Archive for the ‘拉康可能不是类似’ Category

可能不是類似 120g

July 18, 2011

可能不是類似 120g

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

The woman is in a position, with respect to sexual enjoyment, to punctuate the
equivalence of enjoyment and the semblance. In this indeed lies the distance that man finds himself from her.


If I spoke about a moment of truth, it is because she is the one that the whole formation of man is designed to respond to, and now over and against everything, the
whole status of her semblance. It is certainly easier for a man to confront any enemy on the plain of rivalry than to confront the woman in so far as she is the support of this truth, of the semblance in the relationship of man to woman.


In truth, that the semblance is here enjoyment, for the man, is sufficiently indicated by the fact that enjoyment is semblance. It is because it [he?] is at the intersection of two enjoyments that man suffers in the highest way the malaise of this relationship that is
designated as sexual. As someone or other said, these pleasures that are called physical.


On the contrary, no one other than the woman, because it is in this that she is Other, no one other than the woman knows better what is disjunctive between enjoyment and the semblance, because she is the presence of this something that she knows, namely, that enjoyment and semblance, if they are equivalent, in a dimension of discourse,
are nonetheless distinct in the test, that the woman represents for man the truth, quite simply, namely, the only one that can give its place as such to the semblance.


It has to be said, everything we have been told as being the mainspring of the unconscious represents nothing but the horror of this truth. It is this, of course, that today I am trying, I am attempting to develop for you just as one makes Japanese flowers.


It is not particularly agreeable to listen to, because this is what is usually packaged under the register of the castration complex.


By means of which, in that case, with this label, one is at peace, one can leave it to one side, one has no longer anything else to say about it, except that it is there and that one makes a little genuflection to it from time to time.


But that the woman is the truth of man, that this old proverbial business, when it is a matter of understanding something, the cherchez la femme, to which people naturally give a police-style (35) interpretation, is something completely different, namely, that to grasp the truth of a man, one would do well to know who his wife is.


I mean his spouse in this instance, and why not? This is the only situation that can give a meaning to something that one day someone in my entourage called the pèse-personne. To weigh a person, there is nothing like weighing his wife. When the woman is at stake it is not the same thing! Because the woman has a very great liberty….


Louder! 大聲一點!
What‟s that? 什麼事?
We can‟t hear! 我們聽不見!
You can‟t hear? 你們聽不見嗎?
No. 聽不見!

I said: the woman has very great freedom with respect to the semblance! She will manage to give weight even to a man who has none. These are…these are truths, of course, that in the course of the centuries, have been perfectly well noted for a long time, but which are never said except from mouth to mouth, as I might say. And a
whole literature has been constructed, exists, it would be a matter of getting to know its breadth, naturally it is only of interest if one takes the best.


Someone, for example, that someone must take responsibility for one day, is Baltazar Gracian, who was an eminent Jesuit, who wrote some of the most intelligent things that could be written.


They are absolutely prodigiously intelligent in that everything that is involved,
namely, to establish what one could call the sanctity of man, he resumes in one word, resumes it in what?


His book on the Courtier, in a word, two points: to be a saint. It is the only point of western civilisation where the word saint has the same sense as in Chinese, Tchen-Tchen. Note this point, because, this reference, because all the same it is late, today, I am not going to introduce it today, I will give you this year some little references to the origins of Chinese thinking.


In any case, yes, I have noticed one thing, which is that perhaps I am a Lacanian because I formerly did Chinese. I mean by that that I notice that in re-reading things like that, that I had gone over, but mumbled through anyway like a like a simpleton, with donkeys ears, I notice in re-reading them now that, it is on all fours with what I am (36) telling you.


I don‟t know, I will give an example; in Mencius, which is one of the fundamental, canonical books of Chinese thought, there is a chap who is his disciple moreover, not him, but who begins to state things like the following: “What you do not find on the side of yen, this is discourse, do not look for on the side of your spirit”. I translate it for you as spirit, it is hsin, but that means, that by hsin which means heart, what he designated was well and truly the spirit, the Geist of Hegel.



可能不是類似 120f

July 17, 2011

可能不是類似 120f

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

It only happens by accident; and this is also an occasion to illuminate what is involved in what I have long differentiated from the passage à l‟acte, namely, acting out, to bring the semblance onto the stage, to put it on the stage, to make an example of it, this is what in this order is called acting out.


Or again, it can be called passion. But, I am forced to go quickly, you will notice that it is in this connection, and here as I have just illuminated things, that one can clearly highlight, clearly designate what I am always saying: it is that discourse is there in so
far as it allows the stake of what is involved in surplus enjoying, namely, I am giving it the full treatment, it is very precisely what is forbidden to sexual discourse.


