「恰到好处」的真理论述。」这确实是一个耐人寻味的启示,有时看似无心地讲错话,事实上却是有意地拐弯抹角地给予迂迴暗示或警告。说溜嘴的口误,在言说者的无意识里,可能正就是那个意思,只是外表上却又是假惺惺地道歉,掩饰尴尬的场面。这难道不是我们日常生活常见的场景吗?

But let us go straight to the part of the book where Freud deals with chance
and the beliefs it gives rise to, and especially to the facts regarding which he
applies himself to showing the subjective efficacy of associations to numbers that are left to the fate of an unmotivated choice, or even of a random selection.

但是让我们直接回的书的这个部分,在那里,弗洛伊德处理关于偶然与偶然产生的各种信仰,特别是让我们注意这些事实,关于这些事实,弗洛伊德专注于显示,对于数目字的自由联想,在主观上产生它渴望中的效果。这些数目字听由没有动机的选择来决定命运,或甚至听从任意挑选的命运。

雄伯说:
很多人买彩券选择号码,买汽车选择车号,买手机与电话挑选号码,甚至结婚丧葬的选择日期,不单都是从实用及方便记忆的观点,而是希望这个号码,会给他们带来好运及诸事顺利。甚至参加选举,抽顺序号码,都牵强附会地给予合乎自己欲望的吉利的诠释。

Nowhere do the dominant structures of the psychoanalytic field reveal
themselves better than in such a success. Freud’s appeal, in passing, to
unknown thought processes is nothing more in this case than his last-ditch
excuse for the total confidence he placed in symbols, a confidence that wavers
as the result of being fulfilled beyond his wildest dreams.

精神分析领域具有这些主导的结构,在诸如其类的成功里,显示得最为淋漓尽致。在这个情况,弗洛伊德偶尔诉诸于无名的思维过程,仅仅就是他最后的孤注一掷,作为一种藉口,让他对于符号给予全部的信任。由于数字号码实现他的渴望的成功,超乎幻想之外,这种对符号的全部信任会动摇起来。

雄伯说:
一位具有科学思想的理性主义的人,虽然对于数目字跟现实事业,感情,或前途的成败的关系,斥为迷信或缺乏安全感。但实际上,对于现实过于功利而产生的患得患失,还是会他不得不迁究地接受,并且不得不信地随俗从事。

If, for a symptom, whether neurotic or not, to be considered to come under
psychoanalytic psychopathology, Freud insists on the minimum of over-determination constituted by a double meaning—symbol of a defunct conflict beyond its function in a no less symbolic present conflict—and if he teaches us to follow the ascending ramification of the symbolic lineage in the text of the patient’s free associations, in order to detect the nodal points [noeuds] of its structure at the places where its verbal forms intersect, then it is already quite dear that symptoms can be entirely resolved in an analysis of language, because a symptom is itself structured like a language: a symptom is language from which speech must be delivered.

为了要让一种病征,无论是神经症的病征与否,从精神分析的心理病理学的范围内来考虑,弗洛伊德坚持:一种双重意义形成,至少要拥有多重决定,。(在同样是符号存在的冲突里,一个不再存在的冲突的符号,超越它的功用。)假如在病人自由联想的文本,弗洛伊德教导我们在符号的继承关系里,遵循符号逐渐回溯的分叉发展,为了要侦查出符号的结构的这些节点,在它的文词交会的地方。那么这已经是显而易见,在语言的精神分析里,病征能够彻底地被解决。因为病征的结构就像语言:病征就是言说必须被传达的语言。

雄伯说:
何谓「多重决定」over-determination,在网络词典,我找到一个解释:
Freud wrote in The Interpretation of Dreams that many features of dreams were usually “overdetermined,” in that they were caused by multiple factors in the life of the dreamer, from the “residue of the day” (superficial memories of recent life) to deeply repressed traumas and unconscious wishes, these being “potent thoughts”. Freud favored interpretations which accounted for such features not only once, but many times, in the context of various levels and complexes of the dreamer’s psyche.

在「梦的解析」,弗洛伊德写到:梦的许多特征通常是「多重决定」。因为梦的这些多重特征,是由作梦者的生活里的多重因素所引起,从「白天的残留物」(最近生活的浮浅的记忆),到深深被压抑的创伤及无意识的愿望。这些都是「潜藏的各种思维」。弗洛伊德赞同,梦的解析要不仅一次地说明诸如其类的特征,而且要好几次,从作梦者的心灵的各种不同层次及情结的内涵。

何谓「一种双重意义」a double meaning?
括弧号里的解释是:符号在它的功用之上,在同样是符号存在的冲突里,成为一个不再存在的冲突的符号。意思类似索绪尔语言学所说的「能指」signifier与「所指」signified 的双重意义。能指具有历史演变而来的意涵,但是丧失「所指」在当下的活生生的具体意涵,而形成一种僵化而没有意义的符号,无法让人感动。

To those who have not studied the nature of language in any depth, the
experience of numerical association will immediately show what must be
grasped here-namely, the combinatory power that orders its equivocations-
and they will recognize in this the very mainspring of the unconscious.

对于曾经深入研究语言特质的人,数字联想到经验,立刻会显示在此必须被理解的东西—也就是说,规范数字模棱两可的组合力量。他们会在这个组合力量里,找到无意识的原动力。

雄伯说
数字的联想跟潜意识的原动力有关。在日常生活里斑斑可考。譬如,医院通常没有四楼,因为「四」的发音跟「死」类似。在介于生与死仲介的医院,自然会被视为不吉利的象征。

乾隆皇帝自称「十全老人」,政府的「十大建设」的「十」,跟事情的圆满成就有关联。中国老年人一般都害怕「九」这个数字,能够通过的话,会做生日大寿庆祝,表示至少还可再多活几年。

Indeed, if—from the numbers obtained by breaking up the series of digits
[chiffres] in the chosen number, from their combination by all the operations
of arithmetic, and even from the repeated division of the original number by
one of the numbers split off from it—the resulting numbers prove symbolic
among all the numbers in the subject’s own history, it is because they were
already latent in the initial choice.

的确,从被选择的这个数字,把分解一系列的数位数字获得的那些数字,从根据算术的各种运算,给予它们的组合,甚至用分裂出来的其中一个数字,将原先的数字予以重复的减除。假如结果的数字证明,在主体自己的历史中,是众多的数字之一,那它就具有符号性质。那是因为它们在原先的选择时,就已经是潜藏着。

雄伯说:
银行金融卡,信用卡,或网络帐号的密码数字,很多遭人破解。原因就是它们代表的符号性质,「在原先的选择时,就已经是潜藏着」。

And thus if the idea that these very numbers [chif.fres] determined the subject’s fate is refuted as superstitious, we must nevertheless admit that everything analysis reveals to the subject as his unconscious lies in the existing order of their combinations-that is, in the concrete language they represent.

因此,即使这些数字决定主体的命运,这个观念被排斥为迷信,我们仍然必须承认,精神分析给予主体显示的一切,作为他的无意识,就在于这些数字组合的既存秩序。换句话说,在于它们所代表的具体语言。

雄伯说:
分析者在接受分析时所揭露的数字的联想,自然会被分析家用来视为解识他的无意识的指标。只是信不信就由你了。

We shall see that philologists and ethnographers reveal enough to us about the combinatory sureness found in the completely unconscious systems with
which they deal for them to find nothing surprising in the proposition I am
putting forward here.

我们将会看出,语言学家与人种学家,跟我们充分显示,关于在他们所处理的完全是无意识的系统里,所发现的这种组合的确定性。因此,他们对于我在此提出的这个命题,就不觉得有什么好大惊小怪。

But should anyone still have reservations about what I am saying, I would
appeal once more to the testimony of the man who, having discovered the unconscious, warrants credence when he designates its place; he will not fail us.

但是万一有人对于我所说的内容的正确性,持保留态度,我将再一次求助于这个人的供词。他发现无意识的存在后,他保证是确实可信,当他指明无意识的位置。他将不会让我们感到失望。

雄伯说:
「这个人的供词」,我想拉康指的就是弗洛伊德。拉康唯恐自己所说的内容受到怀疑,只好诉诸权威地「回归弗洛伊德」。

For, however little interest has been taken in it–and for good reason —“Jokes
and Their Relation to the Unconscious“ remains the most unchallengeable
of his works because it is the most transparent; in it, the effect of the unconscious is demonstrated in all its subtlety.

「笑话与其跟无意识的关系」始终是弗洛伊德最无可争议的著作,尽管引起的迴响并不是很广泛,(其中自有其原因)。因为这是它最为明白晓畅。无意识的影响被描述得精细入微。

And the visage it reveals to us is that of wit [l’esprit] in the ambiguity conferred on it by language, where the other face of its regalian power is the witticism [pointe], by which the whole of its order is annihilated in an instant–the witticism, indeed, in which language ‘s creative activity unveils its absolute gratuitousness, in which its domination of reality [reel] is expressed in the challenge of non-meaning, and in which the humor, in the malicious grace of the free spirit [esprit lihre] , symbolizes a truth that does not say its last word.

这本著作跟我们显示的面貌,是自由精神受到语言所赋加的模棱暧昧的面貌。在语言里,这本著作的至高力量的另外一面,就是机智妙语。由于这个机智妙语,精神精神的整个秩序,会瞬间被灰飞烟灭。的确,在机智妙语里,语言的创造性的活动,揭露活动能够从没有缘由里产生。在机智妙语里,受到无意义的挑战,自由精神对于现实界的支配被表达。在那里,幽默,以既恶意又高雅的自由精神,象征着:真理永远没有被道尽。

雄伯说:
「真理永远没有被道尽」,也就是拉康后来一直强调的我们穷毕生之力所获的真理,永远是「仅说一半」half said 的真理。天机不可泄露,大话不要说得太早太死,以免后来一语成谶。如同伊底普斯国王开头义正词严的宣告,后来却发现自己就是杀父妻母的罪人。

We must follow Freud, along the book’s admirably compelling detours, on
the walk on which he leads us in this chosen garden of bitterest love.

我们必须跟随着弗洛伊德,沿着这本书令人崇拜的迷人的迂回,走上他引导我们前进的路途,在这个最痛苦的爱的选择的花园。

雄伯说:

弗洛伊德的「笑话与其跟无意识的关系」这本书,被拉康形容为「最痛苦的爱的选择的花园」。理论上来说,爱应该是欢乐,怎么变成是最痛苦呢?不晓得有没有人能够提供这样的经验分享一下?

Here everything is substantial, everything is a real gem. The mind [esprit]
that lives as an exile in the creation whose invisible support he is, knows that
he is at every instant the master capable of annihilating it.

在此,每一样东西都是实质存在,每一样东西都是一颗真实的宝石。在创造里生活作为一位放逐者的心智,知道在每一瞬间,他是能够消灭自己创造的主人,在他自己作为隐形的支持的创造王国里。

雄伯说:
「在创造里生活作为一位放逐者的心智」,听起来很费解。所谓放逐者,通常是指被流放到国外,或外地的人。他在笑话的这个花园创造机智妙语,既当著实质存在,又当著是真实的宝石,却又随时让它们灰飞烟灭。说实在的,心性较为执著的人,实在没有办法这么豁达。

No matter how disdained the forms of this hidden royalty–haughty or perfidious, dandy-like or debonair-Freud can make their secret luster shine.

这个隐藏的王国,无论多么受到藐视,无论是高傲,还是遭受背叛,像花花公子或魅力十足的弗洛伊德,总是能够让它们的秘密光辉闪亮起来。

雄伯说:
只有像弗洛伊德这样才华横溢的人,才会在这样的笑话的花园,玩得不亦乐乎。还让它们的秘密光辉闪亮起来。

Stories of the marriage broker on his rounds in the ghettos of Moravia–that derided Eros figure, like him born of penury and pain–discreetly guiding the avidity of his ill-mannered client, and suddenly ridiculing him with the illuminating nonsense of his reply.

这位媒人流传着无数的故事,当他穿梭在摩拉维亚的犹太人区,—那个犹太人区是受人藐视的色情地区,就像弗洛伊德出生于贫穷与痛苦的环境—他谨慎地引导他的态度不佳的学徒的热切渴望,然后突然以具有启示的无意义的回答,揶揄他的学徒。

“He who lets the truth escape like that,” comments Freud, “is in reality happy to throw off the mask.”

「像那样让真理逃离的人,」弗洛伊德评论说,「他实际上很高兴能够抛掉这个面具。」

雄伯说:
「这个面具」指的应该是「真理」吧?言说没有真理这个面具,也照常可以乐此不疲地玩,弗洛伊德真有他的本事。要是换了雄伯,就有点玩不下去。可是没有主体性,也是怪可怜的。还是勉为其难凑个热闹吧!

It is truth, in fact, that throws off the mask in coming out of his mouth, but
only so that the joke might take on another and more deceptive mask: the
sophistry that is merely a stratagem, the logic that is merely a lure, even comedy that tends merely to dazzle. The joke is always about something else.