There is no sexual act [or relationship?], I already expressed this on several occasions, I am tackling it here from a different angle. And this is made quite tangible in a massive way by the economy of analytic theory, namely, what Freud encountered, first of all so innocently, as I might say, that this is why it is a symptom, namely,
that he advances things to the point that they concern us on the plane of truth.


Who can fail to see that the myth of Oedipus is necessary to designate the real, because this indeed is what it pretends to do, and more exactly what the theoretician is reduced to, when he formulates this hyper-myth, the fact is that the real properly speaking is incarnated…by what?


By sexual enjoyment, as what? As impossible, since what the Oedipus complex designates, is the mythical being whose enjoyment – his enjoyment – is supposed to be that of what? Of all the women.


That such … a system is here in a way imposed by discourse itself, does this not provide the surest (33) cross-check in terms of what I state as theory, concerning the prevalence of discourse, concerning everything that is precisely involved in enjoyment?


What analytic theory articulates is something whose character, graspable as an object, is what I designate by the o-object, in so far as through a certain number of favourable organic contingencies – breast, excrement, look or voice – it comes to fill the place defined as that of surplus enjoying.


What does the theory state if not the following: something that tends, this relationship of surplus enjoying, a relationship in the name of which the function of the mother comes to such a predominant point in all our analytic observation, surplus enjoying is only normalized from a relationship that one establishes to sexual enjoyment, except
for the fact that this enjoyment, this sexual enjoyment is only formulated, is only articulated from the phallus in so far as the phallus is its signifier. Someone one day wrote that it is the signifier that designates the lack of signifier.


This is absurd, I never articulated such a thing. The phallus is very properly sexual
enjoyment in so far as it is co-ordinated, is solidary with a semblance.


This indeed is what happens and this is what it is rather strange to see all the analysts striving to turn their gaze from. Far from having insisted more and more on this turning point, this crisis of the phallic phase, they use every opportunity to elude the crisis, the truth, to which not one of these young speaking beings does not have to face up to, which is that there are some of them who do not have the phallus.


A double intrusion into lack, because there are those who do not have one, and then this truth was lacking up to the present.


Sexual identification does not consist in believing oneself to be a man or a woman, but in taking account of the fact that there are women, for the boy, and that there are men, for the girl.


And what is important, is not so much what they experience, it is a real situation,
if you allow me, the fact is that for men, the girl is the phallus. And this is what castrates them. That for women, the boy, is the same thing, the phallus and this is what castrates them also, because all they acquire is a penis and that spoils things.


Neither the boy nor the girl initially run risks except through the dramas that they unleash, they are the phallus for a moment. This is the real, the real of sexual
enjoyment in so far as it is detached as such, it is the phallus, in other words the Name of the Father, the identification of these two terms having in its time scandalised some [pious?] people.


(34) But there is something that is worth insisting on a little more. What is the fundamentally foundational part in this operation of the semblance, such as the one that we have just defined at the level of the relationship of man and woman, what is the place of the semblance, of the archaic semblance?


This assuredly is why it is worth the trouble to hold on a little more to the moment of what the woman represents. The woman is precisely in this relation, this relationship, for man, the moment of truth.


可能不是類似 120e

July 17, 2011

可能不是類似 120e

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

This has absolutely nothing to do with what is at stake, and has a name that can be perfectly well stated, called the relationships of man and woman. It is necessary to start from these two terms with their full sense, with what that involves in terms of relation. Because it is very strange when one sees the little timid attempts that people
make at thinking within the framework of a certain system which is that of the psychoanalytic institution.


They notice that not everything is regulated by the frolics that are presented as conflictual, and they would really like something different, the non-conflictual, that is
more restful. And so then they notice for example, that there is no need to wait for the phallic phase to distinguish a little girl from a little boy, they are not at all the same. They marvel at this!


And then – I am pointing it out to you because between now and when we meet
again, it will be only in the month of February, the second Wednesday of February, you will perhaps have the time to read something, because once I recommend a book, that improves its circulation, which is called Sex und Gender, and Gender, it is in
English, pardon me!


It is by someone called Stoller, very interesting to read, because this gives on an important subject, that of transsexuals, a certain number of very well observed cases with their familial correlates. You know perhaps that transsexualism consists
very precisely in a very forceful desire to cross over by every means to the other sex, even by having oneself operated on, when you are male.


There you are! With the co-ordinates, the observations that are there you will certainly learn a lot about this transsexualism because these are observations that are quite usable. You will also learn the (31) complete….the completely invalid character of the dialectical apparatus with which the author of this book treats these questions,
and which means that there arise quite directly the great difficulties he encounters in explaining his cases.


One of the most surprising things, is that the psychotic aspect of these cases is completely eluded by him, because he has no reference points, Lacanian foreclosure
never having reached his ears, which immediately and very easily explains the form of these cases. But what matter!