事实上,从弗洛伊德嘴中说出来时,是真理抛掉这个面具。但是仅有这样,这个笑话可能会形成另外一个更欺骗的面具:诡辩仅是一种策略,逻辑仅是一种陷阱,甚至喜剧仅是倾向于让人笑昏。笑话总是关于某件其它东西。

雄伯说:
照拉康的说法,笑话跟诡辩及逻辑最大不同地方,在于笑话是意在言外,在某件其他的东西,在无意识,而不是在意识层面。

“A joke [esprit] in fact entails such a subjective conditionality [ . . .]: a joke is only what I accept as such,” continues Freud, who knows what he is talking about.

「事实上,笑话涵盖如此一个主体性的条件,笑话仅是我所接受的本质,」弗洛伊德说。他知道他正在谈论什么。

雄伯说:
为什么「笑话仅是我所接受的本质」?会不会弗洛伊德认为人活在世上的这个事实,本身就是个笑话。我们却一板正经地在这里要追寻真理,追求主体性。捷克作家昆德拉在「笑忘书」里,也这样说过,人一谈到真理,上帝就发笑。

Nowhere is the individual’s intent more evidently surpassed by what the subject finds–nowhere is the distinction I make between the individual and the
subject so palpable-since not only must there have been something foreign
to me in my find for me to take pleasure in it, but some of it must remain foreign
for this find to hit home.

个人的意图会被主体的发现超越过,在这里表现得最为明显—我在个人与主体之间所做的区别,在这里表现得最为具体。因为在我的发现里,不但当时一定会有某件对于我是外来的东西,我才会对它感到乐趣,而且那个东西一定始终是外来,这个发现才会一矢中的。

This takes on its importance due to the necessity, so clearly indicated by Freud, of a joke ‘s third person, who is always presupposed, and to the fact that a joke does not lose its power when told in the form of indirect speech.

由于这个需要,这个东西具有它的重要性,弗洛伊德如此清楚地指明,关于笑话具有一个第三者。这个第三者总是预先被假定。而且由于这个事实:尽管笑话是以间接的言说的形式来说,它并没有因此失去它的力量。

In short, this points, in the Other’s locus, to the amboceptor that is illuminated by the artifice of the joke [mot] erupting in its supreme alacrity.

总之,在大他者的轨迹,这指向被照亮的仲介,被在笑话的崇高的活跃里,迸发出来的笑话的巧妙所照亮。

There is only one reason for a joke to fall flat: the platitude of any explanation
given of its truth.

笑话会变的乏味,仅有一个理由。对于笑话的真理给予陈腔滥调的解释。

雄伯说:
要了解拉康,无论如何,不要忘记要有一位大他者。笑话也不例外。外来的大他者高高在上冷眼旁观,莊重的事情都会变成笑话。

Now this relates directly to our problem. The current disdain for studies
on the language of symbols–which can be seen simply by glancing at the
table of contents of our publications before and after the 1 920s—corresponds
in our discipline to nothing less than a change of object, whose tendency to
align itself with the most undifferentiated level of communication, in order to
accommodate the new objectives proposed for psychoanalytic technique, is
perhaps responsible for the rather gloomy balance sheet that the most lucid
analysts have drawn up of its results.18

现在这个直接关系到我们的问题。对于符号象征的语言的研究,目前的藐视,在我们精神分析这门学科而言,实实在在对应着目标的改变—我们只要瞥见一下1920年前后,出版物的目录表就可看出。目标的改变的倾向于认同通俗化的沟通,为了迎合精神分析技术建议的各种新目标。这种倾向造成即使头脑最清醒的精神分析家,演算出来的结果平衡表,都是相当惨淡的。

雄伯说:
拉康话题一转,谈到精神分析出版物的过分通俗化,偏重于分析技术的层面,造成精神分析的庸俗化,让即使头脑最清醒的精神分析家,都感到前途暗淡。 (英文的最高级the most ,带有「虽然」「即使」的让步意味,翻译时要注意)

How, indeed, could speech exhaust the meaning of speech or–to put it
better with the Oxford logical positivists, the meaning of meaning*-if not
in the act that engenders it?

的确,言说如何能够穷尽言说的意义—或是用牛津逻辑实证论者的话,说得更贴切些,穷尽意义的意义。那难道不是就在产生言说的行动当中?

雄伯说:
言说如何能够穷尽言说的意义?这确实一件耐人寻味的事情,言说能够透彻吗?言说能够尽意吗?有时言说的行动本身就是一种意义,沉默也会是表示一种意义的行动。譬如,「你说这话是什么意思,挑衅还是不满?」「你怎么不回答?是默认?还是无言地抗议?」

Thus Goethe ‘s reversal of its presence at the origin of things . “In the beginning was the act,” is itself reversed in its turn: it was certainly the Word that was [hait] in the beginning, and we live in its creation, it is our mental [esprit] action that continues this creation by constantly renewing it. And we can only think back to this action by allowing ourselves to be driven ever further ahead by it.

因此,歌德在事情的源头,翻转了言说的存在。「开始的地方是行动」,这句话本身轮到自己被翻转。确实就是这个「文字」,以前就在开始的地方。我们生活在文字的创造当中。我们的精神的活动,以不断的更新文字,来继续这个创造。我们仅能让我们自己被这个文字不断地驱使向前,来回顾这个行动。

I shall try it myself only in the knowledge that this is its path way . .

由于知道这就是文字的途径,我自己也将尝试一下这个文字。

雄伯说:
「开始的地方是行动」,按照基督教的教义,上帝开始从空无中创造宇宙(ex-nihilo)是行动,然后命名万物是使用文字。那么有样学样,我们人的精神难道不能凭借文字,创造自己人生的意义,创造生命的价值?当人生走到穷途末路时,不一定只有自杀一途。自己若是语言的主人,翻转创造一下,不又是柳暗花明又一村?拉康自己见贤思齐,当然也跃跃欲试。

No one is supposed to be ignorant of the law; this formulation, provided by
the humor in our Code of Laws, nevertheless expresses the truth in which our
experience is grounded, and which our experience confirms.

没有人被认为是对法律无知。这是相当幽默的公式,从我们的司法的法典直接获得,仍然表达我们精神分析经验的基础,就是以这项真理作为依据。我们精神分析经验确认这项真理。

雄伯说:
什么叫「没有人被认为是对法律无知」?这个法律的定义当然是广义的,婴儿自从诞生,就学会要吃奶要尿尿排粪的不成文法。成长过程当然更是要遵守循规蹈矩的行为规范。这跟精神分析经验,又有什么关系呢?关系可大啦。君不见无论是家庭教养的规矩,校规的纪律,到社会的礼仪及法律,哪一样不是给人的自由精神及心灵,带来有形与无形的无法抹灭的创伤?

No man is actually ignorant of it, because the law of man has been the law of language since the first words of recognition presided over the first gifts–it having taken the detestable Danaoi, who came and fled by sea, for men to learn to fear deceptive words accompanying faithless gifts.