The important thing is this, that to speak about gender identity, which is nothing
other than what I have just expressed as this term, man and woman, it is clear that the question is posed of what emerges precociously from the fact that at adult age, it is the destiny of speaking beings to divide themselves up between men and women and that to understand the emphasis that is put on these things, on this agency, one has to take
into account that what defines the man, is his relationship with the woman, and inversely.


That nothing allows us in these definitions of man and woman, to abstract them from the complete speaking experience, up to and including in the institutions where they are expressed, namely marriage.


If one does not understand that in adult age, what is at stake is to be-a- man (de faire-homme), that this is what constitutes the relation to the other party, that it is in the light, at the start, starting from something that constitutes a fundamental relation, that there is questioned everything that in the behaviour of the child can be interpreted as being oriented towards this being-a-man, for example and that one of the essential correlates of this being-a-man, is to indicate to the girl that one is so, that we find ourselves, in a word, put right away into the dimension of the semblance.


But besides, everything bears witness to it, including references that are common, that one finds everywhere, to sexual display principally in the higher mammals, but also among … in a very great number of insights that we can have very, very far into the animal phylum, which shows the essential character, in the sexual relationship, of something that should be clearly limited to the level at which we touch it, that has nothing to do either with a cellular level, whether it is chromosomic or not, nor with an organic level, whether it is a matter or not of the ambiguity of one or other tract involving the gonad, namely, an ethological level which is properly one of a semblance.


It is in so far as the male, most often the male, the female is not absent from it because she is precisely the subject affected by this display, it is in so far as there is a display that something which is called sexual (32) copulation, no doubt, in its function, but which finds its status in particular elements of identity, it is certain that human sexual
behaviour easily finds its reference in this display as it is defined at the animal level.


It is certain that human sexual behaviour consists in a certain maintenance of this animal semblance. The only thing which differentiates it from it, is that this semblance is conveyed in a discourse, and that it is at this level of discourse, at this level of discourse alone, that it is carried towards, allow me, some effect that might not be a semblance.


That means that instead of having exquisite animal courtesy, it can happen, it can happen that a man rapes a woman, or inversely. At the limits of discourse, in so far as it strives to make the same semblance hold up, there is from time to time something real, this is what is called the passage à l‟acte, I see no better place to designate what that means. Note that in most cases, the passage à l‟acte is carefully avoided.



可能不是類似 120d

July 17, 2011

可能不是類似 120d

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

To illuminate what is involved in where I want to get to, I will go to what I want to mark today, about what is involved in analytic theory.


Because of this, I am not coming back, I am skipping over a function that is expressed in a certain way of speaking that I use here when I address you. Nevertheless, I cannot but draw your attention to the fact that, if the last time, I challenged you with a term which might have appeared impertinent, and rightly so, to many, of plus de jouir
pressé (a pressurised surplus enjoying) ought I then talk about some kind of pressurised….?


Nevertheless this has a meaning, a meaning which is one from which I preserve my discourse, that in any case has not the character of what Freud designated as the discourse of the leader. It is indeed at the level of discourse, at the beginning of the
20‟s, that Freud articulated in Massenpsychologie und Ichanalyse something which curiously was found to be at the source of the Nazi phenomenon.


Consult the schema that he gives in this article, at the (29) end of the chapter on Identification; you will see indicated there almost open to view the relations between capital I and small o.


Truly, the schema seems to be designed for the Lacanian signs to be imposed on it.
That which, in a discourse, is addressed to the Other as a Thou, gives rise to an identification to something that one can call the human idol.


If I spoke the last time about red blood as being the blood that is most useless to propel against the semblance, it is indeed because, as you have seen, one cannot advance and overthrow the idol without immediately afterwards taking its place, and we know that this is what has happened to a certain type of martyr! It is indeed in the
measure that something in every discourse that appeals to the Thou provokes a camouflaged, secret identification, which is only one to this enigmatic object that may seem to be nothing, the tiny little surplus enjoying of Hitler, that went no further perhaps than his moustache, this was enough to crystallise people who….who had nothing mystical about them!


Who were the most committed to the process of the discourse of the capitalist, with what that involves in terms of a questioning of surplus enjoying in its form of surplus


It was a matter of seeing whether, at a certain level, one would still have one‟s little bit (son petit bout) and indeed this was enough to provoke this effect of identification.


It is amusing simply that this should have taken the form of an idealisation of the race, namely, of the thing which on that occasion was least involved. But one can find
where this character of fiction comes from, one can find it.


What must be simply said, is that there is no need for this ideology for a racism to be constituted, and that all that is needed is a surplus enjoying that recognises itself as such. And that whoever is a little bit interested in what may happen would do well to tell himself that every form of racism, in so far as a surplus enjoying is very well
capable of supporting it, is now what is on the agenda. This is what is in store for us in the years to come.


You will understand why better, when I tell you what the theory, the authentic exercise of analytic theory, allows us to formulate as regards what is involved in surplus enjoying.


People imagine, people imagine they are saying something when they say that what Freud has contributed, is the underlay of sexuality in everything involved in
discourse. People say that when they have been touched a little by what I state about the importance of discourse to define the unconscious. And then when they do not pay attention to the fact that I have not yet for my part, tackled what is involved in this term sexuality, sexual relationship.


It is certainly strange – it is only strange from one point of view, the point of view of the charlatanism (30) that presides over every therapeutic action in our society – it is strange that people have not noticed the world there is between this term sexuality, wherever it is beginning, where it is only beginning, to take on a biological substance – and I would point out to you that, if there is somewhere that one can begin to notice the sense that this has, it is rather on the side of bacteria – of the world that there is between that and what is involved concerning what Freud states about the relations that the unconscious reveals.


Whatever stumblings he himself may have succumbed to in this order, what Freud reveals about the functioning of the unconscious has nothing biological about it.


This only has the right to be called sexuality because of what is called the sexual relationship. It is completely legitimate, moreover, until the moment when one makes use of sexuality to designate something else, namely, what is studied in biology, namely, the chromosome and its combination XY or XX, or XX, XY.

只有這個無意識層次,才有權利被稱為「性」,因為所謂的「性關係」。而且,這是完全可以自圓其說的,直到我們利用性來指明別的東西。也就是,生物學研究的東西。換句話說,遺傳因數及其XY or XX, or XX, XY.等因數的組合。


可能不是類似 120c

July 17, 2011

可能不是類似 120c

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

Two young sages, whom I greet if they are here again today, I hope they will not be offended that they were overheard in passing, gravely nodding their heads, it appears, asking one another: „Is he a dangerous idealist?‟ Am I a dangerous idealist? That seems to me to be completely beside the point!


Because I began – and with what emphasis, I would say that I said the opposite of what exactly I wanted to say – by putting the emphasis on the fact that discourse is an artefact. What I am initiating with that, is exactly the contrary, because the semblance is the contrary of an artefact.


As I pointed out, semblances flourish in (27) nature. The question, once knowledge is no longer at stake, once we no longer believes that it is along the path of perception,
from which we are supposed to extract some quintessence or other, that we know something, but by means of an apparatus which is discourse, there is no longer any question of the idea.


The first time, moreover, that the idea made its appearance, it was a little better positioned than after the exploits of Bishop Berkeley. It was Plato who was involved, and he asked himself where was the real of what was called a horse.


His idea of the idea, was the importance of this naming. In this multiple and transitory thing which was moreover perfectly obscure in his epoch more than in ours, is not the whole reality of a horse in this idea in so far as that means the signifier, a horse.


You must not believe that because Aristotle put the emphasis of reality on the individual, that he got any further. The individual means exactly what one cannot say.


And precisely at a certain point, if Aristotle had not been the marvelous logician that he was, who took the unique step, the decisive step, thanks to which we have a reference point about what an articulated sequence of signifiers is, one could say that in his way of highlighting what ousia is, in other words the real, he behaves like a mystic.


What is proper to ousia, he says it himself, is that it cannot in any way be attributed, it is not sayable. What is not sayable, is precisely what is mystical. Only it appears, he is not of that opinion, but he leaves the place to the mystic. It is obvious that the solution to the question of the idea could not come to Plato. It is from the angle of the function
and of the variable that all of that finds its solution.


If it is clear that if there is something that I am, it is not a nominalist, I mean that I do not start from the fact that the name is something that is stuck like that onto the real.


And you have to choose; if one is a nominalist, one must completely renounce dialectical materialism, so that in short the nominalist tradition, which is properly speaking the only danger of idealism that can be put forward here in a discourse
like mine, is very obviously rejected.


It is not a matter of being realist in the sense that people were in the Middle Ages, the realism of universals. But it is a matter of designating, of highlighting the fact that our discourse, our scientific discourse, only discovers the real because of the fact that it depends on the function of the semblance.


The effects of what I call the algebraic articulation of the semblance and as such it is only letters that are at stake, is the only system by (28) means of which we designate what is real; what is real, is what makes a hole in this semblance. In this articulated semblance which is scientific discourse, scientific discourse progresses without even
asking itself any more whether or not it is semblance.


It is simply a question of whether its network, its net, its lattice, as they say, makes the holes appear in the right place. The only reference is the impossible at which these deductions culminate; this impossible, is the real.


The apparatus of discourse in so far as it is what, in its rigor, encounters the limits of its consistency – it is with this that we aim, in physics, at something that is real.


What is important for us in what concerns us, namely, the field of truth – and why it is the field of truth, only qualified as such, that concerns us, I am going to try to articulate today – in what concerns us, we are dealing with something that takes into account that it differs from this position of the real in physics, this something that
resists, that is not permeable to every meaning, which is a consequence of our discourse, and which is called phantasy.