没有人对于法律会确实无知,因为自从最初的承认的文字掌控着最初的礼物以来,人的法律始终就是语言的法律。虽然还需要从海上来也从海上逃走的达那奥伊人,人们才学会害怕欺骗性的文字,伴随着不可信的礼物而来。

雄伯说:
达那奥伊人,指的是古希腊人。花言巧语的背后,是包藏祸心。人们岂能不懂语言的法则?

Up until then, these gifts, the act of giving them and the objects given, their transmutation into signs, and even their fabrication, were so closely intertwined with speech for the pacific Argonauts- uniting the islets of their community with the bonds [noeuds] of a symbolic commerce-that they were designated by its name.

直到当时,这些礼物,赠送礼物的行为及被给予的东西,它们被转换成为符号,甚至这些礼物的形成,都如此密切地跟言说相关,对于爱好和平的阿果诺人—他们使用符号象征的贸易的契约,将他们社区的那些小岛团结起来—这个符号象征贸易的名字就是指明他们。

雄伯说:
自古以来,礼物从来就不单纯就是礼物,礼物的交换绝对是伴随着文字意义的交换。你不能只要人家的礼物,而不遵守礼物背后文字意义的规范。

言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

December 12, 2011

The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis
言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

11.
Symbol and Language as Structure and Limit of the Psychoanalytic Field
符号与语言:精神分析领域的结构与限制
P 220

TYjv apxYjv O’tL Kat AaAW V!-lLV
-Gospel according to Saint John, 8.25
我一直在给你说的事
(约翰福音书:第八章,第二十五节)

Do crossword puzzles.
-Advice to a young psychoanalyst
做些纵横字谜。
(给一位年轻精神分析家的忠告)

雄伯说
拉康将这两个引文摆在这里,是颇费匠心的。圣约翰是以宣导耶稣福音为真理事件的使徒,「我一直在给你说的事」是耶稣的嘱咐,何其神圣而莊严。而给予年轻精神分析家的忠告「做些纵横字谜。」,则是有点戏弄的语气。把精神分析形容成猜测与推理遊戏。拉康凭借这两个引文,显示精神分析事业的崇高与玄妙奥秘。

To take up the thread of my argument again, let me repeat that it is by a reduction of a particular subject’s history that psychoanalysis touches on relational gestalts, which analysis extrapolates into regular development; but that neither genetic psychology nor differential psychology, on both of which analysis may shed light, is within its scope, because both require experimental and observational conditions that are related to those of analysis in name alone.

为了再一次从事我的论点的脉络,让我重复一遍:凭借着某一位特别主体的历史还原,精神分析才触及到关系性的格式塔完形心理学。精神分析将它演绎成为规律的发展。但是遗传心理学与差异心理学,虽然可能获的精神分析的启发,两者均不是在精神分析的范围之内。因为它们两者所要求的试验与观察,跟精神分析的试验与观察,仅是名称相关。

雄伯说
格式塔学派认为,人类对于任何视觉图像的认知,是一种经过知觉系统组织后的形态与轮廓,而非所有各自独立部分的总和。故谓之为「关系性」。

遗传心理学研究儿童的社会及精神分发展,而差异心理学则是研究个人与团体在行为上的差异。

所谓的主体的历史还原,指的是追踪主体的成长的经历与背景。

To go even further: What separates out from common experience (which
is confused with sense experience only by professional thinkers) as psychology in its crudest form-namely, the wonder that wells up, during some
momentary suspension of daily cares, at what pairs off human beings in a disparity that goes beyond that of the grotesques of Leonardo or Goya, or surprise at the resistance of the thickness characteristic of a person’s skin to the caress of a hand still moved by the thrill of discovery without yet being blunted by desire–this, one might say, is abolished in an experience that is averse to such caprices and recalcitrant to such mysteries.

更进一步探究:纯粹心理学,从日常经验,所突显出来的东西,(只有研究观念的专业学者,才将这种日常经验与理性经验混为一谈),诸如,在短暂地悬置日常的忧劳之时,对于人类的的差异区别,充满了惊奇。这种差异区别远超过李奥那多、达芬奇,或是戈雅的怪诞人物的的图画所描绘的差异区别,或是当好奇探索的兴奋,还没有被欲望弄得迟钝,你依旧会伸手抚摸一个人的皮肤,然后惊奇地发现,抗拒手的抚摸的皮肤竟是如此之厚。我们不妨说,这种惊奇之感,对于厌恶捉摸不定及抗拒神秘经验的人而言,会被排除。

A psychoanalysis normally proceeds to its end without revealing to us very
much of what is particular to our patient as regards his sensitivity to blows or
coloors, how quickly he grasps things with his hands or which parts of his body
sensitive, or his ability to retain things or invent, not to mention the vivacity of
his tastes.

精神分析通常会继续将这种惊奇之感继续穷究到底,但是却没有给予我们多少的显示,关于病人凭藉自己所获得的东西,诸如,他对于发生事件,或颜色,具有特别的敏感,他愿意理解事情,及他承认自己的肉身的脆弱,或是他具有怀念事情,或发明创造的能力,更不要说,他对于他自己的品赏能力的精致灵敏。

This paradox is only an apparent one and is not due to any personal failing;
if it can be justified by the negative conditions of analytic experience, it
simply presses us a little harder to examine that experience in terms of what is
positive in it.

这个矛盾现象仅是显而易见的现象,而且还不是因为任何属于个人的没有能力显示。假如以我们精神分析的负面不利条件,作为基础,来从事显示,都还可勉为自圆其说,那仅是会激励我们要更加努力,从精神分析的正面所具有的优点,来审视那种精神分析经验。

雄伯说:
这个矛盾现象paradox,指的是病人身上呈现那么多的能力及敏感迹象,而精神分析穷究到底,却显示不多。

For this paradox is not resolved by the efforts of certain people who–like
the philosophers Plato mocked for being so driven by their appetite for reality、
[riel] that they went about embracing trees–go so far as to take every
episode in which this reality, that slips away, rears its head for the lived reaction of which they prove so fond.

因为这个矛盾现象,并没有因为某些人的努力而获得解决。譬如,柏拉图嘲笑的那些哲学家,因为他们如此受到追求现实的渴望驱使,以致于他们去拥抱术木,甚至过分到接纳一切事情,在这些事情里,这个稍现即逝的现实,偶尔出现在他们如此喜爱的对于生活体验的反应。

For these are the very people who, making their objective what lies beyond language, react to analysis’ “Don’t touch” rule by a sort of obsession.