And what has to be tested are its limits, its structure, the function, the relationship in a discourse of one of the terms, of the o, the surplus enjoying, the $ of the subject, or precisely the point which is broken (rompu) in the discourse of the master.


This is what we have to test in its functioning, when in the completely opposite position, that in which the o occupies this place, it is the subject that is opposite, this
place where it is questioned, it is here that the phantasy must take on its status, its status which is defined by the very part of impossibility that there is in analytic questioning.



可能不是類似 120b

July 16, 2011

可能不是類似 120b

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

I am not going to go through, even rapidly, an account of what is involved, even though of course I will have to come back to it and to show what is involved in it.


I pointed out that you could refer in the answers described as Radiophonie in the last Scilicet, to what is involved in them, in what there consists this function of discourse as I announced it last year.


It is supported by four privileged places among which one precisely remained unnamed, and precisely the one which, gives the title of each of these discourses, by the function of its occupant.


It is when the master signifier is at a certain place that I speak about the discourse of the Master; when a certain knowledge also occupies it, I speak of that of the University; when the subject in its division, fundamental for the unconscious, is in place there, I speak about the discourse of the Hysteric, and finally when surplus enjoying occupies it, I speak about the discourse of the Analyst.


This place, which in a way is sensitive, that of the top left, for those who were there and who still remember, this place which is here occupied in the discourse of the Master by the signifier as master, S1, this place still not designated, I am designating by its name, by the name that it deserves, it is very precisely the place of the semblance.

這個位置,在某方面是很敏感,左上方的位置,對於那些在那裏的人,那些依舊還記得的人,這個位置,在主人的真理論述裏,在此由能指所佔據,作為主人,S1 這個位置依舊沒有被指明,我是根據它的名字指明,根據它應得的名字,這確實是類似物的位置。

This shows, after what I stated the last time, the degree to which the signifier, as I
might say, is here at its place.


Hence the success of the discourse of the Master, the success all the same that makes it worth while to pay attention to it for an instant, because after all, who can believe that any master ever ruled by force?


Especially at the start, because after all, as Hegel reminds us in this admirable sleight of hand, one man is worth another. And if the discourse of the Master gives the basis, the structure, the strong point around which several civilisations are organised, it is indeed because its mainspring is all the same of a different order to violence.


This does not mean that we are in any way sure that, in these facts, which it must be said we can only articulate with the most extreme caution, that once we pinpoint them by some term or other, as primitive, pre-logical, archaic, and anything whatsoever of whatever order it may be, archaic, archè, are the beginning, why?


And why would this not also be a waste product, these primitive societies? But
nothing settles it. What is certain, is that they show us that it is not necessary for things to be established in function of the discourse of the Master; first of all the mytho-ritual configuration, which is the best way of pinpointing them, does not necessarily imply the (26) articulation of the discourse of the Master.


Nevertheless, it must be said, it is a certain form of alibi to interest ourselves so much in what is not the discourse of the Master, in most cases it is a way of confusing things completely; while you busy yourself with that, you are not looking after something else.


And nevertheless the discourse of the Master is an essential articulation, and the way I expressed it ought to be something that some people, I am not saying everyone, some people, should try to get their heads around.


Because what is at stake, and this I also clearly stressed the last time, what is at stake, anything new that can happen and is called, I have always said it, insisting on the tempering that should be applied to it, because what is called revolutionary can only consist in a change, in a displacement of discourse, namely, of each of these places. I would like in a way, to give an image – but you know the sort of cretinising that an image can lead to – to represent by what one might call four bowls, each of which would have its name, the way that into these bowls there slide a certain number of terms, specifically what I have distinguished by S1, S2 in so far as, at the point that we are at, S2 constitutes a certain body of knowledge, the o, in so far as it is directly a consequence of the discourse of the master, the $ which in the discourse of the master, occupies this place which is a place that we are going to talk about today, that for its part I have already named, which is that of the truth.

因為岌岌可危的,上一次我也清楚地強調這一點。岌岌可危的,可能發生的任何新的事情,我總是說到它,堅持應該用緩和的語氣說,因為所謂的革命性,只能在於改變,處於真理論述的代替位置。換句話說,每一個位置,我想要以某種方式給予一個意象—但是你們知道意象會導致這種的矮化—我用所謂的四個「劇場」來代表它們。每一個劇場都有它的名稱,將會有某些的術語被放進這些劇場裏,明確地說,就是我用第一生命主體S1,及第二生命主體 S2 來作為區別。在我們所在地方,第二生命主體組成某種知識的體系,這個小客體o,因為它直接是主人論述的一種結果。這個被禁止的生命主體$,在主人的真理論述裏,佔據這個位置。這就是我們今天要談論的位置。就它本身而言,我已經命名,那就是真理的位置。

Truth is not the contrary of semblance, the truth as I might say is this dimension, or this demansion, if you will allow me to make up a new word, to designate these bowls, this demansion which is strictly correlative to that of the semblance.


This demansion, I told you that the latter, that of the semblance, supports it. So then, something is indicated all the same about what this semblance is getting at. It is
clear that there is a question that is a little inexact, I mean the one that came back to me along quite indirect paths.



可能不是類似 120a

July 16, 2011

可能不是類似 120a

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971

If I was looking through these sheets, it was not to assure myself, but to reassure myself about what I said the last time, the text of which I do not have at the moment. I have just been complaining about it.


Remarks of this kind come back to me – I do not have to go to any trouble for that – it happens that some people were asking themselves at certain points of my discourse the last time as they express it, what I was getting at (où je veux en venir). Other remarks came to me from elsewhere, that it is very hard to hear at the back of the room. I will try – I was absolutely unaware of it the last time, I thought that the acoustics were just as good as in the previous amphitheatre – if you don‟t mind giving me a sign when my voice lowers despite myself, I will try to do my best.


So then, at certain turning points, people may have asked themselves the last time what I was getting at. In truth, this sort of question seems to me to be too premature to be significant, namely, that it is people who are far from being insignificant, people who are very well informed from whom this remark was reported, and sometimes quite calmly by themselves.


It would perhaps have a greater implication, given precisely what I put forward the last time, if they were to ask where I am starting from or even where I want you to start from.


Already, this has two meanings, this perhaps means, to go somewhere, and again this may also mean, to get a move on from where you are. This „what I am getting at‟ is in any case a very good example of what I put forward about the desire of the Other: che vuoi? What does he want? Obviously when you can say it right away, you are much more comfortable.


This is an opportunity to note the factor of inertia that is constituted by this che vuoi, at least when (24) you can answer it. This indeed is why in analysis one strives to
leave this question in suspense.


Nevertheless, I clearly specified the last time that here I am not in the position of the analyst. So that in short, I believe I am obliged to answer this question, and in saying this I ought to give the reason why I have spoken.


I spoke about the semblance and I said something that is not common knowledge; first of all, I insisted, I laid stress on the fact that the semblance that presents itself as what it is, is the primary function of truth.


There is a certain I speak that brings this about, and it is not superfluous to recall it in order to give to this truth, which gives rise to so many logical difficulties, its correct


This is all the more important to recall in that, if there is in Freud, to designate like that a certain tone, if there is in Freud something revolutionary – I already warned about the excessive use of this word – but it is certain that, if there was a moment when Freud was revolutionary, it is in the measure that he put in the foreground a
function which is also the one, it is the only common element moreover, which is also this element that Marx contributed, namely, to consider a certain number of facts as symptoms.


The dimension of the symptom is that it speaks, it speaks even to those who do not
know how to hear; it does not say everything, even to those who know it. This promotion of the symptom, is the turning point that we are living through in a certain register which, let us say, was pursued, rumbling quietly throughout the centuries, around the theme of knowledge.


It cannot all the same be said that from the point of view of knowledge we are completely lacking, and we clearly sense what is outmoded in the theory of knowledge when it is a matter of explaining the order of a process constituted by the formulations of science. Physical science gives models of it today.


The fact that we are, in parallel to this revolution of science, in a position that one can
qualify as being on the path of a certain truth, is what shows a certain heterogeneity of status between the two registers. Except for the fact that, in my teaching, and only there, an attempt is made to show their coherence, which is not obvious, or which is not obvious for those who, in this practice of analysis, go on about the semblance. This is what I will try to articulate today.


I said a second thing. The semblance is not only locatable, essential, to designate the primary function of truth, it is impossible without this reference to qualify what is involved in discourse.


What defines discourse, this at least is the way I tried last year to give some weight
(25) to this term by defining four of them whose titles I was only able to recall last time, to hastily recall, at which point certain people found that they were out of their depth. What is to be done?



可能不是類似 609i

July 16, 2011

可能不是類似 609i

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 9: Wednesday 9 June 1971

It was even explicitly in order not to run the risk of attacking the aforesaid father that he exiled himself. What the myth is suggestive of, is to show the place that the generating father has at an epoch in which Freud underlines that, just like our own, this father is problematic.


Because, moreover, Oedipus would be absolved, if he were not of royal blood, namely, if Oedipus did not have to function as the phallus, the phallus of his people, and not of his mother.


And that for a time, what is most surprising is that it worked, namely, that the Thebans were so implicated that it is from Jocasta that the turn-about had to come. Is it because of what she knew or of what she was unaware of?


What is there in common in any case with the murder of the second myth which we are led to believe is one of revolt, of need, that in truth is unthinkable, indeed unthought, except as proceeding from a conspiracy.