因为这些哲学家将超越语言以外的东西,当成是他们的目标。他们以一种择善固执的方式,来回应精神分析的规则:「请勿碰触」。

雄伯说:
精神分析为什么会有这条规则:「请勿碰触」?精神分析原则上是以主体的言说及语言作为探究的领域,也就是不去碰触「超越语言以外的东西」,例如,分析者作为客体的的身体。而这些强调身体才是现实界的哲学家,偏偏就是择善固执地以身体作为客体的研究,沾沾自喜。

If they keep going in that direction, I dare say the last word in transference reaction will be sniffing each other.

假如我们继续朝那个方向前进,我胆敢说,在移情的反应的最高潮,将是互相嗅闻。

雄伯说:
拉康以动物之间的「互相嗅闻」sniffing each other, or reciprocal sniffing,作为互相喜欢或爱慕的肢体动作,来形容分析者与分析家之间,发生彼此以身体作为客体,产生的的移情与反移情现象。

I am not exaggerating the least: nowadays, a young analyst-in-training, after two or three years of fruitless analysis, can actually hail the long-awaited advent of the object-relation in being smelled by his subject, and can reap as a result of it the dignus est intrare of our votes, the guarantors of his abilities.

我并不是在危言耸听:目前,一位正在接受培训的精神分析家,经过两三年的徒劳无益的精神分析后,就能够确实地庆贺,他期待已久的客体关系的时代的来临,因为他受到他的主体的嗅闻,并且由于这个嗅闻的结果,他能够获得我们同行投票认可他的「入门资格」,对于他具有精神分析能力的证明。

雄伯说:
「他受到他的主体的嗅闻」,指的是分析家在接受培训的过程,接受他的分析家或是督导的分析审视及认可,获得通过考试或审查的「精神分析家」执业资格证书,就沾沾自己地要从事实践执业。这形同把精神分析视是一种客体关系,让拉康颇不以为然。

If psychoanalysis can become a science (for it is not yet one) and if it is not
to degenerate in its technique (and perhaps this has already happened), we
must rediscover the meaning of its experience.

假如精神分析能够成为一门科学,(因为它目前尚未是一门科学),假如精神分析不想要在它的技术层面堕落 ,(或许,这个堕落已经发生),我们必须重新发现精神分析存在的意义。

雄伯说:
拉康真是语重心长啊!偏重技术层面的分析家能否三思?

To this end, we can do no better than return to Freud’s work. Claiming to
be an expert practitioner does not give an analyst the right to challenge Freud
III, because he does not understand him, in the name of a Freud II whom he
thinks he understands.

为了这个目标,我们最好回的佛洛伊德的研究著作。自称是精神分析的技术专家的执业者,并没有因此就具有充分的权威,以弗洛伊德第二代的名义自居,抨击弗洛伊德第三代。因为他对于弗洛伊德第三代并不了解,却自以为了解弗洛伊德的第二代。

And his very ignorance of Freud I is no excuse for considering the five great psychoanalyses as a series of case studies as badly chosen as they are written up, however marvelous he thinks it that the grain of truth hidden within them managed to escape.

他对于弗洛伊德第一代的无知,并无法用来当著藉口,就将这五个伟大的精神分析,当著是一系列的个案研究。因为这一系列的个案研究,被选得很糟糕,正如它们被写得很糟糕,无论他自己认为是多么地出众不凡。因为隐藏在这一系列个案研究里的些微真理,早已经销声匿迹。

雄伯说:
弗洛伊德的五个伟大的精神分析指的是:朵拉Dora,鼠人the Rat man,狼人 the Wolf man,苏瑞伯庭长Schreber,小汉斯Little Hans。分别是弗洛伊德对精神分析五种病症的分析主张,而不仅是个案研究。

有鉴于弗洛伊德死后,精神分析经过各家的继续研究,诠释及转述,会被弄得失去原来面目,拉康主张回归研读弗洛伊德著作,寻找理论的印证。拉康自己死后,情况也差不多。很多人理解的拉康,是通过齐泽克Zizek,芬克Fink,或亚伦、米勒Allain Miller 等人的转述,也难免都会有曲解。所以,我支持张涛与新雨的主张:回归研读拉康的研讨班!

We must thus take up Freud ‘s work again starting with the Traumdeutung
[The Interpretation of Dreams] to remind ourselves that a dream has the structure of a sentence or, rather, to keep to the letter of the work, of a rebus-that is, of a form of writing, of which children’s dreams are supposed to represent the primordial ideography, and which reproduces, in adults’ dreams, the simultaneously phonetic and symbolic use of signifying elements found in
the hieroglyphs of ancient Egypt and in the characters still used in China.

我们因此必须再一次从「梦的解析」开始,研讨弗洛伊德的著作,为了要提醒我们自己,梦具有一个句子的结构,或者说,为了要忠实于这个著作的文字,梦具有纵横字谜的结构,一种书写的形式的结构。孩童的梦被认为是代表这种结构的原生表意文字。在成人的梦里,这种结构复制能指化元素的语音与符号同时存在的用途。能指化的元素这两种用途,在古埃及的象形文字及中国依旧还在使用的文字,能够被找到。

雄伯说:
Ideography(表意文字) 的定义是A graphic character that indicates the meaning of a thing without indicating the sounds used to say it (图形的文字,指示著一件东西的意义,而没有指示用来说它的声音)。

梦具一个句子的结构,这个结构具有形与义,及形音义同时存在的功用。理论上来说,我们应该能够这些结构的分析来理解梦的义义。

But even this is no more than the deciphering of the instrument. What is
important is the version of the text, and that, Freud tells us, is given in the
telling of the dream–that is, in its rhetoric.

但是甚至这仅是工具的破译。重要的是,文本的解释,弗洛伊德告诉我们,在叙述梦的过程,换句话说,在梦的修饰过程,文本的解释被给出。

Ellipsis and pleonasm, hyperbaton or syllepsis, regression, repetition, apposition-these are the syntactical displacements; metaphor, catachresis, antonomasia, allegory, metonymy, and synecdoche-these are the semantic condensations; Freud teaches us to read in them the intentions-whether ostentatious or demonstrative, dissimulating or persuasive, retaliatory or seductive-with which the subject modulates his oneiric discourse.

省略与夸张,倒序词或按词,倒叙,重复,同位—这些都是句法的移位:借喻、谬词、换称、寓言、换喻、提喻,这些都是语义的压缩。通过这些,弗洛伊德教导我们阅读出它们的各种意图—无论是炫耀或是指示,掩饰还是说服,报复或是诱惑—主体使用这些来调整他的梦的暗示论述。

We know that he laid it down as a rule that the expression of a desire must
always be sought in a dream. But let us be sure we understand what he meant
by this.

我们知道,弗洛伊德订定这么一条规则:梦的表达必须总是在梦里寻找。但是让我们确定,我们了解他订定这条规则是什么意思。

If Freud accepts, as the reason for a dream that seems to run counter
to his thesis, the very desire to contradict him on the part of a subject whom
he had tried to convince of his theory, how could he fail to accept the same
reason for himself when the law he arrived at is supposed to have come to him
from other people?

弗洛伊德承认,他曾经尝试说服主体的这方接受他的理论,而这个主体却具有反驳他的这个欲望。假如弗洛伊德接受这个事实,当著是他做的梦会跟他的梦针锋相对的理由,那么他如何会无法接受相同的理由给自己,当他获得的法则被认为是从别人那里获得?

In short, nowhere does it appear more clearly that man’s desire finds its meaning in the other’s desire, not so much because the other holds the keys to the desired object, as because his first object(ive) is to be recognized by the other.

总之,这是再明显不过的事实:人的欲望在他者的欲望里找到意义。倒不是因为他者拥有所欲望的客体的答案,而是因为他的欲望的最初的客体,应该被他者承认。

雄伯说:
最后一段拉康说得铿锵有声:人的欲望在他者的欲望里找到意义。问题是谁是我的欲望的他者?他者对我的欲望又是什么?我要如何被他者承认?万一他者的欲望是要我的生命呢?我给得出吗?

Indeed, we all know from experience that from the moment an analysis
becomes engaged in the path of transference–and this is what indicates to us
that it has become so engaged–each of the patient’s dreams is to be interpreted as a provocation, a latent avowal or diversion, by its relation to the analytic discourse, and that as the analysis progresses, his dreams become ever more reduced to the function of elements in the dialogue taking place in the analysis.

的确,根据精神分析经验,我们都知道,自从分析变成专注于探究移情的途径—这就我们被指示的东西:分析变得如此专注—每个病人的梦应该被解释,作为一种挑衅,一种潜在的告白或逃避,因为梦跟精神分析的论述有密切关系。然后随着分析的进展,他的梦变得越来越是还原成为发生在分析室里对话的内容。

雄伯说:
分析跟移情有密切关系,而不单是病人的心理治疗而已。而且是分析者付费,分析家倾听。因此病人的梦应该被解释,这对分析家的知识,技术,及解释能力,当然是一种挑衅,病人对于分析家移情的隐藏的告白,分析家如何回应呢?总不能个个都跟她反移情吧?有时只好懂假装不懂,或者提前结束作为逃避。分析者的梦成为分析室的对话内容,那分析家自己难道就没有梦吗?他的梦要去向谁诉说?难道也是付费去找督导分析?人际之间本来应该具有的心灵交流,在现代社会,变成金钱关系。有钱付费,连你的梦都有人要听,要分析,要解释。无钱的话,肚子饿,都没有人理你。

32hsiung@pchome.com.tw
https://springhero.wordpress.com

言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

December 10, 2011

The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis
言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域
P 235
Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

Here it is a wall of language that blocks speech. and the precautions against
verbalism that are a theme of the discourse of “normal” men in our culture
merely serve to increase its thickness.

在此,这是一道语言的墙壁,在阻碍言说。在我们的文化里,「正常」的人论述的一个主题,就是要採取防范措施,避免冗词充斥。问题是,这种防范措施仅仅充当增添语言的墙壁的厚度。

雄伯说:

人的言说的沟通交流,通常是通过语言,但是语言却是阻碍沟通交流的一道墙壁?为什么?

甚至连防范措施本身都是增加阻碍的难度,那人要怎么沟通交流?

There might be some point in measuring its thickness by the statistically determined total pounds of printed paper, miles of record grooves, and hours of radio broadcasts that the said culture produces per capita in sectors A, B, and C of its domain. This would be a fine research topic for our cultural organizations, and it would be seen that the question of language does not remain entirely within the region of the brain in which its use is reflected in the individual

根据通俗文化在甲乙丙丁的各个地区,平均每年出版的纸张的磅数,录音带的长度,及无线广播的时数,它们总加起来的统计数目,来测量这种语言阻碍言说的墙壁的厚度,是具有某种指标性的。这对于我们的文化机构,将是很好的研究议题。我们将会看出,语言的问题并不完全是停留在脑的范围之内,在那里,语言的使用被反映在个人身上。

雄伯说:
通俗文化的汗牛充栋,显示资讯的交流是多么的丰富,但是人际的沟通会因此而变得更加充实吗?这是一个令人不得不质疑的问题。就像有线电视的节目有上百台之多,观众手执遥控器转来转去,却发现没有几台是值得用心去观看的。大众传播媒体越是兴盛蓬勃,人的心灵交流反而越是异化疏远。悲乎!

We are the hollow men
We are the stuffed men
Leaning together
Headpiece filled with straw. Alas!
(and so on)
我们是空心的人
我们是填塞的人
倾靠在一块
头脑填满稻草,唉呀!
(诸如其类)

雄伯说:
这首「空心的人」,是英国诗人艾略特T.S. Eliot 的诗开始的第一段。在此被拉康引用来比喻物质文明丰富的现代人,头脑所填塞的,却是一大堆无聊的废物资讯,心灵的内部却是无以言喻的空虚与苦闷。

The resemblance between this situation and the alienation of madness insofar
as the formulation given above is authentic, namely, that the mad subject
is spoken rather than speaking-is obviously related to the requirement,
presupposed by psychoanalysis, of true speech.

「空心人」的这个情境,跟疯狂的异化相当类似,若是以上所描绘的诠释是真诚的。换句说,疯狂的主体是被说,而不是自己说—换句话说,这种类似跟精神分析预先假设的,真实的言说的这个要件息息相关。

雄伯说:

为什么「疯狂的主体是被说,而不是自己说」?从社会的理性的观点来说是疯狂,从疯狂者本身而言,并无所谓疯狂不疯狂,主体仅是真实地言说自己内心无意识的话语吧了。

If this consequence, which takes the paradoxes that are constitutive of what I am saying here as far as they can go, were to be turned against the common sense of the psychoanalytic perspective, I would readily grant the pertinence of this objection, but only to find my own position confirmed in it–by a dialectical reversal for which there would be no shortage of authorized patrons, beginning with Hegel’s critique of “the philosophy of the skull,” and stopping only at Pascal’s resounding warning, at the dawn of the historical era of the “me” [ “moi”], formulated in the following terms: “Men are so necessarily mad that it would be another twist of madness not to be mad.”