It is obvious that all I have done there is to approach the terrain on which, in any case, let us say, a conspiracy also prevented me from ridding myself of my problem, namely, in Moses and monotheism, namely, from the point at which everything that Freud articulated becomes truly significant. I cannot even indicate to you what is
necessary to bring you back to Freud.


But I can say that in revealing to us here his contribution to the analytic discourse, he proceeds no less from neurosis than from what he picked up from the hysteric in
the form of the Oedipus complex. It is curious that I have had to wait until now in order that such an assertion, namely that Totem and taboo is a neurotic product, for me to be able to put it forward, which is absolutely indisputable, without for all that my questioning in any (158) way the truth of the construction.


That is even how it bears witness to the truth. One does not psychoanalyse an oeuvre, and that of Freud less than any other, is that not so? One criticises it, and far from a neurosis making its solidity suspect, it is the very thing that solders it in this case. It is to the testimony that the obessional contributes about his structure, to the aspect of the sexual relationship that proves to be impossible to formulate in discourse, that we owe
the myth of Freud.


I will stop there for today. The next time I will give to this its exact import, because I would not like there to be any misunderstanding.


The fact of articulating in a certain way what the contribution of Freud is to the fundamental myth of psychoanalysis, I underline, is not at all rendered suspect because its origin is underlined in this way. Quite the contrary, it is simply a matter of knowing where it can lead us



可能不是類似 609h

July 16, 2011

可能不是類似 609h

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 9: Wednesday 9 June 1971

A step towards seriousness could, it seems to me, be taken here by engaging with the man, and you will have noted that up to this point of my presentation I have given him the more modest part.


Even though it is one of them, your servant, who forms part here of this beautiful world. It seems to me impossible — it is not for nothing that I come up against this word from the start – not to grasp the split that separates the Oedipus myth from Totem and taboo.


I am showing my hand right away. The first is dictated to Freud by the dissatisfaction
of the hysteric, the second by his own impasses. There is no trace in the second myth of the little boy, or of the mother, or of the tragic passage from the father to the son – passage of what, if not the phallus – of what is the very stuff of the first myth. Here, Totem and taboo, the father enjoys, a term that is veiled in the first myth by power.


The father enjoys all the women until his sons slay him, which they only set about after a prior agreement, according to which (156) no one would succeed to him in his gluttony for enjoyment.


The term is required by what comes in return, because the sons devour him, each one necessarily only having a part of him and by this very fact the whole making a communion. It is starting from that that there is produced the social contract.


No one will touch, not the mother here, it is clearly specified, in Moses and monotheism, in Freud‟s own writing, that among the sons only the younger ones are
still listed in the harem. So then it is no longer the mothers but the wives of the father, as such, who are concerned in the prohibition.


The mother only comes into play precisely for her babies which are the grain of heroes. But if this is how there is constructed, according to Freud, the origin of law, it is not the law described as that of maternal incest, which is nevertheless given as inaugural in psychoanalysis.


While in fact, this is a remark, apart from a certain law of Manou which punished it by a real castration, you will go to the west with your balls in your hand, etc., this law of maternal incest is everywhere more or less elided. I am not at all disputing here the
prophylactic grounds for the analytic prohibition. I am underlining that at the level at which Freud articulates something about it, Totem and taboo, and God knows he stuck by it, he does not justify this prohibition mythically.


The strangeness begins with the fact that neither Freud, nor moreover any other person either, seems to have noticed this.


I stride on. Enjoyment is promoted by Freud to the rank of an absolute which brings back to the care of the man, I am talking about Totem and taboo, of the original man – and this is all admitted – of the Father of the primitive horde, it is simple to recognise here the phallus, the totality of what „femininely‟ can be subject to enjoyment.


This enjoyment, I have just noted, remains veiled in the royal couple of the Oedipus complex, but it is not only from the first myth that it is absent.


The royal couple is not even put in question until something which is stated in the drama, that they are the guarantors of the enjoyment of the people, which moreover agrees with what we know about all royalties, whether ancient or modern. And the castration of Oedipus has no other end than to end the Theban plague.


Namely, to render to the people the enjoyment of which others are going to be
the guarantors, which of course, given where it has started from, will not happen without some bitter adventures being experienced by all.


13.1.71 I 186
Must I underline that the key function of myth is strictly opposed in the two? The law first of all in the first, so primordial that it exercises its retortions even when the guilty have only contravened it innocently, and it is from the law that the profusion of enjoyment has (157) emerged. In the second, enjoyment at the origin, then law, whose correlates with perversion you will spare me having to underline.


Since it is, when all is said and done, with the promotion, sufficiently insisted on, of sacred cannibalism, that all the women are prohibited, in principle, for the community of males, which has been transcended as such in this communion.