就我正在言说的内容的结构的悖论而言,这个结果具有这些悖论。万一这个结果被翻转过来,用来质疑精神分析观点的合理性,我会欣然承认,这个翻转的质疑是一针见血,但是我会发现,在这个质疑里,我自己的立场被肯定,根据一种辩证法的倒转。这种辩证法的倒转的权威支持者,可说是多得不胜枚举。从黑格尔对于「头颅的哲学」的批判开始,到「受词的我」的历史时代开始,帕斯卡的引起共鸣的警告终止。这个「受词的我」,可用以下的术语来诠释:「人不得不疯狂,因为不疯狂也是另一种的疯狂。」

雄伯说:

黑格尔对于「头颅的哲学」批判,是因为骨相学创始者Franz Jesef Gall,主张人的精神可根据脑的头颅的形状结构来判断,而形成「精神即骨头」的说法,将人类最复杂的特征及情感,都简化成骨头,而贬抑人的精神及尊严的价值。

至于帕斯卡的对于「疯狂」的警告,Alan Sheridan 的英译本注释有不同的诠释:「人并没有非要疯狂不得,因为不疯狂,根据另外一种疯狂来看,才是疯狂。」Men are not so necessarily mad that it would be being mad by another kind of madness not to be mad.”

能不能请懂法文的朋友,帮助核对一下,哪一种说法,较能自圆其说?

雄伯说
在网络看到皮埃尔、玛里的「对面的疯狂」的介绍,可参照一下。

內容提要法國17世紀著名思想家帕斯卡說:“我們每個人都是瘋狂的,不瘋只是瘋狂的另一種表現。”瘋狂作爲一種存在的常態,在本書中通過文學著作和電影作品爲基本案例分析,得到深入淺出的揭示。
  在這本書裏,作者告訴我們:我們每個人都是瘋子。瘋狂是人類社會傳播最廣的一種疾病。撇開一些極端的例子不談,瘋狂與每個人的生活休戚相關。也許每個讀者都能從書中看到自己曾經有過的影子。

This is not to say, however, that our culture pursues its course in the shadows
outside of creative subjectivity. On the contrary, creative subjectivity has not ceased in its struggle to renew here the never-exhausted power of symbols
in the human exchange that brings them to light.

可是,这并不是说,我们的文化是在创造的主观性的外面的阴影里一路前进。相反地,创造的主观性在其奋斗过程,并没有在此终止更新永无止尽的符号的力量,来从事符号作为启蒙的人类的沟通交流。

To emphasize the small number of subjects who prop up this creation would
be to give in to a romantic perspective by comparing things that are not equivalent.

我们若是强调,会有少数的主体,支持这种创造的主观性,那等于是甘愿接受一种浪漫情怀的观点,因为我们比较的东西,彼此寡众悬殊。

The fact is that this subjectivity, regardless of the domain in which it
appears–mathematics, politics, religion, or even advertising–continues to
animate the movement of humanity as a whole.

事实上,这个创造的主观性继续在激励人类全体的进步,无论它出现在哪一个领域,无论是在数学,政治,宗教,或甚至广告。

Looking at it from another, probably no less illusory, angle would lead us to emphasize the opposite trait: the fact that its symbolic character has never been more manifest.

从另外一个角度,可能同样是幻觉的角度,来看待创造的主观性,会引导我们去强调这个相反的特征:事实上,创造的主观性具有的符号的特性,在此是最为明显。

The irony of revolutions is that they engender a power that is all the more absolute in its exercise, not because it is more anonymous, as people say, but because it is reduced more completely to the words that signify it.

革命的反讽是,在力量的运作过程,革命产生更加是绝对集权的力量,不是因为如人们所说的,这种力量是更加无以名之的力量,而是因为这个力量,更加彻底地被简化成为标示它的文字口号。

The strength of churches lies more than ever in the language they have been able to maintain–an instance, it should be noted, that Freud left aside in the article in which he sketches out for us what I call the “collective subjectivities” of the Church and the Army.

教会的力量,有始以来,更是在于他们能够维持他们的语言。有一个例子,我们应该注意到,弗洛伊德忽略的例子,在文章里,他跟我们描绘我所谓教会与军队的「集体的主观性」。

235
Psychoanalysis has played a role in the direction of modern subjectivity, and it cannot sustain this role without aligning it with the movement in modern science that elucidates it.

精神分析学曾经起了一个作用,朝向现代的创造主观性,但是它必须先跟让它出现的现代科学的运作协调一致时,它才能够维持这个作用。

This is the problem of the foundations that must assure our discipline its
place among the sciences: a problem of formalization, which, it must be admitted, has gotten off to a very bad start.

这就是作为基础条件的问题,这些基础条件要确定,我们精神分析论述的位置,是在这些科学分类的范围之内。这就是「学科正式化」的问题,我们必须承认,这种学科正式化,一开头就让我们很不顺畅。

雄伯说:
拉康对于「学科正式化」formalization,一向颇有微词。他强调精神分析学并非是心理学,也不是心理治疗学psychotherapy。他也很不愿意精神分析学被窄化成为就是一门科学,因为他是带着「无限的爱」endless love 的宗教情操作从事。

言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

December 10, 2011

The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis
言说与语言在精神分析的功用及领域

Jacques Lacan
雅克、拉康

233
The third paradox of the relation of language to speech is that of the sub
ject who loses his meaning in the objectifications of discourse. However metaphysical its definition may seem, we cannot ignore its presence in the fore
ground of our experience.

语言与言说的关系的第三个悖论,是主体在论述客观化时,丧失他的意义的悖论。无论这个悖论的定义多么形而上,我们无法忽略,这个悖论存在于我们精神分析经验的前面场景。

For this is the most profound alienation of the subject In our scientific civilization, and it is this alienation that we encounter first when the subject begins to talk to us about himself. In order to eliminate it entirely, analysis should thus be conducted until it has reached the endpoint
of wisdom.

因为在我们科学的文明,这是主体最深刻的异化。当主体开始跟我们谈论有关他自己,这是我们第一次遭遇的的这个异化。为了完全彻的消除这个异化,精神分析应该谨慎从事,以便获得最崇高的智慧。

雄伯说
何谓「主体在论述客观化时,丧失他的意义」?不知有没有读者能提供他的经验分享一下?

To provide an exemplary formulation of this, I can find no more relevant
terrain than the usage of everyday speech, pointing out that the expression “ce
suis1e ” [“it is I”] of Villon’s era has become inverted in the expression “c ‘est
moi” [“it’s me”] of modern man.

为了替这个悖论的举例诠释,我找到的最相关的平台是日常言说的使用。我不妨指出:在维荣的时代,人们表达「我在言说」,现在已经逆转为现代人的这个表达「人家说的是我」。

雄伯说:
英文的代名词有主格与受格之分。”It is I”与 “It is me”,截然分明。但是翻成中文时,却不好表达。褚孝泉译为「是为我」与「这是我」,我则译为「我在言说」与「人家说的是我」。不知是否有不同的诠释,或者从法文翻,是否不同,读者能否贡献一下?

维荣(Villion,1431—1463)是法国诗人。拉康以他生存的时代跟现代对比。大概当时的人讲话比较自负,说话将自己摆在第一,我们现代人讲话比较谦虚或自卑。这两种态度,孰优孰劣?大家表达一下?

The me [moil of modern man, as I have indicated elsewhere, has taken on
its form in the dialectical impasse of the beautiful soul who does not recognize
his very reason for being in the disorder he denounces in the world.

我在别处已经指出,现代人的这个受格的「我」,已经承担起它的形态,当这个美丽的灵魂,处于辩证法里的僵局。这个美丽的灵魂并没有体认出,在世界中,他为什么会处于他所抨击的混乱当中。

雄伯说:

「这个美丽的灵魂」,我想指的应该是作为受格的我的这个人。「承担起它的形态」,大概就是认份地接受这样被贬抑或自已谦抑的身份,不再那么自大。这个现代人,拉康用的是非人称代名词「它」it。应该是具有贬抑的意涵。

「辩证法的僵局」,我想指的是人成长个体化及谋求生存的历程,遭遇到不得不屈服于现实环境,又想要伸张自我作为人的尊严的两难。不知读者是否另有见解?

现代人抨击这个世界的混乱,但是不幸地,他自己却是置身于这个混乱当中。为什么?面对这个世界的混乱,人只有忍气吞声地概括承受,还是有尽一己力量,或大家团结力量,给予拨乱反正的空间?

233
But a way out of this impasse is offered to the subject where his discourse
rants and raves.
= But the subject is offered a way out of this impasse where his discourse rants and raves.

对于主体的论述在那里咆哮与抨击的这个僵局,有一个脱离的途径,被提供给主体。

雄伯说
where his discourse rants and raves 这个形容词子句,我想是修饰前面的this impasse,而不是the subject

Communication can be validly established for him in science ‘s collective undertaking and in the tasks science ordains in our universal civilization; this communication will be effective within the enormous objectification constituted by this science, and it will allow him to forget his subjectivity.

对于主体而言,科学的集体从事研究,与科学指定的工作,在我们全球化的文明里,沟通交流还是能够有效地被建立。在这个科学所形成的巨大客观化范围内,
这种沟通交流将会是有效的。这种沟通交流将会让主体能够忘记他的主观性。

雄伯说
拉康描述科学的研究是集体从事,每个研究者被集体研究指定某部分的工作。这样的研究工作是客观化地沟通,这使的主体的主观性变得比较次要,甚至会渐渐丧失他的主观性。这是大家愿意接受的趋势吗?会不会因此也导致作为人的主体性而跟着丧失?主体处在这样全球化的文明里,有没有另找出路或自力救济的空间?读者或参加拉康小组成员,能不能提供你们的看法?

He will make an effective contribution to the collective undertaking in his daily
work and will be able to occupy his leisure time with all the pleasures of a profuse culture which–providing everything from detective novels to historical
memoirs and from educational lectures to the orthopedics of group relations will give him the wherewithal to forget his own existence and his death, as well
as to misrecognize the particular meaning of his life in false communication.

对于这种的集体的从事研究,主体将会以他的日常工作,作为有效的贡献。然后,他以欣欣向荣的文化的各种娱乐,来消磨他的休闲时间。这种文化应有尽有,包括从侦探小说到历史回忆录,从教育论坛到团体关系的改善。这种文化给予主体所必需的媒介,用来忘记他自己的存在及他自己可能会遭遇的死亡,以及以虚假的沟通交流,来误认他的人生的这个特别的意义。

雄伯说:
拉康所描绘的这种现代人,特别是知识份子与中产阶级,我们真是感同身受!成长过程拼命地用功读书,好不容易获得高等教育文凭后,再凭借着学习而来的专业知识,拼命地挣钱谋生,仅剩的一点休闲时间,又被消磨在浮浅的通俗文化的娱乐当中。有朝一日,猛然觉醒过来,发现自己已经垂垂老矣!面对死亡的日渐逼近,不禁感喟一声:劳碌的一生,意义在哪里?

读者啊!这是你过去,现在,还是将来的写照?面对这样的僵局,你仅能无奈地束手就缚?还是有挣扎奋斗的空间?你还算是具有独立思考能力,具有生命敏锐度的生命主体吗?请说说看!

If the subject did not rediscover through regression–often taken as far back
as the mirror stage [stade]–the inside of a stadium [stade] in which his ego
contains his imaginary exploits, there would hardly be any assignable limits
to the credulity to which he would have to succumb in this situation. Which
is what makes our responsibility so formidable when, with the mythical
manipulations of our doctrine, we bring him yet another opportunity to
become alienated, in the decomposed trinity of the ego,* the superego,* and
the id,* for example.

假如主体没有通过倒退的方式重新发现一个「阶段的内部」—通常是倒退回童孩时的镜子阶段—在那个阶段的内部里,他的自我包括他具有想象力的伟大理想。他在这种情况当中,只有屈从于人云亦云的盲目跟从,几乎到达无可救药的程度。这就是为什么我们精神分析的责任是如此的重大。凭借我们精神分析信条的神秘运作,我们给予主体脱离成为异化的另类机会,譬如,在自我,超我,与本我的三位一体分崩离析之际。

雄伯说:
一个阶段的内部,指的是镜像阶段的内部,也就是拉康在「助成我的功能形成的镜子阶段」所描述的:婴孩观看镜子看到自己的影像,形成「理想的自我」ideal ego,再回头观看抱他/她的父母亲的眼睛,争取他们认同这就是「我」的影像,形成「自我的理想」ego ideal,然后回头观看自己内心,确认这是我自己的影像。

拉康的精神分析要求主体倒退回「镜子阶段」,视为是脱离人云亦云的盲目跟从的僵局的另类机会。倒退时会让主体观看自己在现实世界里的被形成的异化alienatiion,从而产生醒悟回转真实生命的可能。

自我,超我,与本我的三位一体trinity,原是弗洛伊德的术语,借用基督教的上帝圣父Father,圣灵Holy Spirit,与耶稣圣子Jesus的三位一体,比喻主体内涵的圆融一体。一旦三位一体分崩离析,意味着人的异化瓦解。

「凭借我们精神分析信条的神秘运作,我们给予主体脱离成为异化的另类机会。」
英译是 with the mythical manipulations of our doctrine, we bring him yet another opportunity to become alienated, 我翻译时,擅自填加「脱离」两子,觉的这样才能在上下文自圆其说。懂法文的朋友,能不能帮忙一下,核对法文,诠释一下。

除外,拉康替精神分析信条的运作,填加一个「神秘」的形容词,也是颇耐人寻味。似乎,拉康跟荣格一样,精神分析的发展逐渐走入神秘主义。这样的教义晦涩难懂,却又令人著迷,难道就是神秘主义的力量在作祟?