This indeed is the sense of the other primordial law, otherwise, what grounds it? Eteocles and Polynices are there, I think, to show that there are other resources. It
is true that they proceed from the genealogy of desire.


It must be that the murder of the father has constituted – for whom, for Freud, for his
readers? – such a supreme fascination, that no one has ever even dreamt of underlining that in the first myth this murder happens without the knowledge of the murderer, who not only does not recognise that he is attacking the father, but who cannot recognize him because he has another, who, from all antiquity is his father,
since he adopted him.



可能不是類似 609f

July 14, 2011

可能不是類似 609f

On a Discourse that might not be a semblance


Jacques Lacan
雅克 拉康

Seminar 9: Wednesday 9 June 1971

Anyway the whole pantaloonery of the first great formal logic, is absolutely essentially linked to the idea that Aristotle had of the woman. This does not prevent,
precisely, that the only universal formula that he did not allow himself to pronounce was all women (toutes les femmes).


There is no trace of it. Open the Prior Analytics. No more than he, even though
his successors rushed into it headfirst, would have allowed himself to write this incredible enormity, on which formal logic has lived ever since, all men are mortal.


Which is something that completely prejudges the future fate of humanity. All men are mortal, that means that all men, because what is at stake is something that is stated in extension, all men qua all, are destined to death, that is that the human race is going to be extinguished, which to say the least is rather daring.


That x requires the passage to a being, to an every woman (toute femme) that an individual as sensitive as Aristotle never in fact wrote this every woman, is precisely what allows it to be advanced that every woman is the statement by which there is
decided the hysteric as subject, and that it is for this reason that a woman is solidary with a papludun which properly lodges her in this logic of the successor that Peano gave us as a model. The hysteric is not a woman (une femme).


It is a matter of knowing whether psychoanalysis as I define it gives access to a woman or whether, for a woman to come to pass, is the business of doxa. Namely, if it is like virtue, to listen to the people who were dialoguing in Meno – you remember Meno, but no (mais non) – like this virtue, and this is what gives its value, its meaning, to this dialogue, this virtue is what cannot be taught.

問題是要知道,我所定義的精神分析學是否接近「一個女人」,或是讓「一個女人」成為真實,是「共同信仰」的事情。換句話說,假如它像品德,傾聽在「柏拉圖對話錄」對話的那些人—你們記得是「Meno」,而不是「mais non」–就像品德。這是它被給予這個對話錄的它的價值,它的意義的原因。這個品德只能體會,無法教導。

This can be expressed, that what can be about her, about a woman, as I have defined the step, be known in the unconscious, i.e., in an articulated fashion. Because after all – I will stop there – someone who precisely puts it up on the stage again, as if this were a question worthy of absorbing great deal of activity – it is a book that is very
well done – a great amount of activity on the part of the analyst, as if it were really what an analyst should specialise in, someone accords me the merit, in a note, of having introduced the distinction between truth and knowledge.


Outrageous! Outrageous! I have just been talking to you about Meno, have I not? Naturally, he never read it, he only reads theatre. Anyway it was with Meno that I began to open up the first phases of a crisis that a certain analytic system has
confronted me with.


The distinction between truth and knowledge, the opposition between episteme and the true doxa, the one that can ground virtue, you will find written, quite crudely, in Meno.


What I highlighted, is precisely the contrary, it is their junction. Namely, that there, there where they are knotted together in appearance, in a particular circle, the knowledge that is at stake in the unconscious is the one that slides, that is prolonged, which at every instant proves to be a knowledge of the truth.


And this is where just now I am putting the question. Does this knowledge effectively allow us to make progress with respect to Meno? Namely, is this truth, in so far as it is incarnated in the hysteric effectively capable of a subtle enough sliding to be the
introduction to a woman.


I know well, the question has risen by a notch since I proved that there is something that can be articulated in language which cannot for all that be articulated in words, and that it is on that simply that desire is based. It is nevertheless easy to settle,
it is precisely because what is at stake is desire, in so far as it puts the emphasis on the invariance of the unknown, of the unknown which is on the left (à gauche), the one that is only produced under the heading of a Verneinung.


It is precisely because it puts the emphasis on the invariance of the unknown, that obviously what belongs to desire cannot be inscribed by analysis in any function of a variable.


This is the stumbling block by which there is separated as such the desire of the hysteric, from what nevertheless is produced, and allows innumerable women to function as such, namely, by playing the function of the papludun of their being for all their situational variations.


(154) The hysteric here plays the role of functional schema, if you know what that means. This is the import of my formula of desire described as unsatisfied. It can be deduced from this that the hysteric is situated by introducing the papludun by which each one of the women is established along the path of it is not of every woman that it
can be said that she is a function of the phallus (ce n‟est pas de toute femme que se peut dire qu‟elle soit fonction du phallus).